

THE JOURNAL *OF* POLITICAL SCIENCE

Published by

Department of Political Science

GOVERNMENT COLLEGE-LAHORE (PAKISTAN)

Vol. XVIII

1995

No. 1, 2

Editors:

Dr. Muhammad Sarwar
Hameed A. K. Rai

Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.

The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

*Published by Rai Hameed Ali Khan
Manager of the Journal of Political Science*

Printed by : Shaukat Ali - Bukhari Printing Press
Mohani Road, Lahore.

Editorial

The Journal of Political Science has completed its 25th years of publication.


In 1971, the Journal of History and Political Science, was launched jointly by the Departments of History and Political Science. This Journal ceased its publication in 1978 and in its place the Journal of Political Science was started by the Department of Political Science. Since 1978, the Journal is being published regularly due to the sole efforts of the undersigned in spite of financial constraints.

With the march of time, the Journal has earned international recognition because of its high standard of scholarship and research. It has acquired a good readership in American and British Libraries as well as in other countries. It is now on the mailing list of Ulrich's International Periodical Directory, R.R. Bowker, N.J. We have received a substantial number of books for review from Rand Corporation, SUNY, the State University of New York Press at Albany, Marcel Inc. New York and the Scarecrow Press Inc., New York.

The present Silver Jubilee edition contains good articles on different fields. It is hoped that the Journal will continue to contribute on socio-economic, political and other related issues on Pakistan and the world at large.

January, 1996

HAMEED A. K. RAI



Editorial

This is the first issue of the Journal of History and Political Science. It is a Joint publication of the Departments of History and Political Science of the Government College, Lahore. The College is a leading academic institution of Pakistan and has been serving the nation for over hundred years. A large number of scholars, administrators, politicians and other renowned persons have had their education here. Besides imparting education, emphasis here is on research and many departments have their own research journals, which have attained international recognition. The need for a research journal in the subjects of History and Political Science was greatly felt. This journal is intended to present not only the research papers of the staff and students of this College, but also to publish articles by other Pakistani and foreign scholars.

The Present volume contains articles on various topics and in future issues, too, we will not only maintain this standard, but also try to enhance it.

Dec, 1971.

DR. S. RAZI WASTI



Editorial

This is the first issue of the "Journal of Political Science" to appear independently. In the recent past it was published under the joint auspices of the Departments of History and Political Science and was known as the "Journal of History and Political Science". However owing to certain technicalities issues for the year 1977 and for 1978 failed to come out under its banner. The Department of Political Science therefore, took the initiative and decided to launch its separate publication. It has done so successfully in a modest way.

The paramount aim of the Journal is to promote research and provide scholars with a forum to project views on such socio-political themes as would help to enhance understanding particularly of political issues and the polity of Pakistan.

It is in this context that Hameed A. Rai attempts to unravel the problem of political stability in India and Pakistan against the background of their constitutional development during the years 1947-1958. He digs deeper into the past to finally infer that political consensus is the objective correlative of the dynamics of emerging nations.

But this particular issue is a very modest attempt. It is hoped that the Journal will strive to maintain a high level of scholarship and offer its reader stimulating fare especially on Pakistan.

Dec, 1978.

SAEED OSMAN MALICK

CONTENTS

Journal of Political Science

Volume XVIII Summer, Winter 1995 No 1, 2

1. Defence and security Relations: Pakistan and India;1972-1994. *Dr. Mobammad Arif.* 3
2. The Dissolution of Assemblies in Pakistan. *Abmed Husain.* 25
3. Rise of Ethnic Politics in Pakistan. *M. Ikram Rabbani.* 41
4. Political Environment and Democracy in Pakistan. *Dr. Abdul Hameed Khan.* 81
5. Leadership in Balochistan: Psychological and Political Aspects. *Mrs. Neelam Firdous & Nadir Bakht.* 97
6. Ulema and Mashaikh's role in Pakistan Movement. *Gbulam Sarwar Rana.* 107
7. Local Self Government in Pakistan A Case Study of Punjab Local Government. *Gbulam Murtaza Shab* 131
8. Political Trends in Balochistan. *Naudir Bakht.* 143
9. Origin and Birth of Federalism *Dr. Kbalid Javed Makbdoom & Dr. Mrs. Razia Mussarrat.* 155
10. The New Masters of the World. *Dr. Khawaja Alqama.* 173
11. An Analytical Review of Higher Education in Pakistan. *Mrs. Qamar Zafar.* 181
12. Book Reviews. 191

Published by the Department of Political Science
Govenment College, Lahore, Pakistan

DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS: PAKISTAN AND INDIA, 1972 - 1994.

Dr. Mohammad Arif

There is divergence in perspectives of Pakistan and India about the regional power structure. From Indian perspective the security can be ensured through India's preponderance. In the eyes of Indian policy makers a strong and powerful India guarantees security for the smaller states of the region including Pakistan.

While Pakistan is averse to this concept of regional security through India's preponderance. Pakistan's perception is that regional security can only be ensured if the sovereign equality of the states of the region is accepted and a diversity and differences in their goals is recognized.

Defence and security policies and postures of the two countries are the result of such perceptions. The clash of India's foreign policy goal of paramountcy and resistance to Indian hegemony by Pakistan leads to complication and conflict between the two countries. The Pakistan-India threat perceptions are mutually reinforcing. India is permanent adversary to Pakistan since independence. It has never properly comprehended Pakistan's security compulsion and has consistently misconceived its intention. During the 1950's Pakistan's sense of insecurity led it to join the western alliances but India opted to interpret Pakistan's participation in the western alliance system as Pakistan's attempt to attain parity with India and to challenge what they regard as the natural power hierarchy in the subcontinent. India envisaged for itself a place of pre-eminence in the region and expected to be acknowledged as such by its regional neighbours. Pakistan's quest for security has been regarded as a dangerous pursuit aimed at

distorting the existing regional power balance.

