


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- Pakistan and the Representation of the People's China in the United Nations.
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- Book Review.

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
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*The Journal of Political Science, Government College,
Lahore, Pakistan.*



PAKISTAN AND THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE'S CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Hameed A. K. Rai

Pakistan came into being in 1947 and the People's Republic of China was established in October, 1949. In the two years that intervened between the establishment of the two states, the Pakistani attitude towards the Chinese Civil War was somewhat ambiguous. The Pakistani leadership, though groomed in the traditions of parliamentary democracy and, therefore, apprehensive of the communist victory in China, was not very enthusiastic in its support for the existing Kuomintang regime. The reason for the lack of any warmth on the part of Pakistan for Chaing Kai-Shek was that in 1942, during his visit to India, he had supported the Congress viewpoint of a United India. This provoked immediate reaction among the Muslims. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, in a statement regretted that "the Marshal (Chaing Kai-Shek) should have indulged in generalities without understanding the political situation in India and the constitutional adjustments which are necessary" and that he should have expressed views "which may be exploited to the detriment of Muslim India."¹ Moreover, Pakistan, like most other Asian countries, regarded the Chinese Revolution as the opening of a "new chapter in Asian

1 : Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed., *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore : Ashraf, 1943), 3rd ed., pp. 337-338.

history. Its profound significance for the rest of Asia arises from the fact that it is an indigenous revolution, bred essentially in an Asian environment. Whatever the sources of its emotional aspiration, it does not owe its birth and fruition to foreign influence.”²

Pakistan recognised the communist government in Peking on 4 January 1950, within a few days of India's decision to do so. The press communique, announcing the recognition expressed that the Government of Pakistan “trusts that friendly and cordial relations between China and Pakistan will be cemented in all spheres to their mutual advantage,”³

The defeat of the Nationalist Government and the establishment of a Communist Chinese Government on the Mainland of China, raised a delicate question, that who should represent China in the United Nations. The question was of great significance, since China was a permanent member of the Security Council.

The United States view was that, since the Communists had gained control over the country by force, their government could not be recognised as a legitimate government. Moreover, the Western bloc was pessimistic about the future behaviour of the communist government with respect to its obligation as a member of the United Nations.

The question of Chinese representation came before the United Nations at the end of 1949. The Foreign

2 : Mushtaq Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Policies in Southeast and East Asia’, in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), Vol. 4., 1951, p. 88.

3. *Dawn* (Karachi), 5 January, 1950.

Minister of the People's Government of China in a cablegram to the President of the General Assembly, repudiated the legal status of the Nationalist delegate to represent China in the United Nations. In the Security Council, on 29 December, 1949, the representative of the Soviet Union endorsed the position taken up by the People's Government of China, but the matter was not included in the agenda. In the meantime, the communist government was recognised by many states, communist as well as non-communist, as the general de facto government of China.

Professor Lauterpacht, in a letter to the London Times, published on 6th January, 1950, suggested by setting forth principles of International Law, that it was an obligation to recognise the new People's Government of China. The United Kingdom Government officially circulated this statement and recognised the Peoples Government of China on 10 January 1950.

At the 459th Meeting of the Security Council, on 10 January 1950, the representative of the U.S.S.R. submitted a draft resolution for not recognising the credentials of the representative of the Republic of China, and for seating the People's Government in its place. The representative of the Soviet Union warned that if the Council did not take appropriate measures for seating the communist delegate and excluding the Nationalist Delegate the U.S.S.R. delegation would not take part in the work of the Council. The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was rejected by the Council by a vote of 3 in favour (India, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia) to 6 against, with 2 abstentions (Norway and the United Kingdom).

On 9 March 1950, the United Nations Secretary-General circulated a Memorandum on the legal aspect of the representation of States in the United Nations. The Memorandum stated that the primary difficulty in the current question of the representation of Member States in the United Nations was that the question of representation had been linked up with the question of recognition by Governments of member states. After arguing that the linkage was unfortunate from the practical standpoint of legal theory, the memorandum concluded that the proper principle could be derived by analogy from Article 4 of the Charter. Article 4 required that an applicant for membership must be able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership. The obligations of membership could be carried out only by governments which, in fact, possessed the power to do so. Where a revolutionary government presented itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an existing government, the question a tissue should be which of these two governments, in fact, was in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the state in the fulfillment of the obligations of membership. This, in essence, meant an enquiry as to whether the new government exercised effective authority within the territory of the state and was habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population ; if so, the memorandum stated, it would seem to be appropriate for the United Nation Organs, through their collective action, to accord the new government the right to represent the state in the Organisation, even though individual members of the Organisation refused, and continue to refuse, to accord that Government recognition as the lawful government for reasons which were valid under

their national polices.⁴

After the rejection of the Soviet draft resolution, in the Security Council, the scene shifted to the General Assembly. At the opening meeting (277th Plenary Meeting) of its fifth Session on 19 September 1950, the General Assembly was confronted with four draft resolutions on Chinese representation even before the Assembly had elected its president or organised for the work of the Session.

An Indian draft resolution noted that China was a member of the United Nations and that "the obligation of a member cannot be carried out except by a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence actually exercises control over the territory of that Member and commands the obedience of its people", and called upon the General Assembly to recognise that the Chinese Communist Government was the only such government functioning in "the Republic of China as now constituted" and to decide that it was entitled to representation in the General Assembly; it was rejected by a vote of 16 in favour to 33 against, with 10 abstentions.⁵

The representative of Pakistan supported the Indian

4 : *United Nations Memorandum, Security Council Document*, No. S/1466, 9 March, 1950 text from *International Organisation*, May 1950, p. 356.

5. Votes in favour were of Afghanistan, Burma, Bylo-Russian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Israel the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine SSR, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. The abstaining states were Equador, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Lebanon, Suadi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Argentina and Canada.

draft Resolution, and he was as enthusiastic as the representative of India in advocating the cause of the communist government of China.

The representative of Sweden stated that he would support the Indian draft resolution on the grounds that the People's Republic had control over nearly all the territory of China and therefore was the only de facto Government of the country. No Government was obliged to recognise the situation de jure but it was an unequivocal fact that the Chinese were no longer represented by the Nationalistic Government, now residing in Formosa.⁶

The Assembly then adopted in two parts an amended Canadian draft resolution 'referring the question of Chinese representation to a special committee which should defer its report until the Assembly had considered the general question of "Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State", and resolving that pending the report by the Special Committee "the representatives of the National Government of China shall be seated in the General Assembly with the same rights as other representatives."' The vote on the first part, that is to refer the question to a Special Committee was 38 to 6, with 11 abstentions, and on seating the Nationalist's representatives, the vote was 42 to 8, with 6 abstentions. Pakistan abstained on the first part but voted against on the second.

Two Soviet draft resolutions calling for the exclusion

6. *G.A.O.R.* 5th Session, 277th Plenary Meeting, 19 September 1950, p. 13.

of the Chinese Nationalist delegation "because they are not the representatives of China" (A/1369) and seating the Chinese communist representatives were defeated in the Assembly, by a vote of 38 against to 10 in favour, with 8 abstentions and by 38 against to 11 in favour, with 8 abstentions respectively. Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolutions.

The representative of Pakistan, while speaking in the General Debate on the question of the representation of China, disagreed with the view expressed by the United States and declared that :—

"The Western considerations are irrelevant to the issue. It was also irrelevant to consider whether the new Government was peace-loving or not and whether it is able and willing to discharge its obligations under the Charter as required by Article 4. These provisions related to the admission of new members and not to the validity of representation with which alone the Assembly was concerned at the moment."

"The sole question", said Sir Zafrulla Khan is, "who is entitled to represent China?"

"The Government, from which the delegation present here purports to draw its authority has for months ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of the Chinese mainland.....

.....

the truth of the matter is that the General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence of a fact, not because the fact has not been established, but the majority regard it as unpleasant ; It is easy to conceive what the verdict would have been, had the position reversed, and it is this reflection that is so disquieting.”⁸

A similar opinion was expressed by Professor Quincy Wright, an American authority on International Law. Supporting a claim of the Communist Government of China to membership, in the United Nations, he declared :

“While the United States may not be under a positive obligation to recognise the communist government as the government of China, that government appears to be the general de facto government of China and as such is alone capable of committing China under International Law and alone entitled to represent China in International transactions ; it would, therefore, appear that the United States should no longer support the representation of China by the Nationalist Government or oppose its representation by the Communist Government in the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies.”⁹

He further emphasized that this was only a question

8 : *Ibid.*, p. 97.

9 : Quincy Wright, ‘The Chinese Recognition Problem’, in the *America Journal of International Law*, Vol. 49, (1955), p. 336.

of 'Credentials' for the United Nations :

"While the communist government can be admitted to represent China through the normal process of accepting the credentials of its delegation in the various organs of the United Nations. It would appear that after such recognition, the Government of Formosa can only be represented in the United Nations, if it is admitted as the government of a new state by the normal process."¹⁰

Professor Inis L. Claude, an authority on International Organisations, has also supported the view expressed by the representative of Pakistan on the question of China's representation.

"The Chinese problem", he said, "which has been a cause celebre in the United Nations since 1950, is technically a matter of credentials, closely tied to the problem of recognition."¹¹

"The Special Committee created on the basis of the Canadian resolution consisted of the representatives of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines and Poland. It held meetings but failed to arrive at any solution and expressed its inability to make any recommendations to the Assembly on the representation of China.

In the meantime, the Korean War—which started in June 1950—had great effect on the issue of the represen-

10 : *Ibid.*, p. 337.

11 : Inis L. Claude, *Swords in to Plowshares* (Newyork : Random House, 1959), p. 102.

tation of China in the United Nations. Many of the Western States which in 1950 had voted in favour of admitting Communist China to the United Nations as the real representative government of the Chinese people, changed their opinion, because of China's participation in the Korean War. The United States resolution which branded the People's Republic of China, as aggressor, had been adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 44 to 7, with 9 abstentions.¹²

The United Kingdom representative who earlier was in favour of Communist China's admission to the United Nations supported the United States draft resolution which branded Communist China aggressor in Korea. He said that the fact that Peking Government had participated in the aggression in Korea was clear. To reject that paragraph, he stated, would be to undermine the whole moral basis of the United Nations.

Pakistan, on the other hand, voted in favour of that resolution which branded North Korea as an aggressor in the war but abstained on the resolution which sought to brand China as an aggressor. Pakistan also abstained

12 : The votes in favour were of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, The United Kingdom, The United States, Venezuela and Uruguay. Against were Burma, Bylorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Ukraine SSR, and the U.S.S.R. Abstaining States were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria Yemen and Yugoslavia. This Resolution 498 (V) was adopted at 327th Plenary Meeting on 1 February, 1951.

on the resolution which sought to impose an embargo on North Korea and China.

As a Pakistani writer has remarked, "This independent approach to cold war issues paved the way for mutual friendship between Pakistan and China. The foundation of that friendship was so firmly laid that the latter developments in Pakistan's foreign policy did not destroy it"¹³

In April 1951, Pakistan also exchanged diplomatic representatives with the Peking Government.

In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in 1951, the question of China's representation was discussed in the General Committee. Thailand proposed an oral draft resolution for postponing the consideration of the question and against its inclusion in the agenda ; it was adopted by 11 votes to 2, with one abstention. The recommendations of the General Committee were considered by the General Assembly at its 342nd Plenary Meeting on 13 November 1951. The representatives of Burma and the U.S.S.R. strongly pressed for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The representatives of Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States spoke in support of the recommendation of the General Committee. These representatives recalled that by Resolution 498 (V) of 1st February 1951, the General Assembly had condemned the Central People's Government for committing an act of aggression in Korea. That Government could hardly be held to qualify for admission into the very Organisation against which it was

¹³ : A Staff Study, 'Pakistan's Relation with the People's Republic of China', in *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 14, (1961), p. 217.

engaged in aggression. After the discussion, the recommendations of the General Committee were adopted by the Assembly by 37 votes to 11, with 4 abstentions.¹⁴ Pakistan voted against the resolution.

The question of the representation of China was not discussed by the General Assembly at the 7th Session in 1952.

At the Eight Session of the General Assembly, in 1953, the representative of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution at the Plenary Meeting, for seating the representative of the People's Republic of China.

At the same time the representative of the United States moved a draft resolution for the postponing of a discussion on the admission of the People's Republic of China, for not removing the representative of the Republic of China from the United Nations ; and for voting first on the United States draft resolution.

The proposal to vote first on the United States draft resolution was adopted by 40 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions and the United State draft resolution was then adopted by a vote of 44 to 10 with 2 abstentions. A proposal, not to vote on the Soviet draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 35 to 11, with 11 abstentions. Pakistan voted in favour of the United States resolution. India, Burma, Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc voted against the United States resolution.

The Change in Pakistan's position in 1953, with respect to the representation of China in the United

14 : The States which voted against were Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, Ukraine SSR, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. The abstaining States were Egypt, Sweden, Syria and Yemen.

Nations had been the result of a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. The change in Pakistan's foreign policy was the need of the hour, as Professor G.W. Choudhury has explained :

“In the Years 1947-1952, when Pakistan tried to maintain non-involvement in the East-West Cold War, it felt isolated and friendless. This increased her sense of insecurity, and she felt the need of the support of some bigger power. The link with the Common wealth and friendly relations with the Muslim countries could not solve the problem of security and they failed to give Pakistan the freedom from fear which is needed for a country's progress and stability. This led to the abandonment of the policy of non-alignment, and in 1953 there opened the second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy. ‘India and Pakistan as factors in each other's foreign policy and relations’ became more prominent and the shadow of the East-West Cold War was cast over the disputes of the two countries. “The quest for security, the search for friends and allies, and the anxiety to maintain territorial integrity, led Pakistan to pursue a policy of alliance with the West, particularly with the United States.” In the early part of 1954, Pakistan accepted new International commitments which drastically redefined her position in world affairs.”¹⁵

15 : G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relation with India (1947-1966)* (London : Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 233.

Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States in May 1954 and joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September, 1954. In February 1955, Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact.

In the following years, at the 9th, 10th and 11th Sessions of the General Assembly, in 1954, 1955 and 1956 respectively, the U.S.S.R. and the United States presented draft resolutions similar to those of the 8th Session of 1953. Each time, the United States draft resolution was adopted for postponing discussion on the question of China's representation to the United Nations. Pakistan consistently voted for the United States resolutions. Many delegates, like those of India, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia, maintained their respective positions.

