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PROGRESSIVE DISARMAMENT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIA.

by
**Nasreen Javeed
and
Javeed Ahmed**

The development of nuclear capability along deterrence—security continuum has emerged as a bewitching and unmitigated phenomena in the global political dynamics. The countries who are responsible for creating this phenomena are the ones trying to control it. The logic behind the efforts of production-control syndrome is confusing and shrouded in perception-misperception cauldron.

*

Forty four countries have either acquired nuclear capabilities, or they are threshold powers or they are ambitiously clamouring to become nuclear powers. Off these, six countries have been accepted by nuclear hegemons. The pace of development of nuclear arsenals of these countries is obvious from the following table.

Table. 1

Countries	Year of nuclearization	Explosion conducted	nuclear weapons
USA	1945	1032	8711
Soviet Union	1949	715	6,833
France	1950	210	524
Britain	1950	45	200
China	1964	45	450
India	1974	1	300

(The data has been gathered from different sources. It is based on approximation.)

These developments have been conditioned to threefold causes i.e.,

1. to muster power to defeat or deter the adversary/adversaries,¹
2. to use it as a bargaining chip,² and
3. to cater the country's requirement of electricity.³

After acquiring technological edge, the nuclear countries adopted "Market Economy Approach"⁴ to sell technology and know-how to different countries. The US and Canada (non-proliferation country) capitalized on this approach. Later, other European countries and Soviet Union followed the race.⁵ Market economy wrapped up South Asia without exception.

*

India, on receiving the report on the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki condemned the action of USA, but at the same time became ambitious to develop nuclear capabilities. The designs were responded by Canadian industrial complexes in 1948 and the American government committed to supply uranium-enriched heavy water to India in 1950 to further clandestinely manipulated programme⁶. European consortium and Soviet Union enormously helped India in developing nuclear capabilities. India became a nuclear power by the end of 1960's⁷ and ultimately had become a "nuclear power" in 1974. In these developments, every Indian leader patronized and praised the programme. The Indian Prime Minister proudly stated that India had joined the rank of nuclear power. Since then India is persistently following the nuclearization of the country which has germinated nuclear arms race in South Asia.

Pakistan, on the other hand, began nuclear programme after India's detonation of a bomb. Pakistan was persuaded by the US and marketing countries to evolve nuclear capabilities. Pakistan was

reluctant to start such a gigantic, costly and destructive venture. Nevertheless, in 1968 Pakistan got an elementary technology to produce isotopes to treat the cancer patients. When Pakistan declared to take off in this venture in response to Indian explosion of 1974, Pakistan was pressurized by United States and other countries to stop acquiring nuclear potential. Pakistan's nuclear programme was dubbed as Islamic bomb and doubts were extended that the outcome of nuclear programme would be provided to the Muslim countries of the world who were against Israel.⁸

Pakistan adamantly but secretly went on developing atom bomb in reaction to incessant development in South Asia. Pakistan realized that Indian nuclear capabilities had created power imbalance in South Asia. Pakistan became victim to the US displeasure. Her economic aid was suspended on the basis of Presseler Amendment—an amendment in the American economic assistance package which prompted that aid should be linked with nonproliferation commitments otherwise no aid is to be given. The focus of this amendment on Pakistan was unjust. The Americans perhaps ignored, "the deeply ingrained traditional hostility between India and Pakistan accentuates the dangers inherent in a South Asian nuclear proliferation".⁹

It is conceived by western and American scholars that Pakistan has capabilities to produce 50 nuclear bombs but no official announcement has confirmed this contention. The Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did say that under American pressure she capped Pakistan's nuclear programme. This does not necessarily mean that Pakistan has developed A-bomb. Some do say that it is, "a bluff to counter Indian nuclear deterrence". It may or may not be true but one thing is obvious that Pakistan had carried out nuclear research without testing and detonation.

China factor with nuclear capabilities bolstered nuclear arms race in South Asia. Sino-Pak linkages to mutually share nuclear

experience, research and technology has provided India a pretext to increase her nuclear capabilities. On the basis of India's accelerated nuclear developments Henry Kissinger stated that India would be the sixth nuclear power in the beginning of 21st century. The other nuclear powers he pointed out will be USA, Russia, Europe, Japan, and China.¹⁰ Over the years the tension between India and China; Pakistan and India has escalated nuclear proliferation and aggravated to a point of insecurity and destruction.

South Asian's cold war is as intense as ever¹¹, and arms race as vigorous and blatant as one can perceive. The concomitant effect is, "the least likely scenario for South Asia's strategic future is a major premeditated military attack by one side."¹²

*

The dangers don't loom on the geo-political horizon of South Asia but according to George F. Kennan the nuclear arms race has brought the world to a brim of destruction.¹³ Judith and Nazish declared that if the nuclear war happen, the planet earth would turn upside down and if by any chance any corner would be saved, will become a victim to the "fall-out."¹⁴

It is a queer phenomenon that on one side human curiosity to unearth hidden power resources and unbridled ambition to muster and use power has led the world from traditional to nuclear warfare. On the other side, the fear of destruction and awareness of being wiped away and a lurking phobia of MAD has compelled leaders of the world to do something for the continuity of human specie. The phenomenon has been magnified during bipolar world.

In order to have cover up of incrimination of atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the President of USA termed it, "atom for peace". When United States achieved the status of being an atomic power Eisenhower emphasized to introduce stringent measures for

others so to stop nuclear explosion's¹⁵. It didn't work out. By 1952 Soviet Union developed atom bomb and raced to catch up USA three hundred nuclear arsenal target which America had already achieved in 1950.

Nuclear proliferation continually went on in one country after an other. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 America developed more destructive weapons. John F. Kennedy suggested that the use of nuclear weapons should only be permitted as a last resort.¹⁶ On these basis nonproliferation treaty (NPT) was drafted to check nuclear proliferation. After hectic discussions and debates, it was ratified in 1970 by the Congress of USA,¹⁷ but has not been accepted by the world community yet.

The NPT was considered to be a milestone in progressive disarmament. From 1970 to 1994 America has been trumpeting vociferously the need to avert nuclear holocaust by signing NPT. The majority of the countries did not sign. The countries went on nuclearizing themselves. Perhaps nuclear proliferation was to supports Waltz provocative hypothesis.¹⁸ Since WW II, efforts have been made to either disarm countries or control arms race. On one side the UN Disarmament Commission spent thousands of hours in debating ways and means to bridle arms race; volumes of paper work have been done to bring forth acceptable mechanism to introduce disarmament and hundreds of conferences have been convened to thrash out and rationalize globalization of arms control. All efforts remained futile because two big powers remained engaged in discussing and concluding treaties leading to arms control, completely ignoring the UN conferences, debates and paper work. SALT I; SALT II and INF were the treaties signed by Soviet Union and USA to give a false hope to the world that their efforts will bog down nuclearization tendencies. The American scholars challenged seriousness of this arrangement of negotiations. To them each negotiation was preceded by more pestilent weapons.

After America emerging as the hegemon of the world, thought of democratizing the UN to bring forth a treaty which should stop nuclear expansion. Instead of enforcing comprehensive test ban treaty, America pushed it to the decision making parlours of the UN. Under American guide lines the Conference on Disarmament (CD) began working to formulate an acceptable treaty. As a result of four decades of hard work the formal draft was presented in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly for approval.¹⁹ The text was supported by 127 countries but when presented for signature at the UN 94 countries signed the treaty including the five nuclear weapon states (The United States, Russia China, France and Britain) and Israel one of the three so-called "threshold states". Although prospects for CTBT's formal entry into the process of enforcement remain uncertain because of India's refusal to sign. The signing of the treaty may nevertheless effectively preclude any future nuclear tests.²⁰

*

India's refusal to sign the CTBT has not been spontaneous. India had not signed NPT and could not be pressurized by the top officials to cap or roll back the nuclearization. Indian scathingly criticized the initial and later drafts of Conference on Disarmaments and had outrightly flouted the world majority-sponsored CTBT. Indian hard and sometimes confrontational pattern of behaviour has been due to the following reasons.

1. Recognition-non acceptance crisis.
2. Hegemonic design.
3. China factor.
4. Mistrust on initiators of non-proliferation treaties.

Pakistan and India have been suffering with recognition-non-acceptance crisis which resulted in hundreds of clashes, wars and creation of Bangladesh. It has developed into a serious rivalry

between and among three countries to outmaneuver each other. Bilateral, and multilateral alliances politics; aligning with rival power; multiplying defence forces; incurring lion's share of budget sacrificing development of other sectors has endangered the peace and security of the region.

India has already acquired politico-nuclear hegemony in the region and has capabilities to further it to sophisticated levels. The ambitious plans were to become one of the leading countries of the world.²¹ Acceptance of NPT and CTBT can be frustrating. Brahama Chellaney translating Indian dreams into reality wrapped the Indian design with a tough stand. He wrote "India's security interest demand that either India live in a world of complete nuclear disarmament or it builds nuclear weapons:...without a credible nuclear deterrent India has little production from nuclear blackmail and danger such as it occurred in 1971, India-Pakistan war when president Nixon considered using of nuclear weapons to prevent Indian forces from decimating what was the West Pakistan."²²

India took another stance to oppose nuclear disarmament moves. India has been unwittingly exploiting Sino-Pak linkage. India has been contending that Pakistan's nuclear relationship with China and China's intertwined network of nuclear connections with big powers have thwarted security, therefore to concede to non-proliferation regimes will further push India in the realm of insecurity.²³ According to Chelleny, "the China-Pakistan umbilical cord will snap only if New Delhi can stand up to Beijing...India has retained its nuclear weapons options primarily to counter China's intimidating nuclear might and its role in enlarging and maturing the Pakistani threat....Today India cannot meet even the conventional military challenge from China. And as Beijings military and economic power grows, so will the gap with New Delhi... A strategy based solely on conventional defenses would push India into a debilitating arms race without providing the required level of protection."²⁴

Pakistan on the other hand began nuclear program secretly from 1974 onward. Pakistan has not made any explosion up till now. The output of nuclear programme and its achievements are still implied and ambiguous—perhaps US propagated Pakistan nuclear capabilities have been so far accepted as counter deterrent device. Since the creation, if Pakistan, has supported joint defence;²⁵ 20 years No-war pact"; South Asia nuclear free-zone;²⁶ conditional acceptance of NPT & CTBT,²⁷ Pakistan's basic contention of not signing NPT and the CTBT is based on Indian's refusal to do so.²⁸ Pakistan is one of 127 countries who supported CTBT in the UN General Assembly but is reluctant to sign, because Pakistan suffers with insecurity and imbalance of power in South Asia. Pakistan has repeatedly and emphatically asserted that Pakistan is ready to endorse CTBT provided India is persuaded to accept it.

The counter-vailing and contradictory contentions of both Indian and Pakistan have put them into a difficult choice between two South Asia's. Hagerty writes, "Over the long term two South Asias are possible. The first is a region with minimal nuclear weapons capabilities that deter but pose a risk of nuclear accidents and the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The second is a nuclear weapons free subcontinent with an increased likelihood of conventional war but no chance of a nuclear-weapons related disaster only Indian and Pakistan leaders can decide which South Asia they would like to inhabit."²⁹

When American teams contacted high official of both the countries about to cap or roll-back nuclear programme giving them assurance of protection from nuclear weapons and also promising them to help in the establishment of traditional weapons technology, both the countries did not accept. Pakistan capped its nuclear programme but did not roll it back. Whereas India continued nuclearization and testing of their weapons. American assurance did not win them over. The doubts of George Bunn appear to be correct. He wrote "As a result of the current confusion, both US credibility

as a reliable treaty partner and the US leadership role in the non-proliferation regime may be seriously undermined."³⁰ India not only refuse the America offer but when China and France were engaged in nuclear explosions against the resistance from different quarters, India also detonated nuclear weapon. India has frequently reiterated that she would continue her nuclear programme until and unless other nuclear countries would roll-back their nuclear achievements. The United States and the world community has not taken any step to stop India from nuclearization or its further development.

Pakistan has supported every non-proliferation initiative but is reluctant to sign treaties for security reasons. Consequently Pakistan has been punished by suspension of aid, made victim of Pressler Amendment and threatened with Israel's intention to bomb Pakistan nuclear facilities.



The US is a staunch supporter of NPT and CTBT and is working hard to get it through Rebecca Johnson while evaluating CTBT writes, "the prospect of CTBT treaty being successfully completed looks positive, but the price may be a treaty that sits indefinitely in limbo."³¹

The history based efforts of progressive disarmament has ultimately culminated into Ramakers drafts of CTBT. No doubt it is a historical document but inherits ambiguity of certain clauses. The projected doubts are from various sections of the world community. The conspicuous points are, namely.

1. Ban on all nuclear related explosions will lead to zero-yield strategy has been challenged.
2. Defective monitoring system.
3. Absence of protection from nuclear powers.

The first article of CTBT entails, "each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control,"——— and will also, "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapons, test, explosion or any other nuclear explosion."³² This article advertently or inadvertently permits nuclear development without any explosion. Pakistan's nuclear programme was being followed without any explosion.³³ It does not stop the buyers and sellers of nuclear technology.³⁴ India vehemently criticizes this article. Indian point of view is that CTBT is to perpetuate nuclear hegemony of five bigs by stopping others to test their weapons or make more competitive advances in this field.³⁵

The CTBT introduces monitoring system to check nuclear proliferation. International monitoring system comprising seismic, hydroacoustic, infra sound and radio nuclide monitoring. It will also include noble gas monitoring as well.³⁶ When monitoring would detect any clandestine or secret nuclear development, on the spot investigation (the OSI) team would reach the suspected site early enough to collect time-critical evidence.³⁷

The critics extend two kinds of doubts. The first is that below zero-yield level testing will not be detected by monitoring system³⁸ which would permit many ambitious states with Frankensteinian design to develop more sophisticated, weapon producing technology. The second is that some countries especially among the non-aligned fear that the US priority in intelligence technology will be used by the United States to harass its enemies and cover for its friends, and that no government has comparable resources to ensure that the United States does not cheat³⁹.

During Conference of Disarmament (CD) India expressed concern over the role of nuclear powers. The India Government at

home and abroad delineated that the nuclear powers want to establish their superiority over other countries which cannot be reconciled with. The threshold countries as well as some other countries intending to be nuclear do not trust the purposed and suggested protection by the nuclear hegemons. India called it a nuclear apartheid."⁴⁰ Pakistan has not been that critical of nuclear powers. Pakistan has been engaged in supporting nuclear initiatives but is not ready to sign until India does.

India's obstinacy in accepting a large number of countries who are making efforts of achieving comprehensive ban on nuclear testing has stirred a commotion among the decision makers of various countries of the world. Some disapprove of India's point of view; some suggest that India should be pressurized to sign it; some consider that India would be morally bound not to go for testing nuclear weapons if CTBT is enforced; and some suggest that America should take the lead of repairing relations with India. It is believed that if India is rounded off, Pakistan would automatically join the band-wagon. The chances are bleak and limited.

*

Spurgeon M. Keeny in the U.N. General Assembly stated, "Since this treaty is going to essentially bar further nuclear testing, we can celebrate this as a major historic event."⁴¹ It is evidently acknowledged that its a turning point in the progressive disarmament of nuclear weapons. The chances of its successful enforcement outweighs possibilities of failure. A small minority of threshold powers are not in a position to manipulate several others to block CTBT. It has been expressed by the champions of this treaty that if India does not support now, efforts would be made to persuade to accept CTBT. India's doubts and criticism is an outcome of her frustration caused by world pressure depriving her to evolve the position of a competitive hagemon.

