

ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

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Abstract: *The sole aim of this paper is to examine the electoral system used in LGs ordinances issued by the military rulers in Pakistan during different eras. Mainly it covers three major Local Government Ordinances (LGOs) i.e., Basic Democracies (BDs) 1959 issued by General Ayub Khan, Local Self Government (LSG) 1979 issued by General Zia-ul-Haq and Devolution Plan (DP) 2000 issued by General Pervez Musharraf. The colonial system of LGs continued in Post-Colonial Pakistan and a few reforms were seen in the basic electoral structure. Ayub and Zia both used indirect and non-party based election in LGs to manipulate the system in their favor. A visible change occurred during Musharraf regime with his introduced reforms in LGs but basic electoral structure of non-partisan with few others colonial legacies remained intact. This system still needs continuity along with further reforms to run on permanent bases in Pakistan.*

Keywords: Local governments, basic democracies, Devolution Plan 2000, union council, tehsil council, district council

Introduction

LGs are the modern mode of governance of today. It is a method of political and economic development at grass root level. This paper scrutinizes all of three LGs models under different governments while using top down model of governance. To examine these systems in Pakistan, it is necessary to examine the structure and functions of pre and immediate post-colonial LGs and then the systems of LGs installed by the military rulers as well. However these ordinances came by different rulers with a great change in time and space with changing demographics and socio-political scenario within society. Each of these reforms contributed to institutional redesigning which planned for more accumulation of political power into center (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005, 381) while LG is meant to transfer political, executive and financial powers (Anjum, 2011, 847). The system of LGs devised by General Zia-ul-Haq looks different than the system of his predecessor, General Ayub Khan, but if analyzed in detail it is all the same. The difference is in the motives and the timing of both the chief martial law administrators. Both have different motives but common tool to play with. LGs system of General Ayub Khan suited best to his requirement of strengthening the one man rule through presidential system where political participation is totally negated whereas the timing of the General Zia regime is a bit different. The emergence of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in post General Ayub period and dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 were the events which totally changed the political course of the country. The third military rule came by General Pervez Musharraf also allowed politics only at grass root like his predecessors. Overall, the introduced LGs systems and reforms proved intangible and unresponsive to the politics of the country.

Objectives of the Research

This study is an outline of the devolution of power including its origin, functions and structure in Pakistan. To keep this study easy, practicable, focused and time bound was the real test. This study did not aim to answer every possible question on devolution and LGs system in Pakistan. It is an explanatory study of what is going on and regarding its substance, imposition and structure it focused on the main devolution models (Basic Democracies of 1959 (BDs), Local Self Government 1979 (LSG) and Devolution Plan 2000) while electoral process is the main theme. The acknowledgment of the political implication of the devolution of power plan in the background of parallel exercises (Basic Democracy System and Local Self Government) commenced in the past and the paradigm shift of LGs in the era of General Pervez Musharraf are the ideas to be examined. The subject of the study is diverse. Among those it is aimed at government institutional involvement in the design of the process and those undergoing the change. The study anticipates an offer of a planned and issue based discussion of where Pakistan is in the process of power devolution. The study will also provide a direction for researchers and other private sector concerned with this issue. Mainly the objectives of this study are:

- ✓ To find out the gaps in electoral systems
- ✓ To compare the developmental aspects of these plans
- ✓ To find out the best possible working electoral system for LGs

Methodology of the Research

The study is an overview and the methodology is simple. It is a case study based on observation and common sense. It is supported by evidences collected through review of the literature and relevant ordinances. There is a rich literature available on the subject of devolution, its theory and its implementation. This literature provided the secondary source of research. The study, however, suggests a framework for future detailed study on analyzing devolution and decentralization in

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Pakistan in terms of its outputs rather than the processes, on which the present study focuses. This paper in perspectives of devolution looks at the political, administrative and fiscal structures and electoral systems as outlined by the ordinances and offers policy recommendations where problems have been identified.

Pre-Independence Era and LGs

In the Indo-Pak subcontinent (Naz, 2005) the LGs system developed over a long period of time (1688 to 1935). Before British rule there was no concept of LGs in modern sense. But throughout British era, state was highly centralized and organized on top-down model¹ and people were not empowered at grass root level. Ever first separate tier was set up by the British colonial rule to control the public functions of a community on local basis was pursued in Bengal and Madras, Bombay², Punjab and then other provinces of India. Primarily the system was administered through nominated legislature and gradually developed to be run by the elected district and municipal councils in urban and rural areas, correspondingly. The first Act of proper and official measure of municipal institute was introduced in the Bengal presidency by the colonial rule in the form of the “Conservancy Act” led to the configuration of Sanitary Committees in 1842. The panel of Conservancy was formulated in Karachi in 1846, while in 1867 this act was passed for Lahore and Rawalpindi. Conversely, a more concrete notion of local government came out during the era of Viceroy Lord Rippon in 1882. The municipal committees were created through elections and the institution of rural local governments was projected. This led to the endorsement of the Punjab Municipal Act (1884) and the LG system went through a solid conversion when the ‘Panchayat’ Act (1912) was imposed. Rural-urban divide³ was another important feature of British LGs (Chaudhary, Ahmed and Farooq, 2014, Siddiqui 1992). In rural area Panchayat (Council of Five) were working under local tribal leaders or feudal lords (Majumdar 1960) and rural areas were provided a very limited representation in which people were not given adult or universal franchise (Siddiqui, 1992). The urban areas were administrated by town councils. The Lahore Municipal Corporation (LMC) paved in 1941 is the oldest municipality still working in Pakistan. The 1907 Decentralization Commission of British suggested the selection of non-official chairmen of municipal committees.⁴ Lastly, the Government of India Act 1935 permitted a restricted provincial autonomy and allowed provinces to legislate on local government level. Members on local level government (Naz, 2005) were not directly elected but nominated through the Indian Civil Service (ICS) (Tinker, 1968). The real power was laid in central and provincial level so it should not be unexpected that why nationalist elements demanded power in central and provincial governments only (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005).

Post-Independence Era and LGs

Pakistan adopted 1935 Indian Act as interim constitution with a few amendments and modification till 1956 when first constitution was put into practice. Pakistan inherited (Ahmed, Saleem and Iftikhar, 2012) LGs model from British and since it is working in one or other structure though with a little dissimilarity, this model is adopted by different military regimes (mainly three models are there Ayub’s BDs 1959, LSG 1979 and devolution plan 2000). Being post-colonial states, Parochial and primordial attachments succeed political culture of South Asian countries altogether for decades even after independence. Tribal traditions (Gardezi, 1983) remained much influential to resolve local issues. Many tribal leaders (Muhammad, 2004) formulated local government run by local elites, mainly feudal lords and tribal leaders. According to Muhammad Ayaz and Ghulam Yasin (2011) British rule configured two tiers of government initially i.e., District and Panchayat. A local population was controlled by their elites and these elites were controlled by district magistrates. Only qualified voter was allowed to vote. At district level ICS members mainly bureaucrats were appointed by the center and no proportionality was offered.

Central government (Waseem, 1994) remained as powerful as ever before and conduction of elections at local level was neglected. Pakistan received a very few areas that constituted a developed system of LGs (mainly confined to Punjab). Moreover this system was not established on the basis of adult franchise, if election held then with limited franchise and massive malpractices and remained under firm bureaucratic control.⁵

From this colonial background Pakistan emerged (Azam, 2005) with a variety of economic, political and social problems. The then leadership adopted the same colonial structure of LGs like other institutions. They could not redesign it according to needs of new norms. Since 1947 till date, LGs passed through many reforms and still under controversial and pathetic evolution.⁶

According to Dr. Razia Musarrat and Salman Azhar (2012) since partition LGs is the main subject in the political problems of Pakistan but they remained neither participative nor receptive to the people of Pakistan. This system remained neglected in first decade of independence. Pakistan (Saddiq, 2007) inherited the colonial legacies at the core of its social, political and economic spheres and constitutional vacuum threatened the stability of whole political structure. General Ayub Khan took first step to redesign the institution of LGs in Pakistan under Basic Democracies (BDs) system outdated with the regime itself. After that the major reform came under General Zia who introduced and implemented a Local Self Government (LSG) system (1979) in which Ayub’s BDs was reformed with apparently a new structure. Lastly, General Pervez Musharraf came up with reforms in LGs by announcing his LGO 2000 remained operational until his demise in 2008.

To understand the electoral system of LGs in Pakistan, it would be necessary to clear the ambiguities by examine the three LGs models and their respective structure and functions thoroughly.


Basic Democracies under General Ayub Khan (1958-69)

In 1958, General Ayub Khan (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005) imposed first marshal law and like a colonialist revived LGs only as a representative level with an ordinance of BDs 1959. After (Muhammad and Yasin, 2011) dissolving national and provincial assemblies, the military regime realized that political participation of public to some extent was necessary in their own affairs at any level. This feeling brought idea of BDs through which members were elected for national and provincial assemblies. This was ever first step to redesign and reform LGs in Pakistan while not entirely. General Ayub Khan introduced a new LG system under the name of Basic Democracies. It was a new induction (Musarrat and Azhar, 2012, Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005) into political system as a beginning of a new era in the political history. Ayub manipulated these BDs to pass and enforce his constitution of 1962 which was presidential by announcing them as ‘electoral college’ for the election of national, provincial and presidential office.

Apparently 4 tiers were introduced. But according to Dr. Razia Musarrat and Salman Azhar (2012), basically there were five tiers as following:

- ✓ Provincial Development Advisory Councils: Its members were selected by the President on the commendation of the provincial governors.
- ✓ Divisional Level: Its officials were taken from bureaucracy.
- ✓ District Level: Its institutional structure was similar to district level.
- ✓ Tehsil / Thana⁷ Level: bureaucracy was involved here too.
- ✓ Union and Town Councils: Purely based on people participation.
- ✓ But apparently it had four tiers as below. (Figure 3)

(Fig.3)_BDs Institution 1959: Four Tier System



Division Council

Chairman: Commissioner

Members: (a) Nominated Officials and non-officials

(b) Elected Representatives

Functions: Supervisory and no tax power

District Council

Chairman: Deputy Commissioner

Members: (a) District level officers of Line department

(b) Chairman U.C, T.C and M.C in a district

Function: Raise funds (tax) and Local projects (police force)

Tehsil Council

Chairman: Tehsildar

Members: Chairman of all U.C, T.C and M.C

Functions: Supervisory

Union Council

Chairman: Elected

Members: 2/3 nominated and 1/3 elected

Functions: tax, projects, police, judicial etc.

In BDs a union council was established in each village with a population of 10,000 and had ten elected and five nominated members accountable for law and order situation in the village and rural area development schemes and for collecting taxes. These members were elected directly through adult franchise and then elected a chairman among themselves. It meant that Nazims were elected indirectly on UC level. The chairman of union committee was elected as ex-officio members of municipal committee. Union committees were deprived of any fiscal power. All chairmen of union committee, members of town committees and the heads of municipal committees were appointed either by a provincial government or AC/DC. These (Rizvi, 1974, Siddiqui, 1992) directly elected members and some members of higher tiers i.e., tehsil council and district council were designated by the government and had officials as chairman. District and divisional councils were above these village/union councils which were responsible for sanitation, welfare, education, and management of other developmental projects.

Ayub Khan was suspicious and (Jahan, 1972) did not trust the urban middle class especially in Bengal. He liked rural population and thought that they are good, simple and straight. Therefore urban-rural divide was maintained in BDs system. In rural areas first tier was union council that consisted of a group of villages. In urban areas town committees were set up for having population below than 14,000. These committees were expecting 37 functions to deliver services and levy taxes on 29 items. Each council elected its head from amongst its members who served as executive head of council.

Union council like municipal committee had 37 functions assigned to them. Tehsil council did not perform any executive functions unlike union council it had no taxation power. It just coordinated union councils and union committees under its jurisdiction. At district level, district council was formed. All union and tehsil council's heads were the members of district council. They performed as 'Electoral College'. It had 28 obligatory and 70 optional functions and levy tax powers. It worked as a substitute to universal suffrage and acted as an electoral college to elect provincial and national assembly's members and president. With the fall of Ayub, the system became haunted.

Like colonial customs Ayub's LG system of BDs was chiefly controlled by bureaucracy through deputy commissioners and assistant commissioners for different tiers. They had an authority (Siddiqi, 1992) to "squash the proceedings, suspended resolutions passed or orders made by any local body" and outlawed the doing of anything projected to be done. They even suspend elected members of the councils. The central government used the bureaucratic control to curtail their political rivalry at the local level. According to (Noman, 1988) bureaucracy had the central role by selecting candidates. Deputy Commissioners was the most influential as appointed chairman of higher tier of LGs (Divisional Council) and could persuade lower tiers (Kim and Ziring, 1977). Ayub Khan (Khan, 1967) criticized the impediment and inefficiency of parliamentary system and bureaucracy was supposed more competent to manage and coordinate with professional skills to retain support from BDs.

BDs schedule and arrangement was multidimensional. Elections conducted on 26th December 1959 in which 69% of electoral took part, 73% in West Pakistan and 65% from East Pakistan (Ahmad, 1985). Elections for BDs were held on non-party basis and through this Ayub Khan kept political parties out of the competition which could become a threat to his rule. Saddiqa (2007) said that this was a sham democracy⁸ which was maneuvered by the central government through elected, non-elected and local leaders. Members of union council were elected According to Noman (1988) in February, 1960 elected representatives assumed their responsibilities. In February 1960, referendum was conducted and BDs elected Ayub as President by a 95.6 % of yes votes.⁹ Elections were held on adult franchise. For Ayub it is easy to realize that “A voter is called for only when a voter is knowledgeable, there is effective citizen participation, and there is a stable and strong government”. But according to according to Aftab Kazi (1994) Ayub’s BDs elections did not engross popular representation and “non-representative decision-making process has represented only the interest of the ruling elites. Such a colonial style of decision-making has affected and influenced the perception of Pakistani nationalities” and (Pandev, 1994) expanded the feudal power during 1960s.¹⁰

A table comprised on strength and weakness of the model is given below for better comparison of this model with the other two models of the study.

