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## A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema<sup>1</sup>

Since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the awareness of catastrophic consequences of weapons of mass destruction has been constantly on the rise. With diversification in these weapons, concerns for caging such monstrous devices have also considerably increased. Two major approaches have been adopted with a view to make the world safer; arms control and disarmament approaches. At first sight both approaches appear to be straightforward approaches devised to analyze the age-old problem of peace and security. However, it can be easily seen that disarmament embodies the unfortunate ambiguity of both a process and a state to which that process intends to lead whereas arms control approach is a process only. Arms control approach appears more like a regulatory measure that allows the use of varied types of weapons but it aims to mitigate the danger involved in the conflictual cobwebs whereas the disarmament approach also concerns itself with the mitigation of incumbent danger but primarily aims to destroy the source of these dangers. The thin line differentiating these approaches not only reflects their higher degree of mutual dependence but also make them look separable and inseparable simultaneously. Neither approach has attained the heights of complete success. Admittedly while both approaches have paid substantive dividends, the world is still far away from the status that can be termed as safe. Advancements in war technologies and newer forms of weapons of mass destruction continue to outpace the advent of the regulatory measures and progress towards disarmament. What exactly is the situation and what can be done to accelerate the process are two of the

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questions discussed in the first two sections of this short paper. The final section focuses on Pakistani perspective on Biological warfare (BW) along with some suggestions to strengthen verification system.

## I

Despite the existence of a vast body of preventive measures along with substantial awareness regarding destructive capabilities of such weapons, the world has not been able to dissuade most capable nations to opt for an effective non-proliferation regime and to prevent the diversification of weapons of mass destruction. Many reasons account for this retarded growth in this area. Not only the very nature of existing nation state and international political systems makes it very difficult to gain universal acceptance of constructive measures in order to make the world safer but also the quest for tilting the equilibrium to one's own side generates apprehensions which in turn make it much harder for the international community to secure the desired consensus. It is all very fine to have an even fifty-fifty balance but if our side is little bit stronger, we can be all the more secure. Various programmes, often contradictory in nature, ranging from absolute deterrence to total disarmament, from complete isolation to world government, from non-alignment to active participation in a variety of military alliances, from economic self sufficiency to free trade concepts are often put forward in order to be more secure than the others. In addition, man's own nature epitomized in the form of aggressive leadership coupled with soft corner for friends or preferred groups further complicates the processes. Unjust and unequal application of world bodies' collective weight and pressures to somewhat similar crisis situations, in many ways, reveals the poverty of unprincipled approaches adopted periodically. The perennial quest for a favourable equilibrium or disequilibria indeed

complicates the task of those engaged in securing a stable and just security system.

Does the incumbent international security system provide requisite level of assurances to all states? The answer is indeed in the negative. Whether the efforts are focused to promote nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation or to fully implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or to strengthen Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the universal interests and participation of most actors could only be secured when nations begin to perceive that these endeavours would substantively contribute towards the strengthening of their security in an equitable manner. In the absence of a just and an equitable system generating constructive vibes and principled approaches, the regimes devised to make the world safer would continue to lack the much-desired universality. For instance, take the case of Middle Eastern region. While many guardians of peace pay continuous lip service to the desirability of security environment which could effectively support peace efforts in the region, not much pressures are applied to Israel which frequently not only flouts the understandings reached after cumbersome and meticulous negotiations but also cleverly twists the ongoing peace processes. It not very surprising when one finds that not many countries in the region signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) primarily because of Israel's non-acceptance of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or an equivalent regime, which would assure the Middle Eastern countries against the Israeli threat. Similarly at the global level apprehensions and concerns are frequently expressed regarding the inequities of the existing international security order which indeed seems far more conducive to the whims of the powerful and the influential. We live in a world of unequal sovereign independent states with different ideologies and conflicting interests. While it is difficult to deny the radical changes that are taking place at global level causing gradual erosion of

traditional security interests, it is equally true that the existing structure of the international system with its inbuilt inequities still continues to be a source of major influence on state behaviour. Not only the conventional arms still continue to characterize different region of the world, but also even the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons provide a powerful influence on the security calculations of many states.<sup>1</sup> To make things worse the ability of powerful nations to manipulate the universal as well as regional tools of preventive diplomacy to their preferred priority ladder consistently injects the poison of unfairness. The post World War history is replete with examples of the powerful engaged in denying others what they deem essential for themselves. The most recent case is the initial and subsequent persistence of the Western reactions to Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, though it is now beginning to settle down and an unwilling acceptance of realities is being increasingly realized. The imposition of punitive measures is only further strengthening the existing distrust among the developing countries against the powerful nations.

An unjust international security order is unlikely to pay the desired level of dividends. Efforts to strengthen the international security can only make progress if all nations participate on the basis of mutuality of rights and obligations and not on the premise that the rich nations are entitled to total security and not the others. A more equitable global security order is indeed an imperative need of the day. However, this does not mean that efforts directed to strengthen BWC and to establish a compliance promotion regime should either be slackened or minimised. On the contrary these should be pursued with vigour and on the basis of cooperative endeavours. Instead of ignoring or overriding or brushing aside the legitimate concerns of many nations, efforts, should be concentrated on subjecting them to serious considerations and taking all of them along.



No nation feels comfortable living under a security threat and if the threat acquires somewhat permanent character, the uneasiness compounds. Consequently all energies are often directed towards the singular objective of removing the incumbent sense of insecurity as soon as possible. To alleviate its security environment nations employ various political, economic and military strategies depending upon its economic strength, political maturity, and military power.

Advancing military technologies accompanied by focused researches in chemistry and biology continue to affect the nature of warfare as well as to make every nation and society more vulnerable than ever before. Effective defence, in a traditional sense --- the ability to keep an enemy from approaching or penetrating or inflicting damage or polluting environment does not really exist. Monstrous nuclear weapons, deadly chemical gases and dangerous bio-toxin weapons have been developed by modern technology. A nation in possession of these weapons of mass destruction or their modern derivatives with delivery systems can inflict enormous damage to an adversary despite his best preventive efforts. Similarly, the threat of the use of these weapons as weapons of terror is also very real.

While the most important manifestation of the impact of technological developments can probably be seen in the advent of nuclear and sophisticated new conventional weapons, the contributions in the area of chemical and biological warfare are equally significant. Biological weapons include any infectious agents such as bacteria or virus that are deliberately used to inflict harm upon the target country---more specially upon the people of the target country. Besides, the advancement in biotechnologies can provide quicker and much cheaper weapons of terror. It is often said that to effectively cover an area of 1 sq. Km costs \$2000 if conventional weapons are used, \$800 if nukes are employed, \$600 if gases are released and only \$ 1.00 if biological agents dispersed but they

would be as effective as the other would be. For obvious reasons, such a weapon is likely to attract the attention of poor nations involved in their own conflictual cobwebs. This indeed makes it even harder to control the spread of such a weapon. Besides, searching for the biological agents is much more difficult than even the search for deadly gases. It is often said that searching for hidden chemical weapons amounts to looking for a needle in a haystack. But search for biological weapons is even more complex. In fact this would amount to searching for the eye of the needle in the haystack. Low cost involved, the rapid ability of its spread and dual-purpose nature of microbiology and biotechnology make it an attractive option to exercise. Admittedly, both the nuclear as well as chemical technologies are also of dual purpose but the cost involved is indeed enormous. Besides, need to have a stockpile of actual weapons really does not appear very attractive as the BW agents can be easily produced in sufficient quantities rather quickly. Not only the biological agents are immensely dangerous but also they can multiply rather rapidly in the right environment. While some biological agents incapacitate, the others kill. For example Ebola virus kills as many as 90 percent of its victims within few days of contraction of the virus.<sup>2</sup>

## II

Any effective control regime must take into consideration three major issues; lack of concern for incumbent inequalities; lack of transparency and lack of trust. We live in a world of unequal states in terms of resources, power, population, territorial size, technological advancements, and military strength. In such a world there are bound to be difference of opinions and non-recognition of right to disagree, which in turn, prepares the grounds for a conflict. But conflict only germinates when right to differ is conceded but subsequent effort is made to impose the decision, which have been based on majoritism. Pursuing a decision based on

majority implies not only rejecting the minority view but also imposing what the majority has agreed. I think when one deals with weapons of mass destruction, perhaps the principle of consensus is more appropriate. Instead of leaving anybody out or behind, efforts must be concentrated on taking all of him or her along the trail. No terrorist is a terrorist by choice. He feels that the force of circumstances or the irrationality of the rulers has pushed him into it. Either inability to communicate or intense feeling of being ignored or being unnecessarily subjected to suppressive tactics sometimes compels even a decent human being to provide outlet to his suppressed reactions, which could take a form often deemed somewhat uncivilized. Perhaps a much better way out is to promote a dialogue between the weak and the powerful. In the ultimate analysis the best way to promote effective arms control regime and the only sure way to reduce the dangers of hideously lethal exchange is to attack the roots of regional conflicts.<sup>3</sup> The attitude to insist upon the regional actors to resolve their own disputes bilaterally in fact reflects not only low level of commitments to a just world security order but also the domination of national interests over peace. If the parties involved in a conflict situation feel that they would be able to resolve the issue through bilateral process, they would not attempt to internationalise the dispute. But if one of the parties involved feels that the bilateral process is not making any progress, it is likely to engage in a process that would internationalise the dispute. The internationalisation of a dispute not only clearly indicates the inability of the parties involved to resolve the dispute through bilateral process but also an attempt to elicit the support of the international community to help.

Second, lack of transparency often proves to be a source of friction and unnecessary suspicions. Etymologically transparency means, capable of being seen through. In international relations transparency reduces the chances of misinterpretations and injects openness. Transparency implies

systematic release of information covering almost all aspects of military activities as well as areas of chemical and pharmaceutical industries that breed suspicions about the likely manufacturing of dangerous weapons. Besides, transparency measure could turn out to be the most effective restraint on the transfer of biologic agents. Under full transparency, not only both the supplier and the recipient would have to negotiate in full view of all sides but it could also act as an effective restraint in terms of limiting the sales. Transparency could provide an opportunity to all the interested parties to make an accurate assessment of security needs and justifiable procurements. With the rapid and impressive developments in information technology, one would have thought that transparency's role has already arrived but it appears that it is still engaged in the catching-up process. Transparency at all levels needs to be made the hallmark of international affairs. Lack of transparency breeds suspicions. Transparency measures cannot only educate the public and increase their awareness but could also act as the most potent restraint on the contraband trading.

Third, lack of trust among nations makes universal agreement harder to reach and even harder to implement. Trust can be built by sharing the knowledge. For example, assuming that there are some rogue states which are engaged in making and accumulating toxin substance to be used in the envisioned eventuality which may lay in distant future on one hand and there are other nations that had developed an antidote to effectively cope with such toxin material on the other hand, then logical pursuit would be that the antidote is made available to the likely target state despite ideological or other differences that may exist at the time. Obviously, this does not mean that one should abandon efforts directed towards the removal of the underlying reasons for such apprehensions which is influencing the decision to accumulate such material by the potential aggressor. In addition, if some vaccine has been developed to counter effects of particular biologics, one

should immediately share it with other nations. Sharing builds trust much quickly. Establishment of trust is likely to facilitate the passage of even the most complex verification system as the trust strengthens the political will to obviate such weapons of mass destruction. Preventive approaches are likely to increase the distrust. If a violation has taken place or an impediment has surfaced, the approach should be to understand why it has happened. Understanding the underlying factors and then seeking appropriate recipes compared to instant reactive punitive measures are likely to pay more dividends.

So what is the solution to secure the realization of a quick and effective biological warfare control regime. In this connection three suggestions need to be mentioned; resolution efforts, extensive introduction of CBMs and an effective verification system. Conflict resolution implies that concentration be on the basic source of conflict and concerted attempts to secure its resolution through negotiations. It aims to satisfy the underlying need of the parties caught in the conflictual cobweb and does try to sacrifice genuinely important values of the parties involved. It is a process that is not enforced but always agreed upon. To facilitate values of the parties involved, CBMs can play a very useful role. CBMs are not the ultimate panacea but they have proven to be extremely helpful in creating an atmosphere deemed to be conducive for conflict resolution process. Unless the BWC is strengthened through an effective verification system based on universal adherence, the risk would be minimised. Universal acceptance is essential to secure the trust atmosphere, which could make the system rather productive.

