


50TH ANNIVERSARY YEAR



The Journal of Political Science



Volume XX

1997

No. 1.2

*Published by the Department of Political Science
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan*

THE JOURNAL *OF* POLITICAL SCIENCE

Published by
Department of Political Science,
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Volume XX 1997 No. 1, 2.

Editors:

Hameed A. K. Rai

Javeed Ahmed Sheikh

Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.

The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

*Published by Rai Hameed Ali Khan
Manager of the Journal of Political Science*

Printed by : Shaukat Ali - Bukhari Printing Press
 Mohani Road, Lahore.

Editorial

The "Golden Jubilee Celebration" continued through out the year. The mood of the nation remained sombre but the attitude was more determined to tread the path of progress.

The loss-gain calculus reveals sad and agonizing story on one side, the hope and resolution for upward development on the other. The delayed and messy constitutional output, the disintegration of the country, poor economy (with all the dimensions), the debt trap and political instability contributed towards politico-economic underdevelopment of the country. The looming dangers on and around the borders are more threatening in the unresolved Kashmir issue and political quagmire of Afghanistan. The increasing Indian military build up and nuclear development has been mounting insecurity.

The apathetic behaviour of the world community and the indifference of the begemon of the New World Order has further aggravated the political environment of the region. The political elites appear to be serious in over coming the problems. It needs a lot of concerted efforts to put the house in order. Miscalculated steps and half-hearted efforts will pile up difficulties pushing Pakistan back to the zero-level. The history will not forgive them.

Out of this situation is emerging a viable democratic system. The masses though majority is illiterate, yet are politically conscious and are determined to ensure better future. The efforts are being made to secure our borders through diplomatic instruments and are focused on balancing regional power structure.

Hameed A. K. Rai
Javeed Ahmed Sheikh

CONTENTS

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume XX Summer, Winter 1997 No. 1, 2.

	<i>Pages</i>
1. Pakistan: A classical Case of Dependency <i>Mrs. Nasreen Javed</i> <i>Javeed Ahmed Sheikh</i>	1
2. The Typology of Centre—Local Relations <i>Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhry</i>	21
3. Supreme Court of America: A Model of Strong Judiciary <i>Mansoor Akbar Kundi</i> <i>Maimoona Khanum</i>	61
4. Role of Muslim Women in Politics of Pakistan <i>Ahmed Husain</i>	77
5. Begali Language Movement in Pakistan: A View <i>Dr. Razia Mussarrat</i>	85
6. Book Reviews	103

*Published by the Department of Political Science,
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.*

PAKISTAN: A CLASSICAL CASE OF DEPENDENCY

Nasreen Javeed
Javeed Ahmed

Pakistan is considered to be a classical example of dependency.¹ This point of view generates concern about what, why, and how of Pakistan's dependent status. This paper is an attempt to evaluate the pros and cons of the case of the dependency of Pakistan's economy on the developed economies.

THEORETICAL BASIS OF PAKISTAN'S DEPENDENCY

Pakistan has been suffering, since her inception (except for the period of 1960-65) from stagnant economy, import-export gap, imbalance in payments, constant decline in national savings, and deficit budgeting. Awan (1977), Moin Baqi (1980), and Mahboob ul Haq (1979) while analysing the depressing economic conditions of Pakistan expressed that foreign aid and investments have not been strongly related with Pakistan's economic ills, and they further explained that the problems have been the result of lack of efficient planning, mismanagement, and political instability.²

Qureshi (1978-1980) and Alvi (1970-1979) do not agree with this point of view. Qureshi has pleaded that Pakistan should have followed a path of sacrifice instead of begging aid

from other nations. He considers that economic difficulties have come with the complete package of aid and investments.³ Alvi, writes that economic aid to Pakistan has been based on exploitation. It has been paying a ground for Pakistan's economy to become a victim of dependency and parasitism.⁴

These are short explanations of three broader theoretical framework. The first analysis bases itself on economic liberalism which considers competition, interdependence, and international regulatory institutions as means of improving economic conditions of the countries in general and international economic order in particular. The second point of view is, a representative of economic nationalism. The mainstream exponents of this school emphasize that the national priorities, national control on aid and limited role of foreign aid and multinational corporation's investments can lead to the growth of GNP, GDP, and increase of per capita income levels. According to them uncontrolled economic aid drains the national economic potentials and leads the economy to decline and deteriorate.⁶ The third explanation of economic conditions of Pakistan is from a Marxist perspective. The exponents of this school consider that in the world capitalist system: the developed capitalist nations help the underdeveloped countries for the purpose of exploitation.⁷ They contend that the capitalist countries with foreign aid and investments make underdeveloped countries dependent upon them. This develops a dominant-dominated relationship which necessarily leads to negative and uneven development in the recipient nations.⁸

One of the difficulties with the Marxist scholars on dependency is that they consider that dependency is an inherent phenomenon of the capitalist system, but they do not accept the inequality as a natural order among states' relations. Due to this the Marxist believe that dependency is essentially a negative phenomena. They exclude the positive aspects of foreign aid

and investments. Dos Santo's has included both the negative and positive aspects of dependency in these words.

"By dependency-we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter dependant between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development."⁹

The important thing to find out is whether dependent countries have been suffering with negative effects or reaping the positive fruits. In order to determine the negative or positive effects of dependent economics different variables have to be evaluated and analysed. Samir Amin and Alavi used bureaucratic and internal processes of decision making of a recipient country which links up a country to dependency, as measuring variables. They further used foreign aid and types of agreements to measure the impact of dependency and uneven development between the capitalist and underdeveloped countries.¹⁰ Enos, Awan and Moin Baqqi have operationalised foreign aid to determine the development in a dependent economy.¹¹ Wallerstein, Baran and Sweezy and Gunder Frank have based their research on monopoly capitalism and MNCs.¹²

Galtung has used equilibrium and disequilibrium of interests in center and periphery and concluded that it leads to inequalities and uneven development.¹³ In this paper foreign

aid, role of MNCs and general economic conditions are used to evaluate the impact of dependency.

Pakistan came into being in 1947, as a consequent of the British post WWII decolonization process. The colonial power/not only unjustly demarcated the boundaries of this nation, but also failed to give a legal share to Pakistan from Indian treasury, leaving Pakistan with meagre economic resources to sustain, which necessitated the country to interlink herself with the developed economies. After 50 years of relationship Pakistan is still listed among the poorest countries of the world. An average per capita income is US \$ 350, the literacy rate is a little over than 20 percent. More than 60 percent of the labour force is till engaged in agriculture and the unemployment, though difficult to measure is more than 30 percent.

Starting from an almost zero level of foreign capital inflow, Pakistan had at the end of the fiscal year, 1974-75 commitments totalling \$ 10.6 billion, and by the end of 1991-92 it has touched as much as \$ 24 billion. Of these commitments \$ 24,703.286 million are payable in foreign exchange and the balance is payable in non-convertible Pakistan currency. During 1996-97 the liabilities have been added upto \$ 57.7 billion.

Much of the 'aid' obtained by Pakistan has been bilateral in nature although share of multilateral aid increased considerable after the World Bank began to support infrastructure initiated in the early Five Year Plan. Since 1960 Pakistan has received most of its foreign economic assistance through an 'aid-to-Pakistan consortium' created by the IBRD to co-ordinate and expedite the flow of foreign aid. The consortium countries Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A. have also given assistance to Pakistan outside the consortium

arrangements.¹⁴ The United States has been the largest donor in this regard. As of March, 1984, its contribution has been to the order of \$ 3,210.9 million, of which \$ 2,318.332 million are repayable to U.S. dollars and the balance is payable in Pakistan currency. Besides, USA has also been helping Pakistan under the US public Law 480 (PL 480) program consisting mainly of surplus agricultural commodities made available under titles 1,11 and 111. PL 480 assistance's was entirely repayable in Pakistan currency until the fiscal year 1966-67. Since then, a sizeable part of it has been repayable in US dollars at one percent interest rate during the first ten years and 2.5 percent during the next 30 years with a grace period of ten years.¹⁵

Table No. I
External Debt

	(\$ million)						
	90-92	91-92	92-93	93-94	94-95	95-96	96-97
Disbursed & Outstanding Debt *	15,471	17,361	19,044	20,322	22,117	22,275	23,01
Debt Servicing **	<u>1,316</u>	<u>1,513</u>	<u>1,648</u>	<u>1,746</u>	<u>2,042</u>	<u>2,136</u>	<u>2,309</u>
- Principal	782	921	999	1,078	1,294	1,346	1,574
- Interest	534	592	649	668	748	790	735
Debt Servicing as % of FEE	13.7	13.4	15.3	16.2	16.5	16.7	16.1
As % of GDP							
- Outstanding Debt	34.0	35.6	36.8	39.0	36.3	34.4	35.9
- Debt Servicing	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.6
As % of Export Earnings							
- Outstanding Debt	252.3	251.5	279.5	298.7	271.8	255.8	231.0
- Debt Servicing	21.5	21.9	24.2	25.7	25.1	24.5	23.2

E. Estimated Source: Economic Affairs Division & Economic Adviser's wing

* Regular debt (payable in foreign exchange only). Medium and long term.

** Excluding interest on short term borrowings and IMF charges.

FEE: Foreign Exchange Earnings.

EVALUATION

The foreign capital inflow in a country is to provide direction and acceleration to development programmes. In case of Pakistan to created complication and frustration.

Pakistan wanted and requested aid for some specific projects.¹⁶ Her request was not conceded. Instead the capital was provided for several non-productive projects.¹⁷ Consequently, till 1970, there was hardly any project which was totally completed.¹⁸ During 1970s, the expansion of public sector through nationalization discouraged the inflow of economic aid or investment in Pakistan. In the period of 1980s, the military government tried to boost up the in flow by encouraging donors and investors, but could not bring desired fruits. The Span of 1990's have been oscillating in between the swings of certainty and uncertainty, security and insecurity.

In the aid package to Pakistan it has been always included or implied that Pakistan has to buy equipment as well as accept advisor and consultants of the donor nations. Moreover, for equipment, commodity or resources transferral, the services of shipping and insurance companies of the donor nations are to be utilized. The way in which the government of Pakistan has been forced into the hands of US suppliers and US contractors is reflected also in a recent report which appeared in Pakistan Times. The report has been published after the government has been repeatedly let down after promises of generous help. The report says:

"It has become difficult for a public servant to convince Pakistani engineers contractors of firms of consultants that they were not being discriminated against and discouraged by such agencies (i.e. aid agencies)... Agencies like the World Bank are working contrary to

this and (of utilizing available local talents and experience)... The conditions imposed for participation in the bidding (for tenders for construction projects) are such as would automatically eliminate Pakistani firms... It is pointed out that the Jinnah Barrage, Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, Taunsa Barrage and the Gudu Barrage have all been designed, planned and executed by Pakistani Engineers and contractors. However... the World Bank seems to be taking no notice of these facts as neither is the designing likely to be assigned to any local firm of consultants nor is the execution likely to be entrusted to competent local contractors.¹⁹

Technical assistance covers both the services of foreign experts in Pakistan and the training of Pakistan nationals abroad. Technical assistance covers many fields. But as the Colombo Plan for 1960 states: "More than half of the US Technical Co-operation Project funds were devoted to the improvement and expansion of local educational institutions, mainly through contracts with United States universities."²⁰

An extraordinary number of experts in a variety of fields has come to Pakistan during all these years under foreign aid programs. There is difference between experts concerned with overall planning and policy-making, and those whose activities are at the operational level of designing and implementing particular projects. Most of these experts come on fairly short contracts generally not exceeding two years. It is easy to understand how they experience a conflict of loyalties. It is frequently complained that specifications laid down by such experts are so specific that only the parent firms can supply the material and equipment required. In many cases vital decisions rest with these experts. The Government of Pakistan was apprehensive of this and issued circulars in 1958, 1966, 1970

and 1977 in an effort to indicate clearly that those experts have an advisory capacity only, and need not perform an executive role.²¹ These circular's so far have failed to alter the practices of the experts and in most of the cases the interests of the experts override the interests of Pakistan.²² There is also another kind of difficulty that these inexperienced foreign experts are often placed as advisors to qualified Pakistani who feel that their services are not always receiving the recognition that they deserve. Moreover, many of the foreign experts are given fabulous salaries by Pakistan standards. It is estimated that four Pakistanis can be appointed at an equivalent position in the salary paid to a foreign expert.²³ When these experts come they do not always keep to their jobs, rather have often shown too much interests in internal administrative matters and collecting of intelligence data.

Commodity aid is mainly provided under PL 480. Under this form of aid, various surplus commodities are shipped to Pakistan against which payment is made by the Government of Pakistan. The PL 480 funds provided Under PL 430 are designated counterpart funds. They represent the counterpart of community aid. These amounts are classified under "Information and Education" (by the USIS) "Translation and Publication", and "International Education Exchange". The loan given are of commercial type.

The exploitation is done in overpricing the surplus commodities than the world market prices. In one of the reports, it has been given that American has been pricing 50% more on wheat and cotton that have been available in the world market.²⁴ In the process of shipment of commodities to Pakistan: it was noted in 1953 and also in 1978, that America was charging hundred percent more than transporting the same in a foreign ship.²⁵

PL 480 has been designed to reduce the accumulation of surplus commodities in the US which the US government has to buy under price support legislation, and which costs more than a billion dollar a year for storage alone. The pressure to get rid of these commodities has led the American to keep countries dependent upon its aid as an outlet for these surpluses. There are many instances in which the dependent countries have actually been prevented from undertaking development programs which might interfere with the disposal of these surpluses, regardless of the importance of these programmes to the countries concerned.²⁶

Under PL 480 America has been supplying cotton, tobacco, and dairy products, even though Pakistan has not been badly needing those commodities. This compulsion has discouraged local cotton and tobacco growers.²⁷

No doubt these bottlenecks have been hampering the development process in Pakistan, but has paved ground for officials of the donors countries, particularly USA (the largest donor) to interfere in the policies of Pakistan. It is no exaggeration to write that in most of power game of the country the involvement of USA officials have been visible. Even when the leaders of Pakistan show signs of resistance's to the domestic, regional or international policies, the promised economic and defence aid used is being suspected as a pressure tactics. Ayub Khan's bilateralism,²⁸ Bhutto's nuclear policy and efforts of organization of Islamic conference,²⁹ Zia's fundamentalism, Benazir and Nawaz's refusal to roll back nuclear programme,³⁰ not only resulted in discontinuity in the flow of aid, but generated a kind of crisis in the country which have been threatening the security of the country.

Pakistan has always welcomed private foreign investment in its economy and there is no restriction on the remittance of

current profits to the country from where investment originates. Similarly, foreign capital in approved industries established after September, 1954 can be repatriated at any time to the extent of the original investment and citation of any capital investment under this arrangement is also treated as investment for repatriation purposes. Pakistan maintains investment guarantee arrangements with the US, Germany and other countries under which parent countries provide guarantees against losses arising from inconvertibility of foreign currency earnings or against expropriation. This has resulted in a favourable climate for multinational corporate activity in Pakistan. Most of the leading West European, North American, and Japanese corporations are marketing their industrial as well as consumer products quite successfully in Pakistan.