Pakistan's military debacle in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh with India's active assistance and intervention confirmed India's political and military preponderance in South Asia. India wanted to give permanence to that power structure. Indian government began to present itself as a commanding power in a forceful manner in order to be recognized as a regional power. The small states of the region especially Pakistan should accept India's dominant position and accordingly harmonize their foreign policies with India's regional and international priorities. It, therefore, continued with its efforts to strengthen itself by obtaining weapons of all kind from the Soviet Union and the western countries. It also accelerated the pace of defence production. A number of Indian scholars and policy makers agree that regional peace and security can be ensured only if the small states of south Asia acknowledge Indian dominant position.¹

Pakistan responded to the political and security environment and the power structure in south Asia in the post 1971 period by adopting a three pronged strategy.

The first was meant to deal with the problems related to the outcome of 1971 war. These included the return of POWs and the withdrawal of the forces etc. A process to solve these problems was set in motion in July, 1972 when Simla Agreement was signed between Pakistan and India. Secondly, Pakistan re-established its links to the Islamic World. The Shah of Iran assured the integrity of Pakistan. Pakistan hosted the Second Islamic Summit Conference in 1974. The Islamic Conference institutionalized Pakistan's role as a key Muslim State.² These efforts were accompanied by steps to deal with the long term defence and security issues. Arms embargo imposed on Pakistan by the U.S.

was lifted as a result of Pakistan's efforts.³ The numerical strength of military was increased by fresh recruitment. Modern weapon were obtained from diverse sources. Pakistan was not aiming parity or war with India. But at the same time no one in India should think that Pakistan would surrender its sovereignty out of fear of India's colonial size and dimension. Pakistan is a part of subcontinent and it has a bitter experience of the past history that clearly tells in bold, bright words that weakness invites aggression. Likewise Pakistan is making efforts to become strong enough to repel any aggression from where ever it comes.

India is convinced that unless Pakistan is pressurized into accepting India's regional leadership, no south Asian state will acknowledge this status. Therefore, India criticized the reinvigoration of Pakistan -U.S. ties in the economic and the security fields. India argues that the supply of the American weapons is a threat to peace in the region and the security of India. According to P.S. Jayaramu, the major source of concern to India's security was Pakistan's vigorously pursued rearmament programme. It is true that the threat did not materialize in the form of a war in the post 1971 period. But the massive rearmament programme heightened India's perception of threat from Pakistan. The fear was that the newly acquired arms would be used again in the event of conflict as in 1965 and in 1971."⁴

This is the nature of Pakistani threat to India in the post 1971 period. Therefore, the major thrust of India's diplomacy is on the discontinuation of U.S. Pakistan security ties. While, during this period, India purchased arms valued almost two and a half times Pakistan's arms import for the same period. India's indigenous arms production is massively higher than Pakistan. A comparison of India and Pakistan's military strength indicates that Pakistan is in no position to generate insecurity for India. India's defence

expenditure is several times larger than that of Pakistan. The massive military build up is also an important strategy of India to assert its primacy in the region. India enjoys a clear advantage over Pakistan in military strength. The balance of power in south Asia has always remained tilted in favour of India.⁵

NUCLEAR FACTOR IN PAKISTAN INDIA RELATIONS.

India's Nuclear explosion in May, 1974 was also a part of design in achieving domination in south Asia and global greatness. Indira Gandhi became convinced that nuclear weapons were key to great power status.⁶ Although India has tried to reassure the world that her nuclear explosion was entirely peaceful and that it has no plan to make a nuclear bomb. But Pakistan reacted strongly to Indian nuclear explosion. Pakistan's Government described the Indian nuclear capability as a 'fateful development' and a threat to Pakistan's security.⁷ The government adopted a three point strategy to counter what it described as India's nuclear threat.

Thus Pakistan firstly tried to seek 'nuclear Umbrella' from the U.N. and the major powers. China expressed to give absolute support to Pakistan against Nuclear threat and reaffirmed their traditional support for Pakistan's Independence and National Integrity.⁸

Secondly, Pakistan put forward a proposal at the U.N. General Assembly that south Asia should be declared a "nuclear weapon-free Zone." Pakistan's proposal met with strong Indian opposition. K. subrahmanyam (Director of the Institute for Defence studies and Analysis in New Delhi) commented on the Pakistan's proposal that it could be convenient smoke-screen, as Chou En-Lai's proposal for Asia pacific nuclear weapon free zone was in 1963.

India maintained that South Asia could not be considered a distinct region for the purpose of creating a denuclearised zone, and it insisted that such an initiative must come from all the states of the region.⁹ Since 1974, the Pakistani proposal had been endorsed by the General Assembly every year. While opposing Pakistan's NWFZ proposal, India has emphasised the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept.

