

# **The Journal**

## **of**

# **Political Science**

**U.S.S.R., U.S. and the Future of Baluchistan.**

- **Why South-South Co-operation.**
- **Historical Background of Insurance : *A Study of the R.C.D. Countries—1964-75.***
- **Comparative Public Administration : *A Bibliographical Essay.***
- **Pakistan and the Pattern of the Soviet Friendship Treaties in Asia.**
- **Issue Identification : *Egypt-Israel Negotiations (1973-1975),***
- **Nigerian Nationalism.**
- **Book Reviews.**

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
1. U.S.S.R., U.S. and the Future of Baluchistan. — <i>Hameed A.K. Rai</i>	1
2. Why South-South Co-operation. — <i>Zulfikar A. Khalid</i>	7
3. Historical Background of Insurance : A study of the R.C.D. Countries—1964-75. — <i>S. Ahmad-ud-din Hussain</i>	20
4. Comparative Public Administration : A Bibliographical Essay. — <i>Dr. Mujib A. Sheikh</i>	37
5. Pakistan and the Pattern of the Soviet Friendship Treaties in Asia. — <i>Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary</i>	65
6. Issue Identification : Egypt-Israel Negotiations (1973-1975). — <i>Dr. Sardar Muhammad</i>	81
7. Nigerian Nationalism — <i>Ahmed Husain</i>	89
Book Reviews	101

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## U.S.S.R., U.S. AND THE FUTURE OF BALUCHISTAN

*Hameed A. K. Rai*

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has provoked a growing debate, in Pakistan in particular and the Western world in general, over Soviet intentions in Baluchistan. In the light of historical Russian foreign policy objectives in the region, some analysts argue that it is only a matter of time until Moscow annexes the Baluch areas to a Greater Afghanistan or unleashes a Soviet-supported guerrilla struggle for independence, pointing to the traditional Russian interest in the warm-water ports. The Soviet move in Afghanistan is a part of an inexorable southward thrust, towards the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf oilfields and the Indian Ocean.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Soviet interest in military facilities along the Baluchistan coast near the Strait of Hormuz is likely to grow in direct proportion to the increasing Soviet stake in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

In my view, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan do not necessarily point to further Soviet expansion in the near future. For the Russians move very carefully and only take chances when they have a

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1. Richard Pipes "Soviet Global Strategy," *Commentary* April, 1980, pp. 31—39 and S. W. Sanders, "Moscow's Next Target in Its March Southward", *Business Week*, 21 January, 1980, p. 51.

2. Herbert E. Meyer, "Why should we worry about the Soviet Energy Crunch," *Fortune*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 82—88.

basic organisational frame work. This they lack in Baluchistan. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, to me, is a defensive response to the Sino-American-Japanese rapprochement and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan.

Since, fear of Soviet expansionist policy in the region are expressed by every second man in Pakistan and the Mass Media of Western countries, it is, therefore, necessary to make a rational and logical analysis of a "possible" Soviet policy towards Baluchistan based upon Marxist Ideology.

### *Feudal Society*

Baluchistan is mainly a tribal society, under the rigid control of the 'Sardars' of their respective tribes. For example, Khair Baksh Marri, Atta Ullah Mengal, Akbar Khan Bugti, and to a lesser extent, Ghaus Baksh Bazinjo and a couple of other less prominent Baluch Sardars. The pattern of life in Baluchistan is feudal, which to the communists is their number one enemy. Then, how, these Sardars, who have been vehemently objecting to development programmes by the Government of Pakistan, would like that the Soviet Union should come and establish a socialist state and society which diametrically oppose their feudal arrangement. They would not be fools to cut their own feet with the Soviet Axe.

### *Marxist Ideology*

Ideologically speaking, Baluchistan under its present Feudal System does not provide an easy and promising opportunity to the Russians "to fish in" Baluchistan. So

far as, my information is concerned, Moscow has explicitly opposed the Baluch nationalist goal of an independent Greater Baluchistan. and has failed accordingly, to develop strong, Soviet oriented Communist parties in either the Pakistani or Iranian Baluch areas. Thus, if Moscow wanted, it would have to work primarily through non-Communist nationalist groups if it were to promote independence in the foreseeable future. Given the lack of Communist organisational base in Baluchistan, would the Soviet Union be prepared to incur the costs and risks of a military adventure there including a possible confrontation with the United States? Although, far from negligible, the nationalist movement would need massive military aid, reinforced by sustained financial, technical and logistical help, in order to conduct a successful insurgency. Moscow might well be called upon to intervene directly with its own forces if the going got through. Yet in Soviet Doctrine, non-Communist nationalists would be inherently unreliable allies both in prosecuting a Baluch insurgency and in governing an independent state of Baluchistan.

So far as, the present Baluch leaders are concerned, they are outspoken and freewheeling personalities. who must be something of an enigma to the Russians.<sup>3</sup> For, they do not exempt the Soviet Union from their criticism of super power imperialism, though they take a positive view of the Soviet Union's record as a potential liberator.

Taking into account these factors which affect Moscow's calculation, it would be pre-mature to assume

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3. Selig S. Harrison. *In Afghanistan's Shadow* (New York : Carnegie Endowment for Peace), 1981, p. 196.

that Soviet intervention in Baluchistan is inevitable.

*Pakistan's Behaviour.*

The Soviet policy vis-a-vis Baluchistan will largely depend on Pakistan's actions. If Pakistan in exchange of American military "Aid" provide the use of Pakistani territory for anti-Soviet intelligence monitoring as it did from 1958 to 1966, there would be a significant danger of Soviet retaliation in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Similarly, an agreement providing for American Military access to Pakistani ports and airfields would be viewed as provocative by Moscow and could lead to Soviet pressure on Pakistani border areas. Moscow is already using increasingly explicit threats of intervention in Baluchistan to dissuade Islamabad from serving as a conduit for Western military aid to Afghan Mujahideen.

*Washington and Baluchistan.*

In a nutshell, the American interests in the Middle East are (a) Oil, (b) the points of strategic importance such as Suez, Straits of Bosphorous, Dardenells and the Persian Gulf. The importance of the Persian Gulf considerably increased for the United States after the British decision to withdraw militarily from "East of Suez" in 1971. The security of the oil-rich Persian Gulf States became a paramount issue of American foreign policy. After the 1973 Oil Embargo, the U.S., the West European countries and Japan realised the importance of the Persian Gulf Region. Thus, the Persian Gulf area has become the focus of Superpower rivalries. Since the flow of oil is the life-line of Western States as well as Japan, it has become number one objective of U.S. foreign policy in the Region.



The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its proximity to Baluchistan and the Persian Gulf has made Baluchistan, strategically most important area for the West, especially the United States. American loss of Iran after the fall of Shah and the establishment of a hostile religious regime has further enhanced the importance of Baluchistan's coastal areas for the U.S. It is because of this development that the United States which was against Pakistan and opposed tooth and nail the acquisition of Nuclear Re-processing Plant from France, overnight proclaimed its friendship with Pakistan and declared that the 1959 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement could be revived, and offered military and economic aid to Pakistan in the face of Soviet danger in the region.

### *U.S. Options*

The United States has two options for the achievement of her foreign policy objectives in the region. First, they should woo the Government of Pakistan and in exchange of Economic Aid and Military hardware ask for port facilities in the Arabian Sea on the Baluchistan coast. They might also ask for anti-Soviet intelligence monitoring bases. If the Government of Pakistan refuses to provide such facilities—which from Newspaper account appears that she does not want to—then the United States has the second option to pursue. It will contract the Baluch Leaders and would try to strike a bargain with them on the “Independent Greater Baluchistan State.”

Keeping in view the feudal set up of the Baluch society, the Sardars of Baluchistan are prone to American influence because the capitalist system of the West, serves better the interest of the Feudal Lords of Baluchistan.

than the Russian Marxist Ideology.<sup>4</sup>

The writings of American scholars on Baluchistan and the propaganda being made by the Jewish and Indian lobbies in the American Congress and the mass media, not to provide military hardware *i.e.* F. 16 planes to Pakistan, point to a dangerous move which aims at the future of Pakistan as a viable, independent sovereign state. The recent book on Baluchistan by a veteran American Journalist, Selig S. Harrison, "In Afghanistan's Shadow" the author has opposed every kind of aid to Pakistan. He has painted a black picture of the future of Pakistan and has suggested to the American Government for a pre-emptive move in Baluchistan.<sup>5</sup> He has advised that before the Russian's arrive and establish a pro-Soviet Government in Baluchistan, it is high time that the United States promoted the Greater Baluchistan Scheme with the help of prominent Baluch leaders.

### *Pak Policy*

It is the primary duty of the Government as well as the people of Pakistan to remain vigilant, for in international relations there are neither eternal friends nor enemies, the only thing eternal is the "National Interest". In the words of late President Ayub Khan, the conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy amounts to "walking on a triangular tight rope." It requires a lot of political acumen to articulate the available options and keep a triangular balance among the world giants *i.e.* the U.S., the USSR and China. Pakistan has to tread the political path very carefully because a slight limp might cost dearly to Pakistan. For the USSR, the United States and India are bent upon achieving their objectives in the region. it may even be at the cost of Pakistan's integrity.

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4. The present fighting in Afghanistan by different tribes under the direction of their Sardars and Maliks is in fact a fight against Karmal regime's Marxist reforms which directly hit their feudal privileges and is posing a serious challenge to their tribal authority.

5. Selig S. Harrison *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

## WHY SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATION

*Zulfikar A. Khalid\**

The political analysts and military strategists make differences among countries, *i.e.* North, South, East, West, small, big, developing and under-developed, industrial and non-industrial etc, mostly for their own convenience and bias. The popular North-South division of our world is a recent phenomenon. The countries geographically located in Latin America, Africa and Asia, racially non-white, economically backward and socio-culturally non-European fall under the category of the South. They are also known as Less-Developed Countries vis-a-vis the industrially developed countries in the North. The Third World definition of 'rich' or the North in the West is also extended to include the Soviet Union and its East European allies. The need for economic cooperation among the North-South World has been the focus of many top level conferences in the last three decades. The significant development has

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This paper is intended to describe failings and in-built biases in the North South dialogue and argues for the imperative of South-South cooperation.

apparently taken place by the North-South dialogue to hammer out any agreement on the structural changes in the prevailing international capitalist order of trade and foreign aid etc. Indeed, the existing global economic system is under pressure on many fronts—monetary, trade, investment, and donor-recipient of aid relations—that the last few years have witnessed the deterioration of existing arrangements to the extent where reform and restructuring are the imperative.

## II

The demand by the developing countries in the South to have economic and other cooperation by industrial countries in the North, aiming at eliminating economic inequality and social injustice stemming from the structural economic disequilibrium has achieved a new evolution in the shape of economic nationalism.

It is now troublesome to see the North-South gap widening, the dialogue held off, and prospects for solution neglected. The motly collection of countries previously subjugated under the imperialistic urge of the traditional European great powers for colonization are locked up under ever-aggravating socio-economic and political set-ups. The impoverishedness and passivity under an age-old alien rule in which the resources of manpower and raw material were controlled and extravagantly used by the colonial powers has manifested into under-developed, primitive technology, chronic deficit in the balance of payments etc. The heterogeneity of society coupled with the glaring difference in productivity and unemployment has added sharp dilemmas in the destitute and politically

turbulent nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The policies of preferences, full of limitations and strict conditions by the North add to the weak bargaining position of South vis-a-vis the North in international trade—thus resulting in unfavourable terms of trade for the South. The programmes of foreign aid and technical assistance to help the backward economies to reach the stage of 'take off' have created a very wasteful system. A system in which only the higher strata of society in the South enjoys the dividends. Furthermore, the international monetary chaos, mainly created by the reckless monetary policies of the United States have added much more negative impact on the currencies in the South, linked with the inflationary US dollars.

The North calls its foreign aid and development assistance programmes as shouldering the burden of poor countries. The fast moving events of past few years contradict this logic. The industrial countries within the North have made concentrated efforts for the adjustment of their mutual economic interest and world market conditions. Undoubtedly, the whole trouble does not lie in the market but in the forces that shape it. The annual economic summits of industrial countries—'a rich men's club'—since its first meeting at Rambouillet, France, in 1975 for promoting the international management of economic resources and resolving their mutual differences and economic outlook, may be viewed in that direction. On the other hand, after three decades of parsimonial answers, the developing countries in the South are exploring the prospects for South-South cooperation. Raul Prebisch, one time a proponent of the

North-South dialogue, whose perception and economic policies have had great impact in the Third World has called for the South-South dialogue. The sudden change in his outlook lies in his realization that the pressing economic problems in the South cannot be solved "without a fundamental transformation of the system". To him, the capitalist economic model adopted in the developing countries does not work, because :—

"It is imitative capitalism. We take the techniques of the centres, their pattern of consumption, their ideas, their ideologies, their institutions, into this social structure of ours which is completely different to the structures of the great countries from where all these elements have come. This gives rise to a whole series of contradictions, which lead us to the conclusion that it is impossible to develop our countries in the image of the centres."<sup>1</sup>

### III

In his April 1974 address to the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, the late Algerian President Houari Boumediene championed the commencement of a general economic offensive against the North which led to the adoption of a "Programme of Action on the establishment of a New International Economic Order". A decade before this initiative, Raul Prebisch listed a number of

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1. Raul Prebisch's interview with Eduardo Crawley of the South : *The Third World Magazine*, January-February, 1981, p. 30.

shortcomings and in-built biases in the prevailing international economic system from the perspective of under-developed countries and had stressed for cooperation to overcome them. The Sixth special session of the UN General Assembly, in which the Third World was called upon by the then Algerian President to support OPEC-inspired initiative to restructure the international economic system was described as a confrontation between the developed and the developing countries. Indeed, this was a major shift in the stand of developing countries. Commodity negotiation since the early 1960s has had to contend with the conflict between the desire for stability on the part of the industrialised countries and the objective of a truly realistic price for primary commodities sought by the Third World.<sup>2</sup> A conflict arose at UNCTAD II (1968) between North and South, over which product would receive preferences, the size of preferences, exceptions and safeguards, and whether there should be general or special schemes. The system which eventually emerged was not in line with that originally sought by the developing countries.<sup>3</sup> The North-South dialogue for a new international economic order included a number of issues: increasing the financial flows from the North to the South, increasing South's access to the Northern market without protectionism and improving the trade terms between the Southern raw material producing countries and the Northern commodity consuming countries. The Southern demands also included transfer

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2. South : *The Third World Magazine*, July 1981, p. 16.