### III

Pakistan has always supported the ban on biological warfare. Many reasons account for such stance. To begin with, the Islamic laws expressly forbid the cruel killing of non combatants, the killing of prisoners of war, unnecessary

destruction of harvests and cutting of trees, abuse of captive women, killing of envoys even in retaliation, massacre in the territory of the vanquished and the use of poisonous weapons'. Islam is a religion that explicitly believes in the promotion of peace. Even a cursory glance at Quranic verses makes it abundantly clear that God directs mankind down to the path of peace; peace of mind and conscience, peace of the family, peace of the society and the peace of the world.<sup>4</sup> The pursuit of peace is recommended even during the war, even though enemy's intentions and sincerity may appear doubtful. The use of force is only allowed under specific conditions. According to Quran, the waging of war is only permitted in defence of freedom and in the face of aggression.<sup>5</sup> While aggression is expressly forbidden in Islam, the fighting in self-defence is not only regarded as justifiable for defensive purposes, as the pursuit of means deemed essential for defence are allowed.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan would not have opted for nuclear tests had it not been for constant threatening Indian attitude and failure of powerful nuclear nations to extend the much sought after desired nuclear umbrella. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction does not fit well within the Islamic thinking, as these weapons do not discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Even the destruction of legitimate targets is subject to many conditions and to the nature of war. Indeed the entire developments surrounding the acquisition of nuclear technology and accompanying advancements are product of reactions to threatening and belligerent Indian pursuits.

Second, not only are the Pakistanis well aware of the effects of disease spread but also have suffered because of it in the past. Having experienced the outbreak of diseases either caused by floods or other natural or man made disasters, the population is acutely conscious of dangerous consequences. Having seen what a single dead animal can do to contaminate the village, the Pakistanis are at least extremely well educated through their experiences to combat such eventualities. If they

cannot to learn the death of their cattle through a biologic agent, how can they even dream of doing such a thing to the humans.

Third, the Pakistanis support all measures to promote universal adherence to the convention with a view to strengthen the BWC. Not only Pakistan has remained actively engaged in the work of the Ad Hoc group of governmental experts (established by the special conference held in 1994) but has consistently pointed out the need to further strengthen Article X as well also so as to intensify search for feasible measures for verification that are consistent with the security interests of all states. While enthusiastically participating and contributing to the discussions of Ad Hoc group, Pakistan actively promotes the idea of greater transparency and compliance with the convention. Having successfully run an immunization programme including child immunization scheme, the Pakistanis kept their capabilities and other relevant sectors fully transparent. Transparency is indeed the most effective form of open diplomacy. Just as open diplomacy manages to remove many apprehensions among the adversaries, the concept of transparency can help in lessening the temptations of exaggerated estimates and misinterpretations. Transparency implies systematic release of information covering all aspects of suspected areas. By making accurate information available to public and promoting accessibility to what is deemed to be sensitive or dangerous programme tends to reduce uncertainties that often breed tensions.

Fourth, while generally supportive of BWC the two developments seemed to have influenced Pakistani policy formulators in recent times. First, India's admission of substantial chemical weapons programme despite their regular denials of accumulating such a dangerous arsenal over last so many years, the Pakistani policy makers seem to have assumed, quite naturally, that the Indians may also have a BW programme. Perhaps that's why the Pakistanis seemed to be

convinced of the need to have a BWC compliance regime. Another development that seemed to have contributed substantively towards Pakistan's policy regarding BWC is the revelation of a massive Russian biological weapons programme, which may have been developed by the former USSR in total isolation. Indeed this certainly highlights the urgent need to establish a regime that does not extend any unfair advantage to permanent members of the Security Council who can employ their veto power against anything, which is deemed to be disadvantageous to their own interests while enforcing measures against others.

Not only Pakistan supports the need to strengthen the verification network but it also recognises complexities involved. Therefore it had put forward many constructive suggestions especially in the area of on site inspections. It suggested that 'on site inspections other than those agreed as part of confidence visits, should be invoked as a last resort to establish violations'.<sup>7</sup> This implies that the suspected target state has been provided ample opportunities to either obviate with its stockpile or become transparent quickly. The notion of last resort means that it has been undertaken after having exhausted other agreed avenues. Pakistan also suggested that the information on which the inspection was invoked is genuine and had been collected through legitimate means. "The use of espionage and human intelligence and other unacceptable practices must be excluded as valid sources of information".<sup>8</sup> Such inspection should only materialise after the approval by a large majority of the Executive body of multilateral implementing authority.<sup>9</sup> Efforts should be directed to plug all avenues of abusing on site inspection. Cognizant of the fact that on site facility could be abused for the purposes of securing entry into a building or facilities that are totally unrelated to the Convention, the Pakistanis also suggested that the target state must have the right to deny inspection to facilities unrelated to the Convention and deemed to be



sensitive for national security.<sup>10</sup> Indeed such a suggestion could minimise the chances of abusing the on site inspection.

While Pakistan has consistently extended its full support to the strengthening of future protocol of BWC and has put forward many useful suggestions periodically, it seems to recognise the fact that unless and until a just and equitable security order is promoted, undesired impediments would continue to emerge and add unwanted complications periodically. Any security order that aims to cater the security needs of the rich and powerful states only and ignores the equally legitimate security needs of weaker states is unlikely to be durable and lasting.

### End Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> For details see chapter on 'International Security in the Post-Cold War Era' by John Baylis in *The globalization of World Politics* edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford University Press, 1997, PP. 193-211

<sup>2</sup> See 'The Specter of Biological Weapons' by Leonard A. Cole. Also visit the site <http://www.sciam.com/1296issue/1296cole.html>

<sup>3</sup> *The Economist*, June 6, 1998

<sup>4</sup> *Arabia: The Islamic World Review*, No 23, June 1983, p.23

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 23- 26

<sup>6</sup> See the chapter titled 'Jihad' in *The Religion of Islam* by Maulana Mohd Ali, (Lahore; Ripon Printing Press, 1950), pp. 554 - 99

<sup>7</sup> *Pakistani ambassador's address to the Fourth review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition and Stockpiling of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction on 26<sup>th</sup> November 1996*, Geneva.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

## FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS (1951 – 2001)

M. Iqbal Gondal<sup>1</sup>

Establishing cordial and friendly relations with her neighbours and big powers are important ingredients of Pakistan's foreign policy. China and Pakistan are next-door neighbours and China is also one of the big powers of the world. Both the Chinese and Pakistani people desire for world peace, peace that is conducive to progress. These are the facts that laid the foundation of robust and friendly relations between China and Pakistan fifty years ago.

The relationship between China and Pakistan was established as early as September 1949 when India devalued her rupee following the British policy whereas Pakistan did not follow India's example. Resultantly, by the end of 1949 trade between India and Pakistan saw a standstill. Hence, there was a sudden boom in Pakistan's trade with China and this was not without significance for their future political relations. In 1949-50 Pakistan had sold 47,000 bales of cotton to China. In 1950-51 the figure rose to 109,000 bales. China also supplied coal to Pakistan, which was badly needed for running the railways and industry and had been denied by India.<sup>1</sup>

Formal relations between China and Pakistan started when Pakistan recognised the Communist Government in Peking on January 4, 1950, within a few days of India's decision to do so. Pakistan thus became the first Muslim country and the second member of the Commonwealth to accord recognition to that regime. "Pakistan announced the government of People's Republic of China in Peking as the

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legal government of China".<sup>2</sup> On 4 May 1950 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan explained that Pakistan had recognised People's Republic of China as an established fact.<sup>3</sup> Pakistan not only itself recognised China but also made attempts to persuade others to recognize it and was critical of those who refused to do so.

When United Nations refused entry to China on the basis that China was not willing to fulfill the obligations under U.N charter, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, the foreign minister of Pakistan argued in U.N General Assembly that the basis on which China was being denied entry in the U.N was "no more than an assumption".<sup>4</sup>

Diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan were established on 21 May 1951 on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for territory and sovereignty. General A.M. Raza was the first ambassador of Pakistan to China. Pakistan's recognition of Communist China in 1950 and subsequent exchange of diplomatic missions in 1951 facilitated the growth of steady and unceasing relations between the two countries.

Until 1954 Pakistan followed a policy of nonalignment. At the U.N it voted with either bloc as the situation demanded. For instance it voted in favour of stigmatizing North Korea as the aggressor but abstained from the resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor in Korea. It also kept itself away on the resolution imposing an embargo on Communist China and North Korea. Similarly, when Chinese troops marched into Tibet on October 7, 1950 and launched a full-scale attack to liberate her and Tibet complained to the U.N against Chinese aggression, Pakistan declared that she would remain neutral in the proceedings.<sup>5</sup> This independent approach to cold war issues paved the way for mutual friendship between China and Pakistan. The foundations of that friendship were so firmly laid that later developments in Pakistan's foreign policy did not destroy it. In that period a sizable trade was established

between the two countries. China showed interest in Pakistan's cotton. In 1952 Pakistan's exports to China were worth Rs. 97.3 million out of which cotton export claimed Rs. 97.2 million.<sup>6</sup>

China felt anxiety when Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO. India raised hue and cry and instigated Russia and Egypt against Pakistan. Unlike Russia, China did not protest although 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' was slogan of the day.<sup>7</sup> China could very well have lost patience with Pakistan but continued to display exemplary foresight. On September 23, 1954, Chu En Lai criticized the newly formed SEATO but insisted that principles of co-existence should apply to China's relations with all Asian countries including Pakistan. Even more significant was Chu En Lai's parting message to ambassador Raza when the latter left for Tehran on transfer. The Chinese Premier said that he had felt personally hurt at the time Pakistan joined SEATO because he regarded Pakistan as a friend but added that he fully understood her peculiar circumstances and hoped she would continue to play decisive part in bringing peace to the world.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the trade is used as a political weapon by powerful states. Contrary to this the shift in Pakistan's foreign policy since 1954 did not affect the commercial relations between the two countries and up to 1958 there were eight bilateral commercial agreements between China and Pakistan.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Cultural exchange went smoothly too.

Despite growing contacts between China and Pakistan it was felt that for their firm footed relationship the misunderstandings caused by Pakistan's membership of the regional pacts ought to be removed. Pakistan obtained the opportunity for this in April 1955 when Prime Ministers of both countries, Chu En Lai and Muhammad Ali Bogra met at Beijing during the Afro-Asian conference.

Addressing the political committee, premier Chu En-Lai declared, "Prime Minister of Pakistan told me that although

Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear that China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties.”<sup>10</sup>

He also said that Mohammad Ali Bogra assured him that Pakistan will not use any of the military pacts against China, even if the US wanted to do so. Chu En-Lai further added that this would help the two countries to jointly promote “collective peace and co-operation.”<sup>11</sup>

Reaching out to each other at the 1955 Bandung conference was just beginning of the special relationship, which proceeded step by step towards establishing a friendship on the basis of mutuality of interest. This conference paved the way for exchange visits between the two countries. Mao Tse-Tung expressed his happiness that trade and cultural exchanges as well as mutual friendly visits had been continuously on the increase.<sup>12</sup>

During the Bandung conference, Chu En-Lai invited Muhammad Ali Bogra to visit China but he could not do so as a change of government had taken place in Pakistan. The new Prime Minister, Ch. Muhammad Ali also was not destined to avail the invitation. Ch. Muhammad Ali quit his office in September 1956 and was replaced by H.S. Suhrawardy.

Suhrawardy was the first Prime Minister of Pakistan who visited China. The joint statement issued at the end of his visit acknowledged the existence of friendly relations between the two countries and declared that their talks which covered a wide range of subjects contributed greatly to the strengthening of these ties.<sup>13</sup>

With a view further to strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between the two countries, the Prime Minister recognised the need for development of commercial and cultural relations as well as friendly contacts.<sup>14</sup> During this visit Chu En-Lai told a Pakistani newspaper that although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, there was no reason why China

could not be friendly with her. China and Pakistan had many points in common and though they differed in some ways, the two countries had no conflict of interests.<sup>15</sup> Dawn said Chu En-Lai's statement had made new history in international relations by giving so broadminded a lead.<sup>16</sup>

Chu En-Lai, the Prime Minister of China returned Suharwardy's visit on 20-30 December 1956 and was accorded an enthusiastic accord. At Dacca 100,000 citizens gave the Chinese premier a spectacular ovation.<sup>17</sup> The joint statement expressed the desire of both the countries to further the friendly relations existing between China and Pakistan and to promote the great cause of world peace. The two Prime Ministers were of the view that the difference between the political system of China and Pakistan and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between the two countries.<sup>18</sup>

Suharwardy was so impressed by his exchanges with Chou En-Lai that he wrote to Eisenhower, supporting China to represent the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, and also urging recognition of the People's Republic by the United States. He also predicted early in 1957 that he felt perfectly certain that when a crucial time comes, China would come to our assistance.<sup>19</sup>

With the seizure of power in Pakistan in 1958 by Ayub Khan, China-Pakistan relations initially entered into difficulties. In the beginning Ayub Khan was strongly pro-American and anti-communist and when in 1959 India's relations with China soured, Ayub offered in a surprise move to have joint defence with India, evidently against communist aggression from the north, involving either China or the Soviet Union or both India rebuffed the offer mainly because it was conditional to resolving the Kashmir dispute. China was clearly not pleased with Pakistan's move for joint defence with India. It even asked officially as to whom the Pakistanis were proposing joint defence against.<sup>20</sup>

It may also be noted that even though Pakistan until 1960 continued to support the Western-sponsored resolutions postponing consideration of the question of U.N membership of Communist China, the Chinese did not come out in favour of India on Kashmir question. In contrast, the Soviet Union turned against Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir after Pakistan joined the Baghdad pact. The USSR vetoed several Security Council resolutions designed to settle the Kashmir dispute either through plebiscite or bilateral negotiations.<sup>21</sup> This aspect was highlighted by Z.A. Bhutto in National Assembly on 27 November 1962, when he said, "we admire and salute the People's Republic of China for not having a hostile stand on Kashmir inspite of the fact that in the past our relations with that great Asian neighbour were not as cordial as they are today."<sup>22</sup>

The new phase of Pakistan's relations with China started from 1960 when Pakistan openly started supporting the cause of China in and out of the United Nations. Mr. Manzoor Qadir, the then foreign minister of Pakistan criticised the American attitude towards China in a T.V interview in Washington.<sup>23</sup> In July 1961 president Ayub Khan visited United States where he supported the idea of China's entry into the United Nations.<sup>24</sup> It was in the same year that Pakistan voted in favour of seating China in the United Nations. This evidently made a lasting impression in China and Pakistan came to be considered a special friend who had stood by China.

