The Journal of History & Political Science

Published by Departments of History and Political Science,
Government College, Lahore (Pakistan)

Volume 1 No. 1

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This Journal can also be obtained from book-sellers or from Manager of the Journal, Government College.

This Journal is jointly published by Departments of Political Science and History.

Published by Saadat Sāeed (Department of Political Science)
Manager of the Journal of History and Political Science,
Printed at Packall Printers, Lahore.

THE JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume I **1971-72** **Number I**

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The Journal of History and Political Science Government College, Lahore (West Pakistan)

Editorial

This is the first issue of *the Journal of History and Political Science*. It is a joint publication of the Departments of History and Political Science of the Government College, Lahore. The College is a leading academic institution of Pakistan and has been serving the nation for over hundred years. A large number of scholars, administrators, politicians and other renowned persons have had their education here. Besides imparting education, emphasis here is on research and many departments have their own research journals, which have attained international recognition. The need for a research journal in the subjects of History and Political Science was greatly felt. This journal is intended to present not only the research papers of the staff and students of this College, but also to publish articles by other Pakistani and foreign scholars.

The present volume contains articles on various topics and in future issues, too, we will not only maintain this standard, but also try to enhance it. The articles have been arranged in alphabetical order.

We must express our appreciation for the encouragement and support by our scholar-principal, Dr. Muhammad Ajmal. He has been our guide and source of inspiration in the launching of this project.

Editors

POLITICAL ELITISM IN PAKISTAN

*Ahmed Husain.**

The state of Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947. The new state faced a number of difficulties to make a workable political structure.

To begin with, Pakistan had the unique handicap of being divided into two sections lying more than a thousand miles apart. There were also social and cultural differences between the two parts. East Pakistan is riverine province, inhabited for the most part by descendents of pre-Aryan people, who were converted to Islam. West Pakistan is relatively dry and is inhabited by descendants of earlier Aryans. East Pakistan is one seventh of the whole area, but its population exceeds the total population of all provinces in West Pakistan. According to the 1961 census, East Pakistan's population was 54.2% of the total population and West Pakistan's share was 45.8%[1]. The Eastern region was a compact area, whose economy was no organic part of the economy of the rest of the country, nor were the two parts alike in culture or language. Most people in Western region though they spoke different dialects, regarded Urdu as the common language. Both wings are predominently Muslim but East Pakistan had an important non-Muslim minority, which formed 23.2% of the total population. Therefore, to provide adequate representation to East and West Pakistan in the federal structure was a complex task.

Lastly, there was the problem of distribution of powers bet- the federal and the provincial Governments, while there was general agreement over the federal form of Government, differences arose between those who wanted maximum provicial autonomy with a weak

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1. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Home Affairs, *Population Census of Pakistan*, 1961, Bulletin No. 2, p. 4.

centre and those who favoured strong federal government with limited provincial autonomy. In addition to these intractable problems matters were made more difficult because from the very beginning no efforts were made to evolve political institutions, reliance being placed solely on the personal authority of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whom nation unfortunately lost within one year of attainment of independence.

Pakistani society was predominently illiterate, with a 19.2% literacy figure and oblivious to the significaace of political issues. After independence, the franchise was expanded from fourteen percent of the total population to universal adult franchise, but no steps were taken for the proper introduction of adult education. John Stuart Mill's saying that for the successful functioning of the representative Government it is important that universal education should precede universal enfranchisement was ignored by the political leaders. People who received the vote did not know what it was all about. The peasant and the worker knew nothing and cared little about what his pseudo-representatives did in provincial and federal legislatures.

The party bosses were not slow to capitalise on the two-fold advantage the multitude of the electorate provided due to poverty and ignorance. In all the earlier elections conducted in Pakistan it was alleged that the votes were bought and sold by people who did not know for what political issues they were voting or even what was the significance attached to the ballot paper. The middle class existing in the country was not powerful enough to check the forces of extremism. It is only through the middle class that a balance between the rich and the poor could be maintained. But that class was fast being obliterated due to reckless economic policy biased towards private sector. There were a small class of political activists. They were lawyers, journalists and educationists. They criticised the political parties for deviating from traditional parliamentary principles, but they were incapable to give leadership to the people.

As far as working of the parliamentary Government was concerned, the politicians violated the process of the system and loyalty to political parties was based on personal and parochial lines. The party chiefs had no principles and broke pledges with impunity. It was actually the vacillation of the political leaders that made the President a powerful figure in the politics of the country, though the

1956 Constitution envisaged the head of the State, to be mere figure-head, on the British parliamentary pattern. Nevertheless, President Iskander Mirza, a civil servant turned politician, strongly believed in the conception of "Controlled Democracy." He believed that it was for him and the Civil Servants to determine the degree of transfer of effective power to the politicians. He believed in making and unmaking Cabinets in the traditional bureaucratic way and once he refused to allow the outgoing Prime Minister to face the Assembly, to determine whether he still enjoyed the support of the majority or not. This was a clear illustration of the President's antipathy towards the parliamentary procedure. On the other hand the parliamentarians political equivocation aggravated sectional and regional differences. The main reason for the failure of 1956 Constitution was that the people had no training in parliamentary traditions and social and economic conditions did not warrant it.

Another venture to give the nation a productive political structure was made in 1962 and Presidential form of Government was introduced. But from the very beginning it suffered from an inherent defect of indirect election of the President, as well as the members of the National and Provincial legislatures by an electorol college. It was against the view that the evils of democracy could be removed by having more democracy rather than a surrogate, as it was easier to influence a few thousand voters than to win over millions of voters if there was adult suffrage. The system encouraged authoritarianism and creation of artificial public opinion. Consequently, the experiment failed to solve national economic and political problems.

Western democracy had a great allurement for the leaders of the new emerging countries. Almost all of them had been educated at European academic institutions and they believed that an important reason for the progress of advanced countries was due to their political organisation. They had conviction that all social, economic and political ills of the developing countries could be solved by adoption of Western democratic procedure. The haste with which they enforced the method, showed their firmness in the belief. Nevertheless there were a few among them who were skeptical about its efficacy in the new countries. But they were silenced with an argument that the intellectuals in the new countries would give the ignorant masses training to become conversant with democratic practices. The intellectuals were those persons who had advanced modern education and

staunchly believed in emulating the developed countries for scientific progress of their respective societies to attain modernism. Generally speaking they comprised of Civil Servants, Soldiers, Journalists, Lawyers, Teachers and Doctors.

At the same time unless a group was organised and had some influence on the decision-making body, it could not perform its pedagogic role successfully. Accordingly, only Civil Service and Military could be considered important from the view point of controlling the channels of communication and helping the nation to make progress to achieve social economic and political advancement to attain the cherished goal of being abreast with the developed world. Tersely, a class which comes upto the above-mentioned standard is called Political Elite. The significance of a political elite cannot be overemphasised. Whether a new state can maintain both stability and development, depends to a large extent on the performance of its political elites. Pakistan, like a number of other developing countries had Civil Service and Military as two well-knit bodies, with ample administrative experience of pre-independence days at their command.

The pre-independence Civil Service (I.C.S.) was converted into the Civil Service of Pakistan (C.S.P.). After independence lawlessness and refugee problems provided the bureaucracy with a chance to prove its mettle. Quaid-i-Azam turned to it to maintain law and order because it was the only organised group in the administration of the country. This small body of officials was able to establish a framework of administration and restore public order.[2] They shifted their loyalty from the colonial power to the Government of Pakistan and worked in traditional style, with strong corporate spirit. The officials of the CSP cadre were required to serve in any province of Pakistan but remained responsible only to the Central Government. In the provinces, they were helped in administrative work by officials belonging to the provincial cadres. From the top to the lowest rung, the administrative machinery of the Government worked smoothly. At the top policy was made and it was carried out by the lower officials without much interpretation. The system discouraged initiative, but it assumed that once an order was given by the Central Government, it would eventually, be carried out at the bottom.

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2. K.B. Syeed "Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 June, 1958.

The Civil Service of Pakistan attracted outstanding University Graduates and they were a class unto themselves. The bureaucrats were criticised on many occasions in the National Assembly and the Press for being snobbish and aloof from the commoners. Many provincial politicians complained that the Centre's control in provincial administration reduce provincial autonomy to a farce.

The need was to break the remoteness of the civil service from the people, which for long delayed democratic growth. During the British days the test of efficiency of the Civil Service depended merely on the need to maintain law and order, because that was a static society. After independence the need was for change of outlook which could create congenial atmosphere for active participation in economic and political development of the country. But majority of the bueraucrats were nostalgic in outlook and were desirous to exercise authority in the traditional imperialistic way.

The political institutions were amorphous and to guide the nation for political advancement much depended on the Civil Servants. But they failed to come up to the expectations and lack of political control encouraged them to exploit the situation for their own ends, despite the formal training and professional qualifications. Instead of working for creation of harmonious society which is an important prerequisite of representative Government, they allowed propagation of class differences, which eventually made Pakistan a class society.

Before Military as a political elite is discussed, it would be pertinent here to note the difference of outlook between the Civil Service and the Military. The bureaucracy deals with its domestic problems with little regard for what other bureaucracies in other countries are doing. But the Military has to be of international standard. There has to be a greater awareness of international developments and realisation of the weaknesses in the society.

The Pakistan Military, trained on the British pattern learnt to remain aloof from politics of the country and support the political party in power. A number of senior British personnel were retained after partition in the Pakistan Armed Forces. British influence is still of great substance among the senior Pakistani officers. Almost all of them received their training and early experience under British tutelage. Some even passed out from British military academies like

Sandhurst. They are professional soldiers in mental framework and their main concern about National politics until 1958 had been that its corrupt practices should not infiltrate Militray Ranks and undermine its integrity. The rift which is a common spectacle in some of the developing countries within the armed forces is unthinkable in Pakistan.

As an Organisation they have favoured any Government that is determined to maintain law and order. For instance, in 1953, Nazimuddin, the Prime Minister, sought the Military's help to save the Panjab from degenerating into chaotic condition. The Military acted promptly and within a short time, restored law and order in the province. In October 1954, the Military supported Governor General Ghulam Muhammad's decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly firmly, because he seemed resolved to create political stability. The Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan joined the Cabinet. However, he left the Cabinet as soon as the second Constituent Assembly began to function in 1955. Again, when at the end of 1957 the economic situation deteriorated in East Pakistan, due to unstinted food smuggling across the border of the Indian Province of West Bengal, the Civil Administration turned to the Military to eradicate the evil. In a brief but effective "operation closed door" it achieved astonishing success.

By October 1958, the Military Chiefs were fully convinced that there had to be a complete abolition of the existing political corruption in order to remove the national ills and save the Armed Forces from emulating corrupt political practices. As a matter of fact, the imposition of Martial Law was a step for the Military of self-protection. As soon as the new regime was secure the Military was returned to its proper defence functions. The Armed Forces of the country played an important political role to clear the mess and prepared the nation for a more practicable form of political structure. Like Pakistan, the Military in Nigeria and Ghana had to check political exploitation and save the country from deterioration. In January 1966, the Military took over the civil administration in Nigeria to save the country from being broken into different parts, due to regionalism. Similarly, in February 1966, the political dictatorship of President Nkrumah was brought to an end by Military intervention.[3] The above-mentioned examples clearly illlustrate that tradi-

3. W, Sokolsky in *Britannia Book of the year* 1967 PP-374,581.

tionally the Military has to be aloof from politics of the country, but as an organized body it has also to safeguard national integrity. Therefore, on such occasions its indulgence in politics of a country is justified.

Unfortunately within a decade the political situation again degenerated to the unprecedented low level and the Military had to take over the civil administration under its control in March 1969 to protect life and property. During the period between two Martial Laws the political system provided limited representation to the people, with ascendency of the bureaucracy. The Organisation of the Basic Democracies gave limited powers to the elected members and it was ultimately the presiding official whose orders were implemented. There was some economic development but since it was planned on the basis of free economy, the man in the street did not get any benefit from it. The breach between the haves and have-nots became alarmingly wide at a rapid speed. The Civil Service behaved irresponsibly, instead of permitting the people to ventilate their grievances so that the development could be on proper lines, it helped to create artificial public opinion through muzzled press in order to demonstrate a harmonious facade about the relationship between the people and the administration. For example, in the end of 1968, the bureaucrats were applauding by various channels, the achievements of the regime and branded it as a 'Decade of Reforms', on the other hand, the people belonging to all walks of life had taken recourse to demonstrations on the streets to register their disapproval of the policies planned and controlled by the Civil Service. The bureaucracy which had to take important decisions was still closed to the professional classes, even though, now the emphasis was on development rather than safeguard of imperial interests. This was perhaps, the major factor for the masses and the Civil Service being poles apart and ultimately precipitating the crisis which toppled down the erstwhile regime.

Various associations, which have an important part to play for formation of interest articulation were not allowed to operate freely. In other words they had to toe the governmental directions which impeded academic atmosphere for solution of national problems. Since the channels of interest articulation were controlled, therefore, political parties did not form policies genuinely based on interest aggregation which is a basic function of a political party. Political parties revolved around the leaders who looked towards the administration

for guidance. With a burst the agitations started against the former regime, showed the lack of confidence by the nation about the existing communication system, which gave the impression that the bureaucracy worked for vested interests and compeletely ignored the welfare of the rest of the nation. Thus partly upheaval against the regime was resentment against the bureaucratic attitude.

The Military Leaders were mindful of the factors leading to the breakdown of the civilian administrative machinery. Therefore, immediately after the suspension of the civil administration it was declared that ultimate object of the imposition of Martial Law was to introduce representative government on the basis of adult franchise. Accordingly, it was decided to hold elections to National and Provincial Assemblies to ascertain public opinion, which took place in December 1970. The Election proved to be a formidable advancement towards political growth. The electorate discarded the traditional attitude of lethargy and did not vote on kinship basis or to be controlled by the vested interests. Like the electorate of the advanced countries, the voter in our country kept in mind, the economic programmes of the political parties.

For making the Elections fair and full of purpose full credit goes to the Martial Law Authorities. There was no official interference, whatsoever, and arrangements were very effective as far as maintenance of law and order was concerned. Consequently, the Military succeeded where the bureaucracy failed to guide the nation towards representative system based on the will of people. But it has to be borne in mind that in the new emerging countries, due to lack of organized mass parties, sometimes the demagogues hoodwink the electorate about their hidden designs. Therefore, Election itself is no guarantee that the political leadership is sincere about the national cause. The general elections of March 1967, in Sierra Leone is an example of political corruption and ultimately the Military had to overthrow the elected government, to save the country from political and economic choas.[4] However, recently the civilian government has again been restored.

After the successful completion of the Elections, next logical question was the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the pepole. However, it is essential to record here that the reason for

4. W. Sokolsky in *Britannica Book of the year* 1968 p. 690.

the imposition of the Martial Law was to check parochialism and find ways and means for integration of the Pakistani Society and the general election was considered a step towards that direction. But regrettably, the leader of the majority party thought otherwise. He interpreted the demand for more autonomy by East Pakistan voters as a call for breakaway from the motherland. This was a blunder because no one has a right to take a lead for secession. To keep a country united is an old politicle principal, which has never been challenged. In the Nineteenth Century the American Civil War was fought to maintain the American Federal Structure and secessionist elements were curbed. In 1958, Military Operation was carried out in Indonesia to keep the country integrated and suppressed the rebellious forces of the Central Sumatra.

In 1967, the Eastern Region of Nigeria decided to secede from the Federation, due to differences about division of powers, between the Centre and Regional Authority. But the decision was not allowed to go unchallenged by the Federal Authority and after huge loss of life and property the country was kept united. To keep the country intact is an important contribution of the Military as a political elite, because when the passions subside, all realise that there is strength and prosperity in the union. Thus, when the leaders of the Awami League started seditious activities, the Armed Forces correctly disbanded the party and tightened administrative grip over the Eastern Wing and saved the country from being liquidated. It was, indeed, a commendable performance.

The restoration of peace and tranquillity in the country is the main concern at present but ultimate object of the authorities is to introduce a viable political system which gives precedence to the elected representatives of the nation. Therefore, there is a tremendous responsibility on the shoulders of the political elites in Pakistan. The bureaucracy has to adjust itself to the changed situation and has to make it matto to serve the people rather than to rule them. The Military has to keep the country united and safeguard the national interests, so that the nation should forge ahead and attain affluency.

PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS—1958-1960

Farhat Mahmud

THE foreign policy of Pakistan since its independence can be divided into two main phases :

1. The ph se of Alignment (1947-1960) with the Anglo-Saxon powers in which the United States figured most prominently,
2. The post 1960 phase of building an independent though not necessarily neutral, image of Pakistan in special relationship with the Afro-Asian Region.

The years 1958-60, the first two years of Ayub's Regime and the last two of Eisenhower were very significant in the history of Pakistan-United States relations. It was during these years that new stresses and strains appeared in the relations of the two countries and the stage was set for the post 1960 phase of a more independent policy. The best years of Pak-American friendship were already over and Pakistan could not look behind with satisfaction over what she had achieved through a policy of alignment. There was a general disillusionment and frustration directed against the commitments which Pakistan had undertaken without any surety of defense against aggression from India ; restrictions put on freedom of action in international affairs ; lack of total support on Kashmir from the United States ; unpopularity gained in Afro-Asian block because of the policy of alignment ; involvement in the cold war ; resentment caused in the fellow Muslim countries because of membership of CENTO; and alienating China and the U.S.S.R. Never, it seemed, had Pakistan stood so alone.

Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan in October 1958 and Muhammad Ayub Khan emerged as the country's strongman. Naturally new forces played their part in the subsequent happenings.

Ayub's administration followed the familiar pattern of all new administrations in Pakistan by drawing closer to the West in general and the United States in particular. Ever since January 1951,

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when he took over as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Ayub had been very close to the political situation of the country. Some of the politicians relied very heavily on him and he influenced their way of thinking in internal as well as external policies. It would be too much to say that Ayub Khan was the author of the policy of alignment with the United States, but he was certainly one of the strong voices which influenced the Government of Pakistan.

Ayub's administration started with a pledge to adhere to the military commitments Pakistan had with the United States. In fact, Ayub's regime in some ways was even more pro-West than the previous ones. Only four months after Ayub's coming to power, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of Buddhist theocracy in Tibet, fled to India, when China tightened its severeignty over Tibet. Instigated by the United States and Britain, Malaya and Ireland introduced a resolution at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, to discuss Tibet. The resolution was adopted on 21 October 1959. The votes cast were 45 for, 9 against, 26 abstentions and 2 absent. Pakistan supported the resolution with a strong speech. India, the concerned country opposed it and did not take part in the voting. This was a clear case of Pakistan taking to much upon herself to please the United States.

Ayub also belonged to the school of thought which believed in the "push of the north" in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. China's domination over Tibet worried him. One month after the Dalai Lama with his band of courtiers and disciples reached India, Ayub made an offer of joint defense to India on 24 April 1959. In case of external aggression, he thought, both India and Pakistan should come together to defend the sub-continent. For a long time bad relations between Pakistan and India had been embarrassing to the United States and limited its freedom of action. The United States always liked to see close collaboration between India and Pakistan. President Eisenhower immediately welcomed Ayub's proposal but Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 4 May 1959: "We do not purpose to have a military alliance with any country come what may. I am all for settling our troubles with Pakistan and living normal, friendly and neighbourly lives—but we do not want to have a common defense policy which is almost some kind of a military alliance—I do not understand against whom people talk about common defense policies ?"

Nehru's declaration of "joint defense against whom" put Ayub on the defensive. Writing in his autobiography afterwards, he explained :

> A few days later I clarified my position, explaining that it did not mean any special type of pact about which India needed to be perturbed. What I had in mind was a general understanding for peace between the two countries. I emphasised that the pre-requisite for such an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir and the Canal Waters. Once these were resolved, the armies of the two countries could disengage and move to their respective valnerable frontiers. This would give us the substance of joint defence ; that is, freedom from fear of each other and freedom to protect our respective frontier.[1]

It was quite clear that even his explanation of what he called "the substance of a joint defense" was very poor. Moreover it was quite evident that still the 'respective vulnerable frontiers," he was talking about, were the frontiers with Russia and China. Nehru, however, by rejecting his proposal allowed him to get out of a very tricky situation. Ayub would have been more embarrassed if Nehru had accepted it because, the Pakistanis as a nation, would never have acccpted a joint defense with India. There was some criticism of the United States too among the Pakistanis because it was generally felt that some "hidden hand" made Ayub make the offer of joint defense.

The same pro-West and anti-Chinese and Russian tone continued during President Eisenhower's visit to Pakistan in December 1959. Ayub, when asked by newsmen, if he had briefed Ike on the question of Soviet threat in Aghanistan and Chinese threat in Kashmir, replied, that he had, and President Eisenhower realizes the gravity of the threat. James C. Haegerty, White House Press Secretary, also stressed in his communique that "the United States and Pakistan were military allies and there was not one iota of difference between them on the question of Chinese communist aggression."[2]

Writing in the *Foreign Affairs* Journal of July 1960, Ayub, as a "student of war and strategy, again warned against the "inexorable push of the North." He advised that the only chance of preventing recurrance of the history of the past—which was that whenever the sub-

1. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London : 1967), pp. 126-127
2. *The New York Times,* 9 December 1959.

continent was divided some outsider stepped in—was disengagement between India and Pakistan and squabbling with each other. During the trouble in Laos in 1960, Ayub nonchalantly announced that if the United States envisioned a role for SEATO in the conflict, Pakistan would send a military contingent. When China's admission was considered in the Credentials Committee of the United Nation's General Assembly of 1960, Pakistan supported China's admission, but under pressure from the United States, changed its position again when the matter was raised in the Plenary Session.

There is no denying the fact that the policies of the Ayub Regime from 1958 to 1960 were completely pro-United States. Certain facts were, however, causing doubts and making Pakistanis think twice.

In July 1958, a *coupd'etat* in Iraq under Kassim removed the Hashmite dynasty, which was considered a British puppet in the Middle East. Kassim immediately withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which was denounced by the Arab States as a western plot to undermine Arab nationalism as well as neutralizm. With Iraq's withdrawal the only Arab country, which was a member of the Baghdad Pact, was removed. The Baghdad Pact, after Iraq's withdrawal was renamed Central Treaty Organization, popularly known as CENTO. Thus the Baghdad Pact lost its name and gradually its meaning too. Step by step it moved towards socio-economic cooperation and understanding, and lost its military character. Only a shadow of its defensive wall against communism remained.

Membership of Baghdad Pact had caused losts of hatred for Pakistan in the Arab countries. Arabs' attacks gradually ceased after Iraq withdrew. On the other hand, the revolution in Iraq considerably undermined the military pacts. It became clear to Pakistanis that in the time of attack it would be very difficult for Western powers to interfere. At the same time it became clear to the Western powers that it would be very difficult on the part of Pakistan or any other nation to interfere in case of an internal revolution in a member country. It seemed the whole idea of a military pact in defense of the Middle East crumbled in the face of the revolution in Iraq. Khrushchev was right when he had predicted that the Baghdad Pact would burst like a soap bubble, leaving behind some unpleasant memories.

Spectacular advances were being made during these years in military technology. Of these, the development of the Intercontinental

Ballistic Missile, was very significant. With its development the United States had the ability to fire a missile from its own soil in case of a threatened attack or if a vital interest was threatened. This had the virtue of reducing dependence on allies who, on account of the American military bases in their territory, tended to compromise the United States' freedom of action in the service of its interests in international relations. As the importance of military allies lessened the neutral nations gradually started becoming more important. The United States started shifting towards new policy of 'Containment of Communism' through a ring of economically strengthened, free, and neutral nations, supported by United States' military might against communist encroachment. The emphasis began shifting from military support to economic support. Pakistan, naturally, looked at these new developments or 'winds of change', with apprehension.