The formation of SEATO was a direct provocation to China. Peking Radio described it as "an Aggressive military alliance hostile to the people of China and various Asian countries."¹⁶

Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, who was an advocate of non-alignment, used Pakistan's participation in these Pacts as a propaganda tool to discredit her among the Afro-Asians.

It is interesting to note that whereas India and the Soviet Union lodged strong protest notes with the Pakistan Government against its membership in the Pacts, China did not bother to send even a formal note of disapproval to Pakistan's new policy. The reason for this was that

16 : *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 5 September, 1954.

China had foreseen the convergence of interest with Pakistan and had felt that friendly relations with Pakistan would be useful in a possible clash with India in the future, which was trying to pose as a rival for Asian leadership.

Moreover, Pakistan's Ambassador in Peking, Major-General Raza, explained to the Chinese leaders, the reasons which had prompted Pakistan to join the SEATO and other Western sponsored military Pacts. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra further assured Mr. Chou/En-lai, in the Bandung Conference in April 1955, that SEATO was a defensive alliance as far as Pakistan was concerned and that Pakistan had entered into the Pacts to defend itself from aggression and not because of any hostility towards China. Thus, Mr. Chou/En-lai announced at a meeting of the political committee of the Bandung Conference that the Pakistan Prime Minister has assured him that although.

“.....Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear that China would permit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties. The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it.....
.....I am grateful to him for this explanation because through these explanations we achieved mutual

understanding.”¹⁷

An understanding between China and Pakistan of the convergence of interests vis-a-vis India has been further confirmed by a revealing note of Professor Rushbrook Williams. He States:

“Following on the Bandung Conference..... Karachi received—as I have been assured on unimpeachable authority—a private message from Peking. The Chinese People’s Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their friendly relations but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interests could be expected in the near future.”¹⁸

This understanding in Sino-Pakistani relations was maintained in the following years, for, in October 1956, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy visited China and in December 1956, Mr. Chou/En-lai visited Pakistan. By the communique which was issued in Karachi, the two Prime Ministers declared that “there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries.” They added that the “difference between the political systems of Pakistan and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friend-

17 : *New York Times*, 25 April, 1955.

18 : L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London : Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 120.

ship between their two countries.”¹⁹

In July, 1957, Mao Tse-tung made a statement that :

“The Government of China was going to be neutral on its attitude to the rival claims to the States of Jammu and Kashmir and that in his view it would be wise for other communist countries also to maintain strict-neutrality on the issue.”²⁰

To Pakistan, the attitude of a nation on Kashmir is “the touchstone by which friendship and animosity are tested.”²¹ Pakistan, therefore, abstained on the United States resolution on the question of Chinese representation in the General Assembly in 1957. It appears from this voting behaviour in 1957, that the Government of Pakistan adopted a neutral policy on the Chinese issue, similar to that which Chairman Mao announced on Kashmir. Thus, it is clear that Pakistan was following a policy of ‘give and take’ in the pursuit of its national interests.

In 1958, at the 13th Session of the General Assembly, the Chinese question was considered by the General Committee, at the request of India. The representative of the United States proposed a draft resolution whereby the Assembly would : (a) decide to reject the request of India for inclusion of the item in the agenda, and (b)

19 : K.S. Hasan, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Pakistan : China, India and Pakistan*, (Karachi : Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 363. See also *Dawn*, 25th December, 1956.

20 : *Dawn* : (Karachi), 21 July, 1957.

21 : Werner Levi, ‘Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China’, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35 (1962), p. 222.

decide further not to consider at its 13th Session, any proposal to exclude the representatives of the People's Republic of China. The United States draft resolution was approved by the General Committee by 12 votes to 7, with 2 abstentions.

The General Assembly discussed the Committee's report on 22nd and 23rd November 1958. Two amendments to the Committee's United States sponsored resolution were submitted jointly by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Nepal and the United Arab Republic. By these amendments the Assembly would (1) accede to, rather than reject, the request that the item on the representation of China be put on its agenda, and (2) delete the provision not to consider any proposal to exulude the representatives of China or seat the representative of the communist government at the 13th Session. These amendments were rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 40 against to 29 in favour, with 12 abstentions and 41 to 29, with 11 abstentions. The Assembly then adopted the Committee's recommendations by 44 votes to 28, with 9 abstentions. Pakistan voted for the resolution.

The change in the voting attitude of Pakistan in 1958, again in support of the United States resolution is not clear from the speech of Pakistan's delegate in the United Nations. The possible assumption is that because of instability of the coalition government at Karachi, the new government of Malik Firoz Khan Noon was too concerned with internal problems of party politics to pay attention to foreign policy. Therefore, the decision to vote for the United States resolution might have been

based on the personal view of the Pakistani delegate at the United Nations.

At the 14th Session of the General Assembly, in 1959, the United States proposed a draft resolution similar to that of the 13th Session. Nepal introduced two amendments by which the General Assembly would (1) accede to rather than reject the request that the item on the representation of China be put on the Assembly's agenda, and (2) delete the provisions not to consider any proposal to exclude the representatives of the Republic of China or to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China at the 14th Session. These amendments were rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 41 against to 30 in favour, with 11 abstentions. The voting was identical to that of the 13th session. Pakistan voted for the United States resolution.

It is necessary to mention that in October 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan came to power by a military coup d'état. He was the main supporter for the policy of alignment with the United States in 1954. The Military Government, therefore, reverted to the old policy of supporting the United States resolution, *i.e.* that discussion on the question of representation of the People's Republic of China be postponed. In the same year, the political events in the Indo-Pak sub-continent took a dramatic turn because of the revolt in Tibet and because of the first major clashes on the Sino-Indian border.²²

22 : After the revolt in Tibet, the Dalai Lama fled and took political asylum in India. This put serious strain on Indo-Chinese relations.

President Ayub Khan made an offer to India for joint-defence of the sub-continent ; a step which seemed to run counter to the policy followed consistently by the previous governments of doing nothing to provoke the ire of the government of China. But the offer was made with the rider that outstanding disputes between the two countries, especially the dispute over Kashmir, should be satisfactorily settled.

Prime Minister Nehru of India rejected the offer out of hand with the remark "joint-defence against whom ?" He asserted that "the real motive behind Pakistan's offer was not joint-defence but Kashmir."²³

In spite of this offer, no criticism came from Peking. It seems evident that China's silence was the result of Sino-Pakistan understanding and that China deliberately gave Pakistan this opportunity for maximum political manoeuvrability on the Kashmir question.²⁴ After the rejection of the joint-defence offer by India, within a few months Pakistan and China agreed in principle for the demarcation of Azad Kashmir-Sinkiang border.

In the 15th Session of the General Assembly in 1960, the United States proposed a draft resolution similar to

23 : *Times of India* (New Delhi), 2 May, 1960.

24 : China must have felt that if Pakistan got Kashmir as a gift, there would be no problem to secure the strategic areas in Ladakh from Pakistan. Moreover, China had made long term calculations for rapprochement with Pakistan. The two nations had co-operated before and even during the American alliance. China had earmarked India as a major enemy on the Western flank for both ideological and strategic reasons. To weaken India at the proper time, the co-operation of Pakistan had long been contemplated. For details, see Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, (London : Pall Mall, 1968), p. 183.

that of 1959 and Nepal also sponsored similar amendments. After the rejection of the Nepalese amendments, the General Assembly adopted the United States draft resolutions as a whole, by 42 votes to 34, with 22 abstentions. Pakistan voted for the resolution.

The support for the representation of the People's Government of China in the United Nations gradually increased after the resolution of deadlock on the admission of members. This was because of the admission of new Afro-Asian States. The support was more than double in 1960, as it has increased from 16 in 1950 to 34 in 1960. On 15th July 1961, Manzur Qadir, then Pakistan's Foreign Minister, announced that "the Government of China had agreed in principle to the demarcation of its border with Pakistan."²⁵ This was a diplomatic offensive against India's rejection for co-operation and settlement of the Kashmir problem.

In the 16th Session of the General Assembly, in 1961, there were two draft resolutions on the issue of Chinese representation submitted by the U.S.S.R and the United States.

By the operative part of the U.S.S.R. draft resolution the Assembly would : (a) resolve, 'to remove immediately from all United Nations organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-Shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations ; and (b) invite the government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations.

25 : *Dawn* (Karachi), 16 July, 1961.

The second, a five-power draft resolution, was submitted by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States. By the preamble to this text, the Assembly would : (a) note that a serious divergence of views existed among members concerning the representation of a founder member named in the United Nations Charter ; (b) recall that the matter had been repeatedly described in the Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that its inclusion in the agenda had on many occasions been requested under the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character ; and (c) further recall the recommendation made in Assembly resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950, that 'whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a member state in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and circumstances of each case.'

By the operative part of the five-power draft resolution, the Assembly would decide, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the representation of China was an 'important question' and, therefore required two-thirds majority.²⁶

It is interesting to note that the United States draft

26 : Article 18, para. 2., of the *U.N. Charter*, states: "Decision of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."

resolution to declare the representation of China as an 'important question' was a departure from her previous policy to postpone the discussion of the question. The reason for this was that after the resolution of the membership deadlock, a good number of Afro-Asians States were admitted to the United Nations. The emergence of Afro-Asians as an important new bloc in the United Nations changed the balance of voting in the General Assembly. This required that the United States should adopt such measures which could withhold in future the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

On 12 December 1961, Colombia, Ceylon and Indonesia submitted an amendment to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, by which they sought to replace the operative paragraph of the U.S.S.R. text by this new paragraph : that "the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs." After a lengthy debate the Assembly voted on the two draft resolutions and amendments on 15 December 1961. It decided by a vote of 61 to 21 with 20 abstentions to vote first on the five-power draft resolution. The five-power draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 67 to 34, with 7 abstentions. Pakistan voted against the resolution.

The assembly then rejected the three-power amendment to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution by a vote of 45 against to 30 in favour, with 29 abstentions. The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 48 against to 36 in favour, with 20 absten-

tions.²⁷ Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution. This change in Pakistan's attitude was in accordance with her foreign policy because the official reason given for Pakistan's vote for the United States sponsored resolutions in the past was "that the Government wanted to defer a decision on the representation of Communist China until this change was more nearly unanimously favoured."²⁸

Since the United States, recognising this favourable change in voting for Communist China, embarked upon a more secure path by sponsoring resolution requiring a two-thirds majority. Pakistan's change of vote was not surprising because it was waiting for a similar voting situation.

It is worth noting that India, which was very active and vocal for the representation of communists in the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, adopted an attitude of silence from 1960, although it voted against the United States resolutions. This seems to be due to the deterioration of Indo-Chinese relations. On the other hand, Pakistan was becoming more active in support of the Chinese cause in and outside the United Nations. For ex-President Mohammed Ayub Khan, on his visit to the

27 : The States which voted for the U.S.S.R. draft resolution were Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Bylo-Russian S.S.R., Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Mongolian People's Republic, Morocco, Nepal, *Pakistan*, Poland, Romania, Sierra, Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Ukraine, S.S.R., The U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, U.A.R. Yeman and Yugoslavia.

28 : Werner Levi, 'Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35., 1962, p. 219.

United States, openly declared for China's representation in the United Nations, when he said :

“We had, of course, all along been of the view that China had a right to be in the United Nations. I had made my position clear during my visit to the United States. I had publicly stated it was only fair to allow the People's Republic of China to occupy her legitimate position in the United Nations. And for this I was criticised in the American press which felt that as a guest in their country I should not go openly against the American position on the question.”²⁹

As mentioned earlier, the agreement was reached in principle between Pakistan and China for the demarcation of their common border in Azad Kashmir. India protested to China that Pakistan was not legally authorised to reach an agreement with China since Kashmir was a part of India. The Chinese government, in reply to an Indian protest note on Sino-Pakistani border talks, rejected the Indian contention that the Government of China have ever accepted India's sovereignty over Kashmir. It stated :

“ this allegation is totally untenable ; when did the Chinese government accept without any reservation the position that Kashmir is under Indian sovereignty ? The Indian

29 : Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, (London : Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 162.

government could not cite any official Chinese document to prove this arbitrary contention. But, basing itself solely on the guess and impression of Indian diplomatic officials who have been to China, insisted that Chinese government authorities had made statements to that effect. This is not only a unilateral misrepresentation of the fact but a conclusion imposed on others, to which the Chinese government categorically object.³⁰

The talk on border demarcation between Pakistan and China opened in Peking on 12 October 1962, a few days before the outbreak of war on the Sino-Indian border. The Indo-Chinese war of October-November 1962 brought about a drastic change in the situation. Massive military aid from the United States to India changed the balance of power in the sub-continent.

Pakistan regarded Western military aid to India as a direct threat to its security. Pakistan thus protested to the United States and refused to recognise the American justification for the supply of arms to India. A Pakistani writer has summed up well the situation in the following words :

“In 1962 it looked as if American policy in South Asia had turned a full circle. When the United States signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in May 1954, it was

30 : *Peking Review*, 8 June, 1962, pp. 12-13.

followed by deterioration in Indian-American relations and an improvement in India's relations with China. When the United States decided to extend military aid to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war in October, 1962, relations between the United States and Pakistan took a sharp turn for the worse, and relations between Pakistan and China were lifted to a higher level of cordiality. But a reappraisal of American policy towards India and Pakistan, was going on ever since President Kennedy came to power in 1961. Even before, some of the liberal intellectuals in the Democratic Party had put forward the view that India, being the most influential and powerful democracy in Asia, should be supported by the West in the ideological and power struggle that was taking place in Asia between the Free World and the Communist Power like China."³¹

An emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan was called to discuss the "emergency situation arising out of large scale supply of arms to India." In the course of debate, Mohammad Ali Bogra, the then Foreign Minister—who, as Prime Minister in 1953, was the Chief Architect of Alliance policy with the United States, stated :

"The present augmentation in India's military

31 : Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), pp. 271-272.

strength and warlike stores and the assistance now being extended by our friends to India is going to seriously aggravate the situation against us and to our great disadvantage. This is a matter of grave concern to us and we cannot afford to accept this position complacently.³²

The Pakistani Foreign Minister further declared :

“In International relations there can be no eternal friends, nor can there be eternal enemies. The only thing eternal is the national interest.....
If friends let us down, we shall not consider them as friends. Friends that stand by us we shall stand by them.”³³

In the United Nations, the General Assembly discussed the representation of China between 22nd and 30th October 1962. The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would consider it necessary to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and bear in mind that only the representatives of the government of the People's Republic were competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs. The Assembly would also resolve “to remove the Chiang Kai-shek representatives from all United Nations organs”

32 : *Pakistan National Assembly Debate*, 1962, Vol. 2., (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1962,) p. 4.