Indian demand is that the Indian ocean should be kept out of the orbit of super power rivalry, an extension of the paramountcy doctrine from the land to the sea. Pakistan has supported the exclusion of the great power from the Indian ocean but is against the hegemonial designs of India to make the Indian ocean an area of its exclusive influence.¹⁰

Both India and Pakistan has refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). But their reasons for doing so are different and reflect an attitude which characterises the Indo-Pakistan relations in general. India's objection to the NPT, is its highly discriminate nature. She wants to keep its nuclear option open. While Pakistan shares India's criticism of the NPT, she has made her adherence to the NPT on the condition that India first sign it.¹¹

Thirdly the programme for peaceful use of Nuclear technology was expanded by Pakistan. But Pakistan's modest peaceful Nuclear programme for energy needs, became the target of the world media led by India.¹² Although most of its nuclear installations are under international Atomic Energy Agency safeguard and it has offered to open them for inspection to India on reciprocal basis. Indian leadership and the media harp on the theme that Pakistan has either manufactured a bomb or it will do so in the near future. Rajive Gandhi even went to the extreme of instigating

Israel and the Zionist Lobby in the United States by projecting the scary scenario that Pakistan's Islamic bomb would be available to Arabs and thus pose a mortal danger to the Zionist State.¹³ This propaganda aimed at the mobilization of antinuclear group in US against America's economic assistance and military sale to Pakistan.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan brought about a qualitative change in Pakistan's security environments. India was perturbed again by American Arms supply to Pakistan and it accused Pakistan of exploiting the western obsession of the Soviet Union to obtain weapon and economic assistance. India considered Pak-American security ties as a greater threat to peace and security of south Asia than the Soviet Military presence in Afghanistan. Indian views that the main and most immediate threat to India is from Pakistan aided and abetted by the U.S.A.¹⁴ It is interesting that Soviet arms transfer to India and India's own arms production were never considered threat to peace and stability by India. According to Indian strategic Analyst, although Pakistan Airforce equipped with F-16 aircraft put India at a disadvantage because Mirage 2000 will not be operational in time to balance the first consignment of the F-16's. There is no question of Pakistan achieving military superiority over India even with F-16, because of overall superiority in number and hardware which the Indian forces maintain vis-a-vis Pakistan.¹⁵ In fact a strong Pakistan was viewed as an obstacle to the establishment of an Indian centred south Asia regional system.

To remove India's apprehension and promote greater cooperation in south Asia, Pakistan in September, 1981, offered 'No war Pact' proposal to India. Mrs. Indira Gandhi viewed this offer first as a 'trap.' Then in response India put forward in January, 1982, a counter proposal for signing a treaty of peace,

friendship and cooperation.¹⁶

Initially, the proposals of the no war pact and friendship treaty became the controversy of semantic nature, then both the countries lost their interest about them.¹⁷ However, an agreement not to attack one another nuclear installations was signed on 31 December, 1988 at Islamabad between Pakistan and India.¹⁸

SIACHEN DISPUTE

Siachen has been the cause of much tension between Pakistan and India since 1984. It led to at least one major, but mercifully localised, skirmish in 1987 between the forces of the two countries occupying strategic position at 20,000 feet above sea level in the frozen wilderness of the glacier.

The Siachen is a wedge-shaped territory about 87 kilometers in length and five to ten kilometers in breadth located in an area where both ceasefire line and line of control in Kashmir are illdefined, adjacent to China's Xinjiang border. The inhospitable climatic condition of the region prevented both India and Pakistan from drawing up a detailed demarcation line in the past.¹⁹

The Siachen Glacier had been under the actual control of Pakistan from 1947 to 1983. All the foreign expeditions which passed through the area on their way to K-2 always sought permission from Pakistan, and this fact had never been challenged by India. Many maps issued by the United States, United Nations and the Reader Digest Atlas, and the atlas prepared by Encyclopedia Britannica showed the glacier as a part of Pakistan.²⁰

India's interest in this snow-bound land is inspired by strategic motives. India wanted to reach closer to the Karakoram Highway and the Pakistan China border. Indian strategists believe that in order to be a central Asian Power, India must manage to secure direct protected access to Karakoram.²¹

At the Siachen Glacier, climate and terrain are extremely inhospitable for human life and military operations or permanent military presence. Therefore, neither India nor Pakistan stationed its troops on the glacier. However, when in 1984 India moved its troops in a bid to control the entire region Pakistan responded by despatching its troops, thereby escalating tension in the area. As India has gained the upper hand by moving its troops first to the higher points, Pakistan could not dislodge them, resulting in human loss on both sides. After some bickering over the conflicting claims and intermittent exchanges of fire between their troops in the area, the two governments decided to resolve the problem through negotiation.²²

Five rounds of talks were held at the Defence Secretary level from January 1986 to June 1989. Negotiations were focused on the question of rightful possession of the territory. There was no reconciliation due to their conflicting claims. However, at the end of the fifth round, both countries agreed to work towards the settlement of the Siachen dispute based on redeployment of forces to the pre-Simla position in order to reduce the chances of conflict.²³ But after the agreement India introduced an interpretation that it meant partial withdrawal on both sides just to avoid armed conflict, thus leaving itself in the advantageous position of controlling the heights. Further talks were failed because India insisted on the recognition of the ground realities which were not acceptable to Pakistan.²⁴ The uprising in Kashmir has interrupted the strategic dialogue between the two States and

the Siachen issue has been submerged in the larger issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

BRASSTACKS CRISIS.

A new dimension to the worsening Pakistan - India relations was added when, in November 1986, India embarked on a massive military exercise, code-named Brasstacks, along the Pakistan-India border in the Rajasthan and Punjab Sector. The real purpose of the exercise was to attack Pakistan and make Sind separate from it.