The military regime which took over the political power in Pakistan under Ayub, who also declared himself President of Pakistan soon after, was a signal for American intellectual circles, who had never supported the American policy of befriending Pakistan at the expense of alienating India, to criticize Pakistan more and more. A natural ambivalence of Americans towards military dictatorships was creating good ground for spreading the new anti-Pakistan sentiments. Uneasiness was voiced by many American newspapers concerning the military alliance with Pakistan. The *Wall Street Journal* typified these sentiments when it wrote : "Perhaps the alliance will continue, but the Pakistan the United States is allied with this morning, the day after the 'coup', is certainly not the Pakistan it has been relying on for the defense of democracy."[3]

These sentiments, in fact, were working both ways. The intellectuals in Pakistan hated and criticised the United States for the military 'coup' and end of democracy. The United States' military aid, after all, had strengthened the armed forces which now ruled the country. According to their arguments the machinery of military aid and alliances served to prop up right wing military regimes, which would hardly survive or think of ruling the country, on their own, in face of the people. The natural result was that the popular sentiments became more pronounced against the American aid, which fostered the unpopular military regime. *The New York Times* of 30 November 1958 represented this new bitterness in its magazine section :

3. *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), 10 October 1958.

"The fact that the Pakistan Army equipped by the United States, is rated the best fighting force east of Suez, did nothing to save the Parliamentary Democracy in the country. It was, in fact, the American equipped Army which did away with the Parliamentary system."

The Sino-Indian rift in the early part of 1959 had far reaching effects on American policy towards India and ultimate Pakistan-United States relations. On 31 March 1959 the Dalai Lama reached India and was granted asylum. The rift between India and China went on widening after the Dalai Lama's escape, and Chinese demands for demarcating the McMahon Line. The post-Tibet hardening of Indian opinion and the Indian government's decision to upset communist control of Kerala in August 1959, was considered an opportune moment by the United States policy-makers for a whole-hog revision of policy in South Asia. In worsening Sino-Indian relation the United States saw a great chance to make inroads into Indian neutrality.

Criticism of the South Asian policy of the United States increased every day. The most bitter attack against Pakisten came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright, the prestigeous Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the earliest critics of the aid to Pakistan. As early as March 1954, he was virtually the only Senator who had raised his voice in the Senate:

> "I wish to make a few observations about the recent decision of the administration to supply arms to Pakistan. I disapprove of this move, and I wish the record to show very clearly my disapproval, because in the future, when the results of this policy are evident to all, I want it to be clear where the responsibility rests.....When, the investigating committees or the historians of the future are trying to ascertain why we lost the friendship of India I want it to be perfectly clear where the responsibility should be placed." (Cong. Records, Vol. 100, Part 2, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. pp. 2481 & 2483.)

Towards the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, especially the Democratic majority had become very vocal in its attacks on aid to Pakistan. The names of the critics made an impressive reading: John F. Kennedy (Massachusetts), Senator Fulbright (Arkansas), Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota), Mike Mansfield (Montana), and Wayne Morse (Oregon). By 1959,

the criticism was so loud that it not only put the Eisenhower Administration on the defensive but also made Pakisian very apprehensive of the United States' future course of action. After the death of Dulles, who was considered to be a great friend, Pakistan's feeling of apprehension intensified.

The Pentagon went on vigorously defending the aid to Pakistan. But the Senators were not convinced. When Assistant Secretary of State, william Rountree, argued that Pakistan's role as an ally was valuable, Sanator Fulbright said: "I don't agree with you about Pakistan. I think the military aid given there has been a great mistake. I think you would be better off to admit that it probably is, than to try to justify it."[4] Senator Morse not only attacked the military dictatorship in Pakistan, but also aid to Pakistan and its effect on the relations of the United States with India, in one of the most bitter attacks on the floor of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Morse asked Secretary of Defense McElroy:

> Does Pakistan maintain a democratic form of Government? Isn't it...that Pakistan has suspended most of the democratic processes that previously existed and is being operated under...a totalitarian form of Government?

When McElroy replied that "totalitarian form of government" was too harsh a word and Ayub expected to return to a democratic form of government, Morse said:

> Would you like to go through the Bill of Rights to tell me what corresponds with it in freedom that exists in Pakistan... and you do know, don't you, that it is a pretty common practice of dictators to hold out the bait, that a day will come in the future; while they exercise at the present time a suspension of Civil Rights and those rights that determine whether or not a population is free or living under a police state?

Sec. McElroy:

> I am inclined to believe well of our friends.

Sen. Morse:

> I am raising the question whether or not they are friends. Do you think that our military support of Pakistan had strengthened our diplomatic relations with India. They have

4. U. S. Senate, 86th Cong. Ist Sess., *Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings*, (The Mutual Security Act of 1959), 6 May 1959 pp. 481, 637—639.

> to be weighed, as a matter of policy...The Administration, in our opinion, is supporting too much dictatorships around the world and not enough freedom..You are not going to strengthen America by supporting a bunch of dictators...I am going to take a long hard look at the recommendations [in aid] for Pakistan, because it isn't creating goodwill for us in that part of Asia. I think it is one place where there can be a cutback.[5]

Senators Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) and Fulbright asked, and General White, Chief of Staff, U.S Air Fotce replied, that Pakistan was keeping more forces than the United States felt they ought to have because of a fear of India which the United States did not share with Pakistan. "In giving military aid, the military," said Fulbright, "has over-ridden the State Department's better judgement and Pakistan has forces that are in excess of those which are regarded as militarily required by our Joint Chiefs of Staff in their appraisal."[6]

The sentiments expressed and the statements made in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were significant in one more sense. Under the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, which governed the condition of aid to Pakistan, the United States saw to it that the allies maintained a level of armed forces the United States considered necessary. The eligibility for assistance was only if:

(a) the recipient country fulfilled the military obligations which it had assumed under multilateral and bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United States was a part and,

(b) make consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.[7]

It looked in Pakistan that the Senators were trying to prove that Pakistan was not fulfilling the conditions of the Mutual Security Act of the United States of 1951 and therefore should not be provided any military aid or at least a 'cutback', as Senator Morse said, should be made. These views were being put in practice too. Only a last minute White House pressure in the form of a special session threat, forced deletion in Conference Committee of the Senate, a provision

5. Ibid., pp. 205, 206.
6. Ibid., p. 188.
7. *U. S. Statute at Large*, Vol. 65, 82nd Cong. Ist Sess. 1951, pp. 373 & 381.

specifically transferring $ 200 million from less developed countries to NATO aid recipients. An actual cut of $300 million was made in military aid appropriations for Asia. Selig Harrison wrote that: "Although the cuts, which have been made in military aid appropriations carry no area directives and need not be applied to Pakistan in particular, but (sic) the Congress has, in effect, offered a very clear judgement on the Pakistan case."[8]

What exasperated ally Pakistan was that, while all that criticism was levelled against her, aid to Pakistan by the fiscal year ending June 1959 had reached a total of $1·5 billion. In comparison in the name of countering the United States aid to Pakistan, neutral India had received $1·7 billion. Of these $500 million had been spent on Indian Military which would have been insupportable without the United States aid.

Another very important factor appeared at this very time which had far reaching effects on general American economy itself. There was growing concern about the repeated recessions in the economy and about the slackening of economic growth in the United States, which had fallen close to 2 per cent. The alarming danger signal was the deficit in the international balance of payments running against the United States. By 1958 there was a "dollar gap in reverse." America's non-military exports fell from $19·3 billion in 1957 to $16·3 billion in 1958 and 1959. American imports for 1957 were $13.3 billion, for 1958 $12.8 billion and for 1959 $15.2 billion. Thus by 1959 America's non-military exports only slightly exceeded its imports. Because of this narrow gap between imports and exports, America's military and economic aid abroad, along with some other factors, produced a balance-of-payments deficit against the United States of 3.6 billion in 1958, of 3.8 billion in 1959, and 3.8 billion again in 1960. As a result America's gold supply was shrinking at the rate of 6.5 per cent annually.

As a result there were more and more demands for cutting foreign military and economic aid and a new insistence that aid be spent in the United States, and the recipients buy their arms and machinery in the United States. There was a new 'buy American' insistence, but it was discovered that about three-fourth of economic aid had always been spent in the United States.

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8. Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the U. S.—I, Case History of a Mistake," *The New Republic*, 10 August 1959, p. 11.

The balance of payment difficulties and the weariness of the people in the United States at the indefinite continuance of aid to the outside world produced a reaction against foreign aid. The internal situation required the United States government to turn inward. The diminishing importance of the alliances, the emergence of the new states in Africa and a need to concentrate on Latin America were the other factors which were affecting the United States policy towards aid. Pakistan, which was entering its Second Five Year Plan in 1960, needed aid and capital. The new trend in American thinking about foreign aid and new trends of international relations in Asia needed a reassessment of its own foreign policy. Two new incidents in 1960 set it on the policies which were totally different from what it had been following so far. The U-2 incident and the election of John F. Kannedy as President further shook the tattering edifice of Pakistan-United States friendship.

Nikita Khrushchev announced in the Supreme Soviet on 5 May 1960 that Russia had shot down a spying U-2 aircraft over Sverdlovsk. Its pilot, Gary Powers, admitted that it had flown from Turkey to Pakistan and had taken off on its last flight from the United States base in Pashawar in West Pakistan for a destination in Norway. The State Department immediately denied the flight of any spying mission. The Pakistan government denied with greater vehemence that the aircraft had flown from Pakistan. It also stated very strongly that there were no American military bases in Pakistan. The Pakistan government went on denying even after the United States newspapers and periodicals showed the route for the U-2, and Peshawar as a military base of the United States.[9] The denial was puerile and ill-conceived because the President of the United States admitted and shouldered the responsibility of the flight. The incident ended with the plea to the Soviet Union that Pakistan did not know there were spying flights from Peshawar, therefore, innocent. A promise was given that no future flights would be allowed. A protest to the State Department was made with the demand that no future flights should be made. This assurance was readily given as President Eisenhower had already announced there would not be any flights over the Soviet Union.

The U-2 incident exposed to Pakistanis that they were taking too much part in the cold-war. All along they had believed their

9. *Time* and *Newsweek* of 16 May 1960.

government and the government of the United States, that there were no military bases in Pakistan. As late as May 1959 Acting Secretary of State, Douglous Dillon, had told the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate that there were no military bases in Pakistan : "Our arrangements with Pakistan," he stated, "are very definitely that we have no bases there and no base right there... ..Pakistanis are extremely sensitive about this subject of bases. It has been stated that there are bases in Pakistan. There was a news article which caused great difficulty. There are no bases."[10] The belief in the righteousness of the two governments was badly shaken. It dawned on the people that governments go on lying conveniently when it suits their purpose. The popular feeling was : "If one cannot trust them in one thing, why trust them in others ?"

The explanation of the Pakistan government, that it did not know about spying flights, also created lots of ill-will among the people. It was felt that the Pakistan government was playing an absolute second fiddle to the United States. So much so that the United States did not even bother to tell the Pakistan government that such flights were taking place. It created bad feelings against the United States because she did not care to tell the Pakistan government.

It also dawned on the Pakistanis that they could get involved into an atomic war because of the military alliances Pakistan had with the United States. Nikita Khrushchev in a function of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Moscow on 9 May 1960 singled out the ambassador of Pakistan and informed him that "Soviet rockets would be used to retaliate against bases in countries that permitted the United States planes to take off on intelligence missions over the Soviet Union. Peshawar had been marked on the map and a ring put around it by Soviet defense forces."[11] Naturally this threat made the Pakistanis very apprehensive and sick. In turn it made the involvement with the United States very unpopular.

The second incident, which made the Pakistanis think about the friendship with the United States, occurred in November 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected the President of the United States. Kennedy had never made any secret of his pro-India feelings and was a critic of the United States aid to Pakistan. Consistently he talked

10. U. S. Senate, 86th Cong. Ist Sess., *Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings*, (The Mutual Security Act of 1959). 6 May 1959, p. 485.

11. *The New York Times*, 10 May 1960.

about aiding India so that it could assume the leadership of all Asia. Speaking on the floor of the Senate on 14 June 1960 he declared : "It is vital that we aid India to make a success of her new five-year program—a success that would enable her to compete with Red China for economic leadership of all Asia," He devoted a full speech in the Senate on 25 March 1958 advocating aid to India. "Our friendship should not be equated with military alliances or voting the Western ticket. To do so only drives these countries closer to totalitarianism or polarizes the world in such a way as to increase rather than diminish the chances for local war."[12] Kennedy criticized the policy of Dulles and alliances and showed appreciation of neutralism, in an interview with John Fisher, Editor-in-Chief of the *Harper's Magazine*.

Q : You are less disturbed than Mr. Dulles was, for example, by countries taking a neutralist foreign policy ?

Kennedy : Oh, I think it is inevitable. That's the great trend. During the immediate years ahead this is likely to be an increasing trend in Africa and probably in Latin America. In Asia, however, there may be some movement away from a wholly uncommitted neutralism as a result of the growing awareness of the Chinese threat. The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States.

Q : Do you think it was a mistake for us, under Mr. Dulles' administration, to try to force a good many of these underdeveloped countries into military pacts with us ?

Kennedy : I would think that the Middle East and Asia were not the areas that Mr. Dulles was most snccessfule in.... I would say that he was more successful in Germany. The Aswan Dam refusal, the concept of the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, which is being rejected in every country—all these, I would think, are unhappy monuments to Mr. Dulles in the Middle East.[13]

12. John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 157.

13. Ibid., pp. 218—219.

These were the views and utterances of John Kennedy when he contested for the Presidency of the United States. It should go without saying that Pakistanis, almost to a man, were pro-Nixon. They became very nervous when Kennedy was elected President. Their fears were to prove true very soon.

The years 1958-1960, i.e., the first two years of Ayub's administration, as far as Ayub was concerned, were very much pro-American. By his actions, his speeches aud writings, Ayub left no doubt in anybody's mind that he was totally allied with the West and considered Russia and China as a threat. He was totally committed to the military pacts too and wanted to go through any obligation which was binding on Pakistan as a member. He offered India a joint defense, voted with the United States in the United Nations, talked and wrote about the threat from the North and was ready to send forces to Laos, as a member of SEATO. Yet this loyal friend of the United States was soon greatly frustrated. After the Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in 1959, the United States saw a chance to make inroads into India's neutrality. Criticism of pacts with Pakistan increased in the United States. Due to the invention of the ICBM, the dependence on pacts and military bases decreased. The public in the United States became weary with continued foreign aid, and a bad balance of payment in the United States econony made matters worse.

The U-2 incident made the Pakistanis feel very insecure and the election of pro-India John F. Kennedy to the Presidency of the United States made Pakistanis very nervous. Earlier, in response to so much loyalty and friendship shown by Pakistan, President Eisenhower refused to ask Nehru to settle the Kashmir problem, when Eisenhower visited India and Pakistan in December 1959. The President of Pakistan sadly concluded that American interests were far greater in India than in Pakistan.

Pakistan started feeling the need for a change in its own attitude as the United States had. Border negotiations were started with China and Pakistan accepted Russian offer of oil exploration in 1960. This was a step towards neutrality or as the phrase put it, "normalization of relations" with all countries.

Pakistan had embarked on the policies it followed through the 1960's.

THE FORMATIVE PHASE OF THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES

*Hasan Askari Rizvi**

THE Armed Forces of Pakistan occupy an important position in the political system of Pakistan. They not only perform the traditional function of the military—frontier defence and internal security, but also have taken upon themselves the direct political role. Twice in twenty-four years the Armed Forces intervened in the political field mainly due to the lack of well-organized political parties ; the lack of natianal leadership ; the economic and political turmoil and the failure of the political leaders to create consensus about the political system which this country should have. This certainly has increased the commitments and responsibilities of the Armed Forces of Pakistan especially when she is in confrontation with a hostile neighbour. Had the Armed Forces stayed away from politics on the plea that their main job is to defend the country from external aggression and help the government, if necessary, to maintain law and order, the country would have been ruined by the self-imposed and selfish political leaders.

A similar role of the Armed Forces in politics can be noticed in a large number of Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries. What distinguishes the Pakistan Armed Forces from the Armed Forces of these countries, besides many other things, are the peculiar circumstances and conditions under which they came into being Very little work has been done on the formative phase of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The main objective of this paper is to explain and analyse the problems faced by the Muslim League leadership in connection with the establishment of an independent armed force ; the process of the reconstitution of the old Indian Armed Forces ; the re-organisation and nationalisation of the armed forces and the work done by the Army to help the refugees in 1947-48. This study will, firstly, appraise us of the position of the Armed Forces immediately after the independence. Secondly, the problems and how these were solved. Thirdly, by comparing the then position of the Armed Forces with that of their

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This paper is partly based on the author's dissertation submitted to the University of Leeds (U.K.)

present position, we can measure the degree of progress and development made by the Armed Forces.

The year 1940 stands as a landmark in the history of Pakistan. It was in this year that the Muslim League formally adopted the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India as its objective. The movement gained such a momentum that by the end of 1946 the creation of Pakistan had become inevitable. This raised the question whether the British Indian Armed Forces should also be 'reconstituted' so that both India and Pakistan have two separate and independent armed forces of their own. It must be pointed out here that the Indian Army (later the Navy and the Air Force as well) was re-organised on the modern lines by the British Government in 1895 when the three distinct armies of the presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were amalgamated under one command. Since then the British devoted their energies to build a strong, disciplined and well trained army to defend India against external aggression, control the tribal people in the tribal belt of the N.W.F.P., maintain law and order and take part in the Imperial war expeditions. By 1947 the Indian Army had become a force with many achievements to its credit. The British were proud of it.

The Politics of the Division of the Armed Forces :—When the Muslim League put forward the idea of the partition of the Indian Armed Forces, the British Government discouraged it. The Military High Command was of the opinion that the division of the Armed Forces would be suicidal for an institution which they and their predecessors had established with the hard labour of about two centuries. Field Marshal Auchinleck was particularly opposed to such a move. He believed that the Indian Army must be maintained as an undivided and over-all defence force. They were of the view that the division would put both India and Pakistan on a road of administrative chaos and leave the sub-continent defenceless. The broken and confused units might start killing the followers of the opposite religion.[1] A

1. For the views of the Military High-Command and the Government of India, see: Campbell-Johnson, A., *Mission with Mounthatten,* London, 1957, p 58. Connell, J., *Auchinleck*, London, 1959, pp. 874-5. Sherwani, L.A. (ed.), *Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940-47,* Karachi, 1969 pp. 220-221.
Irwin, S.F., The Indian Army in Partition, *The Army Quarterly*, vol. LVI. No.2, July 1948.

section of the British Press supported the views of the Military High-Command and the Government of India. *Glasgow Herald* commented on the possible division of the Indian Army :

> ".....If any attempt is made to divide the Indian Army, it is bound to disintegrate in a welter of blood. This will be the beginning of the real civil war.....Law, order, communications, industry, trade and even farming will cease and India will be back in the days of the break up of the Moghul Empire from which she were rescused by the British.
>
> The staunchness of the Indian Army is all that stands between India and chaos. If it is broken up it will mean the start of famine, disease and probably the most terrible civil war that the world has ever seen".[2]

The British-owned English language paper of India *The Statesman* editorially commented that such a step would prove disastrous for an institution like the Indian Armed Forces. *The Statesman* wrote :

> ".....Asia for several decades, has had only three first class armies, the Russian, the Indian and the Japanese.....The first and second of the three emerged victorious from the recent Great War, the third was beaten. Should the second now for communal reasons fall to pieces,-lowering India's two parts, Hindustan and Pakistan, to the military level perhaps of Siam or Iraq. The global strategic balance would be disrupted and repercussions in power politics be felt in every continent....."[3]

The Muslim League leadership was firm in their demand for the division of the Armed Forces along with the partition of the Sub-continent. They were conscious of the fact that the new state of Pakistan would be dangerously enfeebled if she did not possess her own armed forces. The reason for the Muslim League being more anxious than the Congress to get the Armed Forces divided was that it did not want to be dependent in any way on the Congress and to maintain its identity. Nawab Ismail Khan (president of the U.P. Muslim League), the only non-official member of the Nationalisation Committee appointed by the Interim Government in 1946 to recommend measures to nationalize the Armed Forces, in his note of dissent objected to the Committee's approach to the problem of nationalisation which took

2. *Glasgow Herald*, 22 May 1947
3. 'Into Armed Chaos', (Editorial), *The Statesman*, 14 May 1947

no cognizance of the issue of partition.[4] Liaquat Ali Khan, Finance Minister of the Interim Government and General Secretary of the Muslim League addressed a letter to the Viceroy suggesting that a plan be prepared for the re-organisation of the Armed Forces so that these might be readily available to the new states at the time of independence.[5]

Opposition to such a step was quite strong. The main reason being that such a plan, the British Government thought, would jeopardise prospects of settlement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which remained the official policy of the British Government till June 2, 1947. The acceptance of the Muslim League standpoint about the division of the Armed Forces would have meant that the British Government had agreed to the partition of India.

The Congress leadership was also opposed to the Muslim League demand to prepare a plan to divide the Armed Forces because, it claimed, that the acceptance of Liaquat Ali Khan's proposal would mean the acceptance of Pakistan. But the Congress also maintained that if the country was divided then the Armed Forces must also be partitioned.[6]

All efforts to keep the armed forces united proved useless. The British Government not only acceded to the partition of India but also decided to divide Armed Forces between India and Pakistan. A last minute effort to preserve the unity of the Armed Forces was made by a few senior Indian officers of the Army. They pleaded for a combined army to serve both the countries and to consider India as one unit so far as its defence was concerned.[7] Even Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a former president of the Congress firmly supported the move to keep a joint control of the Armed Forces.[8] But both the Muslim League and the Congress, could not agree to keep a joint control of the Armed

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4. *ibid,* 22 May 1947

5. Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, London, 1969. pp. 131-32. Campbell-Johnson, A., *op.cit*, p.58

6. Connell, J., *op.cit*, p.878
   Ali, Chaudhri, M., *op.cit.*, p 132
   See also Sardar Baldev Singh's statement, *The Stateman*, 26 May 1947

7. Khan, Ayub, M., *Friends Not Masters*, London, 1967, p.19
   It is to be noted that this plea was made by those officers who ultimately opted for India. Brig. K.M. Cariapa (later General) contacted the Muslim officers to secure their support for the proposal to avoid the division of the Armed Forces, but the response was not encouraging. So the proposal was dropped.

8. Azad, Maulana, A.K., *India Wins Freedom*, Calcutta, 1960, p.201.

Forces. The Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah bluntly refused and threatened to decline to assume power on 14 August 1947 if Pakistan did not have her Armed Forces under her operational control.[9]

Once the political leadership decided to divide India into two states on the basis of the June 3, 1947 Plan, Field Marshal Auchinleck carried out orders to 'reconstitute' the Armed Forces. On 2 July 1947 he handed down general principles which governed the reconstitution of the Armed Forces. These principles laid down that each of the government was to have within its territory and under its operational control forces predominantly composed of non-Muslims (in the case of India) and the Muslims (in the case of Pakistan).