There was not a single MNC in 1950, but during 1950-60 there were 60, and the number rose to 105 in 1970, and presently there are 124 MNCs functioning in Pakistan (some of them are included in references).³¹ There is no doubt these MNCs have been contributing to the development of the countries, but their role has created three serious complications. The first is, that the MNCs have encouraged the raw material growers to produce cash crops or those raw materials which are being consumed by the industrial establishments. The second has been, that the MNCs employed Pakistanis on higher salaries as compared to the others of the same qualifications and even sometimes more experience employed in local public or private organizations.³²

The MNCs have encouraged the local raw material growers to grow that raw material which is used by the MNCs industries. The prices they offer for the raw material are higher than their local market, consequently creating a difficult situation for local consumers and business men. The third and the most serious problem has been created by these MNCs is

that they want their share of profits to be paid in convertible foreign currency. As Pakistan has been failing to do so. Therefore has to request for more loans. These loans are usually extended on commercial interest basis.

In 1990s, the governments have been encouraged to invest in the country. The PPP government asked Hong Kong-based companies/groups to invest in power generation. The privatization process of various oiling industries, businesss and public sector has encouraged MNCs to invest. Recently, many MNCs have begun an economic venture. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut are the commonly known actors. The role of MNCs has been constantly discouraging the local businesses. Pakistan has been failing to establish medium range industrial establishments, because the MNCs have already captured the market.

It has been suspected that through the employes of MNCs (which include foreigners and local) the intelligence data is collected, sensitive informations are gathered, and manipulative string are held to mould and influence business tycoons, bureaucrats feudal lords and politicians of the country.

Pakistan government have failed to regulate the price index of the MNCs who supply, assemble or manufacture spare parts, medicines and other consumable goods, because the decisions are done in the headquarters which are out of Pakistan. Through monopoly in the markets, they pressurize governments to evolve politics which might not be politically acceptable.

Foreign capital inflow and private investments are accepted, requested and intended to increase economic conditions of a country and to enable her to be a viable economic entity. The capital inflow in Pakistan has been through consortium, non-consortium and Islamic countries. The

inflow has been fluctuating, but has been helping Pakistan to meet short-term and long-term planning targets.

The table explains the picture:

Table 2
Foreign Capital inflows*

(\$ million)

	Commitments		Disbursements		Commitments		Disbursements		Commitments		Disbursements	
	1992-93	93-94	1992-93	93-94	1993-94	94-95	1993-94	94-95	1995-96	96-97	1995-96	96-97
	(E)		(E)		(E)		(E)		(E)		(E)	
Consortium	1275	2359	1660	2068	1844	2252	1938	2008	1,842	1,578	1,678	1,779
Non-Consortium	550	529	758	453	601	694	531	505	795	687	797	611
Islamic countries	15	42	18	40	117	104	61	71	34	86	80	77
Sub total	1840	2830	2436	2561	2562	3050	2530	2584	2671	2351	2555	2467
Relief Assistance												
for Afghan	57	40	57	40	19	50	19	50	10	2	10	2
Refugees												
Total	1897	2970	2493	2601	2581	3100	2549	2634	2681	2353	2565	2469

Source: Economic Affairs Division

* Excluding short term credits of one less than one year maturity

E. Estimated.

The table portrays the capital inflow in the country during 1992 to 97. It is not different than the pre-1992 period. The fluctuations have been almost the same with marginal difference. The drops and discontinuity of inflow have been due to nationalization and systems break-down.

On the basis of capital inflow, the economy should have shown upward and stable trends. Unfortunately, it could not reap expected fruits due to ill-planning, mismanagement, corruption and ambiguously spelled out priorities. Political instability has been aggravating the deteriorating economy of the country.

The domestic and national savings do contribute towards reinvigorating the economy of the country. In case of Pakistan, the savings could not be made to feed the development processes as well as failed in filling import-export gaps and was unable to balance the payments. Pakistan's economic picture projects different negative trends. Pakistan has been overburdened with the foreign debts. Pakistan with available resources has been trying to pay her debts, but has failed even to pay regular instalments of interests. By the end of 1980 debts outstanding ratio to GNP was almost 40%, and debt service ratio to export was almost 49% which is discouraging for a developing country like Pakistan. This depressing conditions germinated due to import-export gap and constant decline in national savings. It is surprising that during the first year of Pakistan's existence August 15 to June 31 1947-48 when the volume of imports and exports was very small. Pakistan did achieve a favourable balance of trade to the tune of Rs. 12.54 crore. The imports were at Rs.31.88 crore and the exports were at Rs.44.39 crore. Then Pakistan achieved a favourable balance during the Korean war boom 1950-51 when the imports were Rs. 116.71 crore and exports Rs. 134.25 crore giving a net favourable balance of Rs.17.54 crore. Since Pakistan started foreign aid investments, the series of deficit became a routine untill the year 1972-73 when imports were Rs. 839.83 crore and exports were at Rs.855.12 crore, giving a favourable balance of Rs.15.29 crore. Then again Pakistan has been suffering with a very heavy series of deficits. Before 1971-72 the highest deficit was Rs. 253.28 crore in 1964-65 which

steeply went up in 1974-75 and it is still continuing at a upward trend.³³

Table No. 3
Debt Servicing and Net Transfers

Year	Gross Disbursements*	Debt Servicing**	Net Transfers (N.T.)	NT As % of Gross Disbursements
1960-61	342	17	325	95
1970-71	612	182	430	70
1980-81	861	603	258	30
1990-91	2044	1316	728	36
1991-92	2366	1513	853	36
1992-93	2437	1648	789	32
1993-94	2530	1746	784	31
1994-95	2571	2042	529	21
1995-96	2555	2136	419	16
1996-97(E)	2351	2309	42	2

Source: Economic Affairs Division

* Excluding relief assistance for Afghan refugees.

** Excluding interest on short-term borrowings and IMF charges.

E. Estimated

Pakistan's inability to respond to debt servicing, the World Bank and IMF have started pressurizing the governments of Pakistan to increase revenues by increasing taxes, higher prices and permitting MNCs to provide environment of privatization. Apparently, the defaulter is the governments for misuse of the aid which was received by Pakistan, but the burden of WB and IMF is on one side destabilizing the

economy and on the other choking the present government politically. It would lead it to further underdevelopment.

The national savings dependent mainly on export surpluses and domestic savings. Pakistan has failed to abridge the import-export gap and the picture of domestic savings has not been good and encouraging either. Pakistan has experienced considerable acceleration in the rate of foreign capital inflow as well as in the rate of domestic savings. The capital inflow increased to 6.6% GNP in 1964-65 as compared to 2.8% in 1959-60; the rate of savings increased by almost 90% the rate of growth of income approximated 5.2%. However, during the latter part of the 1960's the rate of domestic savings dropped considerable. The rate of public saving which increased from the low figure of 0.5% of GNP during the first plan to 1.9% during the second plan, declined to 1.1% during the third plan (1965-70). Similarly, the decline continued uptill recent evaluation, which estimated 4.2% decline. Qureshi (1981) has analysed that decline of national and domestic savings has been strongly related with foreign aid and investments.³⁴ Even Awan has concluded that the constant decline has been due to import-export gap and foreign capital inflow.³⁵

The economic picture of Pakistan so far has appeared to negative. It does not mean that Pakistan has never improved her economic conditions. During 1960-69 when the capital inflow was tremendous, the economic picture was encouraging. The economic growth was up 14 percent, the industrial output increased almost 5 to 8 percent, unemployment level dropped, and individual and national savings increased. The health picture was considered an excellent and Pakistan was referred as an example of development which was considered to be the result of foreign capital inflow.³⁶

These were temporary economic development. The economic benefits could not be accepted by the people. Per capita income slowly increased 1.4 percent every year. The development centralized the capital in the hands of the 20 families. It has been assumed that 20 families has been monopolising more than 70 percent of national resources. There is no trickling down of the economic development benefits. the unemployment figures rose to more than 20 percent. The poverty level is increasing every year. There is no doubt, the manpower working in the Middle East and other countries contribute considerably to the national income. This contribution goes in the hands of the foreign investors in debt servicing and payments. Alavi has stated that almost 50 to 60 percent of the foreign aid goes back to the donor.

Being a recipient country Pakistan has been left with limited choices of decision-making in domestic and external environment. From Harward Advisory group headed by Papnek to Prestlor Amendment, Pakistan has been punished to the wall in the realm of economy whose political consequences have outdistanced the economic ones.

Politically, Pakistan's dependence of USA, put the country in American bloc, ushering Indian antagonism. Kashmir Issue have been very frustrating, because these issues could not be resolved due to Soviet role and silence of USA. Similarly a little countervailing move against American interests have always put Pakistan in hot waters. Her economic aid has been suspended many times, particularly in nuclearization issue Pakistan has been unjustly treated. France was pressurized not to provide Nuclear Technology though it was agreed upon. It disturbed the flow of aid from other European countries as well. When Pakistan followed nuclear programme, did not sign NPT or CTBT, her economic aid had been suspended.

Foreign aid, and role of MNCs have created degenerative tendencies towards politico economic development of the country. Dependency has worked as one of the predominant variable to foster non-productive economy, ill-advised and illogically followed advice's of the foreigners, rampant poverty on one side, and anarchic political environment, crisis-sticken political system and foreign patronage seekers of coetri of leadership on the other hand made the country dependent on developed economics. Pakistan has presently standing confused at the cross-road unable to decipher the environment and its concomitant affect and incapacitated to take calculated bold step to chalk out her own ways with seriously and cognitively ordered priorities.

REFERENCES

1. Hamza Alvi and Amir Husro, Pakistan: The Burden of US Aid. Rhodes, *Imperialism and Under development: A reader. Economic Development in Pakistan and Bangladesh*. London, 1974.
2. Mahmood Awan., *Foreign Capital and Development Process: The Pakistan Experience*. Washington, D. C. University of America, 1977. Also see him and Baqai in *Pakistan Development Experience*, Lahore. Progressive Publishers, 1981.
3. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi. *Economic History of Pakistan*, Lahore Pakistan Economic Book Service, 1978. pp. 348-78.
4. *Op. Cit.*, Alvi, 1970. p. 67.

5. Griffin, K. B. & J. L. Enos. 'Foreign Assistance Objectives and Consequences.' *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. V. 18 April, 1970. pp. 313-27. Also see Chancery, Hoolis B & Strout Allan, Foreign Assistance and Economic Development *Journal of Political Economy*, 78: July, 1970 pp. 966-1000. Also see Smith, Tony., The Underdevelopment of Development Literature. The Case of Dependency Theory: *World Politics* V. 2., Jan., 1978. pp. 247-288.
6. F. List., *The National System of Political Economy*. New York. Kelly, 1966. Also see Prebisch, R., *Towards a New Trade Policy for Development*. N. Y. United Nations, 1964 In addition to that R. Dan Wallerstein, has made a comparative evaluation of economic nationalism with liberal and Marxists approaches. "The Political Economy Literature on North South Relations" *International Studies Quarterly*. V. 22. n. 4., Dec., 1978. pp. 578-624.
7. Wallerstein, Immanuel 'Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformations within the Capitalist World Economy' *African Study Review*. April, 1994. v. xvii., pp. 1-28. Also see Baran & Sweezy., *Monopoly Capitalism*. Monthly Review Press, 1967. Also see Gunder Franki (1970) in Rhodes. Samir Amin (1974)
8. *Ibid.* Also see Wallerstein (1978). pp. 578-624.
9. Dos Santos. 'The Structure of Dependency: *The American Economic Review*. May, 1970. pp. 231-32.
10. *Op., cit.*, Samir and Alvi.
11. *Op., cit.*, Enos. Awan and Baqi.

12. *Op., cit.*, Baran & Sweezy.
13. Galtung. 'Structure of Dependence' *World Politics*.
14. The comparative information is given in Table-2.
15. *Pakistan Times* (Daily), Jan. 8, 1971.
16. Zahid Sharif. PIDC and its Role. A report prepared for the Government of Pakistan 1978. Also see *Pakistan Times*, Dec. 21, 1968.
17. *Pakistan Times*, Jan. 11, 1964.
18. *Ibid.*
19. government of Pakistan. *Impact of foreign Aid*: Karachi, 1980 Also see Parvez Tahir. 'Why Pakistan Needs Foreign Experts' *Pakistan Times*. April 11, 1979.
20. *Op., cit.*, Alvi. p. 70.
21. *Op. Cit.*, Tahir.
22. *Op. cit.*, Alvi. p. 73. And also Qureshi. p. 141.
23. *Pakistan Times*, December, 15, 1980
24. *Op. Cit.*, Alvi. p. 101 and also see Awan. p. 20.
25. *Ibid.*,
26. *Op., Cit.*, Baqi.
27. the figures are given in Pakistani Rupees. I could not get data in US dollars and I did not want to convert it into

US dollars because at different times exchange rate was different.

28. *Op. Cit.*, Qureshi. pp. 116-120
29. *Op. cit.*, Awan. pp. 20-27.
30. *Ibid.*
31. BECHTEL: IBM; GE; Mitsubishi; etc. There are many others MNCs from different countries as well.
32. Benjauian I. Cohen. Multinational Firms and Asian Export. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1975. pp. 133-141 Also see Joel Bergsman and Xiafanq Shen 'Foreign Direct Investment in developing countries'. The Journal of Social, Political and Economic studies vol. 21. no. 3 fall 1996.
33. Economic Survey. 1996-97-pp. 149-154.
34. *Op.cit.*, Qureshi.
35. The picture is clear from the Table -2 of the article and tables given in Economic Survey-1995-97 pp. 149-154.
36. The annual report presented by McNamara in the World Bank in 1965. In that report, it was stated that foreign economic assistance was properly utilized which increased economic stability in the country.

THE TYPOLOGY OF CENTRE-LOCAL RELATION

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Choudhry

The purpose of this paper is to classify the patterns found between national and local governments in different countries and highlight the common models adopted, thus allowing comparison between countries. Four basic models of central-local relations, each representing a unique pattern are discussed. Each of these models has distinctive historical roots and consequently an area of discrete influence around the globe. Some states however, have patterns of central-local relations which do not fall within these categories. These are mixed systems, but are still likely to contain elements from some, or all, of the basic patterns. This study contrasts a mixed system. Pakistan, with that of a prototype system of central-local relations as found in Britain.

Centre-Local relations define the distribution of power between the political centre, intermediary levels of government, such as provinces, and the localities. The distribution of power within a system can be either areal (territorial) or functional. On an areal basis, the power to manage local public affairs is distributed among general purpose regional or local governments. On a functional basis, power is distributed between a number of specialised ministries and other agencies concerned with one or more related activities. Thus the way the power is distributed affects how a central agency exerts control over a local institution and thus shape central local relations in a specific pattern. The central ministries/departments are often determined on the functional basis with their field agencies operating on a territorial basis (Figure 1). The nature of the relations between the centre and

Distribution of Power: Functional and Aerial Channels




Figure 1

the localities depends upon how they interact with each other. In the provision of the public services, such as housing, health, social security or education, the extent to which central ministries and their field agencies share power varies widely. the interaction between the field agencies and multifunctional local government also varies from country to country and defines the nature of control which the central/provincial ministries exert on the general purpose local government and *vice versa*.

A critical variable determining the extent of hierarchical control, is the degree to which the local chief executive is responsible to a hierarchical central authority or to a local elected body. A spectrum of possibilities exists, extending from a low to a high degree of hierarchical control (Figure 2). Four variations are noted by Humes¹ (1991).