3. See *Ibid.* p. 16.

of technology from the North to the South and increased sovereign control over the multinational enterprise. The Declaration of Lima adopted by the Group of 77 in November 1971, 'The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States'—a declaration presented by President Echeverria of Mexico, set the tone for the developing countries to take offensive in two principal ways: by warning multinational corporations that they operated at the will of sovereign states; and by threatening to control primary commodity prices through cartel actions.<sup>4</sup> UNCTAD V in 1979 re-emphasised the lack of cooperation and the gulf between the North and the South. No agreement was reached on the Group of 77's proposal which included a call for restructuring the international monetary system. In the IMF meeting in 1979, the North dismissed this demand by the South on the pretext that the developing countries were 'mixing monetary policy with the development issues'. Finally, at the UN special session in 1980 no agreement was reached on the proposals put forward by the Group of 77, which included the reshaping of the exchange rate system, reshaping international liquidity, amending articles of the IMF and World Bank in accordance with the needs of the South, and effective and equitable participation of the South in the decision-making process.<sup>5</sup>

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4. Tony Smith, 'Changing Configuration of Power in North-South relations since 1945', *International Organisation*, Winter 1977, p. 5.

5. *South: The Third World Magazine*, July 1981, p. 17.



## IV

The Brandt Report, titled, "North-South : A Programme for Survival" calls for an assault on global poverty and hunger, and redistribution of world resources. The Brandt Report, might have at least aroused compassion and concerns in the public at large, even if it failed to rouse the governments in the North, but, it is filled with idealism. The kind of realism which Brandt's Reports aspires in the relations of North-South is frustrated by the persistent phenomenon of international stagnation in the realm of negotiation and growing irreconcilability of the interests of the developed and the developing countries, especially in the last few years. The Report states for example, that 'the future prospects of the South would look entirely different' if only a fraction of the money, manpower and resources presently devoted to military uses in the North were diverted to development in the South. Though this is founded on the morally disturbing discrepancy between famine in Africa or Asia and the vast quantities of weapons of destruction in the North, who is going to stop this, wasteful, self-justifying arms race. The central message of the Brandt Report is that the North and the South have commonality of interest in survival but regrettably, there has been a little understanding of this fact. The prominent individuals in the Western World including statesmen, religious leaders, economists and sociologists have supported this idea, but most of the Governments turned a deaf ear to it. This must be driven home to all capitals in the North that they take the resources of the South and turn the raw material into industrial goods ; poor producers in the

South receive a fraction of the total value but the industrial countries in the North earn immensely.

Neither the colonial guilt nor the poverty, hunger, disease and social stagnation will win sympathies for 'the barbarians at the gate' from the industrial countries in the North. As a matter of fact the South has been very anxious in one way or another to hold dialogue but no one in the North will listen to it. However, in the natural process of change in the basic trends of the world economy, the North will miss this opportunity one day. No one in the western chancelleries realises that accommodating the southern moderate demands could serve the Northern interests in two important aspects—they would potentially allow the North to have new means of leverage in relations with the South; and they offer the North opportunity in its various policies and interests in regard to the developing countries.<sup>6</sup> This point has further been elaborated by Raul Prebisch :—

“It is quite clear that in the long term there is convergence of interests between the centres and the periphery. The centres cannot shut themselves off behind a sanitary cordon; they know that they are vulnerable to all sorts of contingencies and will become more so with the passage of time.”<sup>7</sup>

## V

The varying levels of development in the Third World countries and their individual historical links with the

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6. Smith. *op cit.* p. 1.

7. Prebisch, *op cit.* p. 33.

metropolis countries in the West prevent them to harmonise their policies on development aspirations. The political quarrels in the south coupled with the traditional structure of society and the economic hegemonism of the industrially developed countries in the North also render the North-South dialogue ineffective. The foreign economic penetration of the developing countries through aid agencies, international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the regional development banks, private bank consortiums and MNCs etc. effect the domestic economic structure and policy-making on desired lines—indeed, its vulnerability is pointed by George Ball :—

“How can a national government make an economic plan with any confidence if a board of directors meeting 5,000 miles away can be altering its pattern of purchasing and production affect in a major way the country’s economic life.”<sup>8</sup>

The perspective of dependency, because of its emphasis on the domestic politico-economic aspects of foreign penetration, could also be helpful. And in the past this has had three historic forms ; (i) colonial, (ii) financial-industrial and. (iii) the new dependence’ technological-industrial. The establishment of manufacturing facilities by MNCs from the North, the linkage of internal markets with the integrated world market is helping to an orientation towards normally external factors or values—this affects significantly, the country’s

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8. Quoted in Richard Stuart Olson, ‘Economic Coercion in the World Politics, *World Politics*, July 1979, p 481.

life, pattern of production and purchasing. *Osvalclo Sunkel*, a prominent scholar describes it as :

“The manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political, financial, economic, technical and cultural presence of the developed capitalist state in the underdeveloped country, which contribute significantly to shaping the nature, structure, functioning and transformation of its economy, society and policy ; a kind of ‘fifth column’ as it were.”<sup>9</sup>

The metropolis-periphery relations—a facet of an age-old European imperialism could be elaborated further :

“Colonialism as we knew it before the Second World War seems to be dead and buried. Neocolonialism, or post-colonialism, takes subtle forms of political and military control and goes hand in hand with economic penetration and domination. Basically, the imperialist powers attempt to infiltrate the state machinery (especially the secret services and the armed forces of the dependent peripheral nations), to develop links with the political and trade union functionaries of their client states, and to form an alliances with the local capitalists, who are accorded a status of “junior partnership”.<sup>10</sup>

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9. *Ibid*, p 481.

10. Andreas Bapandreou, ‘Confrontation and Coexistence’, *Monthly Review*, April 1978, p 16.

At present rational issue is not whether the North is ready in promoting industrialization and technical know-how in the South but could this be helpful for the developing countries and at what price ?

There is a widespread presumption that the vast quantities of technical information from the North does not necessarily correspond to the social and economic way of life in the developing countries. Almost two decades ago, Andre G. Frank—a famous economist from Latin America, suggested in his thesis of 'The Development of Underdevelopment' that the best way to development in the countries of Latin America was to reduce or eliminate the economic intercourse with the centres—thus resulting in less dependence on the West and reliance on local resources and technology which would help them to get rid of their socio-economic malaise. In the mid-seventies another version of this idea was presented on somewhat different lines by Mahbub-ul-Haq :—

“Whether it is national order, or the international order, the real bargaining of the poor lies in the ability and their willingness to disrupt the life styles of the rich. In any such confrontation, the rich have far more to lose and are generally far more willing to come to a workable compromise.”<sup>11</sup>

## VI

The fast moving socio-economic and political events

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11. Mahbub-ul-Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for Third World*, (New York : 1976), p 179.

of the past few years, the parsimonial answers from the North over the North-South dialogue, the palliatives held out by the industrial world for the developing countries, the concerted efforts of the North to harmonize the economic and political outlook of the industrial countries and a plethora of other factors summarised in the preceding pages call for a new consensus among the developing countries to stimulate their own economic exchanges.

The matters in regard to economic development have marched scarcely better for the South. Beyond any doubt, economic cooperation among the developing countries, less dependence on the North and political unity among the Third World countries seem to be the basic components of their efforts towards the establishment of a new international economic order. The socio-economic and political milieu within the South is not fit for the externally determined super-imposition of modern sophisticated technology upon pre-capitalist social and economic premises. The increasing dependence on capitalist technology, foreign aid and technical know-how will bring these countries back to the fold of imperialism—though in different forms.

Those Third World leaders who are attempting economic development in their countries, expecting helping hands from the North, will be frustrated in their purposes. The one exploits the other, pillaging its wealth not vice versa. The programmes of aid from the North help only the privileged—the junior partners' in the South—whose mind is set in the conventions of *status quo* and whose style is to command rather to cooperate with

the people in their countries. While these umbilical cords are their, economic development in the developing countries will remain a farce. In these circumstances, the South-South cooperation may include two goals: increased domestic economic capacity for a country's self-reliance; the use of enhanced Southern economic and political unity for more effective bargaining with the North. The realisation in the developing countries of their common history of suffering and struggle against exploitation (regardless of their geographic distance, political differences and outlook) may provide unity for the South.

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## **HISTORICAL BACK-GROUND OF INSURANCE A STUDY OF THE R.C.D. COUNTRIES—1964-75**

*S. Ahmaduddin Hussain\**

It has been generally observed that in the eastern countries, specially in the Indo-Pak sub-continent, people are neither insurance minded, nor aware of the utility of insurance and the role that it plays in economic development. Member-States of the R.C.D. realised the tremendous potentialities of trade expansion in the field of insurance, and adopted through mutual agreement, measures to promote cooperation in the field. Consequently both private and public sectors have been engaged in promoting insurance business in the region. The member-States have also adopted legal measure to facilitate expansion of insurance, for example, according to law, the amounts invested in insurance are exempted from income-tax. Thus, the collaboration between the member-States of the R.C.D. in the field of insurance and reinsurance has been most fruitful and impressive. A minute study of the history of insurance in these three countries would show how an absolutely inactive field like insurance could turn out to be the most fruitful field of trade between the member-States.

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### *History of Insurance in Iran*

Approximately six decades ago, in Iran, for the first time, two Russian insurance companies namely 'Nadeja' and 'Kafka' were set-up. Later, Britain also entered the field and a branch of an insurance company was established known as 'Alliance Assurance' in 1930. Before the second world war, ten more insurance companies started their business in Iran. On the other hand, the Government of Iran had been seriously taking stock of the situation and realised the adverse impact of the activities of the foreign insurance companies upon the foreign exchange reserves. The Government of Iran therefore, took steps to establish its own insurance company known as 'Bimeh Iran' in 1935.

#### *The First Insurance Company 'Bimeh Iran.'*

The Bimeh Iran came into existence with an authorised capital of US \$ 266,667, out of which over 99 % was contributed by the Government itself. In order to provide effective support to 'Bimeh Iran' the Government ordered all the insurance companies operating in the country to cede 25% of their business in favour of Bimeh Iran. In addition, instructions were issued to the foreign insurers to deposit the fixed amount of foreign currency according to insurance law, as 'security deposit' with the 'Bank Melli' Iran. As a result only two insurance companies *i.e.* 'Yorkshire Insurance Company' of United Kingdom and Ingostrakh Insurance Company of U.S.S.R. fulfilled the conditions prescribed by the host country. Other foreign companies failing to do so ceased to operate.

Since the establishment of Bimeh Iran, only a few domestic companies were permitted to start their operations and they are still working successfully.

Some years ago, the Government of Iran opened a new chapter in the history of insurance by establishing the 'Central Insurance of Iran.' The Central Insurance of Iran (an Iranian counter-part of the Pakistan Insurance Corporation) is authorised to regulate, expand and supervise all insurance operations in Iran, so that this sector of the economy is brought under public control. The capital invested in the Central Insurance of Iran, is shown in the following table :

#### CAPITAL OF THE CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN

In		Divided into	
Iranian Rials	US \$	registered shares	Remarks
500 million.	6,600,000	50-of 10 million Rials each.	1. All shares belong to Govt: of Iran 2. Not transferable. 3. An increase in the capital possible.

The Iran Insurance Company continues to carry out its own operations according to its articles of association with the exception of that under sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 of article 5 of the Bimeh Markazi Iran (Establishment) Act, has been included as part of the duties and powers of the Central Insurance of Iran.

The R.C.D. Insurance manual describes the general

responsibility of the Central Insurance Company of Iran, as follows :—

“Government Ministries, Government Companies and organisations Municipalities, and any other Organisations, where majority of the share of Capital belongs to the Government or the above mentioned organisation or are administered under government management or the said organisation, must conclude their insurance requirements with the Iran Insurance Company exclusively.

This order includes the ‘National Iranian Oil Company’, the ‘National Iranian Steel Mill’, ‘Iran National Airlines’, the ‘Central Bank of Iran’, ‘Bank Melli Iran’, the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation of Iran’, and the ‘Agricultural Development Fund’, except in the cases where General Assembly of any one of these organisations adopts another decision regarding their insurance.”

The over-all position of the Insurance business in Iran is clearly shown in the following tables :-

#### NUMBER OF INSURERS

Country in which constituted	Life only	Life & other branches	Other branches	Total
I	II	III	IV	V
Iran	—	5	4	9
United Kingdom	—	—	1	1
U.S.S.R.	—	—	1	1
Total :	—	5	6	11

LIFE BUSINESS AT THE END OF 1965 & 1970  
(in thousands of US \$)

Year	Number of Policies	Sum Assured	Life Fund at the end of 1965
I	II	III	IV
1965	6738	17,968	4373
1970	8200	26,240	7197

*History of Insurance in Pakistan.*

At the time of partition of Indo-Pak sub-continent, there were about 84 insurance companies out of which 77 were foreign insurers and remaining seven were domestic.

The first insurance company which was established in 1847 at Lahore was the 'Christian Mutual of Lahore.' At the time of its establishment it was to transact only the provident insurance business on purely mutual basis.

In 1892, another insurance company was established in Karachi, with the name of 'Indian Life Assurance Company' (Now ILACO—Ideal Life Insurance Company) Later, another insurance company known as 'The Muslim Insurance Company' started business in Lahore in 1935, with the late Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal, as its first Chairman.