CTBT is a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.⁴¹ It apparently looks a saner move but its success depends upon the commitment of the initiators and the signatories. A cursory glance on all the treaties focussing on limited to comprehensive ban lacked a seriousness of purpose and absence of concerted efforts to implement. Consequently, the results were not positive. Srilankan ambassador Dhanapala addressing the annual dinner of the Arms Control Association states, "if I had to describe what the proposal was for nuclear disarmament after the NPT review and extension conference in one word I would say it was good; in two words, I would say it was not good."⁴³ He further stated quoting Robert Frost, "We have miles to go before we can sleep without the nightmare of a nuclear conflict destroying us all—a nightmare that sheer luck and not wise policies, a crises management has prevented from becoming an awful reality."⁴⁴ He rhetorically concluded, "CTBT has brought us so close to a treaty that only perversity can snatch defeat from the jaws of victory."⁴⁵

Objectives are clear, intentions are guised, promises are definite and if commitments are seriously spelled out then whether India or Pakistan, Israel or any other ambitious country pose a threat, can be judiciously dealt with to accept the reality of CTBT. George Perkovich rightly stated. "The United States and the international community simply will not win Indian and Pakistani adherence to the test ban without a serious, practical commitment at least to pursue step-by-step measures to eliminate nuclear weapons."⁴⁸

Seemingly, losses to sign NPT and CTBT are less, gains are many. India, Pakistan and any other country's reluctance to sign might push the region and the world into a nuclear holocaust.

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PAKISTAN, INDIA AND KASHMIR

by

Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan

and

Dr. Khawaja Alqama

Pakistan and India have been living together as independent and sovereign neighbouring states for the last 49 years, yet far from being engaged into a cooperative relationship, the two countries have not been able to achieve a normalization of mutual relations. The two countries have been living in a state of precarious co-existence, frequently disturbed by tensions on borders and outbreak of hostilities, like the wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971. Even after fighting the three wars, the two countries do not seem poised to building a durable and permanent peace in South Asia; their governments are busy in acquiring more and more armaments and issuing inflammatory statements against each other that could only further aggravate the already tenuous relations between them.

Not that there has been no desire for mutual peace and cooperation among the people and leaders of the two countries or that no effort has been made in that direction, Pak-India normalization has remained elusive as ever, inspite of some bold and imaginative efforts made in the past by the leadership of both the countries. The people of Pakistan and India have a shared history and many of the cultural and spiritual values are common between them. They face identical economic, social and even political problems; and there is an increasing realization in both the countries, that through mutual cooperation they can help each other in overcoming serious problems of poverty, underdevelopment and social unrest. However, whenever an effort is made for that purpose, it makes no headway. After some initial advancement, the situation returns to

square one. It comes to the position of the one step forward, two steps backward.

At the outset, it should be noted that the leaders of freedom movement in both the countries did not envisage a confrontational relationship between the two independent countries. The leadership in Pakistan, particularly, from the very beginning had advocated a policy of peace and cooperation with India. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in an interview with Reuter's correspondent Mr. Duncan Hooper in October, 1947 had said: ".....Now that the division of India has been brought about by solemn agreement between the two Dominions, we should bury the past and resolve that, despite all that happened, we shall remain friends. There are many things which we need from each other as neighbours and we can help each other in diverse ways, morally, materially and politically"¹ On another occasion the Quaid-i-Azam showed his inclination to support Pak-India cooperation on international level, and even collaboration in defence. "Personally", he said in an interview with a foreign journalist, "I have no doubt in my mind that our own paramount interests demand that the dominion of Pakistan and the dominion of India should coordinate for the purpose of playing their part in international affairs and the developments that may take place and also it is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers both on land and sea against any aggression".² This statement of the Quaid was taken as an offer of joint defence to India and the Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru welcomed it. But the Quaid had qualified his offer with the condition that differences between Pakistan and India be resolved. "But this (the offer)", he had said during the same interview, "depends entirely on whether Pakistan and India can resolve their own differences, if we can put our house in order internally then we may be able to play a very great part externally in international affairs", he had added.

Unfortunately Pakistan and India were to only unable to resolve their differences inherited from a long colonial rule over the subcontinent, new issues were added to an already tense relationship between the two countries with the passage of time. In the period following the partition of the subcontinent, the new states had numerous bilateral disputes, but two of them related to Indus Waters and Kashmir were most serious. The dispute relating to the distribution of the waters of the Indus river basin raised bitter feelings between Pakistan and India, because the partition of India in 1947, threatened to totally disrupt the system of irrigation on which tens of millions on both sides depended directly for their livelihood.³ Luckily, before this issue could escalate into armed hostilities, India accepted the good offices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a peaceful settlement of the waters question. The river water dispute was finally resolved in 1960. Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan signed on September 19, 1960 the Indus Waters Treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at Karachi. Although dissenting voices are often raised in Pakistan over this settlement and there are occasional outbursts of condemnation of Ayub regime for signing the agreement with India, they are largely meant for the consumption of a domestic public opinion, and the issue is more or less regarded as settled.⁴

The dispute over Kashmir, however, proved much more complex and intractable. The Indians put the blame for starting dispute over Kashmir on Pakistan, and in this connection, refer to two incidents: tribal invasion of Kashmir which began on October 24, 1947 and the second is the intervention of Pakistan army inside Kashmir in the first week of May, 1948.⁵ But a deeper look into the history of dispute would reveal that it were the Indian machinations started in May, 1947 which were the actual cause of the dispute.⁶

Kashmir was one of about 600 princely states which had been under the British control as internally autonomous units. The constitutional position of these states upon the transfer of power to Indian hands, according to the decision of the British Government, was that these states became completely independent and were under no obligation to join India or Pakistan. Politically, however, the situation was different. The British Government made it clear that it will not recognize the independence of these states. Thus, making it clear that these states had no choice but to opt for either India or Pakistan. As to the criteria for deciding which of the two new Dominions a state should join, Lord Mountbatten had said that normally geographical situation and communal interests and so forth would be the factors to be concerned".⁷ By August 1947 every one of the princely states, had acceded to either India or Pakistan, on the same basis as the principle underlying the partition of British India, namely non-Muslim majority states joined India and Muslim majority states chose Pakistan. The three which did not exercise this option were Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the overall population of the Muslims was 78 percent. In the valley of Kashmir for which the state is largely famous, the Muslims constituted the majority of 93 percent. Apart from this fact there were other considerations which strengthened the case of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. As N.C. Chatterjee, a Hindu member of the Indian Parliament, pointed out:

"The geographical situation of the State was such that it would be bounded on all sides by the new dominion of Pakistan. Its only access to the outside world is by road through the Jehlum Valley road which ran through Pakistan, via Rawalpindi. The only rail line connecting the State with the outside world lay through Sialkot. Its postal and telegraphic services operated through areas that were certain to belong to the Dominion of Pakistan."

"The State was dependent for all its imported supplies like salt, sugar, petrol and other necessities of life on their safe and continued transit through areas that would form part of Pakistan."

"The tourist transit traffic which was major source of income and revenue could only come via Rawalpindi. The only route available for the export of its valuable fruit was the Jhelum Valley route. Its timber could mainly be drifted down only in the Jhelum River which ran to Pakistan".⁸

The All India National Congress took advantage of the fact that Kashmir, was being ruled by a Hindu ruler and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the leader of National conference had developed personal friendship with Nehru. The efforts of the Congress leaders to take hold of Kashmir were facilitated by the plan for the partition of Punjab, under which two Tehsils, namely Gurdaspur and Batala were to be part of the Dominion of India, thus providing a geographical justification of Kashmir's accession to India. This plan existed as far back as in May, 1947. The tribal invasion which occurred in October, 1947 was a later development. India used it as an excuse to secure the accession of Kashmir. After accepting Maharaja Hari Singh's offer to accede to India, the Indian forces entered into Kashmir. However, the Indian Government made a number of pledges that Kashmir's accession to India would be provisional. In one of the telegrams sent by Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the former had said: "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world".⁹

But the Indian promises were belied by their actions. They continued to call the Instrument of Accession as temporary and their sole purpose in Kashmir to "restore law and order", whereas in terms of actual actions, they stepped up their military build up in the State and in April, 1948, they mounted an offensive which, if it had not been checked by Pakistani forces, would have created "disastrous consequences" for Pakistan. On July 8, 1948, Pakistan informed the UN that she had been compelled to deploy her armed forces in Kashmir. The UN Security Council which was already seized with the Kashmir question passed two resolutions, namely Resolution of 13 August, 1948 and 5 January, 1949, which asked India and Pakistan to order a cease-fire and called upon them to reaffirm that Kashmir's future status would be determined by the Kashmiris themselves.¹⁰ These two resolutions formed the basic resolutions for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute but there has been no movement towards their implementation. Pakistan and India agreed to cease-fire on the UN call which came into existence on 1 January, 1949.

Thus Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir dashed the hopes of the normalization of relations between the two countries. It was generally felt that if the two countries could settle this question they would speedily resolve their other quarrels. As a prominent writer on Pakistan politics pointed out: "The festering sore of this dispute has infected the relations of the two countries so seriously that it is responsible for failure to reach agreement on any other major issue".¹¹

Thus, the desire initially expressed by Pakistan, and which was equally shared by India, to promote cooperation between the two Dominions, was frustrated by the Kashmir crisis. Although both India and Pakistan had compelling reasons to enter into a cooperative relationship, they could not do so only because of Kashmir. That Kashmir continued to mar relations between the two countries and

every time when there was a chance to open a new chapter in their bilateral relations, it caused disruption is evident from the subsequent history of Pakistan-India relations.

In September, 1960 Pakistan and India signed the Indus Basin Treaty. It was a significant achievement and it was thought that it will be followed by the two countries to settle the most outstanding issue-Kashmir. Ayub Khan was very keen to strike permanent peace with India and in 1959 had even made an offer of joint defence to India. There took place some discussion over Kashmir between Nehru and Ayub Khan when the former extended his stay in Karachi after signing the Indus Basin Treaty. But these parleys produced no results.

In October-November, 1962 India and China fought their border war in the Himalayas. Although, it was a limited war, and the Chinese after pushing the Indians deep into India territory, pulled back, the border clash had far-reaching implications for the region and the world. As a result of Sino-Indian border clash, the US and USSR lined up on the same side to provide massive arms and full political and diplomatic support to India against China.

Pakistan had refrained from taking advantage of the situation created by India's humiliating defeat at the Chinese hands, largely under US pressure. But there was a lot of resentment in Pakistan over the US military assistance to India without consulting her. Pakistan after all, was an ally of the United States and had incurred much wrath from the Soviet Union due to her policy of alliance with the United States. Pakistan's entry into the military pacts had cost her goodwill in the Arab world and earned the hostility of the Soviet Union. The Soviet hostility effectively blocked any attempt aimed at securing the solution of the Kashmir problem through the United Nations. The Government and the people of Pakistan, therefore, were greatly disappointed when the United States, Britain and

Canada rushed arms to a non-aligned India over the protests and objections of an allied Pakistan. In Pakistan, where alliance with the United States and the country's membership of SEATO and CENTO had never enjoyed a popular support, US arms supplies to India strengthened the demands for country's withdrawal from the defence pacts and an end to Pak-US military alliance.

In order to placate Pakistan, the US and Britain arranged a new round of Pak-India talks on Kashmir in 1962. The talks began at Rawalpindi on December 27, 1962. The Pakistan side was represented by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was at that time Pakistan's Minister for Industries, while Sardar Sawaran Singh, the Indian Minister for Railways took part on the Indian side. A total of six rounds of talks were held, the last one being held on May 16, 1963. Although the United States and Britain applied diplomatic pressure on both India and Pakistan for a settlement, the talks failed because as the New York Times remarked, India failed "to manifest any readiness to make any important concession".¹²

The main features of these talks were that Pakistan proposed to India that although she regarded a fair and impartial plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations as the best solution, Pakistan was prepared to consider any other proposal. India was averse to any proposal which referred to ascertaining the will of the Kashmiri people, because India argued in case of Kashmiris decision to join Pakistan that there will be Hindu-Muslim riots in India. India's argument was that a plebiscite in Kashmir would destroy "secularism" in India. At one stage of the talks India proposed the partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir more or less along the cease-fire line of 1949. Pakistan rejected this proposal and Pak-India talks which were held in the wake of Sino-Indian border war, failed. The talks failed because India never seriously wanted to seek the solution of the Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmir people. India agreed to enter into talks with Pakistan on

Kashmir only to buy time and avoid US displeasure. But when position on India's Himalayan borders stabilized and India got sufficient quantities of arms from the western countries, India backed out and, thus, yet another chance to settle the long standing dispute over Kashmir between the two countries was lost. The fourth phase of Pak-India talks involving six rounds held in various cities of the two countries ended in failure. These talks failed because the party in possession of everything that matters has felt strong enough to resist the "concessions that any solution would require".¹³ From an analysis of 1962-63 negotiations", remarks G.W. Chaudhry, "it becomes clear that India was a reluctant party to the conference table. There was no change in India's attitude; it was simply that the diplomatic pressure of the Western Powers whose military aid she needed compelled her to appear amenable to negotiations. India was never at any stage of the talks serious about a fair and honourable settlement. Nehru was playing for time in order to watch the developments regarding the outcome of the mediatory efforts of the Colombo Powers, and to ensure the passage of arms aid legislation by the United States Congress. With the relaxation of the crisis created by Sino-Indian border conflict, and with the assurance of military aid from the Western countries, particularly from the United States, Nehru had no need of these distasteful talks and one excuse after another was offered to paralyse the negotiations".¹⁴

Pakistan's decision to move closer to China and the outbreak of pak-India war in 1965 were the direct consequences of India's failure to resolve dispute over Kashmir. dis-illusioned with the indifferent attitude of the United States and faced with the intransigence of India over Kashmir, Pakistan had no option but to seek friendship with China which was symbolized by Pak-China Border Agreement of March, 1963.

The 1965 Pak-India war followed serious tension between the two countries over grave developments in Kashmir. These

developments were caused by the Indian Government's moves to erode Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which gave a special status to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This created a great resentment among the people of the state. This resentment exploded into angry and bloody demonstrations when a sacred hair of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) was stolen in December, 1963 from the Hazrat Bul mosque near Srinagar.

the upheaval in Kashmir was accompanied by communal riots in East Pakistan and West Bengal. It was claimed by Pakistan that in a period of only two days, 20,000 Muslims had to leave their homes in West Bengal and take shelter in East Pakistan as a result of anti-Muslim riots in West Bengal. Indian sources similarly alleged that a large number of Hindus from East Pakistan were flooding West Bengal.¹⁵ This increased tension between the two countries. Further tension was added with Pakistan's decision to raise Kashmir issue before the UN Security Council and clashes over the Rann of Kutch during the Summer of 1965.

The major cause for the 1965 War between Pakistan and India was the unresolved question of Kashmir. That is why when calls for cease-fire and an end to fighting were issued at the UN Security Council, Pakistan demanded a firm guarantee from India to solve the Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. But India rejected all such demands. Since no one emerged as victorious in the war, and the UN Security Council was no longer taking it as an urgent matter, Pakistan saw the Soviet offer of mediation as the only possible chance for a Kashmir settlement. A meeting known as Tashkent Conference was arranged between President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in the Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent which lasted from January 4 to January 10, 1966. At the end of the Conference a statement known as Tashkent Declaration was issued which was in the nature of a face saving compromise, capable of being interpreted in different ways.