33 : *Ibid.*, p. 10.

and to invite representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs.

The representatives of the Republic of China, Australia, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, and the United States expressed opposition to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution.

The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was supported by the Soviet block and the Afro-Asian non-aligned States.

In the debate the representative of India observed that the People's Republic of China had committed "flagrant, massive and premediated aggression" on the Eastern and Western sectors of India's territory, while glibly talking of peaceful negotiations. His delegation believed that the only effective way to check "Chinese military adventurism" was to make it accept its responsibilities as a member of the Organisation and thereby be subject to the views and disciplines of the United Nations.

In the voting the U.S.S.R. Draft was rejected by the Assembly by 42 votes in favour to 56 against, with 12 abstentions. Pakistan actively supported the U.S.S.R. draft resolution for the representation of People's China to the United Nations.

On the other side, Pak-American relations reached their lowest ebb. In spite of vehement protests from Pakistan, the American military aid to India continued.

This American attitude of 'wholesale indifference' led to a full reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. The result was that Pakistan turned to China for military assistance and support. The Border Agreement between Pakistan and China was signed on 2 March 1963. This smoothed the path for further collaboration and proved Schelling's dictum that :

".....in bargains of mutual convenience, especially where there is not even a pretence at the sharing of fundamental values between the parties, it was the letter rather than the spirit of the bargain that counts, and loyalty to partners is involved only slightly, if at all."³⁴

Pakistan thus, became an active supporter of the Chinese cause in the United Nations and since then the relations between Pakistan and China became closer than ever before.

On 17 July, 1963, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, declared in the National Assembly in the course of a debate on foreign policy, that an attack on Pakistan by India would involve the "largest state in Asia".³⁵ These remarks were interpreted in the press as referring to China.

In October 1963, Bhutto, when asked about China's

34 : Thomas C. Schelling, *American Aid and Economic Development : Some Critical Issue, in International Stability and Progress : U.S. Interests and Instruments* (New York : The Assembly, 1956), p. 140.

35 : *Pakistan National Assembly, Debates* 1963, Vol. 2 (Karachi : Government of Pakistan), p. 1666.

assurance of support to Pakistan in case of a war with India, replied : "There is no assurance, there is no agreement between China and Pakistan on this matter..... but there is a strong assumption."³⁶

Further collaboration between the two countries took place by signing an Air Transit Agreement and a Barter Trade Agreement. The United States before the signing of the Agreement announced that it was "an unfortunate breach of Free World solidarity."³⁷ The instant American reaction was that the United States government immediately decided to defer a 4.3 million loan which it had promised to Pakistan to build a new airport at Dacca.³⁸

At the 18th session of the General Assembly, in 1963, a joint Albanian and Nepalese draft resolution—similar to that which the U.S.S.R. submitted at the 17th Session in 1962—for the representation of People's Republic of China was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 41 in favour to 57 against, with 12 abstentions. Pakistan voted for the resolution.

The question of the representation of China was not discussed at the 19th Session of the General Assembly in 1964.

In 1964, Chou-En-lai, visited Pakistan. At a dinner in honour of the visiting Prime Minister, President Ayub Khan indirectly criticised the United States for its military

36 : *Morning News* (Karachi), 9 October, 1963.

37 : *Dawn*, (Karachi), 7 July, 1963.

38 : *New York Times*, 31 August, 1963.

aid to India when he said "massive military preparations have never been the answer to international differences" and expressed that "we believe that the Sino-Indian boundary disputes can also be resolved through peaceful negotiations."³⁹ Both the leaders expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged by the United Nations resolutions.

President Ayub Khan returned the visit in March 1965. During his visit the Pakistani President declared "friendship with China is for us a long term policy and not a matter of expediency."⁴⁰ The joint communique once again mentioned that the Kashmir issue should be resolved by the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Kashmir people, under the United Nations supervision as pledged by India and Pakistan. The President of Pakistan also "reiterated the firm belief of the Government and people of Pakistan that the People's Republic of China should be restored its lawful rights in the United Nations and any scheme to create "Two Chinas" is bound to fail."⁴¹

This again brought forth bitter reaction from the United States, as a result of which President Ayub Khan cancelled his visit to the United States in April, 1965. The proposed meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium scheduled for July 1965 was postponed at the request of

39 : *New York Times*, 21 February, 1964.

40 : *Dawn*, 6 March, 1965.

41 : *Peking Review*, 12 March, 1965, pp. 9-10.

the United States. Pakistan did not succumb to American pressure : she rather realised that under the circumstances, Pakistan's interests converged more with China than with the United States, since both Pakistan and China considered India their common enemy. Pakistan felt that China was the only major power on whom Pakistan could rely for assistance in case of an outbreak of war with India. This assumption that China alone might be a reliable friend in any confrontation with India proved correct during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. During the war, while the United States looked on as a neutral—an unsympathetic neutral in the eyes of Pakistanis—China declared its open support for Pakistan and branded India as an aggressor.

The United States, on the other hand, instead of coming to the assistance of Pakistan under the 1959 Mutual Security Agreement, decided to stop all military aid following the 1965 war. Although the American decision was directed against both India and Pakistan under the policy of "even-handed treatment," this in reality was harmful only to Pakistan, which for over a decade had received military equipment solely from the United States. All of a sudden, when Pakistan's main source of military supplies dried up, it turned to China for some of its military requirements and got from China MIG fighters and tanks.

In the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly in 1965, the question of the representation of China was again discussed. Two draft resolutions were presented on 15th November 1965. A procedural text was submitted

by eleven States, including the United States. By this, the Assembly reaffirmed the validity of the decision it took on 15th December 1961, in adopting resolution 1688(XVI), to the effect that in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations "any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question."⁴²

The eleven-power draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 56 to 49, with 11 abstentions. Pakistan voted against. The President of the General Assembly announced that after the adoption of this resolution, any resolution for restoring People's Republic of China her rights in the United Nations would require a two-thirds majority.

A substantive draft resolution submitted by twelve powers, including Pakistan, for restoring all the lawful rights to the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the United Nations was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 47 against to 47 in favour, with 20 abstentions.⁴³

42 : Article 18, para. 2., of the *U.N. Charter* states "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."

43 : The States which voted in favour were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Bylorussian SSR, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, *Pakistan*, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine SSR., U.S.S.R., U.A.R., United Kingdom, Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia,

An important development in this Session was that France, which continuously voted with the United States on this issue, openly advocated that the People's Republic of China should be given her rightful place. The representative of France said that the problems of Asia and disarmament could not be solved without the participation of Communist China.

The representatives of Pakistan, Burma and Nepal stated reasons for seating representatives of the People's Republic of China and also stated that they shared the view that the whole question was simply one of credentials to be decided by a simple majority. There was only one China, they said, and that was the People's Republic of China.

The voting record of the Twentieth Session shows that the support for the representatives of Communist China in the United Nations increased enormously ; the votes cast in favour and against the draft resolution were equal, i.e. 47 to 47, with 20 States abstaining. This was the optimum or the high water mark of Chinese support in the United Nations, but it left unchanged the representation of China. As regards the Sino-Pak relations, they were excellent. Chairman Liu-Shao-chi of the government of China visited Pakistan in the Spring of 1966 and was received with great mass jubilation.

The joint communique declared :

“.....the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination must be respected and that the Kashmir question should be settled in accordance with

the wishes of the Kashmiri people as pledged to them by both Pakistan and India.....
The Chairman reaffirmed the firm support of the Chinese government and people to the righteous stand of the Pakistan government on this dispute and the just struggle of the Kashmiri people for their right of self-determination.”⁴⁴

During the same visit, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi declared that :

“If the aggressor dared to attack Pakistan again, China will stand resolutely by her side and give all assistance to the people of Pakistan in order to defeat the aggressor.”⁴⁵

On their part, the Pakistani leaders also reaffirmed their support for the representation of China in the United Nations.

In the Twenty-first Session of the General Assembly, in 1966, three draft resolutions were submitted :

- (1) A 15-power draft resolution by which the Assembly would again affirm the validity of its decision in Resolution 1668 (XVI) of 15 December 1961, that in accordance with Article 18 of the United Nations Charter “any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.”

44 : *Peking Review*, 8 April, 1966, p. 6.

45 : *Dawn*, 31 March, 1966.

- (2) An 11-power Afro-Asian draft resolution with Pakistan as a co-sponsor, was for restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for expelling the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government from the United Nations.
- (3) Third was a 7-power draft, submitted by Italy, suggesting a 'study Committee' of the member states (number unspecified) for knowing the intentions of the Peking government with respect to the United Nations and for resolving the deadlock on the issue.

The representative of France, supporting the 11-power draft resolutions expressed the view that the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China must be restored to it in the United Nations. The restoration of the rights of China, he said, was not an important question in the meaning of Article 18 of the Charter. The proposal of an Ad hoc Committee to study the question was not realistic, since the results of similar procedures in the past was well-known.⁴⁶

The representative of Canada advocated that while the People's Republic of China be given her permanent seat in the Security Council, Chiang Kai-shek's regime should be allowed to represent a second China in the General Assembly.

In urging the 11-power draft resolution the repre-

46: *G.A.O.R.*, 21st Session, 1473rd Plenary Meeting, 22nd November, 1966, p. 4.

representative of Pakistan whose delegation had co-sponsored the resolution, stressed that it was in the interest of the United Nations to seat the People's Republic of China because without its participation in the work of the Organisation, it would not be possible to solve such important problems, as that of disarmament. He emphasized that there was only one China—the People's Republic of China. The theory of "two Chinas" was untenable as China was one and indivisible.⁴⁷

Similar views were expressed by the representatives of Algeria, Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, and Syria.

After the debate the 15-power draft resolution was adopted by 66 votes to 48, with 7 abstentions. Pakistan voted against.

The 11-power draft resolution, which now required two-third majority, was rejected by the Assembly by roll-call vote of 46 in favour to 57 against, with 17 abstentions. Pakistan supported the resolution.

The 7-power draft was also rejected by a vote of 34 in favour to 62 against with 25 abstentions. Pakistan voted against.

In the 22nd and 23rd Sessions of the General Assembly, in 1967 and 1968 respectively, similar (three) draft resolutions were presented. Only the resolution asking for a two-thirds majority was adopted. The other two draft resolutions were rejected. The only development was that the support for the representatives of

47 : *Ibid.*,

Communist China in the United Nations gradually decreased. Pakistan consistently voted for the representation of Communist China. Speaking on the question, the representative of Pakistan again expressed the view that the issue was not an "important question" under the terms of the Charter, but one of "credentials" to be solved by a simple majority vote. In stressing the importance of the principle of University, he pointed out that without the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations, such important questions as disarmament and those relating to the maintenance of peace and security could not be solved. He also expressed the view that, as a member of the Organisation, the People's Republic of China could contribute a great deal to the economic and social development of the world.⁴⁸ At the 23rd Session of the General Assembly in 1968, 125 votes were cast on the question of the representation of China but support for the representation of Communist China was only 44 ; As compared to 1950 at the 5th Session, when the question came before the General Assembly for the first time, the total votes cast were 59 and only 16 states voted for the People's Republic of China's representation in the United Nations. The high water mark of support for the representation of China was reached in 1965, when 47 votes were cast in favour and 47 against. In spite of big increase in the number of members of the Organisation the status of the representation of China remained unchanged.

48 : *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. IV, Number 11, December, 1967, p. 30.

In the Twenty-fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China was discussed between 3 and 11 November, 1969. Two draft resolutions were submitted, the first, an 18 power draft sponsored by the supporters of the United States asked that in accordance with article 18 of the U.N. Charter, the representation of China was an important question and hence required a two-third majority of the members present and voting. It was adopted as Resolution 2500 (XXIV) by a vote of 71 to 48 with 4 abstentions on 11 November, 1969. Pakistan voted against the Resolution. The second draft resolution was sponsored by 17 states including Pakistan which asked for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the U.N. This draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 56 to 48 with 21 abstentions. Pakistan voted in favour of the Resolution.

In the twenty-fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1970 two draft resolutions were submitted between 12 and 20 November, 1970. The first was a 19-power draft supported by the United States, asked for reaffirming the validity of its decision of 15 December, 1961 that the representation of China was an important question and requires two-third majority. This was adopted on 20 November, 1970 as Resolution 2642 (XXV) by a vote of 66 to 52 with 7 abstentions. Pakistan voted against the Resolution. The second draft was sponsored by 18 states including Pakistan, expressing a similar demand as in 1969. It was adopted by 51 votes to 49

against with 25 abstentions. Pakistan voted for the resolution. The text was not adopted having failed to receive a two-third majority.

In the 26th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the discussion on this question took place between 18 and 26 October, 1971. Seventy-three members participated in the debate. Three draft resolutions were presented. The first, a 23-power draft including Pakistan asked for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. The second, a 22-power draft including the U.S. asked to consider it as an important question which required two-third majority. The third, a 29-power draft asked for the representation of the People's Republic of China as permanent member and the Republic of China as an ordinary member. The 22-power, American supported draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 59 against to 55 in favour with 15 abstentions. Pakistan voted against the resolution. The Assembly then adopted the 23-power text as Resolution 2758 (XXVI). Pakistan voted for the resolution. As a result of this, the People's Republic of China was admitted as permanent member of the Security Council and occupied her lawful place in all the Organs of the United Nations after 22 years. The 29-power draft was thus not put to vote.

Pakistan's position on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations presents an interesting picture of Pakistan's voting attitude. It provides a good example of the different kinds of motivations and considerations which influence the policy of a small state in its interaction with big powers.