Moreover, it may not be out of place to mention that at the time of partition there were in operation two more insurance companies with the exclusive backing of Muslim businessmen—'Eastern Federal Union of Calcutta' and the 'Habib of Bombay,' established in 1932 and 1942, respectively.

Just after partition, these two companies shifted their offices to Pakistan. Besides these, there were two more insurance companies with purely domestic capital in operation.

In order to cover the wide gap between the foreign insurance companies, the Government of Pakistan gave its full attention to the problem.

### *Insurance Policy after Independence*

After Independence insurance like banking was still undeveloped. However one could notice steady progress both in banking and Insurance.

Until March 1948, the control and supervision of insurance had remained with the Superintendent of Insurance, Government of India. In April 1948, the department of insurance and its new office was set-up in Karachi under direct supervision of the Central Government of Pakistan.

Insurance business in Pakistan is regulated under the Insurance Act 1938, along with the Rules of 1939, amended from time to time for the purposes of promoting insurance business, regulating operation of the insurance companies and ensuring the interests of policy holders. The insurance Act was reconstituted in 1948, and then enforced, the foreign insurance companies were required to keep 50% deposits in Pakistan. Later, an ordinance, promulgated in 1966, laid down that insurance companies transacting general insurance business should hold investments in Pakistan at a level not exceeding their liabilities by Rs. 5,00,000/- or 10% of the net premium income whichever is higher. These measures were taken to strengthen and stabilize the domestic companies.

### *Pakistan Insurance Corporation.*

Frankly speaking, the Pakistan Insurance Corporation (PIC) is the first reinsurance indigenous organisation which has ever been established in the Middle East or South East Asia. In order to meet initial expenses, the Pakistan Insurance Corporation received 10% of quota share of insurance business voluntarily from all the insurers operating business in Pakistan. However, the percentage of share was refixed @ 30% in 1958.

The Pakistan Insurance Corporation was established in 1953, with an authorised capital of Rs. 2 million, later, increased to Rs. 5 million. The share (capital) position was settled as under :—

<u>Central Government</u>		<u>Insurance Companies/Public</u>	
51%	(+)	49%	(=) 100%

### *The Function of Pakistan Insurance Corporation.*

The Corporation was to perform the following functions :—

1. To provide re-insurance facilities in the country.
2. To assist in the promotion of new insurance companies and give technical advice and,
3. To administer the National Co-Insurance Scheme and Export Credit Guarantee Scheme.

In 1965, under the supervision of Pakistan Insurance Corporation, a new type of insurance called 'War Risk Insurance' alongwith additional 5 different schemes of insurance for different categories of property was intro-

duced by issuing an ordinance on 9th September 1965 during the Indo-Pak war. The main purpose of this scheme was to provide necessary relief to the people, whose property might be destroyed by the enemy action during the war. Hence, the insurance companies worked as agents against the insurers *i.e.* Government. The ordinance of 1965 under the Government directives undertook to cover 'War Risks' during December 1971 war with India.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that since the establishment of Pakistan Insurance Corporation, the insurance business had shown an excellent record in all respects. Before nationalisation of life insurance in 1972, more than 80% domestic companies were successfully operating the country's business, but after nationalisation the ratio of domestic companies vis-a-vis foreign companies had been reduced to 51:27.

The following tables shows the insurance position of the country.

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*General Insurance-Position of the Country.*

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		US \$
1948	2,888,000	2 million
1970	62,750,000	63 million

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*Life Insurance Business during 1948-1970 & 1972.*

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Year	No. of Policies	Sum Assured	Gross Premium
			—in thousands US \$
1948	53,945	32,293	1,500
1970-72	546,338	11,36,062	64,621

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### *History of Insurance in Turkey.*

Before examining the history of insurance in Turkey, the most interesting point to be noted is the fact that upto 1911, the insured persons were required to obtain 'Fatwa' whether or not it was permissible that is 'Halal' according to the Shari'ah (divine law) ?

A century ago, once the city of Istanbul with some parts of its out-skirts was destroyed by fire; this unprecedented holocaust for the first time brought realisation among the people about the usefulness of insurance. Consequently, after a few years of the incident two British owned insurance companies namely Northern Insurance Company and North British Insurance Company established their agencies in Istanbul in 1872. Later on, another French Company 'La-Fonciere' started its operation. Thus upto 1889, there were more than fifteen foreign insurance companies in Turkey. These insurance companies flourished and had the monopoly of all insurance business. There was no Turkish law to regulate and control insurance business and until 1916, there were practically no domestic insurance company and in all 81 foreign companies were engaged in insurance trade.

Taking a serious view of the existing situation in insurance trade, the Ottoman Government took initiative to establish an insurance company in 1893 with the capital provided by a group of share holders of the already established 'Ottoman Bank', 'The Regie Ottoman de Tabac', and the 'Department' of the Public Debts'. In the year 1900, a 'Fire Insurance Syndicate' was established and later, the 'Milli Reassurance Turk Anonim



Sirketi', the third of its kind, was organised in 1919 with the cooperation of 'Phoenik of Vienne'. These insurance companies had been making rapid progress.

*Milli Reassurance : Its Establishment and Functions.*

The Milli Reassurance Turk Anonin Sirketi, was established in 1929, with a paid up capital of US \$ 71,429 (one million Turkish Lira—'T.L'). Initially, the insurance companies operating in Turkey, whether local or foreign, were required to cede to the Milli Reassurance 50% of all insurance business underwritten in Turkey. In 1937, the compulsory quota share was raised to 75% for fire and marine business only, but it was again reduced to 50% in 1938. In 1954, the life insurance business was exempted from legal cessions and the compulsory quota share was further reduced to 35%.

The milli Reassurance has been made responsible for ensuring compliance with tariff and other terms and conditions approved by the Ministry of Commerce on the recommendations of Tariff Committees set-up by the Ministry. The Milli Reassurance is the ultimate authority. Under the Turkish insurance regulations relating to legal succession, an official of the Milli Reassurance has to be present at the time of inspection of the damages by experts. The insurance companies cannot pay more than the amount of loss assessed by the official of the Milli Reassurance.

Incidentally, the insurance business had risen substantially since 1927, when Turkey was declared to be a Republic.

The Milli Reassurance enjoys more or less the same

status as the Pakistan Insurance Corporation and Bimeh Markazi Iran. Under the directives a law was passed according to which, it was proposed 'to raise the national specialists and local employees and Turkish language was to replace English and French'. About twenty years ago reinsurance company 'Destek Reinsurance Company' with cent percent local capital, was allowed to start business and it is successfully functioning in Turkey,

What distinguishes Turkey from the other two RCD partners is the remarkable fact that only in Turkey, the agriculturists are also involved on social insurance schemes, besides the employees or workers in other fields. In order that a proper assessment of Turkish insurance industry in different fields can be made, from time to time, issued new schedules are detailed below :—

Year	Population of the Country	Average Insurance Premium Perhead (US \$)
1942	18,203,000	0.80
1952	22,219,000	0.15
1962	29,418,000	0.66
1972	35,700,000	1.21

  

Year	General Insurance (US \$)	Life Insurance (US \$)
1942	1,408,807	1,05,881
1952	3,359,080	8,50,354
1962	19,337,667	26,10,231
1972	35,137,000	43,52,000

Premium Income Regarding Social Insurance  
(US \$)

1952	5,146,913	
1962	64,771,858	
1972	97,972,205	(aprox)

*Collaboration under the Regional Cooperation for Development.*

After outlining a brief history of insurance in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, it might be appropriate to examine how the three RCD partners have processed to promote cooperation among themselves in the field of insurance trade. The main goals for which they had sought collaboration in the insurance trade were :—

- (a) reduction of the 'foreign exchange transfers' on insurance and reinsurance services ;
- (b) improvement of the standard of insurance service in the three countries.

On 15-16, October 1964, during the meeting of the Ministerial Council at Tehran, it was decided to include, among others, insurance trade for promoting cooperation among the RCD States. On 21-23, July 1965, at the third meetings of the Regional Planning Council and the Ministerial Council, in Ankara, decision was made for its establishment of 'RCD Insurance Center' with its Headquarter in Karachi (Pakistan) and on 23-24, January 1967, in the sixth session of the Ministerial Council, the following three insurance pools were set-up :

1. Accident, to be managed by Iran (Bimeh Iran).
2. Marine (Hull and Cargo) to be managed by Pakistan (PIC).

3. Fire to be managed by the Turkey (Milli Reassurance).

These pools were formally inaugurated in the three member States and started their operation w.e.f. January 1, 1967. Later, two additional pools, during the eighth session of the Ministerial Council on April 14-15, 1968 in Tehran (Iran) for 'Aviation' and Engineering' were approved to be managed by Pakistan and Iran respectively.

*The Aims and Objects of the Centre may be summarised as follows i—*

1. To serve as a focal point for studying measures of regional collaboration in insurance field.
2. To initiate studies and research for further regional collaboration in insurance field.
3. To serve as the main channel for exchange of information among the insurance markets of the RCD Region.

*The main functions of the RCD Insurance Center are reproduced below :-*

1. to serve as a thinking cell for formulating proposals for furthering RCD collaboration in insurance.
2. to serve as the main channel for exchange of information and personnel among the insurance markets of the RCD region.
3. to prepare a common Insurance year-Book/RCD Insurance Manual ;

4. to maintain permanent contact with insurance companies and reinsurance corporations of the three countries for facilitating exchange of business among them ;
5. to assist in organizing RCD Insurance seminars and practical training programmes ;
6. to organize meetings of the Management Board and Technical Committees of RCD Reinsurance Pools and also participate in such other meetings, conferences, etc., as the Chairman may authorise, and
7. to perform any other functions that may be given from time to time by the Governing Body and the Management Board of the RCD Reinsurance Pools.

#### *Administration of the RCD Insurance Centre*

##### *1. Governing Body*

The Centre will function under the direction of a Governing Body which will at present be identical to the Management Board of RCD Reinsurance Pools.

##### *2. Chairman*

Chairmanship of the Governing Body will rotate among the three member countries, in the alphabetical order. The Chairman will hold the office for a period of one year.

##### *Meetings*

The Governing Body will hold meetings at least once a year by rotation in one of the member countries, in alphabetical order. In between the meetings, the

Chairman may decide on matters referred to him by the Centre. The decision taken by the Chairman will, however, be reported in the next meeting of the Governing Body for its approval.

#### *4. Relationship with the Secretary General of RCD*

The Centre will submit periodical progress reports of their activities to the Secretary General of the RCD for circulation and the Secretary General will also be entitled to call for special reports from the Centre when he deems it necessary.

In the meantime, the market survey of the nine elected Afro-Asian countries has been carried out for further expanding business and proposed reinsurance company. The expert Group was assigned the job of conducting the survey and by 1969 they had visited Kuwait, Japan, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. The report of the survey was completed during 1970-71.

#### *R.C.D. International School of Insurance, Tehran*

An RCD International School of Insurance was established at Tehran in 1970 as a non-profit institution of higher learning. The curriculum of the School has been approved by the Universities of Tehran, Karachi and Istanbul. The school is directly associated with the University of Tehran for the purposes enforcing common standards of instruction, credit and grading system, graduation requirements and the use of facilities and the teaching staff. The Universities of Karachi and Istanbul are dealing with the matters of syllabi and the exchange of lecturers. Its affairs are managed by a Principal with the status of a 'Director' under the supervision of a

Governing Body of insurance representatives from the three partners of the Regional Cooperation for Development. The medium of instruction is English and students are conferred B.Sc. degrees on completion of a four year course. Every year students are offered a number of scholarships on merit basis.

In addition to the above insurance school, there is the 'Tehran College of Insurance' which conducts its classes in Persian. Most of the students are local students. The degree offered by the Tehran College of Insurance is the same as the degree offered by the RCD International School of Insurance.

To sum-up, at present 44 insurance companies of the region have joined for cooperation in this field. It may be noted that excellent standards are maintained in this trade. In addition, the authorities of the reinsurance industry have finalised the following schemes :

- (a) The establishment of RCD Reinsurance Company.
- (b) International Automobile Green Card System.
- (c) Container System.
- (d) Export Credit Insurance etc.

Following is a schedule showing progress of the RCD Reinsurance Pools :—

Membership	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972—75	
Fire Pool	25	30	39	42	47	42	43
Marine Pool	25	31	36	41	47	37	37
Accident Pool	13	17	17	16	20	19	18
Aviation Pool	—	19	19	25	24	16	16
Engineering Pool	—	—	—	—	04	05	07

*Gross Premium (US \$)*

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**Fire Pool :**

576,566 540,360 678,803 636,227 692,717 452,521 539000

**Marine Pool :**

377,478 466,912 517,795 553,585 686,050 766,137 759930

**Accident Pool :**

395,728 493,452 548,888 361,958 375,011 172,405 176529

**Aviation Pool :**

——— 21,996 45,703 43,016 51,389 37,131 26964

**Engineering Pool :**

8,009 18,412 19979

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**Total :**

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1349772 1522720 1791189 1594786 2013176 1446606 1522402

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# COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

## —A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

*Dr. Mujib A. Sheikh\**

### INTRODUCTION

This article is an attempt to trace the development of comparative administration by discussing its history, major concepts, important contributors to the field, methods and levels of analysis, trends and problems. The multitude of literature precludes an intensive analysis which the subject deserves. This bibliographical essay, primarily, is directed at the student who is relatively unfamiliar with the field.

### *The Historical Development of Comparative Administration*

The emergence of the field of Comparative Public Administration can be attributed to the failure of the student of Public Administration to discover the "universal principles" of administrative science which many thought to exist. Early textbooks in public administration by W.F. Willoughby and Leonard D. White<sup>1</sup> reflected the attitude that universal principles of Administrative Science, when

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1. Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, New York, MacMillan, 1935.

discovered, would aid in the development of a scientific discipline.