Strength and Weakness of LGs 1959 Model (Table 1)

Strength	Weakness
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Empowered people at grass root level by introducing elections on adult franchise bases. 2. It provided space for lower middle class to enter in active political operations. 3. It ensured participation to various ethnic, linguistic and racial groups in their respective areas. 4. Under the basic democracy the migrated community provided space and resultantly they were able to elect three members in house of ten, by and large near to proportion of their population. 5. It is also interesting that the chairman of district council was elected from among the locals. 6. The money was not involved in the election. 7. Minorities were provided reserve seats. 8. LG was recognized as an agent of community and economic development. 9. It was able to provide schools and colleges in far flung areas of Pakistan. 10. Health centers (hospitals including veterinary hospitals and dispensaries) were also provided in rural areas and in slums in urban areas. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Settlers, refugees, weaker sections of society, minorities and women were marginalized groups. 12. Urban-rural division was maintained. 13. It strengthened the bureaucratic autonomy. 14. Union Council survival was depended on the grants of district council. 15. System failed to bridge the gap between poor and rich and between rural and urban areas. 16. The system to settle/manage common projects or issues was missing. 17. Its position of Electoral College was misused by Ayub Khan to win the election of president. 18. This system curtailed the political movements. 19. This system in its core was based on the non-politician.¹¹ 20. This system granted stability to the presidential office but negated to provide strength to the political system. 21. Structural institutionalization¹² of the political system did not occur. 22. Political culture did not flourish. 23. Controlled construction of LGs proved unsupportive for the common people. 24. Colonial practices remained intact while more strengthened. 25. BDs proved more suitable for fiscal rather than the political field. 26. It was based on pattern of western political model especially of USA. 27. It was easy to bribe and buy the voters. 28. An inequality between the East and West Pakistan surfaced because of equal representation in the system while East wing was more populace which augmented the feeling of distress among the people of the Eastern wing. 29. Provincial autonomy was restricted further through the engagement of governors (accountable to center only) like of colonial rule.


Local Self Government (LSG) 1979

After a short democratic term under Bhutto (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005), military again intervened by declaring martial law in 1979. LGs were revived and reformed with another LGs ordinance 1979 remained operational till 2001 in Pakistan. LGs were not given constitutional security and they remained dependent on provincial government. Ayaz Muhammad and Ghulam Yasin (2011) argued that General Ayub and General Zia’s models are apparently different but actually they are same. General Zia deliberately adopted Bhutto’s populist procedures and LGs reforms (bureaucratic reforms) which eliminated the direct involvement of bureaucracy in LGs as chairman or members and replaced it with voting on adult

franchise.¹³ But Kennedy and Bottern (2006) argued that General Zia borrowed political policy of his LSG chiefly from Ayub’s BDs, under which three local bodies were held during 1979, 1983 and 1985. Besides this debate of adaptation, the key contrast between both is ‘bureaucratic role’. But provincial governments remained influential to “squash resolutions and proceedings” at local level.

Local Self Government Ordinance 1979 initiated some crucial structural, administrative, political and fiscal reforms in the system. The structure of this system was composed of three tiers, as below:

Local Self Government 1979 ; Three Tier System



District Council

Chairman: Elected

Members: Elected

Functions: Tax, budgetary, public works, supervision of line department, police power

Union Council

Chairman: Elected

Members: Elected

Functions: Tax, Budgetary, Public works, police power

NOTE: Union and markez councils were under control of AC (bureaucracy). Municipal and town committees were under DC. District councils/municipal corporations were under commissioner of divisions.

Source: Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan

District council was consisted of the area of a revenue district while its urban areas, cantonment areas and federal areas were excluded. Union Council were comprised of a village or a group of villages with a population of fifteen thousand. The middle tier of tehsil council was usually abolished by the provincial government. According to Ayaz Muhammad and Ghulam Yasin (2012) under municipal/urban¹⁴ government it had 4 tiers i.e., town committees, municipal committees; municipal corporation and metropolitan. Council members elected the senior officers of these councils. Apparently three tiers were existed but provincial government usually abolished the middle tier of tehsil council. So there were mainly two tiers of union council and district council, elected by adult franchise and further elected members elected their heads. Chairman and councilors were indirectly elected by the relevant electoral colleges comprised on the elected members of the particular body. In presence of national and provincial assemblies the role of LGs were marginalized. Association of bureaucracy was apparently eradicated through circumscribing or abolishing membership and fiscal and political power was improved which reduced the bureaucratic authority but some provisions provided a referral role to bureaucracy. Under LSG division of rural and urban was maintained the previous one which provided rural and urban areas a considerable autonomy. Urban and rural councils were given autonomy in their respective domains under two tiers as District Council (made of an area of revenue district excluding its urban, cantonment and federal areas) and Union Councils (villages or village with 15,000 populations).

The People’s local government ordinance of Bhutto government and then 5 points of Junejo government (1985-88) and other such programs intervened in the evolution and growth of a proper LGs setup. Under these programs funds were given to members of national and provincial assemblies (MPAs and MNAs) with discretionary power to use them in their political constituency. This undermined LGs power and functions. These were the inherited conflicts of interest between different tiers of government.

LGs elections under LSG 1979) held on non-party basis (Saddiqa, 2007, Chaudhary, Ahmed and Farooq, 2014) as before and remained an essential part of Pakistani politics but General Zia’s this decision was contentious because in that era of 1970s, the middle class and mass based political parties had emerged. The conduction of non-party based elections (During 1985-non-party based election were held on all levels i.e., national, provincial and local) resultant in “localization and personalization” of local level politics (Wilder, 1999) as elected ministers started to utilize development funds in increasing of their individual chances to re-elect. This rule did not reverse even after return of party based elections on national and provincial level in 1988. The non-party based elections produced lack of political relationship between different levels of government which created tension between local and provincial tiers as a rival “structure of patronage” (Wilder, 1999). Discretionary powers (WB 2000, AERC 1990, Nasim, 1999) became contentious as provincial and central tiers’ unaccountable control over local level development allocations. According to Dr. Razia Musarrat and Salman Azhar (2012) the idea behind non-partisan elections was certainly to confine the influence of political parties which could threaten military regimes. But LGS could not fled from political influence of political parties (Wilder, 1999) actually political participation of common people was zero. Though 17th amendment provided a limited protection to LGs for a period of only six years during which provinces can make changes to the local government legislation with the concurrence of the President. Kafeer (2003) points out the limited constitutional support and argued that practically during Zia regime Pakistan remained a two-tier state i.e., federal and provincial.

For more clear picture of LGs, the strength and weakness of this model are given below precisely.

Strength and Weakness of LGs 1979 Model (Table 2)

Strength	Weakness
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. This could be considered a more reformed, refined and democratic system, having capacity to empower the marginalized. 2. The most important change in the system was that members of all the tiers were directly elected through adult franchise. 3. Political and financial powers were enhanced. 4. The election process created awareness about the importance of voters and vote. People realized that they are empowered to elect or reject to anyone. 5. Public representatives were pressurized by political culture to launch door to door campaign and visit the rich or poor in their constituencies. 6. Reserved seats to workers, peasants and minorities were provided. 7. Small electoral constituencies contributed to generate political awareness, political socialization, political recruitment and political training at gross-roots level. 8. This created sense of stake holder among weaker section of society. 9. The system achieved the target and a new class was created, empowered and included in political process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Apparently reduced the bureaucratic autonomy but some clauses of the Act provided space to bureaucracy to remain as referee. 2. It excluded women and minorities from power-sharing. Minorities boycotted this system because of separate electorate. 3. It was based on non-party. 4. No constitutional protection was provided. 5. It enhanced rural-urban gap like of Ayub’s model 6. Ethnic groups got share more or less but unsatisfactorily. 7. Sometime it was misused by people and ‘votes on sale’ was noticed. 8. Chairman and workers/lady councilors were indirectly elected by the respective electoral colleges comprised by the elected members of the respective bodies. 9. Rural-urban division was maintained. 10. The women are less empowered than men in political, economic and professional spheres. Traditions and institutional mechanics pushed them to less empower and marginalize.


Devolution Plan 2000

The LG System introduced by General Musharraf’s Government in 2001 was also proved transient and as soon as the new governments came to power in 2008, it was abolished. According to Saad Paracha (2003) soon after imposing martial law in 1999, General Musharraf came up with a seven point agenda to deal with the institutional predicament and national reconstruction.¹⁵ His seven points were as following:

- ✓ Reconstruction of national confidence and spirit
- ✓ Strengthening the federalism by eliminating inter-provincial clashes

- ✓ Refurbishing investors' trust
- ✓ Ensuring law and order and immediate justice
- ✓ Depoliticizing state institutions
- ✓ Devolution of power
- ✓ Accountability

On the basis of these seven points (Anjum, 2001) LGO 2000 was announced based on three tier LGs comprised on district, tehsil and union councils. This system maintained checks and balances and ensured apparently a bottom up approach. LGO 2000 Model can be described as 5Ds.



Source: NRB

This figure is elaborating five fundamental objectives of LGs as following:

- ✓ 1. Devolution of political power
- ✓ 2. Decentralization of authority
- ✓ 3. De-concentration of management functions
- ✓ 4. Diffusion of the power-authority nexus
- ✓ 5. Distribution of resources

According to Mohammad Qadeer (2000, 142) DP 2000 established three tiers elected mayors (local executive) and lawmaking bodies at the union (group of villages), tehsil and district levels.

Union Administration: It was the lowest tier of LG under this plan. The reunification of urban and rural areas across the whole district was the prominent feature of this system. It comprised of union Nazim, Naib union Nazim and three union secretaries and other assisting staff (as shown in figure.6). The union Nazim was the head of the union administration. In case the union Nazim is temporarily absent then Naib union Nazim acted as his deputy. Under the direction of union Nazim, the union secretaries harmonized and assisted in community development, execution of the union committees and deliverance of public services.

Tehsil Administration: Tehsil is the middle tier; it had tehsil municipal administration chaired by the tehsil Nazim. Tehsil municipal administration consisted of a tehsil Nazim, tehsil municipal Officer, tehsil officers, chief officers and other officials of the local council service and officials of the offices commended to the tehsil municipal administration (as shown in fig.7). The tehsil municipal administration was assigned with the functions of administration, finances, and management of the offices of local government and rural development, and several other issues at the regional, divisional, district, tehsil and lower levels.

District Administration: The district government is consisted of the District Nazim and district administration. The district administration consisted of district offices including sub-offices at tehsil level, who were to be accountable to the district Nazim assisted by the District Coordination Officer (DCO). The DCO was appointed by the provincial government and was the coordinating head of the district administration (structure of district council is given in fig.8). The district Nazim was accountable to the people through the elected members of the district council. A district council consisted of all union

Nazims in the district, which consisted of members elected on the reserved seats. These seats were reserved for women, peasants, workers, and minority community. The district council had its secretariat under the Naib district Nazim and had a separate budget allocation. A sufficient checks and balances were introduced in the system. The new structure also professionally tackled the particular needs and problems of large cities. The district government was responsible to the people and the provincial government for improvement of governance and delivery of services.

This plan promoted rural and urban unification and somewhat an inclusive LGs structure (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005). Unlike previous models, in this system mayors were accountable for local development of both rural and urban. In all, 6,455 LGs were created including 92 district councils, 307 tehsil and 6,022 rural union councils (Qadeer, 2000). The elected provincial and national assembly members again tried to personalize LGs through control and divert the flow of allocation of developmental funds to their respective electorates. This devolution plan was ruined by “patronage politics” and executive inefficiencies.

For comparison with other LGs models the strength and weakness of this model are given below precisely.

Strength and Weakness of LGs 2000 Model (Table 3)

Strength	Weakness
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fiscal decentralization was better than previous models because of removal of discretionary powers of MPAs determined by provincial finance commission award. 2. Adult franchise was decreased from 21 to 18 years. 3. It served a disconnection from previous experience. 4. Ensure genuine participation of citizens in bottom up developmental planning. 5. Improve service delivery mechanism and promise of checks and balance to safeguard against the abuse of authority. 6. It provided an opportunity to make up the political scene in Pakistan more broad based participatory and improve upon the colonial rule model. 7. CCBs led social mobilization remained to be its “development flag” 8. It had a four year term, 23 members in every union council subsequently formed Tehsil and district councils. 9. It was ever first step to empower elected representatives over civil bureaucracy. 10. It tried to improve governance by involving elected representative in monitoring mechanism. 11. The major achievement of LGs 2000 is advocacy of communal rights and their access through political participation. It included some marginalized groups although not enough. 12. 2000 DP replaced 19th century colonial model that was overemphasized on commissionrate system. 13. Middle class opposed feudal who are dominant in political parties and supported 2000 reforms. 14. Patronage-client relationship was broken gradually. 15. It reunified rural-urban administration. 16. It was directly answerable and responsive to citizens for all actions. 17. It provided space for youth and relatively young people were elected (74% were less than 46 years old). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 18. There is an ambiguity in roles of 3 tiers and funds created confusion. 19. Overlapping of powers between center, provinces and local governments is against constitution. 20. Relationship between local government representatives with MNA and MPAs is not relaxed.¹⁶ 21. No proportionality is mentioned clearly. 22. It never became fully functional. 23. It served to carve a civil constituency for the military. 24. Consultation with and recognition of political parties as major stakeholders is lacking. 25. Implementation of a new model without prior testing. 26. Monitoring mechanism of LGs remained slow. 27. The uncertainty of regime survival affected the LGs. 28. It still lacks in providing arrangements of ethnic inclusion. 29. Many times provincial government suspended district government, froze its funds and initiated audit and has brought back commissioners as dealing with 34 DCOs is more of administration irritation for CM. 30. Little space of voting for common citizens in decision-making. 31. 79% councilors were unfamiliar, untrained and inexperienced regarding new structure of LGs. 32. 74% councilors were illiterate (10% F.A, 16% BA or above). 33. The majority of mayor and deputy mayor belonged to dominant families while most of councilors were from low-income families. 34. Elections were held on separate electorate so majority of minority members boycotted the elections and only 9% seats are contested for. 35. The union council had limited authority and functions and autonomy despite being an electoral college (district council) and deputy Mayors (Tehsil Council). 36. Troubled relationship between federal, provincial and district were resolved to much extent. 37. This system maintained checks and balances and ensured apparently a bottom up approach but top down model remained intact. 38. Though provincial decentralization to district level was initiated but no central decentralization was seen.

Through DP 2000, a better, larger existence and possibility of elected government was provided at LGs. Services were upgraded through an elected government unlikely previous bureaucratic, centralized and unfocused district government (Cheema, Khawaja, Qadir 2005). It (Ahmed, Saleem and Iftikhar, 2012) stimulated young people mainly through electoral process. Though their responsibilities were not clearly defined but 79% of the councilors competed for first time and 64% of them had no family members who had participated in elections before this (Lunthans, 2000, 573). Distribution of funding was an issue in LGs 2000. Relationship between councilors and MNAs and MPAs was not smooth at union level. This was mainly

because of the difference in priorities of councilors from MPAs and MNAs/MPAs while the later thought them as higher and authoritative that was a big issue in making these LGs plans dysfunctional (Kukreja and Veena, 2003). Political affiliation had ever a solid presence in LGs. Though councilors were elected on non-party basis but had political attachment and rivalry as well. Voters in rural areas were untrained and ignorant they did not know how to cast their vote. Mostly vote were casted on political affiliation basis (Ahmed, Saleem and Iftikhar, 2012). Women had 33% of representation through reserved seats for first time in political history of Pakistan.