Pakistan's policy on this question between 1950 and 1952 had been influenced by its non-aligned approach; she supported resolutions which recommended the representation of China in the United Nations by the Communist Government in place of Nationalist Government of China. This was due to the fact that Pakistan followed non-aligned policy from 1947 to 1952.

Pakistan's policy on this question from 1953 to 1968, has been mainly influenced by its power relations with India. From 1953 to 1956 and from 1958 to 1960, Pakistan voted for the United States resolutions for postponing discussion on the question. This period coincides with Pakistan's alliance with the United States and her close relations with the United States; at this time Pakistan received massive United States Aid. Pakistan's position on the question of Chinese representation might seem to have been influenced by alliance politics and United States Aid. But the reality of the situation is that Pakistan has not followed the United States line. Two things prove this contention. Firstly, Pakistan voted for those United States resolutions which asked for postponing discussion of the question. She never voted against resolutions admitting Communist China to the United Nations. If Pakistan was influenced by the United States then it should also have voted against resolutions which asked for the admission of Communist China.

Secondly, the relations between Pakistan and China—as explained in the previous pages—has continuously developed year by year, without any protest from China against Pakistan's participation in the Western Alliances and even to President Ayub Khan's joint-defence

offer to India in 1959. Occasionally the leaders in both countries have expressed full accord and solidarity with each other on different important issues. This gives the impression that Pakistan's voting for the United States resolutions has been with an understanding with the Chinese government. China allowed Pakistan to exploit the United States by voting for its resolutions and to procure more and more aid which was in Pakistan's national interest. But when Pakistan found that the United States policy was going against her national interest she started upon open co-operation with China. This belief is confirmed by Werner Levi, who says :

“Pakistan voted until 1960, for the Western sponsored resolutions postponing consideration of the representation of China. The official reason given was that the (Pakistan) government wanted to defer a decision on the representation of Communist China until this change was more nearly unanimously favoured. Actually, the period during which Pakistan voted with the West coincided with the period of closest relations with the United States, when these relations were subject to some critical evaluation, but also again coinciding with a more favourable voting situation for the communist government, Pakistan in December 1961, voted in favour of considering seating the communist government in the United Nations.”⁴⁹

49 : Werner Levi 'Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35, 1962, p. 219.

The Afro-Asian and Muslim influences have not affected Pakistan's policy on the question of the representation of China. This was because Pakistan's most vital national interests were directly involved ; the fear of India dominated Pakistan's policy with respect to this issue.

In essence, it can be said that Pakistan's China policy has been dictated by the state of Sino-Indian and Indo-American relations.

THE SIMLA SUMMIT (1972): ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

*Dr. Sardar Muhammad**

India and Pakistan met at Summit level at Simla in June-July, 1972. The five-day summitry was held to sort out and resolve the issues of conflict between the sides, both chronic and the one arising out of the December 1971 conflagration in South Asia.

In international politics, an issue refers to a subject of contention between two or more nation-states/entities. An effort by one or more of the contentious sides to solve the problem in a manner inimical to the interests and the wishes of another party or parties may result in war. But it is rare that a war settles the issue or issues of conflict. Rather, it may end up adding new issues to the existing catalogue. For purposes of avoiding war, it is therefore imperative that the issues be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the disputants. But an attempted resolution of a conflict necessitates the identification and definition of issues of dispute between the parties.

Since their independence, India and Pakistan have conducted their relations with each other in an atmosphere of fear, distrust, suspicion and hatred.

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Feeling insecure with each other, they have constantly adopted mutually incompatible positions over issues leading to conflicting actions, including military actions.

The Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971, resulting from the incompatible positions of the belligerents about the political crisis in East Pakistan and the refugee problem, left behind political and human issues. The establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent was contingent on their satisfactory solution.

The major issues of immediate concern for the negotiators at Simla were the following :

Territory : The Indian armed forces closed on Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, on December 15. On the following day, at the Dacca Race Course, General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, the commander of the armed forces of Pakistan in the East wing, signed the surrender documents with General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the commander-in-chief of the joint Indian and Bangladesh forces in the eastern sector. Earlier, on December 6, India had recognized the provisional government of Bangladesh. After the fall of Dacca on December 16, East Pakistan became a separate sovereign state under the name of Bangladesh, and the Bangladesh government moved its headquarters from Calcutta, where it had been functioning since its establishment in April, to Dacca, and took control of the administration of the newborn country. The reality of the new situation thus foreclosed any possibility of Pakistan laying claim, in any peace negotiations, to the territory that formerly constituted its eastern wing.

On the western front, Mrs. Gandhi announced a unilateral ceasefire effective at 8 : 00 P. M. on December 17. Pakistan followed suit and, when the guns fell silent, India was occupying about 5,000 square miles of territory in Punjab, Sind and Azad Kashmir.

While announcing the ceasefire on the western front, Mrs. Gandhi claimed that India had no territorial ambitions in the West. New Delhi, therefore, was not critically concerned about these territories. But for Islamabad, these territories were exceptionally important and at the top of the list of priorities so far as the issues involving India were concerned. The government of Pakistan was anxious to get these territories back from India at the earliest possible moment because the Indian occupation had left almost one million people homeless in West Pakistan. These uprooted people had braved one fierce winter and were disturbed and demoralized by their situation. Also, they were a drain on the shattered economic resources and a burden on the already strained administrative machinery of the government of Pakistan. Return and resettlement of these displaced people was, therefore, a major concern and a top priority of Pakistan.

Related to the evacuation of territories by India was the question of separation of the forces of the two countries. The armed forces of Pakistan had surrendered in East Pakistan, but in the West they were confronting the Indian forces and were largely intact after the ceasefire. Though the ceasefire had been scrupulously observed except in a few cases of violation such as the incident in the Lipa Valley in Kashmir, the very fact that

the two armies were positioned face-to-face signified a precarious and shaky situation with the possibility of a re-eruption of hostilities : hence, the need for the immediate withdrawal of troops to pre-war positions.

Prisoners of War : In the wake of the defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan, large numbers of prisoners of war fell into Indian hands. On the eastern front, 91,498 POW's surrendered to India—56,998 military men, 18,287 para-military men, and 16,213 civilians, including women and children.¹ India took 540 officers and other ranks as prisoners of war from the western front.

The Indian prisoners of war taken by Pakistan in the eastern theatre were automatically released at the surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. On the western front, Pakistan captured 617 officers and other ranks of the Indian armed forces.

The number of Indian POWs compared to the number of Pakistan POWs was negligible. Moreover, they were all male members of the Indian fighting forces. The Pakistani POWs were large in number and varied in composition. There were 16,213 civilians, including women and children, along with the members of the regular armed forces in the Indian prison camps.

For Pakistan, the return of the POWs—being large in number and including women and children for whom the tough life of prison camp was unbearable—was a very basic and critical issue. As time passed, the relatives of

1. See Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense, Government of India, 1971-1972.

the POWs were feeling restless and demanding the return of the POWs. To pressure the government of Pakistan, they staged demonstrations and sent deputations to explain their anxiety and present their demands for early release of the POWs to the high government officials. They also sent deputations abroad to arouse world conscience and acquaint other nations with the inordinate delay in the release of prisoners by India, and deplorable conditions in which the POWs were living under constant threat to their lives.

India, in violation of the provisions of article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 which demands a "release and repatriation of POWs without delay after the cessation of active hostilities," and in defiance of Security Council Resolution 307 of December 21, 1971, calling for a "withdrawal of forces and observance of the Geneva Convention of 1949, "kept the POWs in captivity for more than two years. She made the concurrence of the Bangladesh government a pre-condition for the release of the POWs, on the plea that the Pakistani POWs had surrendered to the Joint Command of the Indian and Bangladesh forces. This Pakistan regarded as nothing more than a "legal fiction."

Recognition of Bangladesh : Recognition is a process by which a new political community acquires the international personality of a state, and a new government in an existing state achieves the status of official representative of that state. It is "the acknowledgement of the existence of a new state or of a new government in an existing foreign state, coupled with an expression of

willingness on the part of the recognizing state to enter into relations with the recognized entity or government.”² The decision-makers of a state decide whether to accord or withhold recognition to another state. National interests, domestic politics and international environment are usually the determining factors in recognition policy. Recognition, therefore, is a political act, and recognition or non-recognition has political consequences. A non-recognition policy can be an important political weapon, depending upon the relative power of the non-recognizing state and the non-recognized entity.

Following the surrender of Pakistan's armed forces on December 16, 1971, the provisional government of Bangladesh-in-exile moved to Dacca and the new state commenced its existence. Since it fulfilled the characteristics of statehood, a number of states accorded it recognition. But its factual existence could not bring it recognition from Pakistan. Instead, decision-makers in Islamabad adopted a policy of indifference/postponement to this issue. From the point of view of Pakistan, the evacuation of its territory under Indian occupation in West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and the release and repatriation of its POWs in Indian hands, were the two most critical issues of immediate concern, requiring urgent solution.

India, on the other hand, having recognized Bangladesh on December 6, wanted a package deal with

2. Collins, Edward, Jr. (ed.) *International Law in a Changing World : Cases, Documents and Readings* (New York : Random House, 1970), p. 88.

Pakistan in peace negotiations, including recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. For her, the legitimization of Bangladesh by Islamabad's recognition, and thereby the confirmation by Pakistan of its own dismemberment, was a more important matter. With the POWs and the territory of Pakistan in her control, New Delhi, indeed, "had all the trumps in her hand for securing the best possible peace terms."³ Therefore, she made the repatriation of POWs contingent on Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. She argued that since the Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan had surrendered to the Joint Command of India and the Mukti Bahini forces,⁴ India could not negotiate a release and repatriation of POWs without the participation of Bangladesh—who would not participate in any negotiations with Pakistan without prior recognition by her.

General Niazi, the commander of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, had wished to deal with the Indian military forces alone and sign the instrument of surrender with them only. But New Delhi insisted that the operation was jointly conducted by India and Bangladesh forces and the surrender, therefore, would be to the Joint Command. General Niazi had to succumb to Indian demand and pressure. So, technically, the surrender was made to the Joint Command, but Pakistan

3. Pandit, C. S. *End of An Era ; The Rise and Fall of Indira Gandhi* (New Delhi : Allied Publishers PVT Ltd., 1977), p. 109.

4. The Joint Command of India and the Mukti Bahini forces was set up on December 6, 1971, the day India recognized Bangladesh.

subsequently refused to recognize the Joint Command theory and termed it a "legal fiction." She emphasized Indian responsibility for the POWs. Her reaction to Bangladesh's announcement that Dacca intended to try a number of Pakistan POWs for war crimes, reflected the same thinking. She claimed that the POWs were in Indian custody, alone,⁵ and that their transfer to Bangladesh for trial would be a gross violation of the Geneva Conventions. Contrary to Indian claim, Islamabad did not consider Bangladesh to be a party to the issue of her POWs.

Human Problems : Biharis and Bengalis

At the time of the dismemberment of Pakistan, there were 1.5 million Biharis (non-Bengalis) in Bangladesh. These were people who, at the time of independence in August, 1947, chose Pakistan as their homeland and migrated to her East wing. These refugees never really integrated into the mainstream of the social and cultural life of East Pakistan, because they were not seriously interested in merging their identity and/or the local populace did not welcome people of different language and culture. This estrangement made the Biharis look to the central government, where they had connections, for everything. The Bengalis disliked their access to the government in Islamabad.

When the crisis in East Pakistan unfolded, the Biharis, for obvious reasons, fully cooperated with the

5. India was well aware that the POWs could never be safe in Bangladesh. For fear of Bengali reprisals against POWs, she transported them to camps set up in India after their surrender.

government of Pakistan to re-establish its control by quelling the insurrection. Many joined the armed forces as Razakar (Volunteers) and fought side-by-side with the Pakistani troops in the civil war and in the war with India as well.

With the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state, the Biharis became the target of Bengali reprisals. Their lives, honor and property were endangered by Mukti Bahini activities. There were numerous cases of brutal murder, looting of property and arrest and imprisonment without cause. In order to escape from this situation of insecurity, the overwhelming majority of them wanted to migrate to Pakistan.

In Pakistan there were about 400,000 Bengalis. They were mostly from the civil and armed services and the business community. Bangladesh wanted to swap the Bengalis for the Biharis, but Pakistan was resistant to such suggestions. In fact, she was interested in the return of the POWs in exchange for Bengalis. Bangladesh was averse to an exchange of POWs for the Bengalis and argued that armed personnel cannot be swapped for civilians. But the fact of the matter was that the 91,498 POWs included 16,213 civilians, and the 400,000 Bengalis in Pakistan included some 30,000 armed personnel.

The question of Bengalis in Pakistan was of major concern to Bangladesh for a number of reasons: (1) there were about 30,000 members of the armed forces who could be of great use to Bangladesh in the organization of defense forces; (2) there were trained civil servants who could help put the Bangladesh administra-

tion in running order and be of great assistance in the rehabilitation of refugees returning from India and in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged social, economic and political infrastructure of the newborn country ; (3) the relatives of the stranded Bengalis were ill at ease and wanted them back soon. This generated social tension in the new country ; and (4) Dacca's failure to get its citizens back from Pakistan cast doubt, in the minds of some of its people, on its ability to handle its problems with adroitness.

Pakistan, on the other hand, was not under any pressure to pay attention to this problem. She was, in fact, hesitant to take so many people that would have further strained its war-ravaged economy. The influx of so many Urdu-speaking Biharis, Islamabad feared, would add to the existing social tensions in urban centers like Karachi, where large-scale language riots took place in the summer of 1972. Therefore, Pakistan emphasized the fact that those Biharis were the citizens of Bangladesh and, as such, Dacca's responsibility. She made it clear that her acceptance of all Biharis was out of question, but expressed willingness to accept a few after scrutinizing individual cases.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The quarrel over Jammu and Kashmir has been the most critical issue that has bedeviled the relations between India and Pakistan since their independence in August, 1947. The "dispute" plunged India and Pakistan into their most important foreign policy

issue”⁶—poisoning their politics and distorting their foreign policies. India and Pakistan have twice fought over Kashmir, in 1947-48 and in 1965. The issue remains unsettled and is a source of continuous tension between the two neighbors.