There was no provision for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistanis did not get a self-executing machinery for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. They had to be content with the pale assurances that both sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both the countries; and that both sides had "recognized the need to set up joint Pakistan-Indian bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken".¹⁵

The Tashkent Agreement was extremely unpopular in Pakistan because it failed even to mention the Kashmir dispute-the core cause of the conflict between Pakistan and India. In Pakistan the Agreement was denounced as a betrayal of the Kashmir cause by the Government of Ayub Khan. "What Pakistan was going to win in the battlefield was lost on the conference table", was the general impression of the people about the Tashkent Agreement. The dissenting voice of Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won great acclaim and appreciation of the people, especially in West Pakistan. The failure to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute at Tashkent not only prevented progress towards the normalization of Pak-India relations, it had serious implications for the internal political situation of Pakistan. President Ayub Khan lost his popularity that he had earned during the war and, ultimately, had to leave the government as a result of mass agitation against him which was largely based upon people's resentment over Tashkent Agreement.

Though 1971 War between Pakistan and India arose out of the circumstances which had nothing to do with the Kashmir dispute, Pak-India talks at Simla, though purported to discuss issues related to the 1971 War, were marked by occasional deadlock only because India pressed her longstanding demand and the existing cease-fire line in Kashmir be declared international border between Pakistan and India so that she could retain the possession of the valley. It is

noteworthy that the Simla Summit between (President) Bhutto and Prime Minister Indra Gandhi (28 June -3 July, 1972) produced some progress towards normalizing Pakistan-India relations, as for example, resumption of communications travel facilities and trade between the two countries but no progress was made on the Kashmir dispute. The two countries remained stuck to their previous position. On the Kashmir issue the two countries agreed only to freeze the present line of control "without prejudice to the recognized position of either side".

When Simla Agreement was signed, it was hoped that some tangible progress in the process of normalization of relations between Pakistan and India will follow. Unfortunately it did not happen. The reason was again the question of Kashmir. Pakistan insisted on the solution of this problem while India came out with the opinion that Kashmir question had been put out of the way by the Simla Agreement. Pakistan did not accept such interpretation. "Pakistan", declared (President) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "remained committed to the Kashmiris's right to self-determination and it would never compromise on this principle". Mr. Bhutto while making this declaration touring Azad Kashmir in November, 1973 further said that it was his firm belief that Pakistan and Kashmir were one and inseparable. Pakistan, he said, was prepared to hold talks with India on the Kashmir issue within the framework of the Simla Agreement.¹⁶

It was chiefly due to the unresolved Kashmir question that Simla Agreement was not followed by a quick pace in the process of Pak-India normalization. Significant steps such as resumption of diplomatic relations, restoration of air links and overflights, expansion of bilateral trade by opening rail and road traffic, repatriation of civilian detainees and promotion of cultural and scientific exchanges, were taken about four years after signing the Simla Agreement.¹⁷

Commenting on the state of Pak-India relations four years after signing of the Simla Agreement between the two countries, a senior Pakistani journalist wrote; "If India has really been amenable to friendly pressures, it remains to be seen how far it goes to seek an equitable settlement of the Kashmir issue. If it continues to drag its feet on this crucial question.... The vision of South Asia detente will prove to be illusory".¹⁸

The Janata Party which replaced Congress rule in India as a result of 1977 elections showed keen interest in forging closer relations between India and her neighbours on the basis of what was called "Beneficial Bilateralism".¹⁹ The objective of this policy was to serve India's national interests by building an infra-structure for regional cooperation in the area extending from Iran to Indo-China. It was thought that such regional cooperation would not only enable the South Asian countries to "tackle the common enemy of poverty and inherited degradation" but in addition if the Indian subcontinent remains free of tension, it would command a unique weight in the counsels of the world.... For this purpose the Janata leaders undertook visits to all the countries of South Asia. Prime Minister Desai visited Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangla Desh and the Foreign Minister Mr. Atal Beharai Bajpai went to Bhutan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in addition to Nepal. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Agha Shahi and President Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangala Desh visited Delhi, too.

The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Atal Behari Bajpai came to Pakistan towards the end of January, 1978. Before his visit, reports published abroad had indicated that Mr. Bajpai proposed to offer a comprehensive proposal on reciprocal transit facilities to be provided to each other by the two countries and raise the question of Common Market among India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.²¹ But Pakistan had let it known that such an idea would be opposed and, instead, "it will raise the question of Jammu and Kashmir".²²

There was even a strong opposition to Pakistan's expanded trade with India. When after the 1976 trade agreement, the two countries opened their markets to each other's manufactured goods, alarm bells began to ring in the economic and industrial circles of Pakistan. The fears and anxieties of Pakistan in case of open trade with India are best reflected in a statement which was issued by Dr. Mubbashar Hassan, a former Finance Minister of Pakistan. He said: "India's economic offensive could endanger the very existence of Pakistan; it threatened our industry, trade and all levels of employment.... The moment the flood-gates of trade with India were allowed to be opened, Pakistan industry would be swept out of the market. The economic disruption would have serious political and social repercussions."²³

With the beginning of the decade of 1980s, a new dimension to an already divergent outlook of Pakistan and India on regional issues was added, and this was the Afghanistan problem created by the march of Soviet Red Army into that unfortunate country. The Indian Government of Mrs., Indra Gandhi which replaced the Janata Dal Government after winning the general elections in January, 1980, refused to condemn the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and was among a few odd countries of the world who did not go along an overwhelming majority of the UN members demanding Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Apart from Afghanistan there were other irritants, as for example, Pakistan's alleged involvement in Sikh separatist movement in East (India) Punjab and conflicting claims over the Siachin Glacier, in the northern most part of Pakistan. These issues caused further tension in relations between the two countries. The situation at one time, for example in November-December, 1986 due to massive Indian military exercises and concentrations on the Pakistani borders, had become so dangerous that there was a real danger of war between the two countries.

However, it goes to the credit of the leadership of the two countries that they did not lose contact with each other and a number of meetings, including one at summit level, were held between Pakistan and India to defuse the tension between the two countries. The issues that were discussed included Afghanistan, Siachin Glacier, no-war pact and bilateral trade and economic relations. As a result of Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan in the last week of December, 1988 to attend 4th SAARC Summit, Pakistan and India signed three agreements on non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities, avoidance of double taxation, and cultural cooperation.²⁴

Before Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan in Dec. 1988, Pakistani Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto had said in a statement that it was naive to expect that all problems between Pakistan and India could be solved as a result of her meeting with Indian Premier. What she suggested was that all the problems between the two countries should be tackled slowly. What was important, she had said was that confidence should be created between the leadership and the Foreign Offices of the two countries. She had emphasized that Kashmir was an issue of vital importance for peace in the subcontinent.²⁵

Cordiality and good-will marked the atmosphere in which two Summit level meetings were held between the prime-ministers of Pakistan and India in December, 1988 and July, 1989. However, failure to tackle the Kashmir problems prevented any break-through to happen in relations between the two countries.

That the Kashmir dispute could have a devastating effect on the efforts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India was amply demonstrated by the tension between the two countries created by the recent developments in Kashmir. Before the eruption of popular revolt in Kashmir, the Government of Benazir Bhutto had

adopted a step by step approach, emphasizing that the goal of normalization of relations between the two countries could be achieved within the framework of Simla Agreement under which the solution of all problems including that of Kashmir has been assured through bilateral talks. From all her statements and gestures it appeared that Benazir Bhutto considered the establishment of friendly and normal relationship with India as a necessary step to attempt the solution of the long-standing and most complex problem of Kashmir. Perhaps, taking a cue from Willy Brandt's success in Ostpolitik, she aimed at dismantling the barriers that have been created by the Indians to divide Kashmir into two parts. What was significant was that this change could be brought about without resort to the use of force. That is why this step by step approach was hailed and appreciated by the saner elements in Pakistan as the most courageous and far sighted policy ever adopted by any government in Pakistan.

It is true that the Government of Benazir Bhutto was severely criticized by her political opponents, particularly in Punjab for her 'soft' policy toward India as a "sell out" of national interests, but she did not seem to be deterred from pursuing her policy of detente with India merely on account of Opposition's sneering campaign. She knew that the majority of the people of Pakistan were not for conflict with India. It was borne out to be true when the Opposition failed to mobilize the people to come out on streets in a mass agitation against her government on Kashmir in April, 1990. Had it not been for the recent eruptions in Kashmir and the brutal Indian response to this uprising, she was determined to pursue her policy of detente with India.

The up-rising in Kashmir and more especially, the Indian measures to suppress it, caused the real set back to Benazir Bhutto's policy of seeking permanent peace with India. It was for every one to see that the uprising in Kashmir was an indigenous and local development, and it was a total rejection of the Indian rule over the

state, but India instead of positively responding to the demands of Kashmiri people for right to self-determination, resorted to the worst kind of repressive measures, including indiscriminate firing on the crowd of peaceful and innocent people protesting against the killing and detention of their friends and relatives. According to the reports that came out of the valley, the Indian authorities responded to the freedom movement of the Kashmiri people with actions that amounted to genocide.

In such a situation, the reaction in Pakistan was natural. India had herself accepted Pakistan as a party to the Kashmir dispute. Moreover a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) lay on the Pakistani side whose people had their kiths and kins in the Indian occupied Kashmir. The repression in the Indian occupied Kashmir was bound to create reaction in Azad Kashmir. In such a situation how a policy of detente and normalization of relations could be pursued by Pakistan.

To what an extent the Kashmir dispute may become a cause of direct clash between Pakistan and India can be measured by recent reports appearing in American press that New Delhi and Islamabad were on the brink of a nuclear war in May, 1990 as a result of tension over the anti-Indian uprising in Kashmir. Although, both India and Pakistan denied that there was ever a danger of a nuclear clash between the two countries, there is much evidence to suggest that the Kashmir situation had brought the two sides perilously closer to an armed clash in 1990.²⁶

A former Chief of the Indian Army General Krishna Swami Sunderjit while speaking in a press interview in early 1990 had said that with the level of tension between Islamabad and New Delhi touching a new high over the Kashmir issue the threat of another conflict had become a very real one.

The Kashmir dispute, therefore, has been the real hindrance in the way of permanent peace and friendship between India and Pakistan. Whenever there were initiated serious and sincere efforts aimed at the achievement of normalization of relations between the two countries, they have received a set back due to the unresolved dispute over Kashmir. It is because both the countries are emotionally involved in this dispute and it touches the vital interests of the two countries, that sentiments and feelings immediately boil up on the Kashmir issue in both Pakistan and India. On account of the formula under which the subcontinent was divided, Pakistan thinks that she has been wronged by India over Kashmir. Unless this historical injustice is undone, there can be no question of an end to the suspicion and mistrust between Pakistan and India.

NOTES

1. Afzal, Rafique, *Selected speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1911-34 and 1947-48)*. (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1966.) p. 458.
2. Quaid-i-Azam's interview given to a Swiss journalist, Mr. De Eric Treiff, Special Correspondent of the *New Zurcher* on March 11, 1948. *Ibid*, p. 459.
3. For a detailed discussion on water dispute between Pakistan and India, see Choudhry, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966*, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1968) pp. 70-186.
4. During 1970 national election campaign, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto criticized Ayub Khan for entering into Indus Basin Treaty as it allegedly deprived Pakistan of the waters of three eastern rivers. Mr. Wali Khan, the leader of Awami National Party

(ANP) has also criticized the agreement as, according to him, the waters of Indus river are unjustifiably being diverted to Punjab to make for the loss of three eastern rivers.

5. Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 21.
6. For a detailed study of Kashmir dispute in the context of Pakistan-Indian conflict, see Zahid Chaudhry, *Pak-Bharat Tanazaa Aur Masla-i-Kashmir Ka Agaz*, (Lahore, Idara Mutalaa-i-Tarikh, 1990) Part II.
7. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, *Time Only to Look Forward*, p. 42, cited in Burk, S.M. *op. cit.*, p. 17.
8. Quoted by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in "Kashmir, India and Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1965. Cited in Burke, S.M., *Op. cit.*, p. 27.
9. Hassan, K. Sarwar, (ed) *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, The Kashmir Question*, p. 67, cited in Burke, S.M. *op. cit.*, p. 27.
10. For details see Burke, S.M., *op. cit.* pp. 32-38.
11. Choudhry, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
12. *The New York Times*, editorial, January 31, 1963, cited in *Ibid*, p. 134.
13. *Daily Telegraph*, May 16, 1963. cited in G.W. Chaudhry, *Ibid.*, p. 139.
14. Chaudhry, 14. Chaudhry, G.W., *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

15. Burke, S.M., *op. cit.*, p. 319.
16. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore) November 6, 1973.
17. Choudhry, A.T., "Spirit of detente in South Asia", *Dawn* May 23, 1976.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Muni, S.D. "India's beneficial Bilateralism in South Asia", *India Quarterly*, Vol xxxv, October-November, 1979, No. 4.
20. Indian Foreign Minister Bajpai, quoted in *Ibid.*
21. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore) January 27, 1978.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), November 20, 1977.
24. For Pakistan-India relations in 80s, see Rizvi, H.A., "Pakistan-India relations in the Eighties", *Regional Studies*, vol. VIII, No. 3, Summer, 1990, Islamabad.
25. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore) December 27, 1988.
26. Ms. Benazir Bhutto who was Pakistan's Prime Minister in May, 1990 strongly denied reports that Pakistan and India were on the verge of nuclear war in early 90. In an interview to an American Television Network ABC's Programme 'Good Morning America' she said during the period there was not even the remotest chance of any war. However, she said tension was at its peak that time and was still at the same levels now. See *The Nation* (Lahore) March 25, 1993.

SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT 1962 AND PAKISTAN'S REACTION

by

Dr. Muhammad Ijaz Butt

Relations between India and the People's Republic of China, though superficially very Cordial Until the 1962 border war, had in fact an undertone of subdued suspicion and rivalry if not conflict on fundamental issues. These two titanic neighbouring countries had since each become a sovereign state, been courteous in their relations with each other. India had been striving for a "leading role" among the non-aligned states in Asia and Africa, Whereas China desired to establish herself as the great power in Asia at the expense of India.¹ Its cherished goal was the leadership of Asia. China with her newly acquired ideology based on Mao Tse-tung's version of Marxism-Leninism and emboldened with her spectacular victory against the forces of the National Government led by Chaing Kai-shek, which were aided by the United States, was trying to dominate the Asian Scene.² India was a big hurdle in the way. Among the newly independent countries of South Asia, India was by far the most populous, industrially the most advanced and ambitious, and politically the most dedicated to achieve her goals of national development through her Western style democratic processes. Therefore, India posed a big challenge to the Communist Ideology of modern China. Communist China keenly desired to set herself up as a model country in Asia, and for Africa and Latin America³, in order to prove to the backward and underdeveloped nations of these continents that only communist ideology of the type advocated by Mao Tse-tung could provide the formula for development. In the opinion of a western political writer W. Friedmann as one of the

Asian states that has been longest and most strongly influenced by nationalist ideology and political ambition, India is China's most obvious rival for Asian leadership.⁴

The first evidence of the clash of interests between India and China manifested itself in 1950, when China occupied Tibet. It was in October 1950 that the Communist Chinese Army invaded Tibet and succeeded in, as they put it, "Liberating" that territory in May 1951. Tibet had been under the actual control or the acknowledged suzerainty of China for centuries. The British accepted this suzerainty even as late as 1914.⁵ To the British in India Tibet was strategically important as a buffer between China, Russia and India. From the time of Viceroy Lord Curzon onwards, the British tried to establish their influence in Lhasa (Tibet's Capital). In 1911, they got their opportunity. With China weakened by the Revolution of 1911, and the Government of Tibet powerless in the face of the British, the British succeeded in extracting special rights in Tibet. With the departure of British from the Indian subcontinent, these special rights devolved upon independent India. However, a new element was introduced into the picture. This was the emergence of a strong China in effective control of all parts of the country, including Tibet, which it liberated in 1951.