But this LGs system has been abandoned with the fall of Musharraf. The main argument behind the suspension of LGs under 2000 DP was that it was designed and implemented by a dictator to legitimize his own rule and for extracting support by building a constituency to sustain. This is for the fourth time that the LG System is suspended in Pakistan. Any system takes time to develop its root within a society but unfortunately every elected Pakistani government without any wise thought overthrew it and left a vacuum. We are not making serious effort to move forward. The plant of LG is demanding a careful nurturing, watering, affectionate caring; weeding but contrarily we are uprooting the plant suddenly and too repeatedly. That is why the deliverance of fundamental services to the citizens in Pakistan remains so dreadful which is the theme of local democracy.

Electoral System of LGs in Pakistan

A critical evaluation of these LGs is not of direct interest to this paper. Many sources of such evaluations are already available. The DP 2000 has several worth-discussing reforms. But the concern of this paper is confined to examine the electoral processes of LGs system in Pakistan. So some general observations I present here for your kind knowledge.

As in previous section it has been elaborated that General Ayub Khan brought a package of guided democracy with no constitutional protection held on adult franchise (21 years of age for voters), non-party based and excluded women, political parties and minority (Ahmad, 1985, Saddiqa 2007, Noman, 1988). In next reforms, General Zia did the same though bureaucratic role was curtailed apparently (Chaudhary, Ahmed and Farooq, 2014). Basically the colonial legacy of LGs remained intact however a paradigm shift was noticed during first tenure of LGs under Musharraf. Kafeer (2003) says that constitutional support remained limited and practically Pakistan is a two-tier state i.e., federal and provincial. Though 17th amendment provided a limited protection to LGs for a period of only six years but during this time period provinces can make changes to the local government legislation with the agreement of the President (Chaudhary, Ahmed and Farooq, 2014).

In pre-2000 scenario, BDs (1959) and LSG (1979) did not recognize women as an equal or necessary stakeholders and minority were also excluded from LSGs (separate electorate was used tactfully to keep minority outside of power-sharing). DP 2000 provided 33% reservation of women seats through a combination of direct and indirect elections. This brought politico-cultural development in society as more than 36,000 women elected in political arena which refuted the concept that women do not take part in politics due to their own lack of interest. This brought a considerable mass of women councilors who concentrated on gender issues especially on poverty reduction and mainstreaming of women in politics. Under 2000 DP, women were elected rather than only nominated. However under Zia there were various committees where women can be members and had access to developmental funds but it could not bridge the gap of male and female.

In previous models of General Ayub and General Zia members of urban councils and district councils were directly elected and they elected further their relevant chairmen. In LGO 2000 (Akramov and Qureshi et al., 2008, 2)...the formation of a new local government with special electoral provisions is an important element which replaced previous one with three tiers, district councils, 337 tehsil council and 6,022 union councils. The union council members and mayor and deputy mayor were directly elected through adult franchise. 2/3 of these elected heads of union council further constituted district and Tehsil councils while the rest of 1/3 members of district and Tehsil council were indirectly elected by these directly elected members of union council (Akramov, Qureshi et al., 2008, 2). In this system the district mayor needed a bulk of the union councilors and union mayors' vote elected in the district instead of a mass of public votes in a district (Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir, 2005). One more change was increased reserved seats for peasants and women with a total of 1/3 seats in union council as compared to the 5% and 10% in district councils.

A chart of comparison can more elaborate clearly the electoral system of LGs in Pakistan as below:

Electoral System of LGs in Pakistan: A Comparison of Three Models (1959, 1979, 2000)

BDs 1959-68	LSGs 1979-99	LGO 2000-2008
1. Non-Party Based 2. Adult franchise 3. Direct elections only on UC level otherwise indirect 4. Bureaucratic involvement 5. Provincial intervention 6. No constitutional protection. 7. Separate electorate for minority. 8. Women were excluded. 9. No proportionality for ethnic and linguistic classes. 10. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)/First past the post (FPTP)	1. Non-Party Based 2. Adult franchise 3. Direct elections only on UC level otherwise indirect 4. Removed bureaucratic influence apparently but bureaucracy remained intact 5. Provincial intervention 6. No constitutional protection 7. Separate electorate for minority. 8. Women were excluded. 9. No proportionality for ethnic and linguistic classes. 10. SNTV/FPTP	1. Non-Party Based 2. Adult Franchise (age was lessen from 21 to 18) 3. Direct elections on all levels 4. No bureaucratic role, even DCO was answerable to elected Nazim of district 5. No intervention by the provincial government. 6. No constitutional protection. ¹⁷ 7. Separate electorate for minority 8. 33% seats were reserved for women. 9. No proportionality for ethnic and linguistic classes. 10. SNTV/FPTP

The DP 2000 gives us a vivid picture of LGs electoral system where elections (Paracha, 2000) of union council composed the rest of the structure of all LGs. The same is being used more or less. The tenure span of these councilors was three years and a criterion of a councilor was as following:

- ✓ 25 years Minimum age
- ✓ Citizen inhabitant of the relevant wards/constituency
- ✓ Good character as Muslims (except for non-Muslim)
- ✓ Not convicted against any crime
- ✓ No employee of federal, provincial or local government could contest
- ✓ Minimum qualification for mayor and deputy mayor was matriculation or secondary school certificate.

LGs elections are ever held on non-party basis (Saddiqa, 2007, Chaudhary, Ahmed and Farooq, 2014) as before and remained an essential part of Pakistani politics but this decision (either taken by military rulers or elected democratic governments) is contentious because in that era of 1970s, the middle class and mass based political parties had emerged. According to Dr Razia and Salman Azhar (2012) the idea behind non-partisan elections was certainly to confine the influence of political parties which could threat military regimes and purpose behind this has remained to push back the oppositional forces. Even democratic regimes used the same tactic against their rivalry forces. But LGS could not flee from political influence of political parties actually political participation of common people was zero. The conduction of non-party based elections (During 1985-non-party based election were held on all levels i.e., national, provincial and local) resultant in "localization and personalization" of local level politics as elected ministers started to utilize development funds in increasing of their individual chances to re-elect. This rule did not reverse even after return of party based elections on national and provincial level in 1988. The non-party based elections produced lack of political relationship between different levels of government which created tension between local and provincial tiers as a rival "structure of patronage" (Wilder, 1999). Discretionary powers became contentious as provincial and central tiers' unaccountable control over local level development allocations (AERC 1990, Nasim 1999, WB 2000). Relationship between provincial governments and LGs remained contentious as the political parties when in government at provincial level perceived LGs as "competing tier of patronage" (Wilder, 1999) and consequently they sanctioned or suspended LGs. These tensions remained highlighted even during Musharraf regime.

LGs in Today's Pakistan

In post 2014 scenario, the provincial governments revived the abolished bureaucratic system of LSG 1979 at local level. In Punjab this revival was made with amending land revenue act 1967 instead of LGO 2000. This system gives a space to exert political influence and maneuvering.

The confusion been non-partisan or partisan election on local level LGs has not been resolved yet. This subject is under consideration in different courts of Pakistan. Yet decision has not come forth but during LG elections, participation of political parties is not a new and covert. All prominent political parties actively search suitable candidates on their behalf for LGs election. The drawing and redrawing of constituencies is another issue. In expected elections of LGs in 2013, Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) demanded 6 billion from central government for the conduction of elections. Approximately 600 million ballot papers would be needed. More than 100,000 candidates were expected to compete. But Punjab government postponed these elections afterwards and no signs of conduction are visible yet. The absence of LGs is leaving many crucial issues unresolved. General public issues like floods, inflation rate, scarcity of many items of necessity, load shedding, health

and education are some examples while crimes on local level are increasing. These all issues demand installation of LGs set up on emergency basis. LGs in Pakistan have no proper existence. They rely on provincial government for inter-government transfer and most of their fiscal resources.

According to Hasnat Abdul Hye (2000) “this vital link in the hierarchy of government has been neglected and its potential stifled never allowing it to grow. Attention has always been focused on making the central government more powerful perhaps because historically everyone believed in a strong center and charismatic personalities”. LGs were supposed to deal with the routine matters of people at grass root level. Bureaucrats and nominated administrators have remained back bone of this system and irregular elections are permanent feature of LGs. LGs at the mercy of provincial government and provinces are at the mercy of central government.

Suggestions and Recommendation

After passing about 70 years of existence Pakistan still have controversial LGs. This system can be improved by removing the faults, dysfunctions and insufficiencies of all three models that apparently hinder the actual implementation phase. It should not be judged and rejected on this base that these models are military given models. Every model demised with the demise of its creator and democratic governments showed biasness towards them. Some suggestions are given below.

Political Affiliation (Non-Party or Party Based Elections): Party base elections provide the best order of checks and balances while non-party based created divisions along tribal, ethnic and linguistic lines. No bureaucratic mechanism can produce viable system of checks and balances. Wilder (1999) says that party base elections are good. All governments either military based or elected held LGs elections on non-party based and excluded parties from elections from all levels. Now there are a number of parties representing almost all classes of society have emerged. These parties are the best forum for their respective community to raise their voice and issues. Now time has come to give these parties an open invitation to take part actively on grass root level. Political parties’ involvement would resolve many core issues of electoral system of Pakistan.

Qualification of Voters and Candidates (literate or illiterate/untrained): Qualification of voter and participants is a very vital issue. It was very common to listen “vote on sale” and councilors are illiterate is a very common. It should be enhanced and only educated and mature people should be given ticket for election in LGs at union level while voters should be trained how to use and cast their vote. CCBs are very good option and should be maintained for this purpose. Through these boards voters should be trained how to use their vote. The participation of the candidates should also been mandatory in these boards to bridge the gap between voters and candidates and they can be trained through these boards as well.

Adult Franchise (decreased from 21 to 18 years): It is good to decrease age level for voting from 21 to 18. It indulges more and more youth to vote but there is a little room of voting for common citizens in decision-making.

No Proportionality: Pakistan inherited majoritarian Model/FPTP from its colonial masters. It is still being used while this system is getting reform in their host countries and a shift is visible from FPTP to Direct Proportional Representation (DPR) or Additional-Members system (AMS) is visible (Mahmood, 2007, 86). In LGs in Pakistan though women are given participation but minorities and ethnic groups are ignored. This phenomenon can be addressed through allowing party based elections and DPR voting system.

Single Transferable Vote (STV): STV system should be allowed. This voting system counts more and more votes and no vote will be wasted. Moreover this would possibly remove or lessen the phenomenon of ‘vote for sale’ which has become an integral part to Pakistani society.

Direct/Indirect Election: LGs elections were mainly indirect. The indirect elections at district and tehsil level haunted the probability of emergence of new local leadership. Consequently, elite class captured the higher posts. The direct elections of top posts as visualized in 2000 DP could guide to the new level of local leadership and accountability. The District Nazims should be elected directly by the voters rather than indirectly by the Union Nazims.

Constitutional Protection: In Pakistan, LGs operates within a framework of political, financial and economic subordination to central government, does little to encourage autonomy and public participation especially inclusion of marginalized groups is ignored. Empowering LGs without constitutional protection is equal to empowering LGs without proper mechanism.

Bureaucratic Reforms: DP 2000 was good in this perspective to curtail the bureaucracy involvement in LGs. Pakistan needs a hybrid LG system and an amalgamation of the merits and qualities of these three tested models which could be acceptable for bureaucracy and politicians and can break patron-client relationship. The LGs system in Pakistan has been developed on such a pattern where individuals feel comfortable by having bureaucrats, who can run LGs according to their wishes. Unfortunately Pakistan has reverted to LSG 1979 model of LGs which is meant the indulgence of bureaucracy again This reversion of LGs in some provinces is actually having the background of this uncomfortability with elected governments at local level and of a high comfort with the bureaucrats. They should realize that it is the collective performance of all tiers of the government that actually matters. If rigid bureaucratic system is damaging Pakistani society then this adhocracy is also

inconvenient with the social norms of Pakistan. To strengthen the LGs in a federal structure would be in benefit of Pakistan in the long run.

Bottom-Up Model of Federalism: The top down model approach of colonial era should be abolished now. Pakistan needs a bottom-up model of hierarchy in which members of local, provincial and national assembly's would be elected from grass root level through direct, party based, STV, adult franchise and DPR voting system from the LGs .

Structural Contradictions: LGs in Pakistan are facing this issue. They are given some powers but on the same side provincial governments are given powers to suspend, squeeze or alter their resolution and even they can influence on the elections of LGs. These structural contradictions should be cleared or removed through demarcation of powers between provincial government and LGs. This would smooth the mechanism. LGs suffer from the fact that their existence is not constitutionally supported and they are a sheer expansion of the provincial government. In the constitution, the allocations of the functions of the federal and provincial governments are clearly specified whereas the existence of LGs is not formally embodied in the Constitution. The elected representatives of national and provincial assemblies usually take over some functions, which LGs used to perform and as such in many ways they are prone to intervene in the evolution of proper and improved LGs.

Conclusion

History proved inconsistent pattern (Cheema, Adnan and Myerson) of LGs in Pakistan. Every time a new LGs models has been implemented. Ayub's BDs was a blend of elected and appointed members. Bhutto even as an elected prime minister could not refresh LGs during his tenure from 1971-77. Zia's LSG 1979 provide locally elected council members usually at union level but avoided direct elections at higher tiers of LGs. The democratic decade between post Zia till third martial law (1999-2007) a full time clash in provincial and LGs resulted in suspension of LGs. The reason was that 'who will control and dominates local patronage?' and replaced it with unelected administrators usually bureaucrats. General Musharaf promoted LGs again with reforms in which locally administrators reported to locally elected government. After him, under a considerable pressure from courts provincial government passed legislation but again delayed LGs elections. According to new government, 2001 reforms had reduced the importance of union councils.

The provincial government often ceased the middle tier (tehsil). Usually district and union council existed and elected through adult franchise. According the population two types of functions were allocated to local governments i.e., compulsory and optional.¹⁹ But these councils performed a few. The gap in availability of resources and institutional capacity for responsibility of developmental work is constant. They work on behalf of provincial government because no constitutional protection is being provided to them. Provincial-LG relationship was subjective and dominating.