1. Inter-Organizational (*regulation*) A system in which the local executive is fully responsible to a council and not directly to any higher authority. Local government in the United Kingdom can be considered a model of this kind.
2. Hybrid (*subsidization*) A system in which the local executive is responsible to the local elected council for most functions, but is also responsible to a higher authority for implementation of specific policies. Local government in the Federal Republic of Germany fits this model.
3. Hybrid (*supervision*) A system in which the local executive is partially responsible to council and as a designated agent of the central authority, or a member of central hierarchy, is directly responsible to and

the localities depends upon how they interact with each other. In the provision of the public services, such as housing, health, social security or education, the extent to which central ministries and their field agencies share power varies widely. the interaction between the field agencies and multifunctional local government also varies from country to country and defines the nature of control which the central/provincial ministries exert on the general purpose local government and *vice versa*.

A critical variable determining the extent of hierarchical control; is the degree to which the local chief executive is responsible to a hierarchical central authority or to a local elected body. A spectrum of possibilities exists, extending from a low to a high degree of hierarchical control (Figure 2). Four variations are noted by Humes¹ (1991).

1. Inter-Organizational (*regulation*) A system in which the local executive is fully responsible to a council and not directly to any higher authority. Local government in the United Kingdom can be considered a model of this kind.
2. Hybrid (*subsidization*) A system in which the local executive is responsible to the local elected council for most functions, but is also responsible to a higher authority for implementation of specific policies. Local government in the Federal Republic of Germany fits this model.
3. Hybrid (*supervision*) A system in which the local executive is partially responsible to council and as a designated agent of the central authority, or a member of central hierarchy, is directly responsible to and

Four Traditional Approaches to Local Governance: A Conceptual Framework

Types of Control: general to functional		<i>Areal:</i> A general ministry/ agency for co-ordinating local affairs has a strong role <i>vis a vis</i> functional ministry/ agencies	<i>Dual</i>	<i>Functional:</i> A general ministry/agency for co-ordinating local affairs has a limited role <i>vis-a-vis</i> the functional ministries/agencies, some of which directly provide local services
Extent of control: intra to inter- organization	Subordination (Intra-organization)	Dual subordination (Soviet model)		
	Supervision (Hybrid)	Pakistan, India, Bengladesh	Dual Supervision (French)	
	Subsidization (Hybrid)	Areal subsidization (West Germany)		
	Regulation (Inter-organization)	Functional regulation (United Kingdom)		

supervised by it. Local government in France presents a model of this system. The local governments systems of

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are also very close of this system.

4. Intra-organizational (*subordination*) A system in which the local executive, being a part of the central hierarchy, is responsible to central authority. The local governments of Russia, ex-Soviet Republics, China, Cuba are the prime examples, but some elements of this system are found in Pakistan as well.

A second critical variable is the degree to which the central control of local government and local affairs is focused in one generalized ministry/agency or is dispersed among number of specialized ministries and similar central operational agencies. A spectrum of possibilities exists extending from the more general to more functional. Four basic models may be noted:

1. More areal: A system in which a general central ministry/agency is responsible for overseeing the general purposes of local governments and in co-ordinating their relations with functional ministries. The functional ministries, at least in principle, communicate through the central ministry/agency in their efforts to advance and oversee local programmes. This practice is found in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also finds parallels in the local government system of Pakistan.
2. Dual/areal is a system in which a general central organization exercises overall control of local

government, whilst specific ministries/agencies direct specific local services. The former Soviet Union, in which the central agency was the party bureaucracy, presents an example.

3. Dual/functional - a system in which specialized ministries/agencies control specific local services. A general purpose ministry supervises local governments and oversees and co-ordinates local affairs. The example is France.
4. More functional model is that in which specialized ministries or agencies oversee or directly provide specific local services. A general purpose ministry or agency has house keeping functions, but has a relatively weak co-ordinating role. The United Kingdom conforms to this type.

In countries with functionally specialized systems, such as France and the UK, the primary channels of power and control are more likely to run vertically from the national ministries to regional and local agencies, thus the process stresses the vertical and functional linkages. In countries with territorial systems, such as Germany, the channels of influence are more likely to run horizontally from political bodies and the regional or local chief executive to the administrative agencies.

In terms of sovereignty, most nation states are either federal or unitary. In federal states government powers are divided constitutionally between two levels. Both the federal as well as state governments have separate jurisdictions, exercising the powers defined in the constitution. In such a country the powers regarding the local government or administration are usually reserved to the provincial/state governments. In a

unitary system of government the constitution usually confers all powers to the centre while the geographical or administrative sub-divisions exercise only powers delegated to them by the national government. Hence local government is included in the national government's jurisdiction. However, in some states, such as Pakistan, which falls into a semi-federal category, local government is also controlled by central government through provincial administration.

Local government is defined by Samuel Humes as "The infra-sovereign geographical units contained within a sovereign or quasi-sovereign province or state. They include intermediate units such as municipalities and in some countries sub-municipal units" ² (Humes 1968, p. 27). The laws establishing and controlling local governments are generally state laws and the administrative controls over local governments in countries with federal constitutions are usually exercised by the state officials. Hence from the local point of view, both the state and the national governments are central governments (Humes, 1968). Provincial/state governments, being quasi-sovereign, are not, therefore, considered as local governments. In unitary states, administrative units without representative or quasi-representative councils should also not be considered as local governments. Whatever definition of local government is followed, a local representative, or semi-representative, and authoritative decision-making capacity seems an essential attribute of any local government³ (page, 1982).

Alderfer⁴ (1964) mentions four basic models which dominate the shape of local governments. These are the French Image, British pattern, Soviet pattern and the Traditional pattern⁵. Humes (1991) modified this view, maintaining that the dramatic expansion of the activities of national specialized agencies has altered the traditional areal patterns of the

distribution of power - thus transforming the way local communities are governed and debasing local government. In the process four distinctive systems of local governance have developed: the French, the British, the Germanic, and the Soviet. The systems of representative, or quasi-representative, local governance which have evolved in other countries of the world resemble one or more of these four prototypes.

THE FRENCH MODEL

The French system of local government of dominant over a large portion of the world today. Outside of the Anglo-American nations and the Soviet world, alongwith their spheres of influence, it practically is supreme (Alderfer, 1964). This includes Western Europe. The Near, Middle, and Far East, Central and South America and large portion of the African continent.

The existing administrative division of France, after the 1982 reforms, consists of 22 regions, 96 provinces (*departments*), 324 sub-provinces (*arrondissements*), 3350 districts (*cantons*) and 36000 municipalities (*Communes*). The basic unit of French system is municipality or commune which is treated as a legal person before the law and is considered as a decentralized local administrative unit. A commune consists of an elected council and a mayor. The mayor is elected by the council and is a more important office than its British counterpart. After election he/she becomes far more than simply the principal politician of the council. He/she also acts as an agent and representative of the centre and ensures the execution of the laws and directives emanating from Paris. As principal executant of the wishes of the commune, the mayor must seek to establish and represent the general view of the community in its dealings with the higher administrative levels.

His standing is enhanced by the generally subservient position of the council of the commune, who are not usually able to exercise detailed control over the mayor's administrative decisions and are normally content to follow his or her leadership.

The next higher and the most important representative unit of local government, which emerged after a long evolution, is the department. A department has an elected council, a president, elected from among the councillors, and a prefect appointed by the central government. The prefect is the most prestigious and unique personality in French local government. Even though the post had been down graded by the 1982 reforms, the office still retains great significance at departmental level. He is the representative of the Ministry of Interior, responsible for the supervision and co-ordination of all governmental activities within the department including public order, public safety and public health as well as police and security services. The prefect is also ultimately responsible for all of the political problems of the area⁶ (Ridley and Blondel, 1969). The 1982 reforms did not, in practice, curtail the prefect's authority as much as it seemed at first. The prefect still often acts as a mediator between the centre and the periphery, reconciling the claims and demands of each upon the other. At the same time he/she must recognize the demands made by the various interest groups and must, in order to survive, be able to secure a consensus for the policies he/she decides to pursue.

The intermediate tiers of local government between municipalities and departments are district and arrondissement. The latter serves as an electoral district for the higher tiers, while the districts, having no representative function, serve only to help the province. The region, after 1982 reforms, has a

structure resembling the department with an elected council and a president elected by the council. The prefect, regional level, has the more subservient role of serving as chief executive to the council and as a mediator between the central government and the regional politicians.

Yves Meny⁷ (1988) explained three main characteristics of the French system:

- (i) Initiative in this system is regarded as coming from above with the base of the system having, in principal, a minor role, being controlled by the central government. Guidance is the function of ministers and, in each of the 96 departments, the prefects, as agents of central power, monitor the proper functioning of the whole administration.
- (ii) The centre and the periphery are not perfectly distinct, autonomous poles. The most striking feature, at least until the recent reforms, has been the osmosis between the institutions and officials of the central power and those of local government. the prefect is simultaneously the government's representative and the department's executive and the mayor, although elected by the commune, has the task of implementing the law at the local level.
- (iii) the relations between local authorities, which vertically are characterized by richness and density, are horizontally often conflictual or at any rate very difficult. Co-operation between communes or between departments works well only to some extent but fails when further attempts

at integration are made. Hence they cannot pose any potential threat to the central domination.

In France, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for security and general supervision of local affairs. It directs policy and, through its prefects, oversees the local government system and co-ordinates the field services of various ministries. The ministries provide the technical guidance and supervision to the local government. The reasons of the domination of functional ministries on local government are: sheer size of national civil service; their prestigious authority; direct involvement of ministry officials in local activities. The principal factor affecting local government is that most senior corps members identify themselves with one specific function of government, a fact which fragments local government. The service in local government is comparatively less attractive and looks more parochial.

There are, however, some factors in the system which play some role in diluting the domination of local government by the centre or provide formal or informal channels for local influence on the centre. One of those is the existence of a competitive multi-party system. The legal and constitutional provisions providing channels for central control sometimes can become ineffective when confronting an alternative party in power. These groups and parties are able to resist, often successfully, the central government's unnecessary interference in local affairs⁸. (Kesselman, 1974; Chandler, 1992). Under the tendency, *cumul des mandats* (to hold more than one office), more than 80% of the National Assembly deputies simultaneously hold offices in local government⁹ (wright, 1989, p. 321). This fact alone forms an informal political or administrative channel for the localities to influence the decision-making process at the centre.

The French pattern of local government is a unique example of 'Strong Centre-Weak Local Authorities' type of relationship. The same pattern is also found in number of other Western European countries e.g. Italy. The pattern is characterized by centralization, a chain of command from top to bottom, hierarchical structures, executive domination and legislative subordination¹⁰ (Alderfer, 1964). In French speaking West African countries, former French colonies, such as Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco, Niger etc., have almost the same pattern as France. In these countries, although local authorities are concerned certain powers by the state, these powers must be exercised in the public interest and within the framework of law. To ensure that local authorities do not 'misuse' their powers, the state exercises supervision over them through a 'tutelage' authority, normally the minister of interior. The explicit or implicit approval of the tutelage authority is required for virtually all decision of the local council or the actions of local executive. The tutelage authority can revoke decisions or actions of the local council and sometimes substitute its own decisions or actions¹¹. (Campbell, 1965). This authority also has the powers to suspend/dismiss a mayor or dissolve the council and appoint a caretaker committee until the new elections¹² (Campbell, 1965).

The French model is, therefore, a mixture of local democracy and central administrative control. Consensus about the system among the political parties, their full participation in the national and local political process, close relationships between the related political and administrative institutions as well as the concerned interest groups helped to establish a long-lasting balance between the central control and local representation. This, in turn, gave stability to the local government system and makes it a model for others. Central

control, guidance, and the supervision of the delivery of services are very prominent features in this model.

GERMAN MODEL

The West German federal system is often described as 'co-operative' in that, although the initiation of policy is firmly with Bonn, in practice, the role played by the *Lander* and local government is extensive. Certainly the establishment of a vast network of agencies and committees to provide co-ordination between Bonn and the states has been indicative of the federal government's reliance on the *Lander* for policy feedback and recognizes that the *Lander* provide the administrative backbone of services provision. In turn, the states depend on local government for the implementation of policies and decisions. According to estimates, municipalities are involved in the execution of 80 to 90 % of the federal laws (HauBerman, 1991).

Financial reforms in 1969 brought about a redistribution of tax revenues, areas of authority and tasks between the federal government, the states and the municipalities. The constitution was amended and as a result the federal government became involved in planning and decision-making of community projects, in return for which, the federal government also participated in their financing. The municipalities are compelled by law to maintain a balanced budget and they cannot finance current expenditure by borrowing. Budgets have to be approved by the *Lander* governments.

Local government structure of Germany is three tiered. The basic unit is municipality or commune (*Gemeinden*) of which there are 3417. A large number, in 1982 it was 1034, have formed federations whilst the other 2376 have unitary governments. The right of *Gemeinden* to direct their own affairs

is explicitly stated in Article 28 of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*). This guarantees, "the right to regulate under their own responsibility and within the limits of the laws all the affairs of the local community". This provision, in fact gives the municipalities vast powers to act in the areas not specifically reserved for the federation or the states. The constitution, however, does not outline local government organization explicitly other than it should conform to the principles of a republican, democratic and socially just political system. The actual format of local government is determined, therefore, by the individual states, with the legal status and structure of the municipalities being established by the constitution of the *Länder* within which they operate. Hence organizations and patterns of the local institutions vary slightly from state to state. Each municipality has a representative elected body, i.e. the council which in turn elects the chairman from amongst its members for a fixed term. The chairman supervises the administrative set-up of the municipality. Administrative authority is vested in an official appointed by the council and responsible to it. In southern Germany, the position is slightly different in that there is effectively the fusing of administrative and political functions in the form of a *Burgemeister* or mayor, directly elected for a term of six years. Though he is accountable to the council, he clearly emerges as chief executive, as he/she is chairman of the council, head of administration and representative of the polity as a whole.

Operating at an intermediate level between the municipality and the *Länder* is the country or *Landkreis*. Its organization and the structure are parallel to the municipalities. The directly elected county councils select an executive board. The chief executive or *Landrat*, is selected by the council (except in southern states where he is popularly elected). Initially he serves for six years and then for a twelve-year term

of office. Counties administer those local services which are beyond the capacity of the municipality or which are assigned to it by the law. Many of the larger cities have dual status of a city and a country. These country's main function, as an agent of the Ministry of Interior of the relevant state, is the supervision of the municipalities to assure adherence to law¹⁴ (Wagener, 1983).

The states supervision of the *gemeinden* does not stop with the country. In the six largest states also exists a number of administrative districts, each run by a district president appointed by the state and responsible to the Ministry of Interior. District president and the staff are the members of the state civil service and hold considerable power in their supervision of the county (*Kreise*) and the municipality (*Gemeinden*). The district president controls the police and seeks to ensure that local government acts within the law (Humes, 1991). Furthermore, representatives of the state ministries at District level closely scrutinize the activities of the municipality where they are acting as agents of the state. German chief executives of the local governments usually serve long terms and are highly respected, their power is generally enhanced by their formal qualifications, proven competence, social class and prestige, contact and shared values with peers, as well as their political connections. Neutrality is seen as a lack of conviction¹⁶ (Humes, 1991). If few countries has the role of the local chief executive been so well established, his professionalism so well assured and his capacity to develop political support so well developed¹⁷ (Marshall, 1967). As he is selected or elected by the elected councils, and is completely under democratic control, his capabilities enhance the importance and potential of the local government.