Tibet region is important to India because she does not wish to see it wholly integrated with China. In fact she would prefer to have Tibet look towards New Delhi rather than Peking for guidance. An autonomous Tibet with a minimum of Chinese control would suit India. When China invaded Tibet, Indian leaders, in the beginning, adopted quite a lenient attitude towards it and were to a great extent favourably inclined towards China. Later on, the gravity of the situation dawned on them when they came to know about the construction of Sinkiang-Tibet Highway in 1956.⁷

Jawharlal Nehru, the late Prime Minister of India, gave vent to these apprehensions in one of his statements in the Indian parliament on September 4, 1959, as follows:

"The two or three main considerations are that internationally considered Tibet has not been considered as an independent country. It has been considered an autonomous country but under the suzerainty or sovereignty of China. Thus being so, when India became independent and we inherited more or less... relics of British imperialism in Tibet.... Then came this Chinese incursion or invasion in to Tibet... Now when this came we had to face a difficult situation in law and constitutionally speaking we could not say anything because of the position we had accepted.... Nevertheless we were rather pained and upset at the way things were happening, armies marching and what appeared to be a forcible conquest and occupation of Tibet".⁸

This was one of the principal factors which decisively influenced and conditioned the course of India's relations with China, and motivated her to lean towards the Western Block. Indirectly it affected Pakistan's foreign policy too. Although Pakistan was very cautious in her approach to this question and abstained from making any sharp-cut statement; she tried to use the opportunity to strike a bargain with India over the Kashmir issue. India also revived her relations with China which had cooled off in the wake of the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. At one time, however, it seemed as though India and Pakistan would settle their differences and establish normal friendly relations. This was in the summer of 1959 when, in the wake of the Tibetan crisis President Ayub of Pakistan made an offer of joint defence of the subcontinent to India.⁹ He even offered to "Consider joint cooperation without having Pacts or treaties". Without even having "some sort of paper agreement". However Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer of joint defence

out of hand, feigning ignorance of the party against whom a Common Defence Policy would be directed? He asserted that the real motives behind Pakistan's offer was not joint defence but the solution of Kashmir in her favour.¹⁰ The Tibet incident, as is evident from the above facts and developments, caused India and Pakistan to have a second look at their foreign policies. Pakistan became clearly conscious of the might and power of its newly emerged neighbour.¹¹ In 1958 China demonstratively spurned India's mediatory role in the crisis of the off shore islands. During the Tibetan uprising of March 1959, India was accused of having master-minded the revolt, for according to the Chinese India was "Lackey of the imperialists" and 'inheritor' of the imperialist lay buried for some time under the pretensions of friendliness, the Chinese at last decided to have a show-down with India. China wanted to establish itself as the great power in Asia by demolishing the rivalry of India and by demonstrating to her neighbours and others the weakness and the instability of India and Indian political system and institutions. Beside old border disputes, strategic realities, geographic location and mineral resources (oil in sinkiang (Xinjiang) and gold and uranium in Tibet), Central Asia attracted China, India and even Russia.¹³

The Sino Indian border dispute has focused attention on the Simla Conference of 1913-14 during which Britain attempted to bring about a settlement with China and Tibet. The British representative, Sir Henry MacMahon, failed in obtaining Chinese consent to a division between inner Tibet, Where Chinese influence would be considerable, and an autonomous outer Tibet; he was successful in agreeing bilaterally with Tibet on a map drawing a boundary between North Eastern India and Tibet.¹⁴ It became known as the 'Mac Mahon' Line.¹⁵ China refused to accept the Mac Mahon Line as the proper Sino-Indian boundary and maintained that at the Simla Conference only the Sino-Tibetan border was discussed, and that the Sino-Indian boundary question was never placed on the

agenda.¹⁶ After the emergence of China as a Communist State the Chinese leaders pressed the problem of the Sino-Indian border harder and harder in order to reach a settlement. The Chinese stand on this issue can be gauged from the following text of the Chinese Government's official note of September 1, 1959.

'The Indian Government's claim that Long-Ju is Indian territory as made in the notes of the Indian Embassy in China of June 27 and August 27, is entirely groundless; the Chinese Government absolutely can not agree to this claim.

As the Indian Government is aware, the Chinese government has pointed out, no section of the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been formally delimited; the boundary between the two countries is yet to be settled through surveys and discussions between the two sides. The Chinese Government has also repeatedly pointed out that the so-called traditional boundary between India and the eastern part of the Tibet region of China as referred to by the Indian Government, i.e., the so-called Mac Mahon Line, was set forth in the past by the British imperialists unilaterally and has never been accepted by the Chinese Government; it, of course, can not be regarded as legal. Nevertheless, even by documents and maps related to this so-called traditional boundary as set forth by the British, Long-Ju is unquestionably within Chinese territory. It can thus be seen that the Indian Government's claim that Long-Ju belongs to India is devoid of any ground no matter viewed from what aspect.¹⁷"

On the contrary, the Indian stand on this issue clarified by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru during one of his statements in the Indian parliament on February 20, 1961. Speaking about the Mac Mahon Line, he observed:

"Our stand is that the border is known, is a defined border, it is not an unknown border. It is not marked down or delimited on the ground everywhere; in small bits it is, because it is frightfully difficult in these glacier regions to go about marking them. Any how it was not considered necessary in the past during the British times, and since we became independent, we did not and could not easily do it. Any how our position is that it is a defined border, it is known border, known by customs, by practice, by usage, by treaty and so on and so forth. So the question of sitting down with the Chinese people to define it and consider the whole matter afresh does not arise, so far as we are concerned.....the fact of the matter is that our case in regard to the border is almost fool proof."¹⁸

As time went by, charges and counter charges on both sides grew in volume and intensity. Preliminary skirmishes occurred along the Mac Mahon Line frontier in the third quarter of 1962 and tension mounted. By the middle of 1962 Indian army established forty three new posts within the border area. As a result of these tactics, Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister reported in August, 1962, that control had been regained over nearly 2500 sq. miles of the 12,0-00 sq. miles previously lost to China. Neither the Indian Government nor the Chinese Government were ready to budge even an inch from the stand they had taken in regard to the Mac Mahon Line. Under the circumstances a head on collision was but inevitable. In one of its notes Delhi accused Peking of "Systematic and Continuous aggression into the Indian territory,"¹⁹ first in the Ladakh region of Kashmir and later along the Mac Mahon Line border of the North East Frontier Agency.

Actually the dispute about the eastern border, i.e., the Mac Mahon Line, which was the line of control between India and China, and the Aksai Chin region, which China had occupied, had been

dragging on since about four or five years. The road Chinese had built through the Aksai Chin in 1956-58 was particularly important as it is hitherto the only road connecting Sinkiang (Xinjiang) Province of China with the sensitive Tibet region. It is, 1,455 Kilometers long with an average elevation of 4,200 meters and is the highest road in the world.²⁰ For the development of Tibet and its close collaboration with the rest of China, the Aksai Chin area is of importance to China.²¹ In 1962 incidents began to occur between Indian and Chinese troops, both sides, as usual, accused the other of responsibility. Indian patrols were strengthened and began to probe Chinese positions. The incidents became more frequent and casualties greater. In October 1961 the Indian forces in the Mac Mahon Line area attempted to dislodge the Chinese from a mountain position. Indian Prime Minister Nehru ordered his armed forces to throw out by force, if necessary, every Chinese "intruder" into the Indian territory.²² Nehru's announcement to throw the Chinese out of Indian territory was described by the New York "Herald Tribune" 15th October 1962 as tantamount to a formal declaration of war,²³ while the British newspaper "*The Guardian*" called it an 'ultimatum'.²⁴ Consequently, the Chinese launched a major offensive on India's north east frontier agency. The assault developed at points along the whole Agency border as far east as the region of Valong close to Burma. simultaneously the Chinese began heavy attacks on Indian out posts in Ladakh. Over powered by superior number and armaments, the Indian forces fell back all along the front. As described by a Western writer, Ronald Segal,

"In the autumn of 1962 the Chinese Army, in retaliation, launched massive attacks in both the north west and north east, blotting out the Indian border posts established under the 'forward policy' in Ladakh, and over whelming the Indian Army in the North East Frontier Agency so as to carry Chinese troops to the very edge of the Assam plains. After four weeks, fighting, China all at once declared a cease-fire,

but the victory was agonizingly hers; the Indian Army had been routed rather than defeated...and the Indian Government requesting substantial military assistance from British and the United States, would be widely considered to have compromised its policy of non-alignment."²⁵

At midnight on the night of November 21, 1962 the Chinese announcement that their troops would cease firing from midnight the following night, and they would start to withdraw to positions 20 kilometers north of the Mac Mahon Line. In other words, the Chinese unilaterally declared that with effect from the 1st of December 1962, they would withdraw to positions 12½ miles "behind actual line of control" as existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.²⁶ Thus the Sino-Indian border clash came to an abrupt end. At the end of the border warfare, China was the winner and India was the loser as is evident from the following statement of the Indian Government:

Between the line of actual control immediately prior to September 8, 1962 and that on November 7, 1959 as defined by the Chinese Government, there is a difference of about 2,500 sq. miles of Indian territory which China has occupied as a result of invasion and massive attacks during the last three months".²⁷

PAKISTAN REACTION TO THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT

This conflict was a turning point in the foreign policies of both the countries in the subcontinent India was shocked and perplexed and had to throw away her mantle of non-alignment in order to secure Western Military aid to save herself from the Chinese threat. On the other hand, when the British and particularly the

United States rushed military aid to India, Pakistan was shocked and felt "betrayed" by her allies. The reaction of this development on the foreign policy of Pakistan was profound. President Ayub Khan declared:

"Pakistan received a new cause for disillusionment with American Foreign Policy. Following the India-China border clash the United States proceeded to rush arms to India on a scale which to us seemed totally unjustified by the requirements of the situation. We are profoundly concerned over this new development. It would increase the existing sense of insecurity among India's smaller neighbours, which could force them to courses of action that might under mine the West's position throughout south Asia."²⁸

So far as Pakistan was concerned the public opinion in this country was rather overjoyed at the rout of the Indian forces. On the other hand, China's prestige rose high in the eyes of Pakistan. The Pakistani press gave prominent display to the success of the Chinese forces.²⁹

An American military expert, in an article captioned "The United States and Pakistan-A Failure of Diplomacy." Published in 'Orbis', Commented: "There is no doubt that the Pakistan found some satisfaction in India's humiliation by China."³⁰

From the objective point of view such a reaction was quite natural. Because of the Kashmir dispute and long standing hostility between the two countries. Pakistan wanted to see India humiliated and disgraced. Peking's aim was to diminish the prestige of India and Mr. Nehru personally, since India was her rival for leadership in the Afro-Asian world and also to humiliate Mr. Khrushchev in the eyes of the communists by showing that this friendship for India could not

prevent China from attacking her.³¹ Pakistan regarded Western military aid to India, ostensibly against communist China, as a direct threat to its own security.³² In a statement on November 5, 1962, President Ayub Khan expressed concern at the large amount of military equipments being rushed to India from the U.S., U.K. and elsewhere, which he said:

"May have the effect of enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India and secondly add to the serious concern already existing in the minds of our people that these weapons may well be used against them in the absence of an overall settlement with India."³³

Two days later President Ayub issued another statement describing the Western Powers decision as "betrayal of Pakistan and maintaining that India was already strong enough to meet the situation from her own resources."³⁴

Although American leadership assured Pakistan that these weapons will not be directed against her but these assurances completely failed to satisfy her. Pakistan had before her the example of 'Goa' in mind. This was an aggression against one of the members of N.A.T.O., but neither the United States nor any other member of NATO did anything to intervene and thwart Indian aggression. It was feared that if India attacked Pakistan or the liberated Part of the Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) on the excuse that she was recovering what she claims to be 'Indian territory' the Western Powers might adopt exactly the same attitude towards Pakistan as they had adopted towards Portugal in the Case of Goa.³⁶

Because of this attitude of the Western Powers, Pakistan, in the words of Norman D. Palmer "Was a disgruntled ally, feeling abused and neglected; it believes that its whole

security is being jeopardized by a stronger and more militant India supported by Pakistan's own allies."³⁷

An emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan was summoned on November 21, 1962 to consider the situation arising out of the Sino-Indian border conflict and western arms supply to India. After the 'in Camera' address by the president of Pakistan, the then Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra opened the debate in the Assembly with an unequivocal denunciation of Western arms aid to India. This caused an unprecedented uproar in the House. Both sides of the House, i.e., the opposition party and the party in power, strongly demanded that Pakistan should withdraw from SEATO and CENTO and conclude a non-aggression Pact with the People's Republic of China.³⁸ Mr. Bogra declared in the National Assembly on November 22, 1962 that:

"The rushing of large—scale arms to India at an extraordinary speed, instead of first exhausting all possible efforts to ensure a negotiated settlement, is a matter of regret to us, and we feel that this would aggravate the situation rather than alleviate it. I speak in anguish and not in anger when I say that one of our allies (referring to the U.S.A.) had promised us that we would be consulted before any arms assistance was given to India. I regret to have to observe that this was not done."³⁹ President Ayub Khan said on July 8, 1963 that if India continued to get massive military aid from Western Powers, the small Nations of Asia would be compelled to 'take refuge' under China. India's small neighbours, he declared, were "scared" of the growing military might of India and would gradually move into Chinese Camp, but this was 'unfortunately' not properly understood by Western Powers.⁴⁰

If these early warnings had been heeded by the Western Powers perhaps Pakistan would not have taken a swing to the anti-west block. These statements by the head of the state and the Foreign Minister of the Country were clear indications of the nation's mood. Pakistan's Western Allies did not pay much serious attention to these protestation and by such an attitude created deep dissatisfaction among the leadership and the Peoples of Pakistan felt that she had been let down by her allies in pursuance of their own global interests.⁴¹

The modern Weapons and other latest military hardware supplied to India by the Western Powers tilted the military balance against Pakistan and the then soldier Statesman President of Pakistan was not slow in perceiving the dangers inherent in such a situation, especially in view of the Kashmir issue.⁴²

The Country's resentment was voiced strongly by the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto in the course of his speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on June 22, 1964. He said: "When the Sino—Indian conflict arose in 1962, We were told that the United States and the United Kingdom assistance to India was on an emergency basis and that it was being given because India faced a grave danger from China....Because of this change, the time has come for us to review our liabilities and our position generally.