During this period another significant development, which was of importance for future relations between China and Pakistan, was the attempt to demarcate of borders between the two countries. Pakistan had taken up the matter of demarcation of borders with the Chinese government in 1959 and in January 1961. China showed her willingness for the demarcation of borders. At that time it was a hot issue for Pakistan because a map published by Chinese government showed large part of Pakistan's territory as Chinese. Pakistan

also knew that China was maintaining armed forces along the Sino-Pak border, while the Pakistani side was inaccessible.<sup>25</sup>

Negotiations regarding the demarcation of borders started in 1962 and the final agreement was signed in Pakistan on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1963 by Z.A. Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan. In his speech on 3 March 1963 at the banquet, Chen Yi, minister of foreign affairs of China stated that the signing of this agreement constituted an important milestone in China Pakistan friend'ship.<sup>26</sup>

Though the Sino-Pakistani border accord was the first agreement between the two countries, their cordiality had begun to grow while the negotiations were in progress. The reason of course was that both needed new friends. China's alliance with the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even earlier than her friendship with India and prudence dictated that China should avail herself of very chance to win over Pakistan, her third largest neighbour. Pakistan, too, was looking around for a new protector in place of the United States.<sup>27</sup>

After the border agreement and other understandings, China came out in support of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. In February 1964, Zhou-Enlai paid an official visit to Pakistan for the first time, China declared open support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.<sup>28</sup> In the Ayub-Cho joint communiqué of 23 February 1964 "They expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."<sup>29</sup>

A trade agreement between China and Pakistan was signed in January 1963 as a result of which China became the biggest buyer of Pakistani cotton during the year. An air agreement in August 1963 established the Dacca-Canton-Shanghai air service. All these factors created an atmosphere of goodwill and trust in both the countries.

Due to increasing relations between China and Pakistan, Pakistan had to face US refusal to give the 40% of the required aid for the first year of the third five-years plan.



Pakistan made it clear to the U.S that it was not ready to sacrifice its increasingly improved relations with China at the altar of economic aid. China, it declared was the only major nation on whom Pakistan could rely for assistance.<sup>30</sup>

The feeling that China alone was a reliable friend was confirmed during the Indo-Pak war of September 1965. During the war, while the United States was neutral, China declared its open support for Pakistan and branded India aggressor and solemnly warned Indian government that it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression.<sup>31</sup>

The strong support given by China during the war would stand as a great landmark in the history of China-Pakistan relations. After the Indo-Pak war China gave economic and military aid to Pakistan. In 1966 Liu Shuo-Chi, the Chairman of People's Republic of China visited Pakistan. In his speech on 26 March 1966, he declared, "The Pakistani people can rest assure when Pakistan resolutely fights foreign aggression in defence of it's national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance."<sup>32</sup> In the joint communiqué, 31 March 1966, the president of Pakistan reiterated the firm belief of the government and people of Pakistan that the People's Republic of China should be restored its lawful rights in the United Nations, and that any scheme to create 'two Chinas is bound to fail.<sup>33</sup> It was with the active support of Pakistan that China became the member of United Nations in 1971.

With the establishment of close relations between China and Pakistan, exchange of cultural and trade delegations had become frequent. Technical and financial aid for the building of various industries in Pakistan was extended by China. During 1969-1970 many new trade agreements were signed. China promised assistance in the field of industry, mining, transport and by the end of 1970 China agreed to

provide an interest free loan of Rs. 1000 million. On the cultural front, from 1969-1971, over 50 cultural delegations were exchanged.<sup>34</sup> Sino Pakistan trade between 1962-63 & 1968-69 increased fourfold from a two way turnover of Rs. 60 million, and the balance of trade remained constantly in Pakistan's favour.<sup>35</sup>

China's support to Pakistan during the crisis of 1971 and afterwards and her stand on the admission of Bangladesh to United Nations would always be remembered by the people of Pakistan with gratitude. She refused to admit Bangladesh to the United Nations until the 90,000 prisoners of war were returned to Pakistan and the territory occupied by the aggression had been vacated. The Chinese veto in Security Council helped to bring about the return of 90,000 prisoners of war.<sup>36</sup>

America did not like the growing relations of China and Pakistan. But owing to the changing international scenario the U.S had to have close connections with China. Consequently, in July 1971, the foreign minister of America Henry Kissinger visited China through the auspices of Pakistan in this way Pakistan played a vital role in the establishment of Sino-U.S relations.

Z.A. Bhutto's visits to China in February 1972 and May 1974 were very successful. In his speech at a banquet in Peking, 3 May 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto stated that the Sino-Pakistan relations were not based on expediency or opportunism. Therefore, their friendship could never weaken or wither.<sup>37</sup> Chinese vice Premier also expressed his satisfaction with the results of the visit and hoped that in the future China would be able to help Pakistan more, especially economically.<sup>38</sup> "The two sides noted with satisfaction that the visit (May 1974) of Prime Minister Bhutto to China had made a significant contribution to the further consolidation of the close relations between their two governments and to

deepening friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people.”<sup>39</sup>

Z.A. Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan visited China third time from May 26 to May 30, 1976 on the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan and the members of his delegation were accorded warm and cordial welcome by the government and people of China reflecting the feeling of profound friendship and solidarity that had traditionally existed between the two governments and people. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung met with the Pakistan premier and they held discussion in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. In a joint communiqué the two agreed that a new economic order should be established on the basis of the principles of independence, self-reliance, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit to replace the old economic order under which the third world is exploited by a few big powers. They agreed to take all effective measures to strengthen third world unity so as to change the unjust economic order - a legacy of the imperialist and colonialist era.”<sup>40</sup>

The Pakistani Prime Minister thanked the Chinese premier for China's firm support for the proposal of the Pakistan government for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. He also reaffirmed that Pakistan would continue to give full support to the People's Republic of China.<sup>41</sup>

General Zia-ul-Haq, who had assumed power in 1977, also termed Pak-China friendship a legend, which did not “depend on mortal persons.”<sup>42</sup>

In order to review relations, Zia visited China in December 1977. During the visit, the vice Premier of China, Tang Hsiao-Ping in his speech stated that the Chinese government and people would continue to give unswerving support to Pakistani people in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and in their efforts

for the exercise of self-determination by the people of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>43</sup>

The Chinese Vice Premier who headed a forty members delegation and arrived in Islamabad in June 1978 reciprocated General Zia-ul-Haq's visit. The two leaders later said that Pakistan and China had complete identity of views.<sup>44</sup> In his speech on 16 June 1978, vice Premier Keng Piao said, "our Pakistani friends may rest assured that whatever the vicissitudes on the international arena, the Chinese government and people, will remain your reliable friends in your just struggle to build and defend your country."<sup>45</sup> On the completion ceremony of the Karakoram Highway he stated, "With the completion of this Highway we have now an additional monument to the friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan. Through joint efforts of our two governments and people, the traditional Sino-Pakistan friendship, which began with the 'Silk Route' will develop more rapidly and grow broader in scope like traffic over the Karakoram Highway."<sup>46</sup>

After Chuo En-Lai who came to Pakistan in 1964, the second visit of Chinese Prime Minister took place in June 1981. The Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang supported Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan issue and emphasized the identity of view. The visit of Chinese President in April 1984 was also very significant. The Chinese President supported Pakistan's stand regarding Russian invasion of Afghanistan and demanded immediate withdrawal of Russian army from Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

In the period from 1985 to 88 Chinese friendship continued towards greater understanding and warmth of relations. Throughout this period, China extended its wholehearted support to Pakistan during the Afghanistan crisis and continued to demand the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from there. It also welcomed the Geneva accord.

In September 1986, Pakistan signed an agreement with China for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the field of industry, agriculture and power generation. China extended an interest-free loan amounting to 27 million U.S dollars, and also helped Pakistan in modernizing the heavy mechanical complex in Taxila in the year 1987.<sup>48</sup> Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang visited Pakistan in June 1987. The communiqué reflected complete identity of views on all-important issues. The trade, cultural, military and diplomatic exchanges with China in 1987 outnumbered Pakistan's diplomatic exchanges with any other country.<sup>49</sup>

In 1988 when Benazir Bhutto came into power, friendly relations with China remained a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy and her first official visit abroad was to China in February 1989. She assured China that the People's Party government would do its utmost to promote the traditional friendship between Pakistan and China.<sup>50</sup>

Following the visit of Benazir Bhutto the Chinese premier Li Peng visited Pakistan in November 1989. Mr. Li said in an arrival statement, "To further consolidate and develop the friendly relations and cooperation existing between the two countries is the common aspiration of the two people which not only conforms to the interests of the two countries but also contributes to peace and stability of the region."<sup>51</sup>

On 15 November 1989 delegation level talks were held between the two countries, where views were exchanged on the current international scene. Bilateral relations were also reviewed and it was decided to identify areas of cooperation in trade and economy between the two countries. The two premiers reviewed latest development in Afghanistan as well as situation in South Asia.<sup>52</sup>

Pakistan and China signed four agreements on the conclusion of the second round of talks held between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The first agreement was to avoid double taxation. The three other agreements signed were,

an interest free loan of 50 million Yuan by China, protocol for procurement of road making machinery for Balochistan and 3.5 million Yuan humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees.<sup>53</sup> Prime Minister Li Peng also revealed that during his talk with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, his government had agreed to provide Pakistan with a 200-megawatt nuclear power plant, to be constructed under the safeguards of the IAE, of which both countries are members.<sup>54</sup>

President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan paid a visit to China in September 1990. He said that China had always been and would continue to be a reliable friend of Pakistan. Chinese Premier Le Peng stated that the two countries enjoyed good cooperative relations in political, economic, cultural, educational and industrial fields, with which China was satisfied. Giving the example of Gulf crisis while discussing the instability in the world, he noted that under such circumstances, the Third World countries should become more united. He cited the example of Sino-Pakistan friendship in this context.<sup>55</sup> Chinese President Yang Shangkun also paid a visit in October 1991. Both the Chinese president and president of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan agreed that the concept of New World Order should be based on equity, justice and principles of coexistence to make it the blueprint of a really new world. Presidents of both the countries agreed that real peace and progress could only be assured if state, big small abide by the principles of U.N charter, settle their disputes peacefully and advance international cooperation.<sup>56</sup>

Pakistan China cooperation expanded during the Nawaz Sharif era in most areas of mutual interests i.e. economy, commerce and trade, science and technology, agriculture and power generation. The two-way trade between China and Pakistan crossed one billion Dollars mark.<sup>57</sup> Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif paid two official visits to China in February and March 1991 and in October 1992. These visits provided an opportunity for an in-depth bilateral review of the economic

relations as well. During the second visit, Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan and China would continue to resist attempts by a country or group of countries to establish their hegemony at the global level.<sup>58</sup>

In late 1993 and September 1995 when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited China, She supported China on all the four major issues of human rights, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet.<sup>59</sup>

Pakistan and China also signed five agreements including one under which China would provide 80 million Yuan - roughly Rupees 375 Million - to Pakistan. The other four agreements relating to cooperation on science and technology raised the limit of border trade to 2 billion Rupees.<sup>60</sup> Premier Benazir Bhutto said political friendship and cooperation between the two countries should be expanded to greater economic collaboration by the investors and businessmen of the two countries. Prime Minister invited the Chinese investors and businessmen to visit Pakistan so that they could be provided with detailed feasibilities and financial aspects of various fields where Pakistan will be interested in foreign collaboration.<sup>61</sup>

The purpose of second visit of Benazir Bhutto to China was to attend the 4<sup>th</sup> world conference on women, where she also discussed regional issues with the top Chinese leaders.<sup>62</sup> Between the two visits of Benazir Bhutto to China, president Farooq Leghari also paid a visit to Beijing in December 1994. Both the countries agreed to strengthen bilateral economic ties and to remove the existing trade imbalance between the two countries. China extended valuable help for developing the defence industry in Pakistan. China also cooperated with Pakistan for the production of K-8 jet.<sup>63</sup>