The LGs system in Pakistan has been developed on such a pattern where individuals feel comfortable by having bureaucrats, who can run LGs according to their wishes. The reversion to the 1979 LSG in some provinces which was introduced by General Zia is actually having the background of this uncomfotability with elected governments at local level and of a high comfort with the bureaucrats. They should realize that it is the collective performance of all tiers of the government that actually matters. If rigid bureaucratic system is damaging Pakistani society then this adhocracy is also inconvenient with the social norms of Pakistan. To strengthen the LGs in a federal structure would be in benefit of Pakistan in the long run. The emerging of challenging demographic trends and transformation of urbanization and a middle class boom make it crucial that a more decentralized, devolved, responsive and representative system of LGs should be put in place properly.

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PARTY BASIS VERSUS NON PARTY BASIS ELECTIONS AT LOCAL LEVEL

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Abstract: *The main objective of this study has been the explanation of the voting behavior in Party Basis versus Non Party Elections at Local Level. It is human nature to exercise ethnic preference for their own group in the form of aggression against others. Biradarism assumes the status of the central character in the local bodies' elections and plays pivotal role as a local pressure group in non-party elections at local level. There is a great need to wipe out such doubts and apprehensions. The local government is a way to make political system a self-governing system. Developing political systems are facing different challenges in the process of democratization in their local socio-political environments. This system is working as dependent rather than independent in developing countries. Local institutions are working as a power show of local Biradari (clans, fraternity). Here an attempt is made to present a general view of such elements which resist change in local bodies' elections system. Such a study can provide a preliminary base to extend the boundaries of local government's politics and basis of local elections. Comparative approach is adopted in this discourse. The study of elections/voting behavior has been observed under Behavioral Approach.*

Keywords: Biradari, caste, biradarism, voting behavior, social system, patti

Conceptual Note

Biradarism is a modern form of Aryan social system. Collection of castes is called Biradari and trend to follow the Biradari traditions is termed Biradarism. Contemporary division of class in Muslim community of sub-continent is called Biradarism. This system having hundreds years backed history and now become part of the political process and in Punjab seems to nullify but not completely due to its traditional values. So its impacts on National, Provincial and particularly local bodies cannot be overlooked.

Faisalabad has just over one hundred year history. Different Biradari of Punjab were allotted agriculture land to settle here at the time of settlement of Sandal Bar the bush (an area of land covered with bushes and trees which had never been used for growing crops and where there were very few people). People of this area were divided into Locals and *Abadkars* (settlers) from the beginning of settlement (1892) to the creation of Pakistan and both words are still used to differentiate the community of this area. After independence a huge number of refugees came in this area, non-Muslim migrated to India and the politics of Faisalabad altered into Biradarism

Analytical Note

"The politics of Biradari played an important role in generating contempt for Nawaz Sharif, Mian Azhar, an Aryan by caste, nominated his brother-in-law, Mian Nasir Jibran, for Lahore's lord mayor in the 1998 local body elections. However, the Sharif brothers supported the Kashmiri Khwaja Hassan, who arose victorious in the mayoral contest." (Wilder, 1999 p.31)

Distribution table of urban and rural population of Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh

Tehsil	Total population	Urban population	Rural population	Ratio of urban population	Ratio of rural population
Faisalabad Sadar	924110	23126	900984	2.5%	97.5%
Faisalabad City	2140346	2008821	131485	94%	6%
Jaranwala	253806	32111	221655	13%	87%
Chak Jhumra	1054289	132997	917701	13%	87%
Sumandri	515785	54908	460877	11%	89%
Tandlinawala	540802	61430	478372	12.5%	87.5%
Toba	617035	59938	557097	10%	90%
Gojra	495096	117896	377204	24%	76%
Kamalia	509462	167571	381881	25%	75%

The situation after establishment of Pakistan further strengthened this system, and some families and Biradari considered ruling this country as their right. Municipal system of the military governments, particularly the non-party elections promoted Biradarism. There was deep influence of Biradarism on the elections from 1985 till 2002. Apart from couple of constituencies, the majority Biradari remained successful in most of the electoral constituencies. Political parties

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succeeded by giving ticket to the majority Biradari. They suffered defeat whenever the policy of giving ticket to the majority Biradari was changed. Unexpected results were seen due to Biradarism. There were some political ideological contests as well, but even then Biradarism was present in some form behind the motives.

The rural politics has its own way of socio-political life. There is local grouping along with Biradarism. People from the same Biradari join one of the political parties in order to sustain their local feudalism, and if their opposition group joined their political party then this group would switch to another political party. So they don't participate in the elections for success of their ideology, instead they take full part in order to defeat the opposition group. Sometimes even the candidate himself doesn't know how why and how he got these votes. "Pati" are formed after names of ancestors in a village of a single Biradari, and the votes of a "Pati" go to only one side. It is very much likely that these votes would go to some other political party or local group because this time their opposition "Patti" has contacted their former ally. Decisions like nomination of candidates in the Biradari meetings, strategy of election campaign, alliance with other Biradari, support and opposition of political party, analysis of weaknesses of the candidates from opposition Biradari, and distribution of seats among ally Biradari on national and provincial level are made. The influence of Biradarism existed even during the general elections of 2002. Since this area is a supporter of the ruling party, therefore Pakistan Muslim League-Q and its allies won in Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh. Success of Muslim League-N in Faisalabad city is a clear indication of difference of urban and rural political attitudes.

Biradarism becomes a central feature during the local body elections. From the list of candidates to the victory, no candidate or member can come out of the Biradari bondage. The buzz at Biradari offices start as soon as election results come out. With the start of battle for statistics, even the common man starts taking interest in the statistics of Biradari. Personality and ideology is suppressed due to association with Biradari, and all members of the every Biradari immediately, or comparatively later but finally, gather at their Biradari heads. Whether the candidate is district chairman of Faisalabad or Toba Tek Singh, Biradari majority is shown to the common people and newspapers. There is alliance for elections between major and minor Biradari. Biradarism remains the core subject of election campaigns. Success or defeat during elections is considered as victory or defeat of the Biradari. Defeat and success of Biradari is the topic of discussion in the government and semi-government departments, and the debate about the background facts behind the election process continues for months. Some Biradari is always blamed in case of defeat. Instead of expressing gratitude to the ally Biradari in case of success of the alliance group, saying things like they got the position without any effort, in order to find reason to continue their Biradari opposition, and giving impression of being ungrateful is often seen. In case of being the ruling party, deep influence of Biradarism is felt during designating positions, making heads of departments and new recruitment. Greetings from the Biradari and dinner parties on success become a routine.

The successful candidates are tied in Biradari bondages in such a way that he cannot leave the system even if he wants to. Recruitment on merit or by chance, and promotion or transfers is showed as their Biradari's positives or as negatives of the opposition Biradari. At present, the people from Jatt Biradari say that Jatt Biradari is being designated key posts in Faisalabad because in Punjab, the government is of Jatt Biradari, while the Jatt Biradari says that since the district mayor is Aryan, the Aryan Biradari is being treated superiorly. So every administrative decision is analyzed with Biradari aspect.

Studying the influence of Biradarism on Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh, it was found that the surrounding environment affected the departments as well. There almost no influence of Biradarism on bar association of Toba Tek Singh and Gojra, while the bar association of Faisalabad does have influence of Biradarism. There is some influence of Biradarism on Agricultural University as well. In the early days, a large no. of students from the surrounding areas took admission here, and they were successful in propagating this important aspect of their culture, but its continuation has more to do with the inapt people. The able people protect their interests through their abilities, while the inapt people do so by propagating their Biradari. The overall standard of merit in Pakistan has the hold here as well; therefore these implications are more prominent.

In general elections of 1970, a strong political party dispels the effects of Biradarism and political ideology remains dominant in 1977 Elections. Local Bodies elections of 1979 on non-party base started to promote Biradarism. General elections of 1985 were also on non-party base and it played a key role to encourage the role of Biradari in politics.

Elections in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2002 were held on party base and voting behavior towards political parties was encouraging factor for the future of democracy in Pakistan but

Tickets are distributed on Biradari base by political parties for general elections and this trend of political parties is promoting Biradarism in this part of Pakistan and this behavior does not seem to end in the near future

This table shows the results of preferences of respondents during local body elections

Preference for casting vote in local body elections	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Brodhray	298	49%
Political Parties	42	7%
Personality	268	44%
Total	608	100%

This table expresses the preferences of respondents during national and provincial elections:

Preference for casting vote in national and provincial elections	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Brodhry	138	22.7%
Political Parties	274	45.1%
Personality	196	32.2%
Total	608	100%

According to the table, the attitude of voters in the national and provincial assembly elections seem to be different than local body elections. The majority of voters (45%) prefer to vote for political party, while the ratio of voting for the Biradari (23%) affects the election results. The persona of candidates is an important aspect of success (32%). These results have much resemblance to the results provided by Shehzad Ahmed Khan (1998), that political parties get 43.4% and celebrities (strong personalities) get 31.3% votes, but the results of votes for Biradari that he provided (38.1%) are different than results of today (23%).

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To what extent do the respondents support the candidate who has is supported by the Biradari:

Support for Biradari candidate	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	244	40%
Yes	208	34.2%
No	82	13.5%
Strongly no	74	12%
Total	608	100%

According to the results of above stated table, absolute majority of voters support the candidate being supported by the Biradari. This shows the trend of acknowledge of the mutually agreed decision of the Biradari, and gives the conclusion that voting is a part of social process. Voter never comes out of the family bond.

Do you feel Biradarism is promoted through non-party elections?

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Agree	288	47%
Strongly agree	218	36%
Disagree	48	7.9%
Strongly disagree	54	8.9%
Total	608	100%

Non-party elections promoted Biradarism. The reaction of voter is quite clear in this answer. The absolute majority of voters (83%) have agreed to this fact. This gives us the conclusion that holding non-party elections is non-democratic action, not just in national and provincial assembly elections, but during local body elections as well, and they give strength to Biradarism.

To what extent did the Martial laws promote Biradarism? The answer to this question is in this table:

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	236	38.8%
Yes	168	67.6%
No	140	23%
Not at all	64	10.5%
Total	608	100%

Martial laws promoted Biradarism. Two-third majority of voters (to some extent + completely = 66%) seem to be in favor of this quote, while one-third disagree. This gives us the conclusion that majority of voters holds Martial law responsible for providing strength to Biradarism.

Influence of Biradari became greater due to inactive state of political parties

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	298	49%
Yes	168	34.9%
No	140	11.5%
Not at all	46	4.6%
Total	608	100%

Absolute majority of voters (84%) hold inactive state of political parties responsible for Biradarism. This gives us the conclusion that voters like to see political parties to be strong and ideological, so that Biradarism could be discouraged. Voters are tied in Biradari bonds due to unclear agenda of political parties

Did the municipal departments promote Biradarism?

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	284	46.7%
Yes	246	40.5%
No	64	10.5%
Not at all	14	2.3%
Total	608	100%

Absolute majority of voters (87%) declared municipal departments as Biradari institutions, and said that municipal departments do nothing besides sustaining supremacy of local Biradari. during the field survey, people considered it imperative for political parties to be included in these departments, and suggested that district mayor should be representative of political party.

To what extent are the candidates responsible for strengthening Biradarism

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	342	56.3%
Yes	208	34.2%
No	46	7.6%
Not at all	12	2.4%
Total	608	100%

During the field survey, one more fact from the hidden facts behind Biradarism was seen that the candidate plays the most important role in promoting and sustaining Biradryism. A large majority of voters (91%) considered the candidate to be responsible for sustaining Biradrism. In further explanation to this question, the respondents said, “voters are told that if the opposition Biradari comes to power, then all your rights will taken away, and in case of success of your own Biradari, resolving all those problems will be the first priority.

Negative effects of Biradarism

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Some extant	308	50.6%
Yes	200	32.8%
No	78	12.8%
Not at all	22	3.6%
Total	608	100%

Majority of voters (83.2%) told that Biradarism is bad for better performance of the political system. They have also given suggestions to counter this situation, which have been included in the conclusion of this article.

Views on the benefits of Biradryism. The following table has the details

Opinion of voters	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Personal Problems	464	76.3%
Regional Problems	82	13.5%
Public Problems	42	6.9%
Others	20	3.3%
Total	608	100%

Majority of voters (76%) accepted one benefit of Biradarism that, it only resolves individual problems or protects only individual interests. This association benefits the candidates personally, or his close relatives and loved ones. Majority of Biradari has to face the same problems and difficulties which they have to face in case candidate from other Biradari wins.

Respondents have indicated their political opposition

Biradari	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Jutt	94	15.4%
Rajput	94	15.4%
Arain	122	20.0%
Gujjar	36	5%
Local	18	2.46%
Nothing	244	40.13%
Total	608	100%

The opinion of voters remained inconclusive in indicating their political opposition Biradari. Majority (40%) said that none of the Biradari is a permanent opposition for them, while it is different in some constituencies, and permanent rival Biradari exists there. Most of the voters considered Aryan Biradari as their political opposition, and the opinion about Jatt and Rajput remained similar (15.4%).

Favorite Biradari for political alliance of the respondents

Biradari	No. of respondents	Ratio/Percentage
Jutt	138	22.6%
Rajput	92	15%
Arain	86	14%
Gujjar	46	7.6%
Local	26	4.3%
Others	22	3.6%
Nothing	198	32.6%
Total	608	100%

This table gives the results regarding alliance of Biradari. None of the Biradari seem to be in permanent political rivalry against each other. The results are different in every constituency. Political allies of one constituency are seen as political opponents in the other. A number of voters (23.6%) did not consider any Biradari as a preference for political alliance. The percentages for being considered as the favourite for political alliance among other major Biradari remained in this manner: Rajput and Jatt are 15%, Arain 14%, and Gujjar 6-7%.