Kashmir has major economic and political significance for Pakistan. The rivers in Pakistan, the waters of which are vital for its agriculture, originate in Kashmir. The concept of Pakistan to its people and politicians has remained incomplete without Kashmir, for Pakistan has failed to insert the “K”⁷ in her name. On the other hand, to India, Kashmir has become a symbol of national prestige. Jawaharlal Nehru’s “thesis that the loss of Kashmir would threaten India’s concept of a secular state, has been widely accepted.”⁸

The U. N. intermediary efforts began on December 31, 1947, when India laid the matter of Kashmir before the Security Council. During the next several years, the dispute was almost constantly before the U. N. The Security Council produced numerous resolutions and appointed a series of mediators to find some method that would permit a settlement.⁹

6. Barnds, Williams J, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 42.

7. Chaudhry Rahmat Ali coined the name of Pakistan, deriving the name from the first letters of the provinces to be included in Pakistan—“P” standing for the Punjab, “A” for Afghanistan, i.e., Northwest Frontier Province, “K” for Kashmir, “S” for Sind, and TAN for Bluchistan.

8. Brines, Russell. *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict* (London : Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 434.

9. Brecher, Michael, “Kashmir : A Case Study in United Nations Mediations,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3, September, 1953, p. 195.

On April 21, 1948, the Security Council appointed a five-member U. N. Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to help the disputants in the restoration of peace and to resolve the conflict through a fair plebiscite. The Commission presented a proposal for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir, which was to be implemented following the establishment of a ceasefire and the restoration of peace. India and Pakistan accepted the proposal and the ceasefire went into effect on January 1, 1949. On January 5, the Commission formally adopted a resolution embodying these proposals.

Difficulties in the execution of the Commission's resolution arose almost immediately. In the absence of a settlement, the ceasefire line has remained the dividing line between Azad Kashmir, under the protection of Pakistan, and the rest of the Jammu and Kashmir state under Indian control.

To break the deadlock, the Security Council appointed a number of mediators, one after the other, but to no avail. On instructions from the Security Council, its president, A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada, unsuccessfully endeavored to mediate in December, 1949. On March 14, 1950, Sir Owen Dixon got the assignment from the Security Council to mediate and in his report of the failure of his mission, he "made a strong plea for partition as a solution, with a plebiscite in a limited area."¹⁰ On March 30, 1951, the Security Council

10. Brown, Norman W. *The United States and India, Bangladesh* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 191.

appointed Dr. Frank P. Graham as the new mediator. Faced with persisting differences between the sides concerning the number of troops each should maintain after demilitarization and the time when the plebiscite administrator should assume his duties, Dr. Graham recommended, in March, 1953, that direct negotiations be tried. In March, 1957, the Security Council considered the question of Jammu and Kashmir and sent Gunnar Jarring to India and Pakistan, but in May, he reported failure. Again, Dr. Jarring was sent to the sub-continent, where his proposal was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India on April 3, 1958.

Following the Indo-Pakistan war in September, 1965, the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexi Kosygin, invited President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, to a meeting in Tashkent to resolve the issues of their dispute. The Tashkent Declaration achieved through Kosygin's good offices and announced on January 10, 1966, provided for the restoration of *status quo ante*, leaving the Kashmir dispute unresolved.

Dr. Graham, in his failure report in March, 1953, had recommended direct negotiations between the disputants. On August 20, 1953, Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister Muhammad Ali, after meeting in New Delhi, agreed to the effect that "the Kashmir dispute.....should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people...The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people would be by a fair and impartial plebiscite...the

plebiscite administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954.”¹¹ But India refused to go along with this commitment when, on February 25, 1954, the United States-Pakistan Mutual Assistance agreement was announced. She maintained that the American promise of military aid to Pakistan had put the whole question of relations between India and Pakistan, including the question of Jammu and Kashmir state, in a “different light.”

In the aftermath of the Indian debacle at Chinese hands in 1962, Prime Minister Nehru, under concerted pressure from the American Ambassador-at-Large, Averell Harriman, and British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, agreed to make an effort to settle the Kashmir dispute. Altogether, six rounds of talks were held at the Ministerial level. Pakistan was represented by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and India by Swaran Singh. At the end of the final meeting, “the two ministers recorded with regret that no agreement could be reached on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.”¹²

The two disputants have consistently proposed opposing approaches to the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has insisted that the Kashmir issue must be resolved before other Problems are considered. India, on the other hand, has maintained that “Kashmir is the peak of their differences...and must be approached by clearing

11. *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 21, 1953.

12. Burke, S. M. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 280.

away the undergrowth on its base.”¹³ She wanted a step-by-step resolution of issues so that a friendlier atmosphere could be generated for tackling the thorny question of Kashmir. Thus, opposing approaches to Kashmir—Pakistan : Kashmir first ; India : Kashmir last—prevented a solution of the Kashmir question and, thereby, the establishment of peaceful relations between the two neighbors.

With the outbreak of armed hostilities on December 3, 1971, on the West Pakistan border and the Kashmir ceasefire line, the limited, although real, achievement of the U. N.—the establishment of a ceasefire line in Kashmir—was undone. When the war ended on the western front on December 17, Indian troops had occupied territories in Azad Kashmir.

Thus, the issues before the summit were old and new, territorial and military, and social and political. The future course of intera-regional relations depended largely on the outcome of the summit talks. While a solution satisfactory to the parties was to generate a spirit of cooperation and peaceful co-existence, a deadlock would intensify feelings of distrust and hatred—marring the prospects of peaceful conduct of mutual relations.

13. Brines, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

MANDATING U.N. PEACEKEEPING

*Dr. Shafqat H. Chauhdry**

A UN Peacekeeping operation cannot operate in a vacuum. It needs to be authorised and its basic form and task set out and this is done by a mandate. That means the role and performance of a UN Peacekeeping mission is closely dictated and controlled by its mandate. The success of a UN operation depends to a varying degree on the authority and mandate it has for that is what partly enhances or mars the importance, credibility and strength of a UN operation.

Primarily it is the Security Council or the General Assembly who give a mandate under the relevant resolution. Yet, the Secretary-General or /and the parties may also be involved in giving a mandate or setting out the tasks and limitations of an operation.

The pioneering UN operations were established in the Middle East the UN Truce Supervision Organization

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(UNTSO) in Palestine was auspicated in 1948 and it served as a basis to organise other UN operations in the area. Its experiences, though not fully made use of, were invaluable in setting up the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF-I) at the time of Suez Crisis in 1956, the United Nations Observation group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) during the 1958 crisis, the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai (UNEF-II) in 1967, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission in 1962, the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) in Golan heights between Israel and Syria in 1973, and lately the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978.

UNTSO

A Truce Commission was formed under a Security Council resolution in 1948 and was empowered to take any necessary steps to make the cease-fire in Palestine effective.¹ The signing of an Armistice Agreement² in the same year substituted the Truce Commission with UNTSO. By implication the task of the Commissions in Palestine fell to UNTSO. The four Armistice Agreements of July 1949 concluded between Israel and the governments of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon expanded the functions of UNTSO and the Security Council approved the arrangement on 11 August, 1949.

UNEF-I

The United Nations Emergency Force (I) was authorised by a General Assembly resolution in 1956 with the

1. Security Council Resolution. S/727, 23 April, 1948.

initial function of entering into Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian government in order to maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of foreign troops.² By March 1957, the British, the French and the Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Egyptian territory. Yet, the UN decided, to maintain the presence of Force in area to keep a watch over the demarcation line in Sinai. Having an open-ended mandate, the UNEF's presence, from then onwards was taken for granted. But just when India and Yugoslavia (the two main contributors) were about to withdraw their troops in 1967, presumably because of political reasons, President Nasser of Egypt asked for UNEF's withdrawal—'a request which voided the legal basis for the presence of the force.'³

After the 1967 Six-day war, UNTSO was brought in by extending its functions and task to providing good offices to seek to contain those hostilities in the Middle East. In a statement of consensus⁴ the Security Council vested the UNTSO to carry out observation task in respect of the Syrian—Israeli cease-fire, facilitate the exchange of Prisoners of War and provide observers to supervise the Suez canal sector.

UNEF-II

In the 1973 episode, there was a possibility of the two

2. Security Council Resolution. S/1000 (ES-I) 5 November, 1956.

3. Urquhart, Brian E., *United Nations Peace-keeping in the Middle East*, The World Today. March 1980. London. P. 90.

4. Security Council Resolution. S/8047, the 1366th meeting 9-10 July 1967.

super-powers, the United States and the USSR, dragging into the conflict in support of their client states of Israel and Egypt who were combating. That factor weighed heavily on mandating UNEF-II to interpose between the parties. The Security Council resolution 340,⁵ calling for an increase in the number of UN military observers order to set up UNEF-II, was followed by another⁶ (341) approving the terms of reference set by the Secretary General for the Force. In terms of the mandate, an improvement over the previous Force was reflected in declaring as essential the enjoyment of freedom of movement, communications and other facilities for the performance of UNEF-II's task. With the conclusion of Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the UNEF-II was disbanded in July 1979.

UNDOF

As a result of consistent personal efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, the Governments of Israel and Syria signed a disengagement agreement on 31 May 1974. The agreement contained a provision asking the UN to establish a disengagement observation force in the Golan heights. The Security Council responded with a resolution,⁷ the same day, setting up United Nations Disengagement observation Force (UNDOF). Unlike the UNEF, the Disengagement Observation Force had a limited mandate of six months which had to be renewed every time. As the agreement specified details of func-

5. Security Council Resolution. S/340 25 October, 1973.

6. Security Council Resolution. S/341 26 October, 1973.

7. Security Council Resolution. S/350 31 May, 1974.

tions of the UN force in relation to both the sides, the mandate appeared more clear.

UNOGIL

Lebanon is another area where the UN has been actively involved. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was set by the Secretary General himself within the terms of a Security Council resolution⁸ of 11 June, 1958. In deciding to despatch the observation group, the resolution defined the character and scope of the operation as limited to observation and contribution to the cessation of illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. It was not the task of UNOGIL to mediate, or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration, and it reported on occasions that it was being asked by the Lebanese authority to do such things, which were not properly within its mandate'.⁹

UNIFIL

The second UN involvement in Lebanon started recently. The UN, which was hitherto hesitant to moot an operation in Lebanon, was induced into action by the unusual urgency for action caused by the Israeli invasion in support of the Felengists, a christian group led by Major Haddad, against the PLO and the Lebanese Muslims. In March 1978, a Security Council resolution, set up United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, authorised it to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to

8. Security Council Resolution. S/4022. 11 June, 1958.

9. Higgins, Rosalyn., *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-67 Documents and Commentary—I Middle East*, London, 1971. p. 548.

restore peace and security in southern Lebanon and to assist in bringing about restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government in the area. This was a rather unrealistic mandate because of two factors. One, there was no clear advance agreement on its functions and limitations. Two, it was based on the shaky assumption that the government in Lebanon would be able to reassert its authority and sovereignty.

UNYOM

Another mission, but relatively of a lesser significance, in the Middle East was in Yemen. After the three parties, UAR, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, agreed, individually but in identical terms, to disengagement in April, 1963, the Security Council asked, in a resolution¹⁰ of 11 June, 1963, the Secretary-General to set up a UN observation operation. The details relating to the nature, scope and methods of operation were not clearly indicated either in the disengagement agreement or the Security Council resolution. This lack of clarity in the implementation process of the terms of disengagement narrowed the operational mandate of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission. The task of the UNYOM was to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of UAR Forces from Yemen and cessation of assistance from Saudi Arabia to the royalists. but the unclear nature and limited scope of the mission's mandate severely inhibited the mission's effectiveness in performing its task. For instance, if UNYOM's investigations in the northern area

10, Security Council Resolution, S/5331. 11 June, 1963.

of Yemen decreased arms traffic, its lack of competence to do so in Beihan area could not stop entry of supplies into Yemen.

ONUC

The largest operation ever authorised by the UN was in Congo in 1960. The Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) was raised by the Secretary-General whom the Security Council asked to provide the military assistance required for dealing with the internal situation'.¹¹ It was authorised on the basis of implicit intention of the council resolution to facilitate the Congolese people to have their own government under peaceful conditions. In order to restore law and order in Congo, the Organisation integrated the functions of political, military and technical assistance, even though they were not clearly mentioned in the mandate.

UNFICYP

Cyprus is another area with the UN involvement. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was organised by the Secretary-General in the light of authority given to him in a Security Council resolution of 4 March, 1964. The force was mandated to use its best efforts, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to prevent recurrence of fighting and to *contribute* to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The declared purpose and intended role of the force were two interesting but complementary parts of the mandate.

The declared purpose was to maintain international

11. Security Council Resolution. S/4387 14 July, 1960.

peace and security. Because of the history and nature of the conflict between the Turk and Greek communities of Cyprus, there was a possibility of a war between Turkey and Greece. Had the situation in Cyprus deteriorated, international peace and security would have been threatened.

The intended role of the force was to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of internal law and order. Indeed, in Cyprus there was an intrastate conflict. But as a consequential by-product of the events in Cyprus, an international conflict may have been ignited.

There is, however, another interesting aspect of the mandate. 'The use of the word *contribute* to describe the intended role of the force is indicative of two things—the desire on the part of the Security Council to leave the provisions of the mandate as flexible as possible, dictating no rigid guidelines nor prescribing any fixed objectives, and the adherence to the accepted principle of UN Peace-keeping intervention as one of assistance rather than enforcement—the word '*will*' does not appear anywhere in the text of the resolution But in a conflict such as that in Cyprus, where the task of each of the six main contingents differ in terrain, scope, and above all in character, anything other than a flexible mandate would be difficult to interpret and implement. Thus, variety of roles is likely to be a common feature of other future operations of the UNFICYP type, necessitating broadly based mandate'.¹²

12. Rikhye, Indarjit., Harbottle, Michael., Egge, Bjourne., *The Thin Blue Line*. International Peacekeeping and Its Future. London. 1974. P. 101.

UN Force in Korea

In Korea, the Security Council mandated its force to effect cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. Its resolution of June 27, 1950 recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.¹³ The mandate was further made clear by another resolution establishing a unified command on July 7, 1950. In the case of Korea the UN did not invoke the implementation of article 43 of the UN charter requiring the Security Council to enter into agreements with the member states for providing armed forces assistance or facilities.