The decade of the 1940's, however, brought increasing concern with this "scientific" approach to administration. A refutation of the concept of universal principles of administration was presented by Robert A. Dahl in 1947. He concluded that :

1. Generalisation derived from the operation of public administration in the environment of one nation-state cannot be universalized and applied to public administration in a different environment.
2. There can be no truly universal generalizations about public administration without a profound study of varying national and social characteristics impinging on public administration, to determine what aspects of public administration, if any, are truly independent of national and social setting . . .
3. It follows that the study of public administration must become a much more broadly based discipline, resting not only on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and processes, but rather extending to the varying historical, sociological, economic and other conditioning factors.<sup>2</sup>

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2. Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration Three Problems", *Public Administration Review*, pp. I-II, (Winter, 1947).

In view of these remedies, and others similar to them, a comparative approach to the study of administration seemed to be a logical development.

The recognition of Comparative Administration as an academic discipline can perhaps be said to have been in 1948 when Dwight Waldo first introduced a course of that title at the University of California.

It has been generally agreed, however, that the importance of comparative administration can be largely attributed to post World War II development of the non-Western nations.

Non-Western societies have received the greatest attention because their demands for political freedom and economic security are the most important social forces at this stage in history, and we know very little about their people, history, or governmental system.<sup>3</sup>

The literature resulting from studies of non-Western societies has been cast into broad area called Comparative Administration. That many studies are not actually comparative in the strict sense of the word does not prohibit their inclusion in the comparative field.

The scope of what is referred to as comparative administration is broadened even further when one considers the inseparability of administration of political,

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3. John M. Pfiffner and Robert V. Presthus, *Public Administration*, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1960, p. 63.

economic, and social factors. Waldo, in an essay in which he surveys the field of comparative administration, re-emphasises his old theme that there is no dichotomy between politics and administration.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, there is no dichotomy between development administration and political or economic development. Evidence of this is the frequent overlapping of Comparative Administration, Government, and Politics disciplines.

The interdependence of these factors is pointed out by Fred Riggs who holds that, "Broad political and social changes consequently are preconditions for modernisation of public management".<sup>5</sup> Riggs' view is the one which is commonly held by others engaged in the study of developing nations.

### *Methods of Analysis and Approach*

The breadth or all inclusiveness of the field of comparative administration should not be exaggerated. Several of its characteristics can be distinguished. An important one is the most common level of analysis. Waldo, in the essay, mentioned above, and Amitai Etzioni, in *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations*, agree that the level is "middle range". In his introduction Etzioni states: "The comparative study of organisation is a much neglected field. The development requires 'middle range' organisational theory, falling between high-level abstractions about the characteristics

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4. Dwight Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration, Prologue, Problems and Promise*, Comparative Administrative Group, American Society for Public Administration, Chicago, Illinois, 1964.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

of organisations in general and detailed observations about single cases. Model for the analysis of various organisational types must be constructed.”<sup>6</sup>

Pfiffner and Presthus provide a rationale for middle-range analysis by indicating that the universal systems of Marx, Pareto, and others are not conducive to empirical research :

Most social scientists are now content to analyse small chunks of reality, using as their guide “middle range” theory which attempts to abstract from the whole social context some limited by meaningful part for analysis. “Middle range” theory attempts to explain a limited set of relationships, as opposed to a theory which attempts to explain an entire social system. A middle-range theory attempts to explain such things as the relationship between a given economic system and its administrative system.<sup>7</sup>

The middle-range concept seems to harmonize well with two conflicting schools of thought. C. Wright Mills argues for a middle-range approach when he accuses the grand theorists of being too broad in their approach, and the abstracted empiricists of being too restricted, to get at the heart of important issues of the day. The behaviorists should be satisfied also, inasmuch as middle-range theory is conducive to empirical research, a hallmark of

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6. Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961, p. xi.

7. Pfiffner and Presthus, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-79.

behaviorism. Waldo discusses at some length the extent to which comparative administration has adopted behavioral methods.

The emphasis on human behavior as a focus of analysis is common to both comparative administration and comparative politics is an outgrowth of the traditionally and institutionally oriented comparative government. The later was wholly inadequate for the study of the developing nations, in which political and bureaucratic institutions were merely temporary reflections of the dynamic and often chaotic political and social climate. Similarly, the recognition by students of development administration of cultural and political factors influencing administrative structure and behavior is indicative of the behavioralist influence.

Etzioni is more optimistic than most of his contemporaries about the prospects and capabilities of the comparative middle-range approach. The universal principles of administration which previous approaches had failed to produce will be discovered through comparative studies. Eventually says Etzioni, comparative studies of public administration will :

1. Establish the truly universal propositions of organisational theory.
2. Reduce overgeneralised propositions to middle-range (specific) statements, specifying the categories of organisation for which they hold.
3. Develop new middle range propositions, so that knowledge of universals will be supplemented with statements about analytical types of organisation. Studies in the near future will probably contribute

more directly to the development of such sub-models than to the general model, since the former have been most neglected.<sup>8</sup>

Etzioni's base for comparison in organisations is compliance, which he defines as the relationship of power employed by superiors to control subordinates, and orientation of the subordinates to that power. By using compliance as a base of comparison, both structural and motivational aspects may be studied. Compliance is closely related to many other organisational variables such as organisational goal, location and power of elites, distribution and control of charismatic participation, power allocation, and others.

### *Comparative Models*

Models of organisations, both political and administrative, are frequent contributions to comparative analysis. The need for models is vital to comparative studies because of limitation imposed by a "narrow, parochial, non-comparative, static, descriptive, and monographic method."<sup>9</sup> Various models have enabled students in the field to transcend these traditional boundaries and develop broad conceptual frameworks. Such models, however, often impose limitations of their own. Specifically, the link between certain models and result is often strained.

The principal reason for this gap between conceptualization and research is that the

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8. Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

9. Alfred Diamant, "The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the study of Comparative Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June: 1960, pp. 93-94.

proposed schemes are often constructed on such a gross or macroscopic level that it is impossible to move from them to the level of actual empirical research. These models are elegant, logically self-consistent, but of little help to the researcher in the field. If, by chance, resources are provided to do the research, the findings might very well fit the prescribed model, but there is controversy over whether violence has been done to the 'reality' of the social systems under investigation.<sup>10</sup>

Diamant divides comparative models into two categories: "general system" models and "political culture" models. The former establish a conceptual scheme for a political system or a society applicable to one or several societies. "General system" models operate at the most macroscopic levels of generalization. The most common model of this type is David Easton's "input-output" model. Easton proposes that political life "...be seen as a system which takes in inputs in the form of demands and support and produces outputs in the form of policies and decisions."<sup>11</sup> Briefly, the model depicts the relationship between a system and its setting.

Almond and Coleman expand on the "input-output" model by outlining the functional categories of political system.

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10. Alfred Diamant, "The Reference of Comparative Politics to the study of Comparative Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June 1960, p. 94.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 96.



## A. Input functions :

1. Political socialization and recruitment.
2. Interest articulation.
3. Interest aggregation.
4. Political communication.

## B. Output functions :

1. Rule-making
2. Rule-application
3. Rule adjudication<sup>12</sup>

The functional categories of "input-output" models are indicative of the dynamic approach of the comparative politics movement. As mentioned earlier, the traditional concepts of the comparative government school proved to be inadequate, particularly in the study of the developing nations.

"General system" models, including Easton's and others by Macridis<sup>13</sup> and Apter,<sup>14</sup> are criticized by Diamant on three counts :

1. Their connection with empirical research is remote.....

12. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960, p. 19.

13. Roy Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, No. 21; Garden City, 1955), ch. i.

14. David Apter, "A Comparative method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, November 1958.

2. Although the "general system" models ought to be based on a general theory of politics, we do not have such a theory at the present time.
3. One of the chief drawbacks of the general system model is.....the impossibility of approaching all societies with a single conceptualization about social systems.<sup>15</sup>

The second type of model which Diamant describes is the "political culture" model. Such models are general system models which have been combined with a classification of political system and societies. By doing this they are made operational for studies in comparative administration.

The most "operationalizable" and widely used "political culture" model is Gabriel A. Almond's scheme of the same name. By combining his definitions of "role" and "system" Almond defines a "political system" as "the patterned interaction of roles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical decision."<sup>16</sup> Political systems can be then divided into four political cultures of which the system is a part. Researchers are thus able to investigate a variety of "role" concepts and show how they differ from culture to culture.

Diamant concludes by stressing the importance of both major types of model to the researcher in comparative administration :

"General system" models will help clarify certain fundamental traits of social systems

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15. Diamant, *op. cit.* p. 108.

16. *Ibid* , p. 101.

but will not yield specific operational concepts for the comparative study of personnel systems and fiscal management, "Political culture" schemes, if their classification is intelligently constructed and based on accurate and reasonably up-to-date information, can be made directly applicable to comparative studies in politics and administration. They should prove especially valuable in formulating inquiries into the problem of bureaucratic responsibility and control.<sup>17</sup>

### *Trends in Comparative Administration*

Fred Riggs of Indiana University, referred to by Waldo as the leading student of comparative administration, has noted several trends in the field. The first is what Riggs calls the shift from *normative* to *empirical* studies. Normative studies supposedly define "ideal" or "better" administrative structures, methods, etc. Classical examples which fit this category are Eaton's *Civil Service in Great Britain*,<sup>18</sup> Woodrow Wilson's "The Study of Administration," and *Civil Service Abroad*, by Leonard D. White.<sup>20</sup>

The lack of applicability of Western administrative

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17. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

18. Dorman B. Eaton, *Civil Service in Great Britain*, New York, Harper 1880.

19. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1887. pp. 197-222.

20. Leonard D. White (Editor), *Civil Service Abroad*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1935.

norms to non-Western cultures has been the primary cause for a shift to empirical studies.

In this category are to be found a growing flood of reports and studies by experts, visiting consultants, technical assistants and even to some extent, by young Western-trained specialists in public administration of the new states. Among these essays are to be found some keenly discerning work, quite sophisticated in its recognition of the relativity for overseas application of American, British, French or other Western norms.<sup>21</sup>

Outstanding works of this type are Paul H. Appleby's study of administration in India<sup>22</sup> and Moore and Ricketts' "A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in the Kingdom of Thailand."<sup>23</sup>

### *Idiographic to Homothetic*

A second shift (within the area of empirical studies) is from *idiographic* to *homothetic approaches*. An *idiographic* study "concentrates on the unique case—the historical episode or 'case study', the single agency or country, the biography or the 'culture

21. Fred Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration", *International Review of Administrative Science*, No. 1, 1962, p. 10.

22. Paul H. Appleby, *Public Administration in India, Report of Survey*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1935.

23. Lyman S. Moore and Edmund F. Ricketts, *A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in the Kingdom of Thailand*, Washington, M.S.A., 1952.

area' <sup>24</sup> Important sources for such studies are the IAS Reports and publications by the Royal Institute of Public Administration, Specific examples are *Public Administration in Ireland*, by Frederick C. King, <sup>25</sup> *The Organization of the Government of India*, by the Indian Institute of Public Administration, <sup>26</sup> and *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*, by Morroe Berger. <sup>27</sup> *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, <sup>28</sup> by Peter Blau is cited by Riggs as an outstanding idiographic study of American bureaucracy.

Historical idiographic works mentioned by Riggs are White's treatise on American bureaucracy, <sup>29</sup> Finer's *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, <sup>30</sup> and Friedrich's *Constitutional Government and Democracy*. <sup>31</sup> A monumental historical work which covers bureaucracies of twenty-seven empires is *The Political Systems of*

24. Riggs, *op. cit.*, p 12.

25. Frederick C. King, *Public Administration in Ireland*, Dublin, 1944-1954.

26. Indian Institute of Public Administration, *The Organization of the Government of India*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1958.

27. Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1957.

28. Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1955.

29. Leonard D. White, *The Federalists ; The Jeffersonians ; The Jacksonians : and The Republican Era*, New York, Macmillan, 1955.

30. Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, New York, Holt, 1960.

31. Carl Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, Boston, Ginn, 1950.

*Empires*, by S. N. Eisenstadt.<sup>32</sup> This study is a historical and sociological analysis of political and bureaucratic systems, the role of elites, and the media of social control. Particular emphasis is placed on the reasons for the decline of each of the political bureaucratic systems.

The *nomothetic* approach, which Riggs views as potentially more important than the *idiographic*, seeks generalizations, 'laws' and hypotheses which assert regularities of behavior and correlations between variables."<sup>33</sup> He goes on to say, however, that it is necessary to have *idiographic* data in order to formulate *nomothetic* analyses.

Nomothetic studies can be further divided into two sub-categories: *homological* and *analogical*. The latter type is of greater utility, according to Riggs, because the fundamental unit of analysis is not the structure, but the consequences of structure, *i.e.* function. Unfortunately, not many works of this type are available. Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society*<sup>34</sup> and Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication*<sup>35</sup> are among the important books of this type which are available. Two excellent books of reading which might rightfully be placed in the *analogical* group are *The Politics of the Developing Areas*,

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32. S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires, The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Societies*. Glencoe Free Press, New York, 1963.

33. Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

34. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, III., Free Press, 1958.

35. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, Wiley, 1953.

edited by Almond and Coleman,<sup>36</sup> and *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, edited by Joseph LaPalombara.<sup>37</sup> Most of Riggs' writings fall into this same category.

The distinction between idiographic and nomothetic approaches is perhaps not as clear as Riggs supposes. Area studies appear to include elements of both approaches. According to Roy Macridis :

...the very definition of an area leads itself to confusion. If defined in geographic terms it is synonymous with a given geographic region which perhaps, but only perhaps, has for historic reasons certain similarities. Within the same region, however, it is very likely that the differences are even greater, so that the concept of "area" provides us with problems that are not fundamentally different from all problems related to comparative study, i.e. the identification and similarities and differences and the search for the reasons which account for them...Area studies and area concepts are a convenient label for the study of individual countries and the making of comparisons between them. In other words, area is no concept, but a convenience.<sup>38</sup>

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36. Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. 1960.