In March 1995, China and Pakistan signed four protocols for future cooperation in steel making, heavy engineering and power generation sectors. They envisaged wide-ranging Chinese technical and financial assistance for the

expansion of Pakistan Steel Mills' capacity from 1.1 million tons to 1.5 million tons. The Chinese government also agreed to train Pakistani engineers.<sup>64</sup>

Chinese president Jiang Zemin paid a visit to Islamabad in December 1996. The visit aimed at exploring new avenues to strengthen Pak-China friendship and to seek closer economic cooperation. During the talks Chinese president assured Pakistani leaders that his country would continue its cooperation with Pakistan in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. A 300-megawatt nuclear power station being built by China at Chishma in Pakistan is a model of cooperation for the peaceful application of nuclear technology. Bilateral trade between the two countries was on the rise and had exceeded 1 billion U.S Dollars last year. During this visit Pakistan and China also signed an agreement aimed at promoting trade, investment and economic cooperation between the two countries.<sup>65</sup> The visit of president Farooq Leghari to Beijing in April 1997 was also aimed at expanding the trade and economic relations between the two countries. During the talks Pakistan's adverse balance of trade with China was also discussed.<sup>66</sup>

In his second tenure, premier Nawaz Sharif paid two visits to China in February 1998 and June 1999 to further consolidate and develop the friendly relations and cooperation existing between the two Countries and to seek closer economic cooperation. During the talks China extended traditional support on Kashmir and reiterated to resolve it according to the U.N Resolutions. Pakistan and China signed two agreements of mutual cooperation in economic collaboration, technical and agricultural sectors.<sup>67</sup> China accepted Pakistan's justification of its nuclear explosions. Chinese foreign ministry's spokesman said that present situation in South Asia was caused solely by India and Pakistan's nuclear tests were conducted as a reaction to India's intimidation. However, China advised India and Pakistan to



work towards non-proliferation in the region. It also advised India and Pakistan to settle their outstanding disputes and problems through peaceful means and bilateral dialogues. China also denied having provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, it claimed that China's cooperation with Pakistan in the nuclear field was peaceful and that its support to Pakistan's missile program was within the parameters set out by the international community.<sup>68</sup>

The Military government of General Pervaiz Musharraf was severely criticised by the west but China assured that its relations with Pakistan would not be affected by the change in government. The Chinese Premier extended a very warm welcome to General Pervaiz Musharraf on his visit in January 2000. He also remarked, "Excellency, you are the first guest we have received in the beginning of the new millennium."<sup>69</sup>

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji told Musharraf during talks, "our two countries always supported, trusted and understood each other and China's support for Pakistan will continue regardless of developments on the international scene or inside Pakistan."<sup>70</sup> During this visit China agreed to reschedule its loan to Pakistan, which was due up to December 1999. These loans would be rescheduled for payment between 2010 and 2019.<sup>71</sup> The Chinese leaders also appreciated Pakistan's policy of resolving the Kashmir issue through intensified efforts based on wishes of the people of Kashmir. The Chinese president Jiang Zemin also said that China wanted to see a more stable and prosperous Pakistan in the future.<sup>72</sup>

Premier Zhu Rongji's visit in May 2001 was historic. It was the first foreign visit of Chinese Premier in the current year and current century. Its special significance was that it took place on the eve of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. The Chinese Premier and the Chief Executive explored ways and means of further deepening this relationship well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The leaders also explored

opportunities for strengthening and widening economic cooperation and trade between the two countries.<sup>73</sup>

Premier Zhu said in a statement: "China and Pakistan are close and friendly neighbours... and cooperation between China and Pakistan has withstood the test of time and vicissitudes. History has proven that this friendship is not only in conformity with the common aspirations and fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples but also conducive to peace, stability and development of the region."<sup>74</sup>

As a result of the constant cooperation between the two countries many projects were completed successfully, to name a few, Karakoram Highway, Heavy Mechanical and Electrical complex, Aircraft Rebuild Factory, Aeronautical complex at Kamra, Factories for fertilizer and defence equipment and Sports complex Islamabad. Cooperation between the two countries has significantly contributed to our self-reliance. Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, being the latest monument of our cooperation. At the eve of golden jubilee of China-Pakistan relations, both the countries signed six agreements. These included agreements on economic and technical cooperation, tourism cooperation, lease agreement on Saindak copper-gold project, supply of locomotives and passenger coaches to Pakistan Railways; white oil pipeline, Gwadar-Port and development of coastal highway.

A historical analysis of the relationship reveals that the two countries had proceeded step-by-step towards establishing friendship on the basis of mutual interests, which overshadowed ideological differences. Both have exemplary friendship because they trust each other, understand each other and can mutually accommodate each other. Both have the unanimity of views on all global, regional and bilateral issues. It is for this reason that every government, every political party and every segment of society wants Sino-Pakistan relationship to remain. Almost all Pakistani premiers have visited China to further strengthen the all-weather friendship. The expectations

China and Pakistan had from each other had a touch of realism. For instance, when India invaded East Pakistan in 1971, Islamabad understood Beijing's limitations in view of Indo-Russian defence treaty.

China has also backed Pakistan's policy in current situation in Afghanistan. Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin said, "The Chinese government and people fully understand the delicate situation Pakistan is faced with. Government and people of China respect and support the position taken by the Pakistan government and people in line with its supreme national interests".<sup>75</sup>

Li Peng best summed up the strategic and historical nature of China-Pakistan ties, the former Chinese Premier when asked how China viewed its relations with Pakistan and India, during his visit to Thailand in April, Li Peng replied, "China adopts a peaceful policy of independence and self-reliance and maintains good relations with its neighbours". Being more specific about Pakistan, he added, "China and Pakistan enjoy a friendship that has stood the test of time".<sup>76</sup>

What is needed to celebrate the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations twenty-five years from now with the same fervour is an increase in trade and more frequent exchange of visits by scholars, intellectuals, students and government officials of both countries. What is most important is for the leaders of both the states to take into account each other's concerns when formulating their respective policies.

### End Notes:

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- 32 K. Arif, opcit; P.102 (Liu Shao Chi's speech at the banquet. 26 March 1966.)
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- 34 Safdar Mehmood Dr; opcit; pp. 173 - 174
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- <sup>36</sup> K. Arif, *opcit*; P, 161 (Bhutto's interview to the Editors of the Egyptian Gazette and Mail at Lahore. 29 January, 1976)
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, PP. 150-151. (Bhutto's speech at banquet in Peking 13 May 1974)
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, P. 150- 152; (Vice Premier China, Teng Hisao-Ping's speech, 13 May 1947.)
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- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, P. 168
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- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, P. 176; (Speech by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping 18 December 1977)
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- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* 14 February, 1989
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- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* 27 October, 1991
- <sup>57</sup> Safdar Mehmood Dr., *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000, P, 332
- <sup>58</sup> The Nation, 7 October, 1992
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 28 December, 1993
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 29 December, 1993
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- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 5v September, 1995
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- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, P. 307
- <sup>65</sup> The Nation, 2, 3, December, 1996
- <sup>66</sup> Pakistan trade deficit during 1995-1996 amounted to 399.77 millions US Dollars. Pakistan imports from China during the financial year 1995-1996 were 554. 73 millions US Dollars while during the same period, Pakistan exported items worth 144.6 million US Dollars. Hence total Pak-China

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trade during the previous fiscal was 399.77 million US Dollars. (The News, 30 April, 1997)

<sup>67</sup> Safdar Mehmood Dr., Opcit, P-333

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Dawn, 18 January, 2000

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 19 January 2000

<sup>73</sup> Currently two way trade stands at US \$ 1.162 billion with the balance of trade slightly in favour of China-Pakistan's exports to China increased from US \$ 390 millions in 1999 to US \$ 492 millions in 2000, registering an increase of 26 percent. Our exports have also significantly increased in the first quarter of 2001.

<sup>74</sup> The News, 12 May, 2001

<sup>75</sup> The News, 2 Oct, 2001

<sup>76</sup> Dawn, 29 June 1999.

## GWADAR –THE HARBINGER OF SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

Farooq Sultan<sup>1</sup>

Gwadar in the local language means ‘a gust of wind’. This is what it may well be or is more likely to be, because, Gwadar has been blessed with some of the finest elements of nature. “The sculptural range of mountains combined with white sand beaches and crystal clean water of the sea all around the area provides the most romantic view in reality.”<sup>1</sup>

With the development of related infrastructure it has the potential to become Pakistan’s most important tourist resort apart from being the hub of Commerce and trade activities.

### **Location**

Gwadar has an ideal location, being at the serene and strategically secure, extreme western end of Pakistan, it is in close proximity to the Pakistan Gulf and the straits of Hormos, which link the Arabian Sea with the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the main trade route between Europe and Asia.

Gwadar (a district of Mekran Division with 700 K.M. coast line) includes not only the town and the port but also the whole sandy peninsula of that name covering an area of approximately 500 Kilometers. It is about 470 K.M. away from Karachi.

“This coastal base has been through the ages one of the main routes of communication between the Middle East and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.”<sup>2</sup> Pasni have been used by the British as ports of call.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Farooq Sultan is visiting professor in Political Science Department, Government College University, Lahore.

## **Population**

The census due in 1991 could not be conducted due to political reasons.<sup>4</sup> We have to resort to 1981 census report in order to determine the population of Gwadar. The previous censuses (1951, 1961, 1972) also becomes doubtful, especially, in the light of the observation made by the Planning Commission of Pakistan, with regard to 1961 census, wherein the Planning Commission indicated under-enumeration of population by 7.5%.<sup>5</sup> The main reason for under-enumeration is that census commission usually appoints male enumerations; the female members of the household in view of social conditions are reluctant to appear before males for questioning. Female members are therefore, less reported because of social desirability factor.<sup>6</sup>

## **Ethnic Composition**

The Baluchis are in over-whelming majority in Gwadar District. They account for over 98% of the population. The rest are Sindhis, Punjabis, Pastoons, Bravis and others. They speak Baluchi, though the dialect is different from that of other parts of Baluchistan.<sup>7</sup>

## **Fisheries**

The bulk of population in Gwadar District is engaged in fishing and their subsistence depends on the catch, which is estimated to be 1/4<sup>th</sup> of the total catch in Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

Over the years the full time fishermen population has increased. According to the statistics released by the Directorate of Fisheries their number has increased from 12963



to 16380 in a decade (1986-1995) i.e. over 50% of the male working population.<sup>9</sup>

Most of the fishermen, who own small boats, are forced to migrate to other areas, especially Karachi, as the sea becomes turbulent in summers (May-September).<sup>10</sup>

## **Background of the Project**

Many attempts have been made in the past to develop a third deep water port at Gwadar but almost all of them being half hearted and casual, failed to bring the desired results. The present government true to its strategy of mega-project development seriously thought about the need of an alternative deep seaport for the strategic and commercial considerations.

China as a true friend and well wisher of Pakistan had shown interest in the port but the Taliban phenomenon in Afghanistan was mainly responsible for hampering any further development in this regard. The dialogue between Pakistan and China continued and after protracted discussions between Pakistan and Chinese officials an agreement was signed in Beijing for the first phase of this gigantic project.<sup>11</sup> Before going into the details of this project let us have a look at the history of this area-Gwadar.

## **History of Gwadar**

Gwadar has a long and chequered history. The area is said to have been ruled by successive Iranian Kings till the arrival of Alexander the Great (325 B.C) who incidentally discovered the sea in this area. Afterwards the area was ruled by one of Alexander's generals who lost it to Chandra Gupta in 303 B.C. Then the track of history was lost for centuries.

Towards the beginning of 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Portuguese,

on their way to India, captured several places along the Mekran coast.

Although many invaders conquered the land, but most of the time, the local rulers exercised power, because, the conquerors had no intention to stay there. Gwadar and the surrounding areas fell into the hands of Muscat in the eighteenth century. One of the claimants to the throne of the Muscat field to Mekran, in 1783, and after entering into an agreement with the khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan, was granted the share of the revenues of Gwadar. He, later on, became the ruler of Musert in 1797. Although it is generally believed that the Khan of Kalat permanently transferred the right of sovereignty to Muscat, the khan and local elders always asserted the temporary nature of this agreement thereby reiterating their sovereign authority over the entire area. The British interest in Gwadar was created in the wake of First Afghan War (1838-39). A special British emissary was dispatched to this area in 1861 followed by the appointment of an Assistant Political agent in 1863. The telephonic connection between Gwadar and Karachi was established in the same year. Later on post offices were opened at Gwadar Pasni in 1884 and 1903 respectively. After the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, areas except Gwadar and its surroundings joined the Baluchistan States union as part of Mekran state. Mekran was awarded the status of a district of former West Pakistan in 1955, after its accession to Pakistan.