UNCI

The UN involvement in Indonesia dates back to 1947 when the Security Council mandated a Consular Commission (consisting of those council members having consuls in Indonesia) to report on Indonesian situation. Under the same resolution, a three man Good Offices Committee (GOC) consisting of Belgium, Austria and the USA, was formed. The military officers of the powers represented in the consular commission were associated with the GOC for the broad reporting function and helping to achieve an effective cease-fire.

In January 1949, the GOC was converted, by a Security Council resolution,¹⁴ into UN commission for

13. Security Council Resolution. S/1511. 27 June, 1950.

14. Security Council Resolution. S/1234. 28 January, 1949.

Indonesia (UNCI) to assist in making preparations for the return of the Republic government to Jogjakarta.

UNTEA and UNSF

The only example of UN military observers ever authorised with a prior directive of the General Assembly or Security Council were the one in West Irian. An agreement reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia, as a result of the UN sponsored negotiations, contained a provision for the transfer of administration of West new Guinea (West Irian) to the UN. The Secretary-General under the provisions of the agreement, set up a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in 1962.¹⁵ A UN Administrator, heading the UNTEA, was to transfer the administration to Indonesia in due course. Under the same agreement, the Secretary General used his authority to set up a UN Secretary Force (UNSF) primarily for supplementing the existing Papuan New Guinea (West Irian) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Memorandum of understanding¹⁶ reached between the parties on the cessation of hostilities also provided a mandate for UNSF, as a sort of police arm of UNTEA.

An outstanding feature of this UN operation is that its mandate originated from an agreement between the parties themselves. The agreement provided for the UN personnel to perform certain tasks and the Secretary-General conceived the devices of UNTEA and UNSF

15. UN document. S/5170 And Add 1 [GOAR, 17th Session, ann., a. i. 87] UNTS. 6311.

16. UN document. A/5170. And Add 1, ann B. 15 August, 1962.

(The agreement did not specify the UN personnel to be necessarily military observers). Also, the UNSF operated in a purely internal situation for maintaining law and order and it wasn't facilitating a state government to maintain internal security. As a subsidiary organ of UNTEA, it was only helping a UN authority whom the agreement had granted exclusive power of government. Yet another outstanding feature of the UN operation in West Irian was that of all the UN operations this was the only one terminated on the originally intended date.

UNMOGIP

The UN is involved in India-Pakistan conflict since 1948. In April 1948, the Security Council authorised¹⁷ the United Nations Commission for India-Pakistan (UNCIP) to establish presence of UN military observers where it deemed necessary in Kashmir. In July 1949, the parties signed an agreement at Karachi providing, beside other aspects relating to the cease-fire and cease-fire line, for the presence of UN observers to supervise the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Soon afterwards, in March 1950, UNCIP was replaced with a single UN representative. A Chief Military Observer, separate from the military advisor to the UN representative, was appointed¹⁸ to head the team of observers in Kashmir. A Security Council resolution¹⁹ confirmed that the Military Observers Group in Kashmir, previously working under UNCIP,

17. Security Council Resolution. S/726. 21 April, 1980.

18. Security Council Resolution. S/1469 14 March, 1950.

19. Security Council Resolution. S/2017/Rev. 1.30 March, 1951.

shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir. Indeed the Karachi Agreement of July 27, 1949²⁰ between India and Pakistan (though sponsored by the UN) formally authorised the UN observers to supervise the cease-fire line in Kashmir, yet the nucleus for the United Military Observers Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was provided by the UNCIP. The mandate of UNMOGIP, under the Karachi agreement, was restricted to Kashmir alone. Therefore, after the 1965 war when as a result of Indian attack on West Pakistan the war spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan, the Secretary General set up a separate mission called United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) to supervise a cease-fire line outside Kashmir.

UNIPOM

UNIPOM's mandate needs elaborate discussion for it was not only one of the most interesting operations that the UN carried out but also the rare one to fulfill its mandate with success.

UNIPOM's mandate primarily stems from the Council Resolution 211 of 20 September which under its operative paragraph 2 authorised the Secretary-General 'to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel'²¹. The resolution, a basic document, was construed as broadly setting out the terms of reference for

20. UN document S/1430/Add. 1, 29 July, 1949, ann, 26.

21. SC. Res. 211. 20 September, 1965.

UNIPOM. The resolution was approved by the Council during the crisis time when there was great urgency surrounding the formation and despatch of UN observers. There was no clear definition of the nature of such a formation or its role. No one could precisely forecast what interpretation might ultimately be ascribed to the wording of the resolution and what formula would be evolved when the provision of 'the necessary assistance' would come to be applied by the Secretary-General aimed the turmoil and tensions.

Complex difficulties surrounding the establishment of UNIPOM as a separate mission did have a bearing on the mandate of UNIPOM. The difficulties arose from the fact that two parallel cease-fires existed, one based on the Karachi Agreement of 29 July, 1949 between India and Pakistan relating to Kashmir, and the second an over-all cease-fire, applying to the entire area of conflict, which was based on the acceptance of the Security Council Resolution of 20 September. Whereas the Kashmir cease-fire could be looked after by UNMOGIP, there was no legal basis for extending the jurisdiction of UNMOGIP to the cease-fire on the international border between India and West Pakistan. 'Therefore in the absence of any Security Council Resolution expanding the scope and authority of UNMOGIP', the Secretary-General thought, 'it was necessary to set up a new operation in order to carry out fully the directive of the Security Council in paragraph 2 of its Resolution 211, 1965 of 20 September.²²

22. S. 6738, 2 October, 1965. (Secretary-General's aide-memoire to India's representative to UN.)

Compromise and political expediency as compared to military considerations, weighed heavily on the preparation of mandate. The instructions, which flow from this mandate were passed on to General Macdonald through two channels. First, the Canadian Forces Headquarters while designating General Macdonald to UNIPOM described his terms of reference in a letter dated 24 September as follows :

'The United Nations has appointed you as Commander (Chief Officer) of the India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM), which has been created by the Secretary-General, pursuant to the Security Council Resolution No. 211 of 20 September, 1965.

You will have powers of command as granted to you from time to time by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

You will be responsible to the Secretary-General for your duties.

Your military observers will not be restricted to investigations but will have a surveillance role and will be required to use a great deal of initiative.'²³

A second set of instructions, rather more detailed, were issued to General Macdonald by the Secretary-General on 28 September. 'General Macdonald inter-

23. A letter Number 53451-11 TD 5266 (DIPLans) dated 24 September, 1965 from Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Forces HQ. Ottawa, to Major General Macdonald, describing his terms of reference,

preted these instructions as a mandate authorising him to take the initiative in arranging meetings with either side or in suggesting practical arrangements to assist in the cease-fire or withdrawals'²⁴. The significant points relating the mandate were as follows :

- (b) The scope of UNIPOM is the area of conflict between India and Pakistan outside of Kashmir and beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line.
- (c) UNIPOM is an observation mission with the primary duty of observing and reporting. . . .
- (f) The observers in the field, in supervising the observance of the cease-fire, shall do all that they reasonably can to persuade local commanders to restore and observe the cease-fire in cases where firing occurs. Observers, however, have no power or authority to order or command an end to firing. Where their persuasive efforts fail, their recourse is to report fully to the Chief Officer on the circumstances leading to the breach of the cease-fire, on their efforts and on the results. . . .
- (n) The observers should be deployed as close to the line as possible and particularly in the sensitive areas. They should as a general rule, not be stationed in population centres.
- (o) The operation of UNIPOM should be conducted as unobtrusively as possible, with a minimum of contact with the people of the country.

²⁴ Higgins, Rosalan., *UN Peacekeeping : Documents and Commentary*, II (Asia), 1971, London p. 420.

- (p) On the other hand, the closest possible co-operation should be developed with the local military commands on both sides of the line'.²⁵

While a mandate establishing the form and role of the operation is one basic document which set out the terms of reference, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is another. SOFA concerns the rights, privileges and freedom of movement of the UN personnel. It is negotiated between the UN Secretariat and the host government. To ensure independent and free exercise of their functions, a convention on the privileges of the United Nations provides for privileges and immunities for the members of missions for the United Nations. Article VI section 22 of the Convention defines that :

'Experts performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their mission'.²⁶

Legally such privileges and immunities and freedom of movement could be guaranteed to UNIPOM only through special agreements with the host countries, as was done in respect of UNOGIL and UNYOM by means of exchange of letters constituting the agreements. Perhaps with that precedent in mind Canada's Chief of Defence

25. *Secretary-General's instructions to General Macdonald, number 110SSS N.Y. 1132/1180 28-2201Z U.N.* Srinagar received on 2 October through UN MOGIP's communications. Also, UN Documents S/6699, Add. 7, 4 October, 1965.

26. *Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations*, 13 February, 1948. New York. 1950 p. 7.

Staff, in his letter on terms of reference, to General Macdonald emphasized the following status for him and his observers :

'You and the Military Observers of UNIPOM are entitled to the privileges and immunities accorded to United Nations experts under Article VI of the convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations'.²⁷

Similarly the Secretary-General, in his instructions, wrote as follows :

'The observers must enjoy freedom of access and movement in the areas of their operation and the usual immunities of UN personnel. Agreements on these matters are being negotiated with the two governments.'²⁸

There were negotiations for an agreement but none ever were signed. It may be that the pace of events after the Tashkent Agreement overtook them. While the Secretary-General's instructions to UNIPOM had, in itself, no standing with the parties, his approach to the parties for a SOFA may have induced them to facilitate freedom of movement by simplifying procedures. Also the fact that the mission consisted of 100 military observers rather than enforcement troops made it easier for the host countries to be flexible on the issue of freedom of movement. The mission was designed to be for a

27. Letter of Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian, Forces.
op. cit.

28. S/6699 Add. 7 Para. h. 4 October, 1965.

limited period which was a helpful factor, but had UNIPOM continued to exist the agreement would have been necessary to formalise the mission's status. But how did UNIPOM manage without a SOFA? General Macdonald answered this question as follows :

'During the five months of UNIPOM's life, freedom of movement was never a problem. We asserted from the beginning our right to go wherever we considered necessary and no one ever challenged us. We took it for granted that we have complete freedom of movement and acted accordingly.'²⁹

Freedom of movement was essential to the accomplishment of UNIPOM's task. It was inevitable, however, that from time to time movement would be restricted either through misunderstanding or because it might be convenient for one side or the other to do so. There had been an increasing number of complaints from both Pakistan and India relating to Milobs crossing the CFL and moving through the forward troops without prior notification to or knowledge of local commanders. This gave rise to irritation and suspicion among the local formations or units concerned, although they seldom prevented Milobs from entering into certain areas on the grounds of military secrecy and security. To ease that situation Macdonald advised his observers, in two different operation instruction as

29. Told to the author in an interview with General B.F. Macdonald, on 16 and 17 January, 1976 at his residence in Ottawa, Canada, Henceforth mentioned as 'Macdonald's Interview'.

follows :

‘—Remember that the local commander has a tactical responsibility that overrides the consideration he must give to UNIPOM. Respect his responsibilities by not jeopardizing his military disposition.’³⁰

‘—Safety considerations together with the dictates of normal military courtesy make it imperative that prior notification should be given to the Local Division, Brigade or Battalion in order that troops in the forward area may be informed about the time and place of the Milobs (Military observers) crossing of the CFL.

‘—It must be understood that prior notification is given as a matter of courtesy and is designed to improve the observer’s safety and the effectiveness of their work. It is given without prejudice to the Milobs’ complete freedom of movement. Nothing should be done to suggest that the permission of either side is being sought for the Milobs free movement throughout the area of conflict.

—When movement is restricted OIC (Officer Incharge) team will immediately attempt to have the restriction lifted by a direct approach to formation headquarters. If successful, physically prove that the restriction has been lifted ; it not,

30. UNIPOM's Operations Instructions 63/A UNL 2-0 8 October, 1965.

advise the Chief Officer as soon as possible'.³¹

This was how UNIPOM went about one aspect of the mandate viz., freedom of movement. It may well have been that the absence of a SOFA was more of an advantage than a handicap for UNIPOM. In a written document like SOFA, the parties might have looked for a legal loophole to restrict the movement of UNIPOM observers. Judging from experience the longer a UN force or observer mission is in the field, the more its freedom of movement is eroded. Had UNIPOM's life been longer it is possible that India or Pakistan might have prevented observers from entering certain areas on grounds of military security. It is doubtful, therefore, that UNIPOM was able to retain freedom of movement just because it took it for granted that it had this right. Due co-operation extended by the parties and the limited life span of UNIPOM were also significant factors.

Beside freedom of movement, the use of force was another aspect which was not an issue for the UNIPOM. The use of force did not arise because UNIPOM was an observer mission rather than a peace-keeping force. The mission was not authorised to use force of any kind, not even in self-defence if under fire, as the Secretary-General had specifically instructed that 'the observers shall carry no arms'.³² If, by chance, an observer found himself exposed to an accidental and/or deliberate firing there was nothing he could do except take cover and hope for

31. *UNIPM's Operations Instructions* 65/13. UNL 2-1-2. 2 December, 1965.

32. *S/6699 Add. 7* Para L. 4 October, 1965.

the safety of his life and person till the fire came to an end. A Canadian Air Force officer, working as a military observer with UNIPOM, was once caught in the middle of a shooting and found himself defenceless in every way. He complained bitterly about it saying that he never joined the Royal Canadian Air Force to be shot at on the ground to which General Macdonald remarked that 'it was one of the hazards of the profession, like pregnancy for a prostitute in the days before the pill'.³³

UNIPOM's assignment was to observe and report, not to prevent incidents. It could not prevent a rupture of the cease-fire if the two armies chose to disregard its presence. UNIPOM had no power or authority to order the two armies to stop fighting each other if they chose to break the cease-fire. Had the mission been empowered to use force and had it actually done so the results would have been disastrous. The parties might have called for the departure of UNIPOM altogether which obviously would have marred the status and reputation of the United Nations. UNIPOM was instrumental in serving the interests of peace best while it did not have to face the conditions where force was used.

UNIPOM could attempt to act as a deterrent by seeing what they were doing or were about to do because the parties could not disregard the presence of military observers altogether. Any course of action on the part of parties that would endanger or violate the cease-fire was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Security

33. Macdonald's Interview. op. cit.

Council Resolution 211. - UNIPOM would not only point it out to the parties but also report it to UN Headquarters in New York thereby bringing the war-like actions of the parties to the attention of the international community. This was perhaps a more effective and acceptable, and less irritating and embarrassing, method of stabilising the cease-fire. Political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the guilty party by the UN and persuasive means adopted by UNIPOM provided a useful alternative to the use of force for peace-keeping in the subcontinent.