Ravi Rikhye, a reputed defence analyst of India has described the aims of Brastacks as " the covert part of the exercise, was to remind Pakistan that its existence was dependent on India's tolerance. India wanted to make this fact clear to Pakistan because of its support of the Punjab Sikh terrorists. India wanted to convey a message to Pakistan; "Support the terrorist and you will pay, because we will make Sind independent."²⁵

By the end of the November 1986, Pakistan became alarmed by the scale of India's concentration on its border and began asking India for explanations. But India had done nothing to allay Pakistan concerns. Pakistan got thoroughly alerted and began its own mobilization. By the middle of the January 1987, Pakistan became convinced that an Indian attack is imminent. Suddenly Indian intelligence became aware that Pakistan's forces has not returned to their bases as expected but had instead regrouped at two very sensitive areas of their common frontiers. One force was positioned close to the line of control in Kashmir, the state which is disputed and has twice been the cause of war between Pakistan and India. Another force was positioned opposite some of the most sensitive areas of India's troubled Punjab State. India decided that troops engaged in Rajasthan on Brasstacks be

immediately redeployed northwards to resist any Pakistan's attack across the border into Jammu and Punjab. The troops movement took place on 23 and 24 January, India's Republic Day and the day a big sikh congregation was to take place in Amritsar, to launch an attack.²⁶

Pakistan offered consultation for de-escalating the situation when Junejo Prime Minister of Pakistan had telephonic conversation with the Indian counterpart, Rajive Gandhi. President Zia-ul-Haq also met Rajiv Gandhi on 22 February 1987, when he flew to India to watch the third cricket test match between Pakistan and India at Jaipur.²⁷ These contacts saved the situation from reaching the point of no return and facilitated bilateral talks at foreign Secretary level.

The simple move of Pakistan's troops so panicked the Indians that they immediately decreed general mobilization and simultaneously agreed to begin disengagement talks with Pakistan. As a result they agreed not attacking each other and would exercise restraint and avoid provocations along the borders.

POST COLD-WAR STRATEGIC CONCERNS.

In the past, during the cold war period, Pakistan and U.S. have enjoyed a special relationship on account of their so-called interest in the Afghan War, during which massive military and economic assistance was available to Pakistan. Ever since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, subsequent fragmentation of the USSR and with the end of the cold war in 1990, has changed the region's strategic equation. Pakistan's value to the United States as an ally in its policy of containment of the Soviet Union also decreased. The Pak-U.S. special relationship is over and the two are no more close allies.

From the U.S standpoint, India has acquired a special significance in aftermath of the cold war and demise of the Soviet Union. The United States perceives India as one of the emerging global powers, which not only has its own defence industry, but whose military strength has grown over the years considerably. The former being apprehensive of rise of fundamentalism in many Muslim countries, and particularly in the newly independent states of Central Asia, finds this concern shared by India which claim to be struggling with fundamentalist forces in Kashmir.

India is dreaming of getting the status of a junior partner in the New World Order and hobnobbing with Israel to convince US that the two, India and Israel, can be rampart against Islamic fundamentalism.²⁸

Pakistan needs to pay greater attention to its security problems in the context of the transformed international and regional environment. The major threats continue to emanates from the immediate neighbourhood. As a result the threat posed by India will most likely occupy Pakistan's full attention in the immediate future.

The denuclearization of south Asia has been major irritant between Pakistan and India. In the post cold war era, where emphasis is being laid on nuclear nonproliferation, India has been engaged in increasing its nuclear strength. Not only this but India also emerged as a formidable military power as the country became one of the leading arms importers in the world in the post cold war era.²⁹

Pakistan has declared time and again that she is ready to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to accept International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on her nuclear programme alongwith India to conclude a bilateral agreement with India for mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities to make a joint declaration with India renouncig nuclear weapons and to enter into a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban agreement with India. Pakistan also sought to stgrenghen non-proliferation in south Asia through its proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone

Pakistan's commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear technology is manifested by its proposals made to India for banishing the threat of nuclear arms race from south Asia. On 6 June, 1991, Pakistan resubmitted a proposal for a five nations conference of Pakistan, India, China, Russia and USA to resolve the problem of Nuclear weapon proliferation in south Asia. India rejected all these proposals and does not want to accept any restriction on its nuclear programme. However, it wants Pakistan to unilaterally cut back on its nuclear programme. Pakistan cannot accept any discriminatory restriction. Any check or restriction has to apply equally and simultaneoulsy on India otherwise India will be in a position to endanger Pakistan's security.³⁰

In fact India views its nuclear option as an integral part of its self-perception of an influential actor in the broader Asian and Indian ocean rgion. India objected to the proposals on the ground that it is illusory to seek security through regional arrangement, particularly where the security interests of all the concerned states are not taken into account in defining the region. Pakistani officials read this statement as a reference to China but discounted its validity, because, they asserted, the Chinese were no longer a strategic threat to India as they had decided to concentrate on economic development. Recent Indian detente with China has also decreased its security concerns. Further Pakistan's proposal of five powers conference was to provide India an opportunity not only to

discuss the issue bilaterally with Pakistan but also to talk it over with other nuclear powers notably China - the nuclear power next door whose nuclear potential New Delhi has always cited as a reason for discounting the prospect of any regional non-proliferation. Although the proposals have been endorsed by U.S., Russia and China, New Delhi has so far refused to participate in it.³¹

Therefore, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy may appear to be reactive in its visible dimension, the Indian pursuits are some what goal oriented. What is the goal? India must become a self-reliant and self sufficient in nuclear technology and must keep its nuclear weapons option open until the existing nuclear weapon states begin to take tangible steps like introducing a freeze on or considerably reducing their nuclear arsenal. Its reluctance to seriously consider Pakistan proposals reflect India's desire to seek a global solution to the proliferation problem.

While Pakistani approach is regional and non proliferationist, where as India's policy is global which contain the element of Nuclear blackmail.³²

India is fully aware that regional freeze on nuclear programme would allow Pakistan to revive its relationship with the United States. It will therefore, be naive to expect a shift in India's policy in the immediate future.³³

Nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as one of the key concerns of unipolar world dominated by the United States, President Clinton, stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most critical national security issue facing the United States today.³⁴ But the U.S. suffers from double moral

standards. It has lack of appreciation for Pakistan strategic situation with India. In principle U.S. claims that it is against nuclear proliferation, but in fact it is selective in its enforcement of that principle. It patronises both India and Israel in their acquisition of Nuclear energy but looks askance at Pakistan's arrogance.