37. Joseph LaPalombara (Editor), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1963.

38. Roy C. Macridis, "The Area Concept", *The American Behavioral Scientist*, June, 1962, Vol. V, p. 9.

*Non-Ecological to Ecological.*

A criticism running throughout many of Riggs' articles is that much of the comparative administration literature does not relate non-Western administrative structures and functions to the cultures of which they are a part. This "non-ecological" viewpoint, he says, is beginning to be replaced by an "ecological" approach. "It is possible to understand politics and administration in the (developing) countries only ecologically, *i.e.* by relating these non-administrative factors to the administrative."<sup>39</sup> A brief, but inciteful, expansion of this theme is Robert Theobald's *The Rich and the Poor*.<sup>40</sup> Theobald argues that the Kenesian economic assumptions are not applicable to non-Western nations. People in the developing nations will tend to work enough only to remain at the subsistence level. Therefore, economic assumptions about supply and demand which apply to industrial nations are not relevant to the developing nations.

Riggs, himself, has contributed a short volume stressing the ecological viewpoint entitled *The Ecology of Public Administration*.<sup>41</sup> In it he outlines a scheme of administrative models suited to modern and transitional societies. The models were originally put forward in an article published in *Toward the Comparative Study of*

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39. Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

40. Robert Theobald, *The Rich and the Poor: A Study of the Economics of Rising Expectations*, Wenter Books, New York, 1960.

41. F. W. Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration*, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1961.



*Public Administration*.<sup>42</sup> He concludes by saying that the most fruitful frontiers of research in comparative administration are those which utilise empirical, nomothetic, analogical, and ecological approaches.

### *Categories of Comparative Literature*

Ferrel Heady has offered a valuable summary of comparative administration literature in the June, 1960, issue of the *Administrative Science Quarterly*.<sup>43</sup> Although it is less sophisticated than Riggs' grouping, it is somewhat more comprehensive. Heady divides comparative works into four categories :

1. Materials primarily concerned with matters of theory, approach, methodology, model building and the like.
2. Comparative studies emphasizing Western, developed, industrialized Societies primarily in Europe and North America.
3. Comparative studies emphasizing non-Western, under-developed, transitional societies in South and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.
4. Materials dealing with individual countries with contents of interest for comparative

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42. Riggs, in W. Siffin. *Towards the Comparative Study of Administration*, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind., 1957.

43. Ferrel Heady, "Recent literature on Comparative Public Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June, 1960, pp. 134-154.

administration studies.<sup>44</sup>

(Works in this category are what Riggs would refer to as idiographic )

Obviously, the categories of Riggs and Heady greatly overlap.

### *Theoretical and Methodol gical Works*

Heady, as others before him, has recognised that while much theoretical comparative material exists, little of it can be operationalized for empirical research. In attempting to formulate models which are applicable to non-Western societies, Heady says :

...students of comparative administration, who have usually been trained as political scientists, (have ventured) into the other social science disciplines and even beyond. Extensive borrowings and adaptations from economic, sociology, psychology, anthropology and history have resulted already, and more of this kind of interdisciplinary synthesis is in prospect.<sup>45</sup>

In discussing the relationship of anthropology to comparative administration. Storm indicates that a determination of cultural values as instruments for predicting reactions to change stimuli would be useful to students of comparative administration.<sup>46</sup>

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

46. William B. Storm, "Anthropology and Comparative Administration", *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1961.

Among those works which fall into the theoretical and methodological category would be most of those mentioned by Riggs as nomothetic. Cited by Heady are books by Slesinger,<sup>47</sup> Riggs,<sup>48</sup> and Marx.<sup>49</sup>

The Weberian bureaucratic model has provided an important reference point for students of comparative administration as well as for other branches of administrative science. Partly because of Weber's influence, a great deal of the literature in comparative administration leans toward bureaucracy as a focal concept. Three articles contributed by Diamant,<sup>50</sup> Delany,<sup>51</sup> and Presthus<sup>52</sup> challenge, but do not entirely reject, Weberian bureaucratic concepts.

### *Comparative Studies of Western Administrative Systems.*

Heady reluctantly agrees with Presthus that little new has been added to the study of Western administrative systems. Three works which he considers worthy

47. J. Slesinger, *A Model for the Comparative Study of Public Bureaucracies*, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, Papers in Public Administration No. 23; Ann Arbor, 1957.

48. Fred Riggs, 'Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration', in Siffen, *op. cit.*, pp. 2—116.

49. Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State; An Introduction to Bureaucracy*, Chicago, 1957.

50. Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," In Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (ed.) *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1967), pp. 59—96.

51. William Delany, "The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, March 1961, pp. 458-501.

52. Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian V, Welfare Bureaucracy", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6-1-24, June, 1961.

of mention are Meyer's *Administrative Organization: A Comparative Study of the Organization of Public Administration*.<sup>53</sup> *The Administrative State* by Marx,<sup>54</sup> and the *Profession of Government*, by Chapman.<sup>55</sup> Storm argues that while there is already a large quantity of information available on Western bureaucracies, most such studies are lacking in depth in that they do not relate to the cultural values of the nations being studied.

Students of comparative administrative systems would value studies in depth made of Russian, British, Chinese, German and other of the more complex cultures. From an identification of world view, thought patterns, and values, hypotheses could be drawn about organization behavior, bureaucratic characteristics, management techniques, and forms of public programmes which would fit the situation. Research could then be specifically focused.<sup>56</sup>

#### *Comparative Studies of Non-Western or Traditional Societies.*

The bulk of comparative administration publications dealing with non-Western societies is directed at problems

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53. P. Meyer, *Administrative Science Organization: A Comparative Study of the Organization of Public Administration*, London, 1957.

54. Marx, *op. cit.*

55. B. Chapman, *The Profession of Government*. London, 1959. Sydney Verbas *civic culture* may also be mentioned, but its main focus is not on administration.

of social and cultural, economic, political and administrative development. An excellent book of readings edited by Irving Swerdlow, entitled *Development Administration Concepts and Problems*,<sup>57</sup> integrates these concepts and demonstrates their interrelationship. Several articles by Riggs,<sup>58</sup> Spengler,<sup>59</sup> Braibanti,<sup>60</sup> and Kapp<sup>61</sup> relate the concepts of economic and administrative development. IaPalombara<sup>62</sup> and Pie<sup>63</sup> discuss the relevance of political development to administrative and bureaucratic development.

As indicated earlier, students of comparative administration have somewhat narrowed the gap between theory and research through the use of a middle - range

57. Irving Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration Concepts and Problems*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1963. He has recently come out with a book titled *Public Administration of Economic Development*, in which his emphasis is upon field Administration and plan implementation.

58. Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration & Neglected Factor in Economic Development", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 305 : 70—80, May, 1956.

59. J. J. Spengler, "Bureaucracy, Resource Structure, and Economic Development ; A Note," *Kyklos*, II : 459-489, Fasc. 4, 1958.

60. Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (eds.), *Administration and Economic Development in India* (Durham Duke University Press, 1963).

61. William K. Kapp, "Economic Development National Planning and Public Administration", *Kyklos*, 13 : 172-204, fasc. 2, 1960.

62. Joseph IaPalombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas", in IaPalombara, *op. cit.*, 34-61.

63. Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1962).

approach to comparative analysis. For this reason new areas of research have been opened. To aid in the direction of that research the Brookings Institution published *Development of the Emerging countries : An Agenda for Research*.<sup>64</sup> The essays included in the book point out that our present knowledge of the economics, politics, sociology, and psychology of development is deficient. Priorities and possibilities for research are discussed in hopes of eventually promoting growth and orderly change in the developing nations.

## CONCLUSION

One difficulty in writing this paper which the writer did not have was obtaining enough sources of information. Indeed, so much was available that a major task was the attempt to include only important works and discard the trivial. The great breadth of comparative administration, certainly, is partially attributable to its tremendous importance. It is also attributable, however, to the failure of scholars in the field to narrow down the important areas for investigation. Yet, narrowing a field such as comparative administration is a virtual impossibility because of its association with innumerable political, economic and social factors. In view of the necessity in comparative administration to integrate many divergent factors, perhaps what is needed most is what C. Wright Mills calls "the sociological imagination".

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64. Robert E. Ashar (ed.), *Development of the Emerging Countries*. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1962.

..... that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological ; from examination of a single family to comparative assessments of the national budgets of the world;... it is by means of the sociological imagination that men now hope to grasp what is going on in the world.<sup>65</sup>

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65. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, Grove Press, Inc., New York. 1959.

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## PAKISTAN AND THE PATTERN OF THE SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATIES IN ASIA

by

*Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary\**

### I

The stage was Moscow. The occasion was the World Conference of Communist Parties on June 8, 1969. Soviet Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, after mentioning the Soviet Union's long standing proposal for the convening of a Conference on European security, noted that "we believe the course of events is also placing on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."<sup>1</sup>

While opinions differed on the specifics of the role which the Soviet Union intended to play in the future, general agreement prevailed that Brezhnev's proposal foreshadowed a new and more active phase of Soviet Asian policy. Apart from its preponderant influence in the Subcontinent, Soviet activity was otherwise confined almost entirely to supporting North Vietnam in a war then believed to be entering its final stage.

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\*\* This Paper was presented to the Conference on Pakistan at the Crossroads of Power held on June 7-8, 1980 at Asia Society Office Inc., New York.

1. Pravada June 9, 1969.

The new Nixon Administration in Washington had already indicated its intention to wind down the war in Vietnam, and the first withdrawal of the American forces had already taken place. It was generally perceived that volleys of public criticism and congressional rage against the American involvement in Vietnam would gradually lead it to a less active role, if not total disengagement, in Asia. This was confirmed a month later in President Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine. Taken together with the earlier announcement by the British Government declaring the intention to withdraw from East of Suez, this led many observers to believe that the Soviet Union was preparing to move into the vacuum which would result by the retraction of Western powers. To some, it was a "feeler" thrown to explore Asian reaction to a Soviet sponsored collective security system that would replace already deactivated Western security systems.

The announcement got a cool reception in Asia at first. It aroused a suspicion that the proposal was meant for unilateral enhancement of the Soviet influence and directed at 'encirclement of China.' Only a few months earlier the long smouldering Sino-Soviet conflict on a disputed island in the Ussuri River sector of their common border. The inference was quickly drawn by most observers that the Soviet Union was seeking to organize an anti-China united front in Asia to encircle or contain the PRC just as it was struggling to emerge from the turmoil and isolation of the great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Naturally, China opposed the proposal vigorously as a move directed against itself. Most Asian

governments, furthermore, preferred the idea of a multi-lateral balance of power to counteract unilateral hegemony of any power.

The year 1971 brought some developments that encouraged the Soviet Union to bring back the collective Security proposal. It reemerged as a countervailing action to the prospective Sino-American relationship which the Soviet Union thought was directed against itself: Peking no longer seemed to be pressing for the removal of remaining U.S. military forces from Asia; and tying down of massive Communist military forces along the Sino-Soviet border facilitated maintenance of U.S. hegemony over large parts of Asia even with reduced deployment of American military power.

Another stimulus in the same direction was provided by the events of 1971 in South Asia. In the Soviet eyes the possibly emerging Sino-American combination could be balanced, at least in South Asia, by a Soviet-Indian combination. On the other hand, India wanted a reliable and supportive ally to counterbalance the U.S.-China-Pakistan combination, as well as to assure her own security in case she intervened militarily to support the separatist movement in East Pakistan. This collusion of interest of both powers culminated in signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation on August 9, 1971. Henry Kissinger maintains :

The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty . . . . objectively increased the danger of war. The Soviet Union had seized a strategic opportunity. To demonstrate Chinese importance and to humiliate a friend of both China and

the United States proved too tempting. If China did nothing, it stood revealed as impotent ; if China raised the ante, it risked Soviet reprisal. With the treaty, Moscow threw a lighted match into a powder keg.<sup>2</sup>

Kissinger further states :

The Soviet aim in the wake of our China initiative was to humiliate Peking and to demonstrate the futility of reliance on either China or the United States as an ally. Furthermore, if India got away with such tactics, these might well spread to the Middle East, where Egypt, which also had a friendship treaty with Moscow, was threatening in a so called year of decision to settle its grievances by war. For the Soviets to be able to point to South Asia as evidence of the efficacy of war and the impotence of the United States opened ominous prospects for the Middle East.<sup>3</sup>

The outcome of the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, which broke out only a few months after the signing of the treaty, had ambivalent effects on Asian perceptions of the USSR's announced intentions to assume a higher profile in regional politics : it demonstrated both the will and capacity of the Soviet Union to exert strong military

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2. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1979, p. 867.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 876.



equipment and diplomatic backing (\*) to India's victory contrasted sharply with the impotence of the United States and China vis-a-vis their Pakistani allies. The outcome underscored that Soviet support in Asian regional military confrontation could really count ; and if it did not touch off a stampede of applicants for friendship treaties with the USSR, Pakistan's defeat must surely have suggested to others that it was unwise to permit potential opponents to corner the market on friendship with the Soviet Union.

So far as West Asia was concerned the foundations were laid in the form of treaties of friendship and cooperation with Egypt (1971) and Iraq (1972) which various Soviet commentators suggested could be constructed as the first stage of emerging security design. Essentially, these treaties were also dictated by the need to consolidate the Soviet position in the crucial regions in the face of challenges by Moscow's rival, American Middle Eastern initiatives.

As the United States started pursuing vigorously the conciliations with China after the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet Union started mending its fence again for obvious reasons. First, the American-China combination was clearly taken as a threat to the Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, and second, which can be

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\* In addition to blocking every Pakistani move in the U.N., the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, Mr. Kuznetsov, remained present in Delhi while a high Indian external affairs officer, D.P. Dhar, was present in Moscow throughout the duration of active conflict in order to achieve complete coordination.

considered as a psychological factor, the Western commentators had endeavoured to create an impression that the Soviets' collective security design in Asia, after an initial start, had totally failed. To overcome these adverse developments, and to give a signal to the United States not to involve itself heavily in placating the PRC, a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded with Vietnam on November 4, 1978 to formalize the already existing strong relationship between the two countries. It is cautiously presumed that the treaty proved to be a catalyst in precipitating a conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and resulted in complete occupation of the latter and the installation of a pro-Vietnam-USSR regime.