Although through retaining an element of budgetary autonomy, local governments have been quite successful in resisting attempts by Bonn to impose public expenditure guidelines, federal influence is found through its powers of legislation and the increasing reliance of both state and municipalities on financial assistance from the *Bund*. The leverage provided by the establishment of the joint tasks and the wide ranging powers to dispense funds to projects of national value has allowed the centre to establish extensive influence in the fields of regional economic development, welfare and education.

The focus of inter-governmental relations is, however, the understanding achieved between the state and local government. As discussed above, there is a rigid frame of law within which the municipalities work under the hierarchy of checks from country, district and then state's Ministry of Interior. To an extent, however, the municipalities are able to prevent the formal erosion of their powers through formal and informal channels of influence. At national levels representatives of local government are involved alongside other agencies in determining guidelines for government strategy in relation to future expenditure pattern and management of the economy. Within the constant interaction between different levels of government, the municipalities exert influence by virtue of, not only, the discretion afforded to them in the level of service provision, but also the reliance of the *Länder* and Bonn on the municipalities for feedback to enable effective review of existing policy and the formation of future strategy.

On more formal level, further channels for pressure are provided by the election of local deputies to assemblies at both state and national level. Whilst lobbying of deputies is often

undertaken by individuals and organized groups, local government collectively is well represented and influential in the calculations of the *Lander* and Bonn. This interaction is facilitated by virtue of most larger units of local government being dominated by the major political parties. Certainly the use of party caucus, particularly at state level can be valuable in ensuring that the state machinery takes note of local issues, especially, as there is a complete consensus among the political parties about local government system (HauBerman, 1991).

German Model,s dominating feature is very effective interaction, both formal and informal, between federation, states, and the municipalities. Mutual dependence among all the levels has made local government important and an inevitable partner in the administrative and political business of the country. The local delivery of services through the municipalities is not free of any supervision. Municipalities have to work within a hierarchy of checks from county, district and the state's ministry of interior. Like that of France, central control and guidance is an essential feature of German model, and political and democratic process has made it tolerable.

THE COMMUNIST MODEL

Communist model, which is also termed as 'Soviet pattern of local governance', dominated a larger part of the world, i.e. Eastern Europe, China and other countries following the Soviet system of government. Soviet ideology emphasised two principles significantly affecting the local governance: democratic centralism and dual subordination. The pervasive reach of central ministries, the broad co-ordinating of the local boards and their leadership and, most important, the ubiquity of the party's leading role and influence have stemmed from these principles. Local government departments are the field

agencies of the central government ministries. They are accountable to their local executive committees and to their respective ministries. The executive committee, which includes the heads of number of the key local department's field agencies, is subordinate to its counterpart at the next level of government and theoretically to its council. This dual subordination reconciles central control with local participation and functional vertical supervision with areal horizontal coordination. The Communist Party organization and leadership has been the dominant integrating force ensuring general hegemony at least of core local services. After disintegration of the Soviet Union the ex-Soviet republics and the East European countries are gradually diverting from this model while Chinese local government is still following that pattern, though with significant changes. It may be useful to look the Chinese local government with some detail.

Like the former Soviet Union, the communist Party of china holds a monopoly of political power. Leading party members hold key government positions and party cadres carry out government policy. The party organization and government structure are integrated. Democratic centralism and dual subordination (in China called dual rule) are similarly emphasized in the Chinese system of government. In the initial years of the Peoples Republic of China, the Chinese communists stressed the functional networks of administration through which the central ministries and other agencies bypass regional governments. The Cultural Revolution emphasized the role of the areal governments. Since then, the ministry networks have regained some of their functional power. There have thus been a dramatic shift since 1950 in the role of the local governments as they relate to the ministries.

By the mid 1980s China had six tiers of governance: Central, administrative regions, provinces, prefectures, counties and villages. The Ministry of Interior co-ordinates the provincial and local administration. The provincial administrations are the primary institutions through which the central government hands down the decisions to the local governments¹⁹ (Waller, 1981). There are thirty provincial governments, most of which have populations in tens of millions. Within the provinces are the prefectures and autonomous areas (having nominal autonomy). Since 1978 prefectures have been the administrative branch offices of the provinces, generally numbering five to fourteen per province. Within these entities are the counties, autonomous areas, and urban municipalities. Urban municipalities are generally divided into municipal districts.

The county has been the lowest level with ministry field offices. These number 2000, which has been constant for decades. The basic unit within the country are towns and administrative villages. The village head serves as a link between the peasantry. China did not extend the state administration down to the village level. In 1958, when 'Great Leap Forward' was at its height, the Chinese Communist Party formed, throughout China, some 26,000 peoples communes. Such communes were made up of twenty or so agricultural producers co-operatives (renamed production brigades). Their formation was intended to develop units which would be more productive and envelop the government party apparatus. Their development led to conflict with the county and administrative village governments. However, when they were abolished, the traditional tiers of province, county and administrative villages restored.

As the system has evolved, the 'Local Peoples Governments' are the principle institutions at local level (county, urban municipality, and autonomous county) and provincial level (province, special city and autonomous region). The 1979 electoral law provided that the county peoples congress (assemblies) which had previously been indirectly elected would become directly elected. The county-level congress elects the provincial-level congress and the provincial level congress elects the national one. The congresses are responsible for electing standing committees and 'local peoples governments' which constitute the administrative organizations. In reality the party committee and the people's government select the congress candidates. By law the local chief executives i.e. the provincial governors, the county heads, and the city mayors, are formally elected by the peoples government at each level, in fact, however, they are appointees selected at higher level. Whilst the government directs the activities of local governments, the party committee determines the policy within the framework of central directives.

Under the principle of dual rule the departments of the county (or provincial government) are responsible to the corresponding department at the next higher level, as well as to the peoples government and its party committee (and its congress) at its own level. The provincial and special city department heads of all ministries are appointed by the central ministries; the heads of the lesser field offices are appointed from the provincial headquarters.

Thus, in China, on the pattern of ex-Soviet Union, each local government department is subject to two sets of directives: one vertically through a functional chain of command to the ministry in Beijing and another horizontally to the people's government and the party committee and then to the party

central committee in Beijing. Both chains of command are absolute²⁰ (Schurmann 1968). The state council may alter or annul 'inappropriate' directions issued by any governmental council from any level²¹ (Waller 1981). The party central committee similarly oversees subordinate party committees. In practice, then, democratic centralism provides ample opportunity for central control.

The Soviet pattern of local government has been very common in the Eastern Europe. It is difficult to predict that how the dynamics of local governments in the ex-Soviet Union Republics, china, and the other East European countries will change and develop in the next few years. So many changes in the political structures and the political geography of the region, previously dominated by the communist ideology, may affect the future of this model. However, it is unlikely that centuries-long and well-entrenched traditions of hierarchy and central control will vanish easily or soon²² (Humes, 1991). These traditions will continue to affect the central-local relations, structures, and the allocation of resources. In a few countries of Eastern European and through the world (such as China and Cuba) the Communist Model may remain for many years.

THE BRITISH PATTERN

The existing structure of British local government system is based partially upon the Local Government Act 1972, which came into force on 1 April, 1974. According to this Act a two tier system was introduced in England and Wales. These reforms were based on the idea that somehow larger local governments were more efficient than smaller ones, with the result that Britain has some of the largest units of local governments of the world (Goldsmith, 1990). However, in

Wales the government, under Local Government (Wales) Act 1994, has recently established the new system, consisting of 22 unitary authorities. Most of these authorities are the ex-districts which have been given the powers and functions of both districts as well as counties.

British local government differ significantly from continental European system. There is no national Ministry of the Interior (or the central agency) with comprehensive responsibility for coordinating field services and local government. There are no regional government executive with a comprehensive coordinating role. Nor do British local government have political and administrative chief executives with roles comparable with their continental European counterparts. The most conspicuous feature of the British system of local government has been functional fragmentation, which was facilitated by the 19th century merger of special purpose authorities into general purpose local government. Despite of the recommendations made by Bain's Report 1976 and Maud's Report 1969, the traditions of functional fragmentation remains deeply rooted. This fragmentation in turn strengthened the committee system in the local councils.

In the centre, the British ministries differ significantly from the German, French and Soviet counterparts in several respects. The Department of Environment (whose formation brought together the Ministry of Housing and Local Government with several others) is the only one whose responsibilities are not limited to a functional area. It has among its numerous responsibilities, the role of house-keeping for local affairs. Its scope for local government-related duties ranges from keeping statistics to taking the lead in local government reforms. It does not have any general role of co-ordinating the field activities of other ministries with those of

local government. Nor does it have a general review power regarding local actions. In recent years the government has enhanced its role by gaining the power to determine the ceiling on local tax rates. Under the new system the Secretary of State for the Department of Environment assesses what is termed Grant Related Expenditure for each authority and appropriate the grant accordingly. Later legislation further refined the system which allowed the Secretary of State for Environment to withhold grant, if a local authority was considered to be spending too much (Local Government Finance Act 1985). During the 1980s a number of authorities faced quite severe financial deprivations resulting from central government's withholding a part of their grant in response to their refusal to comply with central directives. This discretion is very significant as most of the local government spending (e.g. in 1988-89 37% of the total) are covered by central grants²³ (Chandler, 1992). This factor indicates that in the figure 2 the place of British local government is being drifted towards left, i.e. closer to the French system, while on the other hand the French system is still transferring the financial powers to the departments and communes and confining the prefect's powers.

The internal structures of local authorities are organized in line with the functional departments of the central government. Each local authority has a huge size of local bureaucracy which is divided into different functional departments like education social services, health etc. The functional division of local bureaucracy is mirrored by the organization of the body of elected representatives, the council, into different committees. Each department of the local authority is controlled by the corresponding committee, consisting of the elected councillors and some co-opted members. Direct linkages between the ministries and local government departments has encouraged these specialized

committees. In certain cases, it is specified through the Acts that how those committees are to be established and what are to do. The specialized committees have been helpful in the pluralization of power in the councils. Responsibility for local affairs in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is vested in separate central government ministries.

Once there was a time when the British system of local government was considered a highly decentralised and based on the local autonomy and a partnership of powers between the central government and the local authorities, because both being consists of the members directly elected on the bases of universal adult franchise. However, this model is continuously under attacks from the central government since the long tenure of the Conservative Party started under the premiership of Mrs. Thatcher. The legislative control of the central government has been excessively used during this period as a result the legislative record of the government relating to local authorities from 1980 to 1987 is a long and overwhelming hostile (Association of London Authorities, 1988). From the centre's point of view "A narrow scope of local government with fewer functions and lower expenditure and with a large role played by the private sector in the provision of the services, fits more comfortably with the social-market of the present government"²⁴ (Goldsmith, 1990).

However, still one of the basic characteristics of English local government is that the local authorities are free from other intermediary authorities. There is no authority between them and the national ministries and parliament. This contrasts sharply with the hierarchical system of French and German local governments, where higher local units have administrative and financial controls over the lower units. It is decentralised

rather than deconcentrated, though central authorities have the tendency to gain increased powers in local administration.

Most of the ex-British colonies have followed this pattern of local government with some minor adjustments according to their local needs. For example in India the *Panchayati Raj* and in Pakistan the system of local bodies are very much resembling with this model. The Scandinavian countries also falls in the same category, though they enjoy somewhat more autonomy as compared to Britain. United States system of local government was also founded on the 'British Model', though it is more fragmented, and subject to local competing interests rather than to the political parties.

THE UNITED STATES

In United States local government is constitutionally under the states' jurisdiction. Each of the fifty states of US federation has its own **systems** of local government. They slightly vary from each **other** but at the same time have a large number of common characteristics regarding their structural, functional and procedural dimensions and the context of their relations with **the states**. The US. Bureau of Census has classified **local governments** into five categories: counties, municipalities, **townships**, **school** districts and special districts. Each of these units of government has power of public nature in a given geographic area of the state and has the powers to raise the **funds** through taxation. All of these units have the elected councils **alongwith** the elected officials.

While the United States has **generally** been considered as a model of federal system with powers divided **between** national and regional governments, in fact, the national government has repeatedly exerted its hegemony over the activities which were

once considered state and local (such as health, welfare, roads, and even education). Increasingly, the federal government has dealt directly with, and provided grants directly to, local governments, thus bypassing the states and complicating the system of inter-governmental relations²⁵ (Wright, 1978).

Several departments of state governments have a significant role in local affairs. Such departments, generally, have field agencies which directly provide local services, making local government more complex and fragmented. Departments of local or community affairs co-ordinate local planning and housing efforts (working with the national department of housing and urban affairs) but do not otherwise have a significant role. Education departments set policies providing funds and regulating local school boards and their schools. State departments of transport provide not only major roads but also many of the minor ones (in states such as Pennsylvania and the Carolinas almost all the rural improved roads are state maintained). In many states the field agencies of state departments provide most of the local health and welfare services. Many local field offices have larger budgets than all but the more populous local government. Outside major cities such agencies may be the only providers of such services.

Several national department (ministries) have active role in state and local affairs such as the departments of health and human affairs, transportation, housing and urban affairs and, to a lesser degree, agriculture, commerce, labour and education. All of these have regional offices. No department of national or state governments exercise general responsibility of co-ordinating such field offices of the national government. Federal sponsorship of a number of agencies at the local level has encouraged further fragmentation²⁶ (Seidmann 1970). The Department of Agriculture was the first federal agency to

develop its own local government network with its soil conservation districts. The office of economic opportunity created local community action agencies which functioned independently of city halls. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has fostered local housing authorities with their own autonomous boards. Thus a bewildering array of national and state agencies provide local services. Consequently the municipal building is only one of many foci concerned with planning, programming and providing local services. This diffusion is further compounded by the fragmentation with individual local governments.

The increasing dependence on grant funds and fragmentation of executive structure have fostered the development of centre-local relationships which have tied local departments into centrally dominated functional networks of power. Departments of national and state governments have expanded their services either by developing their field services or by subordinating the appropriate local departments or both. As they respond to nationally funded programmes, local government have become integrated into a system of vertical functional complexes. In their relations with the national or state governments, the departments of local governments have become fiefs and parts of what the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1969) calls 'vertical functional aristocracies'. In this process local governments are providing a small share of all local services and are losing their policy-making authority. The lack of central agencies with a general co-ordinating role has facilitated this long standing trend.

Within the fifty different systems of local governments designed by the states, local governments have a legal status, not unlike that of local agencies in unitary states. They are entirely dependent on the states actions for their authority; the

piece of authority available to them are carefully derived and strictly interpreted and their existence can be terminated at any time by the action of the state legislatures²⁷ (Anton, 1988). Despite of their legal dependence, existence of number of parallel national and state agencies performing the same local functions, the local government in all states enjoy still a considerable operational autonomy and successfully resisted all efforts to impose major structural reforms comparable to the massive changes incited recently in western democracies²⁸ (Anton, 1988).

There are number of factors which contribute towards this autonomy of the local government in United States. One is the long tradition of the local bodies existence. Throughout New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, local governments' jurisdictions predate the federal constitution by a hundred years or more. Towns and brogues, of colonial origin celebrating 300 or 350 years of continuous existence reflect the continuing vitality of a tradition than the nation itself²⁹ (Anton, 1988). It has strengthen the beliefs of political elite in local democracy and autonomy. They value citizen's participation in public affairs and oppose any effort to confine the freedom of local councils.