Further, the United States allows its overriding concern for Israel to dominate its relations with Pakistan in the belief that ultimately, Pakistan's Nuclear capability might work to the detriment of Israel's security.³⁵

Washington's claim that it follows an even-handed non-proliferation policy in south Asia, is not convincing. Washington cannot afford an even handed policy with India on the Nuclear issue or the Kashmir Issue, just as in the 1980s it could not afford to genuinely force Pakistan to opt for nuclear non-proliferation during the Afghan war years. Then Pakistan was needed to "roll-back communism." Today within the south Asian context Washington views improvement of its ties with India as critical to the promotion of its economic interest.³⁶

Pressler amendment prohibits aid to Pakistan unless it is first cleared that Pakistan does not have a bomb. In the decade of 1980, while the Soviet forces were in Afghanistan the American President certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. However, in the 1990, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, President Bush was unable to make the certification. As a result some \$ 600 million per year in American aid to Pakistan has been cut off. Among other things this has meant a number of 38 F-16 fighter bombers - bought and paid for by Pakistan became undeliverable. The decision not to use the same amendment against India would amount to a go

ahead to that country to build the bomb.

The growing Indo-US relationship and the tension with India over Kashmir has prevented Pakistan from closing its nuclear option. Recently, the U.S. has presented a new plan. It proposed to deliver (at least) the F-16 to Pakistan in exchange for verifiable cap of Pakistan's Nuclear programme.

Pakistan's response to this offer is negative. Both opposition and Government quarters has criticised this proposal. They contend that nuclear programme is integral part to Pakistan's security. We cannot allow India to continue with its nuclear plan unabated and cap our own.³⁸

India has no flexibility to restrict its nuclear option and insist that non-proliferation measures must be universal and not discriminatory. The US Administration has ignored the threat perception of Pakistan and realities of the region. Prime Minister, Benazir said that "we shall either induct additional F-16 or make alternate arrangement" and declared that "nuclear capability will never be rolled back"³⁹

So the key to roll back of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme lies not in Islamabad but Delhi. Unilateral roll back of Pakistan's Nuclear programme mean to become an Indian Protectorate-while Pakistan is very sensitive about its sovereignty and independence.

MISSILE'S THREAT TO PAKISTAN SECURITY.

Pakistan faces the growing menace of new and more powerful missiles being produced and tested by India. 'Agni' and 'Prithvi' missile programme of India are in deployment phase and are for

advanced. 'Prithvi' poses a threat not only to Pakistan but to target at distance as 2500 kilometers away.⁴⁰ Prithvi has greatly changed the complexion of threat which Pakistan faces from India. India is also on the verge of developing its intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Cruise Missile is also smoothly running to perfection. Its range is 5000 kilometers, and is able to target Beijing. No missile of this class have ever been deployed without nuclear warhead.

India's missile programme is sure to spark a new and expensive arms race in the subcontinent. Indian Prime Minister Narsima Rao has said in the parliament that the 'Agni' or any other of the missiles or the Nuclear programme would not be capped or rolled back.⁴¹

Pakistan has conveyed its concern to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) countries including U.S.A. over the Indian decision to deploy these missiles. Pakistan hoped that the international community would prevail upon India to stop its reckless move as it would greatly enhance the threat to peace and security in south Asia and rise the spectre of a nuclear arms race in the region.

India has one of the biggest standing Armies and Airforce in the world, besides an oversized navy. Indian Army is two times, Airforce is 4 times, Navy is 5 times and Nuclear is 6 times greater than that of Pakistan. The strength of the Indian Army is 1.4 million largest in the world. It has over 3000 tanks and 700 combat plans. India is the only one country in south Asia with an aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine.⁴² The Indian Armed forces are not exclusively defence oriented. The aim is to develop them into an effective strike force. The build up of a massive nuclear arsenal by New Delhi along with development of sophisticated nuclear.

warhead delivery system is an ominous indication of New Delhi's hegemonic designs.

India has often played the China Card, although it has no threat from that country as the Himalayan ranges offer it a natural protection. By bringing in China, India only wants to cover up its own nuclear intention and gain political support and economic assistance from western countries.

Indian tendency to use force or intimidation has to be checked by evolving an efficacious combination of diplomacy and deterrence. To counter Indian version of Monro Doctrine⁴³ needs invincible defence capability. Peace could be achieved not through charity but from the position of strength. Pakistan's Prime Minister stressed that the nuclear and Missile threat to Pakistan is real and immediate..... sanity and reality demands a regional nuclear solution.⁴⁴

In response to Indian Missile programme Pakistan has indigenously manufactured surface to surface guided Missiles. These Missiles, titled 'Hataf' (meaning "deadly") were named after the sword of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) Hataf-I & Hataf-II have a range of 80 and 300 kilometers respectively.

Hataf series, however, falls short of Pakistan's needs due to India's strategic depth.⁴⁵ "But it has happened repeatedly that a small group has over come the majority.⁴⁶ " The faith in Allah-Almighty and the spirit of Jihad must be strong. Let's follow Islam, Pakistan must survive.

Conventional and Nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India is more explosive than that which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those two countries avoided

confrontation for decades. But when the borders are contiguous the situation can be very different.

The real hurdle to peace is that India aspires to play a global role, and feels that in view of her size and power, no Asian issue should be resolved without her active participation. Pakistan's foreign policy often endeavours to frustrate India's hegemonic designs. This aspect of Pakistan's policy runs counter to the aspiration of India, which makes India resentful of Pakistan. The reconciliation of these diametrically opposed orientation is one of the fundamental dilemma of the Pakistan-India equation.