In 1958, during Ayub's era Gwadar and its surrounding areas were reverted back to Pakistan by the Sultan of Muscat and were declared as a tehsil of Mekran district. After the dissolution of one unit in 1970, Baluchistan became a province, and Mekran became one of its 8 districts. Later on when Mekran gained the status of division in 1977, it was divided into three districts namely Panjpur, Turput (renamed Kech) and Gwadar.<sup>12</sup>

## **Gwadar-An alternative Sea Port**

Pakistan with a population of 130 million and a developing economy is deeply constrained to have a single port or twin ports of Karachi to meet its ever-increasing economic demands.

In purely strategic terms, "The strategic interests of Pakistan demand it does not entirely rely on Karachi, its old harbour and the new port Qasim which are too close to a large and ever armed neighbour with which it has often confrontational relations.<sup>13</sup> Gwadar was therefore the best choice as it is almost 500 K.M. away from Karachi and less vulnerable to any Indian adventurism at sea.

### **Greater Gwadar Plan**

A comprehensive plan has been prepared by the present government spanning over two phases and to be carried out by Gwadar Development Authority. Port at Gwadar is just one part of Great Gwadar plan. Apart from the Gwadar port a huge network of roads and rail links and power supply links are proposed to be built.

#### **Phase I**

Under this phase three multipurpose Berts along with 5 K.M. approaches channel and a 15.5-meter channel drainage drought are proposed to be built<sup>14</sup> to accommodate 50000 dwt vessels.<sup>15</sup> It is expected to be completed within three years of initiation.

## **Allied Facilities/ Infrastructure**

For such a high project like Gwadar, a lot of infrastructure and allied facilities are required to maximize the benefits and linking Gwadar with rest of the country through road and rail network becomes imperative.

### **I- Road Links**

A network of roads connecting Gwadar with Karachi, Pasni, and Turbut will be built. Work on 675 Km coastal line Highway is in progress. This road will link Gwadar with Karachi. The remaining three Highways, i.e.

1. Pasni Gwadar Road.
2. Ormara Gwadar Road.
3. Gwadar Turbut Road will be built in phase II. Pasni will be linked with Ormara in phase III and then to Iranian border at Gupt, in the final phase.<sup>16</sup>

All these roads, in the final phase, will be connected with China through Indus Highway. It is worth mentioning that an agreement between Pakistan, China three central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan and Uzbekistan) already exists for the development of road links from. "Central Asia and the Chinese Province of Sin Kiang to the Arabian Sea coast."<sup>17</sup>

### **II- Railways**

Pakistan Railways too has plans to provide a rail link from Gwadar to Taftan (Iranian Border) via Sandak, the first

ever metallurgical project already completed but awaiting Commercial production of gold and copper since 1995, mainly due to financial constraints. The Sandak project is likely to benefit from the proposed rail link as well.<sup>18</sup>

### **Power Sector**

To meet the power requirements, work on a (164 Km) 132 K.V.A transmission line from Turbut to Gwadar is underway and is expected to be finalized in a year at an estimated cost of Rs. 360 million.<sup>19</sup>

### **Cost of Phase I**

Estimate cost of Phase I is around Rs. 14900 million with a high foreign exchange component of Rs. 8674 million and the local investment of about 6231 million, bringing the total to 248 million U.S dollars. China has agreed to provide 80% of the cost.

### **Phase II**

Phase II will start after the completion of phase I. The total outlay for phase II is calculated at Rs. 31442 million with a foreign exchange component of Rs. 22009 besides local funding of Rs. 9433 million.<sup>20</sup>

### **Importance for Pakistan**

Baluchistan, the longest but the least developed area of Pakistan is going to be the Chief beneficiary as the development work will bring in its wake a very large number of job opportunities for the young people of the province apart from the long term benefits of a port.

The importance of Gwadar seaport has to be gauged in the context of current global environment. With the imposition of World Trade Organization rules, tariff walls will erode and

free flow of trade and capital among nations would follow. The main beneficiaries of this liberal, globalized economy would be the developed states. Developing States like Pakistan, with lack of good governance, poor infra structure, stagnant economic performance, raising trade deficit and unemployment are least prepared to take on the challenge posed by the onslaught of globalization. To meet this challenge Pakistan is required to undertake over-hauling and re-designing of its economic architecture. The construction of Gwadar Sea will go a long way to meet this end. The port will not only fill the gap in terms of providing a viable infrastructure and major international sea port, it would also help Pakistan to exploit the potential economic resources of its immediate peripheral states.

It is abundantly clear that land locked Central Asian States are fabulously rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. The legendary Caspian Basin bordering these Republics is projected to become the 'Persian Gulf of the 21<sup>st</sup> century'.<sup>21</sup> It is because the untapped oil and gas resources of CAR around the Caspian Sea are estimated to the total of \$5 trillion. Over 1580 K.M. long pipeline being developed by "A consortium with 50% takes-takes by U.S oil major Chevron, 25% by Exxon-Mobil and 20% by Kazakhstan"<sup>22</sup> has already connected the Caspian Basin to International markets. The pipeline runs from Tengez oil field in Kazakhstan to Novorossiick, a Russian port on the Black Sea.<sup>23</sup> This cooperation on the part of U.S and C.I.S goes to prove the big power 'run for oil' and their acquiesce in the construction of Gwadar Sea port by Pakistan with massive technical and financial help from China.

The Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgistan are land locked and have to route their trade through the black sea port of Odessa, a voyage of almost 34000 Kilometers. However, to be commercially viable, C.A.R would require competitive

production costs, mainly the transport cost between points of production and the market. Pakistan, jointly with Afghanistan, provides feasible trade route via land and sea. Given the vast C.A.R resources of oil and gas and the sheer volume of trade that would thereby follow, the immense importance of Gwadar port can well be imagined.<sup>24</sup>

Apart from these countries Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Iran and Iraq and Iraq can utilize the port facilities being provided at Gwadar. It is estimated that at least 20 countries can benefit from Gwadar port.<sup>25</sup>

### **Strategic Importance**

Gwadar port, when completed will be a big strategic asset for Pakistan as an alternative port. The Karachi port has been under threat of blockade by India in the past. During the Kargil operation, Indian spared no opportunity to convey to the world, in general, and Pakistan in particular, the vulnerability of twin ports of Pakistan. Gwadar Port being 470 K.M. away from Karachi port will be less vulnerable to any such Indian threats of blockade. Besides the presence of China in an around this area could be a real deterrent against any Indian future designs.<sup>26</sup>

### **The Chinese Interests**

China as the main financier of the project is likely to benefit most in times to come. China has performed an economic miracle since the adoption of Deng Xiaopeug's New Economic Policy in 1978 when China was opened to outside World for trade and investment. Over this period China recorded an annual growth rate of 10.5% and her foreign trade leapt to \$360 billion. With China's accession to WT, its exports

in the world trade volume are anticipated to rise from the present 3% to 10% by 2010.<sup>27</sup>

Currently China is focused on developing its underdeveloped western provinces. These 12 provinces account for 71% of its area, 28.4% of its total population and 87% of its ethnic minorities.<sup>28</sup>

The central Bank of China is said to have provided \$200 billion in loan to the western province. The most important city of western China, Kashgar, is 3500 K.M. away from Gwadar, almost half of the nearest Chinese eastern port. China's main interest in Gwadar port and the massive communication network is to get a convenient road link between Kashgar and Gwadar in order to facilitate the bulk of her imports and exports through this area.<sup>29</sup>

Secondly, Gwadar will provide the Chinese the first ever opportunity to establish their Naval presence in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.<sup>30</sup>

The fact remains that transport corridors to be used for the trade purposes have to make use of Pakistani ports (i.e. Gwadar), which is nearer than the Chinese port in the eastern part of the country. Hence, the Gwadar port can serve as the shortest and more economical route for china, CAR, Afghanistan and eventually parts of Iran and India.

### End Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Baboo Ghulab, Gwadar, The Future of Pakistan, Dawn March 22,2002.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.Oman.org/bonn007.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> Baboo Ghulab: op-cit.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.Gwadar.op-cit>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Fisheries - Important Economic Activity, Dawn, March 22, 2002

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Ibid



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<sup>11</sup> Sultan Ahmed, Gwadar - A Part with Great Promise, Dawn , March 22, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> German and International Research on Oman: [http://ww.oman.org/Bonn007 htm](http://ww.oman.org/Bonn007.htm).

<sup>13</sup> Sultan Ahmed, op-cit.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Ghazanfar Mehdi, Gwadar - The Third Deep Water Part of Pakistan, The Nation, 13 April, 2002

<sup>16</sup> Dr. Rashid . A. Khan, Gwadar Project - Economic and Strategic Dimensions, The Nation, 15 April, 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Op-cit

<sup>18</sup> Mairaj Fatima, All Set to Begin Work on Deep Sea Water Gwadar Project, Dawn 22, March, 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Ghazanfar Mehdi, op-cit.

<sup>20</sup> Mairaj Fatima, op-cit.

<sup>21</sup> Jamil. A. Siddiqui, Gwadar Port: A Potential Response to Challenges of Globalization, Dawn 22 March, 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Baboo Ghulab, op-cit.

<sup>26</sup> Dr. Rashid A. Khan op-cit.

<sup>27</sup> Jamil A. Siddiqui op-cit.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

<sup>29</sup> Dawn Internet – 15 October, 2001.

<sup>30</sup> Dr. Rashid A. Khan, op-cit.

## DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO THE GRASS ROOT LEVEL IN PAKISTAN

Razia Mussarat<sup>1</sup>

The concept of devolution of power is not just devolution of a range of political responsibility and administrative machinery. It involves devolution of government having depository power with adequate financial autonomy. Thus a devolution system should not only have attributes of geographical identities separate legal existence, local political representation, access to central and local government relation, and perform services delivery function but should have planning and financial autonomy.

Devolution plan has become a creed - a way of life with ethical roots in democracy. Thus to some extent it is an idealistic concept. It suggests a system in which decision making process is restrictive and in which people are given an opportunity to pursue their individual goals. Thus devolution of power being an important management concept demands a real change in social and administrative structure and behavior in society. Devolution of power has received considerable attention in Pakistan. Pakistan has experienced frequent military takeovers. Military in Pakistan, has taken control of government to save the country from chaotic political disorder. It, however, tends to stay longer. The subsequent concern of the military rulers then becomes finding a civilian support base in order to seek legitimacy for the otherwise illegitimate rule. To analyze this situation, this paper will initially allude to the historical background of the local government system and will seek to evaluate the philosophy and objectives of the novel system of Basic Democracies and Zia's progress towards restoration of democracy. It will also focus its attention on the Devolution of Power Plan 2000.

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## Historical Growth of the Local Self Government System

The local self-government system is more than a century old. It is a philosophy of administration whose roots can be traced to the ethics and norms of a democratic society. Democracy has always been considerable to be political system where supreme control is exercised by a general assembly of all citizens irrespective of wealth, birth or profession.

Everyone has equal rights to contribute and the decisions are to be based on the collective wisdom of all citizens.<sup>1</sup> In British India, local government system was first conceived during the viceroyalty of Lord Mayo. The idea was to bring local interest and supervision to bear on the management of funds devoted by government to education, sanitation, public works etc. The system confined to municipal and the district level, involved only officials first with the kind of heavy administrative responsibilities which an official was supposed to carry with his rank. It was considered that some of his work should be allowed to be shared by local but non-official members. Thus an element of election on a highly limited scale was devised for local participation. These elected men were to relieve officials of some of their burden by sharing some of their responsibilities in already defined field. From the 1861 Council Act through the Rawrence Resolution of 1864, the Bombay Local Fund Act of 1869 and the Resolution of Rippen in 1882, there took place a steady expansion of the indigenous representation in the legislature.

But the introduction of elected element was not meant to share political power and responsibilities. Rippen had declared in 1882 that the measure "was not (taken) primarily with a view to improve the administration.... but was chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education."<sup>2</sup> However, the viceroy had hoped that when after sometime more local knowledge was acquired and more local interest was created, improved efficiency would itself follow. In the

years that followed, the government further extended the representative system to the provincial and central councils. But no political responsibility was vested in the locals.

It should be emphasized that in 20<sup>th</sup> century, important step in constitutional advance for India was taken in 1909, when Indian legislatures, became representative bodies. Behind this development of British policy lay the growing political awareness and ambition of the educated class in India. Later, the fear of failure, if not the will to succeed, forced the government to conceive the right of at least the partial self-rule to Indians under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.<sup>3</sup> Political responsibility was given to the locals for the first time after the passage of the Government of India Act of 1935. Here too, the sharing of power was confined to the regional level only.