Second factor in this regard is the local governments themselves and their associated interests. They are too powerful forces in every state to successfully resist against efforts to weaken local authority. In states with large urban centres, political leaders from these centres are often better known than are most state leaders³⁰ (Anton, 1988). In states without influential local government officials, this gap is filled by the most powerful interest groups and associations, having the interests common with local governments. For example state's municipal leagues, township associations, school districts

associations, municipal employees organizations, construction unions etc., are significant in this regard. They explicitly play a role to protect the local autonomy from any potential threat from centre or the state.

The genesis of local government's are also found even in the political system itself. The opposition to a strong centre has been present in USA even from the very beginning, when the constitution was being framed. The founding fathers of the constitution were divided between the two groups, i.e. Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The latter were fighting for the local and state autonomy. Ultimately the constitution resulted from a compromise between the two forces. They are still existing in the American politics, though without any formal organization. In such a political environment, it is hard to make any encroachment in local government's powers. The federal structure of a country itself favours the local autonomy and administrative decentralization.

This environment, suitable for local freedom is further encouraged by the specific structural and functional nature of the political parties in USA. These are highly decentralized and considered as the coalitions of the state and local organizations. The looseness of the party system has led some observers to describe the parties as confederations of state and local organizations, joined simply to elect candidates who run under their labels³¹ (Keef 1983). Both of the parties have autonomous local branches free from the central command and without any effective coherence contrary to the political parties of Britain and France and most of the developing countries. In USA the local branches of the parties have full autonomy in making the decisions and adopting the policies, even sometimes against the central leadership. It is, therefore, natural that the local leaders of both of the parties always insist on the freedom of the local

governments. Significantly, systematic studies of state and local public studies in USA seldom finds that partisan differences have any policy consequences³² (Dye 1966; Brazer 1959; Lewis-Back 1977).

The federal or central aid to the cities and local government units usually used as an instrument to control the local government policies, especially in case of *grants in block*. In USA such aid reached to a maximum in early seventies and there was much concern about the 'dependency' resulting from the growth of the federal funds to state and local governments, particularly to later which were in some cases receiving more than 50% of their income from Washington DC (Pierre, 1990). The threat to local autonomy has receded somewhat and indeed during the last eight or nine years most local governments have been stimulated to develop alternative sources of local revenues and to innovate in this area.

CONCLUSION

The intensity of central-local relations depends upon the existence of the number of channels of communication and control between the centre and the localities. Central interaction with the local authorities through a single generalized ministry may not be so much intensive and thorough as in case of vertical links between the individual service departments of the central and the local authorities. However, the existence of both types of links makes the relations much intensive and effective, as in the case of France. Regarding the extent of hierarchical control, critical variable is the degree to which the local chief executive relates to a hierarchical authority of central government and to a local elected body. It is also important whether the administrative staff of the local authorities are

totally controlled by the local councils or they are part of centrally controlled bureaucracy.

Despite of structural variation among the four prototype models of local government, there are some common characteristics and tendencies found in all the four and the American local government system. Most striking feature is the central control alongwith necessary guidance for proper delivery of the services. Though it confines the local autonomy to a considerable extent but at the same time it ensures the quality of the locally delivered services, and integrate the local government system with political and administrative system of the country as a whole. This very factor also enhance the confidence of the public in local government institutions and gave them stability. A uniform standard of local services throughout the country is also ensured through this central control and guidance.

It is, however, obvious that in each system when various forces interact with each other it finds a balance between two major conflicting pressures: the interest of the central government to control the periphery and thus keep the nation as an integrated whole, and the demands of the periphery, often strongly articulated at the centre to maintain the local freedom. Different formal and informal forces at centre and the localities work together to diffuse the influence of centralizing tendencies as well as structural and functional arrangements. The existence of effective and competitive party systems in France, Britain, United States of America, Italy or even one-party system like that of China play significant role in this regard. Principle of *cumul des mandate*, i.e. to hold more than one office, in France and Germany provide an informal political/administrative channel for the localities to influence the decision-making process at the centre as well as to counter the

one-sided legislation from central government against the local interests. •

Though there are four prototype models of local government which are dominant throughout the world, it is hard to find any system following totally any one of them. Even these prototype systems are passing through a phase of drastic changes. Most of the Afro-Asian countries have evolved their own systems of local government convenient to their socio-political and administrative needs by combining the salient features of more than one model. Humes (1992) mentioned a Mixed Model of local government which seems as a modified form of the 'Traditional Pattern' given by Alderfer (1964). The mixed system of local government can be classified as following:-

Pro-French mixed Model

Pro-German mixed Model

Pro-Soviet mixed Model

Pro-British mixed Model

Most of the countries, with non-representative dictatorial regimes have developed the local government systems by picking those specific characteristics from different models which strengthened the economic, political, and administrative grip of centre on the localities. But factors which could establish the balance between centralizing tendencies and the local autonomy are either absent or not operational towards that direction. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, Nigeria etc. are the examples of having such systems. Sometimes it does become difficult to put a system into any specific category of these models. A local government systems under transition or

suffering from the political power struggle at the national level have to pass through these different phases. These phases sometimes resemble to the different categories or models, as in the case of Pakistan. All the political systems are subject to different dynamics, working to change or retain the existing patterns of central-local relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Samuel Humes, (1991) *Local Government and National Power: A Worldwide Comparison of Tradition and Change in Local Government*, London: Harvest Wheatsheaf.
2. Samuel Humes & Martin Eileen (1968) *The Structure of Local Government*, Hague: IULA.
3. Page (1982) *Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies* (ed.) London: Sage.
4. Harold F. Alderfer (1964), *Local government in Developing Countries*, New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
5. Samuel Humes (1991) *op. cit.*
6. Ridley and Blondel (1969) *French Communism and Local Power: Urban Politics and Political Change*, London: Frances Printer.
7. Meny Yves (1986) "Radical Reforms and Marginal Change: the French Socialist Experience", in Burno Dente & Francesesco Kjellberg, *The Dynamics of Institutional Change and Local Government*

Reorganisation in Western Democracies, London: Sage, pp. 130-149.

8. Mark Kesselman (1974) "Research Perspectives in Comparative Local Politics: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Notes on the French Case", in Clark, *Comparative Community Politics*, Sage Publications New York; J. A. Chandler (1992) *Local Government in Liberal Democracies: An Introductory Survey (ed.)*, London: Routledge.ut.
9. Wright (1989) *The Government and Politics of France*, (3rd edn) London: Unwin Hyman, p. 321.
10. Harold F. Alderfer (1964) *op. cit.*
11. M. I. Campbell and *et al.* (1965) *The Structure of Local Government in West Africa*, Hague: IULA.
12. *Ibid.*
13. HauBerman (1991) "The Relationship Between Local and Federal Government Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany", in Pickvance & Preteceille (*ed.*) *State Restructuring and Local Power: A Comparative Perspectives*, London: Pinter.
14. Wagner (1983) *op. cit.*
15. Samuel Humes, (1991) *op. cit.*
16. *Ibid*

17. A. H. Marshal (1967) *"Management of Local Government"*, *Local Government Abroad*, Vol. 4
London: HMSO
18. H. HauBerman, (1991) *op. cit.*
19. J. Waller (1981) *The Government and Politics of Peoples Republic of China*, New York: New York University Press.
20. Schürmann (1968) *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
21. J. Waller (1981) *op. cit.*
22. Samuel Humes (1991) *op. cit.*
23. A. Chandler (1992) *op. cit.*
24. Michael Goldsmith (1986) *New Research in Central Local Relations*, (ed.) London: Gower.
25. S. Wright (1978) *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, New York: Duxbury Press.
26. Seidman (1970) *Politics, Position, and Power*, (3rd edn.)
New York: Oxford University Press.
27. Anton (1988) *State and Local Government in America*,
Illinois: The Dorsey Press.

28. *Ibid*
29. *Ibid*
30. *Ibid*
31. J. Keef (1983) *American Democracy*, Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
32. Dye (1966) *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co; H. Brazer (1959) "City Expenditure in the United States", New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 66; Lewis-Back (1977) "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomics and Political Variables for Policy", *American Political Science Review*, June 1977;
33. Pierre (1990) *op. cit.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1969) *Tenth Annual Report*, Washington DC: USGPO.

Alderfer, Harold F. (1964), *Local Government in Developing Countries*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ashford, Douglas E. (1986) *The Emergence of Welfare State*, London: Basil Blackwell.

Association of London Authorities (1988) *The Attack on Local government*, London.

Brazer, H. (1959) "City Expenditure in the United States". New York: *National Bureau of Economic Research*, Occasional Paper 66.

Campbell, M. I. and *et al.* (1965) *The Structure of Local Government in West Africa*, Hague: IULA.

Chandler, J.A. (1992) *Local Government in Liberal Democracies: An introductory Survey (ed.)*, Londogn: Routledge.

Dye, T (1966) *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*, Chicago: Rand Mc Nally & Co.

GoldsMith, Michaël, (1986) *New Research in Central Local Relations, (ed.)* London: Gower.

Great Britain (1967) *Report of the Committee on the Management of Local Government (The Maud Committee on Management)*, London: HMSO.

Great Britain (1972) *Report of the Committee on the Management of Local Government (The Maud Committee on Management)*, London: HMSO.

HauBerman, H. (1991) "The Relationship Between Local and Federal Government Policy In the Federal Republic of Germany", In *Pickvance & Preteceille (Ed.) State Re-*

Structuring and Local Power: A Comparative Perspectives, London: Pinter.

Humes, Samuel (1991) *Local Government and National Power: A Worldwide Comparasion of Tradition and Change in Local Government*, London: Harvest Wheatsheaf.

Keef. W.J. (1983), *American Democracy*, Illinois: the Dorser Press.

Kesselman, Mark, (1974) "Research Perspectives in Comparative Local Politics: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Notes on the French Case", In Clark, *Comparative Community Politics*, (ed.) Sage Publications New York.

Lewis-Back (1977) "The Relative Importance of Socio-Economics and Political Variables for Policy", *American Political Science Review*, June 1977.

Marshall, A. H. (1967) *Management of Local Government*, Vol. 4, *Local Government Abroad*, London: HMSO

Maud Report (1967) *Committee on Management in Local government: Report, Volumnes 1-5*, London: HMSO.

Meny, Yves (1986) "Radical Reforms and Marginal Change: the French Socialist Experience", In Dente, Burno & Kjellberg, *op. cit.* pp. 130-149.

Schurmann, P. (1968) *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Seidman, H. (1970) *Politics, Position, and Power*, (3rd edn.) New York: Oxford University Press.

Waller, D. J. (1981) *The Government and Politics of Peoples Republic of China*, New York: New York University Press.

Wright, D. S. (1978) *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, New York: Duxbury Press.

Wright, V. (1989) *The government and Politics of France*, (3rd end.) London: Unwin Hyman.

SUPREME COURT OF AMERICA; A MODEL OF STRONG JUDICIARY

Mansoor Akbar Kundi
Maimoona Khanum

"The judicial process in its many forms is the human culture answer to the problem of conflict process management. Institutionally, the judicial process is, in sense, the heart of political system. the system may employ violence or the threat of violence to support its decisions, but only in the last resort. If compliance is not voluntary for most decisions, than the system is not functioning well. Thus public acceptance of the judicial system declines and each person assumes the role of judge once again, the stability and legitimacy of the political system vanish".

The American political system has served the model of a strong Presidential system with a doctrine of separation of power a novel feature of its constitution, by dividing power among three branches of government: legislative, Executive and judiciary (Supreme Court). the doctrine of separation is implemented through the principles of checks and balances. Thus it restricts the role of one branch against another from exercising of excess of powers lest powers are abused. the Supreme Court of America has played an important role in exercise of its powers against the executive and legislative powers at federal and state level. The Supreme Court has served as a model of a strong judiciary, and many of the worlds developed and developing countries, in one way or another have

tried to adopt the pattern of American Supreme Court in establishing their seats of highest court of appeal.

The Supreme Court in America exercises an influential role in its political system. In one analysis, "the judiciary is one of the important branches of the state system in America with the assertion of strong judicial independence against presidency and Congress"¹. The constitution of the United States of America established the Supreme Court at the top of the national system. Article 111, of the US constitution vests all judicial powers in the Supreme Court. It says, "the judicial power of the United State shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish... the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution. The laws of the US and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, the all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to controversies to which the United States shall be a party etc."²

The judicial branch, symbolised by the US Supreme Court, has had a tremendous impact on public policy in the past two centuries, and will continue to play an important role in American political life.

The Supreme Court can exercise a judicial leadership through four means:

- (i) by judicial review;
- (ii) defending the rights of citizens;

- (iii) reviewing of state and local statutes and practices;
and
- (iv) interpreting of federal statutes"³

The article is an attempt to analyze the role of the Supreme Court of America by exercising these means to provide a judicial leadership.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

The right of judicial review, a peculiar American term is an important feature of the American judiciary. The term is not mentioned in any article of the constitution or amendments. It has emerged out of legal decision.⁴ The importance of the judicial review arose mostly because of two reasons;

1. American was a new nation with a shortest constitution, which in many constitutional law experts analysis, was too inadequate to explain the role of federal judiciary to exercise its powers of deciding cases touched upon constitutional validity.
2. The US had federal system where it had become imperative that Supreme Court has the power to safeguard the interests of individuals/state against the infringement of their constitutional rights. Also, it is believed by many constitutional law experts that without the power of judicial review the right to strike down presidential or congressional actions at a variance with the

constitution, the Supreme Court would be severely restricted in its power. the power of judicial review actually originated out of the famous decision in 1803 known as Marbury V. Madison. The Supreme Court responded to Marburys petition who was denied commission under secretary of state, James Madison, and had sued for his commission under the provision of the judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the authority to issue writs compelling the delivery of the commissions"⁴. Justice Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, declared that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction regarding the Marburys case, therefore, he was not issued commission"⁵. The Supreme Court, however, in its rulings made it clear that the court had the power to declare any law of congress null and void if found unconstitutional. He based his decision on three principles:

- (i) the constitution is superior to congressional law;
- (ii) the court has the power to determine what the provisions of constitution mean;
- (iii) laws or an executive action/order that violates the constitutional spirit must be declared by the courts.

The Supreme Court under the judicial review can overturn acts of congress and Presidential actions. The power may not be exercised once too often however, it makes the other two branches of the US Government: Congress and Presidency aware of a fact that the excesses of powers they do may be challenged by the Supreme Court itself under the judicial review. From 1789 to 1992, a total of 80 laws passed by the congress and approved by the president were declared null and void.⁶ A number of them were rejected during the second term of the Presidency of president Roosevelt between 1936 to 1940 where many of the NEW DEAL Laws were turned down by the Supreme Court as they were against the provisions of the constitution. It bred a big frustration for President Roosevelt. One of the major rejections for President Roosevelt was after the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRC) of 1937 was challenged by the Court. It was rejected under the Judicial Review on the ground that the Act since delegated legislative power to the President, and because it involved the federal government regulating intrastate commerce.