The process of 'reconstitution' was to be completed in two stages. In the first stage all the Muslim majority units were to be moved to Pakistan that might be out of that area. Similarly all the non-Muslim majority units, which happened to be in Pakistan, were to be moved to India. The second stage was to sort out Muslims and non-Muslims in each unit. Every Indian Officer and Other Rank were to be asked which of the two states they wished to serve. But freedom was restricted in the sense that a Muslim from that area which became Pakistan could not opt for India and a non-Muslim from the rest of India could not opt for Pakistan. There was no objection to non-Muslim officers and men from Pakistan and Muslim personnel from the rest of India selecting to serve the Armed Forces of Pakisran and India respectively.[10]

The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, headed by the C-in-C, was set up to supervise the work of 'reconstitution'. It was to work in consultation with the Steering Committee, acting under the orders of the Partition Council. There were three sub-committees, one for each of the three services. Each of the sub-committees had a British chairman and equal representation of the Muslims and the

9. Ismay, Lord, *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*, London, 1960, p.428.

10. A few non-Muslim personnel belonging to the Pakistan areas and a few Muslim personnel from the rest of India opted to serve Pakistan and India respectively. Later due to communal disturbances and large scale movement of population, these men expressed their desire to change their option. The Joint Defence Council decided to allow the Muslims belonging the East Punjab and the non-Muslims belonging to West Punjab and N.W.F.P. to change their option. Some of them made use of this chance.

non-Muslims. The division of the troops was completed without much difficulty. By 15 August 1947 the future of the units has been decided. The units under the Punjab Boundary Force and the troops overseas temporarily escaped the division on communal-cum-territorial basis. These units were divided between India and Pakistan later on. Table I shows the share of India and Pakistan of the Armed Forces :

(TABLE I)

Division of the Armed Forces Between India & Pakistan

	INDIA	PAKISTAN
THE ARMY		
Infantry Regiments	15	8
Armoured Corps	12	6
Artillery Regiments	18½	8½
Engineering Units	61	34
Signal Corps)	The then existing static layout remained unchanged in each Dominion.	
Supply Units (RIASC))		
Electrical & Mechanical Eng. Units	10	4
Indian Pioneer Corps	Group HQrs & 9 coys	2 coys.
Animal Transport Regiments	4	3
Mechanical Transport Units (RIASC)	34	17
Ambulence Platoons	15	7
Indian Army Medical Corps Hospitals	82	34
	11,713 beds	4,037 beds.
Military Farms	29	20
Mountain Regiments	2	1
THE NAVY		
Sloops	4	2
Frigates	2	2
Fleet Mine-sweepers	12	4
Corvettes	1	Nill
Survey Ship	1	Nill
Trawlers	4	2
Motor Mine Sweepers	4	2
Motor Launch	1	Nill
Harbour Defence Motor Launches	4	4
Landing crafts	All existing crafts	Nill

THE AIR FORCE

Fighter Squadrons.....	7	2
Transport Squadrons.....	1	1

On 15 August 1947, the Joint Defence Council was created. It consisted of :

(a) The Governor-General of India as an independent chairman.

(b) The Defence Ministers of India and Pakistan.

(c) The C-in-C of un-divided India. (Now designated as the Supreme Commander to distinguish him from the C-in-Cs of India and Pakistan.)

The Supreme Commander had no operational control over the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan, and was not responsible for the maintenance of law and order. He was responsible for general administration of pay, clothing, equipment and food. He also controlled the military establishments serving both the Dominions, command and control of all the British officers and men, movement of the 'reconstituted' troops, men, stores, equipment and weapons. The moment the units, troops or equipment reached their destination, the control of the Supreme Commander ceased to exist. The Supreme Commander was responsible to the Joint Defence Council. The office of the Supreme Commander and the Joint Defence Council was to be closed down on I April 1948, when, it was expected, the task before the Supreme Commander would come to an end.[11]

The Supreme Commander, right from the beginning, faced difficulties in carrying out his duties and completing the work of the 'reconstitution' of the Armed Forces. The main difficulty was to divide the ammunition and stores and the ordnance factories. Most of the arms and ammunition was stored in India and all the 16 ordnance factories were within the Indian territory. It was decided that Pakistan would get one third of the military stores and equipment, but difficulty arose when the plans were put in practice. The Government of Pakistan was trying to acquire as much as possible, whereas the Government of India was determined to give Pakistan as little as possible. As a result of these opposite approaches the meetings of the Joint Defence Council were marked with sharp exchanges between

11. For the full text of the Joint Defence Council order, see:
Poplai, S.L. (ed.), *India 1947-50 Internal Affairs*, Vol.I, Bombay, 1959 pp.42-5
Elliott, J.G., The Army in India ; *The Army Quarterly*, Vol. LV. .No1. Oct. 1947.

the representatives of India and Pakistan. Field Mershal Auchinleck came under strong criticism from the Indian Government. Although he had no operational control over the armed forces of India and Pakistan, the Indian leaders interpreted the presence of such a senior officer in the capacity of the Supreme Commander as negation of their sovereignty and accused him of being pro-Pakistan. In his report dated 28 September, 1947, and sent to London, Field Marshal Auchinleck wrote :

> ".....So open and obvious are these attacks that there is not one of the officers of Supreme Commander's H.Q., senior or junior who is not imbued with the greatest disgust for and dislike of the creators of this state of affairs.....The Governor General has done his best to check this campaign but with little result. The authors of it are too strongly imbued with the implacable determination to remove anything which is likely to prevent their gaining their own ends, which are to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything of the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores etc., held in the arsenals and depots in India. This is an open secret. This being so, it is becoming increasingly impossible for myself and my officers to continue with our task. If we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets in the shape of movable stores belonging to the former Indian Army".[12]

Referring to Pakistan's attitude, Field Marshal Auchinleck wrote:

> ".....The attitude of Pakistan, on the other hand has been reasonable and co-operative throughout. This is natural in the circumstances, as Pakistan has practically nothing of her own and must obtain most of what she wants from the reserves of stores, etc., now lying in India".[13]

The Indian Government's attack on Field Marshal Auchinleck became very strong and relations between India and Pakistan strained to such an extent that the British Government decided to close the Supreme Commander's Office. The Joint Defence Council decided that it would continue to function. The Council also set up an Inter-Dominion Committee, to be known as the executive committee of the

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12. Connell, J., *op.cit.*, p.921
    A few extracts of the report may also be seen in :
    Ali, Chaudhri, M., *op.cit.*, p.192
13. *ibid*, p.922

Joint Defence Council to complete the work left undone by the Supreme Commander's Office.

The Indian Government promised that it would send Pakistan's due share of the military assets, but the Government of Pakistan claimed that her due share of the arms and ammunition were not sent to her by India. Whatever it received, it was claimed, was broken and useless stuff. Even this supply was stopped during the Kashmir fighting of 1947-48.[14]

The division of ordnance factories provided another delicate problem as all of these were situated in India. After protracted deliberations in the Inter-Dominion Council and the Joint Defence Council, the Government of India agreed to pay Pakistan a sum of Rs. 60 million to enable her to establish her first security printing press and an ordnance factory.[15]

The Nationalization and Re-organization of the Armed Forces :—

Ir was not until 1917 that the British Government agreed to grant King's Commission to Indians. The commission could be granted by the British Government for extraordinary service, but if a young Indian wanted to enjoy the fullest opportunity of adopting military career on terms of equality with an English-man, he must pass through the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, which meant going to England involving a heavy expenditure. The result was that the number of candidates who qualified for admission never exceeded the number of vacancies at Sandhurst.[16] The Indian officers were posted in eight units selected for Indianization because the British Government wanted the proof of efficiency of the Indian officers before increasing the pace of Indianization, The pace of Indianization improved slightly with the establishment of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun in 1932 but by 1947 only a few Indians had reached the substantive rank of Lieut. Colonel.[17] The following table gives the positions of Indians

14. Khan, Fazal Maqueem, T*ag-o-Taz Javedana*, Oxford Univ. Press, Karachi 1963, P. 45. See also Prime Minister Suhrawardy's statement in the National Assembly: *Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly of Pakistan*, Vol. I, No.13, 22 Feburary 1957, P. 916.

15. *Pakistan News, London*, December 10-16, 1947

16. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930*, Vol. 1. Survey, P. 101

17. For a brief study of the Indianization of the Army and allied problems, see: Cohen, S.P., T*he Indian Army*, University of California press, Los Angeles, Berkeley, London, 1971. pp. 73-87, 115-124, 143-46,

(Muslims nd Non-Muslims separately) in the higher commissioned ranks of the former Indian Army in 1947 :—

(TABLE 2)

The Muslims and Non-Muslims in the higher Commissioned Ranks of the Indian Army in 1947.

Substantive Rank	Total number of Officers	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Field Marshal	3	0	0
General	3	0	0
Lieut. General	3	0	0
Major General	13	0	0
Colonel	109	0	0
Lieut. Colonel	634@	4	5
Major	833	42	61
Captain	1003	114	218

@ including 10 in the Supply List.

Source :—*Indian Army List, 1947,* (Special Edition)

Notes :— (i) Since the religion of the officers was not mentioned in the Army List, these figures have been compiled on the basis of their names (whether a particular name is Muslim or non-Muslim). There were a few Anglo-Indians, whose name have not been taken into the Non-Muslim category as these could not be distinguished from the names of the British officers.

(ii) These figures do not include the officers of the Medical Corps. During the war period, Short Service and Emergency commissions were also granted but none of them attained the rank above that of Major. They have also been excluded from this table. The grant of permanent commission was suspended during World War II.

(iii) During World War II, quite a number of officers were promoted to higher ranks in temporary, acting capacity or for a limited period of time. For instance, out of four Muslim Lieut Colonels, one was appointed temporary Colonel and one, acting Brigadier. A few days before independence the Acting Brigadier was promoted to the rank of Major General.

He was Major General M. Akbar Khan. (opted for Pakistan). Besides the above mentioned four, one Muslim Lieut. Colonel (Supply List) had joined the political service of the Government of India, a few years after being Commissioned. He, later on became the fourth Governor General of Pakistan and then first Presidant under the 1956 Constitution. His name was Iskinder Mirza. He the first Indian graduate of Sandhurst.

Out of five non-Muslim Lieut-Colonels, two were appointed Acting Colonel and temporary colonels for a limited period of time. Three becamc Acting Brigadier. One of these three became Brigadier, who along with one Acting Brigadier was promoted to the rank of Major General, a few days before independence. They were : Major General K.M. Carippa and Major General Maharaj Shri Rajendra Sinhji. Both of them opted for India and served as the C-in-C of the Army.

Promotions on similar lines were given in the ranks below that of Lieut Colonel.

To meet the requirements of nationalisation and re-organization of the Armed Forces after the independence, the Government of Pakistan took the following steps : Firstly, it appointed a nationalization Committee in February 1948 to examine the problems of nationalization and re-organisation and other allied matters and to make recommendations for the complete nationalization by the end of December 1950. Secondly, keeping in view the recommendations of the committee, a good number of British Officers were retained in the three services especially in the higher and technical ranks. Pakistan retained a greater number of British Officers and for a longer time than India did. The reason being the number of the Muslims in the Commissioned Ranks of the three Services was smaller than the Non-Muslims. Table 3 gives approximate percentage of the officers in the Army :

(TABLE 3)

The Approximate Percentage of the various communities in the Army

Community	Officers	Other Ranks
Hindus	47.8%	55.7%
Muslims	23.7%	33.8%
Sikhs	16.3%	7.5%
Others	12 2%	3·0%

Source :—*The Daily Telegraph* 24 May 1947

The Muslim officers particularly lacked staff experience. Out of all the Muslim Officers, four decided to stay in India. But a few non-Muslims who opted for Pakistan, went to India after independence.

Thirdly, competent officers in the lower ranks were given accelerated promotions. Non-Commissioned officers of the three services were promoted to the Commissioned ranks. The accelerated pace of promotion can be understood from the fact that the first Pakistani C-in C of the Pakistan Army (Mohammad Ayub Khan) was promoted from the rank of Lieut Colonel to that of General in a period of less than four years. Fourthly, a limited number of the officers and non-warrent officers of the three services were sent to England, the United States and some of the Commonwealth countries for specialized and technical training courses. Fifthly, all released personnel, not in government or essential service, were asked to offer themselves for enlistment. A good number of them were taken back. The Pakistan Government also decided to stop all the releases from the Armed Forces except in certain special cases.

The nationalization of the Navy and the Air Force took an even longer period of time. The Navy and the Air Force of pre-partition India were designed as a force subsidiary to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force respectively. At the time of independence only four Muslim officers of the Navy had 8 years experience and all the 50 Muslim Officers had joined the Navy during the 2nd World War.[18] Almost similar was the position of the Air Force at the time of independence. It was not before January 1948 that a Pakistani attained the rank of Air Commodore. As the required number of officers became available, they replaced British Officers. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force had Pakistani C-in-Cs in 1953 and 1957 respectively. The Army had its first Pakistani C-in-C in 1951.

Reconstitution of the old Indian Armed Forces necessitated the re-organization of the Armed Forces. The problem of re-organization was more acute in Pakistan as there was not a single exclusively Muslim battalion, so the non-Muslim elements had to be subtracted from them. Thus almost all the battalions and regiments had to be re-organized. Two methods were adopted to re-organize the Army. Firstly, the regiments with common traditions, common class composition and common recruiting areas were amalgamated. Secondly, the

18. A Naval Observer, Navy from small beginning to a great fighting force, *Dawn*, 14 August 1967 (Independence Day Supplement)

gaps were also filled by fresh recruitment. Therefore, one could find such soldiers and officers in one regiment who had never seen or met each other before, and thus, certainly lacked the sense of belonging to one regiment.

Soon after the independence the training institutions of the three services of the Armed Forces had to be doubled. The initial proposal was that till I April 1948, the training institutious would be jointly used by them. But the political situation necessitated abandoning the plan and the cadets under training were asked to go to their respective countries. Since no physical division of these institutions was possible these were handed over to the country in whose territory these were situated. Both India and Pakistan had to establish new institutions for those which they lost to the other.

Along with the nationalization and re-organization of the Armed Forces, the modernisation of arms, equipment and establishment of training institutions was also to be tackled. The problem of moderisation was more acute in the case of the Navy and the Air Force, which consisted of out-dated training craft:, over-age bombers and frigates, minesweepers and destroyers. Pakistan purchased arms and ammunition, bombers, fighters frigates, minesweepers and destroyers from Britain and a few other Commonwealth countries to tide over the initial problems. Missions were sent to various European and North American countries with shopping lists. Since Pakistan had no orndance factory, plans were rushed to erect one. By the end of 1951 the first ordnance factory was inaugurated at Wah in West Pakistan.

The armies of the princely states were also gradually absorbed in the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan. Only 10 states (excluding Junagadh) opted for Pakistan. None of these had very large armies. But in the case of India out of over 500 states which opted for India, a few had fairly large armies (i.e. Jammu & Kashmir, Kolhopur, Patiala, Baroda and Hyderabad, etc.). Suitable personnel were taken in the ranks of the National Army. Others, who were either unfit or unwilling to serve, were relieved with various concessions admissible under law.[19]

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19. For the details of the integration of the armies of the princely states, see:
Venkateswarn, A.L., *Defence Organization in India*, New Delhi, Ministry of Defence, Publication Division, 1967, pp. 177-86.
Menon, V.P., *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, Bombay & Calcutta, 1961, pp. 426-31
Cohen, S.P., *op.cit.*, pp. 201-03.

The Armed Forces and the Communal Riots of 1947 :—While the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan were undergoing the process of reconstitution and nationalization, the communal situation deteriorated and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent witnessed many horrors and tragedies which were enacted in an attempt to gain political aims by violence and murder. The Armed Forces had to be called upon in various places to maintain law and order and to save the lives of the victims of the riots and restore the authority of the civil administration.

The situation particularly worsened in the East Punjab and Delhi area after the announcement of the partition plan. The reaction to the Muslim massacre in the East Punjab, where the Muslims were in the minority, was the worsening of the communal situation in the West Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. Here, to a lesser extent, non-Muslims were massacred.[20]

In order to safeguard peace in the Punjab, a special Military Command, named the Punjab Boundary Force was created by the central government on Ist August, 1947. The command consisted of 50,000 troops of mixed composition. When the situation deteriorated to such an extent that it could not be controlled by the Punjab Boundary Force, it was dissolved and from the mid-night of 31 August 1947/1 September 1947, the areas were handed over under the direct control of the two Dominions, each having full control of the area within its territory.

The Government of Pakistan handed over the evacuation of refugees and their protection to the Armed Forces. The troops provided protection to refugee conveys, moving across the frontier on foot, carts, buses or trains, established and managed and protected camps in co-operation with the civil authorities and provided shelter, food, clothing and medical facilities to them, maintained law and order in the disturbed areas and kept clear from raiders. In autumn 1947, floods which swept across the Punjab, further worsened the conditions

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20. For the details of the communal riots in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, see:

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1947-48) pp. 8547-8549 & 9049-9052.
Birdwood, Lord, *A Continent Decides*, London, 1953
Moon, P., *Diride and Quit*, London, 1962.
Menon, V.P., *The Transfer of Power in India*, Princeton, 1957.
Lumby, E.W.R., *The Transfer of Power in India*, London, 1954.

under which refugees were living. Here again the Army engineers and the Sappers came forward for help. The Navy also helped in moving refugees and troops by sea. The Air Force conducted supply and rescue operations during the floods.

The task before the Armed Forces of the two countries was not so easy as it might appear on paper. The lack of co-operation between the governments of India and Pakistan; the disruption of the means of communications, which became an obstacle in the way of movement of the troops from one trouble spot to another; the enormous number of refugees with meagre resources, were the main hurdles in their way. On many occasions there were pitched battles between the troops and raiders and on certain occasions the Army force arrived when the raiders had escaped after killing almost the whole population of a village.

No exact figures were available about those killed in the riots. Various unofficial estimates differ from each other. But one thing is quite clear ; that India had never witnessed such a large scale massacre and the movement of population from one place to another in her history. No doubt the Armed Forces could not totally control the situation for obvious reasons, but they did their utmost to fulfil the responsibility bestowed upon them by the civil government. In fact the Armed Forces had no option but to take up this role as the civil authority was not properly organized and in certain areas it hardly existed. Nationalist feelings were so strong that the Armed Forces seemed determined to help their co-religionists. In the past they had come to the rescue of the civil administration, a foreign government, now they were assisting the civil administration, which was their own.

Conclusions :—The present paper suggests that contrary to the fears expressed by different quarters, the division of the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan did not result in administrative chaos. At the time when the Armed Forces were undergoing the process of 'reconstitution', they helped the civil administration to settle down by providing assistance to maintain law and order and keep peace in the riot striken areas immediately before and after independence and the division of the Indian sub-continent. Had the Armed Forces remained silent spectators, the havoc caused by the communal riots would have been greater and the number of those killed would have been higher.

In spite of the fact that the relations between the newly established states of India and Pakistan were strained and there was a lack of co-operation between the two governments, the process of 'reconstitution' was completed without serious complications.

Pakistan inherited comparatively less organized armed forces. There was greater shortage of the Commissioned Officers in Pakistan than in India. Pakistan had no ordnance factory and her government claimed that India did not supply her due share of the assets of the former Indian Army. Imbued with the desire to maintain their national identity, the military leaders of Pakistan adopted all possible methods to make the Armed Forces highly mobile and hard hitting force. Later on necessary assistance was also sought from the friendly countries to cover up the deficiencies. If we compare this humble beginning of the career of the Pakistan Armed Forces with that of their present position and role, we can safely conclude that the over-all development made by the Armed Forces in 24 years has been very impressive.

DATA COLLECTION THROUGH INTERVIEWS

By

*Mirza M. Ahmed**

In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss some of the problems of interviewing which are usually faced during field work. The analysis is in no way final or exhaustive one. It only sensitises the researcher against the situations which he is expected to face in the field.

There is no short-cut method to knowledge. So far different approaches have been adopted to study the universe. The theological approach had been very common up to the middle ages. With the emergence of positive philosophy in the seventeenth century, the scientific approach gained popularity and within the scientific approach even, there appeared various Schools,[1] i.e. the school of philosophers who believed in "a priori' thinking or *verstehen,* then there emerged another school of those who would emphasise field testing and there were still others who would stress the use of numbers in all kinds of research. During the second decade of the twentieth century the school of empiricists became popular. The idea received gravity that the scientific knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge and all traditional and metaphysical doctrines are to be rejected as meaningless. The school differs from the earlier schools in holding that the ultimate basis of knowledge rests upon public experimental verification rather than upon personal experience.[2] It may be noted here that it is not the era of the beginning of empiricism, but a period during which it has acquired tremendous momentum. We can go back to the eighteenth century where we find that systematic beginning of data collection from empirical world was made by John Howard (1726-1790) a British philanthropist and prison reformer.[3] He was followed by Fredrick Le Play (1806-1882)

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1. Bertrand Russell *History of Western Philosophy,* London George Allen and Unwin and Co.,

2. *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences ;* New York : The Macmillan Co., 1954.

3. Pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research,* Engle-wood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall Inc, 1963.

a French social reformer and economist who published mono-graphs on family standards of living. He aimed to get systematic information about family composition, daily habits of work and the general state of house-hold. The direct observations were supplemented by personal interviews guided by questionnaire forms designed to secure uniform data.[4] These studies and similar others, especially those conducted by Charles Booth[5] and B. S. Rowntree[6] in England and Jacob Rii's, *"How the other Half lives"*[7] in the United States led to various survey and research movements in the West and the United States. These works in surveys and social research established confidence in the validity and reliability of field observation and consequently in the tools employed for the purpose. The most commonly used tools in all these studies were interviewing schedules and questionnaire forms.

Today also, interview and questionnaire remain two main tools of data collection in social research, although these are not the only devices for the purpose. The library for instance, will be indispensible source of information in all kinds of research. Interview as a method of discovery has been known to man since time immemorial. The first interview situation experienced by man was, perhaps, when Adam and the angels were subjected to the 'Divine' querries, where Adam established the superiority of himself and consequently of human race by answering the entire question schedule. There appears repeated mention of interview methods (i.-e. dialogue, questionning and discussions) in the historic records and the folk-lore where these methods have been effectively used to establish reality and facts. In daily life we come across numerous situations where either we are i. terviewer or interviewee. When the father asks where the son has been wandering throughout the day, he is carrying out an interview. In fact every-one of us has experienced interview situation. Some of these interviews have been successfully performed while others have failed to elicite the desired information. A few might have antagonised the situation, while others have become a means of fast friendship.[8]

Interviewing has become a specialization due to the over-all emphasis on empirical social research. The method is used by the

4. Ibid, (P. 5)
5. Ibid, (P. 10)
6. Ibid, (P. 17)
7. Ibid, (P. 21)
8. William J. Goode, and Paul k. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research*, New York Mac Graw-Hill Book Co. Inc, 1952.

various national and international research and survey organisations. When a census enumerator records information regarding the number of family members and their other social attributes, he is getting information through interview. The questionnaire method is also advantageous in some respects and for the same reason is used where-ever possible. The usual advantages of questionnaire procedure are, (1) it is likely to be less expensive (2) the stimulus for all the respondents remains constant while in case of interview this condition may not be maintained, (3) the individual gets sufficient time for filling the questionnaire and (4) due to its impersonal nature, respondent may easily respond to some personal querries which he may not do so otherwise. In an interview situation, for instance, the present writer found that the married respondent after reporting his marital status, was a little disturbed when he was asked about the number of his wives, especially, when he had two or more wives. But in a country like Pakistan where social research is still in its infancy, interview procedures may prove more advantageous, due to the following considerations.

There is a huge mortality of response in case of questionnaire procedures. The percentage of responses to the questionnaires distributed remains very low. To quote from the personal field experience where the population constituted college students the response was only 35.3%[9]. According to the comments of another researcher, "Although the universe consisted of educated girls, the researcher found that the students were reluctant to give back the questionnaires or answer the questions".[10] Due to the lack of appreciation for social research, there is every likeli-hood that the respondent would behave in a non-serious and irresponsible manner. In a research study, for instance it is mentioned that when the researcher went through the filled questionnaires, some were half filled and still other were non-seriously filled. A few responses included obscene and childish remarks and some others were full of trash.[11]

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9. Mirza M. Ahmed, *A study of the Factors Responsible for Low Standard of Achievements At Intermediate Level,* University of the Punjab, an Unpublished thesis, 1959.

10. Obaida ; *Time Perspective of Goals As A Factor Leading to the Greater or Lesser Input by Students* University of the Panjab, an unpublished thesis, 1962.

11. Tahira Durdana ; *Reported objectives of the Panjab University Students for joining Post Graduate Classes,* University of the Panjab, an unpublished thesis, 1962.