It is time, India and Pakistan come to term with the subcontinental reality: the people of both the countries are now part of the two most significant independent political entities of south Asia. Let them get to know and understand each other. Once that happens, the impending danger of nuclear catastrophe in the region will also vanish. The climate of fear and mistrust will disappear. Most of the public money will then be spent not on tanks but on people's welfare.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

- 1) Imtiaz Ahmad, *State & Foreign Policy. India's Role in South Asia*, Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1993, P.289 & Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and Bharat's Hegemony in South Asia*, in Rafiq Ahmad (ed.), *Pakistan and India Relations*, Lahore: South Asia Study Centre, 1989, PP 203-207.
- 2) 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy', *Nawa-e-Waqat*, 20 December, 1975.
- 3) K.Arif (ed.), *America Pakistan Relations*, Vol.II, Lahore: vanguard, 1984, PP. 305-309.
- 4) P.S. Jayaramu, *India's National Security and Foreign Policy*,

- New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987, P.178.
- 5) The Military Balance 1981-82, The International Institute for Strategic Studies; Facts on File Publication, 1981, PP.79, 80, 86 & Abdur Rehman Siddiqi, India-Pakistan: Myth of Military Balance; *Defence Journal*, Vol.XI, No.8, 1985.
 - 6) Sumit Ganguly, An Indian Concern is China, *The Nation*, 8 July, 1994.
 - 7) National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, June 1974, Vol.III, No.1-3, PP 299-302.
 - 8) Keesing contemporary Archives, 1974, P.26584 & Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geo-strategic environment*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993, P.147
 - 9) K.Subrahmanyam, *Indian Security Perspective*, New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982, P.168. & Dilip Mukherjee, India's Nuclear Test and Pakistan, in VERINDER-GROVER, *India's Neighbours and her Foreign Policy*, Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1992, PP.582-586 & Ziba Moshaver, *Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent*, London: Macmillan, 1991, PP-116-120.
 - 10) KAMAL AZFAR, *ASIAN DRAMA Revisited*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, P.201 & Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean, *Strategic Studies*, Islamabad, Vol.IV, No.4, 1981, PP.30-42.
 - 11) Gerald Segal (ed.), *Arms Control in Asia*, London: Macmillan Press, 1987, PP.1341-132 & U.S. Bajpai, *India and its Neighbourhood*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1983, P.172.
 - 12) India assured that Bhutto sold the idea of Islamic Bomb to Faisal (of Saudi Arabia) and Colonel Gaddafi (of Libya) both of whom were to contribute towards its cost. see D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb*, New Delhi Vikas Publishing House, 1979, P.32 & for Indian propaganda against Pakistan's Bomb see SREEDHAR,

- Pakistan's Bomb*, Delhi: A.B.C. Publishing House, 1986 & SREEDHAR, Dr. A.G. Khan on *Pakistan's Bomb*, New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987.
- 13) K.Subrahmanyam, Op cit; 169. & Third World International, Karachi, July, 1988, P.20.
 - 14) Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statements on Foreign Policy, January-March, 1982, P.46 & V.D. Chopra, (ed.), *Pakistan and the Asian Peace*, New Delhi: Patriotic Publishers, 1985, P.105 & Major Genral Satinder Singh, *Strategy for Indian Defence*, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986, PP. 94-95.
 - 15) Maj.Gen.Habib Ullah & B.K. Narayan, *Compulsions of Indian Security*, ABC Publishing House: New Delhi, 1984, P.178.
 - 16) Prime Minister Inira Gandhi - Speaks on Foreign Policy, 1981, P.73 & V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985, P.385.
 - 17) Parminder S. Bhogal, Pakistan's India Policy: Shift from Zia to Benazir, *India Quarterly- A Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.XLV, No.1, January-March, 1989, New Delhi, P.41.
 - 18) See the text of the agreement in D. Shyam Babu, *Nuclear Non-proliferation-Towards a Universal NPT Regime*, Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992, PP.186-187.
 - 19) Colonel Mohammad Zakir, *SIACHEN GLACIER - World's Highest War front* (Urdu) Sakardu: Baltistan Academy, 1990, P.75.
 - 20) ibid, PP.77-84 & Altaf A. Shaikh, The Challenge of Peace, *The Nation*, 21 July, 1989.
 - 21) Muhammad Arif, The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan India Relations, 1972-1992, *The Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.47, No.1, 1994, P.4-.
 - 22) Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic*

- Environment*, New York : St. Martin's Press, 1993, P.46.
- 23) *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.XLII, No.3, 1989, P.8.
 - 24) *The Pakistan Times*, 23 February, 1993.
 - 25) Ravi Rikhy, *The Militarization of Mother India*, New Delhi: Chanakya Publication, 1990, Ch.7.
 - 26) NICHOLAS NUGENT, RAJIV GANDHI, London: BBC Book, 1990, PP.120-121.
 - 27) Mohsan Farani, Ham Kahan Kharra Hain (Urdu) *Urdu Digest*, Llahore, June, 1994, PP.20-21.
 - 28) Dr. S.M.Koreshi, A New Approach to Nuclear Issue, Karachi, *GLOBE*, October, 1992, P.21.
 - 29) Farzana Shakoor, Pakistan India Relations after the end of the cold war, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.45 , No.4, 1992, P.55.
 - 30) Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, *Defence Journal*, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1993, P.18.
 - 31) Kail C.Ellis, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Alternating approaches*, in Hafiz Malik (ed.), *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan*, London: St. Martin Press, 1993, P.140 & Farhat Ullah Babar, Pakistan Not averse to Nuclear - non-proliferation, *Pakistan observer*, 22 October, 1993.
 - 32) Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Peaceful Nuclear Pursuits, *The Pakistan Times*, 8 Feb. 1994.
 - 33) Afzal Mahmood, Getting off the Nuclear Hook, *Globe*, Karachi: October, 1992, P.31.
 - 34) SEN Larry Pressler, Nuclear Proliferation: Darkest Clouds over south Asia, *The Nation*, 7 July, 1994.
 - 35) Khalid Akthar, Selective denuclearization on risky Proposition, *The Muslim*, 17 June, 1994 & Ghulam Sarwar, Security Dimention of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, *The Nation*, 28 Feb. 1993 & Hafiz Malik, Op. Cit; P.140.
 - 36) Nasim Zehra, The Nuclear Question, What the Bottom Line, *The Nation*, 2 June, 1994.