Conclusion and Recommendations

After completing my research article, I've reached the conclusion that the influence of Biradarism do exist in Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh, and these are more noticeable during the elections. It affects other activities of daily life as well. There is also a positive aspect of Biradarism, which cannot be overlooked. Sometimes the Biradari helps to resolve social and financial issues of a person so well that the person starts living a good life again. A person never feels alone on occasions like wedding, and other joyous or sad times. But an ideology limited to being local or focused on grouping instead of being national, can never be a good sign for a nation and Biradarism is a big hindrance in development of a strong democratic way of thinking. Elimination of negative aspects of Biradarism does not seem to be happening in the near future, but this study has led to some suggestions for reducing the influence of Biradarism and using this trend for the development of society: Regularity of elections can subdue this trend. Political parties should make strong decisions regarding allotment of tickets, and a candidate who withdraws from the elections due to pressure from Biradari should not be given the ticket next time. The members of the assembly from this region should be given reasonable share from ministries, so that the assembly members evolve from this domestic thinking and in case of winning on two seats they should not be limited, or in other words compelled to local politics. The local body elections should be held on party basis as well, and political parties should nominate their district mayors and deputy mayor prior to elections. Biradari influence is reduced with the improvement of financial situation of farmers. More research should be carried out on this subject, so that the future generations could be informed about its motives.

SOCIO-POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE AND INDIGENOUS POLITICS IN COLONIAL DISTRICT MULTAN (1849-1901)

Abida Kausar Chaudhry *

Abstract: *With the annexation of Multan as in the province of Punjab, the British erected an administrative apparatus that relied heavily upon the support of the region's powerful landed elite. The relationship between the two was one of mutual benefit, with the British using their landed allies to ensure the maintenance of order and effective economic accumulation in exchange for state patronage. Over a century and a half later, the politics of Pakistani Punjab continues to be dominated by landowning politicians as Pirs and Jagirdars despite significant societal changes that could have potentially eroded their power. This research treats the initial period of colonial rule in Multan tracing the factors that led the British to rely on the landed elite for support, and enter into the bargain between the two actors that drove subsequent power politics. This bargain in the shape of rewards and patronage disturbed the balance of power and innate sense of competition began to exist among the local allies and the indirect willingness was to serve more and be rewarded more. This is demonstrated through the war services of Qureshies and Gillanies, the dominant political elites. This research then explores the mechanisms used to perpetuate this arrangement, by the state and the landed elite, of legislative interventions, bureaucratic power, and electoral politics.*

Keywords: Multan, socio-political power, local politics, colonial annexation

Social Structure of the Region

With the colonial administrative structure firmly established within a few years of annexation, the immediate change that followed was reform of the power structure of land. ¹ As Mustafa Kamal Pasha described that the British saw a social revolution in land relations as the only durable state. They viewed the old *jagirdars* and the other privileged groups of ancient regime as guardians of status quo.²

Based on the simple principle of reward for collaboration and punishment for resistance, the British policy produced a class of land owners who would dominate politics in Multan for many generations: for example the Pir and Pathan families who had been rewarded in the campaign of 1849. The campaign of Multan in fact was a power game between Hebert Edwardes and Multani Muslim elites. Muslims had ruled Multan before 1818 Sikh Government; these were known as Multani Pathans. Edwardes had realised the importance of Multani Pathans as British allies and he succeeded in winning their loyalties. Pathans were ready to help Edwardes so that they could retain their jobs in the army and restore their lands after the change in the government.

When rebellion erupted in Multan, Edwardes contacted Faujdar Khan, a trusted Lieutenant of his army and relative of many influential officers of the Diwan's force. Edwardes decided to take his services and send him as ambassador to the Diwan for discussion. Faujdar Khan too understood the importance of the time, and felt that Company could help him and his family in regaining the position authorities lost 30 years ago.

In early 1848, Mulraj himself sent one of his senior officers Ghulam Mustafa Khakwani to Edwardes to convey that he wanted to transfer power peacefully. On 8th May, Gulam Mustafa Khakwani and Faujdar Khan met at the east bank of Sindh River where Khakwani told Edwardes that Pathans were ready to leave Mulraj if Edwardes would give back all their lands and property with their jobs that were taken by the Mulraj. Edwardes gave them his hand written guarantee for their lives, property and honour.³

This was how the Muslim leadership of Multan became ready to give support Edwards.. If the sword was the source of power for armed class, we cannot deny the importance of Pirs and Sajjada Nashins and their influence on social sector. From all of them, Shah Mahmood Qureshi was most prominent because he was the Sajjada Nashin of Pir Bahudin Zakria, who was the most important Pir of Multan. Bahawal Haq was most famous Pir in Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab. Followers from Kharasan, Afghanistan and Hindustan came to his tomb with offerings. It was due to his blessing that Shah Mahmood was the most powerful person in Multan. Alongside Shah Mahmood, two other important families of Multan - Gillani and Gardezi- helped Edwardes against Mulraj. Now the question is why Muslims of Multan were ready to support Colonial officers? We cannot understand the entire situation without analysing prevailing circumstances with special reference to their relationship with Hindus. Hindus became dominant over Muslims in the fields of politics and economics during the last 30 years of Sikh rule. Hindu traders and bankers took many benefits from the peaceful period of Sikh rule.

Before Sikh annexation, Shikarpur in Sindh was a trading and banking centre where Hindus were the dominant business-class. Multan city was the main exporter of fine silk and textile cotton while Shikarpur was the centre of banking.

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Shikarpur and Kalkata were associated with banking networking. This commerce network was very important for those traders who were exchanging money with gold and silver coins. With the start of Sikh rule, Hindu traders from Shikarpur located to Multan,⁴ where they became very powerful not only politically but economically as well. For Muslims, it was period of decline. In 1831, when Burnes came in Multan he wrote in his travelogue ... 'So high a Mahomaden Supremacy, there is now no public numaz, the true believer dare not fit his voice in public. The Eieds and Moherrum pass without the usual observances; the Allah ho Akbar of priest is never heard, the mosques are yet frequented, but the pious are reduced to offering up their orisons in silence.'⁵

These were the circumstances when Muslim political and religious elites decided to throw in their lot with the Colonial officers. After annexation of Multan, the East India Company decided to give rewards for their war allies. Sarfraz Khan Sadozai secretly worked for the British during the war. Sarfraz Khan was the only living son of ex Afghan ruler Muzafar Khan who had died during the war of Sikh annexation. Sikh government gave him life time pension but forced him to remain under their observation.⁶ In 1849, Sarfraz Khan claimed to the Board of Administration, because he was the chief of his Tribe. The Board declared him to be a life time pension holder for his family. Many Pathan allies got rewards for their war time services but the Board was especially generous with Sarfraz Khan.⁷

In the irregular army of Herbert Edwardes, local soldiers, like Faujdar Khan, Gulam Sarwar Khan Khakwani, Sadiq Muhammad Khan Badozai and Gulam Qasim Khan Alizai were appointed as regular servants.⁸ Pirs and Pathans got much from the East India Company for their war time services. In this respect Shah Mahmood got more than others. However, the government refused to compensate the loss of damage of shrines of Bahawal Haq due to war. After generously distributing the rewards, the East India Company secured not only their raj but also took the oath of faith for future assistance. The Company finished their traditional type of rule because they did not need their services. Now they wanted to rule over the people with their new ruling policies. According to John Lawrence, 'The soldiers long for native rule. He is not fit or inclined for our service. His trade is gone; he is too old or lazy to lean a new one. Crowds of irregular horses and footmen are thrown out of employment and swell the number of the discontented.'⁹ Pirs and Pathans got much from the East India Company for their war time services. In this respect Shah Mahmood got more than others. However, the government refused to compensate the loss of damage of shrines of Bahawal Haq due to war.'¹⁰

The Test of 1857 and Collaborative Relationship

The next test of the Muslim elites' faithfulness was the war of 1857. At that time there were two platoons in Multan that were suspected by the British. They took back all the arms from them. Yet 1200 men from 69th regiment rebelled. The British, however, were able to crush the rebellion, thanks to the help of their local landlord allies. Multan was thereafter seen as a bastion of Colonial strength in the region.

In a region like Multan, land was an essential factor symbolizing power and authority.¹¹ It gave a feudal economic and social privilege over the rest of the society.¹² Muslim society was based on tribal kinship bonds. The Colonial administrator acknowledged the social and political importance of the tribal and kinship groups and strengthened and promoted them further.¹³ Multani society was essentially rural in character and peasants were the backbone of the rural economy. It was organized along tribal and biradari kinship lines. These very structures of organization shaped the Punjabi conception of authority. The headman of biradari, who was elected by the notable biradari members, was the key element of this social fabric. Agricultural land, being a means of livelihood as well as a status symbol, was the most precious asset for them. Land grants to them, therefore, served on both counts. So land grants not only strengthened their conception of a benevolent colonial authority but were also commensurate with their desire of land.¹⁴

Colonial Management and Conception of Authority

In order to command people's allegiance, the Colonial management had to show that it was working for their benefit. Hence the policy of canal construction and land grants to win beneficiaries loyalty. By the mid-19th century, the Colonial policy had created a class of rural leaders who were close to the management, and acted as intermediaries between the ruler and the ruled. This class which owed its position to Colonial management was key in maintaining Imperial control over India.¹⁵ Members of this class were integrated in the colonial hierarchy as honorary magistrates, members of district boards and legislative councils.

In the 1860, the Punjab government started pursuing a new policy aimed at tying together the influence of traditional leaders with their knowledge and skill. To this end, three new offices were created: Honorary Magistrate, Honorary Police Officer and Zaildar. These people were assigned various duties, primarily the investigation of revenue free holdings. The most important group among the revenue holders was that of the Jagirdars. During the Sikh period, roughly 66% of the land in Multan district was held in Jagirs. However, Jagir holdings were reduced to about 20% of the total district area following the first regular land revenue settlement which was sanctioned in 1860. Jagir holdings were further reduced in 1870 when the second settlement in the district was completed. So, the revenue-free holdings in Multan district were substantially reduced within the first twenty one years of the British rule. The British government improved the position of the Jagirdars in the late

1850s to reward their loyalty during the rebellion of 1857, and Jagirs and pensions were generously granted to various Jagirdars and particularly to the influential people¹⁶ The British granted considerable autonomy to the villages through the co-option of influential men ; the co-option procedure was initiated through Zaildars.¹⁷

Zaildari system was introduced in Multan district during the second regular settlement (1873-1880).¹⁸ A total of 79 Zaildars were appointed: two of them e for police administration and 79 for the newer common functions. In many cases, however, the appointment of Zaildars was nothing more than a paper exercise.¹⁹ Magistrates, however, were more helpful and satisfactory as collaborators for colonial rule.²⁰ A provincial Government enquiry in became the reason for the introduction of Honorary Magistracy in district Multan. However it was somewhat later when actual appointments were made.²¹ In 1877 four Honorary Magistrates were appointed for Multan city, invested with the powers of a third class magistrate. Two more honorary magistrates were appointed in 1879.²²

The Colonial management wanted to manage the district as economically as feasible. It was hoped to get local influential support in return for honours, rewards and other financial benefits. In each village, there were a few a headmen, appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. The headmen represented their clients in transactions with the government. They were also accountable for revenue collection and were bound to assist in the prevention and detection of the crime. A chief headman was elected in every village through the votes of the proprietary bodies, subject to the sanction of deputy commissioner. .²³

The headmen were appointed on the basis of their loyalty and skills, and were under the Zaildars. Usually, these Zaildars were the leaders of the local “tribes” and “clans”, and had shown their unquestionable loyalty to the British. The early practice in the selection of Zaildars called for elections among the Zails headman, whose vote though not binding was intended to guide the choice.²⁴ Zaidars were the most essential segment of the local level management and their involvement in government was of much importance..²⁵

District Management and Colonial Multan

The district of Multan was divided into circles containing between twenty to forty villages, and a Zaildar was selected to act as the link between the local sphere and the management. Most of the Zaildars were selected from prominent landowners of dominant castes and biradaris. The Zaildari system was an attempt to link rural masses with the management through prominent men from dominant families. .²⁶ These Zaildar families emerged with considerable influence and gained the position to claim the leadership of the Zail's dominant tribes. Though the position of the Zaildars was not hereditary, mostly it passed from father to son, and thus this class became very influential . After 1890, the British granted large tracts of land in the canal colonies to enhance the position of many Punjabi Zaildars. Few Zaildars became land-lord as influential as the magnates of southern Punjab.²⁷ These rural leaders had played increasingly more important rule in the district boards and provincial legislature..

However, the managerial system was not restricted to the villages only. The Colonial government followed the same approach vis-a-vis Multan city where 15% of the district's population lived. Initially, the attempts were made to encourage the influential men of the town to get involved in addressing the critical issues such as town taxes and municipal funds. The Colonial management tried to win the loyalty and goodwill of these influential by bestowing upon them several titles..²⁸

Like Zaildars in rural areas, municipal committee members were appointed in the cities. The Municipality of Multan was established in 1867.s. The composition of the Municipal committee was differed at different times. Between 1885 and 1899, it consisted of 36 members, of whom 24 were elected and 12 were nominated. After 1899, it was composed of 24 members, of whom 16 were elected and 8 were nominated; of the elected members 8 were Muslim and 8 were Hindu.. The nominated members comprise 4 Europeans, 3 Muslims, and one Hindu.²⁹

The establishment of the Zaildari and headmen system in the rural areas of Multan and the formation of the Municipal committee and board of Honorary Magistrate in the city of Multan shows how the British devised their policies to consolidate their rule by linking the structure of district administration more effectively with the masses. The management wanted to administrator the district not only as effectively as possible but also as cost effectively as possible. The basic determinates of colonial policy making were the concerns of law and order and the revenue collection.

In the early years of British rule, many administrators distrusted the existing landed elite particularly old Sikh *jagirdars* of central Punjab whose power they saw as legacy of the rule of Ranjit Singh. It was assumed that *jagirdars* left by Ranjit Singh had no links of “old association” with the village. Then influence was not confined to boundaries of tribally defined *zail* but often transcended limits. These local leaders were linked to administration through *inams* and revenue free grants. .³⁰

The local elite had earned power and influence by displaying political loyalty during Sikh War and War of 1857. Their nexus with the Colonial government existed because they shared the prosperity and benefits, the government brought to the rural society. The Colonial administration dispensed large amounts of patronage to landholders in order to secure their

alliance.³¹ Such landlordism produced a culture which maintained a distinction between different classes of society. The culture widened the difference between commoner and elite.³² The Colonial administration strengthened this difference in the process of redefining tribal leadership, which created factional rivalry as less privileged tribes felt they had been implicitly relegated to secondary status.

If the jagirdars were the prop up of rural society, spiritual support was provided by religious figures known as Pirs and Sayids. The importance of Pirs in Multan can not be overvalued. Every Multani honoured a particular pir, to whose *mazar* a regular contribution would be made at harvest time. The living pirs were a source of spiritual guidance and inspiration and gave practical advice on disputes. In this way, pirs complemented the *jagirdars* as adjudicators. Indeed *jagirdars* would frequently consult their *pirs* before exercising authority in difficult or complex cases, while cultivators who had lost their *jagirdars*' good will, or who wanted a favour, might approach the great man through his Pir. The *pirs* and *jagirdars* shared the leadership of Multani society.