The inherent disadvantage of questionnaire is that the researcher is seldom sure that the response is filled in by the required respondent and that the response is strictly his and not the dictation of any body else. In one home, for example, the questionnaire may be filled by the head of the family, in another by some member and still in another by a group of people after many discussions and consultations.

Another problem with questionnaire procedure is that it assumes a high level of education among the respondents and hence may not work well where literacy is low. This is especially true for Pakistan where only 19.2% of the population are literates.[12] Here, questionnaire method can only be used for segmental studies where the entire sample would constitute literate people; i.e., the people who can read, understand and write. Nevertheless, for the studies designed at national level and the researches intended to study the rural people we shall have to rely upon interviewing for a few decades.

Forms of Interview :

Interview as a method of data collection is used in a variety of ways. The psychologists and the psychiatrists use it with an elaborate system of projective techniques. The anthropologists make use of interviews in participant observation methods. As a method of systematic observation, interview is used by the sociologists in both completely non-structured as well as highly structured forms. In the rigidly standardized interviews the specific answers are required in the form of "Yes", or "No" and the "Don't know" is the last resort. Here the fixed alternative responses may force an individual to state or select an opinion which he actually does not hold. Many respondents accept or reject a policy, an ideology or an attitude partly and this characteristic is not likely to be revealed by the Poll-type of questions. The "open end" interview on the other hand is designed to permit a free response from the interviewee rather than one limited to stated alternatives. The questions, of this type, merely raise an issue and do not supply any structure for the respondent's reply. This method is more useful in individual case studies. The form of interview which is more popular with the modern sociologists is the combination of the above two approaches. The interview schedule is so designed as to include both the structured as well as un-structured questions. Which question is to be structured to what extent would however, depend upon the discretion of the researcher and the requirements of

12. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Home Affaires : *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961,* Census Buletin 4 ; (P. 7)

research. The construction of interview schedule and interview guide is highly technical job and is usually assigned to the experts and highly experienced people. The following precautions, however, may prove useful in designing an interview schedule.

(1) The items included in the schedule must be related to the central problem.

(2) It should be precise enough to be completed within an hour or so.

(3) The qnestions should be explicit and self explanatory.

(4) The questions as well as the subjects included in the echedule should be organised into a sequence so that the whole body appears as one unit.

(5) Enough space should be left between the questions, especially after the open ended questions which may require more space to record lengthy responses.

(6) A good schedule also carries a cover sheet which explains the purpose of the study and seeks the cooperation of the respondent.

(7) It should be finalized and sent into the field only after "pre-testing."

Preparation for Interview :-

Training :—Interviewing is not only confined to an individual researcher as a part of his research project, it is also a profession, a specialization. Many survey and research organisations employ paid staff for the purpose of interviews. It has been found that some interviewers are better than the others and that the interviewing qualities can be improved through proper training. According to William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, "Although interviewing is easier for some than for others, every one can improve his technique by learning to avoid certain types of errors, by developing an alertness to embiguities and deceptions, and by becoming aware of the purpose of the interview, as well as the interaction between interviewer and respondent.[13]

The interviewers who are to be sent in the field should be carefully selected, preferably from those having back-ground of social sciences and research methodology. Their training may include, (i)

13. William J. Goode, and Paul K. Hatt; *Methods in Social Research*, Mac Grew-Hill Book Company, New York, Inc. 1952 (P, 184-85)

referesher courses on field work with special reference to the project for which they have been recruited (ii) demonstrations and trial interviews and (iii) tests to evaluate their competence for the field work.

Interview Schedule :

Although study of the schedule would have been part of training curriculum where each question and item had been discussed in full details, i.e. the significance of the question, the way in which the question is to be asked and the manner in which the response is to be recorded. But this would not suffice. The field worker before going into the field must go through the schedule many times, pondering over each item very carefully, preferably, rehearsing various explanatory phrases for different questions and the tone and mood in which a particular question is to be asked. It will be more advantageous if the gestures like the movements of hand, fingers or chuckle of shoulders ; facial expressions, the pauses, and the remarks to break the pauses etc ; are also fully rehearsed.

The usual convention is that the interviewer be properly introduced to the interviewee. This is another important issue to which the researcher should pay full attention. He should have a good practice of introducing himself to all types of people. This is particularly important because an impressive introduction would go a long way in building up a situation for a fruitful interview.

Approach to the Interview :

Some knowledge of the community and the universe is necessary to over-come various field problems like transportation facilities, bus routes, location of the residences and the leisure hours of the respondents. These data help in selecting suitable time and place for interview. The appropriate time for interview would be when the respondent feels free. In our society, for instance, men are usually free in the evening while women are free during after-noon. "The most suitable place would be one where it is believed that the interviewee will be most at ease."[14] In urban areas, probably, both the males as well as the females will prefer to be interviewed at their residences, while in rural communities women would like to be interviewed in their houses but the men may prefer "Dara" (a kind of community Centre) or Lumberdar's Baithak (village head-

14. pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*; Engle-wood Cliffs,, N.J.P rentice-Hall Inc, 1963 (P. 250)

man's guest house). In many cases it has been found convenient to interview community leaders first, to win the cooperation of the rest of the community. It proved useful during a survey[15] where it was found that the individuals who constituted tribal people were hesitant towards interviews unless they were assured that the Chief has already been interviewed and that it was not going to cause annoyance on his part. Hence it was decided that the cooperation of the Chief must be sought before going to the community and in case the chief was not a sampled respondent, he should be interviewed, his response however, should be kept as dummy one.

A consider-able attention has been paid towards the dress of the field worker. Some-times it is recommended that the field worker should achieve complete identity with the community in matters of dress. This may prove useful in general but in some cases it may fail to generate sufficient influence which is some-times required to elicite response. During a recent survey[16] of beggars it has been observed that a better dressed interviewer could more easily initiate response from a beggar. Although there appear to be no final rule, it is clear that every society and community uses such differentiations as sober and dandy, serious and funny, adequate and in-adequate, proper and improper, in matters of dress and clothing. These differentiations are useful aids in making decisions about the field dress whose purpose is to facilitate field work and not to arouse pity or to attract the opposite sex.

The language of the interviewer also poses similar problems. There is always a chaste language which is identifiable from the slang and vulgar one. Whereas the knowledge of researcher regarding slangs is always an advantage to the communication process, he can safely rely upon the use of chaste accent and grammer.

The investigator should, also, check up his field kit thoroughly, which may include things like, his identity card, the schedules, extra sheets, writing pad and the writing equipment etc.

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15. Government of Pakistan, National Development Organisation; programme Analysis Unit, *Agricul—turist's Impressions (A Reaction Survey)*, July, 1961.

16. Government of the Panjab, Directorate General of Social Welfare, Evaluation and Research Unit. *The Survey of Beggars*; an unpublished study 1971.

Knocking At the Door or Ringing the Bell :

Sending a call is culturally patterned phenomenon and hence may vary from culture to culture. For the purpose of sending a call, the researcher may safely rely upon the prevailing norms of the society. In our society, for instance, a brief and gentle knock may serve the purpose. The researcher should not be impatient, he should give the inhabitant sufficient time to answer. In one survey[17] it was suggested that after the knock on the door, the interviewer should step back three or four feet. In this position he could be seen from windows beside the door, or from the above if there were no porch. Thus, house-wives who do not answer the door unless they first satisfy themselves regarding the appearance of the caller could see the interviewer.

Establishing Rapport :

It may be assumed, quite safely, that the interviewer will be met with an adequate reception. People are normally courteous enough to receive the stranger when he appears to be a reasonable fellow. "The interviewer must, then, approach the interview with some confidence. Whatever his nervous feelings, he must know that in most cases the respondent will be willing to talk because of the guarantee of a good listner'.[18]

In the initial contact the friendly greetings, according to the cultural patterns of the interviewee, must be exchanged. The purpose of interview, then, may be explained. This should be in terms of the interviewee's capacity of understanding and appreciation. The interviewee might have some objections or excuses, for which the researcher should be prepared. He must realize that his status with respect to that of the interviewee is some-what sub-ordinated, in one sense he is a beggar because he is to beg information. In most of the cases he has no authority and is not capable of exercising power over the respondent. Power and authority even otherwise, are least desired attributes for a researcher, he can use influence which is sometimes needed while working with traditional societies. Hence in such a situation the researcher has to rely upon his knowledge of human relation skills and experience. The usual excuses and objections raised by the interviewee may be ;

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17. Middle Parten. *Surveys, Polls and Samlples,* New York, Harcourt Brace and Co ; (P, 350)

18. William J : Goode, and Paul K. Hatt *Methods in Social Research* ; Mac Graw-Hill Book Company, New York, Inc, 1952 (P. 190)

(*i*) I am sorry, at the moment I am busy.

(*ii*) Some-one is sick in the house.

(*iii*) I am least interested in your research.

(*iv*) Is it compulsory to answer your questions ?

(*v*) Why don't you interview my neighbour also ?

(*vi*) I am uneducated and won't be able to answer your questions.

(*vii*) Better consult some experts for this type of information.

(*viii*) I won't tell you any thing without the permission of my husband.

Much depends upon the competence and skill of the interviewer to satisfy the respondent. If the respondent is really in a hurry or busy, the researcher should not press for interview. He may take leave after making some other appointment.

The researcher should see that a sense of friendliness prevails throughout the conversation, but this is a condition for interview and not the end in itself. After assessing that a state of rapport exists between the interviewer and the respondent, the researcher must carry the interview forward otherwise he will find himself merely "maintaining rapport" and no "interview". This happended with the present writer during an interview, that the rapport was extented to more than two hours and the interview had to be postponed for some next time.

Asking Questions :

The questions should be asked in the sequence, they are designed in the schedule. Sometimes specific instructions are issued not to change the order of the schedule in any case. Some questions, especially relating to attitudes and opinions are to be asked in a particular mental condition of the respondent and hence they are so designed that if asked in the specified sequence the questions automatically arrive at the appropriate moment. So if the order is changed, the questions may lose their significance thereby decreasing the value of information.

It is also advisable that each question be asked in the language, used in the schedule. If the respondent does not follow it, the question may be repeated, reading out slowly. In case the respondent fails to understand, despite of repeated efforts, the interviewer may

simplify the language but the tone and gist of the question must remain the same. There is every danger that while explaining the question, the researcher may suggest the answer. During a survey[19] the first editing of the information collected by three investigators (I^1, I_2, I_3,) from a village showed the following :

I_1. The people are fully aware of V-AID* philosophy.

I_2. The people know nothing about V-AID.

I_3. A few of them know while majority are ignorant.

The population being similar for these investigators, it was found that the first investigator, while explaining the questions (not necessarily intentionally) suggested the answers, while the second one was not prepared to enter into explanation business, whereas the third investigator was conducting interviews adequately, so the special instructions were to be issued to the first two investigators and consequently their information also reconciled with that of the third one.

Probe Questions :

For certain questions the investigator has to use probe questions in order to get correct response. For instance, the question of age, is very difficult to answer, especially in case of rural people. In order to arrive at some reliable response the investigator may use some significant events like previous floods the partition or the second world war etc. With reference to such events, people are sometimes able to recollect some reliable information.

Pauses During Interview :

Sudden pauses during the interview should be avoided and continuity or the sequence should be maintained during conversation. The respondent, however, must be given sufficient time to think and any sign of haste and hurry should be avoided. The respondent should constantly be encouraged to open up himself. This may be achieved if the researcher behaves like a sympathetic listener. He can express this feeling through smiles, movements of his eye-brows and the manipulation of various other facial expressions. Phrases like the following tend to reduce hesitation. "No-body really knows", "on

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19. Government of Pakistan, National Development Organization, Programme Analysis Unit, *Agricul turist's Impressions (A Reaction Survey, 1961)*.

*Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme ; (a kind of rural Community development pragramme).

the whole", "in general' "'We'd just like your personal opinion," "Your guess is as good as the next fellows.[20]

Recording the Interview :

The information given by the informant should be completely and correctly recorded. Before concluding the interview, the investigator must sheck up the schedule and complete the unfilled entries. In case of structured schedules, where only tick mark (✓) is required, the recording business becomes much easier. But in case of open ended querries the investigator should have a good practice of fast writing, some investigators use short-hand or some symbols to cover the entire answer. It is a good practice if, the interviewer before taking the leave goes through the interview schedule making sure that no information is missing. In a study it was advised that after the day's work the interviewer should go back to the desk, for writing special notes and extra information with respect to each interview. The basic assumption was that each interview may render extra information which may not be recorded during the regular interview, but this information may prove useful while interpreting the data. Hence such an information should not be allowed to go waste.

The Close Up :

The interview should be concluded in a friendly atmosphere. The best time to close the interview is when the respondent is still fresh and willing to talk. The good and healthy relations that a researcher establishes during the field work go a long way in promoting appreciation for social research and facilitating the work of check interviews and revisits.

The interviewer may, then take leave after offering due thanks according to the cultural patterns of the interviewee. In our culture, for instance, "Khuda Hafiz" (God may take care of you) or "Saalam-o-Alaikum" (God bless you) may be the appropriate phrases to take leave from the respondent. It is very usual in Pakistani families that the children cluster around the guest and they might have been sent away for the purpose of interview. There is no harm if the interviewer meets them for a friendly chat before leaving the place. This will leave a good impression of his visit and interview with the family.

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20. Middle : Parten, *Surveys, Polls and Samples* ; New York, Har Court Brace and Co ; (P. 360-61).

To conclude, it may be pointed out that no amount of training and material will make the researcher, a "perfect" interviewer. Much will depend upon the researcher's genius, intelligence, talent, experience and many other uncontrolled situational factors to make an interview a real success. That is why interviewing is not only regarded as a "Skill" but also an "art" and hence a matter directly related to the personality of the interviewer.

GENESIS OF THE PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICE IN INDO-PAKISTAN

*Prof. Muhammad Rafi Anwar**

IN 1867, the Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Northcote saw a passage of an administrative Report of Oudh for 1856-66 by R.H. Davies[1], Financial Commissioner of Oudh that there is no greater evil in the existing system than the manner in which "many Indian officers of ability" were denied incentive by the bar set to their promotion. The development of education in India also neccessitated the probing into the whole question.[2] The Governor General - in - Council thereupon recorded a resolution to the effect that he was fully alive to the urgent political necessity of opening up to Indians of ability and character, a more dignified sphere of employment in the administration of British India. He regretted that even superior posts which had been filled by promotion had gone to Englishmen only. He proposed that as in the regulation provinces all superior posts were reserved by law to the covenanted officers so Indian talent should also be rewarded and inspired in thc non-regulation provinces.[3] In the meantime, a deputation of East India Association, consisting of eminent personalities waited upon the Secretary of State on August 21, 1876 requesting a simultaneous examination for covenanted Service both in India and England. It was emphasized that competitive examination should be held for a portion of the appointments to the Indian Covenanted Service. The Secretary of State had a favourable attitude but did not agree with the suggestion that Indians could be given appointments only in the non-regulation provinces. He saw no reason why only Europeans should be appointed to all posts not exclusively reserved for covenanted officers, both in the regulation and non-regulation provinces. He preferred Indians to Europeans because the Europeans

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1. Davies. R. H. (1824-1902) I.C.S., entered Service 1844; Secretary to Punjab Government 1859, Financial Commissioner Oudh, 1864. Chief Commissioner, Oudh, 1865; Governor of Punjab, 1871-77; member Council of India.

2. The Lytton paper "*Native Civil Service*" 1885 95. MSS F 218, 23/1 p. 54. I.C.L. The Secretary of State to Government of India, No. 4, March 31, 1870.

3. C. 2376, 1879, p3-4; Governement of India - Secretary of State, desp. no. 1415, Aug. 10, 1867 No. 38 (Foreign) Sept 13, 1857.

did not enter the service through competition and therefore they could not be allowed to override the natives. He suggested that Indians of character and ability be appointed to higher and better jobs both in the regulation and non-regulation Provinces.[4] Sir Erskine Perry, a member of the India Council wanted the appointments of the Indians near their own seat of education from where they could derive all the succour and moral support of their educated friends whether native or English.[5]

On March 16, 1868, the British Indian Association also submitted a memorandum to the government to the same effect as that submitted in 1867, by East India Association in London. Dadabhai Naoroji published a pamphlet, "The Admission of Educated natives into the Indian Civil Service" in 1868. In it, by quoting authorities like Mountstuart Elphinston[6], Sir John Malcom and Colonel W.H. Sleeman[7], he proved that Indian were capable of holding high administrative and judicial offices. To the objection that Europeans would not like to serve under natives, he replied that Englishmen were capable of appreciating true merit and that there were already native judges with Englishmen as subordinates. He pointed out that it was important to associate Indians with administration to make British rule popular. By quoting Sir Bartle Frere[8] he pleaded that Indians were best exponents of British Government's policy and also in adjusting their policy to the peculiarities of the Indian atmosphere. He also wanted simultaneous exammations for covenanted Service in India, because of the fact that Hindus, religiously were not generally in a position to cross the sea.[9] This statement of Hindus being reluctant to cross the sea is corroborated by S.N. Banerjea.[10]

In such circumstances, Hindus could not come forward because of religious inhibitions, and Muslims were backward in western learning ; hence the result was the same for both the peoples. The Bombay

4. Parl. P. Vol. L. C. 178. 1867-68 p, 291-292 - The Secretary of State. Desp. Revenue (Foreign) No 10, Feb. 1868.
5. Ibid p. 292. Minute of Sir E. Perry, Feb. 8, 1868.
6. Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1779-1859) I.C.S. joined the Service in 1796; Resident at Nagpur, 1804-1808; Envoy to Kabul; Resident at Poona, 1811 ; Governor of Bombay, 1819-1827.
7. Sleeman, W. H. (1786-1856); joined Bengal Army, 1809; General Superintendent of the operations for thagi,1835, Resident Gwalior 1843-49 & at Lucknow, 1849-56
8. Ferer, Sir Bartle (1815-1884) I.C.S; Private Secretary to Grovernment of Bombay 1842 : Members of Governor General's Council 1859-62, Governor of Bombay, 1867-77.
9. Dadabhai Naoroji. *The admission of Educated Natives into the Iudian eivil service*, 1868 pp. 1-18.
10. Banerjea. S. N. (1848-925), entered I.C.S. 1871, Magistrate at Sylhet; dismissed from service, March, 1874, editor of "The Bengalee", Calcutta 1808 ; estabished Indian Association, 1876 ; member of Bengal Legislative Council, 1893.

Association also sent a memorial in which *inter alia* demanding the institution of simultaneous examination requested the restoration of the maximum age limit of 23. In the meantime Henry Fawcett moved a resolution in the British Parliament that simultaneous examinations should be held in London, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. He observed :

Firstly, it would remove the long standing grievance of the Indians.

Secondly, create an intellectual rivalry between the English and the Indians which would benefit both.

Thirdly, the employment of Indians in higher services, instead of endangering the stability of British rule in India, would make it more stable by their association with it.

Fourthly, Indians wanted equality of treatment and the institution of simultaneous examinations would place them on equal footing with the British candidates and this would have a beneficial effect on the Indian public opinion.[11]

Sir Charles Travelyan,[12] co-author of the Northcote-Travelyan Report on the Civil Service and an ardent supporter of the competitive system, objected to the proposal because it would bring in Indians by shoals which was undesirable. He proposed that uncovenanted Indian officers of proved ability should be appointed to the covenanted posts, without a competitive examination.[13] Fawcett withdrew the motion on the assurance given by the Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Northcote that he wanted to move a bill empowering the government of India to appoint persons of proved merit and ability to the posts held by covenanted civil servant.[14] Northcote objected to holding of simultaneous examinations firstly, because it would be difficult to find a proper standard of comparison in viva voce examination and secondly that nature of examination was not suitable to the Indians and then it would have to be altered to suit them, and lastly, a large number of Indians who might be intellectually good but might otherwise be unfit to hold superior posts, might get into the service. When such officers were denied promotion they resented it for they felt deprived of their

11. Parl. Deb. Vol. CXCI, 1868, CC 1839-42.

12. Travelyan, Sir Charles (1807—1886). Joined I.C.S. 1826; Under Secretary to Foreign Department, Government of India, 1831; Assistant Secretary to Board of Revenue, 1836-38 ; Assistant Secretary to Treasury, 1840-59, Governor of Madras, 1859.

13. Parl. Deb. Vol. CXCI, 1868 CC 1849-50.

14. Ibid. CC 1857 & 1859

right on account of racial distinctions.[15] However, the proposed bill could not be passed for Parliament was dissolved for new elections.[16]

The Duke of Arygll Act of 1870 :—In the meantime, in British Government changed and the new Secretary of State, Duke of Arygll also favoured the scheme of his predecessor for he thought it futile to depend on competitive examinations because of the past record in which 16 Indians had appeared in 14 years and only one had succeeded. He opined that competitive examination did not suit the genius of the people of India. Indians of proved ability and merit should be nominated to higher offices and thus those qualities be secured by nomination. He further pointed out that competition would work more to the advantage of Bengalis and martial communities like Pathans and Sikhs, would be in a disavantageous position. He, therefore proposed:

Firstly, that due to racial diversity and regional differences in India, each province and race should be treated separately.

Secondly, in order to safeguard the British rule in India, only those Indians, who could be relied upon, should be promoted.

Thirdly, only a limited number of superior posts should be made open to Indians.[17]

In March 1870, the Duke of Argyll's Bill (33 vic.c.ap.3) was passed by Parliament to accelerate the admission of Indians into higher services. It seems to have been enacted partly to pacify the growing demand of the educated Indians for greater employment in the covenanted Civil Service. The East India Association, Calcutta[18] had been requesting the Government by petitions and deputations to give Indians greater facilities for admission into the Service.

Liberal thinking of certain British politicians also helped the Indian cause. Sir Stafford Northcote's contribution along with men like Fawcett was no less. He once wrote to Lord Lawrence:

"I am myself of the opinion that some plan should be adopted for rendering it easier than it is at present for natives to gain

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15. Ibid. CC 1853-56
16. Parl. Deb. Vol. CXCIII, 1868.
17. The Lytton Papers '*Native civil Service*' op. cit. p. 51.
18. Memorials of the British Indian Association and the East India Association.

appointments in the covenanted Service"[19] "It seems a mockery", he wrote to Lord Napier[20] "to tell them to come and compete in Westminister if they like."[21]

However, the motive in passing the Act was more a financial one, than to associate Indians in administration, for deteriorating finances of the Government of India since 1858 prompted the British Government to employ cheaper agency in the administration as was pointed out by 'The Times that "it becomes every year more apparent that we must hold India by some cheaper, better tenure than an army of 60,000 men[22] " Lord Hartington expressed similar views in the House of Commons in 1883[23]. The constant insistence by the Government on the lower rates of pay for Indians employed under the Act of 1870 than those of covenanted civilians also bears a testimony to the fact that economy of the country was one of the motives for passing that Act.

The Act of 1870 laid down the principles for the admission of Indians to superior posts, but its operation was left to rules and regulations to be framed by the Government of India and sanctioned by the Secretary of State. For two years there was no progress in this direction and in 1872, a reminder was sent to the Government of India by the Secretery of State but without response.[24] In the following October another reminder was sent proposing that while framing the rules the Governor General-in-Council should consider three points.[25]

First, whether any proportion should be established between Europeans and Indians in the superior posts. It was pointed out that it was essential to have large proportion of British officers to keep peace and order in the country.

Secondly, whether all civil appointments should be thrown open to Indians. He observed that Indians had aptitude for judicial work

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19. Lang, Andrew— *Sir Stafford Northcote, life aud letters*. 2nd diary-London 1891.

20. Lord Napier of Magdala, Robert Cornels, 1810—1890) joined Bengal Engineers, 1828. Major 1846. Lt. Col., 1856. Brig. Gen. 1858. Maj. Gen. 1861-65. Acting Governor General Nov. 21-Dec. 2, 1863. C-in-C India 1870-76 Field Marshal 1883.