The famous Dred Scot case in 1857 declared by majority to 7 to 2, that no black free or slave could claim the United States citizenship. In the Dred Scot case the Supreme Court also stated that the Congress could not prohibit slavery in the US territories. The Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, speaking for the majority, declared that Scot could not bring a suit in a federal Court which he had tried because they (black) were not the US citizens. The ruling aroused angry resentment in the North where people were against the existence of slavery. This pushed the country "a step closer to the civil war" The introduction of the 14th Amendment after the civil war was influenced by the

resistance to the decision. Similarly, during 1953 to 1968, under the chief justice-ship of Warren 22 laws or sections of laws were declared unconstitutional by the court.⁷

DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

The court has defended the rights of citizens foreign individuals and even international agencies or multinational corporations under the judicial review. Going through the major Supreme Court rulings regarding criminal proceeding in last four decades, one can see the role of Supreme Court to uphold the rights of people where a violation of first ten amendments to the constitution (Bill of Rights) was found. In *Mapp v. Ohio* case (1961) the court ruled that evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizures are inadmissible in all federal and states courts. In *Robinson v. California* (1962), it decided that constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment extended to states would continue, and these nasty punishments would not be allowed. In *Washington v. Texas* (1965), it was decided by the court that defendants must be provided assistance to obtain favourable witness. In *McCleskey v. Kemp* (1987), court passed judgment that claims of racial discrimination in death penalty are rejected. There are a number of decisions where the Court disallowed racial discrimination and exploitations of human rights.

In 1967, referring to the Nationality Act of 1940, in *Afroyin v. Rush* the court announced that congress lacked the authority to pass laws depriving individuals of citizenship without a hearing. In *Oregon v. Mitchell* case, the court ruled that lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 for states and

local elections violated the constitutional provisions granting states power over their own elections.⁹

Although judicial reviews usually involve the constitutionality of acts of Congress, a judicial review may include determination of the constitutionality of acts of a President. In 1952, during the Korean war, President Harry Truman sought to seize and operate steel plants that were threatened with a strike. he legitimized the actions under his authority as commander-in-chief of US defence forces. The court ruled that the Presidents action as they were unconstitutional because he had failed to follow procedures set down by congress for the seizure of private properties during the period of emergency; Trumans action was found unconstitutional.¹⁰

In 1975, the courts ruling against President Richard Nizon proclaimed that a president must spend funds appropriated by Congress even if he dislikes the programmes for which the funds were appropriated. President Nixon had impounded funds in an effort to kill programmes he thought wasteful.

The President—Supreme Court relations have fetched controversies where the Presidents blamed the court for interfering with his exercise of powers essential to carry out the national policies. Presidents have been disdained by the courts decisions by finding them a rejection of many of their administrative actions required for successful running of their administration.

Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson perceived many of justice Marshalls decisions against their Presidential programmes.¹¹ Franklin Roosevelt irked by the judicial decisions even called at a time for popular recall of the Supreme Court judges in greater interests of nation. A great deal of his "New Deal" Programmes were blocked by the Supreme Court decisions against him. Roosevelt, who raised his voice. "I pledge you, I pledge myself to a New Deal for the American people", for better economic recovery in the wake of second world war disasters, was bitterly confronted by the Supreme Court when he in 1937 decided to add justices to the Supreme Court bench. It was proposed by Roosevelt administration, sought the reorganization of the Supreme Court. It was proposed that when a Supreme Court justice reached the age of 70 a younger person should be appointed to sit with the justice on court. The total number of justices was not to exceed fifteen.¹² His proposal was rejected on the ground that it would favour his programmes with more justices of his choice.

Over the question of segregation, resulting into a national problem for the Nixon administration, the Supreme Court opposed policies of President Nixon regarding the settlement of problems arising out of segregation. Nixon was perturbed by the Supreme Court decision that children could be bused to integrate public school in areas where state laws had required segregation. Nixon proposed rapid legislation to stop federal courts from issuing new busing orders. The President—Supreme Court dialogue created an impression that Nixon believed the court was not supportive of its policies, and he tried to nominate more liberal candidates to Supreme Court benches on vacant seats. Two of the President Nixons nominees to associate justices were rejected one after another under this

impression. The turndown of the nominations of Clement F. Haynsworth; and G. Harrold Carrswell was the first time since 1894 that two of presidential nominees for Supreme Court were rejected by the Senate one after another.

The courts decisions against the presidential actions, nonetheless, are marked as a corner stone of the check and balance that he is going to "pack" the Supreme Court with judges whose policies essential to stem power abuse by the executive branch.¹³

Every year 4,000 cases are registered with the Supreme Court where a judicial review is asked by the petitioner, nonetheless. Hardly 150-200 cases are retained by the Supreme Court for judicial review, and the rest are discarded. A Supreme Court decision, regarding a case registered with the Court, can replace earlier decision the Supreme Court had made. For example, in 1969, the Supreme Court ruled out that segregation must be ended in all public school districts of America at once. The ruling actually replaced the 1955 decision calling for an end to segregation in general. Similarly the Supreme Court in 1943 under famous *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* held unconstitutional a West Virginia statute requiring a school child to salute the flag a practice forbidden by the child's religion.

REVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL ACTIONS

The Supreme Court can exercise its right to review the constitutionality of acts of state and local governments and can declare them null and void if any of them is repugnant to the spirit of constitution. According to the article IV, "This

constitution, and the law of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof: and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United states, shall be the Supreme law of the land".¹⁴

This Clause is called "Supremacy Clause", which enables the Supreme Court to strike down any act by local or state governments if it is against the federal laws or the constitution. The "Supreme Clause" incorporated in Article VII. of the US constitution is the part that keeps the entire structure from falling apart. It means simply that when state laws conflict with national laws, the national laws are superior. it also mean that to be valid, national law must follow the constitution.

Though the Supreme Court's powers of judicial review in case of state and local actions has bred some controversy regarding the violation of state court actions, nonetheless, the Supreme Court has played a indisputable leadership in safeguarding individuals rights against state and local practices. The Court in its history has overturned more than 1,000 state and local practices".¹⁵ The Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia case had ruled that a state lacked power to pass laws affecting Indians living on Indian territory with in a state of the US. Similarly, in the famous Brown v. board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, was against the state action of violating the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the de jure school segregation, and this became applicable every where in the country. The decision involved great importance as prior to that decision the problem of inferior, segregated education was not an important issue before Congress and state legislatures were so weak that legislative remedies were not even being seriously debated, especially in those Southern states where conditions

for black youngsters were most wretched. The Brown decision helped American government to face up to problems of racial discrimination.¹⁶

The Supreme Court by expanding its judicial authority can raise social justice by backing federal and State courts against a states action. The Federal courts have taken on occasions over the day-to-day operation of prisons hospital and school system. They have issued specific court orders and thus are required state legislature to reform a system. For example, in the case of Jacksonville, Florida jails, where inmates rights were violated by denying them basic rights, the federal district judge, Charles R. Scout, had ordered numerous for improvements for reformation. The judge also threatened city and country officials with contempt of Court if they failed to follow the order. When objected by the state government that Scotts action was interference with state jurisdiction, he threatened to forward the case to Supreme Court as the prison system suffered inmates rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.¹⁷

INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES

The Supreme Court exercised the power of statutory interpretation, a vital part of its judicial leadership through its review of state and local practices where the constitutionality of statute has been challenged in court. Both these sources of leadership involve overturning a law or practice on the basis of its unconstitutionality. The interpretation of laws, which is the third source of judicial leadership, differs from the first two in that it does not involve finding of unconstitutionality. Many Supreme Court decisions do not involve challenges to the

constitutionality of legislation but rather disputes over how legislation should be interpreted. The court is called on to interpret the statutes passed by Congress, though as a policy the Court tries to avoid considerations of unconstitutionality. Mostly, to avert the question, the court interpret a law on a manner that changes the intent of Congress or a state legislature but avoids a finding of unconstitutionality. In famous case, *Destereich v. Selective Service Board*, the Supreme Court held as a national policy by prohibiting draft boards from removing the exemptions of protesters, it had not ruled the Selective Service Act, as any of its sections, unconstitutional.¹⁸

Decisions of the Court need not be unanimous; a simple majority of six judges is required to fulfill the legal quorum, In case of split decisions, the court issues a majority and a minority, or dissenting opinion of judges. In deciding a case, the Chief justice and the Associate justices are entirely equal, the vote of the Chief justice carries no more legal weight than that of the associates. He being administrative head of the court divides among justices the work to do. The opinions regarding the decisions by the judges form the basis for future decisions by the Supreme Court. The opinions of the judges of Supreme Court have been marked with great importance for the promotion of international laws: they served model of equity for many European courts.

CONCLUSION

The role of Supreme Court has been marked with great importance in American political system. It has been successful in exercising its functions as a highest judicial organ and court of appeal to enhance the credibility of its powers against the

excess of power by the other branches of government. Legislature and executive, In a fragmented and plural society as the US is, the court has been exercising its functions in integrating it. The court has been able to secure the political support of important divisions of American society on behalf of its decisions. it "has become a part of the dominant national alliance". It is relatively a cohesive alliance of political forces that tends to control decision-making in American politics.

The court, nonetheless, remains under certain restraints to exercise its excess powers of judicial review. In other words, the court is neither free to rule on all controversies in American society nor capable of correcting all justices. The power of exercising its role involves many considerations, The political consideration are considerable. The court keeps in consideration the consequences of a decision in public. Any decision, on matter relevant to judicial review, if can provoke public resistance, the courts may not touch it. Therefore it is believed that Supreme Court must not get either too far behind or too far ahead of public opinion, On the other, it must not follow public opinion too closely. The goal of the court is to achieve justice. If it bends too easily to public will, it may lose contact with ethical principles. The court decisions require that they are broad social policy based, rather than narrow thinking of the majority of justices themselves. Similarly, the Court is bound by a number of established rules and procedures that puts a restraint on its powers. Cases brought to the Supreme Court must have been initiated by an injured party. Cases cannot be initiated by the Court itself, and the Court cannot give advisory opinions that is, offer guidelines as to how it would respond to a given controversy. The Court has assumed many issues "political questions", and have refused to consider those

questions. For example, the right of exercise of many powers by states in the US have touched the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to declare them null and void, but it remained silent. The questions of abortion in many states and implication of state taxations were ley by the Supreme Court untouched for broader mobilization of federalism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kermith Hall, "*The Oxford Dictionary of the Supreme Court of the United States (ed.)*", (London: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 20.
2. "The Constitution of the United States of America", *State Department Publications*, 1982, p. 2.
3. R. V. Demenberg, "*Understanding American Politics*", (Suffold: The Chaucer Press, 1984), p. 121.
4. Micael B, Levy, "*Political Thought in America*", (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 321
5. Walter F. Murphy, "*Element of Judicial Power*", (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964) p. 321
6. Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba, "*Principles of American government*", (New York: Harper & row Publishers, 1980), p. 163.
7. *Ibid*, p. 173.

8. Peter Woll, *"Behind The Scene in American Government"*, (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1985), p. 134.
9. *op. cit.*, Michael B. Levy, P. 322.
10. Rolf H. Theen, and Frank I. Wilson, *"Comparative Politics: An introduction to Six Countries"*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), p. 39.
11. *Ibid*, p. 39
12. Lawrence Baum, *"The Supreme Court"*, (Washington. DC. 1989), p. 45.
13. *Ibid*, p. 45.
14. *Op. cit.*, Michael B. Levy, p. 345
15. *Op. cit.*, Lawrence Baum, p. 59.
16. *Ibid*, p. 125.
17. Jean Blondel, *"An Introduction to Comparative Government"*, (London: Weidenfeld, 1969), p. 123
18. *Op. cit.*, Demenberg, p. 123

ROLE OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN POLITICS OF PAKISTAN

Ahmed Husain

Present is a democratic age based on the concept of universal adult franchise. There is equality of sexes in principle but in practice there is difference between men and women, both in developed and developing countries. The rich countries do not provide them equal opportunities. The developing countries beside this discriminate against them in provision of nutrition, education and health care. The impact of universality of the right to vote for women in empowering them is further weakened as this right does not give them access to seats of political power.

Right to vote, to women has been given through slow and procrastinate manner. Scandinavian countries have the highest average of women representation in National Legislatures i.e., 33 of the total seats. Followed by socialist countries and western Europe. Women are not assigned powerful ministries. They are assigned generally ministries in social fields such as education, culture and social welfare.³ In developing countries there is difference between urban and rural women. The developing countries have less than 10% average representation, with 13 countries without women in the parliament.⁴ The gap of power between men and women is due to historical patriarch dominance based on hunting for food by men. Hence men are in an advantageous position, which has

been accepted by United Nations convention on the "elimination of all forms of discrimination against women."

The debate about "Chadar and Chardiwari", for Muslim women started after 1857, with emphasis on Education by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He believed that male education was a prerequisite if aristocratic Muslim families were to send their daughters to academic institutions.⁵ Sir Mohammad Shafi of Lahore became involved in improving the status of women by advocating for abolition of dowry and women's right to inherit property. These efforts led to the formation of the Anjuman-i-Khawateen-i-Islam in 1908, to work for the rights of women, in the light of Islamic teachings. In 1917, the Anjuman-i-Khawateen-i-Islam passed a resolution against polygamy which caused a minor furore in Lahore.⁶

In 1918, the All India Muslim League (AIML) passed a resolution for the demand for women's franchise, to lay emphasis on women's political right. Mrs. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz from Lahore started crusade against pardah and taboos on female education. Quaid-i-Azam, the President of AIML, in an address at Aligarh spoke against the perpetration of women's seclusion. To set an example, he always kept his sister Mothrama Fatima Jinnah with him in public meetings, to show that in Islam there was no restriction on political participation by women. In 1941, the Muslim Girls student federation was formed and in 1943 women's National Guards came into existence. Its green uniform was adopted by Pakistan Girl Guides.⁷

During the elections of 1945-46 Muslim women on the direction of the Quaid, took active part to support the Muslim League candidates. Muslim women had discarded the veil by a large majority and became politically active. The result was that the league achieved a great success by capturing all the reserved

seats for the Muslims at the Centre. But there was not a single woman contestant on the League ticket. The women members were content with the secondary political status. This had deep repercussions on the representation of women after independence.

Keeping in view the spirit by which the Muslim women took active part in the freedom movement of Pakistan, all the restrictions of voting on women were removed, after independence⁸. It was hoped that women of Pakistan who formed about 46% of the total population would take active part as candidates in the elections following the maxim: "Panacea for all political ills is an election". But they failed to take active part as candidates in the elections due to a number of reasons. Even though Madar-i-Millat Fatima Jinnah, Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto by contesting Presidential election against President Ayub Khan in 1965, participating in the PNA movement of 1977 and leading MRD movement in 1981 respectively, cleared the way for women participation, according to the objectives resolution of the constituent Assembly of Pakistan.⁹

To enable the women of Pakistan to make progress in the new State Begum Rana Liaquat Ali Khan founded All Pakistan Womens Association (APWA). Social Work and protection of women by family laws Ordinance of 1961 are its main achievements. In 1953, it urged the reservation of ten special women's seats in the national and provincial assemblies. The organisation did some good service for the uplift of women but its contribution in political field is negligible since its formation in 1949. The reason being that rural representation of poor women is negligible.

Since the formation of Constituent Assembly in 1947 an effort was made to give representation to women by nominating

two women members to it. There was no woman member in the Second constituent Assembly which approved the 1956 Constitution. The 1956 Constitution provided for ten reserved seats for women in the National Assembly. The 1962 Constitution had a provision for six seats and 1973 constitution twenty reserved seats till the General Election of 1988. A number of women candidates also contested on the general seats. The highest number of women elected on general seats is eight in the 1988 elections. A dismal performance about women representation.