Socio- cultural role of Sufi Shrines

The affluent institution of Saint Shrines of Multan must be understood in the light of its pre- Islamic history. For centuries, the city had been a centre of Hindu pilgrimage, because of the presence of two famous *mandirs*, the 'Temple of the sun' and the Parhladpuri temple.³³ Two of the main shrines, those of Shaikh Bahawal Haq Zakariya and Shah Rukn-i-Alam were built near the *mandirs*.

During the sovereignty of Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707), Multan town was the capital of one of the main *Subahs* of the Empire, comprising the whole Southern Punjab, part of Eastern Baluchistan and Northern Sind.³⁴ Amongst the several Sainly customs of Multan, three *dargahs* (shrines) stood out for their sociocultural and historical roles. Two of them belonged to old established lines: the Suhrawardia, represented in Multan by Bahawal Haq, but also by numerous smaller shrines of disciples and relatives of the founder saint spread over the surrounding territory;³⁵ the Qadiri line, descended from Muhammad Ghaus of Uch and represented in Multan by the shrine of Musa Pak Shahid Gilani. The third custom, represented by a saint, Shah Yusuf Gardezi, apparently was not associated to any specific Sufi line. Still the memory of the saint was important for the religious identity of the Muslim population, as he was generally believed the first saint to have settled in the place. The Muslim quarters of the city were supposed to have been built around his tomb, near the old bed of the river Ravi.

Two shrines in particular, those of Shaikh Bahawal Haq and Musa Pak, stood out for having relations and connections beyond the limits of the district. The former's influence extended towards Sind where Bahawal Haq had most of his disciples, and the latter having mainly a Baluchi and Pathan following, gathered around the traditional Qadri strongholds of Uch, and north-west in the Derajat.³⁶ These two shrines consequently attracted most of the disciples from outside the District, and it was due largely to them that Multan had acquired its importance.

The second significant indicator was the correlation between the shrines and the ecology of the region. The terrain of Multan was branded by a model of human settlement deeply influenced by the course of the rivers. Most of the villages and the settled world were located in the riveran areas, while the so called bar or rawa lands (the arid highlands at the centre of the doabs) were, in the pre-colonial era, essentially uncultivated and used for grazing and pastoral purpose. The autonomy between settled and nomadic worlds was a crucial motive for the relevance of the saints and their shrines.³⁷ The communication of the nomadic pastoral tribes of the bar with settled inhabitants was stimulated by the requirements to replace the products of pasturage, as well as by the pilgrimage to the *dargahs*. As 19th and early 20th century testify, the '*urs*' - the celebration in memory of a deceased saint - were predominantly relevant for the interaction between these social groups in the district. In the second half of the 19th century, 46 Muslim festivals were recorded by a local historian.³⁸ Beside those of Multan city, there were significant festivities at Sher Shah, Makhdum Rashid, and Jalalpur Pirwala; here the religious character of the event met with material and business-related functions. There were festivals that had become famed as places where 'young camels from Bikanir and Bahawalpur' could be purchased.³⁹ The shrine's festivals, therefore, were principally vital for the pastoralists. Historical evidence shows that it would not be correct to consider these traditions as simply representative. There is sufficient evidence to show the relevance of the saints for the religious identity of the pastoral population. The relationship between tribes and the holy families was crystallised in the toponymy of the villages. Between 1885 and 1900, Edward Maclagan observed that the Sufi saints were frequently recorded in local memory and in oral traditions as founders or even as purchasers of villages, a fact that he correctly interpreted as a representation of spiritual authority rather than proprietary right.⁴⁰

However, the *pirs* of Multan were not to be considered entirely spiritual leaders. In south-western Punjab the personification of *sajjada nashin* tended to show a particular importance of the political aspect, as compared to other South Asian contexts. This is symbolically indicated by the local traditions of the saints of Multan who are depicted as having a spiritual but also a political control over the region. Sometimes the *pir* appears as the 'patron saint' as in the case of Bahawal Haq, who apparently protected the city from the Mongol invasions in the 13th century. In other cases we find the figure of the *pir* leading an army in battle or fighting against dacoits to protect his own disciples, as in the case of Musa Pak.⁴¹ But besides hagiography, we have considerable historical records that are witness to the participation of many *pirs* in politics. The most

pertinent example is that of the Suharawardis.. In the Indus Valley, Sufi leaders frequently tended to transcend the spiritual field to fill the political vacuum left by a distant Muslim state.⁴²

The mixed political - spiritual influence of the saints of Multan was also apparent from their emphasis on religious and 'caste' hierarchy. All the long established Sufi traditions of Multan belonged to generally Sayyid and Qureshi families or in the case of more recent Chishti Nizami, Pathan. These families, together with the Baluchis, represented the upper level of Muslim society in Multan.. They came to expand a distinguished culture, through the adoption of a lifestyle that emphasized a 'high' Islamic standard. The saint in the Indus Valley maintained his spiritual authority also by 'by keeping the distance' from his *murids*.⁴³

As is often the case, Muslim high culture in Multan had a firm tie with law. The sharif families confirmed to follow the sharia mostly in the matter of family law. Interestingly, the only point in which they all followed the 'Customary Law' was the field of succession.⁴⁴ Women usually did not receive their share in inheritance; moreover, the person who became *sajjada nashin* would normally receive a larger share of the Land – from 1/3 to 1/2- than his brothers.⁴⁵ This custom was usually justified with the *sajjada nashins'* need to preserve an image that emphasized the divine blessing. A further point was the obedience to strict marriage rules, which characterized mainly the Sayyid families, who followed a policy of intermarriage. For example, the Gilani Sayyids of Multan and the Sayyids of Sher Shah, *Sajjada nashins* of the shrine of Shah Ali Muhammad, were allied through both spiritual and marriage contacts. But firm links existed also between the Pathans and the *sajjada nashins*. In this case, as usual, marriage symbolized political and religious surrender, and went frequently together with spiritual attachments. *Piri-muridi* associations were developed in the 15th century between the Makhudum Gilani and Nawab Langah of Multan, and additionally recently between the Gilanis and Saddozais, who were Nawabs of Multan between 1752 and 1818.⁴⁶

As mentioned above, *pirs* were not the only members of the 'high' Islamic society in Multan. Baluchi existence in Multan went back to the mid-14th century, and was attached to long-term dealings between Baluchistan and, the Dera jat and the Indus valley.⁴⁷ Moreover a very old and stable Afghan presence in Multan was linked through the trade route that passed through the city, which was used by Afghan merchants, mainly Rohilas. Apart from this community, the Afghan settlement in Multan was initiated by the Pathan tribes that had migrated in the 16th and 17th centuries, following the Indian invasion by Turko-Afghan warriors..

At the other end of Multan's social spectrum were Hindu tribes and castes, mainly the Jat and Rajput, who had converted to Islam. Many were the tribal groups of Sindh origin that had settled in South-western Punjab, as had the Siyals who dominated the territory of the lower Ravi, between Jhang and Multan. Further south, in the bar lands of the Mailsi and Kabirwala Tehsils, Langrial, Hirraj and Singana were the dominant nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes and the Joyas on the southern course of the Sutlej. Langha, Thahim and Traggar were present along the Ravi on the Shujabad tehsil. While many of these tribes in the 19th century appeared to have settled in great numbers founding the riverian villages, the tribes inhabiting the bar, although converted to Islam, had not yet made- or not completed their transition to a settled way of life.⁴⁸ Therefore, the difference between hithar and bar or riverian and highlands, largely corresponded to one between settled and nomadic or semi-nomadic worlds. This pattern remained intact despite Colonial pressure, until the second half of 19th century.⁴⁹

Land Settlement and Structure of Land Ownership

The Colonial annexation of Multan in 1849 was followed by the efforts to restructure land ownership. With the Land Settlement, however, the management did not simply record land rights and revenue, but also tried to alter the local rural structure. One of the prominent outcomes of these efforts was the idea of 'village community'. This policy was operationalized through the officials from the North-Western Provinces, where the idea had already been put into practice.⁵⁰ The pursuance of this policy was partly due to the thinking among Colonial managers that that in Multan the common peasants and the large zamindars lacked the necessary spirit to become the back bone of the province, unlike in the eastern and northern districts of the Punjab. According to Edward Maclagan, settlement officer in Multan between 1885 and 1900, the Multani Peasant was:

... more self-centred and, at the same time, less alert and less industrious than the ordinary Punjabi. The Multani peasant lives on a well and not in a large village, he marries a neighbour and not a woman from a distant district. He never enlists, and sees nothing of any district but his own. He has therefore, a distrust of strangers...He has little public spirit, and seldom looks at anyone's interest but his own...The richer man have no idea of spending money on works of public utility...the inhabitant of Multan, though capable of exertion for a time, is, as a rule, easily discouraged. His efforts are by fits and starts; long continued energy is unknown to him; and he has not the instinct of discipline which marks the Jat of the central Punjab.⁵¹

The notion of a village community, therefore, was not just an administrative process planned to develop the revenue sources it was a also method to construct a 'community of interest'. Regardless of the fact that the villages in Multan were nearby only in the riverian areas, at a distance from a few collections of scattered houses in the bar near the wells, the view

that the Colonial administration had of the lower Bari Doab was that there should have been village communities, and that these should form the basis of the revenue administration in the Multan region.

Village communities in Punjab were defined by Richard Tupper as a 'group of families bound together by the tie of descent from a common ancestor.'⁵² Therefore, the people had to be made jointly accountable for the collection of revenue. The land was thus alienated into artificial units, called *mauzah*, to which a joint liability was accredited. However, the presences of these communities in Multan were more a fantasy than a reality due to the environmental characteristics of the region. The Commissioner G.W. Hamilton warned, in 1860, of 'non-existence of village communities and the incoherent nature of the subordinate fiscal division.'⁵³ However the Government, while admitting the non-existence of these communities, emphasised the need to create them. There was a logic that the formation of the communities had to be the 'natural' growth of the Multani society. The individualistic stage, at which the rural people of Multan lived, was for some a type of first on the mode of civilization. The Financial Commissioner R.N.Cust in fact wrote that:

...these people are the pioneers of civilization, the squatters in the primeval forest. Gradually however, the ramparts of a municipality will be formed round them; we have now given them a defined village area, and a joint property in the jungle, to the exclusion of others...the ties of fellowship and mutual advantage will draw them together, the law of joint responsibility will bring with it the right of pre-emption. As cultivation, population and wealth extend, these infant communities will develop themselves on one of the Gangetic valley, and the village community has come in to existence.⁵⁴

However, by trying to classify a region in common property for a community 'to the exclusion of others' in an area where grazing areas were so insufficient that the cattle had to 'wander over wide tracts in search of food'⁵⁵ was not only to go against any verification of the standard of living and ecosystem of the area, but also to bring the risk of creating clash in the society. It was a situation similar to Kamshmiri settings as analysed by Aprana Rao.⁵⁶ Where, ordinary entrance to sources was controlled by the colonial interference.

It is fascinating to note, however, that in the colonial mind, the shrines of the Sufis could become a tool to build 'common identities' in the localities. During the management process with which, in the late 19th century, the colonial management recorded the verification –or continuation – of *jagirs* or *maufi* attached to the shrines, special consideration was given to the social life of every institution. The management tried to measure if the shrines were in fact at the centre of the local villagers' or pastoral tribes' life. This would verify the bent of mind by the management to see the *dargahs* as the focus of local identities,⁵⁷ but would also propose a long term procedure in the direction of the 'secularization' of the shrines under the colonial government.⁵⁸

If the effort to form village communities was not successful, additional attempt to change the rural social structure was made through the claims to revenue-free grants that after annexation were forwarded to the government. Apart from a variety of cases of exemption from the payment of land revenue-known as *jagir* or *maufi*- an auxiliary model of support was *the tirins*. These grants were usually quite old, many of them originating from Mughal *sanads*, and testified to the relevance of pastoralism in the south western Punjab's economy.

Between 1850s and 1880s, the Colonial management had to scrutinize a great number of claims for the confirmation on *tirinis*. The trend was towards decrease of grants. The official reasons were typically the lack of written proof or the possible falsification of the documents by the claimants. Although interviews with witnesses were part of the process, and these often confirmed the claims, little worth was given to them; oral evidence always succumbed to written evidence. For example, in the 1850s, cases were recorded for two Hindu families - entered as 'nomads' – both of whom claimed *tirini* grants for various camels. Both grants, according to the claimants, had been conceded by the former Diwan Sawan Mal (1821-1844), and this was confirmed by the witnesses. Still, both were resumed due to lack of original *sanad*. In another case, the resumption of the grant was made on the basis of the rather strange argument that the grant was 'not in favour of a shrine or temple'. However in this case the pressure of the tribe led the commissioner to go against his subordinate's view and confirm the grant for the life of the incumbent.⁵⁹

From the 1880s onwards, the Colonial establishment in Multan tended to authenticate the grazing grants only for the life of incumbent, and in case importance of the family, confirmed it in perpetuity, to resuming the *tirni* and replacing it with a grant in land.⁶⁰ The policy cannot be explained in conditions of diminishing significance of pastoralism. As a substitute, the high number of *tirni* grants enjoyed by non-nomadic landed families confirms that in Multan the modes of survival were mixed to an extensive level. The Khakwani Pathans, who had led, since their migration to the Punjab, a sedentary life, had become one of the most important landed Muslim families in South-western Punjab, enjoyed a *tirni* grant conceded in Mughal times for pasturage of a hundred camels. Many saintly families also enjoyed grants for pasturage of their cattle. The offering of animals by the *murids* to the shrines' custodians was customary in Multan.⁶¹