Conclusion :

True, vitally important for the success of a UN mission is the understanding and acquiescence of the combating parties of what the UN men are attempting at. It is imperative that the support of the parties is elicited, for the success of a UN mission depends more on the full cooperations of the parties than anything else. Added to this, is the political will of the international community to support the UN operations. Political backing of the international community, in and outside the United Nations, can enhance the efficacy of a mission, provide teeth to the mandate and help in de-escalating a conflict. The notion of collective security, on which the UN must be based, should be better reflected in a mandate if a UN peacekeeping operation is to function effectively.

To an extent, a clear and firm mandate is necessary for the success of a UN mission. The UN military observers and commentators on the UN operations have criticised the UN for the ambiguities and weaknesses of the mandates given to the numerous missions. A

vague and weak mandate has been frustrating to all efforts of the peacekeepers in doing their job properly. The inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of various UN operations have been partly attributed to the inadequacies and limitations in their mandates. That points to the need of removing lack of clarity and strength in the mandate of an operation. Where the UN mission has a defined line of responsibility, where it has to supervise a definite cease-fire and a cease-fire line or an armistice and where it has clear and unambiguous terms of reference—all contained in the mandate—, a mission would be afforded with better chances of success.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION : A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Khalid Javed Makhdoom

Many contemporary social scientists have agreed to believe that a modern polity implies conscious and unconscious emotional attitudes of mankind. These emotional attitudes emerge from the established social values and reciprocal expectations. A prominent scholar, for instance, considers political system as "a system of action".¹ Others explain it as "a set of interacting roles".² The roles in political system are the political actors, each performing allocated function. Political system, hence, acquires the status of a mechanism which ensures an actor's orientation in terms of his participation in an interacting process.³ When combined, all the role performing actors display an interdependence and tend to maintain stability and coordination in their interaction.⁴

Similar is the approach of the social scientists towards political culture. Almond and Verba interpret it as "the

1. G. A. Almond, quoted in, H.V. Wiseman, *Political System: Some Sociological Approaches*. (London : Roulledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 23.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

3. G.A. Almond, quoted in, *Ibid.*, p. 23.

4. G.A. Almond, quoted in, *Ibid.*

attitude towards the role of the self in the system".⁵ D. Kavanagh calls it "the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the political system operates".⁶ H.V. Wiseman refers it to "the particular distributions of the patterns of orientation towards political objects".⁷

A more comprehensive explanation of political culture is presented by W. Pye and S. Verba. They contend: "The notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing. In spite of the great potentialities for diversity in political orientations, in any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process. The concept of political culture assumes that each individual must, in his own historical context, learn and incorporate into his own personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community. This means in turn that the political culture of society is limited but given firm structure by the factors basic to dynamic psychology. Each generation must receive its politics from the previous one, each must react against that process to find its own politics, and total process must follow the laws that govern the development of the personality and the general

5. G.A. Almond and S. Verba, *Civic Culture*. (Boston : Little Brown Co., 1965), p. 12.

6. D. Kavanagh, *Political Culture*. (London : 1972) p. 10.

7. H.V. Wiseman, *op. cit.*

culture of a society".⁸

Political system thus ensures a mechanism of action ; and, political culture provides the tools to activate political system. The tools of activation are the historic emotions, beliefs and symbols that a society remodels to suit a given period of time and maintains for uniform action.⁹

This process of growth and stability in political culture, streamlined by political system, is indebted to a persisrent technique of cultural transformation—political socialization. A few interpretations of political socialization are worth citing here. For example, Talcott Parsons says that political socialization mobilizes the value inherent in a given society and transmits the same to its members.¹⁰ David Easton agrees with Parsons and suggests that political socialization shapes individual's acquired political orientations and patterns of behaviour.¹¹ S. Lipset holds the opinion that political socialization is "the radical discipline stressing social conflict and social change and focusing on latent functions, informal

8. W. Pye and S. Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*. (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 7.

9. For further details about Political Culture, see for example, Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Political Culture", in, *The Journal of History and Political Science*, 1975-76, pp. 22-27.

10. Quoted in, J.C. Pierca and R.A. Pride, *Cross-National Micro-Analysis*. (SAGE Publication, 1972), p. 73.

11. David Easton, "The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization", in, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, June 1968, p. 125.

aspects and . . . the dysfunctional aspects of politics".¹²

As such, all the notable theorists emphasise the instrumentality of political socialization in terms of personality formation. It is meant for the old roles to be replaced with new ones. The new members of the society attain the height of maturity and prepare themselves to be recruited and absorbed in the political system for taking future responsibilities. Any discrepancy in this political orientation of the new incumbants would deprive the political system of a basic resource for its stability, operation and innovation in the political order.¹³

Given this limitation, political socialization is a life-long learning process. It is one of the most promising approaches to shape the political culture and set the political system on a sound footing.

Political learning must be considered in a developmental sequence. It is dependent upon the cognitive as

12. Quoted in, L.A. Coser, *Political Socialization*. (Harper & Row), p. 5. For more definitions see : H. Hirsch, *Poverty and Policization*. (Free press, Collier Macmillan Ltd., 1971), p. 22 ; R.S. Sigel, *Learning About Politics*. (New York : Random House, 1970) ; R.D. Hess and J.V. Thorney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*. (Chioago ; Aldine Publishing, 1967), p. 6 ; O. Brim, *Socialization After Childhood*. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 3, F.M. Wirt, *Introductory Problems in Political Research*. (New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p. 31 ; W.H. Sewell, *Some Recent Developments in Socialization Theory and Research*. (Philadelphia : AAAPS. 1963), p. 166 ; and, for a more comprehensive definition, G. Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*. (London : Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 280-81.

13. For exam ple, Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics ; A Developmental Approach*. (Little, Brown), pp. 64-65.

well as the personality upgrowth of the political organism. To understand, some relevant concepts are as under.

Almond and Verba list three assumptions of the psychocultural approaches : (1) the outstanding social experiences that take place quite early in life and reflect an impact in the later period ; (2) these experiences are "not manifestly political experiences," yet they have latent political consequences ; and, (3) the socialization process is "an undirectional one," in the sense that family as the primary socialization structure has a vital effect on the secondary structures though it is not in response influenced by them.¹⁴

The next in our preference is the Allocation Theory. It provides a conceptual outlook for comprehending how values are allocated among members of a democracy. It explores the roots of existing adult behaviour and attitudes and tries to establish the imprints of early learning on the future adult.¹⁵

A System-Maintenance Theory of Socialization demonstrates that socialising pressures do quite often assure continuity in political action. "The task and outcome of socialization is to contribute to the stability and maintenance of a political system...(the) system is stable when it is able to impute to it the capability to solve its problems pacifically and with some modicum of equality".¹⁶

14. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

15. See for example, Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

16. David Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

A more elaborate viewpoint is that of R.D. Hess and J.V. Thorney. They present four models of training through political socialization. Their models describe in different ways the acquisition, change and stabilization in political attitudes.¹⁷ These are not formal explanatory models, but devices for examining the impact of training on attitudes that children bring to the socialization process and the way they utilise experience in the development of political roles. Each of these models may best be suitable for a specific situation.

Interpersonal Transfer Model

Child acquires explicit political socialization by means of processing sufficient experiences in interpersonal relationships and gratifications. These experiences are gained by child as a member of the family as well as a pupil in the school. In this transition, he develops "multifaceted relationships of figures of authority". As the relationships with the figures of authority sustain, child conceptually shapes interacting personality models which are usually similar to these he develops earlier in his family. But in so far as interpersonal experiences are dynamic, the child's perception of distinct authority figures may also undergo a modification.²⁸

Accumulation Model

The acquisition of political role expectation proceeds by addition of knowledge, information, attitudes and activities. "The child's attitudes, involvement and beha-

17. R.D. Hess and J.V. Thorney, *op. cit.* pp. 20-22.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

viour are seen as an accumulation of the specifics and direct learning which has taken place".¹⁹

Identification Model

Child demonstrates his personal identification by means of imitating the behaviour of the adults. In this approach, he is not necessarily attempted to persuade the adults' viewpoint. The transformation is, thus, inadvertent. (i.e. : political party affiliation).²⁰

Cognitive-Development Model

The capacity to deal with certain kinds of concepts and information sets limits on the understanding that can be achieved of political phenomena. The acquisition of Social norms is related to the phase of cognitive development. The child, as he matures in age and experience, develops progressively more abstract and complex ways of apprehending, classifying, differentiating and structuring his perceptions of realities.²¹

Precisely, we may agree here with Hess and Thorney to infer that the Interpersonal Model is potential to gauge child's initial approaches to political system and his potency vis-a-vis his derived experiences in infancy. The Accumulative Model falls short of the requirement to explain child's early attachment to the environment outside the family. But it is worthwhile for assessing the contribution that school makes in building initial know-

19. *Ibid.*

20. N. Alder and C. Harrington, *The Learning of Political Behaviour*, (Scott-Foresman & Co., 1970), p. 10.

21. R.D. Hess and J.V. Thorney, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

ledgeable information about governmental discipline. The Identification Model is more potential. It refers to party affiliations and other preferences in politics. The Cognitive Developmental Model promotes further our understanding about child's grasping capacity for complex and abstract concepts relevant to political awakening.²²

Although socialization is partly affected by the mature personality of the parents and partly by the developing conscience of the child himself, it is also a social phenomenon. The society has a definite and obvious interest in the upbringing and training of its new entrants, and makes systematic arrangements through broad-based agencies to solve the inevitable functional problems preventing satisfactory socialising plans.²³

Among the socially structured agencies of socialization found in every society are family, age peers, schools and job associations. (All of these do of course have other functions besides socialization). In each of these essential socialising groups, joined by the one in the same sequence, the individual learns how to step into the society as a useful role-performing member. This aspect enables him in his adulthood to accept any group of his choice. His preferences (or reservations) of adulthood may be based on his personal reasoning. Nonetheless, these groups of socialization attempt to infuse both planned and unplanned learning. Family and school specifically impart planned learning and may be attributed to formal struc-

22. *Ibid.*

23. For instance, Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

tures ; whereas, age peers and job associations are informal agents and provide more or less intermittent training.

We should recall that family is the primary influence on child. It has the means for transforming the mentally exposed infant organism into the adult, fully composed in its own personality. The manifest influences inflicted on child have a lasting impression. The decisions made in family, backed with potential sanctions, are authoritative for child. His participation in decision-making, protestation against it, and adherence to the sanctions enhance his capability of joining a system. His sense of obedience to family decisions can help the growth of the sense of obedience to the political system in future. Denied such opportunity, he may degenerate into a subject culture.²⁴

The family acts as a catalytic agent in three dimensions. First, it transmits valuable attitudes to child. Second, parents serve as a model for the child to emulate. And third, role allocations and expectations within the family framework are generalised to political objects. This establishes a frame of reference by which child learns to approach political system at a later stage.²⁵

The impact of family on child should be understood from the fact that parents begin to assign roles to him right from the beginning. The implicit purpose is to enable the infant form his own concepts about self-

24. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

25. See for example, *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

discovery in terms of present endeavours and future ambitions.²⁶ Given the proper situation and adequate opportunity, the child's conceptualization orients his response for all types of systems and activities of his future life.

The relevance of family experiences for the political system depends heavily on the extent to which this political learning of the early age is supplemented by the intermediary socialization agencies within the society (i.e. : play grounds and children clubs). These petty agencies usually provide a link between the family and the greater political system. The stability of orientation rests with the stability of environment presented by such intermediary agencies. If the training in family is sound, the child may ably steer his way through these agencies.²⁷

In other words, the children (including orphans) who depart from the parental training in early age, presumably are influenced by other agencies of socialization which operate in some organised way in the given span of time. They help widening the child's outlook and may well present a competition with other groups and agencies posing different norms of political consideration. The impact is healthy, though the patterning of life is not as uniform as in the case of family. A contrast with the original parental exposition is inevitable.²⁸ For instance, many middle-class parents make sure that

26. K. Langton. *Political Socialization*, (Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 21.

27. *Ibid*,

their wards belong to the middle-class intermediary organizations ; and they control their wards' informal play so as to keep them in the company of those children who express a middle-class attitude. Consequently, in their outside-the-home endeavours, as well as the home itself, the middle-class and the lower-class children are socialised adequately yet differently.

However, as the child grows older, he tends to move more and more out of the house and out of the sphere of direct family supervision. But as he moves away from direct family control, indirect parental supervision is tightened in the form of family choices and restrictions upon his leisure activities. At this stage, and among his age peers, the adolescence can try out new ideas, norms and emotions without the supervision of adults. He now learns how to adopt to other people within his own age group, as an individual ; which is to say as an equal in authority, and not as a subordinate child. When he learns something new, he passes it on to his friends. Learning is, thus, improved and consolidated. "Students whose peer groups express mere interest in political affairs are more actively involved in conversations about political and current events and are more likely to defend their opinions on these issues".²⁹

The student culture is one of the prime educational forces at work in the schools. It teaches child the adult sub-culture, of which the schools are a part, and rein-

28. H.H. Hyman, *Political Socialization*, Illinois : Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 98.

29. R.D. Hess and H.V. Thorney, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

forces the norms and social patterns taught by adult society.³⁰ Peer groups found there, assist the child in adjusting to the school life and even to the social principles. The child's role behaviourism designed in family will be modified. Inevitably, therefore, the child will acquire revised experience.³¹ If the child enters a school peer group composed of students from the same social class, this may act to elaborate the class attitudes as well as exasperations already learned in the family. Heterogeneous peer groups, nevertheless, change the student opinion patterns in the direction of those held by "high-status" peers ; and the flow of training is towards the level of politization and political outlook of the dominant class group.³²

It is also suggestible that, normally, parental authority indicates a marked decline from the ward's age of eleven years and reaches its maximum decline at about age fifteen. Correspondingly there is an increase in the teacher's authority. This attitude of changing authority-association is more evident in boys ; while, girls continue a considerable idealization with parents. The relative influences of parental norms decline as peers and other agencies assert themselves on the growing child.³³

Schools can inculcate political beliefs formally through conscious and planned instruction, as well as informally through inadvertent and casual experiences in the school

30. K. Langton, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

32. *Ibid.*

33. H.H. Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

milieu. In the process of socialization, for example, schools revitalize child's elementary attachment with his own people (and so with his own nation). The tools employed for this revitalization of attachment include flag hoisting and patriotic singing at the time of school assembly in the morning.³⁴ Again, the schools also boost up child's feelings pertinent to his involvement in the larger national interests. He learns that the individual action is the most effective instrument of political influence.³⁵ Likewise, the elementary school civic trains the child in the direction of consensus values regarding political behaviour (like elections and democracy), rules of morality recognised by the society, reconciliation of differences, and expression of solidarity.³⁶

By the time the child leaves elementary school, he has assembled a formidable array of basis political orientations. Among them are relatively well established sentiments for the system, and not all of them necessarily favourable and supportive. (This is indeed more true of the developed societies).