The hypothesis is to discuss ways and means to attract women voters to contest on the general seats and defy taboos on their success in the elections. There had been persistent efforts to improve the political status of women in Pakistan. In September 1954, when Mrs. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz presented a charter of Women's Rights in the Assembly demanding more seats for women, it was surprisingly resisted by Sir Zafarullah Khan. After some lobbying, the constitution of 1956 accepted the principle of universal suffrage for women¹⁰. By 1970s the increased social and educational activities convinced Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto to form a 13 member Women's Rights Committee headed by the attorney General Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar¹¹. It submitted its report in July 1976 along with a set of recommendations which were never made public. Prime Minister Mothrama Benazir Bhutto twice tried to introduce a constitutional amendment to restore reserved seats for women in the National Assembly in November, 1993 and April 28, 1994. This new bill would have amended the constitution to allow the introduction of twenty five seats for women in the National Assembly, nine in the Senate, for the first time and also restore seats in the four provincial assemblies. The Government faced stiff opposition from the Pakistan Muslim League. The result was that bill ran into difficulty and women's reserved seats could not be restored¹². It is important to note here that in the

manifestoes of both the major political parties restoration of special seats for women in the National and Provincial Assemblies was common. The debate about the women seats in the National Assembly prompted the Senate to decide unanimously to have a commission of Inquiry for women. Following the resolution a Commission was setup in 1994, headed by Mr. Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid.¹⁴ The commission recommended total adherence to fundamental Rights mentioned in Article 8 of the Constitution. Specifically there has to be no discrimination on the basis of sex. It also was against the method of separate electorate for election of minority seats. The commission felt that the non-Muslim women, who are already handicapped in social and economic terms are further discouraged to contest elections. The commission suggested that as equal and responsible citizens, the non Muslim women should be granted atmosphere to participate in the mainstream of politics of the country.¹⁵

Now we come to main difficulties due to which women voters of Pakistan cannot actively take part in the elections. The society is patriarch, heavy dependence of women on men in social and economic life. Hence also dependence on men in politics by women in Pakistan. The concept of equality of sexes is still a myth. The women voters are believed to vote according to the direction of male members of the family, it is still common in many parts of the country that men make an agreement with contesting candidates not to permit their women to exercise their right to vote. This means that there is disparity between political rights of men and women in practice, even though the constitution provides equality of Rights.¹⁶ The women are not supposed to exercise political power. Normally most voters are unwilling to vote for them. The political parties are reluctant to give women party tickets. The women organisations mainly concentrate on education and health and eschew politics.¹⁷

With a millennium fast approaching it is high time that women population should make concerted effort to improve their political status by joining a political party of their choice and assert for reasonable say in the decision making process in a political party. Upto now they are used by male dominated political parties. The reservation of seats has not advanced the case of women. For indirect election to a reserved seat, a woman has to approach the party leadership. Who treats them as less important members of the Assembly and their opinion is ignored. For example, the law of evidence was passed in 1987, despite presence of women, indirectly elected on reserved seats. The concluding remarks of the Pakistan Commission on the status of women headed by Begum Zari Sarfaraz, 1983, are useful for political status of women of Pakistan. It urged that there should be greater participation of women at grass root level and they should be encouraged to participate in national life. A political party which does not have at least 20 per cent women membership should not be allowed to contest elections.¹⁸

The political situation for participation of women can improve provided at least 20% of the general seats are reserved for women equally divided between rural and urban constituencies for at least three future general elections, with voting by voters of either gender.

The women members of a party should be given a few leading offices to motivate the general body of the party to solve the problems of women. Government women organizations which lay emphasis only on social work and education, should also talk about political education, i.e., the importance of vote and elections. This would motivate the less educated and poor women to understand the importance of election. Active participation for political awareness among the women in general is the need of the hour from the educated and

affluent women of Pakistan. They have to talk positively about political participation by underprivileged women who have also a right to vote like a limited affluent women population of the country. Lastly, once for all, reservation of seats should be discarded and women should take active part in local politics as was done by Syeda Abida Hussain in 1979, to create political awareness at grass root level, as is done in the leading democracies of the world. For sometime, 33 % seats should be allocated to women by direct election. The question of elections is at the centre of politics everywhere

FOOT NOTES

1. The News, March, 7, 1994.
2. *Ibid*
3. United Nations, The World women 1970-1990. Trends and Statistics, New York, United Nations 1991 p. 31.
4. *Ibid* p. 33
5. Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Women's Role in the Pakistan Movement*, Lahore, 1981, p. 7.
6. Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed (eds.) *Women of Pakistan. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?* London, 1987, p. 42.
7. Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Antony's Series Oxford, 1997.
8. Kripal. C. Yadan - "*Elections in Punjab, 1920-1947*". The disqualification for being a woman was removed in

1926, however, there were property/status qualifications to be a voter.

9. Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1995. p. 127.
10. Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, op. cit. p. 301
11. Ibid p. 146
12. Anita M. Weiss, *The Status of Women*, (Pakistan 1995-96) p. 55.
13. Navid Zafar and Ishtiaq Hussain, *Election 1993, Facts Figures Feats*, Modern Book Depot, Islamabad. 1994.
14. The Nation, March 2, 1998. p. 7
15. Ibid p. 7.
16. Anita M. Weirs - *The Status of Women*, op. cit., p. 53.
17. The News, March 08, 1994.
18. Iftikhar H. Malik *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 18.

BENGALI LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN PAKISTAN: A VIEWPOINT

Dr. Razia Mussarrat

This is to inquire here that in Pakistan the language issue was the first to emerge and necessary to be resolved. In retrospect, it is curious that this matter was ever permitted to degenerate into regional polarization. In its crisis stage the language question was a landmark of Bengali cultural mobilization and helped to create a frame of mind which persisted long after satisfaction had been given on the immediate issue.

The language issue shook the very foundation of Pakistan¹ and, according to Rafiqul Islam, "the freedom struggle of Bangladesh originated from the Bengali language movement²"

T.V. Sathyamurthy argues that, ".....the linguistic question loomed on the horizon as the single most important point of conflict³"

The language controversy of Pakistan started even before the creation of Pakistan. Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad, a former Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University of India had suggested that Urdu should be the official language of the future state of Pakistan⁴. Dr. Md. Shahidullah, a noted Bengali linguist from Dacca University, opposed the suggestion. He wrote, "If Urdu or Hindi instead of Bengali is used in our law courts and Universities, that would be tantamount to political slavery⁵ "

Dr. Shahidullah's comment was the beginning of the language controversy of Pakistan.

On the 15th of September, 1947 in a booklet it was proposed that:-

1. Bengali language shall be the following:
 - a) medium of instruction in East Pakistan.
 - b) medium of court communication.
 - c) medium of office communication.
2. The language of the central government will be both Urdu and Bengal⁶. According to Bud. B. Khleif "language is the key to the new nationalism"⁷. And according to Daniel Bell, "ethnicity has become more salient (than class) because it can combine interest with an effective ties"⁸.

Melson and Wolpe argued that,

"in culturally plural societies, citizens tend to perceive their competitive world through a communal prism and to be responsive to communal appeal".⁹

Hence language conflict can occur wherever there is language contact particularly in multi-lingual communities.

According to Joseph rothschild,

"No society or political system is today immune from the burgeoning pressure of ethnic nationalism, with its

possible legitimating or delegitimizing effects. Old or new, communist and non communist, advanced and developing, centralist and federalist states must all respond to the pressure of this ascendant ideology".¹⁰

According to Mansur Ahmad,

"Pakistan surely meant cultural autonomy. it was to be Bengali culture freed from Hindu linguistic and religious shackles. It was to be Muslim, but distinct from the culture of other Bengalis and other Muslims".¹¹

The origin of Pakistani nationhood was spiritual and ideological, but "immediately after the creation of Pakistan, other forms of identity surfaced which, in the eyes of many Pakistanis, were not incompatible with Islam".¹² The foremost among them was unrelenting loyalty to their language and failure of the central leadership of Muslim League to come to terms with the regional and linguistic identity.¹³ Statistically Bengalis were the majority community of Pakistan about fifty six percent of the total population.¹⁴ The basis for the demand that Bengali be made a state language was that it was the language of a majority of the people of Pakistan. Pakistan's national leaders were convinced that political integration was possible only if the country could be made to accept one language. The language chosen was Urdu.¹⁵ The Pakistani government failed to appreciate the fact that nations are made up of human beings whose deep feeling about such questions as their language can not safely be ignored. A federal union can be strengthened by giving cultural liberty and autonomy, but Pakistan's attempt to impose uniformity where diversity was desirable had unfortunate consequences. The "Rashtra Bhasa Sangram Parishad" the state language committee of action was formed in Dacca in October 1947. The committee vehemently protested the exclusion of Bengali language from the newly

issued money, postal stamps, coins, office forms of government of Pakistan.¹⁶

These proposals were the manifestation for the aspirations of the Bengali speaking people of Pakistan.

On the 5th of December, 1947, the teachers and the students of Dacca University had their first street demonstration i in favour of Bengali. On the following day, another protest meeting was held in Dacca University against the government sponsored Education Conference, held in Karachi, which recommended that Urdu should be the only state language of Pakistan.¹⁷

On the 25th of February, 1948, when Mr. Dharendra Nath Dutta, a Hindu Member from East Pakistan, moved an amendment to the Constituent Assembly rules pleading that Bengali should also be made an official language.¹⁸ Then the members could speak Urdu or English.¹⁹ The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, opposed the motion arguing that the amendment was designed to create a rift among the Pakistanis and that Urdu alone would be the national language²⁰, despite the strong claims of the Bengalis.²¹ The emphasis on urdu therefore heightened tension between the two parts of the country and from the start volatile Bengalis asserted they were being turned into a colony. The policy makers stuck the Bengalis assimilationist approach.

Refiqul Islam wrote that,

"Liaquat Ali Khan's argument was emotional and fallacious because the Indian Muslims are historically multilingual and the Bengali speaking Muslims have always outnumbered the Muslims of other language groups of United India²²".

Bengalis refused to accept superiority of any other language²³. The resentment was transformed into a political movement²⁴. The students demanded that Bengali be given national status,²⁵ as there were so many federal states in which more than one language was spoken and understood. Trouble arises over language, when the government, on the bidding of the strongest state or party, attempts to force its language on the whole. The attempt of the Pakistan government to force Urdu on the East wing did provoke a violent reaction from the Bengalis.

According to Rushbrook Williams,

"the reaction of the Bengalis was exactly what might have been expected. They enjoyed the virtual unity of race and culture...leaving aside some minority tribal elements²⁶".

The adoption of Bengali would probably lead to stronger ties and better understanding between the people of two wings of the federation of Pakistan. The multi-lingual solution, it would seem, was a pragmatic approach in the existing circumstances. Every attempt made by government to foster a cultural uniformity based on Islamic culture in East Pakistan produced a sharp reaction, and "the Bengalis began to look more and more to West Bengal for cultural affinity and bonds²⁷".

Raunaq Jahan asserted that,

"the centre's assimilationist cultural policy, therefore, rather than uniting the two wings, drove a wedge between them²⁸".

Language controversy was responsible for several significant developments. According to Philip Oldenburg:

"The demand for Bengali and Urdu to be equal in every respect was the final reprise of the language issue, which had sparked the first bengali opposition to the Muslim League rule in Pakistan and fueled the subsequent movement that ended in the United Front Victory of 1954."²⁹

The 21 point programme was designed to appeal to the vernacular elite as opposed to the national elite³⁰.

The United Front pledged that in the event it won the election and formed a government the following steps would be taken:-

1. Bengali shall be made one of the state languages of Pakistan.
2. Arrangement will be made to impart education through the mother tongue only.
3. The United Front will change the residence of the Chief Minister (as the Chief Minister of the province Mr. Nurul Amin was responsible for the 21st February killings) and that the residence would be converted into a center of research for Bengali language and literature (the Bengali Academy was housed in that building at that moment)
4. In memory of those killed on the 21st of February a befalling martyr's column will be set up

at the spot of the killing and compensation will be given to their families.

5. The 21st of February will be declared as the "Sahid or Martyrs" day and made a government holiday (this is now a national holiday)³¹.

Pakistan United Front fought the provincial elections of 1954 on the basis of 21—point program, registered an overwhelming victory and formed a government in East Pakistan.

It was clear that East Bengal was not prepared to surrender essential features of its corporate cultural identity to the idea of primary loyalty to an Islamic identity³².

And according to Trevor Ling,

"in 1954 they have shown an awareness of the public social issues, which were at stake, they showed their keen awareness of the main problems and cast their votes correctly³³".

It was also clear now that political parties were becoming dominated by regional ethnic interests³⁴.

The demand of Bengalis for equal status of Bengali with Urdu was conceded in 1954 in Bogra Formula³⁵.

Lawrance Ziring comments on this,

"in 1954, Bengali was given equal status with Urdu as a national language, but neither this act nor many other

concessions since then have healed the rift between East and West Pakistan³⁶."

As a result of the victory of the United Front in East Pakistan, the voice of Bengal could now be heard in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in Bengali. What's more in the First constitution of Pakistan in 1956, Bengali was made one of the state languages of Pakistan.

"The constitution of 1956 recognized Urdu and Bengali as two official languages³⁷".

The Constitutional stipulation was interesting in that the implimentation clause was kept in abeyance for twenty years. The Bengalis were not particularly happy about this. However the United Front Government in East Pakistan took the necessary initiative to setup a "Bengali Academy" at Burdwan House (the former Chief minister's residence). The Bengali Academy was setup on the 12th of June 1957 with the Department of Research, Translation, Compilation, Publication and Sales, Cultural, Folk and Library. The Bengali Academy Act was passed by the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly on the 3rd of April 1957 to promote the culture and development of the Bengali.³⁸

The New ruler, General Ayub Khan, regarded ethnic sentiments as inherently divisive and dangerous, more the creation of politicians than real. He did not favour even the recognition of two national languages, Urdu and Bengali, a decision, arrived at during the parliamentary phase. "With two national languages" he wrote, "it is quite clear to me that we cannot become one nation-state".³⁹

Ayub Khan setup an educational commission. The National Educational Commission submitted its report to the

government in August 1959. The commission suggested the setting up of two Boards: one for Urdu and the other for Bengali⁴⁰. The main concern of this commission was to bring Urdu and Bengali nearer and to create a common language.

Bengalis were deeply conscious of belonging to a distinct cultural group. They regarded their language as one of the beautiful languages. They often spoke of the heights of literary excellence it had reached.⁴¹ Bengalis were not enthusiastic about bringing Urdu and Bengali nearer artificially. Thus the dream of a common Pakistani language was never realized. The language issue consolidated Bengali nationalism more than any other issue, though subsequently the constitution of 1962 recognised both Urdu and Bengali as the state languages of Pakistan⁴². The bitter struggle which the Bengalis had to suffer to secure due recognition for their language had left a permanent scar which was but the first of its kind on the process of integration between the two units of Pakistan. Anyhow it became evident that East Pakistan won its cultural battle with the recognition of Bengali as a national language⁴³.

Since Bengali and Urdu had been recognized as the two state languages of Pakistan, the central government's policy was to work for changes in the script of the Bengali language, so as to prevent the growth of the "language barrier" which the West Pakistanis viewed as the major cause of separatist sentiments in East Pakistan⁴⁴.

A "Central Board for the Development of Bengali", as suggested by the National Educational Commission of Bengali in 1959, was setup in June, 1967. The primary function of the Board was to promote national value and develop Bengali to the level at which it could become the effective medium of instruction at the higher level of education⁴⁵.

government in August 1959. The commission suggested the setting up of two Boards: one for Urdu and the other for Bengali⁴⁰. The main concern of this commission was to bring Urdu and Bengali nearer and to create a common language.