After independence a centralized system was established in Pakistan in 1947 with the adoption of the Government of India Act 1935. Although it was modified to exclude certain discretionary powers of the Governor General but it retained his power under section 92 (A), 102 and 125. It provided for a controlled parliamentary federation as means for organizing public power. No change occurred in the politically established system even after the enforcement of the 1956 constitution. Local bodies were more or less lifeless institutions with faulty frameworks, in adequate finances, curtailed functions and little contact with the people whose affairs they were supposed to administer.

### **The System Of Basic Democracy**

The military coup of 1958 ushered a new era in the history of local government in Pakistan. Commenting on the imposing of the Martial Law Dr. Khawaja Alqama says, "Thus, bringing to an end the first phase of the 'drama of politics' in Pakistan".<sup>4</sup> To make Pakistan a sound, solid and cohesive nation, the military leader demonstrated extraordinary enthusiasm in the restoration of democracy and preferred to

take the initiative from the grass roots level. A new political system was established exactly one year after the regime seizure of power, which came to be regarded as the mainstay of Ayub's political system.

Hamza Alvi asserted, "indeed search for legitimacy and also the articulation of powerful elements in Pakistan society into institutional structure of so-called 'Basic Democracy' underpinned the civilian foundation of that regime."<sup>5</sup> An important characteristic of General Ayub Khan which distinguished him from many other military rulers elsewhere was his willingness to undertake the task of political institution-building for legitimizing the regime and recruit support for its policies.<sup>6</sup> Although he recognized that Pakistan was facing the problem of national integration and he stressed the need for it, this was to be achieved by paternalistic leadership through his novel creation of the system of Basic Democracies. Being convinced that the people of Pakistan were too uneducated, divided, impoverished and unsophisticated to form democratic institutions, General Ayub introduced a kind of grassroots system which the people could understand and operate and which, according to his perception, could form the basis on which the superstructure of the representative institutions would ultimately grow and flourish.

This measure was to create a system of local government to encompass both the rural and urban areas of Pakistan. But more stress was on the former where approximately 85 percent of the country's population resided. The system was introduced with obvious appeal to the small landlords and middle peasantry of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.<sup>7</sup> It was thought that the system would provide rural leadership, which would develop into a Grand National Assembly. It would also shift the focus of politics away from the urban areas to the rural areas.

Huntington holds the view that the Basic Democracies brought politics to the rural areas and created a class of rural activists with a role to play in both local and national politics. For the first time political activity was dispersed outward from

the cities and spread over the countryside. Political participation was broadened which was a major step towards creating the institutional link between government and countryside as a pre-requisite of political stability in a modernizing society.<sup>8</sup>

It successfully limited urban participation; the participation it provided for rural areas also had certain limitations. Its participation was limited by the domination of government officials and council chairman.

The scheme was primarily designed both to promote rural development and to create a rural power base for the regime, by establishing a new class of collaborators in the countryside. It must be noted that rather than establishing a popular base for the regime, the Basic Democrats were increasingly ridiculed and at the height of the 1969 agitation they simply faded away.

According to Ian Talbot, "it (Basic Democracy) does suggest a possible way in which politically and economically backward countries can arrive at self-government on our Western lines."<sup>9</sup>

It was declared that the scheme was to effect democratic decentralization by bringing the will of the people closer to government and the personnel of government closer to the people. There were a number of political reasons for such a move and they were that Ayub distrusted the urban middle class and the intelligentsia, particularly in Bengal. Thus the balance of power moved, for a decade, in favour of the new rural leadership and the urban elite was eclipsed. The critics of Basic Democracy system, therefore, did not accept the system as a substitute for real local self-government.

It was thought that Basic Democrats would develop a direct relation between the bureaucracy and rural elite, thus cultivating a network allies for government, based on the access to the states resources.<sup>10</sup> The key to the Basic Democracy System was the field administrator and there was no mistaking the revitalization of a pre-independence colonial legacy in the form of district administration. Because the civil

servants were responsible for selecting candidates thereby extending detailed administrative control over political issues. The bureaucrats exerted influence on the Union Councils. Also their continued dominance of the Tehsil/Thana, the District and the Division, left their influence unimpaired.

The underlying rationale of the system was that the political process which the state elite viewed as basically disruptive of the community, had to be carefully nurtured under the enlightened and modernized leadership supplied by the top elite of the military and bureaucracy.<sup>11</sup>

The system was an ambitious attempt to create a social contract between the state and society by co-opting locally privileged individuals into the lower levels of administration. It was so in view of the fact that the organization of the Basic Democracies was highly coterminous with the class structure of the Pakistani society.<sup>12</sup> Designing the structure thus, one contention was the demands facing Pakistan were numerous and complex whereas the bureaucracy at both the central and provincial capitals was so limited that solution to these problems could be achieved only with decentralization of responsibility to sub-national units.

The association of Basic Democrats with the officials was to produce two results: first it was to act as a check on the working of the government, while the second was to provide the Basic Democrats with an opportunity to understand how government functioned and how to supervise and guide its functioning. One of the important achievements of the Basic Democracies had been to bridge the gulf by bringing the elected representatives of the people closely and directly in touch with the administrative officers. Through the prolonged gulf (that existed between the governing class and the governed), there had developed certain amount of skepticism on both sides. At a later stage, the government officers were astonished by the value of the contribution, which Basic Democrats from the grass roots were making to the work of higher-level councils. The government's idea that these institutions would be in a position to influence the

administration and determine the way it should be run and thus reduce the gap between the officials and the people could not be fully materialized on account of the preponderance of the bureaucracy and the fundamental role that was assigned to the Deputy Commissioner as 'Controlling Authority' for much of the activities of the council operations. Many problems were faced in subjecting the administration, with a long tradition of benevolent autocracy, to non-official scrutiny and interference without suffering traumatic effects and a sharp drop in efficiency. Local institutions under Basic Democracies had a defective organizational structure compared to those of government departments. The lack of ability on the part of elected representatives to reach the government greatly enhanced the chances of official opinion getting weight on some conflict that might have arisen between the two. The appointment of official chairman to all local councils, except union councils, further tightened the control of bureaucracy. It was, too perhaps, the result of this caution that the non-official element at the upper levels was not as strong as might in theory have been possible. The bureaucratic attitude thus negated the idea through which the military ruler intended to create institutional arrangement wherein bureaucracy and the elected members to the localities could achieve maximum co-operation in national development.<sup>13</sup> One major flaw in the system which did not allow the people to have a feeling of real self-governing local bodies was, therefore, the supremacy of bureaucracy to whom belonged the real power and not to the elected councilors. The reason was perhaps the regime depended more on government officials than on the Basic Democrats, in recruiting support for itself.

This system was originally conceived as devoid of political party activity, political socialization, a favourable popular response to symbols and values in the federal system. It could be achieved only after the nation had been mobilized to participate in the process of national reconstruction. It is important to note that one method for the attainment of this goal was lost with the abolition of the political parties. Another



was rejected by disassociating the professional and urban elite from experiment.

It must be remembered that the Basic Democrats owed their existence to the president and could not be expected to commit political suicide by casting a vote against him. The first thing which the government asked the newly elected members to do was to decide, by secret ballot, whether they wanted Ayub Khan as President and whether they endorsed his policies. Commenting on this first Presidential election held in Pakistan, Khawaja Alqama writes, " Ayub Khan was elected President by a 95% yes vote an exercise which made East European election look glamorous"<sup>14</sup>. The Basic Democracies alienated, by disfranchising the urban areas the previously mobilized and semi-mobilized groups. By monopolizing electoral rights the Basic Democracies system became the most visible target for the discontent of all alienated groups. Who looked upon it as the mechanism by which the regime perpetuated itself. Thus, the system not only failed to legitimize the regime but also lost its own legitimacy. This kind of indirect presidential election was borrowed from the example of France. The method was adopted here despite significant gap in the level of education and political consciousness between the two countries. The National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies elected in May and June 1962 respectively came into existence with no political parties and no political activity preceding them. There were, therefore, no platform, no program and no policy for the legislature as a whole and no basis for concerted action therein once it came into existence. In the absence of national organizations, groups emerged on provincial lines. To the opposition political parties the purpose of the Basic Democrats, as Electoral College was to undermine the direct franchise and to develop a group of supporters who would sustain the existing regime in power. The election of governing elite through the electoral college stretched the power of the President to every organ of the state and this, in practical term, set up a highly centralized form of government which affected the working of the local

government institutions specially, the parliamentarians so elected became tutelage in the hands of the President.

The feeling remained in East Pakistan that President Ayub devised the electoral system to rob leaders genuinely representative of the people's will. Yet another vital objective of the government was to strength the foundation of the Conventional Muslim League. So Ayub Khan called for greater collaboration between the party and the Basic Democracies. This combination was to produce a fully mobilized, ideologically disciplined and centrally directed organization.

For a successful working of the system of Basic Democracies Ayub had to rely heavily on the civil servants who became the staunch ally of the system after digesting the early shocks of the military coup of 1958. Here it is important to point out that Ayub sought to strengthen the state's grip over society by giving the civil bureaucracy a bigger hand in dishing out political and economic patronage.<sup>15</sup> Apart from bureaucracy, "the effect of the new system has been to associate local landlords with the officials machinery of the government".<sup>16</sup> By calling the rural localities directly into the service of the centralizing state, Ayub hoped to exercise his presidential authority without any interference from parties and politicians with provincial basis of support. Ayub's Basic Democracies major contribution lay in developing a pattern of official and rural leaders jointly working in productive operations e.g., the public works programme and thus diverting the energy of a vast number of rural leaders from traditional political activities e.g., petitioning, civil disobedience, and strikes to modern leadership roles such as organizing programmes, mobilizing rural masses, and working out local problems.

The opponent of the system described the Basic Democracy system as out right hypocrisy. They declared it was done more to isolate them than to improve the condition of the poor. They also pointed out that the main beneficiaries of the system were the Basic Democrats and the rich farmers, as against the vast majority of the landless labourers. They looked

upon it as a scantily veiled measure to perpetuate the power of the regime. The opponents of the system in Bengal strongly felt that the system of Basic Democracies was devised to recruit a base of popular Bengali support for the regime and not to make Bengali equal share of power at the center.<sup>17</sup> The Bengali counter elite did participate in the election of 1962 and 1964-65, in the first one with skepticism, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> one seriously and to the extent that they participated, the constitution did gain the appearance of legitimacy. But one of their objectives in participation was to change the constitution from within. Yet their pressure inside the system as well as outside had little impact in bringing about the major constitutional reforms they desired. They had an eager audience in East Pakistan over lordship of East Pakistan. There were limitations because the Basic Democracies were dominated by the governmental officials and the council chairman. An early report on the Basic Democracy found that 80% of the items on the agenda for discussion at the Union Council meetings were initiated by letters and visits from government officials.


Despite some impressive strides in overall uplift, the system suffered from different types shackles which inhibited its flowing into a viable superstructure of local government. With the fall of General Ayub Khan in 1969, the Basic Democracies also went into oblivion and was subsequently abolished.

### **Zia's Progress Towards Restoration of Democracy**

The military take-over by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977 was initially projected as a ninety-day-operation for holding general elections later; he changed his mind and expanded the goals of the coup. Opposition leaders perceived that slowing down the promised return to civil rule was not a good sign. These leaders assembled their "defunct parties" under a new umbrella organization called " Movement For Restoration of Democracy" which was launched in February

1981.<sup>18</sup> The movement was not an electoral alliance but an opposition front to secure restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Zia's government reverted to the first principle of military rule in Pakistan, local bodies first, democracy later. Zia gave top priority to local government institutions in Pakistan as in many of the new democracies of Asian countries are of considerable importance and very useful in educating the general mass of people.

General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a policy of restriction on partisan. Political parties were banned in 1979. In the some year Zia-ul-Haq established a system of local government with the promulgation of "Local Bodies Ordinances"<sup>19</sup>. Zia established four-tier local government institution.



“The composition of the Union Council was determined by direct universal suffrage on a non-party basis. Tehsil or Taluka Councils were composed of Union Council Chairmen, Town Committee Chairmen and representatives of nation building departments i.e. bureaucrats. District or Zila Councils were composed of elected representatives of Union Councils and Tehsil Councils Chairmen, and bureaucrats.”<sup>20</sup>

First Local bodies elections were held in 1979, and the second in 1983. The elected local councilors were responsible for small-scale developmental projects.

The traditional power holder in rural areas, the landlords and peers dominated local bodies. As the elections for these bodies were held on non-party basis. Generally local bodies institutions of Zia-ul-Haq regime were different from the Basic Democracies of Ayub Khan in regard, first bureaucrats were less dominant in local bodies institutions than they were in Basic Democracies. Second unlike Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq had not converted local government structure into an electoral forum for National Elections.

The local councilors had been assigned a wide role and delegated reasonable measures of authority in the field of agriculture, communication, housing and industry, manpower and social welfare. In order to settle petty disputes, local councilors entrusted with power of conciliation and arbitration. The finances of rural and urban local councils were derived from taxes, remunerative projects, specific grants by the federal and the provincial government. The rural local council could levy taxes like property tax, tax on transfer of immoveable property. The urban local council could levy taxes like property tax, parking fees, school fees, and agricultural and industrial exhibition fees.<sup>21</sup>

It appears that president Zia wanted to made remarkable progress in the political field. Zia attempted to eliminate the political parties. But he failed to do so.