We had undertaken certain Political Commitments, but that was done" in entirely different circumstances. The new situation is such that it would be on our part a dereliction of national duty if we did not, in the light of it, fully examine its political and military consequences.....perhaps the time has come for Pakistan to reconsider and to review its foreign policy.⁴³"

Earlier, while opening a foreign policy debate in the National Assembly on July 17, 1963, Mr. Bhutto remarked:

"Pakistan will not be alone if she becomes the victim of aggression. It would involve the largest state in Asia. The situation has become more difficult because India had been menacingly bolstered by the Western Powers and Pakistan was thus left with no recourse but to reshape her foreign policy which was being re-appraised."⁴⁴

THE TIMES COMMENTED on Mr. Bhutto's speech

"This is the first time that such a categorical statement about China's assistance to Pakistan in the event of aggression has been made"⁴⁵

A change in Pakistan's foreign policy became perceptible by the middle of 1961 when President Kennedy of U.S.A. declared that he would help India to become an Ideal democratic country in Asia in order to counter China's influence. President Kennedy, long before he came to power, had introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate, affirming that the economic development of India was in the interests of the United States.⁴⁶ This was a clear indication of the U.S. Democratic Party's Pro-Indian attitude.

In pursuance of this policy the United States began giving military aid to India. This step set in to motion a Chain reaction in Pakistan, which is very sensitive to any sort of overtures towards India. All these developments reached a climax in 1962 with India's Sino-Indian border Clash and its repercussions in this part of the world. Pakistan felt outraged by the western powers eagerness to rush to the help of India—a non-aligned country with no obligations and responsibilities to the western world under any military alliance. Pakistan repeatedly protested to the United States against arming India and endangering the security of an ally. The United States did not pay much heed to these protestations. This attitude forced Pakistan to reappraise her foreign policy and she

hurriedly took steps to normalize her relations with China, and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ The feelings of Pakistan on this occasion has been aptly described by an eminent Pakistani diplomat Mr. M.A.H. Isphani:

"It would be hypocrisy to deny the joy almost all Pakistanis felt at the catastrophic rout of India. Some even went so far as to thank Allah for teaching our haughty and bullying neighbour the lesson of her life and act the same time bringing her down several pegs from her claim of leadership in Asia....In these circumstances China came closer to us. We too, for the first time, sincerely extended our hand of friendship to her. This, of course, did not mean nor can it mean that we accept her ideology. We worked out an acceptable border demarcation, cultural exchanges, became more frequent, trade increased and the Latest show of goodwill by China has been demonstrated by the offer of a loan equivalent to 60 million U.S. Dollars easy terms, free interest."⁴⁸

Over the past years China observed strict neutrality in Pakistan—Afghanistan and Indo-Pakistan disputes and had refused the Indian request to negotiate the demarcation of the Azad Kashmir-Sinkiang boundary. It was therefore, understandable that Pakistan chose to remain neutral in the Sino-India border clash; Indeed she had to adopt such an attitude due to her geographical situation. Furthermore, due to massive military aid to India by the Western powers, SEATO and CENTO Pacts had lost much of their meanings for Pakistan. Pakistan had to change her foreign policy and came close to her mighty neighbour, China, to counter Indian threat. Pakistan through different Channels made it clear to the United States that China is the only major nation on whom Pakistan could rely for assistance in case of an

outbreak of hostilities with India, since both these countries considered India their common enemy. This feeling that China alone was a reliable friend in any confrontation with India was confirmed during the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965.⁴⁹

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THE TRIPLET RETROGRESSIVE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

by

Ahmed Husain

The Constitution of 1956 was abrogated on October 7, 1958. To do away with the fundamental legal document of a country indicates serious nature of political crisis which means that the rules were made by a non representative body, without contact with the electorate. But the constitution under discussion was drafted by a Constituent Assembly, exactly sixteen years after adoption of the Lahore Resolution, with federalism and British patterned parliamentary institutions.¹

President Nawabzada Syed Iskander Ali Mirza (1899-1969), dismissed the central government and provincial assemblies and abolished all political parties. He appointed Mohammad Ayub Khan Chief Martial Law Administrator and Prime Minister.² From this it can be concluded that after the revolution they wanted to form duumvirate, because without the direction of the President, the Military head was hesitant to take over.³ Both were in the "All Talents" cabinet in 1954.⁴ The failure of the Rawalpindi conspiracy of February 23, 1951, headed by General Akbar Khan was mainly due to lack of support of some political leadership.

Nevertheless, by analyzing the political events since October 6, 1955, when Mirza manoeuvred to oust ignominiously G.G. Ghulam Mohammad (1895-1956) and assumed office of head of the state. It would be proved that by and large he was responsible for the imposition of Martial Law and suppression of parliamentary system in the country.

A Constitutional Commission was appointed in 1960, to analyze the causes of political crisis of 1958 and suggest ways and means to avoid the political pitfalls which caused collapse of political institutions. The main drawback in politics before 1958 according to the Shaluddin Commission was undue interference by the Head of State in the ministries and political parties and lack of proper elections.⁵

The head of the state was Mirza. He came to Indian Army from Sandhurst in 1919. He was assigned to the Indian political service in 1926 and was posted in the North Western Province. He never lost sight of the target and followed it with zeal and determination. He was discrete in outlook. After independence he became Defence Secretary and came close to General Ayub Khan. He got into prominence by supporting imposition of Martial Law in March 1953, to curb anti Ahmadis riots in Punjab.⁶ This indicates that as a bureaucrat he was already politically active. To impose his political thinking he got a chance in 1954, first as Governor of East Pakistan and later as federal minister of interior. Finally, he took over as Governor General on Oct. 6, 1955. As interior minister he had assured G.G. Ghulam Mohammad that the military would never interfere in the civil administration. He was elected acting president unopposed of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan⁷ under the new constitution.

As an acting president, he had to be symbolic head of the State.⁸ Before him was the example of the Quaid as Governor General of the country. According to the interim constitution the Governor General had arbitrary powers. Nevertheless, the Quaid never interfered in the day to day affairs of the government and gave dignity to the office of the head of the state by maintaining political aloofness. Unfortunately, Mirza could not think above the level of an administrator of colonial era and hence had to leave the country disgracefully on Oct. 27, 1958, without making any positive

contribution to the political institutions of Pakistan. He had avowed aversion towards the representative government and hatred for the masses as an electorate.⁹

For him the politicians and political parties had no use for efficient government. He believed in dividing the political leaders and using them for prolonging his stay as president. He believed in appointing people loyal to him and not to state. He nominated Dr. Khan Sahib (1882-1958) a formal Congress leader as Chief Minister of West Pakistan.¹⁰ The Quaid, took great care to ensure that the democratic institutions functioned in complete freedom. Exception was the case of congress ministry headed by Dr. Khan Sahib in Frontier. He did not accept the referendum in the province which was to accede to Pakistan. He refused to take oath of allegiance to the new state and deliberately declined to attend the flag hoisting ceremony. President Mirza made it a point to get majority support in the Assembly for his nominee and imposed Governor's rule till March 1957.¹¹ This showed that the President believed only in one man rule and had no regard for parliamentary provisions of the constitution. The appointment of Dr. Khan Sahib, a former Congress leader showed that he was totally ignorant of the background of creation of Pakistan and erased the line of division between two nation and one nation political theories.

He criticized the masses of the country for being oblivious of the basic principles of the representative government. But he himself flouted the constitutional provisions with impunity. The Prime Minister had a constitutional right to request the President to summon the National Assembly to enable him to ascertain majority support in the National Assembly. But constitutional right was denied to Suhrawardy (1893-1963). The President forced him to resign on threat of dismissal on October 11, 1957, without seeking vote of confidence from the house with the exit of prime Minister Suhrawardy it was clear that the President wanted total political

control on the political process in the country. Hence he floated a term controlled democracy to have political tranquillity in the country. President Mirza was thoroughly relaxed person with cosmopolitan outlook., At the sametime mentally he thought himself to be a Viceroy of British Indian days to treat parliamentarians at his own discretion. He had to be a figure head according to the constitution but indulged outrageously in day to day politics and created worst kind of palace intrigue during his tenure of office. His great desire was to be elected as permanent president under the 1956 constitution, for which there was to be formed an electoral college consisting of 930 legislatures who had to be elected by the voters during the General Election. He hated the idea of an election. Because he had openly criticized the masses as incapable to properly cast votes' this view he clearly conveyed to Bengalis as Governor in East Pakistan. Since, he pursued everything objectively he decided to abrogate the constitution and appoint Gen. Ayub Khan as his Prime Minister. After the abrogation of the constitution and declaring that the integrity of the country was more important, about which he gave reference to the death of the deputy speaker on Sept. 23, 1958 in East Pakistan Provincial Assembly and constitutional trouble created by the Khan of Kalat in West Pakistan.¹² The argument was false, because both the negative events were due to his connivance. He became so arrogant after the revolution that he made his position anomalous as head of the state. "My authority is revolution.....I have no sanction in law or constitution".¹³ He did not make money because he had poor living during exile in U.K., but he did great harm to the political institutions of Pakistan. By and large he sowed seeds of Bangladesh by humiliating the Bengalis and degrading eminent statesman Suhrawardy. A national disservice which was least expected from a versatile Mirza. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who saw President Mirza very closely declared. "A gentleman who knew nothing about politics."¹⁴

Another President of Pakistan who worked for Election contrivance is Gen Ziaul Haq (1925-88). He became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) on July, 5 1977, and declared that he would hold fair and impartial elections within ninety days, and hand over power to the elected representatives, actually decided not to hold elections, and remain in power. To this he succeeded very intelligently and remained President and COAS till his death on August 17, 1988. A unique distinction enjoyed by him alongwith the Quaid to have died while performing his duty as head of the State.¹⁵ To achieve it, he used three devices very successfully, corporate strength of the military, Islam and fair and impartial elections.

General Ziaul Haq often called himself as a simple Momen. But in politics he was not simple and had the distinction of staying in power longer than President Ayub Khan. The way General Zia the junior most of the rank was picked up by Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto to be replacement of Gen. Tikka Khan as Chief of Army Staff showed that he was in a way much shrewd politician than his appearance reflected. For the "Operation fairplay" he used lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chisti Commander of the Rawalpindi corps. Zia called him Murshid.¹ Whenever he addressed the nation on television, he was in military uniform and the cap used to be on the table to be visible to the audience. He never forgot to mention in his speech the corporate strength of the Military. Many times he referred to it as his constituency.

The main demand of the Muslim League founded in 1906 was to protect the rights of the Muslim community of British India. The President of the Indian Muslim League demanded Pakistan to enable the Muslims to follow Islam freely. In 1949 the National Assembly unanimously passed the Objectives Resolution which became MagnaCarta of the constitutional history of the country. It became preamble to the 1956 1962 and 1973 constitutions. All the three constitutions had basic Islamic provisions. However, President Zia

talked about Islam and welfare of Pakistan day and night. Because he knew that the nation had reverence and obedience to Islam. He started a campaign to Islamise the institutions of Pakistan, without which the country could not make progress. There were indeed some good aspects of the Islamic campaign, but at the same time it gave way to sectarianism, which did harm to national cohesion. The process of Islamisation was slow and led to confusion among the illiterate masses.

The policy of Islamisation did have appeal to the trading and commercial groups. Since the political parties had no roots among the masses, therefore, the religious stance of the President discredited them and to some extent gave way to biradari influence.¹⁷

President did apply his view of Islamisation on politics and election process in the country. He wished to use election as a means to an end—his permanent presidency. Zia opined that the Islamic polity was based on unanimity of opinion. Hence there was no need of political parties.¹⁸

He also criticized parliamentary form of government. In his view Presidential form was much better suited to the country Zia claimed that elections on the basis of adult franchise were un-Islamic.¹⁹ To refute this, there was the General Election of 1945-46 in which the All India Muslim League under the Presidentship of the Quaid participated and became the cornerstone of independent Pakistan.²⁰ He also could not totally ignore the definition of democracy that it is a regime in which those who govern are chosen by those who are governed, by means of free and open elections.²¹

President Zia wished political legitimacy for his military rule and also in February 1981, twelve opposition political parties and groups headed by PPP formed a Movement for the restoration of Democracy (MRD). It decided to start political agitation in the

country on independence day, August 14, 1983. to pre-empt the agitation the Zia government announced national elections within the next eighteen months.²⁷ The unrestricted elections to the National Assembly with the participation of political parties could produce adverse results for the President. He believed in positive results, which meant consolidation of the political position of the President and election of like minded persons to the National Assembly because the process of Islamisation had to continue unhindered. Thus the first thing had to come first, the election of the President without contest because he had to complete the mission of Islamisation. The Presidential referendum was held on Dec. 19, 1984. The voter was required to answer yes or no. The question was: "do you endorse the process initiated by the President, General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, and are you in favour of the continuation and further consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people."

The turnout of voters, avoiding to official figures was over sixty percent.²³ The referendum was a fraud and deceit on the citizens of Pakistan. There were no polling agents to guide the voters to their polling booths. Since, there was no contest, therefore, the presiding officers were lukewarm to ascertain the identity of the voters. At many polling booths non constituents voted to make the ballot boxes bulky. The President had earlier decided that all elections would be held on identity card requirement, but for Presidential referendum the conditions was waived. Consequent to the referendum the President became secure for the term of five more years.

As far as his popularity in the masses was concerned, it decreased and they doubted his capacity to conduct fair and impartial

elections on party basis. He had already cancelled the October, 1977 elections, despite a solemn assurance given to the people, at the time of coup. He had previously backed out of his commitments on a number of occasions and for many CMLA came to mean: "Cancel My Last Announcement." ²⁴ But the President was not disturbed by these inferences. to further consolidate his position he planned for the election to the National Assembly in 1985 and transfer of power to the elected representatives. A regime without political parties is of necessity a conservative regime.²⁵ Historically speaking parties were born when the masses really made their entrance into national politics. Followed by periodical elections President Zia did not have confidence to face political parties. Hence he introduced non-party elections and separate electorate for minorities. Both decisions were criticized but being firm on his plan, elections were held to the National Assembly on February 25, 1985, without participation of political parties. The major political party, the PPP boycotted the elections.

The President nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister and he convincingly secured vote of confidence from the National Assembly. The Prime Minister immediately organised Muslim League in the Assembly because he believed in democracy and political parties being integral part of elected government. He also wanted to get rid of Martial Law as being inconsistent with democracy.

For this he had to get the eighth amendment to the constitution passed unanimously by the National Assembly. Even though discretionary powers to dissolve the National Assembly were given to the President in the proposed amendment and there was opposition to it by a number of members of the National Assembly. They cited example of President Mirza, who dissolved the Assembly capriciously, while the nation was prepared for the General Election. Since, Prime Minister Junejo was determined to get rid of Martial

law. Therefore, the discretionary power under Article 58 adopted in the amendment was also endorsed. President had also assured the Nation that with the lifting of Martial Law, he would retire from the Army, which did not happen. The balance of power was in favour of the President and when he found that his nominated Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo was trying to behave as if he was not sharing power with him, he removed him on May 29, 1988, on the plea that the process of Islamisation was being delayed. Thus, he remained the Chief Law giver till his death on August 17, 1988. He did rule with dexterous strategy and suppressed the constitutional rights of the people, with a conviction to reform the society morally and politically.