21. Lang. Andrew op. cit. p. 185

22. The Times, May 8, 1868

23. Quoted by Subramanian Iyer-The Hindustan Review "*The Royal commission on public Service in India*, Sept. 1912 p. 200-201.

24. Publ. Progs. (Home) Dec., 1873. The Secretary of State to the Govt. of India. Desp. No. 34 April 18, 1872.

25. Pub. progs. Dec. 1873. The Secretary of State to the Government of India. desp. 113 oct 22, 1872.

but not for executive offices of collector or magistrate. He wanted to know if any restrictions should be explicitly put on such selections.

Thirdly, whether the rate of pay was to be regulated on that of covenanted civilians or on that which Englishmen received in their own country?

It was urged that while considering these points the stability of British rule in India must be kept in view.[26]

Official opinion in India on the implemention of the Act :—The Government of India invited the opinions of the provincial governments on the points raised by the Secretary of State and on the draft rules framed by it. A majority of the opinions was against fixing any proportion of two classes of appointments on the ground that such proportions were usually found very embarassing in the choice of proper officials and that such a proportion would prove exceptionally embarassing in the case of Indians as they would insist to have the full number of their proportion.[27] It was a new system and there was a need to proceed slowly with it. Sir Arthur Hobhouse[28] thought that it would be impossible to fix a maximum number for Indian appointees, under the circumstances.[29] Any settled ratio of natives to Europeans for employment was considered by the Government of India not only undesirable, but inconvenient and difficult to preserve.

Lord Napier of Magdala was of the opinion that it was necessary to fix a limit to the admission of the Indians.[30]

On the second point, the Government of India was in favour of throwing open all appointments to natives and not reserving any judicial appointments for them. It was, however, generally agreed that judicial appointmcnts normally be given to the Indians and chief executive posts be retained by European officers.[31] Sir John Strachey on this point said.

> "It would be every bit as foolish to make over the executive charge of our districts and of our cities to native commissioners and deputy commissioners, and it would be to revert

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26. The correspondence of Duke of Argyll (1872) (.74) M.S S, Eur. C. 144 (9) 1874. Calcutta. I.C.L. P. 32. letter No 21, The Duke of Argyll to Lord Northbrook, January 7, 1873.

27. The Lytton Papers, "*Native Civil Service*" op. cit pp. 7-8.

28. Hobhouse, Sir A. 1819-1904; Legal Member of Governor General's Council 1872-73 ; Member of Judicial Committee of Privy Council, 1881-1901.

29. The Lytton Papers "*Native Civil Service*" op. cit., Minute of A. Hobhouse May 20, 1873

30. The Lytton papers. "*Native Civil Service*" op. cit. p. 9.

31. Ibid. p. 188.

to the system which cost us so dearly, under which our artillery and our arsenal and magazines were entrusted to the loyalty of native soldiers."

Another reason for not giving executive posts to the natives was the unwillingness of Englishmen and other Europeans to serve under the natives. Moreover, he pointed out that there were constant and also not ill founded, complaints, from the covenanted civil servants that their number was too large, that their promotions were blocked, and that the admission to the Statutory Civil Service would create more difficulties for them because many of the appointments hitherto reserved to them would be given over to the natives, thereby aggravating the already existing discontenment.[32]

Thus policy of doubting the loyalties of the natives and keeping them away from positions of trust and responsibility seems to have worked in a vicious circle and as a result created further distrust against foreign rule in the minds of educated natives. Either they should not have been given western education or they should have been allowed to participate in the administration of the country. To fill their minds with western education, with the writing of Burke, Macaulay, Mill and others, and then let them rot aimlessly was a dangerous policy for the safety of the British dominion in India.

Pressure from the covenanted Civil Servants was to a great extent against giving employment to the Indians in the higher services of the country. The passage of the Act of 1870 would raise among the members of the service great apprehension and uneasiness, so far as their future prospects were concerned because the transfer of some posts, reserved for the Covenanted Service to the Statutory Service would reduce their chances of promotion[33]. The Government of India and other high officials supported their view.[34] Robert Lowe voiced that complaint in the House of Commons.[35] The Secretary of State, however, rejected the plea as in his opinion the Act of 1870 did not affect their interests and their apprehensions were baseless.[36] That Englishmen were

32. The Lytton papers '*Native Civil Service*' op. cit p. 59-60. Minutes of Sir J. Strachey, Oct. 21, 1862.

33. Pub. Progs. No. 278,—12th March 1875.

34. Minute of Sir John Strachey, 21st October, 1872 and also Publ. Progs. 1878, desp. No. 35— May 2, 1878, The Government of India to the Secretary of State.

35. Parl. Deb. Vol. CCXXV, 1875 CC 714, 715 June 29, 1875.

36. Pub. progs. Home, July 1875, No. 67, The Secretary of State to Government of India No. 68. May 27, 1875.

averse to serving under Indian officers was raised into a big problem, although Englishmen served under native officers in Ceylon and Egypt and even in Indian states.[37] The civil servants, it seems, thought that a monoply of higher appointments had been guaranteed to them as the prize for open competition, and that those who wanted to enter the service without competition had no right in that Service. They grudged all such admissions, not only of Indians, but also of British military officers as it is clear from the protests made by them in 1861.[38]

To the Secretary of State's inquiry about pay scales Government of India opined that a native had not to leave his home and friends and that lower pay would also be in the interest of Indian tax payer.[39] The fixing of the rates of pay for different posts was considered a solution to avoid the embarassment of creating the racial distinction and would also be economical. Some of these appointments which were carrying high salaries be made over to a grade carrying the same rank and authority but with salaries calculated sufficient to enlist natives. These appointments should be made over to the Indians.[40]

The Government of India interpreted the phrase "proved merit and ability" to imply (*a*) officers in the uncovenanted services, who distinguished themselves in it should be promoted and (*b*) in the case of fresh oppointments in the judicial branch, only those would be taken who had distinguished themselves in the profession of law. This opinion of the Government of India was in harmony with Duke of Argyll's opinion expressed in a letter to Lord Nothbrook. He had observed : "My notion is that natives ought to be appointed to subordinate positions only, and out of those who do well, a few first-rate men should be promoted" and in another letter to Lord Northbrook he again expressed similiar views.[42]

The rules framed provided that any native of proved merit or ability, who had either served at not less than Rs. 200/- per month for not less than 5 years in some subordinate capacity under the government or for judicial appointments, who had either worked in that

37. Secretary of State to Government of India No. 125. Pul Nov. 7, 1878 C 2376 1878

38. Pub. Progs. No 278, March 12, 1875.

39. Ibid. Dec. 1823. The Secretary of State to Government of India No. 113, Oct 13, 1872.

40. The Lytton Papers, *Native Civil Service* op. cit. p. 90. Government of India to the Secretary of State, desp no Jan 23, 1874

41. Correspondence of Duke of Argyll, M,S,S, Eru C. 144 (9) 1874. p. 32 I.O.L. Letter No 21, Jan. 7, 1873.

42. Ibid. letter No 21, Jan. 7, 1873.

capacity at not less than Rs. 250/- per month for not less then 5 years or had been a barrister or pleader of two years' standing, could be appointed.[43]

The Law Officers of the Crown found that in putting these limitations on the admission of natives to Civil Service, the Government of India had "put too narrow a construction upon the Act of 1870." They thought that the Act in question scarcely justified that limitation which indeed was not expedient, as it would exclude persons of ability who had proved it in an employment other than government service.[44] Thus advised, the Secretary of State withheld his sanction for the rules and asked the Government of India to frame new ruels on the lines suggested by the Law Officers.

There was a great deal of irritation on the part of some high officials on the opinion of the Law Officers, on the ground that the Act in question was to be worked out by the authorities in India and that the authorities at Home should have given them considerable liberty in dealing with it.[45] It was, however, thought safe by the Government of India not to act contrary to the opinion of Law Officers on a point of Law[46] and Lord Northbrook even observed that on reconsideration he had found the opinion of Law Officers sound.[47]

However, the revised rules promulgated on 19th August, 1875 stated that any native of India, if of proved merit and ability, be appointed to any office in the Indian Covenanted Civil Service. Appointments were to be made by the provincial governments but with the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council. These appointments were to be reported forthwith, by the Government of India to the Secretary of State-in-Council, who could disallow any of the appointments within twelve months from the date of the receipt of such a report. Two years probationary period was also fixed.[48]

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43. The Lytton Papers, "*Native Civil Service*" op. cit. p. 93. I.O.L.

44. Pub. Progs. no 272, March 1875, letter from Secretary of State to Government of India No .131-20th August 1874.

45. Ibid. no. 274. Government of India to Secretary of State desp. no 6, 22nd Jan. 1875 also

(1) Minute by A.C, Lyall, 18th Sept., p 110

(2) Minute by A. Hobhouse-28th Sept., 1874, p 112-3

(3) Minute by Sir W. Muir, Dec. 2, 1874, pp. 116-7, The Lytton Papers '*Native Civil Service* op, cit

46. Thy Lytton Papers, *Native Civil Service* op, cit p 112

47. Ibid. p, 122

48. Ibid. p, 146, notification of the Government of India, Aug. 19, 1875

The Government of India in a dispatch dated 20th April, 1876 told the provincial governments that they were free to recommend natives for employment under new rules, but in that their special attention was drawn to the administration of civil justice, because it was in that service that Indians could advantageously be employed more often. It was also suggested that there might be small districts to the charge of which Indian officers of experience might be appointed occasionally and an Indian might be added as a member or appointed secretary to a Board of Revenue.[49] It may be of some interest to add that at that time some Indian judges filled the offices of the Judges of High courts with perfect integrity and in some cases with distinguished ability.[50]

Lord Lytton who had succeeded Lord Northbrook in 1876, did not seem to feel satisfied with the rules framed and subsequent instructions given by his predecessor for the selection of the candidates[51] and wanted to re-open the whole question. He circulated a lengthy minute among the members of his Council, inviting their opinions. His objections were:

First, there was a unanimous opinion of those most competent to speak on Indian affairs that Indians should not be appointed as incharge of districts, as the time had not yet come for making such appointments and so he felt great apprehensions about such appointments.

Secondly, the extension of the scheme to the non-regulation provinces was also questionable because the progress of education in those provinces was not equal to those of older ones. He was prepared to appoint natives to districts judgeships, but did not think it advisible to appoint them collectors and magistrates of districts. In the case of Boards consisting of at least three members, he thought, an Indian of talent and knowledge could be appointed. Like his predecessor, Lytton was not in favour of fixing any proportion of the native appointments to the covenanted Civil Service, as in his opinion that would create expectations in the hearts of the

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49, Ibid. pp. 188, 189

50, G, A, Naleson & Co, Madras, *Indian Jndges* 1932—(1) Sir T, Muthuswami Ayyer (1878-1894) Madras High Court (2) Shambunath (1867), (3) Dwarkanath Mitter (1867-1874) Calcutta High Court, These Judges were spoken of very highly

51, The Government of India, desp., no. 14771-81 April 20, 1876 to the provincial governments.

natives, which in its turn would create difficulties.[52] He wanted that competition should remain for the English and admission to appointments hitherto reserved to covenanted Service should, in the case of natives, be restricted to men whose merit and ability had been tested and proved by other means than that of an academic criterion. He favoured lower scales of pay for Indian entrants into the service as Indians had a lower standard of living than the Englishmen.[53]

T.C. Hope[54] suggested a bifurcation of the covenanted Civil Service into two grades, lower and upper. The appointments under the Act of 1870 should be made to the lower grade, the upper grade being reserved for men entering the service by competition held in England. This suggestion of bifurcation of the service was put into practice as a result of inquiry of the Public Service Commission (1886-87) in 1892.

Hope further suggested that the general competition of Europeans and Indians for the Civil Service should be abolished and in view of it a fixed proportion of 15% of the appointments available each year should be kept aside for the Indians and conferred on them provided they reached a certain reasonable standard fixed by the Civil Service Commissioners. In this way a regular supply of Indians of good family or of tried ability would be secured by the government and the difficult problem of putting Indians above Europens would not arise. As the same appointments would not be thrown open to Europeans and the natives, the question of whether they should have the same pay would also not arise. Thus any objection would be adequately met and the definition of the position of Indians in the administration would satisfy both Europeans and Indians.[55]

A majority of the members of Council agreed with Lord Lytton that there should be no fixed proportion between the Statutory Civilians and the covenanted Civil Service and favoured nomination to competition as the method of selecting Indians to Civil Service.[56]

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52. The Lytton Papers, "*Native Civil Service*" op. cit. pp. 264-69 Lytton's letter Oct. 16, 1876.

53. Ibid. pp. 263-64 Lytton's note Oct. 16, 1876

54. Hope, Sir Theodore Gracroft: Entered I.C.S. 1853, Member of Governor General's Legi lative Council 1875-80 ; Secretary to Government of India Finance and Commerce Deptartments; 1881-82, Member of Governor General's Council, 1882-87.

55. The Lytton papers, *Native Civil Service* op. cit. pp. 269-275.

56. Ibid. pp. 276-280

A.P. Howell[57] in his note dated 16th March, 1877 observed that the problem of giving Indians a share in the administration of the country must, like other difficult problems of Indian administration, be solved in India as it was "no use looking to England where benevolent intentions working upon intermittent attention and deficient information result in inconsistent and spasmodic action most embarassing to the directly responsible authorities in India."[58] He pointed out that by excluding the higher classes of Indians from the exercise of power, the Government was emasculating the race and turning the natural props and bulwarks of its rule into a source of danger and decay.[59] He urged that the policy of keeping the whole generation of Indians away from the exercise of authority has naturally resulted in the absence of capable men to be appointed under the Act of 1870. He supported the proposal for associating the higher classes of Indians with the administration. He remarked that the promotion of a native made by the Bombay Government would be received by the civil service there with the same kind of cordiality that a wasp is received into a hive of bees and service antipathies would certainly go deeper into class and race antipathies.[60] Col. O. T. Burne,[61] prepared a confidential note[62] for the use of the Governor General only. In that he observed that Indians had a claim to the extension of employment from the declaration of 1833 and 1858 and the Acts of 1861 & 1870 and the covenanted Civil Service could not have any ground of complaint with regard to the employment of Indians to the covenanted posts as they had been declared eligible by the above Acts. He seconded the opinion of Sir. A. Den that instead of Covenanted and Uncovenanted there should be 'Imperial' and local civil services and proposed that the government should appoint a special commission to settle the distribution of posts into imperial and local.

The next important step was a confidential note dated 30th May,

57. Howell, Arthur Pearse (1834-1911) entered I.C.S. 1857. Assistant Commissioner 1862. Under Assistant to N.W.F.P. Government 1862. Under Secretary to the Government of India, Finance Deptt, 1964. Acting Secretary to Government of India, Home Deptt. 1868, 1874 & 1877 Commissioner Narbuda Division, 1885.

58. The Lytton papers - op. cit p. 327.

59. Ibid. p. 329.

60. Ibid. p. 336.

61. Burne, Sir Owen Tudor : Military Secretary to C-in-C, in India 1861, Private Secretary to Lord Mayo, Governor General of India, 1569-72. Political A.D.C. to Secretary of State for India 1872, Secretary to Political and Secret Deptts-India Office, 1874, Private Secretary to Lord Lytton, 1875- 77, Member of the Council of India, 1887-97.

62. The Lytton Papers, *Native civil Service*, op. cit. pp. 452 - 458.

1877 by the Governor General, Lord Lytton and circulated in the first instance to three members of his Council (Sir E. C. Baylay, Sir. J. Strachey and Sir. A. Arbuthnot). Lord Lytton said that the Government was placed between the pressure of two antagonistic responsiblities. On the one hand were the pledges implied in the various Acts of Parliament, declarations of policy and the expectations which had grown out of them in the minds of the Indians, but on the other hand was the imperial necessity of maintaining safety and welfare of the empire by restricting the most important executive posts to Europeans. The Governor General proposed that the number of admissions to the covenanted Civil Service should be reduced, that there should be established a native civil service which should have a monoply of the appointments removed from the reserved list for the covenanted Service, with a portion of those then held by the uncovenanted Service; that appointments to the new service should be made not by competition, but by nomination, and that the members of the service should be remunerated at rates somewhat less than those of the covenanted Service but that the new service should be equal to the covenanted Service in status and position. In order to prevent both the regular services, covenanted and native, becoming too close, he further proposed fixing beforehand a percentage of appointments from outside in each. He further observed that holding of competitive examination in London and the reduction in the age-limit were deliberate and transparent subterfuges for stultifying the Act and reducing it to a dead letter".[63] He admitted that the attempts of the Government of India to implement the principles of the Act of 1870 had been resisted by the majority of the provincial governments and resented by the whole of the covenanted Service, and it had also failed to satisfy even the most moderate demands of the Indians. Lord Lytton said that it was extremely desirable to associate the young native *noblesse* of India with the Government because every such admission would be an addition to the strength of British rule in this country.[64] Lord Lytton held the proposals[65] of Sir Ashley Eden as thoroughly sound and amply drew upon them.

These suggestions of the Governor General were agreed to by

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63. The Lytton Papers, op. cit. p. 539, para 18.

64. Ibid. p. 553.

65. Ibid. pp. 306-309, Government of Bengal to Government of India, no. 1233, March 8, 1877.

the Governor of Bombay[66] and the Lt. Governor of Bengal[67], of N.W.F.P. and Oudh[68] and of the Punjab[69]. The Governor of Madras being preoccupied with a famine in his province was not consulted.[70]

Both Sir A. Arbuthnot and Sir, E.C. Baylay agreed with Lord Lytton that after the establishment of a close native civil service competition should be barred to the natives, although like Sir Richard Temple and Arbuthnot he doubted if this were possible under the terms of the Act of 1870, particularly in view of the Act of 1833 which stated that no natural born subject of the Crown in India could by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent and colour be disabled from holding any post. Sir E.C. Baylay agreed that the Indians should be placed on a lower scale of salary than the covenanted Civil Service for the sake, at least, of economy. For the mode of selection both Arbuthnot and Baylay were in favour of nomination instead of competition. Baylay was also in favour of leaving certain well-paid jobs such as judgeship of a High Court, of additional membership of a Board of Revenue, to the Indians. He recommended that 15% of the appointments reserved to the covenanted Service, should be taken away from it and given over to the new Service. He however did not want it to be an absolutely close service[72] J.O. Kinealey[73] held that the abolition of the principle of competition would be opposed by one section of Bengali community[74]. Sir Henry Lepel Griffen in his note[75] was quite outspoken and held that the Government could not give any executive appointments especially executive charges of the districts to the Indians because Englishmen due to their pride of birth will refuse to serve under native superiors.

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66. Desp. of Government of India to Secretary of State no. 35, Public Home May 2, 1878, The Lytton Papers "*Native Civil Service*".

67. Ibid. pp. 499 & 504

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. pp. 612, 614 & 621 - note Aug 1877, by Sir Lapel Griffen, Secretary to government of the Punjab and Lt. Government of the Punjab sept. 22 1877.

70. Ibid. p. 716

71. Ibid. pp. 650 - 657 - note Jan.30, 1878

72. Ibid. p. 666, para 3,

73. O. Kinealey, James (1837-1903) I.C.S. Joined service 1861, served in judicial branch of civil service in Lower Bengal, Legal Rememberancer and District Judge; Member Bengal Legislative Council. Acting Secretary to Government of India Home Dept : Pusine judge of Calcutta High Court, 1883-99.

74. The Lytton papers, *native civil Service*, op. cit. p. 691 note Feb. 1878.

75. Ibid. pp. 612 - 15.

further proposed that with the establishment of special native Civil Service, the ordinary covenanted Civil Service should no longer remain open to the Indians.

The Governor General assured the Secretary of State for India that the proposals in question would be widely welcomed by the natives as a very substantial boon. But so long as the higher executive posts in the administration of this country continued to be nominally open, but virtually closed to native agency, the constitution of the Civil Service of India could never be wholly free from an element of uncertainty, which tended to perpetuate growing dissatisfaction on the part of our native subjects and chronic irritation amongst our European Servants.

That Lord Lytton was quite vexed by the unsettled state of affairs about the admission of natives into the Civil Service is evident from the letter sent to Lord Salisbury a few days after the despatch just described.[78] Two months later in a letter pleading for his own scheme about the close native civil service, he wrote to Lord Cranbrook.[79]

"Broadly and briefly I think our case stands thus:

(*a*) On grounds of expediency, generosity and policy of economy, it is desirable to employ natives largely than heretofore in the civil administration of India.

(*b*) The principal cause of the acknowledged failure to fulfil fairly the promises given lies in the vagueness of the promises themselves.

(*c*) Hence, the more pressing and important claims of Europeans have invariably taken precedence over the claims expressly created for the natives and solemnly recognized, and reaffirmed, on their behalf by Acts of Parliament.

(*d*) It is very rarely indeed, and then not without vehement protest from the covenanted Service, to which they are nominally eligible, that natives can obtain any appointments coveted by Europeans or for which Europeans think it worth while to agitate.

(*e*) If now and then a viceroy or a lt. governor recognizes native claims to any appointment worth having he will be burning his own fingers.

(*f*) We remain in the vicious circle around which we have been wandering. We do not employ natives more largly because

78. Lord Lytton—Letters desp. Vol. 11 p 357-359 May 10, 1877 M.S.S. Eur, E. 218 I.O.L.

79. Ibid. desp. Vol. III, 878, July 21, pp 509, 513, M,S,S, Eur, E 218, 1878 I.O.L.

"We, a few thousands, hold India in the midst of millions by our ruling qualities. We hold India for no sentimental reason of its own good, but for our own advantage and for the glory of our own country. The propriety of granting increased employment to the natives of the country is a question altogether trivial beside the necessity of holding and governing India".[76]

Home Government on these proposals :— The Governor General-in-Council sent the proposals to the Secretary of State for India.[77] He argued that so far the object of the Act of 1870 could not be secured as under the existing rules the condition of proved merit and ability could apply only to the appointment of persons who had proved their merit either in the public service or in some profession and this interpretation would exclude all untried persons, whom, from a political point of view, the Government wanted to associate with the administration of the country by offering them careers in this Service. Moreover under existing condition appointments of outsiders to the Service would not fail to excite the justifiable hostility of those who had entered it through competition. Therefore, to give appointments to the Indians in it, without doing injustice to the covenanted Service it would be desirable to reduce the strength of the covenanted Service to establish a close native Civil Service, which should have a monoply of appointments removed from the list of those then reserved for the covenanted officers and a portion of those then held by the uncovenanted Service. It was proposed that 15% of the posts then reserved to the covenanted Civil Service and about 20% of the posts then held by the uncovenanted Service should be assigned to the proposed new service. The despatch went on to say that political expediency required the association of the landed aristocracy and princely class with the administration because they were the native leaders of the people, and their association with the administration would give greater stablity and popularity to the British rule in India. The scheme, it was argued, besides giving to the Government, men of proved merit and ability from the aristocracy of the country, would make it possible to satisfy the just claims of the uncovenanted officers, who by their proved merit and ability had already established a claim for promotion to the new service. Nominations, it was proposed, would be made by the Governor General-in-Council. The despatch

76. Ibid. p. 613

77. Pub. progs, May 1878, Home Deptt desp. No. 35 May 21, 1878.

> they are not well qualified and they are not well qualified because we do not employ them enough."

He went on to say that there was only one way out of this tangled positon.

> "Define more clearly the promises which have been given so vaguely and indeed so rashly; continously circumscribe them, but then make them realities within their necessary limits. Do not hold out to the natives vague hopes of filling every appointment now filled by Europeans".[80]

The Secretary of State accepted the general outlines of the proposals but refused, first, to make that service a close one, and secondly, to close the competitive examination for the covenanted Civil Service to the Indians as both these proposals involved a modification of the law, and therefore, a recourse to Parliament. This he would not undertake as there was no prospects of its success. He asked the Government of India to frame rules in such a way as would comply with the existing law.