The latest entry in the Soviet Union's Asian bilateral treaty network is that of Afghanistan. It is the second treaty-partner, the first being Mongolia, who has common borders with the Soviet Union. Its strategic importance can be judged from the fact that the Soviet Union, by precipitating a regional conflict by encouraging territorial and ethnic rivalries, can fulfil her long-desired goal of having an access to the warm waters of the Indian ocean and thereby controlling the oil nerve of the Persian Gulf.

Inasmuch as the collective security initiative was originally meant to bring about normalization of relations between Asian states themselves and to put an end to "closed" military alignments based on opposition of some countries to the others, it could be interpreted as a means of facilitating the Soviet policy of broad-basing its Asian contacts and seeking to develop a diverse range of relationships with that continent. But, as events unfolded

during the early 1970's, it became increasingly apparent that attainment of these two objectives suffered from internal inconsistency. On the other hand, in the context of great powers rivalry, the Soviet Union found itself drawn into the policy of bilateralism. Whereas the Soviet media had indicated that the collective security in Asia might be constructed by both bilateral and multilateral efforts, the former created serious difficulties for the latter course. How much was the Soviet Union to get any cooperative Asian enterprise off the ground when the first fruit of its policy of bilateralism was the alienation of a significant section of regional states, most notably Iran, as a product of the Iraqi treaty and Pakistan, as a consequence of the Indian one? Contrary to the objective put forth, the idea has contributed to inter-state conflicts in the region. A cursory overview bears this out.

Since the year 1971 to the end of the year 1979, the Soviet Union has concluded bilateral friendship treaties with Egypt (\*), India, Iraq, Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Afghanistan. Each of these states has a long history of either ethnic, ideological or territorial disputes with their neighbor states. In some of these cases the disputes have resulted in open conflicts between the parties even prior to the establishment of a bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. The purpose with which the Soviet Union initiated these bilateral treaties with the respective nations was to normalize the regional inter-state relationships in order to create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation in the respective regions. On the contrary, the post-

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(\*) Egypt and Somalia have rescinded the treaties with the Soviet Union.

treaty-period, in each case is marked by increasing tension, and, in most cases, by an open conflict between the Soviet treaty partners and their neighbors.

## II

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place at the time when the region was still reverberating to the revolutionary tremors in Iran and Afghanistan. The move may not have achieved its prime purpose — what it did achieve was the increase of tension in the area.

The Soviet Union maintained that it had sent a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan to help it repel the armed intervention from outside, that Afghanistan's interests coincided with its own, and acted in strict accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation signed between the two countries in 1978.<sup>4</sup>

Leonid Brezhnev contended:

To act in any other way would mean to leave Afghanistan to be torn to pieces by imperialism, to allow aggressive forces to repeat here what they were able to do, for example, in Chile, when the freedom of the people was drowned in blood. To act in any other way would mean to look on passively as a centre of a serious threat to the security of the Soviet state arose on our southern frontier.

On the contrary, K. Mikhailov, "Provocatory Campaign over Afghanistan," *International Affairs*, March, 1980, p. 98.

with the Soviet Union. ( ) Egypt and Somalia have reached an understanding with the Soviet Union.

The speculation in western circles about the recent development in Afghanistan ranged from the relative innocence of a Russian desire to stabilize conditions in a neighbouring state (where the government had changed hands three times in the span of two years) which was already effectively in their sphere of interest to the possibility that the defiant show of efficiently deployed force was but a step in an ongoing "Great Game" whose winning players anticipated the advantages of using Afghanistan as a jumping off point for the warm-water ports of the Indian Ocean and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf region.

Whatever the effects of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the nation which will bear the major brunt is Pakistan. This country finds itself in an extremely unenviable situation, sandwiched between two hostile nations which are bound in treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. While one of these nations has already utilized the Soviet Union's support in truncating the eastern part of Pakistan, the other is bolstering up the separatist tendencies in its North. Much is being said about the Soviet Union's desire to reach the warm-waters of the Indian Ocean, but what is usually forgotten is the territory of Kashmir where it has biggest stake at present, and which might prove to be a major scene of conflict in the future.

Kashmir is an area of vital strategic interest to the Soviet Union and a source of major conflict between India and Pakistan, but the region from Gilgit northward, now part of Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir is particularly significant to it. During the nineteenth century,

the rival ambitions of Czarist Russia and British India threatened a collision in this area. The two powers deliberately created a buffer zone by agreeing in 1898 to cede a narrow wedge of land, called Wakhan, to Afghanistan. The strip, some forty miles wide, still divides Soviet controlled Pamir and northern Kashmir. The Anglo-Russian agreement also handed over lands lying northward of Mintaka Pass, a main mountain gateway to Northern Kashmir. For strategic reasons, the Czarist Russians and the Soviets have maintained military positions down to the northern reaches of the pass. Some 125 miles southward, at Gilgit, an airfield had been maintained for some time, and the American improved it after their 1954 agreement with Pakistan, but as often claimed by India, it has never been made into a major airbase. From Gilgit, as it has been claimed by an Indian writer, "the whole of the Pamir region could be controlled and Soviet Central Asia threatened." The same writer further maintains with regard to Gilgit :

Military considerations forced them (the Soviets) to join hands with India on the Kashmir question and proclaim Gilgit a part of India. She declared that Pakistan had no right to occupy Gilgit or to allow the Americans to build an anti-Soviet base there.<sup>6</sup>

Under the circumstances, the Soviets could not (and cannot) tolerate the presence of a strong hostile

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6. Satyanarayan Sinha, *China Strikes*, p. 51, quoted in Russel Brines, *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1963, pp. 147-49.

power in Gilgit and its surroundings.

Obviously, the construction of the all-weather 500 mile Karakoram Highway linking China and Pakistan has been the target of strong protests both from India and the Soviet Union. For India, it is an "illegal" construction supported and assisted by an antagonist power on a disputed territory which it claims to be its own. For the Soviet Union, it presents a dilemma of the presence of a hostile power in the region which it considers extremely vital to its own security. Furthermore;

For Peking, the KKH is a way around the spectre of Russian encirclement. China is locked in to a 4, 673 mile border with the hostile Soviet Union and the Russian fleet at Vladivostok could blockade her coasts. To China's South lies Vietnam, a former friend turned new foe, and to the South-west sprawls India, an untrusted neighbor. The KKH opens up a backdoor through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea and the West.<sup>7</sup>

Chinese access to the "backdoor" and the possibility of its defensive and economic utilization is viewed as extremely dangerous to both India and the Soviet Union's interests, considering their shared concern with PRC's influence and role in the region. By closing this "outlet" both countries stand to gain their territorial ambitions, and particularly the Soviet Union which would not only

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7. Seymore Topping, "Opening a New Road to China: The Karakoram Highway" *The New York Times Magazine*, December 2, 1979, p. 54.

be able to establish a land-link between itself and two of its treaty partners, but also eliminate Chinese influence from the region.

Considering the intensity of the acrimonious relationship between the Soviet Union and China, dwindling credibility of the United States in the region, and past as well as present attitudes of the people in power in India toward Pakistan, the possibility of this situation cannot be easily ruled out as a random shot in the dark. The Soviet Union, since 1955, has given unequivocal support to India's claim to Kashmir, and India has never been able to reconcile with the idea of independent Pakistan. Writing about the Indira Gandhi-Nixon meeting in 1971 in Washington D.C., just preceding India's aggression against Pakistan, Henry Kissinger sums up Mrs. Gandhi's feeling about the country:

Her real obsession was the nature of Pakistan, not the injustices being committed in a portion of that tormented country. Ignoring the issues that had produced crisis, she gave a little lecture on the history of Pakistan. She denied that she was opposed to its existence, but her analysis did little to sustain her disclaimer. Her father, she averred, had been blamed for accepting partition. And there was an element of truth, she said, in the often heard charge that India had been brought into being by leaders of an indigenous independence movement while Pakistan had been formed by British collaborators who, as soon as they became "independent" proceeded to imprison



the authentic fighters for independence. Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred of India, which was being stocked by each new generation of Pakistani leaders. Conditions in East Pakistan reflected tendencies applicable to *all* of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier belonged to Pakistan: they too wanted and *deserved* greater autonomy; *they should never have been part of the original settlement.*<sup>8</sup> (Emphasis writer's own)

The last sentence of above quoted statement provides an insight into the mental framework of the person who rules India at present and what she thinks of Afghanistan's often claimed independent "Pakhtoonistan", which comprises the same regions to which Mrs. Gandhi alluded and the Soviet Union too, not a coincidence, supports Afghanistan in her claim. The emergent triangular relationship is in an enviable position to dictate the events to its favor. Any miscalculation on the part of Pakistan, at this extremely crucial juncture, may cause her an irreparable damage.

There is a danger, therefore, that the Soviet ambition to play an active role in Asian politics, driven by profound concern over the long-term strategic implications of Sino-Soviet hostility and Sino-American convergence, is channeling Soviet assertiveness in Asia in directions that are far removed from the promotion of order and stability. The Soviet Union is offering security selectively

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8. Kissinger, p. 881.

to those Asian States which are embroiled in regional conflicts and who find themselves without access to other external sources of effective political military support. It is precisely the provision of such support that has been the Soviet Union's stock in trade so far in the Third World. Where the Soviet Union has been successful in planting its presence and expanding its influence abroad, it has done so by massive transfers of military resources and flexing its muscles internationally on behalf of its client engaged in regional conflicts with their neighbours. Moscow's first success in the Middle East stemmed directly from its willingness to supply arms first to Egypt, and latter to the series of Arab States, assistance which surely contributed fresh incendiary materials to potentially explosive conflicts. In Vietnam and India, as well as in the Middle East, Soviet military power and political support have made an enormous difference in the outcome of regional conflicts. With America's willingness to extend support on a similar scale and with China's future policies and military capacity still highly uncertain, Moscow's announcement that it is available as an alternative source of security support cannot be dismissed lightly.

### III

In the sequence of bilateral treaties, those nations were first who were declared neutrals (uncommitted) but with policy orientations more favourable to the Soviet Union. They were followed by those who, not only were favourable to the Soviet Union, but had also established communist regime, (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Afghanistan). Assertion of physical force in Afghanistan not only shows that the Soviet Union

would no more (after the loss of Egypt and Somalia) tolerate any internal or external forces to disrupt the existing bilateral relationship, but also to bring home the point to the neighbours that reliance on anti-Soviet forces is not in their interest. The step is also meant to inflict a death blow to the U.S. as well as Chinese credibility in the region in order to reduce the number of options to those who had (or have) any commitment with the West.<sup>9</sup>

As Richard Nixon maintains :

What made the fall of Afghanistan so significant a loss to the West was not just the fate of its 18 million people, and whose \$ 160 per capita annual income makes Afghanistan one of the poorest countries of the world. Not even its strategic location would make its loss so significant, if that loss had occurred in isolation. It was a part of a pattern. And that pattern is what presents the challenge. It is a pattern of

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9. "Soviet writers divide all under-developed countries into the following categories :

First, states which have adopted the policy of non-capitalist development ; (Committed)

Second, countries which try to strengthen their national independence and create a modern economy with the broad participation of the national bourgeoisie; (Uncommitted)

Third, States whose ruling groups disregard national interests, accept semi-colonial way of life, and act as the accomplices of imperialist exploiters. (Western allied)

(bracketed insertions author's own)

*contd. on next page.*

ceaseless building by the Soviet toward a position of overwhelming military force . . . .<sup>10</sup>

One may not agree with the "Zero-sum game" situation between "East" and "West" to which Mr. Nixon refers here, but it would be naive to believe that there is no prevailing pattern in the developments. With the establishment of that pattern of expansion of the Soviet treaty network in Asia, the question remains, who is next?

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*contd. from previous page.*

W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Union in World Affairs*, Syracuse Univ. Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1973, p. 161.

(Pakistan used to be considered belonging to the third category when it became a participant in Western-sponsored treaty arrangements. She was put in second category particularly after the "Tashkent Agreement". She has been put back again in the third category for her alleged "anti-Afghanistan" role after Communist takeover of that country).

10. Richard Nixon, *The Real War*, Warner Books Inc., 1980, p. 12.

## ISSUE IDENTIFICATION : EGYPT—ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS (1973-1975)

by

*Dr. Sardar Muhammad\**

### **Introduction :**

Most of the international conflicts are complex and multidimensional. They comprise several interdependent and overlapping issues. Usually, neat and clean delineation of boundaries of component parts of conflict are difficult. It is problematic to fix the parameters of the various issues of a conflict.

Despite the difficulties involved in the demarcation of boundaries of the issues of conflict it need to be underscored that the initiation and a successful conclusion of peace negotiations becomes more feasible and practicable by undertaking this exercise. Separating and identifying the issues of a conflict helps in creating a rank-order of their importance in terms of their social, economic and political impact on the parties to conflict. It facilitates in focussing attention in issues of vital concern to the sides and thereby narrowing down the area requiring immediate action.

Egypt and Israel have been engaged in hostile interactions since May, 1948. They have fought four wars ;

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1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Each of the wars originating in some of the issues of conflict, added to the existing bitterness and led to further armed conflict.

The conflict resolution efforts, initiated in the Middle East in the aftermath of the October, 1973 War, took cognizance of and addressed themselves to both old and new issues. Following are brief comments on the issues taken up for resolution.

### **Supplies :**

October 16, 1973 was a crucial day in the 1973 Arab-Israel War. In a special address to the Knesset concerning the military and political situation, Mrs. Golda Meir announced that Israeli forces were operating on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

The Israeli forces, led by Major General Ariel Sharon, had found a gap between Egypt's Second and Third Armies and had reached the canal without much difficulty. On October 15, they crossed the canal below Ismailia. But on October, 16, only a few tanks reached the west bank. The Egyptians either did not attach much importance to this small Israeli presence on the west bank, or they could not understand its strategic significance.