During his controversial longest political hegemony a crop of young politicians emerged. He used controlled electronic media and newspapers relentlessly to criticise the political opposition, which created dichotomy in the country between those who favoured him and others who wanted restoration of constitutional ascendancy. His all efforts seemed to work to perpetuate his rule and after death the political scenario changed, with emphasis on normal elections and rule by majority. His nonparty elections of 1985, did change the attitude of the elected members to the national interests, they remained lukewarm to them and concentrated on biradari benefit. According to the constitution, after the death of President Zia, the Chairman of the Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan took oath as Acting President of Pakistan. He was a civil servant by profession and had entered service in 1940. He believed in civil code and obedience. He had vast experience of management and economic development and for nearly eight years he held the portfolio of finance under President Zia. During 1977 when political agitation started against the regime of Prime Minister Bhutto, he sided with Gen. Zia. It indicated that he did not believe in political institutions as only resort to progress. He dismissed the Governments of Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto on

August, 6, 1990 and that of Mr. M. Nawaz Sharif on April 18, 1993 respectively.

In both the cases of dismissal and dissolution of the National Assembly, almost same kind of charges were framed, which meant that the Government of the Federation could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an appeal to the electorate was necessary.²⁶ Briefly, commenting on the dismissal orders, it may be added that his over exuberance to influence the Federal Government was main cause of the difficulties faced by the above mentioned two regimes. In the constitutional history of Pakistan only one on the initiative of Prime Minister the National Assembly was dissolved in 1977, to call for General Election. Rest of the dissolutions were on the initiative of President.

President did not allow the government of Mohtrama Benazir to work smoothly. for it was by his connivance that the provincial government of Punjab, headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif created a number of hurdles in the smooth functioning of the Federal Government. The obdurate attitude of the President made the Federal Government helpless. when Mr. Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister after the General Elections of October, 1990, after sometime the relations between the President and Prime Minister became cold. Mainly on the issue of eighth amendment which gave discretionary dissolution power to the President and appointment of Chief of Army. The Prime Minister openly criticized the President and refused to take any dictation from him.

The President who had no patience to listen to criticism from a political leader, dismissed his government under Article 58(2-B) of the constitution and called for fresh elections. President could not be otherwise because he had been holding important administrative posts starting with a membership of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Commission under Ayub regime and continued to be a decision

maker during Zia dictatorship. Both of them had aversion towards political parties and unrestricted elections. Had he been a politician, he would not have dismissed the two governments summarily. Both the political parties of the two prime ministers had voted for his election as a permanent President in December, 1988. By discussing the political role of the above three Presidents, one is bound to presume that the gentlemen were omnipotent and had not been bound by constitutional constraints. By and large, their approach was pedagogic and against the parliamentary norms. Traditionally, the right to seek dissolution of the elected legislature rests with the Primer Minister to keep the recalcitrant members under control. In Britain, the government often uses the vote of confidence as a weapon to restore discipline within the party.²⁷

Keeping in view that Pakistan is an emergent democracy, where liberal traditions have to be established, for political stability. There has to be more importance attached to the public opinion rather than the thinking of one man with a support of a small political clique to make a political decision. The periodical elections should be a regular political process. The elected assemblies should be allowed to complete the full tenure mentioned in the Constitution. The President should coax the opposition to concentrate on their responsibilities within the legislature rather than try for backdoor to get into power. This would make the Assembly debates salutary for political cohesion. It has been commonly observed that after the dissolution of the elected legislature, almost same parliamentarians are returned to the new Assembly by the voters. This means that the public opinion does not favour political indulgence by the head of the state.

As for as relationship between the President and Prime Minister is concerned the original 1973 Constitution should be followed. The discretionary powers given to the President vis-a-vis the National Assembly should be abrogated, because to-date the

clause 58-2B has been used mischievously. Moreover, The President is indirectly elected while Prime Minister is choice of the electorate. Let the President perform his ceremonial functions as a symbol of unity of the Federation and parliamentarians may remain accountable to the electorate on the Westminster model: The weak democracy does not mean to have a surrogate but to have more democracy as a panacea, the modern is an age of democracy.

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A REVIEW OF PAKISTAN—CANADA RELATIONS

by

Dr. S. Ahmad-uddin Hussain

The modern era is characterized by dynamism in the nature and relations among international communities. As such, no state can survive by itself and without the cooperation of other states. Indeed, the cooperation should be based on cooperation and not masterism. It goes back in time when we talk about relations between the two friendly states, viz. Pakistan and Canada. Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the invaluable assistance of Canada in various sectors of development is well known. More recently, the visit by Canadian Premier Mr. Jean Chretien has proved an epoch in the relations between the two democratic states. Not leaving any stone unturned in any area of cooperation, this has been a tremendous effort on the part of Canadian government to resolve Kashmir problem besides heavy talks on nuclear non-proliferation. Being well aware of the Indian point of view on Kashmir dispute and NPT, the Premier helped a lot to forward negotiations and force India to bilaterally sign nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The claim to be unruled proved true after signing NPT by the Canadian government and it has put enormous pressure on India, which has strived hard to become nuclear power in South Asia. The Premier's admission on Pakistan's point of "South Asia as Nuclear-Free-Zone" is an implied recognition of Pakistan's stand on the issue.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

"Pakistan badly needed both investment and technological knowledge if it intends to implement its agenda to become an Asian

Tiger by the beginning of the next Century"¹. As Big-Push Theory denotes the inevitability of super power at the back of an under-developed country as either a motivational force or physical force, the need to extend relations with developed countries becomes overwhelming for Third World Countries. Canada being an economic giant is by no mean incomparable with any developed country of the world. It has been pronounced earlier that Canada extended exhaustive assistance towards Pakistan since its inception. The annals of both countries provide gravity of data in exports and imports. Through Columbo Plan, Canada assisted Pakistan with various commodities and lines of credit and technological cooperation.² The exports from Pakistan to Canada and imports from Canada to Pakistan valued Rs. 137 millions and Rs. 514 millions respectively in 1973-74, increased to Rs. 4,020 millions and Rs. 2,528 millions respectively in 1992-93.³ A look at such a vast investment depicts that Canada, one of the few highly advanced countries with vast scope of expansion, will prove a good partner for us in our quest for economic development.

The most recent visit of Canadian Prime Minister to Pakistan early this year with 150 members business delegate helped enhance opportunities for investment. They signed Memoranda of understanding worth US\$ 2 billions. they signed 12 contracts on business, investment and cooperation worth US\$ 800 Millions. this big deal includes US\$ 926 millions in commercial contracts and 1.2 billion in agreements in principle including MOUS.⁴ Mr. Chretien with ever largest business mission and 7 Chief Ministers showed content over investment and hoped that coming years will bring more exhilaration to Pakistan and Canada in their relations. His visit, the first by a Canadian PM since 1971, is expected to prove a catalyst for development.⁵ The present Pakistan government policies of privatization exhorted Canadian Government a lot and obliged her to open new avenues of cooperation. The true spirit of privatization will lead both nations toward joint venture rather than dependence which,

indeed, we need more than any thing else. During his visit, Mr. Chretien admired the economic reforms of Pakistan government.

The rapid advancement of Canada on the pace of economic development and growing urge of Pakistan to become an Asian Tigers have brought both the nations on the crossroads to face each other and come across economic turmoils. Their intentions of collaboration for the achievement of equally important objectives could only be dreamed true unless they strengthen relations in economic sectors. Because, it has been admitted universally that development without cooperation is nothing but simply impossible. The status of Pakistan for Canada may be of a host to serve her as a free market and raw-material provider while on the other hand she may be a glaring example to be followed for development.

POLITICAL COOPERATION

The strategic importance of Pakistan is no more invisible. Being centre of attention for super powers, Pakistan got a pivotal role to play in international politics. But due to certain bilateral disputes with India Pakistan does not attain its due position in the area.

Canada does not regard herself as member of the club of nuclear powers after signing Non-Proliferation Treaty. No country with an urge to excel in nuclear proliferation can exert pressure on other states to avoid nuclear proliferation. Her status of non-nuked pays her tribute to exercise its influence on the states trying to become haves in nukes. Whole of the world know that Pakistan believes in nuclear disarmament. Pertinent enough to the issue, Canada has always been influencing Pakistan and India to sign NPT.⁶ Mr. Jean Chretien statement is still on record pronounces that world would have changed following end of the cold war and now is the time for enhancing understanding.⁷ He asked all the countries,

across the globe, to abandon nuclear armament and establish mutual cooperation in social and economic areas to develop their countries. Pakistan appreciates Canada's assistance upon its demand of "South Asia Nuclear-Free-Zone".

Another important and most crucial aspect of political relations between the states is Kashmir dispute. The world recognizes Kashmir as a disputed area between Pakistan and India. It could only be solved through United Nations Resolutions. The friendly relations with Canada demands her support over the dispute and on many occasions Canadian government expressed her resentment over the Indian aggression in Kashmir and tried to influence India in this connection. In the earlier this year visit of Canadian Premier to India, the issue came under discussion and government of Canada asked India to subdue their disputes for the betterment of the area. We, indeed, expect a lot more on Kashmir issue from Canada and hope that her involvement in the affairs will help resolve the problems in a smooth way.

ENERGY SECTOR COOPERATION

The swelling needs in energy sector have created a perturbing situation for every country of the world, except those possessing nuclear option. Sane are those who are well aware of the severity of problem and trying hard to wipe out the problem from their land. Pakistan has not been laggard to understand the gravity of the impasse expected to face in near future. Self-sufficiency in energy conservation has become a serious issue for almost all the developing nations. Here the need for assistance from developed nations provided a notion of cooperation to destall traditional machinery with latest equipment for energy conservation.

Pakistan would be assisted a lot in future by the Canadian government in overcoming the crisis of energy. Canada helped

Pakistan in establishing first major hydroelectric projects of Warsak and Tarbela Dams.⁸ Of course, this contribution in energy sector from Canada would remain an outstanding contribution in the historical development of Pakistan.

Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) was also set up with the prime assistance of the country,⁹ which is a sort of blessing, for which Canada became a source. Presently, 18 projects to enhance energy capabilities worth several millions dollars have been signed. A peerless glance of the agreements signed is as under;

- B.C. Hydro-Raiwind Power project. (project value approximately US\$ 150 millions)
- B.C. Hydro-MOU on Swat. (project value approximately US\$ 1 billion).
- SNC Lavalin-Karachi Mass Transit System. (project value approx. US\$ 0.5 billion).
- Alert Disaster Control Ltd. bid for recovery of oil well. (Project value approx. US\$ 6 millions).
- Teleglobe 128 kbps Inernet facility to connect Supernet (Arfeen Group) customer in USA (Project value US\$ 150,000).¹⁰

SOCIAL SECTOR COOPERATION

World is fraught with rapidly growing social problems. These problems are making life more vulnerable. From all nooks and corners of the world, the NGOs are struggling hard to make social conditions better to avoid havoc in future. Population growth as well as environment have been deeply concerned to all countries of the

world. Deteriorating conditions of human rights and outraged use of Child labour in under-developed countries are at the apex in worsening social arenas. Canada, since very long, showed deep concern over these problems and extended utmost assistance to alleviate these conditions.

Recently, Canada provided extensive help of 4.5 millions Canadian dollars for the immunization programme for children upto five years of age against polio over a period of three years.¹¹

Pakistan and Canada also signed five Memoranda of Understanding on environment, food and agriculture, air services, justice and help in Management of Pakistan's radio frequencies.¹² Canada also showed intent to extend help to improve police efficiency and control crimes and drug trafficking which is of course a gigantic threat to society anywhere.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONS

We have undertaken many aspects of cooperation between the two friendly states. Leaving no field of mutual collaboration unquenched, Canada provided untiring and unending opportunities to Pakistan. The cooperation is, indeed, highly recognizable and we feel proud of her friendship.

To wipe out mass illiteracy and foster development in social sectors like basic education, primary health care, nutrition, population welfare and rural water supply and sanitation, our government started a Social Action programme (SAP). The SAP was launched in 1992-93. Initially a 3-year SAP as formulated, which was overtaken by the exercise carried out for the 8th Five Year Plan.

Within the mentioned areas, the focus is on the most vulnerable or marginalised groups of society e.g. female education, infants care, unreached rural inhabitants. In view of this SAP envisages to accelerate the pace of social development through three channels:

- (i) Ensuring adequate financial allocations to above identified components.
- (ii) Improving the delivery of services in these components by providing adequate recurring budget.
- (iii) Removing implementation constraints in these components via (a) improving institutional arrangements, and (b) undertaking implementation reforms.¹³

SAP has been funded by International Bank, Asian Development Bank and Netherlands to help Pakistan alleviate its social problems growing day by day and dragging the country into the vicious circles of backwardness. We expect that Canada, being a great soldier committed to eradicate social problems from the world, would definitely come ahead to cooperate with us in making things done.

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POLITICAL PARTIES A STRUCTURAL & FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

by

Mansoor Akbar Kundi

INTRODUCTION

Political parties are a distinctive organization of the 20th Century politics. The rôle played by political parties may vary from state to state, such as the importance of political parties in providing legitimacy and stability in a developed country differ with the institutional inheritance of a traditional Third World State. They, however, tend to be an important part of the country's politics and reflect the logic of these by providing a strategically critical concept for understanding a political system. A political party has a multi-functional rôle. It can be a political leader of the working classes and vanguard of the people's or the source of corruption and division; it can be the promoter of democracy and organizer of public opinion or the defender of an ideology and religious dogmas. In Feliks Gross's analysis:

A political party is an organized group, oriented towards political goals, that attempts by its actions to maintain the status quo or to change the existing social, economic and political conditions by means of influencing attainment of the conquest of political power. Political power is the power of state.¹

The above mentioned conquest for power reflects the different strategies and tactics a political party undertakes. Their rôle in

developing areas show that political parties are both: a creative and destructive elementary force which builds and ruins. Where they promote the control of mobilization and change adaptation requirements of political development by providing a stable foundation of support for sponsored regimes; a vehicle for national integration of resource mobilization and a mechanism for restricting the idiosyncratic behaviour of political leaders, there they maneuver in a variety of ways destabilizing the organizational structure of a political and social order. They become a weapon in the hidden struggle for power by having an access to peripheral organizations, penetrating institutional targets and applying dual-power tactics, which all assist them in the ultimate manipulation of power.

DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties can be defined in a variety of ways. The comprehensive definition of a political party is always under a change. In Jupp's opinion the confusion over the definition of political parties stems from the incomplete and socially or temporally determined definitions that have been used since the time parties became a regular feature of politics at the beginning of the 19th Century.² The immediate character of parties and importance of their real or alleged roles in the operation of a political system explain in large the propensity to defining and studying parties in terms of their effects. William R. Schonfeld observes it as:

The intermediate character of parties explains the research focus on effects. This emphasis so dominates the field that the explicit definitions of parties invariably identify what they do or seek to accomplish within the political systems and ignore what they are or what special activity occurs within them.³

Edmand Burke, in whose time, the concept of political party was not fully developed, defined a party as a "body of men united

for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interests upon some particular principle on which they all agreed."⁴ In Max Weber, the German philosopher's analysis:

the term "party" will be employed to designate associations, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its activity is devoted is to secure power with an organization for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members. These advantages may consist in the realization of certain objectives policies or both. Parties may have an ephemeral character or may be organized in a variety of forms. They may consist of the following of a charismatic leader, of traditional retainers, or of purpose or value rational adherents.⁵

In Leiserson's words, a political party is to provide "the major connective linkage between separate, formal agencies and officials, of government, between official and non-official holders of power".⁶ Thus when we evaluate a modern political party, it is an agency of informal, indirect representation of social groups and classes, and is to be contrasted with a direct system such as the medieval parliament of estates, or the doctrine advocated by syndicalists, socialists, and some trade unionists of functional group representation in the official government structure.⁷

KINDS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

There are different kinds of parties within class and category. They may be classified in a variety of ways. The broad definition, however, to define political parties (a) doctrine based parties; and (b) non-doctrine based parties.