He said that he was fully alive to the arguement that English officers wou'd not serve under the native officers, but he had observed that in Egypt, Turkey and even India itself English gentlemen of the highest character were not unwilling to accept subordinate positions under native authorities. He added that the right of admission of natives to the Civil Service gave no claim to any particular class of office, as every appointment must be determined in reference to what the public interest required. With respect to salaries, he accepted the proposal of the Government of India that salaries of every office should be fixed and in the case of covenanted British civilians, an allowance under some neutral demonination, sufficient to make up for the deficiency, might be added. By this method on the one hand, there would be no invidious distinction dependent on race, and on the other, able Englishmen could be tempted to serve in India. He further observed that Indians were eminently fit for judicial posts and therefore, should ordinarily be employed in them, although in exceptional cases they could be employed in high executive posts.[81]

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80. Lord Lytton : Letters desp. Vol. III 1878, p. 267. letter to Sir A. Clark April 26, 1878 M.S S. Eur. E. 218, 1878 I.O.L.

81. C. 2376, Parl. P. Vol. 25, 1879, H.M.S.O. Secretary of State to Government of India, desp. no. 125 (Public) Nov. 7, 1879.

The Rules for the implimentation of the Act :—Consequently the Governor General-in-Council sent fresh rules prepared in the light of the suggestions and objections made by the Secretary of State for his sanction. The first step was to reduce the number of recruits selected through competition in England for the Covenanted Service, to make room for the Indian nominees to the new service. This had already been agreed to by the Secretary of State. The members of the new service were not to be fullfledged members of the regular Civil Service. Further, as the Secretary of State had refused to sanction the formation of close native civil service, the idea of taking 15% of the superior posts and 10 to 20% of the uncovenanted posts, to make that service was also dropped. The Governor General-in-Council proposed instead, that the number of natives to be employed in the Covenanted Service in any one year, should not exceed 1/6 of all the recruits added to the Civil Service in that year. It may be noted that it was not necessary to employ 1/6 in any one year. Nominations were to be made by the local governments, considering the position of the candidate's family or of his educational attainments or of his efficiency in the service of the Government. The term of probation was to be of two years except in special circumstances, which the Government could determine, and after the successful expiry of the term of probation, the native civilians were to be eligible, equally with their English colleagues to all civil service posts except those of secretary to Government, chief magistrate of a district and commissioner of a division or of Customs to which offices he could be appointed with the previous sanction of Governor General-in-Council.[82] The Secretary of State sanctioned the rules with the omission of one rule stating that "persons admitted under these rules to the Service shall not without the previous sanction of the Governor General-in-Council in each case, be appointed as members of Boards, secretaries to the several governments and chief magistrates of districts, observing that it was undesirable to lay down any rules on the subject as it was obvious that selection for high offices must always be based on fitness and efficiency.[83]

On the receipt of the sanction of the Secretary of State to the rules, Lord Lytton issued a confidential note to the provincial

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82. Ibid. pp. 23 - 26, Secretary of State Government of India, to no. 31, May 1, 1879.

83. The Lytton Papers, *Native Civil Service* op. cit. p. 812 ; Secretary of State to Government of India, no. 68 July 17, 1879.

governments discussing as to what kind of persons could be selected for the Statutory Service. He pointed out that a majority of appointments should be of youngmen under 25 years of age, from socially high families, and that they should be enabled to prove their ability and merit in two years probationary period. But he maintained that the main object of these rules was not to transfer to the superior ranks of civil administration, officers whose services have already been secured by the Government in the inferior ranks but to attract to service youngmen of good family and social position, possessed of ability and education to whom offices open in the inferior ranks have not proved a sufficient inducement to come forward for employment.[84]

In a resolution of 24th December of 1870, the Government of India expressed similar views i.e. majority of appointments should be made from youngmen below 25, of good faimly and social position.[85] The pay of the statutory civilians was fixed at 2/3s of the covenanted civilian as the maximum.[86]

Analysis of Official Opinion :—From the whole controversy for drawing up the rules, the following points became clear. First, the Government of India and other higher civil servants thought that Indians should not be given access to the higher and select reaches of the Covenanted Service, lest they should prove a danger to the safety of the Indian Empire.

Secondly, the Government of India wanted to enlist the sympathy of Indians for the British rule and for that purpose Lord Lytton and his government in India thought that it could best be done by associating the landed aristorcacy and princely class with the administration, who would, not only, by having the honour and prestige that the service would give them, themselves remain loyal to the government but would also inculcate feelings of loyalty and goodwill in the masses, who being illiterate and inert, were in the habit of following them.

Thirdly, the Government of India and the British Government preferred nomination to competition because (a) aristocratic class could not get in through competition due to lack of education, (b) there was not equal diffusion of education among all communities in India, and educationally backward classes were generally the martial

84. Ibid. p, 831.

85. Publ. progs. no. 371 - Dec. 1879 - Resolution of the Government of India Dec. 24, 1879.

86. The Lytton Papers, *Native Civil Service*, op. cit. p. 882.

races of Nothern India such as Sikhs, Pathans, Rajputs, and by establishment of this service the Government wanted to distribute the appointments in proportion to the population of all religious communities in India.

Educationally advanced classes like the Bengalee Hindus, and Parsees, mostly from Bombay, thought that they were being by passed so that sons of old, high families might be provided with jobs. Another purpose of selection by nomination was that if any Indian entered the service by competition he would be "entitled to expect and claim appointment in the fair course of promotion to the highest posts in that service" and that expectation the government was never going to fulfil[87] and in nomination, the government could altogether do away with such claim of promotion as a right.

Fourthly, there was the idea of economy and a cheaper agency for the administration of India, as is clear from the whole controversy where almost everybody had stressed the need to give lower rates of salary to the Indian enterning the service under the Act of 1870.

Indian Opinion :—The Anglo-Indian Press generally expressed satisfaction over these rules. Indian press, mostly Bengalee papers especially *The Hindus Patriot*, The Indian Mirror and The Bengalee strongly disliked proposed system of nomination and objected to placing statutory civilians on an inferior footing in regard to salary compared with their Europeans colleagues. They pointed out that men admitted under new rules would be looked down upon by civilians who had entered service by competition and by reason of their lower pay would suffer a diminished prestige among their countrymen. "In fact native opinion, so far as it has had time to express itself appears to be far from satisfied with the new scheme."[88] Syed Ameer Ali[89] wrote.

> "The Act of 1870 remained, however, a dead letter, until a year or two ago, when under pressure of British public opinion, the Government of India framed a set of rules, which the Indian people have with one voice declared to be a fiasco. If the educated public opinion possesses any value, these rules stand absurd and impracticable. The Act of 1870

87. The Lytton papers, *Native Civil Service* op. cit. p. 579, note by Lord Lytton, May 30, 1877, para 8.

88. The Times, June 4, 1879, p. 5 - Report of the correspondent in India.

89. Ameer Ali Syed (1849 - 1928), called to the Bar, 1873. Practiced in High Court, Calcutta, Magistrate and Chief Magistrate, Calcutta 1878 - 81. Member of Bengal Legislative Council, 1871-18 & Governor General's Legislative Council, 1883-85; Puisne judge of Calcutta High Court, 1890 - 1904; Founder of the Central National Mohammaden Association and its Secretary, 1876-90; Privy Councillor, 1909.

authorized the Government of India to appoint Indians of proved merit and ability to offices of trust and emolument without regard to the fact whether they belonged to the Civil Service or not. There was no question of difference of pay between European and native officials involved in the objects of the Act. It is undoubtedly true that the primary principle in view was to save India from bankruptcy and collapse by utilizing indigenous labour and stopping the needless influx of the foreign element. The rules, however, not only stultify of the Act, but negate completely the theory upon which the objects the Government has ostensibily proceeded."[90]

The establishment of the Statutory Civil Service was a significant stage in the Indianisation of the Civil Service. Under the rules framed in 1879 Indians were given 1/6 of the total appointments of the Civil Service in any one year, in addition to any number of offices to which they were entitled on the basis of the result of competitive examination. Even under the favourable conditions from 1862 to 1878 only eleven Indians could get into the service by open competition but from 1879 to 1886, 15 Indians got into the Statutory Civil Service.[91] In spite of this, the Service could become popular niether with the covenanted Civil Service nor with the educationally advanced classes of India. The former thought that by the establishment of this Service, the number of covenanted appointments would be reduced and therefore it would cause a blockade to their promotion.[92] Moreover, men appointed under it were not efficient and capable of the highly exacting service and when they would not be promoted because of their inefficiency, to the higher and responsible jobs, they would grumble that they had been ignored on racial grounds.[93] The latter thought that it was established to bring into the Service sons of aristocracy by nomination and merit was being ignored. They thought that the appointmants to which they were entitled because of their education and merit, were given to moderately educated people belonging to high families.

The recruitment of the Statutory Civil Service 1880-1884 :—The total strength of covenanted civil servants for the whole of British India was fixed at 1098 officers and the annual recruitment at

90 Ameer Ali, Syed "Some Indian suggestions for India". *Nineteenth Century*, June 1880, p. 971

91. Parl. P. no. 48 C. 2327 - 1887. p. 21. In all 48 appointments were made up to 1885 of which two were from British Burma,

92. The Lytton Papers, '*Native Civil Service*' op. cit pp. 122-23 - Memorial of the Bengal Civil Servants, March, 1875.

93. Pub. Progs. no. 167. Sept. 1884 - Minute of J. B. Peile, June, 1884.

48.38 officers of whom 37.32 were to be civilians recruited in England, 8.05 statutory civilians and 3.01 military officers attached to frontier provinces and these proportions were to be fixed for a period of five years.[94] The Secretary of State, Lord Hartington disagreed with this proportion and asked the Government of India to determine the proportion after consulting the provincial governments.[95] In another despatch he suggested that it should be made clear to the Indians appointed in the Statutory Civil Service that though they were not members of the Covenanted Service, they might hold offices reserved for members of that Service.[96] The Government of India accepted this view, but suggested that the working of the rules framed in 1879, was capable of improvement and consideration,[97] but Lord Kimberley, who succeeded Lord Hartington as Secretary of State for India, however, suggested that provincial governments might be consulted about the improvement in the statutory rules for the selection of native civilians.[98]

The Government of India, thereupon, invited the opinions of the provincial governments on the following points.

Local or provincial governments should prepare from time to time a list of persons, eligible for admission to the statutory service and that a competition be held in each province among the persons so selected for statutory vacancies in that province in that year. Minimum educational standard be fixed.

Local governments and universities should be invited to nominate either concurrently or alternately a certain number of eligible candidates of that province to compete for each appointment allotted to that province.[99]

The replies of provincial governments were conflicting on some points, but they were unanimous that the Statutory Civil Service as organized by the Resolution of Government of India No. 59/232429 dated 24th December,[100] 1879, had failed to secure men of ability and merit for the government service. The Governments of Bengal[101] and Assam[102] were explicitly against preference being given to members of the high families.

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94. Pub. Progs. no. 140. June 1882, p. 1077.
95. Ibid. no. 114 Nov. 1881 p. 2142.
96. Ibid. no 80 June 1883 p. 162.
97. Ibid. no. 17 - no 1382 p. 2156. desp. no. 120 (pol.) sept. 18, 1882, Government of Bombay to Government of India.
98. Ibid. no. 162, Sep. 1884. cesp no. 128 (Pub. Nov. 22, 1883).
99 Ibid. no. 163, Sept. 1884, no 19/720 A, April 30, 1884. p 1175.
100. Idid, no. 371, Dec. 1879.
101. Ibid. no, 168, Sep. 1884 - pp. 1195 - 98 desp no. 1166 A.D,
102. Ibid. no. 184, Sep. 1884, pp. 1261 - 93 desp. no. 3557, June 27, 1884.

The Lt. Governor of Bengal, Sir Rivers Thomson said that undue importance given "to the fact of connection with the aristocracy of" India would not let the Government choose the best men. The Government of Assam observed that appointments of exalted families may be reserved by the Government but should not be the only principle to be followed.[103] The Governments of Madras and Bengal and J.B. Peile, Member of the Council of Bombay, were in favour of completely abolishing the Statutory Civil Service.[104] The majority of the provincial governments favoured nomination-cum-competition, if the Statutory Service was not to be abolished.[105] The Governments of Madras, N. W. F. P. and Oudh and Assam were in favour of making occassional promotions from the uncovenanted service, of men of exceptionally high merit and ability. The Lt. Governor of Punjab, Sir Charles Aitchison was against any reservation of appointments either in the covananted Civil service as suggested by Lt. Governor of Bengal Sir Rivers Thomson or for promotion from the uncovenanted civil service since in his opinion, both these arrangements were against the spirit of law. "What I understand the law to authorize, is the appointment to a particular office not to a service or to a class of appointments, to a proportion of all appointments, individual natives who have proved their merit and ability."[107]

Most of them were, however, in favour of nomination by the universities as they thought that they would ensure scholastic qualifications but not the moral, social and physical qualities essential for high executive appointments. Then for the age limit problem, Sir River Tomson, Lt. Governor of Bengal suggested its raising as that would satisfy native grievance.[108]

Sir Charles U. Aitchison, Lt. Governor of Punjab was most emphatic in his denunciation of the reduction of the age limit. He said that he had every sympathy for the Indian agitation regarding the raising of age limit for he believed that nearer the government returned to the position of 1854, better it would be for the country; more just to the people and less need would there be to have recourse to the statutory arrangements which could

103. Pub. Progs. no. 164, Sep. 1884, desp. no. 1332, June 18, 1884.
104. Pub. Progs. no. 197. Sep. 1884 p. 1889 minute of Peile.
105. Ibid. no. 170 Sep. 1884, p. 1298 - 9 desp. no. 11, July 16, 1884.
106. Ibid. no. 174. Sep. 1884, pp. 1245 - 48 desp. no. 231 S, July 11, 1884.
107. Ibid. Para 9
108. Ibid. no. 168 Sep. 1884 p. 1198.

be defensible only as long as the means of entrance into the Civil Service by competitive examinations were practically closed to the Indians.[109] The Government of India thereupon suggested for the appointment of a Commission to review the question of services.

Appointment of Public Service Commission, 1886 :- The Secretary of State accepted the suggestion of the Government of India for the appointment of a Commission to review the whole question of admission of Indians into the covenanted, statutory and uncovenanted services. As to the constitution of the Commission, the Secretary of State directed Government of India to include in it a proportion of Indian members who might sufficiently represent the different classes and modes of thought in India and further to include a trained English lawyer of judicial experience, if possible.[110]

The Commission made a thorough and comprehensive effort to obtain the facts about its field of enquiry and views of both administrators and administered. In brief, the Commission recommended that for the recruitment to covenanted Civil Service, the competition should be held in England only, and to give to the Indians a fair chance of competing with the British candidates the age limit should be raised from 19 to 23. The Commission also recommended that Statutory Civil Service should be abolished and in lieu of that a Provincial Civil Service should be established which be wholly officered in India, partly by promotion from the subordinate services and partly by recruitment. The existing members of the statutory Service were to be amalgamated with the Provincial Service.

These recommedations were made after it had examined in all 469 withnesses including both officials and non-officials, 140 were Europeans of whom 33 were domiciled in India, 138 were Hindus, 7 were Sikhs, 66 were Muslims and the rest belonged to other communities. Taken as officials and non-officials, 225 were officials, 243 non-officials 32 spokesmen of societies, 27 newspapers editors, remaining 184-other categories.[111]

Consequences of the Report :- The age limit was raised to 23 and thus the longstanding desire of the Indians to compete on an equal footing with the British candidates fullfilled.

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109. Parl. P. Vol 58, C. 4580, 1884 - 85, minute of Lord Ripon.
110. Pub. Progs. no 111 Nov. 1886 pp. 944-45 desp. no. 65 (Pub.) July 15, 1886 (Secretary of State to Government of India)
111. Parl. P. Vol 48, C, 5327, 1887, p. 2 Report of PSC (188 - 87), pp. 6-7.

Under the new scheme persons employed in the Provincial service were to become members of an organised Service in which their prospects of promotion were assured in the usual manner, while in Statutory Service every promotion was to be considered as a new appointment gained on the basis of ability and merit and not as a normal stage in the career of a member of an organized service.

The statutory Service, as a result of the recommendation of Public Service Commission (1886-87) was replaced by Provincial Civil Service, an organized service, and appointments to it began to be made by provincial governments according to their circumstances either by nomination or by competition.

British Policy Towards The Indian Muslims Immediately After 1857.

S. Razi Wasti *

WITH the death of Aurangzeb Alamgir in 1707, the inevitable process of decadence and decline set in. Recalcitrant tendencies grew apace and the provincial plenipotentiaries began to assert their independence. Thus the mighty fabric of the Mughal Empire was shattered. Nadir Shah's invasion of India in 1739 and the holocaust and plunder that ensued subsequently gave a fatal blow to the already staggering Mughal Empire. Nadir's invasion did not only reveal the hollowness of the Emperor's powers, it also brought to light the differences among the powerful baron classes; and the advantages that an interested party could possibly have acquired by exploiting them. This state of affairs enocuraged the foreign trading companies in India to nourish designs of territorial aggrandisement. The British East India Company, which had the temerity and resources to defy the Mughal authority even in the most palmy days of the latter's rule was the first to take advantage of the anarchical conditions obtaining in India. In 1757 the British conspired with some Hindu Seths[1] against Siraj-ud-Dowla, the Nawab of Bengal. Siraj-ud-Dowla was accordingly defeated in the famous battle of Plassey and was subsequently put to sword. Thus the East India Company acquired, by sheer dint of diplomacy and stratagem, one of the most fertile provinces of India.

Though masters of the situation, the British did not assume, for certain political reasons, direct responsibility of the administration and preferred to rule through puppet Nawabs. First they elevated to the throne Mir Jaafar, one of their accomplices and the commander-in-chief of the late Nawab. As a price of the throne Mir Jaafar had to

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1. Prominent among them were Omichand, Jagat Seth, Mànikchand, Durlabh Ram and Raj Ballabh. See Ram Gopal, *How the British Occupied Bengal*, Bombay, 1963, pp. 183—215.

cede all those concessions to the British which Murshid Quli Khan and Siraj-ud-Dowla had so ably and stubbornly resisted in the past. His own income was considerably reduced as he had to part with the 24 parganas of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong. Besides this, he had to grant the British a monopoly of inland trade, and pay such a large amount of gold by way of presents and compensation, that the province was almost drained of its financial resources. According to the estimates made by the Select Committee of 1772 the total amount which Mir Jaafar had to pay was about £1,250,000 'proved or acknowledged.'[1] In order to cripple the powers of the puppet Nawabs and to undermine their prestige, the British gradually reduced the number of both their forces and allowances. Mir Jaafar had to disband eighty thousand of his armymen and Mir Qasim and Najmud Dowla were left with such number of soldiers as were deemed sufficient by the British to maintain the dignity of the Nawab[2]. Likewise, the amount of allowance given to the Nawabs was reduced from Rs. 53,86,000 to 16 lacs only[3]. Thus stripped of their powers, prestige and resources, the Nawabs of Bengal could no longer grant Jagirs or lucrative jobs to the Muslims. The upper classes of the Muslims were thus hard hit. But it was only in an indirect way that they had suffered. Having undermined the power of the Nawabs, the British were soon to turn to the Muslim aristocracy and the peasantry. Some political developments rendered the task of the British easier. In 1761, the Marathas, who had by that time become the most powerful factor in the Indian politics, sustained a terrible defeat at the hands of Ahmad Shah Durrani. Owing to some pressing problems at home, the Afghan ruler had to leave India without founding a new dynasty. The new situation presented an excellent opportunity for the Mughals to establish their sway firmly. But unfortunately they had sunk so low that there was left no hope for their revival. Now the British were left the only power to be reckoned with in India. And they were not slow to avail the opportunity. In the meanwhile, Mir Jaafar, who had become restive of the British high-handedness, had been deposed and Mir Qasim was installed in his place. The British practice of exactions and extortions continued under Mir Qasim as well. The latter who was an able administrator, and wanted to put

1. *First Report.* Select Committee, 1772. pp. 145—148 (Evidence of Richard and Beecher. India Office Library).

2. J. C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal*, London, 1927. pp. 95—96

3. Ibid. p. 97.

the administration of the province in order, could no longer bear the excessive demands and anomalies of the British. In 1764, he entered into an alliance with Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor, and Nawab Wazir of Oudh, in order to shake off the yoke of the British domination. In the ensuing battle that took place at Buxur, the joint armies of Shah Alam, Nawab Shuja-ud-Dowla and Mir Qasim were defeated. The battle of Buxur was of great significance. It boosted up the prestige of the British arms and established their superiority over those of the Indians.

After their victory at Buxur, the British could have easily extended their borders upto Oudh. But they abstained from annexing it for two reasons. Firstly, they did not have ample resources and personnel to control their new acquisition effectively. Secondly, the annexation of Oudh would have brought them face to face with the Marathas ; and might have evoked the jealousy of other foreign trading powers in India as well. These considerations led the British to act in a cautious and diplomatic way. Under the circumstances Oudh as a buffer state appeared to them more useful than otherwise. Accordingly they satisfied themselves with the realisation of 50 lac of rupees and the districts of Kara and Allahabad as war indemnity from Shuja-ud-Dowla. The two districts alongwith an annual subsidy of 26 lac of rupees were later conferred upon Shah Alam whom the British had decided to befriend. By this stroke of diplomacy the British did not only avert the possible dangers of evoking the jealousy of the Marathas and other powers, but also succeeded in winning over Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-Dowla, who might have otherwise proved serious foes.

In 1765, the East India Company extorted the Diwani *i.e.* the right to collect revenue and carry on the civil administration of Bengal, Bihar and Orrisa from Shah Alam as a price of the annuity and the two districts which they had conferred on him. The grant of the Diwani thus completed the control of the British over the affairs of Bengal, and enabled them to undermine the financial position of the Muslims. The actual repression of the Muslims of India started with the acquisition of Diwani by the British. The Muslims in the position of rulers and conquerors had monopolised the financial resources of the province for centuries. To put it into the words of Hunter, "Three distinct streams of wealth ran perennially into the coffers of a Noble Mussalman House—Military Command,

the Collection of the Revenue, and Judicial or Political Employ."[1]

The first of these streams, Military Command was dried up soon after the battle of Plassey. A large number of the Bengal Muslim armymen were disbanded. The East India Company did not at all employ the Muslim Army chiefs in its army, if at all any Muslims were recruited, they were given the lowest ranks.[2] As a result of this policy hundreds of noble families were rendered jobless and had to turn to cultivation[3]. But even as zamindars and cultivators they were not immune. After the grant of the Diwani the East India Company almost doubled the land revenue[4]. Besides, the land revenue was collected most rigorously.[5] With a view to speed up the collection the Company introduced the system of farming out the revenues to highest bidder, who was in most of the cases a Hindu bania, or money lender and dealer.[6] The Nazims "exacted what they could from the zamindars and great farmers of revenue, whom they left at liberty to plunder all below, reserving to themselves the prerogative of plundering them in their turn, when they were supposed to have enriched themselves with the spoils of the country."[7] Under this system anomalies and corruption increased beyond limits. The revenue collectors all the time busied themselves in amassing wealth from the cultivators[8]. Thus the poor peasants were reck-rented. Even during the terrible famine of 1772, in which one-third of the population of Bengal was perished, the land revenue was collected without making any allowance. The loss of revenue caused due to the death of some farmers was made up by extortions from those who survived.[9]

Another factor further worsened the condition of the Bengal Muslims. The servants of the East India Company and other European individuals taking advantange of their position, indulged in extensive private trade. They evaded duties, forcibly purchased

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1. W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, Lahore, 1964, p. 118.
2. *Seir-ul-Mutakhareen*, Vol. III p. 203.
3. Hunter, op. cit. p. 114.
4. In 1766-67 the net amount collected was $ 2,527,594, as against $ 1,681,427 in 1765-66. See the *Fourth Report 1733.*
5. R.C. Dutt, *Economic History of India*, London, 1906, p. 9.
6. J.C. Sinha, op. cit. pp. 94-95.
7. *Fifth Report*, Select Committee, House of Commons 1832, Vol. I.
8. J.H. Harrington, *An Elementary Analysis of the Laws and Regulations enacted by the Governor General in Council at Fort William in Bengal*, Vol. II Col. 14—15, p. 8, Calcutta, 1814—1815.
9. Letter from President in Council, 3 November 1772. See. Ibid, pp. 6—7.

goods at a lower price, sold the same goods at high rates, monopolised trade with the weavers and thus deprived the Indians of their bread by ruining the commercial prosperity of the country[1]. Consequently, small Muslim traders, weavers, and handicraftsmen in the absence of alternate means, either resorted to "begging or thieving." Describing the miserable condition of the people a contemporary writer remarked that "the shaft has sunk to the quick and knife has cut through to the bone."[2] The permanent settlement of Bengal under Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore, dealt the final blow to the Muslim aristocracy and peasantry. Under this settlement the lands of Bengal and Bihar were made over to the new zamindars, without any survey, and without any record of landed right and without, in fact, ascertaining the boundaries of estates too[3]. As a result of the permanent settlement the subordinate Hindu officers who had hitherto dealt directly with the husbandmen were acknowledged as landlords. The system gave the Hindus, "propriety rights in the soil and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Mussalmans under their own rule."[4]

Thus while the Muslims were suffering the political and financial losses, the Hindus and especially the British were growing stronger day by day. The unimaginable amount of wealth fell into their hands, the vast resources of Bengal which now lay at their feet, and the incredible ease with which they had seized power in Bengal, made the British cast covetous eyes on other parts of India as well. The disappearance of the Dutch and the French as the serious rivals of the British from the Indian scene, the defeat of the Marathas at the hands of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the defeat of the joint armies of Mir Qasim, Shuja-ud-Dowla and Shah Alam at Buxur, and finally the growing weakness and differences among the Indian ruling chiefs made the British extend their sway beyond the borders of Bengal. The subsidiary alliances system under Lord Wellesley; the policy of annexation and turning various native states into buffer states ; and the doctrine of lapse were some of the devices by which the British were able to bring almost all the independent states of India under their

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1. H. Vansittart, *A Narrative of Translations in Bengal* from 1760—1764, London, 1766. Vol. I. pp. 311—12.