Security Council Resolution 338 calling for an immediate ceasefire in place, was adopted on October 22, 1973, but the war did not end. The Israelis, taking advantage of their presence on the west bank of the waterway, maneuvered to completely besiege the Egyptian Third Army. On October 25, when the shooting finally stopped, the Third Army and the City of Suez were nearly surrounded by the Israeli forces.

Israel was resentful that a complete victory like June 1967 had been snatched away from them because of the United States acquiescing to the Soviet demand for an immediate ceasefire without consulting her. She claimed to have been deprived of the time needed to finish the job on the west side of the Suez Canal. Having succeeded in besieging about 20,000 Egyptian troops the Israelis were expected to strive for a hard bargain by bringing all sorts of pressures, including refusal for the transit of supplies to them. The most pressing and immediate concern of Egypt, therefore, was to get food and medical supplies to the Third Army and the City of Suez.

#### **Prisoners of War :**

When the war terminated on October 25, Egypt held some 240 Israeli POWs, and there were about 8,000 POWs in Israel. Apparently, the number of Egyptian POWs was significantly greater than the number of Israelis POWs, but in terms of proportions, the difference was not that substantial because the Egyptian population is about twelve times larger than that of Israel. Moreover, the impact of so many POWs was more consequential for the Government of the open Israeli society. The Israeli government, therefore, wanted an exchange of prisoners of war as soon as possible.

The Israeli concern for an early exchange of POWs was stated during the 1973 war, when efforts at the super-power level were being made to stop the war. On October 17, the United States conveyed the Soviet desire to Israel for a ceasefire in place. Abba Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, proposed to the Israeli Government that Jerusalem suggest to the United States

that the prisoners of war exchange be made a condition for a ceasefire agreement.

However, the text of the ceasefire resolution, agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow and adopted by the Security Council in its Resolution 331 on October 22, made no mention of the prisoners of war. The Israelis were resentful of this omission. When Henry Kissinger arrived in Israel on October 22, on his way to Washington from Moscow, Mrs. Meir raised the POWs issue with him and questioned the wisdom of accepting the resolution without a reference to the exchange of POWs. She felt satisfied only when Kissinger told her that, 'the prisoners exchange will be implemented immediately after the war'<sup>2</sup> and that he had the approval of Leonid Brezhnev in the matter.

### **Disengagement of Forces :**

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli war ended in stalemate. The Egyptians were entrenched in the Sinai and the Israelis were on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The two armies, equipped with formidable modern weapons supplied by their superpower patrons, were standing face-to-face with each other after the ceasefire

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1. For the text of the Security Council Resolution 338. See Edward R. F. Sheehan. *The Arabs, Israeli and Kissinger; A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the middle East* (New York : Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 228.

2. Golan, Matti, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger : Step by step diplomacy in the Middle East*, New York : Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), p. 85.



became effective on October 25. Even though a general calm prevailed on the front, minor incidents of ceasefire violations were taking place.

The close proximity of the two armies created an unstable situation—one not conducive to peace. Indeed, the ceasefire of October 22 had been a fatality of this military confrontation. Security Council Resolutions 339 and 340<sup>3</sup> called for a return of the forces of the two sides to the positions they had occupied at the time the ceasefire became effective on October 22. But there was no sign of the implementation of this part of the Security Council Resolutions. Israel was not ready to give up its advantageous position of surrounding the Third Army and the City of Suez by pulling back its troops to the October 22 lines.

Continued ceasefire could be assured only by disengaging the Egyptian-Israeli forces. The issue of separating the forces, therefore, demanded an immediate attention and action by those who were interested in keeping the guns silent on the western front of the October 1973 Middle East War.

### **Territory :**

Egypt had lost the Sinai peninsula to Israel in the June 1967 war. Efforts by the U.N. and the superpowers to restore the Sinai to Egypt had been fruitless. Peace in the Middle East had been elusive.

The "bitterness and sufferings" of the defeat, coupled with the successive failures of diplomatic efforts to

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3. For text of the Security Council Resolutions 339 and 340 see Edward R. F. Sheehan *Op Cit.*, pp. 228-229.

recover the lost territory, forced President Anwar el Sadat to initiate war against Israel in October, 1973. Addressing the National Assembly on October 16, he said, "We have fought for the sake of peace, the only peace that really deserves to be called peace—peace based on justice."<sup>4</sup> He continued, "We do not fight to attack the territory of others, but we fight and will continue to fight for two objectives : (i) restore our territory which was occupied in 1967 ; and (ii) to find ways and means to restore and obtain respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine."<sup>5</sup>

### **Palestinian People :**

As a result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the state of the Palestinian Arabs could not come into existence. Eversince, they have been living in "diaspora". The Arab leaders consider the Palestinian question to be at the heart of Arab-Israeli conflict. They believe that peace in the Middle East is neither finally attainable nor durable without Palestinians participation in the peace process—a process which should lead to the creation of a sovereign independent Palestinian entity, presumably on the west Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Israel, on the other hand, refuses to go along with this formulation of the peace scenario in the Middle East. She is not ready to sit with Palestinians in the peace negotiations.

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4. For parts of Anwar el Sadat's speech of October 16, 1973, see Walter Laqueur (ed.), *The Arab—Israeli Reader: A Documentary History of Middle East* (New York: Bantam Books Inc., 1976), p. 466.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

## Security and Peace

Security has been the chief concern of the Israelis. She fought her first war with the Arabs immediately after the proclamation of the establishment of the state of Israel was issued on May 15, 1948. The Palestinian Arabs uprooted from their homeland have frequently indulged in armed actions inside Israel.

President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced the liquidation of the state of Israel and establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in its place as the major goal of the Arabs. When, in May 1967, he ordered the United Nations Emergency Force out of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and adopted a threatening posture, the Israelis pre-empted and attacked Egypt and Syria from air and on the ground. Later, Jordan, too, entered the war. The war ended in a defeat for the Arabs, and Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

The 1967 Military victory gave the Israelis an immense sense of superiority and security vis-a-vis the Arabs. The seizure of about 48,000 square miles of Arab territory provided a sufficient strategic depth for defense for Israel and gave Israelis a feeling of security. Thereafter, they decided to sit tight until the Arabs agreed to sign a contractual peace reached through face-to-face negotiations.

On the Western front, the Suez Canal was the separating line between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. When President Nasser, in the spring of 1969, initiated the war of attrition, the Israelis in order to beef up their

defenses, constructed the Bar Lev Line<sup>6</sup> and thus tried to procure additional guarantees for their security.

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal and destroyed the Bar Lev Line after storming it. This shattered the Israeli assumptions concerning the arrangements for their security. In the aftermath of the war they seemed open to new concepts and ways and means of ensuring their security.

### **Conclusion :**

The preceding discussion signifies that the Egypt-Israel conflict, on the morrow of October 1973 war, consisted of multiple issues. The importance of these issues was different to the two sides. For Egypt the most crucial issue of immediate concern was supplies to her besieged Third Army Corps. On the other hand, Israel wanted an immediate release and repatriation of POWs, return of Sinai peninsula to Egypt, insurance of Israeli security and the problem of the Palestinian people could be taken up at a later stage.

Identification of the Issues of Egypt Israel conflict was helpful in determining the priorities of the two sides in the up-coming peace negotiations. The structuring of the conflict helped determine the importance of issues to the sides and was to be useful in the issue-selection for resolution.

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6. The Bar Lev Line was a series of heavily fortified strong points with interlocking fields of fire named after Israeli Chief of Staff Haim Bar Lev.

## NIGERIAN NATIONALISM

by

*Ahmed Husain*

Aristotle the classical political philosopher believed that man is social by nature. No individual can live in isolation. A man who cannot live in political community or state must be either a "beast or a god". Consequently the state is natural to mankind. By living together for a reasonable period of time a group of people form particular habits which discriminate them from others. This separate identity gives them the status of a nation. However, some nations are strong and powerful, others are weak and disorganised. This difference of political power among the nations give rise to the concept of Nationalism. By and large powerful nations following the Machiavellian concept believe in "expansionism" and want to extend their sphere of suzerainty, which may be called negative aspect of Nationalism. On the other hand subjugated nations resist the foreign control and want to assert their "right of selfdetermination".

Power has its own dimensions which was displayed by the European nations by dividing among themselves the disorganised African and Asian states on the plea to make them modern in the nineteenth century. Actually

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1. Michael B. Foster—Masters of Political Thought Harp, London 1979 P, 127.

they exploited the colonised territories for their own advantage. They used cheap labour and raw materials of the exploited Africans and Asians for the economic gain of the Europeans.

This exploitation could not last indefinitely. Gradually frustration and misery gave rise to political awakening among the peoples of controlled states. It made them to bury their tribal and sectional differences and demanded "right of self determination" on the basis of the doctrine of Nationalism". "Briefly, the doctrine hold that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained and that the only legitimate type of government is national self government".<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, it was by coming in contact with the white rulers that subjugated nations realised the values of life which they were being denied. According to Professor Peter Worsley "European rule in Asia and Africa has meant a fundamental transformation of the social life of the ordinary peasant and town-dweller and European rule overseas has been so brief precisely because of the social disturbances it has created".<sup>3</sup>

It was World War II which made the European Imperial powers to succumb to the pressure of Nationalism launched by the colonised African and Asian States. Eventually the British and French Empires disintegrated and a number of new sovereign states emerged on the

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2. Elie Kedourie—Nationalism in Asia and Africa P. 28.

3. Peter Worsley, The Third World, London, 1964 P. 17,

World map. Nigeria was one of them in West Africa. The country became independent from Britain in 1960.

The Nationalism of Nigeria from about 1920 was the history of movements towards independence. In 1922, the Clifford constitution conceded for the first time to elective principle in the legislative council. Political development was accelerated after the Second World War. In 1946 the Richards Constitution provided a federal framework dividing the country into three regional assemblies and a Central House of Representatives. It also widened the franchise and elective principle to include most Nigerians. In 1951 the Constitution was revised under Governor Macpherson to provide for responsible Government. Regional self government was attained by both Eastern and Western Nigeria in 1957 while the Northern Region attained the same status in 1959. The federation as a whole became independent on Oct. 1, 1960. In 1963 Nigeria became a Republic.<sup>4</sup>

The degree of Regional autonomy in the Federal structure was the most debateable issue in Nigeria on the eve of independence. By and large, it was believed that intervention in the affairs of the Regional Government had to be minimum. The main idea behind Regional autonomy was to enable ethnic minorities to have self rule and protect their respective traits. But unfortunately the politicians twisted it to gain benefits for themselves. To support this the pertinent example is the declaration

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4. The Nigeria Year Book 1981. Printed by Times Press Limited. P. 63.

of emergency in Western Region in 1962.<sup>5</sup>

Politicians at all levels believed that there should be created more regions on the basis of different ethnic groups. In view of this, the federal house of Representatives passed a motion for the creation of a new Mid-West Region to be carved out from the non-yoruba areas of the Western Region. This proposal was also endorsed by the Northern and Eastern Region legislatures. But Chief Awolowo and his followers opposed the proposal on the grounds that politically the Western Region would be weakened *vis-a-vis* other Regions. He also alleged that it was a deliberate move on part of politicians of other regions to dominate politics of Western Region. He even declared that no state of emergency as defined by the Constitution existed such as to justify the Federal Government's action. Consequently, he was arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Federal Government.<sup>6</sup> In 1979 as Presidential candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria he secured second highest votes among the five candidates.

Parliamentary democracy was introduced in Nigeria with a hope that the political leaders of the pre-independence period would work with same sense of devotion for the nations as they had done for freedom from the 'White Man'. But they did not come upto the expectations and all the abuses of cultural pluralism

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5. Michael Crowder—The Story of Nigeria. Faber and Faber, London P. 262.

6. *Ibid.* P. 263.



were evidenced after independence. Tribalism was operated in its destructive form. Federal government was weak and could not solve the existing social and political problems and gave way to further regionalism. Apparently the civilised government had ceased to exist and there was no respect for letter and spirit of the Constitution among the political activists.

It was in the midst of this political confusion that Military took over political power in January 1966. Military in developing countries alongwith its professional role has also to participate actively in National integration of the country. In Nigeria the Military had to be more responsible because it was the only organised political elite. It had to help the nation to enjoy real advantages of independence. However, the Military administration headed by General Ironsi took a hasty decision which caused concern among people about its intentions.

Before discussing that event it is important to note that though Nigeria is divided into many ethnic groups of which the major ones are Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo, Fulani and Ibibio but one thing is common among them *i.e.*, they want only limited control by the Federal Administration. Perhaps this is a legacy or tribal heritage. Hence the introduction of Federal system with emphasis on Regional autonomy.

General Ironsi immediately after takeover promulgated an order to have firm control over the administration from the Centre. "The former Regions are abolished, and Nigeria grouped into a number of territorial areas called provinces. Nigeria ceases to be

what is described as a Federation. It now becomes simply the Republic of Nigerian. The Regional and Federal Public Services were declared unified and every civil servant is now called upon to see his function in any part of Nigeria in which he is serving in the context of the whole country".<sup>8</sup>

The above mentioned announcement caused doubts about the sincerity to nation of the Military Regime headed by General Ironsi. Many interpreted it as curtailment of autonomy which was the basis of Nigerian Nationalism. It was also rumoured that he was fanning tribalism for good of his own tribe. There was too much mistrust about his intentions. Following it he was Pilled in a coup staged by military officers of an other tribe.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, this mistrust about concentration of power at Centre *vis-a-vis* Regional autonomy took still more ugly shape which plunged Nigeria into a Civil War and a large number of valuable lives were lost. The new military head Gen. Gowon was not recognised as a bonafide successor to the former military head by Lt. Col. Ojukwu Military Governor of the Eastern Region. Despite the fact the Military Federal Government created 12 states out of the four existing regions. The nomenclature of the component units of the Federation was also changed from Regions to States. But

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8. Press Release No. 723, Federal Ministry of Information Lagos, 1966.