A political party based on doctrine is characterized by the fact that the bases of its appeal remain largely in the realm of principles

and moral argumentation. MacDonald, who defined the functional analysis of doctrine-based parties, included the socialist and communist parties in this category. To him;

Socialist parties which are not based upon the union membership may be regarded as a type of doctrinal party. a party which conceives of its task as being to moderate change and which rests the notion of its task upon a general view of the way things happen or should happen is a doctrinal party. Likewise, a party which is essentially revolutionary rather than liberal or gradual, and which bases its revolutionary advocacy upon a theory of the nature of revolution in the scheme of things is a doctrinal party.⁸

A party is regarded doctrinal, both on the score of the substantive programme it advocates and the methods which it adheres to as a matter of principle. Party doctrine may be derivative of religious doctrine. Rustow classifies all the parties in the Near East (Middle East & South Asia), which are based on highly organized political ideology, as doctrinal parties.⁹ The list includes Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamiat Islami in Pakistan, the defunct Tudeh Party, and Islamic Republican party of Iran etc. The fact, however, remains that many of the doctrinal parties lose most of their ideological content by deemphasizing the doctrinal element as its leaders share and monopolize political authority and extend social base with other parties.

The parties whose appeal and organization basis rests upon a shared interest or identity constitute the bulk of party bases which may be regarded as essential non-doctrinal in nature. The marriages of convenience between competing groups usually involve a deemphasize on doctrine and give rise to a party or party alliance based upon a shared desire to govern. On non-doctrinal party basis of great practical importance is derived from the holding of official

political authority. All the pragmatic parties whose appeal is based on mass appeal and are eager to extend their social base are non-doctrinal parties. They may include a wide variety of disparate political groups and pseudomovements.

ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The differences that exist between political parties bring difficulty in defining the structural analysis of political parties. Duverger discusses and distinguished parties in terms of what he calls direct and indirect structure.¹⁰ He classifies the organizational structure of political parties into four units as Caucus, Branch, Cell, and Militia type-unit.

Each party has its own structure which bears little resemblance to that of other parties. In spite of everything our main types of basic element may be distinguished and most of the existing parties can be related to one of them. These elements are the caucus, the branch, the cell and the militia.¹¹

Parties with direct structure are those whose members or affiliates are related directly. for example, party with direct structure is composed of the individuals who have signed a membership form, pay a monthly subscription and attend the local meetings regularly. Indirect parties are those which are built upon other social formations as their basic component units. The party affiliation is indirect. Such as a party whose popularity lies with a charismatic leader, is indirect party, and the population supports the party mainly because it supports the leaders.

The four units duverger describes are explained as thus:

- (i) The parties made up of caucuses are tied together and

are limited in numbers. Despite the numerical weakness, the caucus, nevertheless, wields great power. This type of party represents an organizational stage in the development of most parties.

- (ii) A branch is a more numerous group than the caucus and possesses a more perfected internal organization. This type of party has a simple hierarchy where the personal influence of a leader can be seen at work. It is apt to run counter to the traditional lines on which a society is based and accentuates the organizational aspect. As the caucus is oligarchic in character, the branch is open to all its members are elected by the members. Most political parties in the developed world are branch based parties.
- (iii) A cell-based party is developed by adherents of communism. They are an invention of the Russian Communist Party. Its adoption was imposed on all communist parties in the world by the Third International in its resolution of January 21, 1924.¹² The existence of cells have played an important role in the underground activities of the communist parties in the developing countries. The Communist cells have been periodically identified within the armed forces in many of the Middle Eastern countries. For example, the regime in Iraq in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, purged the entire military establishment. The establishment of leftist cells in the Afghan army during the President Daoud period were ultimately accountable for the coup against Daoud and brought the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) into power in April 1978. A cell is organized around the job or profession,

and is very small and conspiratorial in its mode of operation.

- (iv) The militia type of party has qualities suggested by the name. Members are an elite, they wear a distinctive insignia, a uniform or a colored shirt. Although no political party has ever been exclusively formed on the basis of the militia, these have been served side by side. The existence of a militia-type party is based upon the notion that it is possible to distinguish between quasi-legitimate violence and raw violence.

A TOPOLOGY OF PARTY-SYSTEM

A party-system is the configuration that exists in a given country as a result of legal requirements and the long-term influence one party has on others. The ultimate impact parties have depends on the party system under which they function. A Party system is an intervening variable between the polity and political party. The social, political and economic structure of a society gives rise to a particular type of party system in turn, the party system accounts for the characteristics of every political party.¹³ The role of political parties can well be understood under a party system they exist. (a) Authoritarian Party System, (b) Dominant Party System, (c) Multi-Party System, and (d) Bi-Party System.

SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM

An single party system is an important political phenomenon of the many developing and socialist countries. There are many factors responsible for a single party system. In most cases it is established with the emergence of single, monolithic, ideological oriented political party, which takes over the power after a coup d'etat, revolution, and where development aspirations and mission of

the nation are identified with that single party. In such a system members of the opposition are defined as traitors or counterrevolutionary working against revolutionary or nationalistic causes. They are regarded as a threat to national interests. Small groups may exist under the system as long as they are not a challenge to the ruling party. The authoritarian system is highly non-competitive as the absence of free party system and an open electoral process usually reduces the aggregate functions to the formulation of policy alternates. Sartori, who coined the ruling single party as "Hegemonic Party", describes the situation as follows:

the hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted exist, but as a second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. Not only does alternation occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the possibility of a rotation in power is not even envisaged. The implications that hegemonic party will remain in power whether it liked or not.¹⁴

The classic example of the countries holding authoritarian party systems are: Communist Party of ex USSR, Communist Party of China. In the constitution of 1982 of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is defined as "the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people". The CCP is not only having a de facto power but is central policy-making agency for the country. All powers belong to the CCP.¹⁵ One may include the political parties of East European states.

DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM

The dominant party system can well be defined as a system in which a party outdistance all the other parties and emerges a dominant party. It is dominant because it significantly is stronger

than the others. The dominant party-system can be divided into two kinds: dominant non-authoritarian party system, and dominant authoritarian party system.

In the first case, a system where a party distinguishes itself as a dominant ruling group but retains the broad principles of opposition. The opposition parties with different ideologies are allowed to exist and provided equal (constitutional) opportunities to compete. The case of India is a leading example where the Indian Congress Party remained dominated from 1950 to 1977, or 1980 to 1992 as dominant political party. In 1962 general elections in India, the Congress Party won 358 seats out of total 503 seats. The rest of 145 seats were claimed by seven parties. At present, India can rather be put under a multi-party system. In 1996 elections no political party had a visible majority, and Gowda government was possible in alliance with 14 small political group/parties to form a coalition.

In the second case, a party plays a dominant group by limiting the role of opposition to secondary groups. Though the principle of opposition exists in theory, it, however, does not exist in practice. The freedom of political organization is limited. In most of the cases the constitutional procedure is such that it not only safeguards the role of the dominant party, but can inhibit the growing strength of opposition. A dominant-authoritarian party system may result in single party system. The case of socialist/communist countries where a political party by playing an authoritarian role can limit the existence of all other political parties.

MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

The multiparty system is found in the countries where political opinion is divided amongst several groups. Sartori spells out the three factors responsible for a multiparty structure. First, no party is likely to approach or at least to maintain an absolute

majority. Second, the relative strength of the parties can be ranked according to their respective coalition indispensability, and third eventual potential of intimidation.¹⁸

Duverger describes the topology of the multiparty system a difficult, since the "innumerable varieties can be imagined ranging from three parties to infinity, and within each variety innumerable patterns and shades of difference are possible."¹⁹ However, to the broad category it is classified the multiparty system, as Almond points out, is into two kinds: "Working" multiparty system, existing in Scandinavian countries and "immobilized" multiparty systems of France, Italy and Israel. In the former case, parties are broadly aggregate; political culture is more homogeneous and fusional of secular and traditional elements. That is why relationships between parties and interest groups are consensual. The second kind, "immobilized multiparty system" exists in the countries which produce a fragmented, heterogeneous political culture, where the relations between interest groups and parties are not of instrumental bargaining kind.¹⁹ In Italy, in 1992 elections, for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate respectively, the Christian Democratic Party had 206 and 107, Democratic Party of the left 107 and 64, and Italian Socialistic Party 92 and 49 out of the total 630 seats. Thus it was classified as multiparty system.

TWO PARTY SYSTEM

The two party system is a well-known category. It may be because of the simpleness of the system or the countries that practice two-party system are important countries and they present a model case. The four ideal conditions for a system that functions two-party system are:

- (a) the two parties are in a position to compete for the absolute majority of seats;

- (b) one of the two parties actually succeeds in winning a sufficient parliamentary majority;
- (c) the party in majority is willing to govern;
- (d) alternation or rotation in power remains a credible expectation.²⁰

The leading example are of Great Britain and United States of America. The credibility of alternation or rotation in power is a condition for the two-party system. The 1993 elections in Pakistan which led Pakistan Peoples Party to secure 86 seats against 73 of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) out of the total 207 seats, may be closer to a two-party system, but overall the system could not be regarded as a bi-party system.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

It may be a lengthy and complex task to find a functional approach that fits all kinds of the political parties and environments in which they exist, however, a conclusive functional analysis is as under

Function of Integration: Participation, socialization and mobilization are variants of essentially one overall function of integration. Political parties perform the function of integration in most of societies. Socialization is the process through which norms about the political system are transmitted to the people. The mobilization is the extreme variant of socialization. The party attempts to bring rapidly large numbers of people who are formerly outside of the system, either because they are apathetic, alienated or indifferent, into the system to secure mass support. By establishing a level of participation, party integrated the individuals into the political system. Huntington defines a political party as a principal

institution for the organization and expansion of political participation—an instrument of mobilization.²¹ The motives and range behind integrative functions vary from polity to polity.

Control of the Government and patronage: The control of the government is the desiring function of each political party. Each party exists in hopes of becoming the ruling class one day. Since all political parties are concerned with power they naturally operate by placing members and supporters into positions of power. Therefore, an essential function of a party (once in position of making patronage and control).²²

In the state controlled economics of the most nation-states an element of party patronage in appointments to administrative and economic posts is extremely important. The rate of patronage and control was/is higher in communist/socialist states. It is equally higher in the developing countries where the ratio of education is low. The Soviet Communist Party today was the more important patronage party. Similarly, the case of political parties showing patronage is higher in the countries with dominant party system.

Setting and Attaining Goals: A large number of political parties view their functioning of patronage as in some way related to the attainment of political goals. They can be divided into three categories; adjustive, programmist, and ideological. All these parties, however, have the function of setting values for their societies and trying to attain them in concrete form.

The adjustive parties try to defend what already exists and what is usually legitimized and accepted by the majority of the people. The programmist parties work in hopes to shift the centre of political agreement in its direction, while remaining immune to rival creeds.

The ideological parties are more sophisticated than the other parties (adjustive and programmatic) in setting and attaining goals. The appeal to identity should not be overlooked. The great dynamic political and social movements of the twentieth century appealed to class, ethnic or religious identity.

Transmitting Ideology: The political parties have functioned in transmitting and defending ideologies. In most of the countries the ruling party identifies itself with an ideology and transmits it through different means. The pattern is prevalent in the communist and socialist countries. This happens in most of the Middle Eastern countries, where the ruling parties spend much of their energy in the emanation of an ideology.

Party as a Source of Legitimacy: In many countries, political parties have been used as a source of legitimizing power. A monarch or a military dictator attempts to institutionalize popular support for his continuing rule. The establishment of National Resurgence Party by the Shah of Iran, Istiqlal Party by the King of Morocco, restructuring of Muslim League into Convention Muslim League by President Ayub Khan, and founding of "Hizb Inqilab Meli" (National Revolutionary Party) by President Daoud in Afghanistan etc. was an attempt to establish party as a source of legitimacy. Huntington describes that the establishment of the "party is the source of legitimacy because it is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, the popular will or the dictatorship of the proletariat."²³

Party as an Organizational Weapon: the role of political party as "an organizational weapon" is an important notion about a function exercised by the Communist parties, which is not common to many of political parties, especially in the developing countries. The party works as an organizational weapon to those formations which operate outside and against the established order.

Supportive Function: A political party/parties may exercise a "supportive function". Macridis writes about the supportive role as it not "only mobilizes and governs but must create conditions for its own survival and stay in government."²⁴ A number of political parties in the developed and developing countries have adapted the strategy of supportive function to survive and consolidate their position. The role of a party to support a stronger party is possible under democratic or undemocratic government and two-party or multi-party system. The question of a party's survival may be more necessitated under an undemocratic government than the democratic one, however, under a democratic system, a party's major concern for a supportive function is to remain in power by gaining privileges.

Opposition Role of a Party: The role of a political party has been marked with an importance in states where elections are held on party-bases for legislatures, and a party-government is in power. The opposition parties in established democracies are regarded not only performs the role of opposition parties or factions, but principally of a "shadow formation". The offices of government are imitated within the opposition, which thereby forms itself into a body prepared to substitute for all the occupants of those offices at any time. The opposition has its leader, its base organization and committees, and usually responds to every move of the government with counter-proposals, representing, in theory, what it would do if it were in office."²⁵ In the developing democracies, the power-opposition parties relationship might have been marked with a dilemma of democratic relationship, nonetheless, an opposition party exerts a considerable check on the policies of government. The role of an opposition party and its leaders is stronger under a two-party system rather than in a multiparty or loose-multiparty system. The role of opposition leader in Great Britain is marked with the saying that the Prime Minister knows more about the leader of opposition than he does about his own wife. In case of Mrs. Thatcher, it might have been opposite.

CONCLUSION

Political parties are an universal character of the twentieth century politics. In the game of politics where ultimate aim for a player is to gain more power, the role of political parties have become more common and active in both developed and underdeveloped countries. Out of the all different kinds of political parties under various party-systems, the ultimate aim for a political party is to gain power and penetrate its influence amongst people. They carry a public participation under a democratic or an underground network in an authoritarian regime. The growth of representative government has enhanced the role of the political parties more entrenched.

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THE EUROPEAN CONCEPT OF THE SIRAIKI LANGUAGE AND ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

by

**Dr. Abdul Hamid Khan
Javid Usman Shami**

Allah, the Almighty has bestowed the power of speaking to human being which distinguished him from other creatures of the universe. The political thinker, Al-Farabi stresses that Man's power can be analysed into power of reason, thinking or feeling and the other power of contention. Through power of speaking and knowledge the human being is able to differentiate between good and evil, profit and loss, while the power of contention is basis of love and hate, truth and untruth.¹ Al-Farabi has translated the Greek philosophy into Siryani and then into Arabic. Abu Ali Sina came to know the philosophy of Aristotle through the works of Al-Farabi: language played a great role in the realm of knowledge and the modern world is much conscious to learn the different languages. Language is the collection of such individual and compound words which help to comprehend and to understand recognised signs in various human groups or these are the words of various colours having certain meanings when uttered. Language is the means of thought. It plays an important role in interpretation of human being's feelings, emotions and concept through words and sentences. The movements of body which help to clarify the meanings of the speaker are also included in it, which is common among the people who speak a particular language.² Language is the index of the civilization, culture and geography of a particular region or area. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Siraiki language and to know how European scholars were benefitted of this language and

particularly the study of Siraiki region.