2. Seir, Vol. III. pp. 192—93.

3. B.H. Baden-Powell, *A Manual of the Land Revenue Systems and Land Tenures of British India,* Calcutta, 1882, Vol. I.

4. James O. Kinealy's remarks cited in Hunter, op. cit, p. 121.

sway. Wherever the British went, they crushed the power of the local chiefs ; disbanded their armies and took the administration of the area into their hands. But the thing the Indians could not tolerate was the British interference with their religion and social customs. The British missionaries on the other hand deemed it a religious duty to bring the Indians under the fold of Christianity and carried the proselytizing activities on a large scale. This caused immense hatred, discontent and distrust among the Indians especially the Muslims. A number of religio-political movements were started by the Muslims with a view to counter-act the missionary activities of the British and to help solve the economic problems of the Muslims. Notable among them were the Faraizi Movement of Haji Shariat Ullah and his son Dudhu Mian and Titu Mir in Bengal, and the Jihad Movement of Sayyid Ahmad of Breli. The leaders of both these movements declared India *Dar-ul-Harb* or enemy country. The Faraizis discontinued the practice of offering Friday and Eid prayers which they thought could only be done in an Islamic country. Though movement met with a great success, it evoked the jealousy of Hindu zamindars who regarded it detrimental to their interests. The movement was crushed by the British. Sayyid Ahmad having declared India *Dar-ul-Harb* migrated to Afghanistan and died fighting against the Sikhs.[1] Apparently there remained no danger of a Muslim armed revolt after the death of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed in 1831. However, the oppressive policies of the British East India Company, and the keenness of the missionaries to propagate Christianity among the Indians soon resulted in an attempt on the part of the latter to shake off the yoke of British domination.

The outbreak of the Revolt in 1857, brought the greatest of perils on the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The British accused them of the Revolt[2], and decided to crush their power once for all. Mass massacres, indiscriminate hangings, inhumane tortures, and large-scale confiscation of properties were some of the means adopted by the British for the purpose. No distinction was made between the 'rebel' and the faithful ; civilian or sepoy ; between a man or a woman and old or infant. All stood condemned in the

1. *India Gazette*, 24 June, 1831.

2. Abdul Latif, *Athara so Sattawan Ka Tarikhi Roznamcha (Urdu)*, Tr. by Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Delhi, 1958. pp. 36—37. See also. *Notes on the Revolt in N.W. Province of India* by Charles Raikes and *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*, by Mrs. Coopland.

eyes of the conquerors ! As a result, thousands of noble and prospering families were perished. Those who survived were no less unfortunate. They found the doors of all respectable means of living closed on them. To make the matters worse, the Hindus too, who were equally responsible for the Revolt, put the blame on the Muslims and joined hands with their new masters. The Muslim sufferings and afflictions were so great that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who was an eye-witness to all that happened, lost all hopes of their regeneration. "The amount of grief it caused to him was such," writes Syed Ahmad, "that he grew old and his hair turned grey."[1]

Sir Syed's statement might appear to some as an exaggeration, but only a casual study of the details of the extreme severities and inhuman atrocities that were perpetrated on the Indians, particularly the Muslims, would reveal its truth. Soon after the outbreak of the war, instructions were issued for the extermination of the 'rebels' by "slaying them in fighting, by raising the people against them, by offering rewards for their seizure, by driving them on to destruction in the rivers, in the hills and jungles."[2] The orders were aptly carried out. Wherever the native regiments were found in a state of rising or were suspected to be so, they were instantly disbanded, put under chains, court-martialled and then transported or blown to pieces[3]. Others who somehow made good their escape were pursued and arrested or put to the sword on the spot. The purpose of these exemplary punishments was to "show these rascally Musalmans that with God's help, Englishmen will still be masters of India."[4] Most heinous crimes and barbarities were committed by the English and all in the name of God ! On 10 June 1857 one hundred and twenty persons were arrested at Peshawar. These persons "though taken fighting against their masters had not shed the blood of their officers, and there were some amongst them, who in the tumult of the hour, had been carried away by the multitude without any guilty intent". Forty of them were blown up by guns in a most public and dreadful

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1. *Collection of Sir Syed's Lectures*, Ambala, 1892. p. 258.

2. *Peport on Measures adopted in the Punjab during the Mutiny*, West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records, Proceedings of 25 May 1858. File No. 75.

3. Referring to the blowing up of the Mussalmans from guns Lt. Roberts wrote to his mother, "the death that seems to have the most effect is being blown from a gun. It is rather a horrible sight, but in these times we cannot be particular. Drum Head court-martials are the order of the day in every station." See *Letters written during the Indian Mutiny*, 11 June 1857.

4. Ibid. Letter of 31 December 1857.

manner. Commenting on the executions Kaye writes : "It is a significant fact that neither Sir Herbert Edwardes, in his official Peshawar Report, nor Sir Sydney Cotton in his published Narrative, says one word about this punishment parade. And what these brave men, being eye-witnesses of the horror, shrunk from describing, I may well abstain from dwelling on in detail. There is no lack, however, of particulars, all ghastly and some grotesque, in the contemporary letters before me."[1] The story of Peshawar was repeated in the Panjab and in a still more horrible manner. When the news of the outbreak at Meerut and the capture of Delhi reached Lahore, the authorities took precautionary measures, and on 13 May disarmed and arrested 3,800 Indian soldiers. A vigilant guard was posted on them for about three months. On 30 July while a violent dust-storm was raging a Sikh fanatic killed the Major. Thereupon the 26th Native Infantry, tried to escape under cover of the storm. Fire was opened and a number of them were killed. The remainder tried to cross the Ravi near Amritsar but were intercepted by the Police. Fredrick Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, came out to deal with them and saw them in the following situation :

"The villagers were assembled on the bank, flushed with their easy triumph over the mutineers, of whom some 150 had been shot, mobbed backwards into the river, and drowned inevitably ; too weakened and famished as they must have been after their forty miles' flight to battle with the flood. The main body had fled upwards, and swam over on pieces of wood, or floated to an island about a mile off from the shore, where they might be described crouching like a brood of wild fowl. It remained to capture this body, and having done so, to execute condign punishment at once." Two boats were sent by Cooper fully armed with muskets, to arrest the fugitives. In utter despair some fifty of them jumped into the river. But to the surprise of all Cooper did not order to open fire on them. Thinking that Cooper wanted to give them a trial the remainder delivered themselves. Two hundred and eighty-two prisoners who had given themselves up for arrest alongwith a number of others, were locked up into a bastion at the police station. Immediately after that a party of Sikhs arrived. Thereupon Cooper sent the Hindoostani Muslim troopers and horsemen away to celebrate the festival of sacrifice—

1. Kaye & Malleson, *History of the Sepoy War*—London, 1889—Vol VI, Ch. IV.

Bukra Eid—falling on the next day. Next morning the prisoners were brought out of the bastion in groups of ten to be shot. When the prisoners came to know about what was in store for them, they were completely taken aback and filled with anger at the treachery of Cooper. When two hundred and thirty-seven sepoys had been shot, the district officer was told that the remainder declined to step out of the bastion. When the doors of the room were opened, "forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light."

The bodies of all the dead and shot were then thrown into a nearby dry well[1].

No explanation was demanded, no action taken against Cooper for the most treacherous slaughter of such a large number of innocent Muslim sepoys without giving them a trial or providing an opportunity to say a single word in self-defence. On the contrary, his action was applauded by no less a person than John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, who on 2 August 1857 wrote to Cooper :—

> "I congratulate you on your success agaist the 26th N.I. You and your police acted with much energy and spirit and deserve well of the state. I trust the fate of the sepoys will operate as a warning to others. Every effort should be exerted to clean up who are yet at large."[2]

Robert Montgomery, the successor of Lawrence as Lt. Governor of the Panjab, was no less enthusiastic about Cooper's adventure. He expressed his appreciation in the following words :-

> "My Dear Cooper,—All honour for what you have done, and right well you did it. There was no hesitation, or delay, or drawing back. It will be a feather in your cap as long as you live...The other three regiments here were very shaky yesterday ; but I hardly think they will now go. I wish they would, as they are a nuisance ; and not a man would escape if they do."[3]

As a natural effect of the advocacy and appreciation by higher authorities, for cold-blooded murders of the sepoys, every European

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1. Edward Thompson, *The Other Side of the Medal*, London, 1925. pp. 58—62.
2. Sir Henry Lawrence to F. Cooper, 2 August 1857. Cited in Thompson op. cit. p. 64.
3. Ibid.

officer and soldier became more and more blood thirsty and merciless. Even in areas of the Panjab such as Murree Hills and Multan where discontentment against the British was comparatively less, thousands of the native sepoys were killed on mere suspicion, or on charge of desertion. In an official letter to the Secretary, Government of India, the Chief Commissioner, Panjab, informed the former that between 31 August to 20 September 1867, 918 out of 1,075 sepoys were arrested and disposed of. He further stated that "the estimate of killed and drowned is below the real number, as only those have been entered of whom authentic intelligence has been received."[1] One can well imagine from this instance the extent of bloodshed to which the sepoys of Meerut, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Ambala and Oudh, which were the major theatres of war, would not have been subjected. Lord Canning's letter which he wrote to Queen Victoria throws some light on the subject :

"There is a rapid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad even among those who ought to set a better example, which is impossible to contemplate without a feeling of shame for one's countrymen... Not one man in ten seems to think that the hanging and shooting of 40,000 or 50,000 men can be otherwise than practicable and right."[2]

However, the viceroy's lamentation over the attitude of his countrymen in India, should not mislead anyone. The supreme Government of which Canning was the head, was itself responsible for certain inhuman enactments, which provided the branding of every sepoy prisoner convicted of Mutiny and desertion like animals.[3] The British were not content with this horrible punishment even. They advocated the inflicting of most excruciating tortures on the Muslims. Some were suggested by Nicholson in a letter to Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar Division. The letter read as follows :-

"Let us propose a Bill for the flaying alive, impalement, or burning of the murderers of the women and children at Delhi. The idea of simply hanging the perpetrators of such atrocities is maddening...If I had them in my power today, and knew that I were

1. Chief Commissioner, Panjab, to the Secretary, Government of India 2 October 1858. See *the West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records,* Political Department Proceedings of 2 October 1858. F. No. 28—31.

2. Lord Canning to Queen Victoria, Cited in Thompson. op. cit. p. 54.

3. Act 32 of 1857 was especially passed for the purpose. See the *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records. Judicial Department.* Proceedings of 10 July 1858. File No. 1—3.

to die tomorrow, I would inflict the most excruciating tortures I could think of on them with a perfectly easy conscience."[1]

As every European appears to have taken the law in his own hands, all the tortures enumerated above and some more ghastly, were soon restored to by them without least fear of or regard for the law. A horrible account of the treatment meted out to certain Muslim prisoners was one narrated to Sir Henry Cotton by one Mowbrey Thompson in the following words :

"Late in the evening a Sikh orderly came to his tent and, saluting, said, "I think, Sir, you would like to see what we have done to the prisoners." Suspecting the worst, he sprang up and rushed to the guard room, and there witnessed the spectacle of these wretched Mohammedans at their last gasp, tied to the ground, stripped of their clothing, and deeply branded over every part of their bodies from head to foot with red-hot coppers. With his own hand he put an end to their agony by blowing out their brains."[2]

The insatiable thirst of British vengeance could not be quenched by such heinuous atrocities, and excited them to resort to some more horrible ones. An eye-witness states that the wild British officers and savage Sikhs having repeatedly bayoneting and wounding a prisoner in the face burnt him alive over a slow fire,—"the horrible smell of his burning flesh as it cracked and blackened in the flames, rising up and poisoning the air, so in this nineteenth century, with its boasted civilization and humanity, a human being should lie roasting and consuming to death, while Englishmen and Sikhs, gathered in little knots, around, looked calmly on."[3] William Howard Russel, the *Times* correspondent who happened to be in India during those days, stated that he himself saw the charred bones of the poor victims some days after the incident.[4] He strongly condemned the British for resorting to spiritual and mental tortures "such as sewing Muslims in pig-skins, smearing them with pork fat before execution, and then burning their bodies."[5] Condemnation and criticism could not, however, deter the British from indulging in acts that injured the religious

1. Cited in Kaye. op. cit. Vol. VI. Chapter I.

2. Henry Cotton, *Indian and Home Memories*, London, 1911. p. 143.

3. Lt. Vivian Dering Majendie. *Up. Among the Pandies,* London, 1859. p. 187.

4. William Howard Russell, *My Diary in India in the Year 1858—59*, London, 1860. Vol. I. pp. 301—2.

5. Ibid. Vol. II. p. 43.

susceptibilities of the Muslims. As a matter of fact they intended to add insult to injury by forcing them to act against their conscience and religion. Once a number of prisoners were made to clean out the church at the point of bayonets and were susbsequently hanged[1]. Such was the treatment that the British meted out to the Muslim sepoys, about whom it was taken for granted that each of them had murdered European women and children. Nevertheless when, we see that even those, who did not swerve in their loyalty to the British, were not spared, we are forced to conclude that the feelings of exasperation that existed in those days had taken away from the British the power of sanely judging the conflict. That is why they did not make any distinction between the disloyal and the faithful and wrecked vengeance upon both. An officer of Major Renaud's column told Russel that "the executions of the Natives were indiscriminate to the last degree". In two days forty-two men were hanged on the roadside, and a batch of twelve men were executed because their faces were turned the wrong way when they were met on the march.

All the villages in his front were burnt when he halted. These severities could not have been justified by the Cawnpore massacre[2], because they took place before that "diabolical act." From Russell's remarks it appears that the inflicting of such terrible punishments not only on the rebles but even on the loyalists would have been justified if they had been resorted to after the Cawnpore tragedy. But some of his own countrymen and highly-placed contemporary officers were of the view that "if mutiny is ever justifiable, no stronger justification could be given than that of the Sepoy troops."[3] Even General Anson, the then British commander-in-chief confessed that "incredible disregard of the soldier's religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these cartridges."[4] P.E. Roberts goes a step further in openly professing that "through carelessness or ignorance animal fat had actually been used in the ammunition factories at Woolwich."[5] Besides the question of

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1. Mrs. R. M. Coopland, *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior and Life in the Fort of Agra during the Mutinies of 1857, London, 1859. p. 243.*

2. As a reaction of British atrocities a number of European women and children were killed and thrown into a well by orders of Nana Sahib at Cawnpore.

3. William Edward Hartpole Lecky, *The Map of Life*, London, 1901. p. 104.

4. Cited by Lord Roberts, *Forty one years in India.* Vol. I. p. 94.

5. P. E. Roberts, *History of British India*, London, 1858, p. 366.

cartridges that proved to be the last drop in the cup of bitterness, there were certain other causes which forced the Indians to attempt the overthrow of the British rule. That the responsibility for the alienation of the Indians rested solely with the British has been aptly accepted by Benjamin Disraeli, who remarked, "The old principle of our rule had been to respect nationality; but the Government of India of late years has had alienated or alarmed almost every influential class."[1] In the light of these facts and open confessions of blunders committed by them, there was absolutely no justification for the British to perpetrate horrible atrocities on the Indians who had been forced by the circumstances to take arms against their foreign masters. Even if the guilt of the rebellious sepoys could not have been condoned for certain political reasons the repression of the loyal elements among them and the innocent civilians was not warrantable by any cannon of law or justice whatsoever. Besides, the conduct of the civilian population during the war was above question, as a large number of the British were given protection and sheltered by them. It has been rightly remarked that "Wherever the sepoys broke out, as a rule they murdered all the Europeans they came accross. It was the exception when they did not do so. On the other hand, among civil population our fugitives were generally spared and often assisted, it was quite the exception when they were murdered."[2] But the British made no such distinction and made the lives of the civilians a hell. A large number of Muslim villages and towns through which the British troops passed, were set on fire. Their properties looted, their women outraged and all the population without any regard of age or sex put to sword. While sending reinforcements to Cawnpore, General Neill gave some instructions to Major Renaud. According to which "certain guilty villages were marked out for destruction, and all the men inhabiting them were to be slaughtered.....The town of Futehpore which had revolted, was to be attacked, and the Pathan quarters destroyed with all their inhabitants. All heads of insurgents, particularly at Futehpore, to be hanged."[3] Referring to the massacre at the hands of the British, Majendie remarked :- "This to my mind is one of the most melancholy feature of the war, that so many comparatively innocent

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1. George Earle Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, Vol. IV. p. 88.

2. Sir George Campbell, *Memoirs of my Indian Career*, London, 1893, Vol. I. p. 233.

3. Kaye. op. cit. Vol. V. Chapter II.

beings should have suffered, as many have done, and that so little distinction should have been made between the cowardly mutineer, red-handed with the slaughter of women and children, and the Oude villager, or "*budmash*" who, whatever other acts of injustice and rapine he may have committed, and whatever his private character, cannot be said to have been guilty of rebellion, nor had done any of these deeds, but simply taken advantage of a great revolt to strike a blow of his country which we had taken from him, and who was fighting—whether wisely or not is another question—with at least a show or right upon his side, and in a cause which was not wholly vile.. it would have been more satisfactory, if for the people of Oude—Sepoys excepted—there had been some mercy and quarter."[1] But it appears that in those days the British had expunged the words mercy and indulgence from their dictionaries and remembered only vengeance. This led Disraeli to declare his "humble disapprobation of persons in high authority announcing that upon the standards of England 'Vengeance' and not 'Justice' should be inscribed." He further launched a great protest "against taking Nana Sahib as a model for the conduct of the British soldiers. I protest against meeting atrocities by atrocities. I have heard things said and seen things written of late which would make me almost suppose that the religious opinions of the people of England had undergone some sudden change, and that, instead of bowing before the name of Jesus, we were preparing to revive the worship of Moloch."[2] Lord Canning, who has been much praised by the Western scholars, and against whom great hue and cry was raised by his countrymen, who nicknamed him 'Clemency Canning,' for the restraint he exercised in dealing with the mutineers, miserably failed in checking the Europeans from indulging in wholesale massacres of Indians. In July 1857, he issued certain instructions forbidding "the indiscriminate burning of villages" and prohibiting "civilians from punishing any unarmed man as a mere detester. Several commissions with powers of life and death were withdrawn from civilians who had used them ferociously."[3] These instructions were so grossly violated everywhere that it gave the impression that Canning never meant to enforce them. In August the British troops returning from a village-burning expe-

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1. Majendie, op. cit. p. 195.

2. Buckle. op cit. Vol. IV. pp. 98—99, (Speech at Newport Pagnell, 30 September 1857).

3. Thompson. op. cit. p. 49.

dition shot and bayoneted a number of royal sepoys merely because they were sepoys. Referring to the incident the *Times* of London called it "wild justice."[1] The worst example of non-compliance of Canning's orders is afforded by no less a person than Lawrence, the Chief Conmissioner of the Panjab. While Canning had issued instructions to withdraw a number of commissions with powers of life and death the chief executive of the Panjab was endeavouring for introduction of such commissions in areas under his jurisdiction. On 30 December 1857, he wrote to the Commissioner of the Delhi Division : "In the Panjab it is the practice, under Acts XIV,XVI and XVII,[2] for two civil officers to form a commission for the trial of Mutineers and insurgents and to forward the proceedings in cases where capital punishment is awarded[3] for the consideration of the commissioners of the Division. As these rules have been found to work very well, the Chief Commissioner considers that they should now be introduced in the Delhi Division."[4] That the trials were mere farce is evident from the fact that while conducting the trials even the basic requirements of justice were not fulfilled. The accused were not allowed to say a word in self defence or hire the services of a pleader.[5]

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1. *Times*, 24 October 1857.

2. Canning and his council were responsible for the passage of these Acts.

3. The Judicial Commissioners had instructions to "execute capital punishment without further reference," See. *Reports on Measures adopted in the Punjab,* op. cit.

4. Chief Secretary to the Commissioner, Delhi Division, 30 December, 1857. West Pakistan Civil Secretariate Records, Judicial Department, Proeeedings of 2 January 1858. File No. 13–16.

5. The most lamentable example of the British disregard of justice is afforded by the outright rejection of an application filed by F. Fenwick, a licensed English Advocate of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes, praying to be allowed to appear for the defence of certain persons under trial. The judicial commissioners, to whom the application was made, were unanimous in their decision that "the permission could not be accorded." Thereupon Fenwick filed on appeal to the Chief Commissioner, Panjab, against the decision of the Commissioners. The advocate appcaled to the Commissioner's sense of justice by remarking that "we cannot influence the Court for or against persons, but he (an advocate) can do what if he has the ability he always does, viz, point out errors which the Court sometimes unintentionally commits, and for this alone, if for nothing else, advocates should be encouraged, especially in times like the present to show our native subjects that we are above feelings of petty revenge, and that it is the intention of the Government to punish only the guilty. The refusal of the commissioners to grant any prayers is likely to create a feeling in the minds of the masses, that it is the intention of the Government to condemn both guilty and innocent and the permission to the King of Delhi and Raja of Bullumupur, to be defended by advocates of their own choosing, was granted from fear. I have been offered the defence of several respectabl epersons now in cnofinement and awaiting their trial, but are unable to undertake their defence in consequence of *the refusal of the commissioners. To say the least, the permission in some cases to be defended by advocates, refusal in others shows a degree of partiality which is most unbecoming in a court composed of English Judges."

* Alluded to the only exceptions maed in cases of the Ex-King of *Delhi* and the Raja of Bullumpur.