Moreover, in the early 20th century, about 48 % of the region of Multan fell under the grouping of 'uncultivable waste'. In the uplands, according to the official records, land was 'a grazing ground for sheep and a browsing ground for goats and camels.'⁶² In addition, we have sufficient proof to suggest the different sectors of the society tended to maintain pastoralism as a preferred activity. If therefore, pastoralism and breeding were so important in the life of the district, we would

argue that the decrease of grazing tax payback by the management to the families and tribes of the district signalled the colonial concern in reducing the admittance to resources for pastoral nomadism in the district, motivating as a replacement for adjusted life and agriculture. In any case, the stability of a 'pastoral spirit' in the temperament of Multani peasants was something about which the Colonial management kept complaining throughout the period under discussion. This complexity faced by the management in enforcing a diverse pattern of economic activity would be part of the background of the large scale irrigation projects of the late 19th and early 20th century. As we have seen, the Multan bar was a high and mostly arid region, which extended from the southern part of the Jhang and Montgomery districts to confluence of the Sutlej and Chenab rivers, south of Multan city. It was a region that was populated mostly by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes judged by the management to be generally 'unreliable' and 'predatory'. The area had not considerably changed despite earlier attempts of artificial irrigation made during the Mughal period.⁶³ In the early 18th century, agriculture in Multan was still limited to the fertile *hithar* lands. A partial extension of the agriculture towards the bar occurred many years later under the Nawabs of Multan and Bahawalpur in the mid-18th century, possibly due to the political autonomy enjoyed by the Nawabs with the passage of the independence from the Mughal to the Afghan kingdom.⁶⁴

Pre- Colonial Canal Irrigation System

The pre-colonial canals can be separated into two categories: those from the Chenab, in the north, were generally constructed by Pathan chiefs for irrigating the lands of their own *jagirs*. The canals from the Sutlej were almost all excavated by the Daudpotras of Bahawalpur, except for the Ghulamwah, constructed by Ghulam Muhammad Daultana, the Diwanwah, by Diwan Sawan Mal, and the Hajiwah, by Gulam Mustafa Khan Khakwani. In general, the pre-colonial canals did not have the scope to irrigate the bar lands but rather to improve the cultivation along the villages that depended on the natural floods. Two relevant exceptions were the Hajiwah and the Diwanwah. With these two canals, for the first time, a partial cultivation into the bar was introduced. But in these cases the canals created tensions with the nomadic tribes of the area reached by the water.⁶⁵ In any case, despite the canals of the mid 18th century, the natural formation of the region did not change. At the beginning of the colonial rule, it was still feasible to differentiate the fertile strips of irrigated areas along the rivers, mainly populated by settled Jat tribes, and the arid, basically sterile lands at the centre of the doabs, inhabited by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes.⁶⁶

The uncultivated areas were not economically profitable for the management: the land paid little as revenue and the grazing tax paid was considered 'insignificant' by a Colonial officer in the early 19th century. Furthermore, the tribes of the bar were not useful for the military needs.⁶⁷ This was the main complaint of the management against the Multani inhabitants in general, and at the same time was noticeable and a vital point of dissimilarity between the South-west and the other districts of the Punjab, where the peasants were the backbone of rural economy and army. The only tribes that in the early 19th century were entered for recruitment were the Pathan tribes, as the Khakwanis and Badozais, with which the Colonial officers had had close links since the 1849 war.⁶⁸ However, the members of these tribes used to enrol as officers of elite Cavalry and Camel corps, not as infantry troops. The aggression of the management towards the tribes of the bar was expressed clearly during the war of 1857, when Colonial officers feared that the tribes could join the rebellion. According to a colonial officer, 'the predatory clans inhabiting the Bar...from time immemorial had been addicted to robbery and cattle-lifting, and under former Governments had repeatedly broken out in insurrection.' During the war of 1857 some of the chiefs were locked up as de facto hostages by the Deputy Commissioner in Multan, in order to avoid the feared rebellion.⁶⁹

Conclusion

To conclude, within a couple of decades of the Colonial annexation, a number of officers serving in Multan, began to believe that *jagirdars* who got worse off the competition. They were floundered in a mesh of debt and usurious interest payments. Their estates were broke up and passed to their Hindu creditors. The *Jagirdars* would soon become extinct. In short, the traditional power structure of rural Multan was disintegrated. The prospect of social revolution on such a scale was appalling due to the disintegration of the rural power. If the rural power structure disintegrated, it would take the colonial regime with it the *jagirdars* were a crucial element in the system of rural intermediaries through whom the Colonial governors governed Multan. Without them little would remain of the local administration.

The period under analysis concluded that the management was far away from troubled that the rapid agricultural indebtedness and land alienation, to be the trend as an example of the survival of the fittest. Economic policies brought effects as the economic and social position of many prominent landed families deteriorated.

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ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO: BOURGEOIS SOCIALIST OR POPULIST DEMAGOGUE? (1971–77)

Raza Naeem *

***Abstract:** Ayub's grand plans for capitalist development in Pakistan had led to two different crisis in the structure of the state: firstly, his attempts to play the Bonaparte had ended up not only consolidating the nascent industrial bourgeoisie as an economic power, but had simultaneously strengthened the power of the landed elite as well; and secondly, the contradictions of uneven capitalist development while certainly making way for a partial elimination of feudalism (by incorporating members of the landowning elite into elite forming strategies) had manifested themselves at a greater level by leading to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971.*

Keywords: Bhutto, socialist, populist, demagogue, bourgeois

Ayub's grand plans for capitalist development in Pakistan had led to two different crisis in the structure of the state: firstly, his attempts to play the Bonaparte had ended up not only consolidating the nascent industrial bourgeoisie as an economic power, but had simultaneously strengthened the power of the landed elite as well; and secondly, the contradictions of uneven capitalist development while certainly making way for a partial elimination of feudalism (by incorporating members of the landowning elite into elite forming strategies) had manifested themselves at a greater level by leading to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971.

It is our contention that while what happened subsequently after 1971 had little relevance as far latter crisis is concerned, nevertheless there was a common thread which joined the two events: namely that what really happened was indeed what should have been expected to happen; given the fact that Pakistani state had been functioning in an atmosphere of semi-peripheral capitalism, where because there was not a strong industrial bourgeoisie ready to take hold, and because the praetorian state needed legitimacy from established members of the ruling elite, it ended up mediating among the various stakeholders of the state instead of encouraging a more progressive bourgeoisie. Thus the state's role in this regard cannot just be reduced to playing a develop mentalist or modernizing role on its own. Ayub's state was thus a victim of specific historical circumstance it was in.

In such an environment, where neither an emerging bourgeoisie was in control, and neither the landed elite's power had been curbed, it appeared sensible for a figure like Ayub to hold on to power and consolidate the state independent of both classes, not totally dependent on them but still requiring their mediation, thus encouraging a sort of healthy competition between both, with him as a non-partisan referee. But if this Bonapartist tendency had worked so well under Ayub for about a decade, and the proof was that he kept the state glued together – partly through mediating between competing classes and partly through repression of the Bengalis – why did this formula unravel during his successor's time?

I think it is historically simplistic to attribute as a reason the immense hostility generated in West Pakistan by Ayub's placatory politics – which did not work for the masses and resentment generated in East Pakistan due to the dynamics of uneven capitalist development. Post-colonial states having dominant militaries often demonstrate such features. The answer lies in the fact that after the secession of East Pakistan, the military had been thoroughly discredited both as the monopolizer of force in Pakistan and as an institution capable of salvaging Pakistan's integrity as a fortress of Islam; this was something not peculiar to Pakistan. Military regimes in Argentina (after the Falklands War in 1973), Nigeria (after the Biafra War), Portugal (after losing their colonial possessions in Mozambique Angola), and France (after losing possessions of Algeria in 1960) had all relinquished power when they lost credibility during war-time. Thus as we noted earlier, while power interests were certainly behind the military coup in 1958, they were not responsible for the fall of the regime in 1971; there is ironically yet no theory to explain the fall of military in peripheral capitalist societies undergoing late industrialization.

It was in this environment that Bhutto had come to power. According to Tariq Ali (1983: 99), "History has recorded that military defeats feed the processes of social revolution... The mood of the country was such that a radical overhaul of the social and economic structure of the truncated state would have won massive support. A socialist regime could even have pushed through measures that demolished the crumbling edifice of the military-bureaucratic complex". Of course history was to issue its own somber verdict on the fallacy of such an expectation.

Other analysts have dwelled on how Bhutto was more a creature of the Ayub regime and that this association benefitted him in consolidating power after 1971. According to Akbar Zaidi (2000: 6), "Without Ayub, Bhutto would not have been possible". In many ways, Bhutto was the only person who had been tainted enough by being associated with the Ayub regime to know what the masses needed was more than mere talk of Rostow and development; in other ways, he was the

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opportunist par excellence who could visualize that Ayub's dictatorship was destined to fall because of its unpopularity. Ayesha Jalal (1995: 78) describes it as such, "... If recourse to populism was the most effective strategy to leaven the effect of Pakistan's widening economic and social disparities, the politician chosen to direct it was one of the main beneficiaries of the very military-bureaucratic state that posed the biggest obstacle to its implementation". Bhutto was thus well-equipped to silence the claimers of the Pakistani masses post-1971.

However in the context of our theoretical model of late-industrializing societies (which is neither Ali nor Jalal's theoretical paradigm), these observations become more relevant. Ayub and Yahya and left a state which although had suffered a loss legitimacy for one of its chief constituents – the military – and only temporarily per se, but the other two members of this state, the nascent bourgeoisie – albeit not in a very strong position – and the landed elite were still there to be supported; notably these two classes had stayed away from opposing the regime in the 1958 riots against Ayub. Moreover, the state was still strong. All these factors played in Bhutto's favor when he assumed power.

An indication of the way Bhutto intended to run the country – his slogans of "bread, clothing and shelter" notwithstanding – once in power, could be had from the manifesto which his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had put out prior to the toppling of the Ayub regime in 1968. The manifesto cannot really be defined as socialist even in the parliamentary sense of the term. As a number of observer had noted (Ali, 1983; Ahmed, 1973; Ahmad, 1983), this manifesto explicitly laid out the framework of how to manage an economy and polity *within the confines of the capitalist system* (as had been consolidated by Ayub); it did not aim for a radical overhaul of the state institutions as in abolishing private property; and did not plan to give land and factory over the peasants and workers respectively. As Feroz Ahmed (1973: 182) had noted, "*For Pakistan, the PPP's recipe for 'socialism' consisted of nationalizing the banks, insurance, heavy industry, the already partially nationalized communications, and energy resources*".

Other commentators such as Tariq Ali have noted the contradiction in Bhutto's other flagship slogan, "Socialism is our economy, democracy is our policy, and Islam is our religion". A more variegated amalgam of ideological obfuscation cannot be imagined. Bhutto sought to elevate the masses, the bourgeois classes and the religious fundamentalists at the same time without realizing the various conflicting classes and class interests inherent in this rallying cry. Bhutto wanted to be Lenin and Khomeini at the same time, and it can be added that the structure of the state allowed him to play such role with consummate ease.

Also suspect is Feroz Ahmed's (1973: 184) assertion that, "*In Pakistan's political context. Bhutto and his petty-bourgeois supporters represented a progressive force. They had spoken for the end of dictatorship, feudalism, and monopoly capitalism. They had demanded restoration of freedom of press: they had provided opportunities to the leftist intellectuals, suppressed for too long, to express themselves again; and above all, they had legitimized the slogans of socialism, which had been taboo in Pakistan*". To assert that Bhutto's version of "Socialism" was something novel in the country was not only to be oblivious to – but also abusive of – decades of Communist or Communist-inspired peasant and proletarian insurrections in the Indian sub-continent prior to 1947; such as Bhagat Singh's legendary exploits, the uprising in Telingana, Tebhaga and Malabar, and the great naval Mutiny in 1946.

The contradictions between Bhutto's own class (landed elite) and the class forces he claimed to represent (proletarian) soon started to become evident. It reflected in each and every one of his steps. Bhutto had come to power promising an end to the hold of the landed elite, which had not only dominated the pre-independence Muslim League but had been progressively strengthened since then; not only by non-implementation of radical proposals to distribute land but also largely favored by Ayub's own land reforms (1950s), as we have witnessed in chapter two.

The only reason why the masses – land-starved since about two decades of "independence" – were willing to trust Bhutto, himself a large land owner with yet another attempt and addressing their blight had got more to do with a strong passion the issue of land has always evoked in the Indian subcontinent in the scores of peasant uprisings, mostly in Bengal in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and had less to do with the fact that Bhutto as a member of the landed elite himself was well-aware of the injustices meted out of them and a consequent sympathy with their plight.¹

Noting the ways in which the 1972 land reforms were "different" from earlier land reform attempts, Akbar Zaidi (2000: 30) remarks, "*While ceilings had been further lowered in 1972 and a number of exemptions removed, possibly the most prominent feature of the reforms was that, unlike in 1959, land resumed from land owners would not receive any compensation, and this land was to be distributed free to land less tenants. In addition, all those peasants who had acquired land under the 1959 reforms and had dues outstanding, had their dues written off and were not required to make any further payments*".

In Guatemala, in 1954, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's appropriation of United Fruit Company's idle land had merited a CIA-sponsored coup which overthrew him and his reform program; in Mexico much earlier, leading up to World War II, the land reforms instituted by Cardenas turned over about 100,000 hectares of land over to the Mexican peasant, in what was one of the most revolutionary redistributions of land while keeping Mexico within the ambit of capitalism (this project overturned as recently as 1994)

In Pakistan, meanwhile Bhutto merited neither a CIA coup nor produced a land reform of some merit like Cardenas. He had learnt from neither experience, claiming to be a student of history; he could have been the initiator of a land distribution experiment which, according to Aijaz Ahmad (1983: 107) “*would have been surely destroyed the basis of semi-feudal ownership in Pakistan*”. But Zulfikar Bhutto was as much a representative of the degenerated breed of bourgeois nationalist maturing in the limelight of late capitalism, as Guzman and Cardenas had been of the opposite tendency.

Omar Noman (1990: 94) reflects on how this latest attempt at land reforms was reflective of the contradictions faced by a class which feared arousing not only the wrath of landed elite – by whom Bhutto was a part and on whose support he was parasitically dependent – but also of the peasantry who might have forced Bhutto to do something his class was not capable of doing – making the tenants master of land. According to him, “*The administrative machinery was controlled and manipulated by the large landlords. A corollary to this was lack of an honest administration capable of implementing the legislated measures. Finally, the land reforms program was marred by arbitrary political interference punishing recalcitrant land lords and rewarding loyal supporters of PPP*”. It is these contradictions which underlined the 1972 land reforms that led at least commentators (Hussain; Zaidi; Noman) to describe as them as a failure, joining its prestigious predecessors on the scrap heap of opportunistic shenanigans. Thus, according to Zaidi (2000: 31), “*Although, a lot of propaganda was issued about the success of 1972 reforms. As a resumed land was far less than in 1959, only 50,548 persons benefitted from the redistribution of 308,390 acres during 1972 – 78. Only 1 percent of landless tenants and small owners were benefitted by these measures*”.