A strong and sound system of local self-government institution helps greatly in providing an infrastructure of democracy. Modern democracy gives serious thought to the relations between successful democracy and the existence of a sound system of local self government institutions in a country like Pakistan where the majority of the people are illiterate and live in rural areas, the importance of local government institutions can be exaggerated. The 1985 party-less elections initiated a phase of guided democracy. In practice restricted political participation was restored. In the short run the military

regime succeeded in weakening the political parties, but in the long run it failed to promote politics of consensus building.

### **Devolution of Power Plan 2000**

The army toppled the elected civilian government and took control of the government on October 12, 1999. General Pervez Musharraf became the Chief Executive of the country. He felt the urgency to decentralize both government's administrative and development services. The principle simply says that decisions should not go to an upper level provincial level or even worse the federation upper level. In his opinion decentralization was the only way out to solve governance problem in Pakistan. Devolution of power plan is implemented at three levels.

1. Union Council.
2. Tehsil Council.
3. District Council.

General Pervez Musharraf called devolution plan revolutionary. He claimed that,

“The change in the system will be revolutionary and benefit the people enormously as devolution plan will give them the power, authority and finance to run government.” He further said, “it was now up to the people to elect the proper representative's as the corrupt have misused billion of rupees in the name of well-being of poor”.<sup>22</sup>

The question arises what are aims and objectives of the government by policy of devolution of power through local election? The declared object of the plan is to decentralize the authority and function from the provincial government to district, tehsil and union council governments. The plan does not touch the provincial autonomy and infect tries to put in place city and district government at the expense of provincial government.

The most important question that arises is how would the system work effectively and honestly under the present social structure, which is feudal in character and power wielding by nature? The village is the territory where the first

devolution plant is to be planted. The truth is that here informally power and authority are still exercised by the influential class of people like the jagirdars, the waderas and the sardars. Who demonstrate this frequently in their sphere of influence. All other human beings are dispensable, disposable by the feudal or the wadera who is not answerable to anyone even now. The Union Council is the territory where he has ruled as the unchallenged lord of all he surveys. Sardars or waderas got their own men elected to the local council or biradris had played the same role where there was no sardar or wadera or jagirdar. How would then a common man find his interests saved or protected? But it must be noted that now sardar, jagirdar or wadera is to be dislodged from the position of eminence. Because the moment the Union Council comes effectively into its own, a new order and culture is born. At the very best, the present feudal area is reduced to one single vote. If he is not disqualified under the Political Parties Act. It will be unwise not to be fully prepared to counter relentless opposition from this quarter. If there is silence on this front at this stage, it may be tactical.

As regards the bureaucratic attitude, we all know that very little good can be expected of them. During Ayub era bureaucracy dealt with the public in an arrogant and whimsical manner. Bureaucracy had undermined the electoral process and had satisfied Ayub's political advisors. In the absence of effective political articulation by the regional counter elite, the bureaucracy seized defacto political power and played a decisive political role in the policy formulation and execution. It readily filled the vacuum created by the lack of strong non-parochial leadership and in the process politicized itself and discarded the politicians as superfluous and as hindrances to modernization. It is true that no local self government is known to have been worked well enough without the back-up of political organizations or without the membership being a conscious part of larger objective in one way or another. The Union Councils and District Councils are picked out non-political persons. There are no provincial and national

assemblies. The elected councilors are bound to be influenced by the ruler's own declared prejudices. These members are, from their point of view, clean people. They will, being, at the grassroots and having established themselves enough in the hierarchy, be certain to have substantial influence on the outcome of second and third stage of elections to the provincial and national assembly. What we will get at that level too may well be a bit in the nature of more clones cast in the prescribed imagines.

In the existing order of things, the Union Council and smaller town is the domain of a sort of tacit condominium in which the feudal and the bureaucracy have ruled supreme. Of the feudal and bureaucrat, who has the upper hand is usually a personal equation. If the feudal has political clout, he would be calling the shots more often. If not, the bureaucrat will be the person who wears the pants in the area.

The feudal usually has so much to hide that when the crunch comes. He either makes an abject surrender, or, like a cunning operator, lies low for a while only to strike back when least expected. This is a serious possibility. From the bureaucratic camps resistance is more likely to take the form of non-cooperation, going slow, upsetting documents and files, deliberately delaying things and just passive sort of sulking. Indications of this passive resistance are already visible. The bureaucrat might also try to be casual and dismissive of the elected Union Councils. There has to be close and constant interaction between the Union Councilors and the local bureaucrats. The bureaucrat should be left in no doubt about who is the boss. Also that there will be no compromise on demands of the disciplines of public service. In fact in any effort to reform the Pakistani political scene, a reformed bureaucracy, police and judiciary must inevitably play a critical role of providing checks and balances for fair play. The system's success lies with the character of the people, who run it, and success and failure of the new system depends on the quality of political leadership elected by the people, which in turn is to run the affairs of public concerns.



Now the entire system of district bureaucracy is changed into a hierarchy of District Coordination Officer (DCO), District Executive Officers (DEO) and subordinate officers at tehsil level. The creation of the office of the district ombudsman is proposed to ensure speedy redressal of public grievances. But we see in the past the functioning of the system has failed not so much because of the inadequacy of, or faults in, the laws as because of the existence of a hostile environment.

The main objective now is decentralization. It however, seems that excessive powers are concentrated in the hands of the Nazims. The new system of governance means not only a change in the administrative system, but the entire political and historical characteristics of the federation are to be profoundly affected.

The political parties have no major say in the devolution process. Judiciary is perhaps neutral, as it largely remains unaffected. Bureaucracy, especially the future of the District Management Group (DMG) has been rendered uncertain by the devolution plan.

Political parties involve people at local, provincial and federal levels. Without political parties local government will automatically bring in individuals and small narrow interests groups. This local government plan by definition is local. It evolved and developed by local people. The politicians are removed from the actual scene of action when the politician is sitting in the capital, while the activity is taking place in the district hundreds of miles away, the relationship is influenced by several factors and layers. The provincial politician is able to maneuver and blackmail the district politicization through the civil servant. Because the Nazim and the council could concern themselves with the framing of the policy and the implementation could be the function of the bureaucracy. This is the method on which democracy works successfully in the world. This is very complex situation and the government will have to think to arrive at a correct balance between the two circumstances.

It is doubtful if power is exercised by the new holders of office in a manner free from whims and caprice, especially when the power is localized. It is beyond an administratively and financially emaciated provincial government to ensure against such aberrations. The existing devolution of power plan has made removal of the Nazim subject to the approval of the governor who is an appointee of federal government. It seems that the federal government has the effective control of the district government.

Devolution Plan is designed on bottom-up basis instead of the traditional top down approach. Most Commissioners have become District Coordinating Officers (DCOs). The DCOs work between Nazims and Naib Nazims and the provincial departments of administration, revenue etc, and the police have been but under the Nazims. The DCOs are regular civil servants like deputy commissioners. It means that the Nazims and Naib Nazims perform general supervisory or social functions while the professional government's work is management and practically controlled by the DCOs. Further there is concentration of power in the Nazims, which they probably cannot exercise at ease. And this, ironically, works against the decentralization basis of the whole system. Recently several departments like the municipal cooperation, city development authorities like water and sanitation authorities and the like were put in the charge of the District Nazim. On the face of it, the local government system contains, many of the important functions, under the criminal and civil law that the provinces alone supposed to perform. As a result, when the otherwise historically, ineffective and inefficient provincial assemblies came into being, the issue of provincial autonomy will come to the fore. Most elected representatives are finding it extremely difficult to move the administrative machinery. In order to exercise their executive authority they have to rely on the District Coordination Officer (DCO). The legislative power is with the councilors. There are no rules of business and no road maps. Finances are being provided for the

uplift of the cities and towns but Nazims are expected to make their own budgets and set their priorities.

The Nazims are expected to keep their paper work in order. Decisions have to be taken after a due process with documentary and evidence. Budgets have to be approved and accounts audited. Public complaints and feedback mechanism have to be effective. Can the Nazims do all the above task on their own? If the answer is no then how can they be helped?

Most DCOs are experienced bureaucrats and know how to operate the existing system. Most elected representatives realize the relative limitations of time in authority and deserve to move fast. The bureaucrats are not driven by time constraints. The resulting tug of war producing adhocism interaction with the Nazims and the administration below has to be affectively established. If the system fails, the Nazims will be blamed while the DCOs will move on to counter future revolutions and change mechanisms.

Nazims must have access to correct information in order to effectively run their cities and towns. The Nazims should be provided with guidelines to implement the revolutionary agenda in their areas. In additional to the NRB guidance the Nazims should seek help from professionals in preparing budgets and management and building consensus.

Adhoc measures have not worked in the past. The Nazims and the administrative machinery have to work in unison to produce results. The Nazims should know that the old rules of business are no longer applicable and can be changed. The changed methodology has to be developed by the NRB and handed over to Nazims to be used extensively as needed. All resources must be pooled in for the success of this revolution.

Empowerment of the masses and decentralization of authority is at the core of the devolution plan. Literacy is the basic building block of the nation. Major effort is needed in this area. In order to lead the empowerment effort the Nazims must be empowered themselves. This calls for the training for the elected representatives.

The government's higher educational level would improve the representative's performance.

There is, however, no denying the fact that the performance of the representatives in Pakistan has generally remained dismal. There are various reasons for that, the most obvious being the absence of certain support service that enable the representatives to discharge their responsibilities in an efficient manner.

The basic task of politics is to shape the system of government to monitor and analyze problems, to create conditions for social change and to constantly improve the legislative framework. Any legislator who wishes to do this job better has to depend on a constant flow of information for his political work and policy decision. Individual members must have access to basic information reflective of the level of knowledge. They must familiarize themselves with the relevant data, facts, arguments and parameters and be aware of both the consequences of the action and the alternatives available to them. Only then they can fully participate in deliberation of the legislative body and influence the decision-making process in the best national interests.

In Pakistan the legislative information services remain inadequately staffed and ill equipped to meet the pressing needs of the representatives.

There is the need for strengthening the research base inducting in academic level component subject specialists for providing information, data and relevant material to Nazims. This will really help in increasing the efficiency of the local bodies and making them vibrant bodies. We may therefore try to raise the literacy level in the country. It is assumed that the devolution process would produce the panacea for most of the ills that afflict our society.

Guidance and resources have to be ensured for the Nazims to function. If a legal opinion is sought or financial guidance is needed whom should the Nazim contact for guidance or answers. Again the NRB should be able to provide

the professional expertise or the Nazim should be at liberty to appoint legal and financial advisers as the need arises.

A Devolution resource center will also be able to provide training and guidance at provincial level. Province-wide training programs can be arranged to cover all districts.

It is interesting to note that President Pervez Musharaf did not go through these councilors to get himself elevated to the presidency in 2001. He simply eased out Rafiq Tarar to don the presidential hat just before his visit to India in late July 2001. President knew his military commanders were behind him and the judiciary earlier had overwhelmingly given him extra-ordinary power to change the system to his own desire. He tried to get public approval by referendum on 30<sup>th</sup> April 2002. In a speech delivered to national convention of Nazims in Islamabad, President Musharaf took credit for establishing democracy at the grass root level. Now he reiterated his commitment to hold elections in October 2002.

## **CONCLUSION:**

Though the conception and structure of Basic Democracies was bold, imaginative, tailor-made to fit the peculiar circumstances of Pakistan's political and cultural traditions, it embodied the principle of a guided and controlled democracy.

The Basic Democrats were expected to give a sense of political participation in managing local affairs, to mobilize the people for development roles in the rural areas, to narrow the gap between the elites and masses and to provide legitimacy for Ayub's rule. They leave a vested interest closely linked with the military and civil bureaucracy. A critical evaluation would reveal that the scheme could not develop grass-root support because it was premised on extending regimes control without political participation. The government's claim that the system had contributed to stability and economic development was fictitious. This so-called stability was more personalized

than institutionalized and succession was likely to be marred by crisis rather than order.

Zia-ul-Haq tried to institutionalize the army's political involvement. In depending on the army's command structure for political support, Zia avoided the pitfalls that cut short the political career of Ayub Khan. Zia-ul-Haq's reference was for party less democracy. The system of 'dyarchy' with power divided between a military president and a civilian Prime Minister, appeared to have found a solution to one of Pakistan's many problems, the political role of the armed forces. Zia-ul-Haq began to seek ways to legitimize his military government. He tried a number of methods including a limited amount of popular participation through the establishment of a system - or rather, four systems, one for each of the four provinces of local government. Experience proved of this method to be flawed. The establishment of local government was a move in the right direction but only a small step towards the creation of a reasonably representative form of government. The government continued its efforts to evolve a viable system of local government, but once again the motives for doing this was not necessarily political.