- 37) Dr. Hamid H. Kizilbash, Them and Us, *The Frontier Post*, 27 Sep. 1991 & SEN.Larry Pressler, Op.Cit;
- 38) See editorial of Nawa-i-Waqat, 20-21 May 1994 & the editorial of the Pakistan Times and Frontier Post, 18 April 1994 & Dr. Hamid H. Kizilbash, Roll-Back or F-16s, *Frontier Post*, 1 April 1994.
- 39) The Pakistan Times, 18 April, 1994.
- 40) Timothy V MC Carthy, India: Emerging Missile Powers, *The Muslim*, 24 Sep. 1993 & Javaid Nazir, Prithvi: the Hindu Warhead, *The Frontier Post*,
- 41) See the editorial of the Pakistan Times, 14 May 1994 and 2 June 1994.
- 42) Kamal Azfar, *ASIAN DRAMA Revisited*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, P.201.
- 43) For India's Monro Doctrine see, Major Mohammad Farooq, India's Monro Doctrine (Urdu) Pakistan Army Journal, Vol.30, No.3, 1989, PP.64-74. & The Rajive Doctrine: India as a Mini Super Power, *GLOBE*, Karachi Vol.2, No.1, January, 1989, PP.43-46.
- 44) *The Pakistan Times*, 14 & 20 May, 1994.
- 45) Ali Abbas Rizvi, The Prithvi Threat, *GLOBE*, Karachi, November, 1993, P.43.
- 46) The Holy Quran, The COW: 249.

THE DISSOLUTION OF ASSEMBLIES IN PAKISTAN

Ahmed Husain

Political institutions in an emergent democracy are based on periodical elections. To enable the elected representatives to solve the various kind of problems faced by the nation. Nonetheless, there is a tendency nowadays to dissolve the elected assemblies arbitrarily before completion of the constitutional tenure, by the President, by exercising emergency powers vested in his office . The pertinent example of an emergent democracy where assemblies failed to fuction due to the exercise of emergency powers of the President is Pakistan. Seven assemblies were disssolved in Pakistan between Oct.24, 1954 to April 18, 1993. Thus, there is a legacy of broken assemblies in the country. On the eve of each dissolution there existed a political scenario that prompted the President to think it proper to excercise his discretionary power, which may be inappropriate for the existing political situation. Hence discussion on the dissolution would be tackled by "Situational Approach".

Surprisingly, there is no such problem in United Kingdom becuase all political power belongs to the Parliament and the Monarch is a titular head. The purpose of the Magna Carta was to limit the monarch's powers and to be sure he stayed within the law¹. Generally, the political decision process shifted from the British monarch to the parliament. In 1689 a "Bill of Rights" spelled out Parliament's relationship to th Crown that no laws or taxes without former's assent². The British parliament can do everything except making woman a man and man a woman. The sovereign reigns but does not rule. All the Commonwealth countries have parliamentary democracy, with limited Presidential

executive exercising discretionary power to suspend the normal administrative functions. He may also dissolve the elected legislature and call for fresh elections, with the support of military. The roots of democratic and civil freedoms have been barely planted in more recently emergent regimes, and Pakistan is one of them³. The poorer the country, the more likely it is to have a president as effective leader.

It is important for the head of state to realise that he is symbol of the nation in the international community and a kind of surrogate parent for the population. In the public imagination he is above politics. Head of the State, in other words, personifies the ideal of the polity⁴. By and large this status of the head of the state was accepted by Quaid-i-Azam, the founder of the State and the first Governor General of Pakistan. At the same time he put his statesmanship at the disposal of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, because in August, 1947, the entire machinery of the central government had to be created. But after his death the heads of state indulged in day to day politics indiscreetly, because they belonged to the political elites, i.e., bureaucracy and military, and were oblivious of the discipline required by the office of the head of the state. They even did not hesitate to indulge in political manoeuvrings and influenced the members of the National Assembly, by invoking discretionary powers, which had to be exercised in exceptional circumstances.

Late GG Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the first Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954. At that time the Speaker was Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan and Prime Minister was Muhammad Ali Bogra. Assessment has to be made by applying the situation theory of the discretionary power exercised by him under section 92(A) of Act 1935, to dissolve the Assembly. One observation was that it was an action of a half madman with the support of Military⁵. The

other view point was that the position of the members of the Constituent Assembly had become untenable due to the humiliating defeat of the Muslim League in the provincial elections in East Pakistan in the spring of 1954⁶. Hence, there was a demand by the victorious United Front government in the province that sitting members of the Muslim League from East Pakistan should resign from the National Assembly because the electorate had given the verdict against the party. There was also public resentment against the sitting members of the National Assembly, in general that they were not sincere with the constitution making business in the House. They only wanted to avail the privileges and benefits of the membership without making constitutional progress, the *raison d'être* of the Assembly. They wished to turn themselves into a permanent body and for this decided to bring an amendment in the interim constitution to withdraw discretionary powers of the head of the State⁷.