In such a situation, the teacher has the potential to develop and understand the desired objectives of the formal programme of civic education—namely : correct approach towards rights and duties, political authority, law and order, and the perception about the framework of society.³⁷

34. R.D. Hess and H.V. Thorney, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

37. H. Entwistle, *Political Education in a Democracy*. (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1971), p. 35.

It is also worth stressing that men with primary education are different political actors than individuals who have attained high educational standards. Men with low educational level normally come from families with low average income and education, and possess cultural beliefs of a low status. Those who are college bounds already have different political orientations as compared with those who are not.³⁸

This dilemma of low status individuals vs high status individuals has to a large extent been solved in the developed societies. The problem still haunts the developing societies where the low status and lower intelligence youth appears to be retarded and hampers uniform political socialization so long as economic disparities persist.

As such, the path of socialization is smooth at least in the developed societies. Norm internalisation goes on casually and inperceptively, often without either teacher or student being aware of it. Much of it is even not political in nature but incidental to other experiences. Since precisely it is incidental, it has a more lasting effect on the acquisition of political values and behaviours than does deliberate indoctrination. When the norms, values, beliefs and attitudes of a social system are internalised by the individual, then the efficiency of the socialization process is demonstrated.

As we said, political socialization continues in varying degrees throughout the life of the individual. Learn-

38. R.D. Hess and H.V. Thorney, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

ing new ideas and values does not stop with adolescence or with the end of formal schooling. There are always some new roles, new groups and new social situations for which the individual has to be trained in one way or another.³⁹

Political socialization beyond childhood can briefly be explained in more than one ways. For instance, experiences in non-political situations, providing a guideline for approaches towards political objects, are instructive. These experiences stem from the pre-adult family and school behaviour as well as from the post-adult extra-political and non-political associations. Supplementary to such experiences are the operational contacts with the governmental and non-governmental political units, exposure to the interaction of diverse political activities, and reported achievements (or failures) of others in the political or non-political fields.⁴⁰

“the function of socialization would seem to be to work towards this congruence in outlook and behaviour within a generation, that is, to bring about collective homogeneity. System-stability would falter strain, and conflict might prevail if socialization did not help to confine a generation within some minimal range of diversity. Since diversity and intra-generational discontinuities, so-called, are most likely to occur where there are ethnic, regional, economic, occupa-

39. Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

40. W. Pye and S. Verba, *op. cit.* p. 551.

tional, linguistic, or religious differences, socialization is presumed to bring about some congruences along these lines even within a given generation, not only between generation".⁴¹

To conclude, we scarcely need to insist that, in a world so marked by generational conflicts, each succeeding generation should not pattern itself on the tested and discarded norms. Instead, it should explore new avenues to make innovations. Traditionalism quite frequently clashes with new norms advocated by emerging elites especially in the developing societies. Schools provide the forum for learning the desired change. These are the assimilating premises to induct into the bulk of the society the dynamism of a particular way of life (or political ideology) which in its turn is essential to provide a contemporary state with a coherent political culture.

41. David Easton and J. Dennis, *Children in Political System*, (Macgraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), p. 85.

THE RATIONALE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Diplomatic immunity can be described as an "immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction, not immunity from jurisdiction itself".¹ In other words the receiving state has the right to subject the diplomats to local jurisdiction but in order to allow the diplomats to perform their duties unhindered, jurisdiction is not exercised. Diplomats are not above the law of the accredited states, but, in practice, many laws are not invoked when violated by a diplomat. Besides, the inviolability of foreign missions' premises is not only a universally accepted practice but also recognised by international law. Why are diplomatic immunities necessary? Why is a foreign mission accorded a sanctimonious status? What is it all about anyway? This is precisely what I set out to answer in this paper; namely to discuss and analyse the logic of diplomatic immunities.

The institution of diplomatic immunity originated in the dark ages. The primitive man lived in a "self-determining community" in which the prevalent traditions and customs were laws of the community.² One

1. Max Sorensen (ed.) *Manual of Public International Law* London: Macmillan, 1968, p. 397.

2. Quincy Wright: *A Study of War* (Abridged by LL. Wright) Chicago: The University Press, 1964, pp. 34-35.

such custom was to observe their hunting areas. The delimitation of hunting areas must have been agreed upon through some form of negotiations. The envoys of both communities must have met somewhere to negotiate the boundaries of their hunting areas. The very existence of the limits of hunting areas indicates the success of negotiations on the part of earlier human groups. Indeed negotiations of any kind presupposes the existence of certain amount of immunities accorded to the negotiators. It is difficult to imagine how negotiations can be conducted if the basic immunities are not accorded to the negotiators.

Among the earlier known human groups who recognised the need and importance of immunities for the purposes of negotiations were those of Australian aborigines.³ The poems of Homer depict the prestigious position enjoyed by heralds who were held in high esteem because it was believed that Zeus and Hermes conferred special sanctity upon them.⁴ Thucydides' writings indicate that "by the 5th century the Greeks had developed an elaborated system of diplomatic relations; that the members of diplomatic missions were accorded certain immunities and great considerations".⁵ The Greeks handed over their system of diplomatic relations to the Romans who legalised and attempted to universalise the institution of diplomatic relations. The Roman contri-

3. Herold Nicolson : *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* ; London : Constable & Co., 1963, pp. 2-3

4. Ibid.

5. Herold Nicolson : *Diplomacy*, London ; Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 8-9.

butions to international law are undisputed and it is in this field we find their enormous contributions to the institution of diplomatic immunities. The Roman law provided the legal basis for ambassador's immunities which was "strengthened by the thunders of the Canon Law".⁶

The later Roman emperors and Byzantinian emperors took keen interest in the development of diplomatic practices and immunities. Realising the decline of their physical strength they tried to supplement it by strengthening the diplomatic practices. They introduced a new element into the practice of diplomacy ; the element of playing off one neighbouring ruler against the other.⁷ This presupposed the increased privileges and immunities of the ambassador in order to enable him to collect information regarding the weaknesses and resources of those whom they intended to deal with or use. The practice of playing off neighbouring rulers against others soon became a widely accepted formula of conducting foreign relations and with it the immunities of diplomatic representatives were further strengthened.

The Middle Ages did not witness any rapid progress in the field of diplomatic immunities as the age was predominantly occupied with religious affairs. It was an age in which religion had a powerful hold over the minds of people. Consequently the clerical emissaries became

6. Adair, E.R. : *The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries*, London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1929, p. 5.

7. Nicolson, *Diplomacy. op, cit.*, p. 10.

far more secure and enjoyed more immunities than the diplomatic representatives. It was not until the advent of Renaissance and Reformation that the diplomats started enjoying similar immunities which were once only the privilege of clerical envoys. The Renaissance and Reformation brought the reign of clerical ambassadors to an end.⁸ By the 16th and 17th centuries the sanctity of an ambassador's office was fully recognised and the immunities attached to his office were firmly established.⁹

The basis of diplomatic immunities is necessity.¹⁰ Negotiations cannot be conducted properly if the negotiator's life is not secure. Negotiations under the Sword of Democles have always resulted in a renewed clash or quick renunciation of agreement. From an early date it was recognised that it is essential to grant certain privileges to the emissaries in order to have meaningful intercourse between the nations. International Law Commission in its report submitted to the 10th U.N. General Assembly session unequivocally mentioned three theories that have exercised tremendous influence over the development of diplomatic immunities ; "the extritoriality theory, according to which the premises of the mission represent a sort of extension of the the territory of the sending state ;" representative character theory which propounds that "the diplopmatic mission personifies the sending state" ; and functional necessity theory

8. Adairs, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

9. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, London Chicago : William Benton, 1970, Vol. 7, p. 474.

10. O'Connell, D.P. : *International Law*. London ; Stevens & Sons, 1970, p. 887.

which "justifies privileges and immunities as being necessary to enable the mission to perform its functions".¹¹ There is no doubt that all three theories have played a positive role in the evolution of diplomatic immunities. However, the theory which appears to have formed the principles basis of the diplomatic immunities is that of extritoriality ; namely, the mission representing as an extension of sending state. The diplomats asserted their right of not to be subjected to local jurisdictions but only to the laws of the sending state. As the reformation introduced a bitter religious and political strife into Europe along with the idea of territorial state, it became necessary to exempt the diplomats from subjection to local laws. It was soon evident that a Protestant ambassador accredited to a Catholic state could not be subjected to local jurisdiction based on Catholic Laws. The doctrine of extritoriality provided a positive 'response to the difficulties of the situation'.¹² Without the general acceptance of this doctrine it would have been very difficult for a Muslim state to send its ambassador to a Christian state or a Catholic state to a Protestant state or vice-versa.

The influence of functional necessity theory is equally important with regard to the evolution of the diplomatic immunities. According to this theory, as stated above, it is necessary to grant immunities to diplomats and to the missions in order to enable them to

11. Korley, E.L. : "Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 56, 1962, pp. 88-129,

12. Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 264,

perform their functions properly. It was this theory which helped in clarifying the purpose of the diplomatic immunities. Originally it was not clear whether the immunities were intended for the personal benefits of the diplomats or for securing the interests of the foreign mission as a whole. The Mexican representative in the U.N. General Assembly's Committee aptly remarked that the "immunities are granted for the purpose of facilitating the performance of the functions of the mission rather than for the personal benefits of the members of the mission".¹³ This explanation has been widely accepted and have formed the basis of diplomatic immunities necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the foreign missions.

The theory of representative character has also contributed usefully towards the evolution of the diplomatic immunities. In olden days an ambassador not only represented his king in the Court of receiving king but also looked after his king's interest in the accredited state. This function is still performed by diplomats in the modern world. Today a diplomat represent his nation and looks after its interests in the receiving state. Just as the disgracing or dishonouring of an ambassador was regarded as a personal rebuttal of the king of the sending state during the olden times, the contumelious attitude adopted towards an ambassador would amount to a national insult of the sending state these days.

It seems to me that each of the above mentioned theories has made useful contributions towards the evolu-

13. Karley, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

tion and strengthening the practice of observing diplomatic immunities. Clearly the immunities are essential not only for the efficient performance of the foreign missions but also necessary and an important component for the conduct of relations between independent sovereign states. They are given not for the personal benefits but for safeguarding the interest of the missions as the missions are regarded an extension of the territory of sending state. They are observed on the understanding that they will be reciprocated in similar manner and degree. The violations and infringements caused by any state often lead to strong protests which, in turn, prejudicially affect the violator's representation abroad.

Book Review

NATION-BUILDING AND THE PAKISTAN ARMY

By Raymood A. Moore, Jr.

This book is the first major study of the Pakistan Army in the non-traditional, non-military role of nation-building. The author has undertaken a survey of the nation-building activities of the Pakistan Army from 1947-1969. However, only inferentially is the study concerned with the role of military in the politics of Pakistan.

The significant contribution the Armed Forces are capable of making to nation-building activities—in addition to defending the borders of the homeland—is seldom recognized. The value of the book lies in focussing on this hitherto neglected aspect of the Army's functioning—a role which may be important not only in Pakistan but perhaps also in other developing countries. The author contends that the Army is not only the country's defender against external attack and the chief guardian of its internal peace but that in Pakistan, it has in addition "performed notable economic, social, political and psychological services in the nation's behalf during both man-made and natural emergencies, and through the peaceful uses of its forces, it has contributed importantly and uniquely to the Pakistani nation". For

instance, it is pointed out, after the 1958 coup, the Army began to fulfil various non-military functions which earlier were "non-existent or less crucial". Those listed by the writer include the following : the army provided an important source of political support for the regime ; it acted as a moral force "above and beyond politics working for the general welfare as a servant of the nation" ; it supplied the country with purposeful leadership ; it acted as an important vehicle of social change "by maintaining a modern, capable, well-equipped organisation amidst stultifying tradition, poverty and disunity" ; it was a unifying force for national integration.

The author notes that Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) itself visualised that a major role will be played by the Armed Forces in the development of society. He maintains that "the Army actually did—many of the things—called for in the Second and Third Five Year Plans". In his words, "The role of Army in Pakistan as a force outside politics, dedicated to the protection and welfare of the nation as a whole, relatively free from the impossible red-tape of bureaucracies in the South Asian sub-continent and largely immune to the corrosion of graft and corruption, has enabled it to perform admirably the nation-building activities so necessary for Pakistan's evolution into a modern state".

The book is divided into four sections. The first three relate to the historical role of the Army, its contribution in times of emergency and in extending services to outlying areas, and the Army's own institutions which make a nation-building contribution. Section IV con-

tains some valuable comparisons and conclusions. Of particular interest to many Pakistani readers will be the comparison of the Pakistan experience with that of India—where, the author notes, the Army has “played a far less active role in nation-building than Pakistan’s”.

Nation-Building and the Pakistan Army is a notable addition to the available literature on Pakistan and has a special value as the study of a generally overlooked aspect of the functioning of one of the country’s most important institutions, its Army. Much of the material is based on original research undertaken by the author and the arduous as well as the important nature of such research must be recognized.

“In bringing to light in such lucid manner” says Lieutenant General (Rtd.) Altaf Qadir, in his Foreword to the book, “this (nation-building) aspect of the story of the Pakistan Army which normally tends to be neglected, Mr. Raymond A. Moore has made a telling contribution to the study of Pakistan and the book deserves respected place in any reference library on Pakistan”.

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