General Zia-ul-Haq had to organize a system in which people could directly participate in order to ensure a degree of political tranquility.

The declared object of the present Devolution Plan is to decentralize the authority and functions from the provincial government to district, tehsil and taluka and union council governments. We are aware that the present government wants to bring the power to the grass root level. Our greatest problems have centered, around our inability to bring changes within the existing institutional framework. Instead of doing so we have attempted to replace one plan with another when we face institutional difficulties. Furthermore the bureaucracy has instead of advancing and helping the locally elected representatives of the people, emerged as local government administrations thwarting the very idea of local self-government.

The recent plan, attempts to give unprecedented powers to locally elected representatives. The acts of local government have been designed in such a way as to make local government institutions not only viable but also powerful. The army as a national institution is expected to provide the best talent in its ranks for civil services. For various reasons, however, the inductees from the armed forces do not easily blend in with the mainstream of civil service and often continue to keep themselves aloof from civil society. If they are keen to serve as civil officers they should compete like others, right from the initial recruitment stage of written test.

The solution to our dilemma is a slow and patience testing process of political evolution. And the only way to get there is by engaging every citizen at every level, increased awareness for need to participate rather than merely criticize, forcing on fundamentals rather than issues on the surface. Without popular participation, there is no accountability, and without accountability politicians do not need to worry about serving the nation. Need for political development and devolution of power lies at the core of multitude of problems that Pakistan is facing today.

I say deliberately that if the improvement of our administration is to depend upon the initiative or activity of local governments, it will never advance at all. I cannot recall in any time a single suggestion that has emanated from any one of the local governments for the improvements of any branch of administration. The need of hour is to introduce urgent reforms and changes from the top (the center) with the consent of the provinces. These reforms are, infect, revolutionary but accentual to the life and the safety of the nation and country. The loss of magnificent leadership at the top can not be made good through the unwise supply of patty and puny leaders at the bottom who do not have the require ability or power to steer the ship of society to the land of prosperous peace. Ability backed by virtue must be the basic standard and requirement for the men who hold office of position in government. Without this things will not change for the better.

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## BOOK REVIEW

The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies

By: Dennis Kux

Oxford University Press Karachi

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Pages: 470

Pakistan came into existence on the basis of an ideology, founded on the urges and aspirations of its predominantly Muslim population. With Quaid's idealism of amity and rapport toward all and enmity toward none, Pakistan sought to foster cordial relations with the West and strengthen fraternal ties with the Muslim world. For regional peace and security, Quaid-e-Azam proposed a "Monroe Doctrine" for India and Pakistan. Despite all the goodwill intentions and overtures made, Pakistani foreign policy had to be re-shaped in accordance with the crucible of objective realities. Muslim world in throes of disintegration and West locked in its battle with Communism, Pakistan was left vulnerable to unscrupulous Indian chauvinism. As the nascent state was coping with the problems of communal carnage, refugee rehabilitation, river waters dispute, boundary settlement and assets division - outbreak of a limited war over Kashmir exposed an inherent Indian animosity toward Pakistan and hence a grave realization to seek allies immediately for ensuring the territorial integrity of the still born state.

It was in this background that Pakistan sought assistance from US and develop an alliance status. The relationship once established went through phases of cordiality and mistrust, shaped by the relevance of regional and global environment alike, along with specific policies and personality traits of the leaders at the helm. The present book under review

by veteran American diplomat is the first study undertaken in this framework to analyze the Pak-US relations spanning over 5 decades. The author makes note of Pakistan's domestic compulsions, especially its stand off with India, as key factors in his splendid analysis. Instead of tracing this history by dividing Pakistan's foreign policy into different phases, he has rather discussed the relations according to the policies adopted and views held by individual US presidents. Such an arrangement is interesting for two reasons. First, it helps to uncover the extent to which consistency of policies was maintained in the past toward South Asia with the change of guards in White House. Rarely did a drastic reappraisal was made. One such occasion was the ascendancy of Republicans in the 1980s' leading to a complete reversal of Democrat policies with regard to Pakistan. Otherwise the shifting of presidents has had little impact, which shows the unanimity of views among the Republicans and the Democrats in their foreign policy preferences in South Asia. Second, Dennis Kux's treatment of the contents is a tacit reference to the asymmetrical nature of the Pak-US relations in which Pakistan was affected more by US policies than the other way around; hence the need to study the history of "alliance" with a "US-centric" approach.

Dennis Kux goes back to the days of early 1940s when US started showing some interest in Indian affairs. This was not out of sympathy for the Indian freedom fighters, but for the sake of ensuring a stable situation in the region while WWII was in progress and Japanese had made inroads up to Burma. From the very beginning, secular Americans looked upon secessionist Muslims with a suspicious eye. They too, along with the British, favored a United India, being oblivious of the circumstances and the background in which a demand for separate homeland was being made. Initially President Roosevelt and his personal envoy expressed their dislike for partitioning British India, fearing a "China like" situation in the

sub continent. Pakistan was however very anxious to establish early diplomatic relations with US so as to have the semblance of an independent foreign policy. Curiously even after the partition plan was formally announced, notes Dennis Kux, "*US state department made no explicit reference to the decision to create Pakistan \_ as if the US government was unwilling to accept this new fact.*" Pakistan on the other hand was bent upon securing US help. Quaid-e-Azam sought a "Marshall Plan" for Pakistan as his envoy in Washington pleaded for a \$2 billion soft loan for economic development. The Americans were taken aback by such an expectation of magnanimity on the behalf of Pakistanis and politely turned down the request. Unlike Vanket Ramani, an Indian scholar on Pak-US relations, who has tried to malign Quaid over this incident, Kux has kept a neutral tone, being cognizant of Pakistan's security imperatives of those days.

Dennis Kux notes that Liaquat Ali Khan felt snubbed for not being able to get an invitation to visit US like Nehru received. Even when he visited US, his visit lacked the bonanza of the red carpet welcome laid out for the "*George Washington of India*" Nehru. An interesting anecdote has been quoted by Dennis Kux, showing how ignominiously ignorant US was about sub continent. During a lunch in Los Angeles a California businessman asked Liaquat "*whether the blank space between the two parts of Pakistan as shown on the menu card was Africa*"!

For Dennis Kux, the real architect of Pak-US alliance was the Secretary of State John Forster Dulles who was wooed by Ayub Khan, Ghulam Muhammad and other military-civilian high ups. While visiting sub continent he was chilled by his reception in India and charmed by his welcome in Pakistan. With Pakistan's anti-Communist rhetoric, Dulles was made to believe that "*these fellows are going to fight any Communist invasion with their fists if they have to.*" Likewise, Vice-President Nixon, during his visit in 1953, found Nehru least

friendly and gained a highly favorable impression of Pakistan. Despite that US had to calculate the pros and cons of enlisting Pakistan as an ally at the expense of alienating a much stronger and larger India. As a matter of “bad arithmetic” on the part of US policy makers, Pakistan was finally embraced into the American fold.

Astonishingly Dulles too was embarrassingly ill informed about sub continent and so was Walter Lippmann, America’s most influential and celebrated foreign affairs columnist. When grilled about the new security pacts, Dulles justified Pakistan s’ membership of the alliance for “*US could never get along without Gurkhas.*” An equally naïve Lippmann retorted that *Gurkhas* were not Pakistanis, they were Indians! Still, for Dulles the justification lay in *Gurkhas* being Muslims! With such a little understanding of regional environment and mutually antagonistic & misplaced priorities, the alliance had little potential. Another factor blowing apart the strength of alliance was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, according to which Pakistan needed to be furnished with \$505 millions annually, three times the original estimate of \$171 million, to maintain a viable force structure for the defense of Middle East – the basic US interest in the alliance.

The “alliance mania” or “pactitis” was condemned by Eisenhower. Little could be done to salvage the pact, other than the “personal charm” of Ayub Khan and the utility of Badobar Base for US interests. The alliance fell apart once differences of interests prevented each party to continue it in its present form. Here, Kux notes especially Kennedy s’ ascendancy as a president and his Pro-India stint, which sent jitters among the policy makers back in Islamabad. Once again Ayub indulged in the miscalculated fallacy of being able to charm Lady Kennedy to bring about a change in US policy toward Pakistan, as revealed by Altaf Gohar in his book. But later events showed that a clear policy shift had taken place to the detriment of Pakistan. From 1962 onwards, followed an era of cold

relations. In governmental communiqués, relations were cordial but in real terms, they had slipped to lower rungs. The 1965 war exposed the US perfidy and Chinese sincerity. Later, Lyndon Johnson was to literally droop over elegant Indian PM Indra Gandhi, as noted by her biographer Katherine Frank, and made sure that “*nothing happens to this girl*”. Even with Nixon at the helm, situation did not change dramatically. Rather Pakistan was the major loser as it was used by US as an intermediary to reach over to Beijing, bringing an end to Pakistan’s precarious treading on a triangular diplomatic tightrope. Contrary to the common held belief, Dennis Kux notes that US had a real interest to save West Pakistan from disintegration. He has quoted Henry Kissinger saying US was afraid that “*East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal.*” For Nixon, “*a victory of India over Pakistan would be the same as a victory of Soviet Union over China.*”

The residuary Pakistan had been left with little strategic interests for the US. Pakistan created one for US when Bhutto vowed to make Pakistan a Nuclear state after India’s Nuclear blast in 1974. Dennis Kux says: “*Warning that Pakistan might face an economic aid cut off under the new legislation, Kissinger urged the PM to accept the Ford administration’s proposal: a substantial conventional arms package, including the potent A-7s’, if Pakistan agreed to forgo nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.*” Refusal of this offer “surprised” the Americans. Further strains developed as Jimmy Carter – whose mother had served as a sixty year old Peace Corps volunteer in India – became president. Imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan coincided with lifting of emergency in India. Following Zia’s repressive Islamization, execution of Bhutto and the burning of US embassy led to the deterioration of relations to its lowest ebb.

Zia's big moment came in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Zia played his cards shrewdly. He brushed aside US offer of \$400 millions as "peanuts" and said Pakistan will not buy out its security for \$400m. The State department called Zia's remark a "quibble". The situation changed wholly when communist basher Reagan, a president with the luck of an Irish, took over. The rhetoric, which ensued, was reminiscent of 1950s'. Pakistan found him amiable and easy to negotiate. As it happened, Pakistan was able to squeeze out considerable concessions for its price in the *Jehad* against communism. US promised to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's Nuclear program as long as no weapon was detonated for testing. Domestic political persecutions and disturbances were left out as Pakistan's domestic affair. There was some hiccup with regard to provision of F-16s-which according to US officials, was a "luxury" that Pakistan did not need. In the 1980s, however, Pakistan became the largest recipient of US aid after Israel and Egypt. As the heat increased, as much as \$1 billion was being pumped into Pakistan by US and Saudi Arabia to train and equip *mujaiden*.

The honeymoon period soon came to an end after the Geneva accord. The Pressler axe fell. The Nuclear related sanctions had to be "painfully" imposed on Pakistan, lamented George Bush, heir to Reagan. The general reaction in Pakistan was that "*US has thrown us away like a piece of used kleenex.*" With the end of cold war, US was left with "*as much interest in Pakistan as Pakistan has in Maldives.*" While analyzing the new forces and trends in the post cold war period, Dennis Kux has limited himself to the issues of Narcotics trade, Human rights, Kashmir, Nuclear/ Missile program and Terrorism. The revival of limited US aid after Brown amendment and settling of F-16s issue are no way indications of revival of cordiality. Through out the Clinton years, Pakistan came under heavy pressure to reign in Kashmiri separatists and encourage the Indian sponsored elections. Arab extremists were driven out of

Pakistan under US rubrics and ISI chief Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir had to be fired for being a “maverick” of fundamental groups. In Pakistan reaction to these policies is that of anger and disappointment. For them Kashmir movement is as much legitimate as Afghan resistance against Soviets. They do not see any harm if Pakistan is used as a conduit of arms supply to the Kashmiri freedom fighters, as was the case in Afghan *Jehad*. One of the major interest of US, as it has now turned out, is to preserve stability in the region by maintaining status quo, to avoid the possible catastrophe of a Nuclear War in the most “dangerous spot on earth.” Repeated US calls for negotiations leading to Lahore Process and intervention during Kargil crisis ending up in Washington agreement, show US eagerness to play a role of moderator and balancer to ensure regional security.

The book comprehensively deals with the developments till March 2000, when Clinton made a 5-hour visit to Pakistan and chided the Pakistan authorities on democracy. The 9/11 events took place after the publication of the book, for which additions will have to be made in the next edition. In its present form, this book promises to be the most well researched and lucidly written one volume analysis of Pak-US relations. The author has delved deep even into the minutest of details and has kept an impartial, objective tome throughout the book, which makes an extremely pleasurable and fruitful reading.

**A.U.Q**



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