Since the conquest of Romans, Europe had come across with many phases in the development of English literature. Two major invasions by Julius Caesar in 55 and 54 B.C. led to Flourish Roman civilization in Britain. Their occupation lasted for over 400 years and during this period they had a dynamic impact on the new English Literature in the Great Britain. An other important phase in the English Literature and language was Anglo-saxon period (656-1100 A.D.). It was made up of German, Latin, Scottish and Pictish dialect. Basically, Latin was the background of the Anglo-Saxon Literature. From 1100-1200 A.D., the English were under the influence of Anglo-Normans. They were more French so their literature was the Model of Medieval French in nature. The 14th century was remarkable in the history of the English literature. During (1203-1300 A.D.), Geofary Chaucer was the only major poet of significance recognition. Geofary Chaucer was known as the father of the English Literature. So, the real English literature came into being in the 14th Century.³ As the Europeans developed the other faculties of civilization with political comprehension and conquered the most of the countries of the world.

The British ruled over the vast land of the subcontinent for more than a century. Communication and the comprehension of the local languages remained a problem for them through out their stay in the subcontinent. So, far the better understanding and proper communication, the British rulers gave special attention to learn the local languages. They developed special institutes for the development and translation of the native languages. They took personal interest in local literature and culture as they themselves were benefitted out of it. A number of European scholars worked on the local dialects, phonemes and grammatical structure. The British, particularly wanted to acquire multidimensional benefits including political and religious aspects. They wanted to preach Christianity.

For this sole purpose, they translated the Holy Bible in local languages., The first Translation of the Holy Bible in Siraiki language by the missionaries came into being in 1818.⁴ After the conquest of Sindh, there were only two British Officers who knew Sindhi language. Mr. Wathen, a Britisher, was the first to write the "Grammar of Sindh" in the Arabic scripts, actually this grammar was written for the use of political officers and administrative purpose at the court of Amirs of Sindh. Later on, for their convenience, the British further classified the local languages. particularly, the local languages of Sindh were categorized.

The linguistic status of Siraiki as a set of regional standards differs in many features from those of the central Punjab. The obvious differences are phonological, Siraiki has the usual Indian voiced aspirates, which are reduced to tones on adjacent vowels in the speech of central Punjab, and also possesses a distinctive set of implosive consonants, which it shares with Sindhi, not Punjabi. But many shared morphological details, as well as overall agreement in much of the vocabulary and Syntax link it quite closely to Punjabi. Siraiki is to be regarded as occupying an intermediate position between Sindhi and Punjabi".⁵ Dr. C. Shackle gives Siraiki an intermediary position between the two provinces and cultures. As many of the words of Siraiki language are commonly found in both of the languages. An old form of Lehnda must have extended right up to Sarawati and is still the foundation of Punjabi.⁶ Siraiki previously known as Lehnda, Jatki, Multani, Riasti or western Punjabi. The Siraiki speaking area lies in the central part of Pakistan on either side of the Indus including the lower reaches of the Chapab and the Sutlej. The relationship of Siraiki with others is complex as there is no natural boundary among them.⁷

The Western Punjabi or Jatki languages has many local names applied to it, Multani, Derawal, Jagdalli, Shapuri, Baluchi, Peshawari, Pothohari, Hazari, Bahawalpur and all names of dialects

of the languages, which is spoken by the Jafir Pathans and Khetrans on the East and from Sindh in the south to the confines of Kashmir in the North, covering an area about the size of Ireland and with a population variously estimated by from three to five millions, the later is probably near it not under the actual number, there seem to be three well defined dailects.

1. **Southern Punjabi:-** Including Multani, Derawai, Bahawalpuri spoken from Sindh to the Dera Ismail Khan district.
2. **The Salt Range:-** Dialect, called in Bhai Maya Singh's Dictionary Pothohari spoken in Rawalpindi, Jehlum, Shahpur, Gujrat and Salt Range.
3. **The Hazara Dialect:-** Each district seems to have its own local name for the language, which has dialectical differences of pronunciation, meaning or idiom varying more or less every few miles, or even in different quarters of the less every few miles, or even in different quarters of the same city. This is more or less the case with every written language.

Mr. Frank Worthington Skemp wrote Multani stories and a bit about the culture of Multan when he was an Assistant Commissioner of Muzaffar Garh, Pandit Hari Krishna assisted him. The stories reflect the typical culture of the Siraiki belt and their temperament.⁹ In 1902, the languages used were (a) Multani or Western Punjabi, (b) Punjabi (Jatki or Obhechar); (c) Sindhi, and (d) Marwari, Rathi in cholistan. In 1955, the chief language spoken is Bahawalpuri, which is identical with Multani, Jatki or western Punjabi the official language with which business is carried on is

Hindustani (Urdu).¹⁰

The origin of the Siraiki language is related with the ancient age when Elexander, the great conquered Sindh. 4000 years ago Egyptian language was developed in this region. Later on, with the arrival of Romans, it mixed with the Roman language. The civilization of the Indus Valley is thousands of years old. The valley was fertile so the arrival of Egyptians, Romans, Derawains and Harappans had been noted 2500 B.C. Particularly, with the arrival of Derawains, a new civilization came into being in the Indus valley. They were refined and religious minded people. The valley was spreaded to Punjab, Sind, Sarhad, South Baluchistan, Gujrat, Haryana, Rajistan. The arrival of Arians in the valley had been noted in 1500 B.C. The language of the Derawians was replaced by Soris, Soris had their relationship with the ancient Egyptians and Arabs. The language which had been spoken by Soris was known as "Asorki", while the language which is being spoken in the particular territory is "Siraiki". The common words between names of the two languages are S.R.K.I. An other reason for the name of the language is that an Arian Sardar (leader), a religious figure, named Sri Ram Chander, Ji, was a Sinsakrat speaker, in Sinsakrat language "Sri" means "Sardar (Leader)".

Siraiki, essentially the local language of the middle Indus to the North of Sind, was carried down into Sind by population movement, and came to enjoy intensive literary cultivation there, especially in upper Sind in the 18th and the 19th Centuries, thus anticipating its rather later period of Florescence in the area of its origin. The fact that the poets of upper Sind also composed poems on identical themes in Sindhi, is sufficient evidence for the fact that there is little which can be said about Siraiki which is not applicable to Sindhi also: often this will be true of comparable poetry in Punjabi, too".¹¹

"Mysticism" is indivisible and a common heritage of mankind and its language can safely be called "lingua Franca" of the entire human race. The study of the spiritual systems of various religions does not only have the way for mutual accord and amity on international scale, but holds, also, the potential of ensuring peace. Since, spirituality is the best means of taming the beast in man, the same beast which is responsible for all the calamities of the modern age."¹² For the Siraiki, like the Urdu, marsiya is essentially designed for public performance in the mourning assemblies, and most of the marsiya writers were themselves Zakirs. Indeed, when published collections sell so few copies and an audience of hundreds may attend a single mourning majilis, it is Zakir's role which chiefly confers fame, even some financial reward."¹³ It should, however, be mentioned that many of these writers originated from the northern Districts of the Siraiki-speaking area, a few also from the southern region, such as Bahawalpur or Khairpur. There is, however, rather little trace of dialectical variation in their compositions, the Siraiki of Multan providing the standard language of the marsiya; after all, the city was the centre both for publishing and for majalis, as well as being the birth place of most of the important poets."¹⁴ With the amalgamation of Sinsakrat along the local languages various regional languages came into being which are known as Hindi, Sindhi, Gujrati, Marvari, Punjabi and Multani. Hindi and Sindhi are the ancient languages, Punjabi, too. With the amalgamation of Sindhi and Punjabi a new language came into being and it was known as Multani.

The Multani language had been known with the different names in various territories. It was known as Derawari in Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan, Hindko in Peshawar, Gujrati in Kashmir, Muzzafar Garhi in Muzzafar Garh, Uchi in Uch and Multani in Multan. Its popular name is "Siraiki". Some of the scholars believe that the name of the language is given on "Sarawa". Sarwa was an ancient city situated near the boundary of Multan and

Sind. An other reason of its name was that the ruler of Multan was ruling over the vast region in a particular period. So the language of courtiers and the ruler was known as Siraiki.¹⁵ Lehnda, is Modern Arian Hindi language. It is related with the European Hindi linguistic Eastern group. "Lehnda" means the language of the West. The language is spoken in a great part of Pakistan which is spread over 70 to 74 Eastern longitude and 28 to 34 Northern latitude.

The language is spoken from the southern area, which is situated between Sutlej and Indus river and almost covers the Northern area to peshawar. The Eastern boundary of the language starts from the south of Bahawalpur city and covers the area Sahiwal, Gujranwala and the North of Jehlum. It finally touches the boundary in the North of Muzzafarbad in Kashmir. It almost covers the Western area of Punjab, which is 2/3 of the total area."¹⁶ It is generally calculated that about thirteen millions people resided and spoke Siraiki language upto 1973. The number of Siraiki speaking has been increased, but the government record does not show so much population. They are classified in Punjabi speaking category."¹⁷ Pakistan is a state where numerous languages are spoken in various parts of the region, language controversy of Urdu and Bengali as a state language had been one of the causes of dismemberment of Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) could not assimilate with the people of West Pakistan.

Siraiki speaking range is very wide and it has vital force, so far as the strategic point of view this territory is situated in the central part of Pakistan. It should be developed and it will be able to play its important role at the time of any foreign aggression. Unfortunately, this part, particularly, Bahawalpur Division (former Bahawalpur State) is neglected since its accession to Pakistan. Though, having three broad barriages, of Sulemanki, Islam and Punjnad Head works and various canals, the irrigation system is not much developed.¹⁸ The people of this part are mostly poor as

compared to the other parts of country. Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan are also neglected. the capabilities of the young people are being wasted. The government has started to develop the region, but so far as the capital of the former state of Bahawalpur is not developed yet poverty exists among the people as the unemployment is common due to the lack of industries.

We can conclude that the area of Siraiki language was appreciated by the European scholars, tourists and educated people. They are showing interest to know something about this region which is rich with forests, deserts and agriculture lands. The Siraiki language has its own heritage, civilization and its source of knowledge, which should be developed as the regional language.

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BOOK REVIEW

Strategic Appraisal, 1996,

Edited by: Zalmay Khalilzad, Rand, USA, Pages 329.

The book prepared by the Rand researchers deals with the major strategic Issues confronting the United States of America, in the post cold war era, with an emphasis on the future role of U.S. Air power. The book discusses both the question of U.S. Grand Strategy for the new era and the trends in various regions of the world and the challenges they could pose to the Military forces of the United States.

Inspite of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has not been able to reach a consensus to replace the containment strategy which dominated the U.S. policy for decades. Thus, in the absence of new strategy, the U.S. will have difficulty in assessing the importance of international events.

The discussion of geopolitical trends in various regions of the world has been undertaken to find out potential challengers to the United States. The study of each region is undertaken to see the political situation related to U.S. interests and the possibility of U.S. Military involvement.

The book is based on the research of Rand's Strategy and Doctrine Programme as Project Air Force sponsored by the United States Air Force.

Project Air Force is a division of Rand and Federally funded Research and Development Centre (FFRDC) for studies and analysis.

It provides the Air Force with independent analysis of Policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness and support of current and future air space forces.

The book covers all the regions of the world and the analysis given by different writers on different regions is interesting and informative and provides an insight to the readers. I do not agree on some of the observations, especially on South Asia, yet by and large the book is a good survey of 1996, with special reference to U.S. Policies.

Hameed A. K. Rai.

Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor

by Richard L. Kugler, Published Rand, 1996, pages 290.

The end of the cold war left East Central Europe as a large neutral zone between the Western Community and Russia. To promote stability and democracy there, NATO and the European Union, are making plans to begin enlarging into this region by admitting new members.

The book is intended to contribute to U.S. and Western Strategic defense, and arms control planning for NATO enlargement, which is an issue of growing importance.

The Central East European countries are facing a Russia that is intent on putting its imprints on the region and is opposed to West's enlargement. In future, the interaction between the West and Russia promises to be positive for the emerging geo-politics of East Central Europe and it will affect the stability of Europe as a whole.

Focused on the big strategic picture, this study presents a political military analysis of the dynamics which might unfold and the action the United States can take to shape a positive outcome.

The book begins with a theoretical framework and an indepth assessment of Russia's new statist foreign policy and defence strategy, including actions in Eurasia. It than examine East Central Europe's current and future geopolitics. The book concludes with an analysis of alternative strategic and military "end games"—destinations coupled with plans for getting to them—that the Unites States and its allies can pursue for achieving their goals of admitting new members while encouraging overall regional stability

including good relations with Russia.

The book will be of interests to government officials who deal with this issue and to others who are concerned with the new era of security and defense affairs in Europe.

Hameed A.K. Rai.

Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia,

Ayesha Jalal, Cambridge University Press, U.K.

Price Rs. 385.00

The book is divided into seven contents and is spread over two hundred and ninety five pages. Its approach is comparative for the study of political institutions of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with a common political heritage of British imperialism. Two useful books on the developing politics were earlier published. The Politics of the developing areas and elections and political development. The book under review is useful because it has brought South Asia under discussion the problems being faced by Bangladesh after emerging on the world map due to political tussle between India and Pakistan in 1971. A comparative study on the elected and nonelected institutions is part of it. The use of coercive power, economic and political development is the main theme.

About legislative process there is discussion on formation of the first constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the factors which made it a weak institution. As far as comparison between the legislatures of India and Pakistan was concerned the author declared. "To this date the national assembly in Pakistan is a pale reflection of Indian Lok Sabha". Without an effective legislative organ it is particularly difficult for a political system to strike roots. In Pakistan the political leadership was regional in outlook. Therefore, the political elites bureaucracy and military took active part in politics of Pakistan. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 a succession of unelected civil bureaucrats assumed elective office. (52)

With the reference there is a special mention of Zia regime. During his tenure systematic campaign was launched to discredit politicians and politics laid emphasises on local personalities leading

to importance of biradari for voting purpose rather than the merit of the candidate.

Ayub era has been criticised for creating economic and political differences between East and West Pakistan. When President Ayub Khan, came to hold office, the East Pakistan's per capita income was 30 percent less than of West Pakistan. By the time he was thrown out of office the differential was as such as 61 percent. (153) This was the result of too much concentration of power at the centre and economic development for the advantage of a limited number of families rather than the general national development for good of the common man.

India and Pakistan follow two different political ideologies. In Pakistan the official ideology of Islam has been followed by successive regimes, based on the Objectives Resolution of March 12, 1948. India follows secularism following it, recently after the tenth General Election to the lower house of the India Parliament, the Prime Minister belonging to pro-Hindu Baratiya Janata party, had to resign only after 13 days in office. However, the purpose of the national ideologies could not be achieved due to multiple challenges. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 enunciated the deficiencies of Islam as the sole basis of Pakistani nationalism. (254)

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