Bengalis were deeply conscious of belonging to a distinct cultural group. They regarded their language as one of the beautiful languages. They often spoke of the heights of literary excellence it had reached.⁴¹ Bengalis were not enthusiastic about bringing Urdu and Bengali nearer artificially. Thus the dream of a common Pakistani language was never realized. The language issue consolidated Bengali nationalism more than any other issue, though subsequently the constitution of 1962 recognised both Urdu and Bengali as the state languages of Pakistan⁴². The bitter struggle which the Bengalis had to suffer to secure due recognition for their language had left a permanent scar which was but the first of its kind on the process of integration between the two units of Pakistan. Anyhow it became evident that East Pakistan won its cultural battle with the recognition of Bengali as a national language⁴³.

Since Bengali and Urdu had been recognized as the two state languages of Pakistan, the central government's policy was to work for changes in the script of the Bengali language, so as to prevent the growth of the "language barrier" which the West Pakistanis viewed as the major cause of separatist sentiments in East Pakistan⁴⁴.

A "Central Board for the Development of Bengali", as suggested by the National Educational Commission of Bengali in 1959, was setup in June, 1967. The primary function of the Board was to promote national value and develop Bengali to the level at which it could become the effective medium of instruction at the higher level of education⁴⁵.

The board during its four-year existence had some useful work to its credit, the most important was the evolution of a modern keyboard for a Bengali typewriter and the manufacture of the machine with foreign collaboration.

The Bengali Academy in Dacca appointed a committee in April 1963 for reforming Bengali grammar and the writing system⁴⁶. The recommendations made by this committee, if implemented, would have drastically changed the nature of the language. It would have given new dimensions to Pakistani Bengali, by detaching it from the traditional Bengali of West Bengal. Responsibility for implementation of the Bengali Academy's recommendations was entrusted to Dacca University. Despite opposition from the Bengali experts and linguistics, the Academic Council of the Dacca University in its meeting on August 3rd, 1968 decided to implement it with minor modifications⁴⁷.

The Bengali governor of East Pakistan, Monem Khan, took an open stand for eliminating Hindu influence on Bengali and banned the import of literature from West Bengal. The regime also discouraged the use of Tagor's song, generally popular in East Pakistan. The Bengali intelligentsia saw this policy as an attempt to distort the original character of their languages, leading to a "resurgence of linguistic nationalism" in the late 1960s that manifested itself in celebration of Tagor's birthday, use of Bengali for writing sign boards and car plates, and pressure for introducing Bengali as medium of instruction in schools, colleges and universities⁴⁸.

However, these policies of cultural regimentation only enhanced the Bengalis pride in their linguistic, cultural and literary tradition, which constituted the strongest element of their nationalism. In a federation demands for cultural autonomy, under such conditions, are tantamount to demands

for speeding up the economic development of various units in such a way as to enable the least advantage to catch up with the more privileged units. In other words, a political climate is necessary, in which the different units would be able to avail themselves of the same material opportunities in order to develop their own cultural and material resources and bring their own specific contribution into alignment with their capacity in the field of socio-economic growth⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's government allegedly regarded Bengalis' cultural and linguistic affinities as a link with India's West Bengal. The Pakistan authorities regarded this as a serious menace to the existence of Pakistan and tried to impose a cultural uniformity based on Islam. The Bengalis reacted sharply. They felt (just as the Muslims of undivided India did) that their culture and way of life were threatened. The central leadership adopted the view that a significant number of Bengali Muslim leaders were probably not loyal Pakistanis. It was suspected that such leaders not only believed in retaining the Bengali language and culture but admired Tagore, and were not opposed to the steady influx of Hindu ideas and cultural influences from across the border.

The Pakistan government failed to appreciate the fact that nations are made up of human beings whose deep feeling about such questions as their language cannot safely be ignored. A federal union can be strengthened by giving cultural freedom and autonomy. But Pakistan's attempt to impose uniformity where diversity was desirable had unfortunate consequences. The federal system requires cultural autonomy of the federal units. The policy of suppression always widens the cultural gap between the center and federating units. If central government suppresses the language of any province (majority populated province) then this province may react against the policy of suppression and organize a separatist autonomous force. We see

that every attempt to foster a cultural uniformity in East Pakistan produced a sharp reaction. the Bengalis organized a separatist autonomous force. An autonomous force always gives unqualified preference to vernacular interests, when they are in conflict with national language considerations. In case of Pakistan the cultural differences led the Bengali elite to formulate Six Point Programme. But all these moves of reform and creation of a Pakistani language ended in a fiasco, due to the mass anti-Ayub political upsurge in 1969 which brought the down fall of Ayub Khan.

REFERENCES

1. Dr. Khawaja Alqama, "Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan. The Road to Disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity?", *Ph. D. Thesis*, University of Kent, Canterbury, 1990, p. 2.
2. Rafiqul Islam, "The Bengali Language Movement and Emergence of Bangladesh", *Asian Studies*, Vol. XI, 1978, p. 142.
3. T.V. Sothyamurthy, "Language, Religion and Political Economy: The Case of Bangladesh", in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.), *Political Identity in South Asia*, Curzon Press, London, 1979, p. 225.
4. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid*, p. 143.

7. Bud. B. Khleif, *Ethnicity and Language in Understanding the New Nationalism. The North Atlantic Region*, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. XXIII, No. 1-2, 1982-83, p. 119.
8. Tahir Amin, *Ethnoo-National Movement of Pakistan*, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, p. 28.
9. *Ibid.*
10. "The Policies of Ethnicity in South-West Asia, Political Development or Political Decay," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 4, 1984-85, p. 657.
11. Quoted in Dr. Khawaja Alqama, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.
12. *Ibid*, p. 102.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1968, p. 155.
15. Lawrance Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969* (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1971), *op. cit.*, p. 48. There were only 7-8% Urdu speaking population in Pakistan. See Muhammad Waseem, *Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985*, (Vanguard Books (PVT) Ltd., Lahore, 1987), p. 229.
16. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
17. *Ibid.*

18. *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. 11., 25, Feb. 1948, pp. 15-16.
19. Lawrance Ziring, *Politics and Language in Pakistan: Prolegomena 1947-1952*, *Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, January, 1971, Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided*, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore 1989, p. 8.
20. *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, 1948, p. 17; Lawrance Ziring, *opt. cit.*, p. 113; Rafiqul Islam, *op.cit.*, p. 144.
21. Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1967, p. 238. C.I. Evegene Kim and Lawrance Ziring, *An Introduction to Asian Politics*, Prentice Hall Inc, U.S.A., 1977, p. 186.
22. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 144. also see Farzana Sheikh, "Islam and the Quest for Democracy" *Journal of Common Wealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, March, 1986, pp. 80-82. Talukdar. Maniruzzaman, *Politics of Development*, Green Book House, Dacca, 1971, p. 42.
23. Quoted in, Safdar Mahmood, *opt. cit.*, p. 9. G.W. Chaudhary, *Last Days of United Pakistan*, C. Herst and Company, London, 1974, p. 11.
24. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 186
25. Philip Oldenburg, *A place insufficiently Imagined, Language, Belief and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971*, *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. XLIV, No. 4. August, 1985 p. 717. For student reaction to the language see

Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-152. Dr. Khawaja Alqama, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

26. L. F. Rushbrook. Williams, *The East Pakistan Tragedy*, tom Stacey, London, 1972, p. 18.
27. G.W. Chaudhary, *The Last Days of the United Pakistan*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
28. Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 38.
29. Philip Oldenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 715. In Raunaq Jahan's analysis, the language issue was crucial to the development of the vernacular elite', and the major thrust of the twenty one point manifesto (the programme for the 1954 election) is the accommodation of the vernacular elite's interests. For a summary statement and analysis see Raunaq Jahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47. Rafiqueal Islam, *p. cit.*, p. 147.
30. Craig Baxger, "Pakistan and Bangladesh", in, Frederick L. Shield (ed)., *Ethnic Separatism and World Politics*, British Library Lending Division, University of America 1984, p. 221.
31. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-48.
32. Farzana Sheikh, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
33. Trevor Ling, "Creating a New Stat: The Bengalis of Bangladesh". *South Asian Review*, Vol. V, No. 3, April, 1972, p. 226.

34. The Muslim League as early as 1954 had lost its footing in East Bengal because of its being dominated by Punjabi landlords. Other political parties also created to specific interests, for example the Republican Party for the Punjabis, the Awami League for the Bengalis and the National Awami Party for the Pathan interests. Quoted in Asaf Hussain and John P. Hutchinson, *The Impact of Relation and Ethnicity on Political conflict in Pakistan*, Asian Profile, Vol. 4, August, 1976, p. 329.
35. Inayutuallah, *op. cit.* p. 100. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967, p. 73, G. W. Chaudhary, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*, Longman Group Ltd., London, 1969 p. 82. G. W. Chaudhary, *Pakistan Transition from Military to Civilian Rule*, Scorpion Publishing Ltd., England, 1988, p. 17 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, *op. cit.*, p. 47. Craig Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 222.
36. Lawrance Ziring, Politics and Language in Pakistan, Prolegomena 1947-1952, *op. cit.*, p. 122. also see Craig Baxter and others, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1988, p. 234.
37. M. Nazrul Islam, *Pakistan: A Study in National Integration*, Vanguard, Lahore, 1990, p. 131.
38. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
39. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, Oxford University press, New York, 1967.
40. For their views see Khalid Bin Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

41. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
42. Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, U.K., 1967.
43. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Changes*, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1982.
44. Rafiqul Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
45. *Ibid*, p. 155.
46. Raunaq Jahan, *op. cit.*, p. 163. Talukdar Maniruszzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12., Inayatullah, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: the Nature and Direction of Change*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1980.
47. *Ibid*.
48. T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Nationalism in Contoemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspective*, Frances Publishers, London, 1983, pp. 93-94.
49. Dr. Khawaja Alqama, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

BOOK REVIEWS

STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, 1997 Zalmay M. Khalilzad David A. Ochmanck

by RAND, 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 USA Pages 337 Price \$ 20.00

The book is a survey of U.S. Defense Planning and Strategy to be adopted for the 21st Century. It proceeds to present several possible grand strategies and finally agree that a policy of Global leadership will best serve the United States in the years to come. The book also discusses threats to U.S. position in the world after the breakdown of cold war alliances, the proliferation of weapons of Mass destructing, the emergence of global rivals in the future. The strategy for global leadership can be adopted by the following: a partnership among democratic Allies, precluding Hostile Hegemony over critical Regions, by preserving American Military pre-eminence and U.S. Economic strength with an open International Economic System.

To provide capabilities DoD's leaders will have a wide array of promising new programmes among which to choose. High on the priority list should be new battlefield sensors and platforms; a new variety of smart munitions; multilayered defenses to shoot down, Theater Ballistic missiles, enhanced capabilities for suppressing and destroying enemy air-defenses and airlift aircraft for global mobility.

To fund such extensive modernization, it will be necessary to break some traditional modes of thinking. Defense

planners will need to examine new and more challenging scenarios and will need to use assessment techniques that reflect revolutionary impact of new capabilities more accurately and more clearly than previous models. The Army's reserve component will need to be down-sized and reshaped. And the U.S. military posture abroad will need to be reviewed. Each of these tables poses real strategic, analytical, and political challenges. Together, they constitute a daunting agenda that will require foresight, sustained leadership and considerable political courage to carry out.

Hameed A. K. Rai

ANTICIPATING ETHNIC CONFLICT

*by Askley Tellis, Thomas Szayana and James Winnefeld,
(Rand, 1998), PP 134 Price \$ 15.00 Soft Cover.*

The book provides a theoretical model of the social processes and dynamics that lead to ethnic and communitarian conflict and state breakdown.

The U.S. intelligence community has a mixed record while anticipating communal violence. For example, few predicted the rapid disintegration of Rwanda into genocide. Even in former Yugoslavia, when accurate intelligence forecasts were available, important elements of the driving forces of the conflict were largely unexpected. If these tragic events could have been predicted, thousands of lives could have been spared in Bosnia.

The authors examine the social and psychological sources of ethnic tension and find that by asking the right questions, political and military analysts can better anticipate such conflicts. This can improve the prospects for preventive action without the use of force.

While, the book is designed as a practical tool for intelligence analysts as they work to identify and plan for potential ethnic conflict contingencies around the world, its discussion of the social science underpinning of the analytic model makes it an important reading for anyone interested in analyzing the phenomena of ethnic conflict.

Hameed A. K. Rai

ALGERIA: THE NEXT FUNDAMENTALIST STATE?*by Graham Fuller, Rand, 1996, Paper back Price \$ 15.00*

Algeria—the largest and of the most important states in the Arab world—is in a state of virtual civil war. Underlying a four-year paralyzing spiral of violence are issues of a corrupted and failed elitist rule, class struggle, generation differences, democracy versus authoritarianism, a European versus an Arab orientation, the imperialist legacy and a debate over what is to be "modern".

The Algerian "fundamentalist" movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is ultimately going to gain a dominant voice in the country in the next few years. But the current Ruling Junta is dealing with FIS with a heavy hand. The Islamists coming to power in Algeria would have major and far-reaching repercussions.

To protect western interests in Algeria and its neighbouring states, to bring an end to violence, and to stem the rise of any radical group, the West must ensure that a democratic Government is established.

The author of the book Graham Fuller attempts to put that possible takeover in perspective. Why it might happen, what it would look like and what it would mean for the West and the region. He speculates on the political future of Algeria, outlining the political and social policies an Islamist regime might likely to follow. He suggests specific steps, the United States and its Western allies can take to encourage a democratic restoration in Algeria.

Hameed A. K. Rai

SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
Regional Features and U.S. Strategy

*by Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser (RAND) Santa Monica
 C. A, March, 1998) soft Cover price Price \$ 20.00 pages 275.*

In World Politics nothing remains status quo for a longtime. Today's friend might become enemies in future. Even among military leaders there is disagreement over possible future threats and how the military should prepare itself for the future.

The; authors of the book, *Sources of conflict in the 21st Century*, examine political trends and potential sources of conflict in three regions — Asia, the Greater Middle East and Europe and former Soviet Union —upto the year 2025.

The writers have divided the book into regions and their implications for strategy and planning.

The authors have also described three possible alternative future "Worlds". Each with their own meanings for strategic planning. These possible features include a projection of present political climate, a more benign world in which the great powers are at peace and are actively cooperative in a world which; is beset with economic, demographic and political turmoil.

Hameed A. K. Rai

CONTRIBUTORS

1. *Mrs. Nasreen Javed*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lahore College for Women, Lahore.
2. *Mr. Javeed Ahmed Sheikh*, Vice-Principal and Head of the Deptt. of Political Science, Govt. College, Lahore.
3. *Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhry*, Chairman, Deptt. of Political Science, B.Z. University, Multan.
4. *Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi*, Chairman Deptt. of Political Science, Balochistan University, Quetta.
5. *Mrs. Maimoona Khanum*, Lecturer, Law College, Quetta.
6. *Prof. Ahmad Hussain*, former Chairman, Deptt. of Political Science, Govt. College, Lahore.
7. *Dr. Razia Mussarrat*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Islamia University Bahawalpur.
8. *Prof. Hameed A. K. Rai*, former Chairman, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.