As in the field of land reforms, Bhutto’s industrial “reforms” also sought to accommodate to capitalism, instead of breaking away with it and keeping true to the promises he had made to proletariat of Pakistan. His nationalization plan started very ambitiously with the nationalization of 31 large firms in 10 basic industries in 1971. This was followed up in 1972 by the takeover of 32 life insurance companies. However, the real blow which subsequently alienated Bhutto’s government from two important constituencies – the middle class as well as the landowners came with the nationalization of most private schools in 1972 – 74 and of all private and domestically owned banks (1974) and cotton ginning, rice husking and flour milling factories (1976). (Zaidi, 2000: 99)

On closer inspection, we get a more realistic impression of Bhutto’s nationalizations which were unlike those conducted by segments of bourgeoisie in other parts of the Third World (e.g. Arbenz and Cardenas, and even Nasser). According to Aijaz Ahmad (1983: 110), there was no attempt to antagonize foreign capital in Pakistan which was securely entrenched in Pakistan since the 1950s; his nationalization program also entrenched the old bureaucratic elite who had seen their privileges spirited away under Ayub’s alliance with the feudal oligarchy (Zaidi, 2000; Ahmed, 1973)

Coming at the heels of Ayub’s attempt at consolidating capitalism in Pakistan, Bhutto’s actions terrorized the nascent industrial bourgeoisie in Pakistan, not as much by the nature of those reforms as by conducting show trials of Bhutto’s personal enemies e.g. Adamjee on television and humiliating some of them publically; no analyst has said it, but Bhutto’s actions probably did a lot of harm to the consolidation of a strong industrial bourgeoisie in the country, by the latter preferring to shift their capital overseas to the Gulf, East Africa and North America and Europe rather than reinvesting in Pakistan.

Some observers such as Noman (1990: 79) have noted the increasingly divergent nature of the Bhutto regime from its proposed aims of attempts at socialization of the means of production. He says, “*The nationalization program under the PPP... was neither efficient in the corporatist sense nor was it a part of serious commitment to socialism. The managers of state enterprises saw public intervention, not in terms of a step towards socialism, but as an instrument through which power and income could be redistributed in their favor*”.

Thus Bhutto’s government which had come to power amidst such fanfare could not neither implement land reforms – which meant more than merely reducing the size of holdings – nor did it really challenged the power of industrialists who had accumulated vast amounts of wealth since Ayub’s time. When the workers tried to assign themselves the task of taking over factories, they were victimized by Bhutto’s personal police apparatus.

One more blow for those who still cheered as a representative of the classic bourgeois democratic revolution, and his version of democracy as providing a modicum of bourgeois democracy, came in the way he treated the provincial governments of Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where Bhutto’s party was still unpopular (in large part due to strong currents of Baloch and Pakhtoon nationalism as opposed to socialism per se) and the PPP’s ideological counterpart, the National Awami Party has secured the right to govern.

However, Bhutto thought that just on the strength – and part hubris – of he being “People’s Leader” he could proceed to extend his brand of petty personalistic politics to divest the smaller provinces of their right to elect their own representative and his decision to bring back the army against the popularly elected Baloch government quickly transformed a humble demand for basic provincial rights (within a federal structure) into a national liberation in Balochistan, the more recalcitrant of the two provinces. This event, pulls Bhutto’s refusal to accept the opposition’s quite credible charge of rigged elections in 1977 – an opposition which had only attained some form of support thanks to Bhutto’s successive policies of alienating and antagonizing the – was to be his undoing and led to the army coming back again as the presumed saviors of the status quo.

How can Bhutto's failure be explained then in an environment where democratic rules had never been firmly established, beginning with the advent of the Muslim League; and whenever the military came to power, the sense of failure multiplied. How can we explain the fact that a party which became so successful in capturing the public's imagination – unlike even the Muslim League in 1947 – at a crucial time in our history, upon coming to power in nation's first ever popular vote, would rapidly degenerate into a personalized apparatus exclusively dependent on Bhutto's whims; and would neither deliver economic or political emancipation for the people who had selflessly reposed their trust in it in 1971, is there some theoretical framework through which we can analyze the rapid rise of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan and its successive decline during the tenure of the same person i.e. Bhutto?

“Bonasocialism”, Populism and the historical task of the “bourgeoisie” in Pakistan

Pakistan since its inception in 1947 behaved like most other post-colonial states beset by the supremacy of the armed forces vis-à-vis elected parliamentary regimes, as well as issue of nationalism, ethnicity and imperialism by foreign powers. However, the succession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the ascendance of what many at that time were describing as a first in parliamentary democracy in the country, soon threw up many questions regarding the future of the country; for the ethnic majority in East Pakistan had just separated, which like its West Pakistan counterpart was overwhelming Muslims; thus this event dealt a death-blow to Islam is the reason d'être of Pakistan, in fact the very act of partition from India itself, as the subcontinent of old replicated into three states. Secondly, the military which had been the only stabilizing institution in Pakistani politics (and most would say still is) was also dealt a lasting humiliation as far as claims of legitimacy to rule in the absence of any capable politicians and its commitment to the best interests of people – as witnessed by the events of 1971 – were concerned.

Thus in this uncertain climate, where the twin pillars of stability – Allah and the army – had both lost their legitimacy, the emergence of a socialist, parliamentary regime could not help but give theorists new building blocks to play with. The theoretical debate shifted from top to bourgeois democracy to that of a bourgeois democratic revolution. No attempt was made to inquire whether such as bourgeoisie had ever existed in Pakistan, given its particular historic conditions (vastly different from India), different pattern of capitalist “development” and different pattern of consolidation of productive forces. The result was an uncritical grafting of European concepts of democracy (and authoritarianism) to conditions specific to Pakistan. Briefly, one such attempt of whose principle authors are Hamza Alvi (1983), Aijaz Ahmad (1983), Anwar Syed (1977) and Omar Noman (1990) attempts to explain Bhutto's subsequent actions upon coming to power to a form of deradicalization whence the more radical member of PPP – who supported redistribution of land and workers' takeover factories and also criticize growing cronyism and lack of democracy in the PPP – such as Mairaj Muhammad Khan, J.A. Rahim, followed by the voluntary resignation of Finance Minister Mubashir Hasan were forced to leave the party, and a more conservative faction took over in whose interests it was to advocate the status quo.

While having some explanatory merit, it is my contention that such deradicalizations have also occurred in China after Mao and in the USSR after Stalin (and even in Mexico after the peasant revolution in 1911), when the principle of class struggle was abandoned in favor of full-scale restoration of capitalism, but it should be noted that it took place only after a fully-developed bourgeoisie had allowed itself to be overthrown by the peasants and working classes. When applied to Pakistan, this thesis does not explain when and how an industrial bourgeoisie ever developed in Pakistan prior to the Bhutto period, and if it did, why their rule had to culminate in military rule by either a Communist Party in the case of Russia and China, or a party of consolidated bourgeoisie like the Congress in India and the PRI in Mexico.

Had elections been allowed to happen in the pre-coup period, a parliament would have come to power which while accountable more to the people (given the strength of leftist forces in the 1950s) but still would have been forced to recognize the power of the military-bureaucratic complex. More importantly, the country could have passed through a genuine series of reforms, breaking up the power of landlords in the countryside, and on the path of industrialization. Thus it can be said that the absence of parliamentary democracy actually strengthened the bureaucratic-military oligarchy.

But the intervention of the military in 1958 meant that Pakistan could not graduate into a period where a strong *national* bourgeoisie could develop as had happened in India, Iran and in the various regimes established by the national bourgeoisie in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s i.e. Goulart in Brazil, Arbenz in Guatemala, etc.

In such an atmosphere where capitalism had produced an oligarchy but not a strong bourgeoisie; had abolished the feudal mode of production but not the feudal lords themselves, the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could only confirm the contradictions of uneven capitalist development coupled with the unevenness of populism.

Mouzelis (1986: 78) mentions populism as one of the key concepts which can help explain the transitions to a post-oligarchic phase in late-industrializing societies; he has noted that while populism is certainly instrumental in bringing some form of pluralism to such societies, it also has the potential to degenerate into strongly personalistic politics and authoritarian tendencies. For him, “... *the end result is the break-up of the political monopoly of a small number of powerful families, the*

transition from political clubs or coteries of notables to more extensive forms of political participation, and the introduction of a series of reforms in the field of labor, legislation education and so on". (pp. 78)

In this case of Pakistan, we again find Mouzelis' delineation to be of substantial significance in explaining the rise of Zulfikar Bhutto and his PPP. But it must be noted that contrary to what Mouzelis observed about Latin America, populism in Pakistan came about as a result of the excesses of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy under Ayub, with the attendant contradictions of uneven development, rather than any tradition of parliamentarism. And even when Bhutto came to power in 1972, it did not lead to any reduction in the power of oligarchy, and led to post-oligarchic phase in Pakistan; in fact, bar some cosmetic changes, his populism led to the strengthening of the landlords as he not only was a member of the landed elite by class, but his party's major support base came from powerful landlords in 1970 elections. Another thing which happened during Bhutto's rule was the re-enthronement of the bureaucracy, which was edged out of the dominant functions of the state under Ayub. Also, the army was gradually brought back in by way of increases in military expenditures and the decision to send the military in Balochistan against people exercising their due right of provincial autonomy. Interestingly, under Bhutto, then the state began to move back towards a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, this time a parliamentary one, as had originally outlined by Mouzelis. The contradictions of late industrialization were again evident in this period as the nascent bourgeoisie again took a back seat and their capital fled out of the country.

In so far as Mouzelis (1986: 75) characterizes "incorporation" as "*not implying the total abolition of parliamentary democracy*", he is right as per the Bhutto regime. However, in all other respects, Bhutto's regime was an excellent example of a *state-corporatist regime* (pp. 75), since there was a very limited social pluralism but absolutely no genuine political pluralism, exemplified by his attempts to liquidate the NAP in Balochistan and NWFP: by frequent crackdowns and purges of trade-union and left-wing leaders, often with brutal police violence. As per Mouzelis' (1986: 77) notion of clientelism as another way to explain the type of politics in late industrializing societies, I agree with his definition when he describes populism as "*safeguarding the status quo against any serious threat from below, and it draws the new political entrants into types of conflicts where fundamental class issues are displaced by personalistic politics and particularistic squabbles over the distribution of spoils*". Even insider accounts (see Mubashir Hasan, 2000) testify to this object of Bhutto regime. Much was made of the television viewings showing some big industrialists such as Adamjee in handcuffs, but suffice it to say that most were punished on the basis of personal animosities, while foreign capital was not touched (Ahmad, 1983); the majority of industrial magnates got good compensation from nationalization of their concerns; and nationalized units were handed over to Bhutto cronies. When the radical wing of the PPP tried to object to these politics of clientelism, most of them were jailed or forced out, often with great violence.

Another of Mouzelis' (1986: 72) observations which hold some significance for Pakistan and its peculiar form of politics after 1971 is that, "*both the post-oligarchic broadening of political participation and the post-1929 rapid industrialization did not weakened but rather reinforced/ consolidated the authoritarian, incorporate state features that the semi-peripheral countries had inherited from pre-independence days*". Of course Mouzelis observed this about the Latin America late-capitalist societies; but Pakistan only differed in the respect that its industrialization program was conducted in the 1960s under Ayub, and the uneven nature of that development plus the demands for mediation among various interests ensured that political participation still gave way to much authoritarianism, as we have seen under Bhutto. Lastly Bhutto's politics can aptly be summed as *plebiscitarian* politics, while staying faithful to Mouzelis' definition (1986: 79). This form of politics is characterized by a strong reliance on the leader's charisma, so that the reliance of the working classes on such a leader becomes so much that they cannot engage in any independent mobilization and organization independent of the populist leader (1986: 79-80). Such a form of politics makes the working class impotent in the face of backlash against the populist leader, and is thus not healthy for the long term development of the working classes in the Third World. The same happened with the fall of Sukarno in Indonesia, that of Nkrumah in Ghana, Peron in Argentina and Bhutto in Pakistan. The working class was so mesmerized by the populist slogans of their leaders that they gave armies in these countries ample time to consolidate their hold over the state apparatus.

Indeed, Bhutto evokes fairly accurate comparisons with Peronist Argentina. But the form of state which in my opinion is the most suitable for describing the Bhutto's era, whatever the status of industrialization, is the notion of Bonapartism; this is a form of a state where the regime in power vacillates between the interest of competing classes i.e. bourgeoisie and the working classes. Such a leader, because he is not faithful to any one class, will always serve the interests of either when it serves his own interests. Thus he can never be a cause of revolutionary upheaval of the state in favor of the masses. Therefore a Bonapartist leader cannot be relied upon to serve the interests of the people; he always follows his own interests, which are seldom at one with the majority. According to Trotsky (1974: 326) "*In the industrially backward countries foreign capital plays a decisive role. Hence, the relative weakness of the national bourgeoisie in relation to the national proletariat. This creates special conditions of state power. The government veers between foreign and domestic capital, between the weak national bourgeoisie and the relatively powerful proletariat. This gives the government a Bonapartist character sui generis (of a special type). It raises itself, so to speak, above classes*".

Zulfikar Bhutto made the same mistake of following the Bonapartist route, trying to mediate between both classes (though as opposed to what Trotsky had said, there was no significant bourgeoisie in Pakistan, what of talk of their national character), he ended up siding with the strongest class, but remembered by the weaker class. Tariq Ali (1983: 132) reflects on Bhutto's failure, and the oligarchy's gain, "... (Bhutto) failed to construct a strong basis in any class. Instead he gave a special twist to the Pakistani variety of the populism; he sought to compensate for his lack of institutionalized political support by constructing extremely powerful extra-state apparatuses designed to coerce... Once Bhutto had put the state back on its feet, however, he was dispensable, and the army eliminated him at the first possible opportunity".

Bhutto's failure was historic; but that of capitalism's role in spawning such a mass of contradictions had been even larger. It served a dual function: it provided the masses with a fallen martyr and the military another reason to keep coming back from the barracks.

References

¹ It must be said that most Marxist commentators on Bhutto often indulge in labeling Bhutto as a "feudal" (much like their adversaries like to describe Bhutto as a socialist) without comprehending what such a connotation implies; Bhutto was a big landlord, and no doubt benefitted from Ayub's flawed land reform, but in the context of late industrialization, Bhutto stands out as much of a Bonapartist as was Ayub. But just as Ayub's class had nothing to do with the nature of his land reform, so did Bhutto in his subsequent actions. These actions have to be understood in the context of contradictions of uneven capitalist development, which forced Bhutto to seek to accommodate to those not only of his own class but also veering towards the masses with some reforms. Such is the contradictory nature of Bonapartism.