9. Michael Crowder, *cit. op.* P. 269.

this territorial adjustment was not accepted to Military Governor of Eastern Region.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, he showed no intention to keep his Region in the Federation and on May 30, 1967 announced that the territory comprising the Eastern Region had decided to secede from the Federation. He named it the "Republic of Biafara". In this way he tried to interpret the concept of autonomy as secession, which is incorrect meaning of autonomy in relation to Federation. The concept of autonomy is only limited to constitutional liberty. After thirty agonising months, the battle for National Unity was won on January 12, 1970.<sup>11</sup> The country was again politically controlled by the Federal Government from Lagos. The military action of the Federal Government was justified. Federalism means component units antonomy and not creation of an independent State. "Almost all nations will fight for their unity, even if sentiment in the disaffected area is overwhelmingly for secession. So it was during the Civil War, with Nigeria toward Biafara, and with the congo toward Katanga. Pakistan was unique, however, in that the seceding province was separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory".<sup>12</sup>

Immediately after the military action, the Federal Military Government started work to create political

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10. J.H. Price—Political Institutions of West Africa, Hutchinson of London, 1977, P. 190.

11. The Nigeria Year Book 1981, P. 37.

12. Henery Kissinger—The White House Year—Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph London, 1979 P. 852.

cohesion and emphasis on Nationalism. The head of the Federal Military Government General Gowon realised that the nation wished full participation in the administration and for this return to the Civilian elected government was essential. Therefore, on the occasion of the tenth independence anniversary he announced a nine point programme to reintroduce representative government in the country by 1976 <sup>13</sup>

Earlier General Gowon's Military regime was appreciated for suppression of the secessionist attempt and with the announcement about return of the country to civilian Rule by 1976 he gained some support among masses. However, the political maxim "all powers corrupt and absolute power corrupt absolutely" could be appropriately applied on Gowon's administration. He proved to be a vacillating administrator and had scant control on his military colleagues sharing political power with him. He and his colleagues did not want to leave office. Therefore, in 1974 he announced postponement of return to civilian rule indefinitely. The announcement was unwelcome. The citizens of Nigeria had been counting days for the change of government. Because they had tolerated inefficient and corrupt administration for quite long.

There prevailed period of insecurity and frustration. It was against this background that in July 1975, a group of military officers headed by General Murtala Mohammad took over the administration in a bloodless

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13. J. H. Price op. cit. P. 193.

coup. Immediately afterwards he assured the nation to introduce elected government by October 1979, by a five stage programme.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, General Mohammad was assassinated in an abortive coup in 1976. Due to this shocking incident the future of representative government seemed in jeopardy. But full credit goes to Lt. General Obasajo for carrying out the programme of his predecessor. Finally the power was handed over to elected president Alhaji Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1979.

One of the major factors for political instability in Nigeria was the large number of parties with parochial interests. This problem was overcome by the Federal Election Commission by emphasising on nationalism. Consequently only those political parties were encouraged which had following throughout the country. This principle was firmly applied during the five elections in 1979 which resulted in political stability in the country. Even though, on the eve of Elections there were about twenty five political groups and only five were declared eligible to nominate their candidates by the Election Commission. It is an important landmark in the political history of the nation.

The present Constitution encourages active participation of the citizens in affairs of the country. Therefore, people are also encouraged to participate in their local matters. One of the main reasons for the successful operation of the Federal Government of U.S.A. is the local self government which enables the American citizens

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14. Michael Crowder, op. cit. P. 281.

to enjoy democratic values. The present Nigerian Constitution which adopted presidential system like U.S.A. has also acknowledged the importance of Local Self Government. The main purpose of the present local Government in Nigeria is "to encourage initiative and leadership potential, mobilisation of human and material resources through the involvement of the public in local development".<sup>15</sup> This emphasis on local government is an approach in the right direction. It would enable the people to appreciate administrative difficulties and realise the importance of self help. It would also encourage young talented citizens to participate in their own local affairs and get training for further leadership.

Since it was due to the effects of the Nigerian masses that independence was achieved, therefore, the Constitution has unambiguously declared that "sovereignty belongs to the people from whom government through this Constitution derives all its powers and authority."<sup>16</sup> Regarding the importance of peace and tranquillity, guidelines have been laid down in the Constitution to forestall parochialism and destructive politics, so that there should be rapid economic development to enable the masses to be affluent and enjoy the benefits of the mineral wealth of Nigeria.

The Constitution is very clear about the political objectives of the nation. The motto of the Federal

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15. The Nigeria Year Book 1981 P. 71.

16. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. P.7,

Republic of Nigeria is "Unity, Faith, Peace and Progress." The National integration is encouraged. Discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association is prohibited. The State fosters a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the various groups of the Federation, so that national loyalty should be put above sectional loyalties. Similarly the Constitution also has high economic objectives. The national economy is to be managed in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity.<sup>17</sup> Thus to make Nigeria a modern State where the people enjoy civil, economic and political liberties.

Federalism is a complex system. It needs a lot of active participation at Federal, State and Local levels by the citizens of a State. There is also needed tolerance and legal acumen to enjoy the advantages of the system. In other words basic education is very essential for the federal system. Therefore, the Constitution provides provision for educating the masses of the country. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to eradicate illiteracy throughout the country, for which the State provides free education at primary, secondary and university levels, which is indeed commendable. To conclude at present, the Nigerian Nation is constructively moving forward, "with the National ethic of Discipline, Self-reliance and Patriotism".<sup>18</sup>

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17. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria P. 8.

18. Ibid P. 10.

The citizens of Nigeria have experienced political instability in the past. At present the nation is careful not to commit the past mistakes. Therefore, Nigerian Nationalism is an ideal for remaining parts of Africa under racist control and are struggling to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination based on the principle of "one man one vote."



## Book Reviews:

### **INTERNAL STRIFE AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTION : INDIA'S ROLE IV THE CIVIL WAR IN EAST PAKISTAN (BANGLADESH)**

*By*

*Hasan-Askari Rizvi*

**Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1981, Pages 313,**

**Price : Rs. 150/-**

The civil strife in East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971 was debated by a good number of Western, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi journalists and scholars over the last decade. Most of these works were either descriptive and purely historical or were meant to project the point of view of some of the parties involved in the 1971 episode. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi's book stand out not only because it is a careful and a thorough examination of the East Pakistan crisis and India's interventionary behaviour but also because the study has been conducted within a framework derived from the theoretical and methodological literature in International Relations and Comparative Politics.

The author first examines the various aspects of the concept of Intervention—origin and development, meanings and definition typologies, the causes of proliferation of external intervention in the Third World, and the impact of changes in the international system on the

modes of external intervention. He makes use of the concepts of 'linkage' and 'spillover' to explain the growing tendency of internationalization of domestic strife in the present day international system. He suggests a framework comprising three sets of variables to examine intervention in a domestic strife : (i) Domestic environmental factors of the fragmented policy (ii) Domestic environmental factors of the intervening actor (iii) International environmental factors.

While dealing with the East Pakistan crisis, the author examines the character of the Pakistani policy in 1971, the nature and dynamics of the intra-state conflict and the efforts of the ruling elite of Pakistan to cope with this crisis. Emphasizing the fact that 'a political system, unable to provide sufficient opportunities...for political participation and for equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development, finds it difficult to maintain their (people) attachment to its basic norms', the book discusses how Pakistan nationalism was gradually replaced by Bangladesh nationalism in East Pakistan based mainly on language and ethnicity. It also looks into the development of the Bangladesh Movement, the pattern of interaction amongst the different political groups in the Bangladesh Movement, and their linkages with the Indian polity.

India adopted different strategies of intervention in East Pakistan crisis in support of the Bangladesh Movement. These included : **POLITICAL INTERVENTION :** (i) Assistance to the Bangladesh nationalists to set up a government-in-exile ; (ii) support by/through voluntary

groups ; (iii) support extended by the State Governments and the Indian Government ; (iv) efforts to mobilize international public opinion. **INDIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION** : (i) Origin, recruitment and training of the Mukti Bahini ; (ii) supply of arms and equipment : (iii) joint military operations. All these strategies have been discussed in detail by the author. It was not until late November 1971 that India resorted to direct military intervention.

While reviewing international environmental factors the author shows that the Soviet Union was the only major power which publicly censored Pakistan's policies in East Pakistan but it did not endorse India's policies as well as the Bangladesh Movement. It was only after the "diplomatic breakthrough" between U.S. and China through the good offices of Pakistan that the Soviet Union moved closer to the Indian stance on the Bangladesh crisis. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (August 1971) marked the beginning of the shift in the Soviet policies towards the South Asian crisis. Later the Soviets airlifted military hardware to enable India to resort to direct military intervention and extended full diplomatic support to India at the U.N. The U.S. Government endeavoured to contain the conflict but by October-November the U.S. was convinced about the inevitability of the establishment of Bangladesh. It favoured the establishment of Bangladesh. It favoured the establishment of Bangladesh through negotiations rather than an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The People's Republic of China was extremely critical of the Soviet standpoint and India's policies. China worked

for the containment of the conflict in collaboration with the U.S. and extended diplomatic support to Pakistan.

The combination of theory and hard data and a detailed documentation makes this book a useful contribution to South Asian studies. It will be read with interest by those interested in the history of the emergence of Bangladesh as a nation-state.

Hameed A. K. Rai

## **'READINGS IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY'**

*By*

*Hameed A. K. Rai*

**Aziz Publishers, Urdu Bazar, Lahore: Pp. 815 (both volumes)**

**Library Edition : Rs. 180/-**

The work presented in the two volumes listed above confirms Mr. Rai's ability to scrutinise the literature available on his subject and to cull from it items that effectively dumbrate the various aspects and phases of the country's foreign policy as conducted by its different rulers. The articles featured in this comprehensive anthology include basic statements of intent made by the founders and the later stewards of foreign policy, as well as perceptions of foreign scholars of the directions into which Pakistan's foreign relations have been guided by its leaders. The result is a most useful collection of basic writings on a subject least studied by our scholars, a treasury of information for students and teachers alike.

Volume I begins with a speech made by Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, in the course of his visit to the United States. The speech lays down the basic aims of a newly formed country, its aspirations of peace and Islamic way of life. Kalim Siddiqui's article, which follows, explains the nature of Pakistan's early attitudes and the constraints which channelled its foreign policy in certain directions. The bias of the first decade further examined by a group study reinforced by

Khalid bin Sayeed's analysis of Pakistan's fears and interests which led to its participation in CENTO and SEATO. A speech of Ayub Khan marks the change of posture in the sixties when some equilibrium was sought in the wake of economic recovery.

M. A. H. Ispahani puts on record Pakistan's growing disenchantment with the alliances and a distinct change of direction is foreshadowed in a 1973 doctrine and a process of neutrality is well under way with the country facing towards the Middle East. An Afghan American Zalmay Khalilzad, examines Pakistan's alleged potential for nuclear weapons. This is followed by Ambassador Sultan Muhammad Khan's view of the geopolitical imperatives as impinging upon Pakistan's diplomacy. B. C. Rastogi gives a retrospective on the country's alignment and persuasions towards non-alignment upto 1960. Aslam Siddiqui tries to answer the question whether Pakistan can stay neutral.

Khalid bin Sayeed is featured again to put on record Pakistan's contacts in the region of South-East Asia. Ahsan Chaudhri relates the problem of Kashmir to the incentives for joining the military pacts, followed by Rafat Ara's review of Pakistan's attitudes towards these pacts. Dobell gives an overview of relations with the major world Powers. Hameed Rai himself leads the discussion of relations with India in new section. Sheikh Abdullah's well-known article on Kashmir, India and Pakistan sets the perspective for the vicissitudes that have followed. Famous historian of India, Michael Edwardes, examines the situation created by India's nuclear

explosion. S. P. Seth sets out the role played by China in Indo-Pakistan relations, followed by Muhammad Habib's analysis of Chinese policies in South-East Asia in general and with India and Pakistan in particular.

Volume II begins with American scholar Brodtkin's retrospective study of the U.S. Aid to Pakistan in the fifties. Ayub Khan goes on record as identifying Pakistan's disaffection with the American contact and Trager writes about the failure of American policy in South Asia. Mary Mcgrory focuses on the American role in the India-Pakistan war of 1971. Another woman scholar Shirin Tahir Kheli, discusses the nuclear options open to Pakistan and the American attitude towards them. A separate section on Pakistan's relations with China is led by Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan. Indian scholar Mohammed Ayoob researches the Indian factor in Sino-Pakistan relations, while Dobell highlights the ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty of 1973. The Pakistani scholar who has written about Sino-Pakistan relations, Anwar Syed traces the Chinese reactions to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.

The section on relations with the USSR begins with Mohammad Ahsan Chaudhri's inquiry into the early misunderstandings and prejudices and their gradual removal. Werner Levi goes into the implications of a triangular relations between Pakistan the USSR and China. Zubeida Hassan describes contacts with the USSR in the sixties and S. P. Seth advances the discussion by highlighting the Soviet role in Indo-Pakistan politics, followed again by Hassan's inquiry into the patterns of

Soviet arms aid to Pakistan and India. G. W. Chaudhri examines Moscow's influences in South Asia.

Pakistan's relations in the Muslim world are treated in the final but brief chapter. Khalida Kureshi's rather weak article on Iran is followed by Rajput's even weaker assessment. The only contribution worth reading is the well known article by Weinbaum and Gautam Sen. Pakistan enters the Middle East which indicates the progress made in Pakistan's post-1971 shift in regional self-identity.

Problems of copyright have no doubt thwarted Rai's work of section. Yet, despite a weak selection on the Middle East and the serious oversight of not indicating the source of the articles included and a sketchy table of contents, it is an interesting and useful collection. Distilled through the sensibility of a single scholar, it tends to be idiosyncratic but given the poor state of availability of sources in Pakistan the collection is a commendable effort.

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