But the appeal appears to have fallen on deaf ears, as the Chief Commissioner turned it down on the pretext "that Court is of a quasi political character."[1] The records of the West Pakistan Civil Secretariat pertaining to the Judicial and Political Departments bear testimony to the fact that the judicial commissioners and the Chief Commissioner had determined not to forgive anybody. In most of the cases they awarded capital punishment and thus indulged in judicial murders, in others the convicts were sentenced for various terms, at the same time confiscating their properties. Others were flogged or fined. "Clemency Canning" through an enactment, *i.e.* Act No. X of 1858, conferred upon Magistrates very extensive powers "authorising imposition and assessment of fines in case of rebellions, and other specified crimes, not only upon village communities, but upon the inhabitants of any Mohallah or Division of a city or Town."[2] The Muslims of Delhi were the worst victims of the British wrath. After the fall of Delhi on 14 September 1867, a reign of terror was let loose on them. "Those in arms against us had already fled, except the wounded; and our troops spared the lives of women, massacring the male population only."[3] Then the city was subjected to plunder.[4] The plundering was done to such an extent that nothing was left with the people either for food or clothing. In their zeal to search out the hidden treasures the British demolished a large number of houses and the floors and roofs of houses were inundated. This practice could not be put to an end until January 1860 when the Governor General on the recommendations of the Lt. Governor of the Panjab, issued special orders directing "all further search of hidden treasure in private houses at Delhi to be stopped."[5] Then was started the practice of judicial murders through the judicial commissioners. "I saw Sir Theophilus Metcalf the other day," wrote Montgomery Martin, "he is held in great dread here by the natives, and he is every day trying and hanging all he can catch."[6] "These judges," wrote Holmes, "were in no mood to show mercy. Almost all who were tried were condemned ; and

1. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, Judicial Department, Proceedings of 8 May 1858. File No. 5—6

2. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, General Department. Proceedings of 24 April, 1858. File No 64—68.

3. Thompson, op. cit, p. 77.

4. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, General Department. Proceedings of 24 April 1858 File No. 64—68.

5. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, Judicial Department, Proceedings of 11 February 1860. File No. 7—8.

6. Letter to the *Times*, January 1858.

almost all who were condemned were sentenced to death. A four square gallows was erected in a conspicuous place in the city, and five or six culprits were hanged every day. English officers used to sit by, puffing at their cigars, and look on at the convulsive struggles of the victims."[1] The horrors and panic among the Muslims of Delhi made them so desperate that a large number of them killed themselves and their families lest they should fall in the hands of the English. Montgomery Martin wrote, "I have given up walking about the back streets of Delhi ; as yesterday an officer and myself had taken a party of twenty men out patrolling and we found fourteen women with their throats cut from ear to ear by their own husbands, and laid out in their shawls. We caught a man there who said [that] he saw them killed for fear they should fall into our hands; and showed us their husbands, who had done the best thing they could afterwards, and killed themselves."[2] After the carnage, the entire Muslim population of Delhi was banished from the city.[3] They were not allowed to return to their Houses till August I859, and even this was not unconditional. For this they were asked to pay "a fine of 25 percent on the value of their real property."[4] The British did not even spare the places of worship of the Muslims, which were turned into stables, magazines, treasury offices, or were closed for prayers. Even the principal mosques, the *Jamia Masjid* and *Eidgah*, were closed down and were not given up for worship until November 1862.[5]

What was true of Delhi was true for rest of India. The Muslims were crushed everywhere. On 24 December 1857 speaking in his council Lord Canning described the entire situation in the following words :

"The indiscriminate hanging, not only of persons of all shades of guilt, but of those whose guilt was at the least very doubtful, and the general burning and plunder of villages, whereby the innocent as well as the guilty, without regard to age or sex were indiscriminately punished, and in some cases, sacrificed, had deeply exasperated large

1. T. R. E. Holmes, *The Indian Mutiny*, 4th Edition, p. 353.

2. Letter in the *Times*, 19 November 1857,

3. For reference see. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, General Department, Proceedings of 1 January 1859. File No. 11—12.

4. *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records*, General Department, Proceedings of 5 May 1860. File No. 28—29.

5. Ibid, Proceedings of 15 November 1862. File No. 1—2.

communities not otherwise hostile to the Government; that the cessation of agriculture, and consequent famine, were impending; that there were sepoys passing through the country, some on leave, others who had gone their homes after the breaking up of their regiments, having taken no part in the mutiny, but having done their utmost to prevent it; others who had risked their lives in saving their European officers from the sanguinary fury of their comrades; and that all of these men, in the temper that at that time generally prevailed among the English officers and residents throughout the country, and still unhappily prevails in some quarters, were liable to be involved in one common penalty; and lastly that the proceedings of the officers of Government had given colour to the rumour—that the Government meditated a general bloody persecution of Mohammedans."[1] Analysing the British reaction to the outbreak of the war Russell passed the following remarks by way of criticism: "Either it was a military mutiny or it was a rebellion more or less favoured by the people when once the soldiery broke into insurrection. If it was a pure military insurrection, it is most unjust to punish the country people and citizens by fine and hanging for complicity in acts with which they of their own accord had nothing to do; it is also impolitic to inflict chastisement upon them for not actively resisting armed men, drilled and disciplined by overselves, and masters for the time of the whole country."[2] According to Sir George Campbell the responstibilty of the diabolical atrocities committed on the Indians rested to a great extent on Lord Canning. Because "When Lord Canning's Government passed that Act of 6th June 1857 and proclaimed Martial Law in certain provinces, they were bound to exercise the strictest executive control over the manner in which such terrible engines were used. And while giving Lord Canning every honour for the principles of clemency which he inculcated, I cannot forgive him the extreme administrative inefficiency which allowed those principles to be set at naught in practice, and blood to be shed in a most reckless manner."[3] There was very little of the formalities of military law in what was done.

Whether the formalities of military law were observed or not, whether Lord Canning or somebody else was responsible for the conduct of British officers, it made little effect on the latter. On the other hand the Muslims who were made the deliberate victims of the

1. Governor General in Council, 24 December 1857 on state of affairs in the provinces July, cited in Thompson. op. cit. p. 74.
2. Russell, *Diary* II, op. cit. p. 259.
3. Sir George Campbell. op. cit. p. 232.

British vengeance were doomed. No truer picture of the degree of degradation and destitution to which they had been subjected can be afforded than that of the Muslims of Delhi themselves, who in an application addressed to the Governor-General stated, "we the Muslim inhabitants of Delhi have since sustained the extreme losses of life, property and honour. At present we have absolutely nothing to feed our children and ourselves. There is no ceiling under which we could seek shelter against inclement weather, and no clothings to cover our bodies. Thousands of us not bearing the severities of climate perished last year, and if nothing is done to protect us, many more will die this season. We are at a loss to understand as to whom should we turn for mercy, and to whose door should we knock at to get our grievances redressed, except that of yours....."[1]

The assumption of power by the British crown in November 1858 made little effect on the Muslims. In her Proclamation of 1 November 1858 the Queen had assured her Indian subjects that in future no discriminative policies would be formed ; and that equal opportunities would be accorded without any distinction of caste or creed, to all the Indian subjects of Her Imperial Majesty for the betterment of their lot.[2] But even now justice was not done to the Muslims. They were deprived of their legitimate rights and the venues of all employments were closed on them. The Government considered the preponderance of the Muslims in various departments dangerous for its safety. As back as September 1859 R.H. Davies, the Secretary to the Government of Panjab, in a report addressed to the Governor-General observed "that amongst those whose conduct has been impeached are some of our own employees in the Educational Departments. In the village schools the great majority of teachers are Mohammedans, and W. Temple's remark contains great truth that "if by any chance the Moulvees were to obtain a decided preponderance among all grades in the department then Government may be sure that in the event of Mohammedan movement the disaffected would find in the Educational Moulvees a forceful organisation for mischief 'ready to hand.' *But attention will be given* to the prevention of any such preponderance."[3] The result of such apprehensions was that

1. Tr. Petition of the Muslim inhabitants of Delhi addressed to the Governor-General, for reference see. West Pakistan C.S. Records. General Department Proceedings of 1 January 1859. F. No. 11—12.

2. Public Documents. *The Annual Register, 1859.* London, 1860. pp. 203—5.

3. R. H. Davies to Governor-General dated 6 September 1859 for reference See : *West Pakistan Civil Secretariat Records,* Judicial Department, Proceedings of 10 Sept. 1859. File No. 8.

the Muslims who had, before 1857, a lion's share in all the departments of government were now excluded not only from the Educational departments but from almost every state department, and were replaced either by the Europeans or the Hindus. If at all they were given any employment by the Government, it was never "above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots, and mender of pens."[1] On I4 July 1869 *The Durbin*, a Persian paper of Calcutta, depicted the whole situation in the following words:

"All sorts of employment, great and small, are being gradually snatched away from the Mohammedans, and bestowed on men of other races, particularly the Hindus. The Government is bound to look upon all classes of its subjects with an equal eye, yet the time has now come when it publicly singles out the Mohammedans in its gazettes for exclusion from official posts. Recently, when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sundrabans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointment would be given to none but Hindus. In short, the Mohammedans have now sunk so low, that even when qualified for Governmcnt employ, they are studiously kept out of it by Government Notifications. Nobody takes any notice of their helpless condition, and the higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge their existence."[2]

And all this was happening under the very nose of the Governor-General and his council, whose headquarter was at Calcutta. One can well imagine the plight of the Muslims residing in areas far off from the seat of Government. It suffices to say that the Muslims of the sub-continent were, at that time, at the lowest depths of their broken pride.

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1. In *the Indian Musalmans*, W. W. Hunter has given a graphic account of the systematic exclusion of the Muslims from the Government employment and their replacement by the Hindus.

2. *"The Durbin"* (Calcutta), 14 July 1869.

Book Reviews

Selected Speeches and Statements—by Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Edited by Abdullah Malik, Nigarshat, Lahore, 1971, Price Rs. 15.00

THE Selected Speeches and Statements of Mian Iftikhar-ud-din, edited by Mr. Abdullah Malik, is a welcome addition to the literature published so far, containing the speeches and statements of important leaders of the Muslim National Struggle. Mian Iftikhar-ud-din came of very highly respected family of Lahore and inherited at a young age immense landed property and cash. He was educated at Oxford and on his return joined the Indian National Congress in 1936. He was elected to the Punjab Assembly in 1937 at the age of 29, became Secretary of the Congress Assembly Party and founded the Congress Socialist Party in 1938. He was President of the Punjab Provincial Congress from 1940 to 1945 and he along with other Congress leaders went to jail, first in 1940 and later when the Quit India Resolution resulted in the arrest and internment of many Congress leaders of note. He left the Congress because of his disillusionment with that party, which according to him. had failed to recognise the claims of the Muslims and give them a due share and an honoured place in the Government of a United India. He resigned later from the Indian Congress in September 1945 and joined the All India Muslim League in the same year. In his last speech from a Congress platform he severely castigated the Congress leaders for their failure to understand and meet the demands of the Muslims. He said, "Whereas the Muslim League has been able to understand their just demands, and has succeeded in interpreting their true aspirations, the Congress leadership has completely failed in this. Any one who refutes this argument must believe that the Musalmans do not believe in freedom, that they are incapable of fighting for it and that they have not got the courage to face our foreign rulers; such an analysis is, as is realized by any one who has even an inkling of Muslim tradition and Muslim history, totally false. Muslims, are as desirous of, and as capable of fighting for their freedom as their Hindu brethren provided they are assured of place in the free India. This the Congress has failed to do so far."

In 1945 he was elected on Muslim League ticket to the Punjab Provincial Assembly. He led the civil disobedience movement against Khizr Hayat Ministry in 1946. He later founded the Progressive Papers Ltd. at the behest of the Quaid-e-Azam and became Refugee Minister in Agust 1947 but resigned on account of differences of opinion with the then Government in the country. He was elected President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League in November, 1947. Coming of an aristocratic family with a large landed property he was a pationate advocate of land reforms and the removal of social and economic inequalities, having come under the influence of Communist ideology. He founded the Azad Pakistan Party in 1951 and was member of both the Constituent Assemblies and that of the National Assembly from 1956 to 1958. He was also a founder-member of the National Awami Party and took active interest in social, economic and political problems with which the country was faced. Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din was "one of the most controversial figures in our recent history." On his return from Oxford he fell under the influence of the Brelvi school and he is reported to have at one time worn a beard but soon after he left the Brelvi party and joined politics and later on came under the influence of the communists. When he joined the Muslim League he passionately and with singleness of purpose tried to promote the demand for Pakistan. His independent views and ideological differences with other Muslim leaders brought him into conflict with the various parties, and particulary after the Partition, with official policies. In his speeches and statements he never minced matters. As a Muslim leaguer and a member of the Constituent Assembly and the National Assembly he followed an independent policy vigorously and uncompromisingly. As a passionate advocate of the civil liberties he advocated the establishment of an egalitarian economic structure and an independent foreign policy. These features of his thinking are amply prominent in this collection of his speeches. His statements and speeches in the various Assemblies and outside made him many enemies and he became a *persona non grata* with Martial Law Authorities in 1958. He suffered his greatest disappointment when the Progressive Papers - *The Pakistan Times, Imroze* and the Lail-o-Nihar were taken over by the Government in 1959.

So far no biography of Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din has been written. At one time we are told that Mr. Abdullah Malik, the editor of the present selections, had promised to compile a biography. Except a very short pamphlet by Mr. Shorish Kashmiri who with his characteristic intellectual integrity as well as asperity has given a short

appraisal of the work of Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, which is not very complimentary to him. A detailed biography is still awaited. In the present selection the reader will be able to find ample material to reconstruct the political, social and economic ideas of Mian Sahib.

Two great contributions of Mian Iftikhar-ud-din are worth mentioning. The creation of an independent opposition party in the Assembly which was crushed after 1958, and the founding of three valuable papers, which enriched the literary life of the Province. He had gathered around him a number of eminent writers and journalists but somehow or other he fell foul of them and most of them were either removed from service in the Progressive Papers Ltd., or left in disgust. Some of the observations of Mian Sahib are still as relevant to the present situation as they were to the time when they were made. Writing in 1953, he spoke with conviction, thus; "Sir' we must bear in mind that compulsion is not the best method of achieving the unity. We have, unfortunately this conception that unless there is a strong government, there will be no unity. I think it is absolutely incorrect. Strong Government at times may lead to bigger disruption." (P.389). He pleaded always for decentralization of administration, as according to him, centralization could result in disruption and in disunity. "If you centralise in that way," said he, "there will be revolt in Bengal, if you brought in all the subjects that there are today in Bengal, you will find that there will be a revolt there and vice versa. If you take the capital to Dacca and give all the subjects there, there is bound to be revolt in Western Pakistan. Therefore, to say that centralisation and unity are one thing is the greatest mistake. At times centralisation, over centralisation, leads to disunity as, surely at times, lack of coordination leads to disunity. I beg to submit, Sir, that situated as we are in this country, this factor has throughout to be borne in mind that centralisation is not to be confused with unity." (P.389). On another occasion, speaking of the integrity of Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in September, 1958 (P. 441), he appealed to the leaders to consider the political needs of the people of Pakistan in the context of the exigencies of the domestic situation as well as of foreign pressure. He pleaded for the acceptance of the just demands of Bengali people. With his forthrigtness without mincing matters he made the following observations :

> "I submit then, sir, that the manner in which were conducting ourselves, would not lead to the unity that we all desired, or said that we desired, but would gradually result

in the disintegration of our country. At that time we were being ruled, as we have even now are, under an administration which has been so centralised that we may say it, for all practical purposes, of unitary form of government. The provincial governments were puppets. You will remember, sir, that all the fourteen or fifteen changes, that have taken place in our provincial ministries, were due to the intervention and the pressure of the central government. At that time I submitted that if we went on with this type of government, where control is so centralised, we may one day antagonise our countrymen in Bengal, and that antagonism may lead not only to administrative complications and conflicts but may also result in what we may call an emotional estrangement. Sir, what I feared two years ago has happened." (PP. 443-444).

It has been said that he had no political acumen and had not much political vision but he was a close observer of the political, social and economic scene. His speeches were carefully prepared and well orded. They engendered heat which was cooled down by his opponents in the Assembly and outside. His aristocratic way of life and his wealth-he was one of the topmost landlords and capitalists of the country-could be ill-reconciled with his views about a more equitable and just distribution of wealth and his great political influence did little to relieve the distress of the working classes whose cause he pleaded inside and outside the Assembly. Inspite of this Mian Iftikhar-ud-din played a very important role in the achievement of Pakistan and suffered a lot in bringing about the successful consumation of Muslim political struggle for freedom both from the British as well as Hindu bondage. The book is well printed and well brought out and his speeches will repay a careful and close study in understanding the contemporary situation. One basic defect,which is common to most of our recent publications in Urdu and English which are coming out from Pakistani writers, is the absence of a detailed analytical index and cross refernces, which would have made the work of the reader and researcher easier and enable him to find references to relevant portions of the speeches, according to individual needs.

Sh. Abdur Rashid.

Political Movement in the Punjab (Urdu)—by Abdullah Malik, Nigarshat, Lahore, 1971, Price Rs. 12.50

THIS book gives an account of some of the most important movements is the Punjab during the fateful two decades in our history 1920—1940. According to the writer, the present work is a part of his forthscoming books on the history of the Punjab in four volumes, beginning with 1849 when Punjab was conquered by the British. He complains and justly, that little or no work has been done on the social and economic history of the Punjab, so as to analyse the genesis, policies and programmes of the various movements described in the book during this period. This book is intended to fill that gap and acquaint the general reader with the role these movements played in the political and social developments in the country.

Mr. Abdullah Malik's analysis and interpretation of these movements, the organisation of these parties, their programmes, is based on materialistic interpretation of history and he measures the circumstances of their origin, the progress and the policy of some of these movements with the yard length of dialectic materialism class antagonism the possession of the means of production by particular classes and the exploitation of the proletariat. This sometimes mars the otherwise clear and convincing narration of events, and the reader does not always and cannot agree with the views of the writer about the social, economic and political ideologies, if any, of these movements and the tensions which gave birth to them. As an example of the tendencious opinions expressed by Mr. Abdullah Malik may be cited the following : his equation of Jamaat-i-Islami, its programmes and policies with the Rashtrya Sevak Sangh, the insistance on the dichotomy between religion and state as the union of the two leads to fascist tendencies; Sir Fazal-i-Hussain representing only the interests of urban classes with the support of the Government; the comparison between Sir Sayyid Ahmad and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, the role of Mirza Bashir-ud-din particularly in connection with the Kashmir Movement; the lack of political insight and inability to study the deep lying causes of social maloire of Islamic society by the late Allama Inayatullah Mashriqui and the role of Muslim league led by Quaid-i-Azam in bringing about an understanding between Sir Sikander Hayat Ministry and the Khaksars. Mr. Abdullah Malik in his lengthy description of the Quaid's role; not explicitly but by implication, holds Quaid responsible for the failure of the negotiations between the two as according to him the failure of the Khaksar movement would have created a more congenial atmosphere for popularising the Muslim League.

The most readable portion of the book is the introductory chapter, wherein he pleads for the need of a better understanding of history and not a flight from it. The main movements covered by the writer in the above mentioned book are:

1. Rashtrya Sevak Sangh
2. Khilafat Movement and the Ahrars
3. The Ahrars and the Kashmir Movement
4. The Khaksar Movement.

Though the Arya Samaj, the Congress and the Muslim League do not find a separate place in this book they are examined in relation to the movements mentioned above. A very relevant and important question posed by Mr. Abdullah and well considered by him, is an analysis of the causes which made Punjab a fertile ground for the movements to flourish there. The same communist critical apparatus is employed but his thesis is neither novel nor convincing.

It is difficult to agree with the views expressed by the author about the meaning, and purpose of history. Though the chapter forms an interesting reading, the author's ideas and conclusions are sometimes submerged in his ideological bias. In all the chapters mentioned above the account of the main movements studied by the author and other movements incidentally discussed and described by him contain much assoneour information which is so jumbled up, some having a bearing, on the subject and others irrelevant to the subject, that the reader finds himself lost in the mist of their petty bickerings and their sterile activities.

The book is written in chaste Urdu and is full of very valuable information which is not easily available to the student of the history of the political movements in our country. This is a valuable addition to our historical literature and inspite of the defects, which are purely technical, it forms an excellent, interesting and profitable reading. Mr. Abdullah Malik is to be congratulated on the production of this much needed study. The book suffers from the defects pointed out elsewhere—lack of an index, a bibliography and proper documentation. Quotations are given from documents and printed books without giving their titles, names of the publishers, the year of publication, or the edition used by the author. He has taken considerable pains in compiling this book, but it would have considerably added to its utility if the documentation had been on more scientific lines.

Sh. Abdur Rashid,

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW

1. S. M. Ikram—*Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

2. Abdul Hamid Siddiqi — *Al-Jamat-us-Salah*, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

3. M. Ajmal — *Tahlili-Nafsiat* (Urdu) Nigarshat, Lahore.

4. Urdu Translations published by Nigarshat.

   (*a*) *Khak-i-Uftadgan (Les damnies de la terre)*

   (*b*) *Vietnam mein Jangi Jariam* (*War Crimes in Vtet Nam*)

   (*c*) *Mao Tse Tung* — (*Mao Tse Tung*)

   (*d*) *Ho chi Minh* — (*Ho chi Minh*)

   (*e*) *Bharat Ka Buhran* — (*The Crisis of India*)

5. Perveen Feroze Hassan — *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, Publishers United Ltd., Lahore.

6. Jamil-ud-Ahmad — *Muslim Political Movement* — (3 Vol.) Publishers United Ltd., Lahore.

7. Javid Iqbal—*Idiology of Pakistan*—Ferozesons Ltd., Lahore.

8. Syed Yaqub Shah—*Islamic Jurisprudence*—Ferozesons Ltd , Lahore

List of M. A. theses submitted and approved in the Departments Political Science and History, Government College, Lahore.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

1. *Mian Ata Muhammad*—The Unionist Party, (1936—1942) ... 1966
2. *Jehangir Khan*—The Khilafat and Non Co-operation movement in the Punjab, 1913—1924. ... 1966
3. *Saadat-ullah Khan* — The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956—1964 ... 1966
4. *Saadat Saeed*—Development of Pakistan's relations with the U. S. A. and People's Republic of China (1958—1967) ... 1968
5. *Haroon Nasir*—The Sino-American Conflict-a Political Study (1949—1967) ... 1968
6. *Muhammad Murtaza*—Training of the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. ... 1968
7. *Arjumand Tahir Butt*—The Role of Political Parties in West Pakistan (1965—1969) ... 1970

IN PROGRESS

Tauqir Ahmad—Legislature of West Pakistan under the Second Republic. ... 1971

HISTORY

1. *Riaz-ud-Din Shah*—Administration of the Punjab under Lawrence Brothers ... 1968
2. *M. Afzal*—Sir Syed Ahmad Khan as education reformer ... 1968
3. *Abdul Ghani Sameen*—The Role of the Punjab in the Revolt of 1857 ... 1969
4. *Muhammad Bilal Farooq Adil*—Partition of Bengal—Its Social, Political impact on Muslim Community ... 1969
5. *Miss Yasmin Bashir*—Syed Ameer Ali as political leader and a writer ... 1969
6. *Ahsan Ali*—Hazrat Mujaddid Alaf Sani - un ki Siyasi Rujhanat (Urdu) ... 1970

IN PROGRESS ... 1971

1. *Muhammad Zafar Iqbal*—Hazrat Shah Ismail Shaheed aur unki Tehrik (Urdu) ...
2. *Ali Asghar*—Some aspects of Curzons policy and the Indian Muslims ...
3. *Iftikhar Haider*—Sir Sikandar Hayat as a politician ...
4. *Athar Waqar*—Zakaullah as a Historian (Urdu) ...
5. *Miss Saeeda Bokhari*—Muslim Political awakening 1885—1906 ...
6. *Miss Qaisera Shahzadi*—Sir Syed Ahmad Khan as a Social reformer (Urdu) ...