Perhaps this was the immediate reason for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on Oct. 24, 1954. But the fact remains that the people were not satisfied by the working of the Assembly. It had not drafted a constitution in the seven years, which was its main function. On the other hand the Indian Constitution was adopted in January 1950⁸. The Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra continued to head "all talents" cabinet. Thus, the action was against negligent parliamentarians and it was justified. The members of the Constituent Assembly proved to be ignorant of the main responsibility to draft a constitution for the new country.

Oct 7, 1958 was another tragic day when the President of Pakistan Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly and abrogation of the 1956 Constitution⁹. This extraordinary step he tried to justify by making serious nature of allegations against the political parties and the politicians. Before

proceeding further it is important to have a glimpse on his career. He was defence secretary at the time of imposition of Martial Law on March 6, 1953 in Lahore. The initiative for this strong action was mainly due to him because he had special aversion for the democratic political process. Therefore, by 1958, the political leaders of all parties were unanimous that the Acting President Iskander Mirza should not be elected for regular term of office after the general election, scheduled for February 1959¹⁰.

Late Mirza was aware of it and he did not want to take the risk of the election to the office by an electoral college consisting of 930 elected members of the Assemblies. Hence, he accelerated critical objections to the working of democracy in Pakistan, leading to the dissolution of the National Assembly¹¹.

After, the coup he formed a dummvirate with Ayub Khan, which could not last long. The President wanted to play the same game of divide and rule which he applied to the politicians which failed and finally he had to leave office on Oct. 27, 1958¹². The abrogation of the 1956 parliamentary constitution was a very cruel blow to the democratic institutions in Pakistan. It had to be properly enforced after elections of the Assemblies and the head of the State. In a modern state elections are important, so that the electorate are represented and their grievances are ventilated¹³. This is true about the creation of Pakistan.

The demand for Pakistan was made during the general election of 1945-46. At that time both President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan were members of the British Imperial Service, oblivious of the election campaign launched by the Quaid, President of Muslim League with a slogan; "If you want Pakistan vote for Muslim League." After independence the election process started in India in 1951-52¹⁴. The completion of

elections in Pakistan in 1959 would have proved salutary for development of political institutions. Consequently, the arbitrary step to abrogate the constitution was undemocratic and self aggrandised. The situational demand was to hold elections at the earliest to properly implement the 1956 constitution.

On the evening of March 25, 1969 an order from F.M Preseident Ayub Khan was delivered to Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, to impose Martial Law in the country, and assume power¹⁵. The National Assembly was dissolved and the 1962 Constitution abrogated. This he did in complete violation of 1962 Constitution. The Speaker of the National Assembly Abdul Jabbar Khan was deprived of succeeding President Ayub Khan. The violation of the 1962 Consitution was the crux of political ambiguity during Ayub regime. Nonetheless, in his initial broadcast to the nation on Oct. 7, 1958 he promised to restore democracy, "but of the type that people can understand and work"¹⁶. In this way President Ayub Khan adopted a pedagogic role and introduced limited franchise for the purpose of national and provincial elections. He failed to get popular support for his concept of limited political power. There was persistent public demand to restore the principle of one man one vote based upon parliamentary system. Finally, he agreed to the popular demand of representation and elections during the February, 1969 Round Table talks. As a matter of fact President Ayub himself was not sincere with the Constitution which had his stamp. His main political formula was to have a democratic facade and run the government with the support of bureaucracy but it was not a permanent system. It revolved around the personality of the Presidnet. When he became weak, the political system he had created collapsed. Ayub Khan did want to leave a political legacy but he failed. He could not overcome his dislike for the parliamentary form of goverment. Alternatively he gave real

power to the bureaucracy which did not help the political institutions to flourish. Perhaps, it was due to his corporate background that he believed in giving orders and intolerant of suggestions. Politically his regime was very unpopular but under the influence of bureaucracy he decided to celebrate decade of reforms in 1968. In the end he accepted his political defeat. Hence the dissolution of the National Assembly was proper because it denied the democratic concept of political institution of the country.

On July 5, 1977 Gen. Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National Assembly working under the Speaker Sahabzada Farooq Ali and dismissed the government of Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto, with an allegation of rigging the elections of March 7, 1977. The military chief promised to hold fair and impartial elections within ninety days¹⁷. To determine the authentication of the allegation of rigging two points have to be discussed in detail. Whether the Bhutto regime influenced the result preparation of the March, 1977 elections and were the elections held in ninety days by the military administrator Gen. Zia-ul Haq.

A number of countries became independent after World War II, with a resolution to adopt parliamentary system with which it became familiar during imperial period. However, they failed to adopt liberal democracy due to political limitations. Hence they were termed as emergent democracies. It bear many of the characteristics of liberal democracies except evidence of stability in their political system¹⁸. For this an important political role is adopted by the military to protect the roots of democratic and civil freedoms recently planted in the emergent regimes. At the same time, it may be tempted to have direct control if the democratization process moved ahead in a direction which sharply conflicts with military intents. The military intervention in

1977 was based on the direct personal interest of the corporate Chief. He wanted to destroy the Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto and his political party, with the connivance of the political forces which were against him. He took it to logical conclusion by announcing that Quaid-i-Azam was against parliamentary system and holding elections on nonparty basis in 1985, which was an insult to the Muslim voters who voted for the creation of Pakistan in 1945 election.

The year 1976 is very important in the political history of Pakistan. The hundredth birthday of the Quaid was celebrated throughout the country as year of the father of the nation. Secondly, General M. Zia ul Haq was appointed as Chief of Army Staff. This choice of Zia proved his most fatal error of personal judgement²⁰. Bhutto opined that he could have full trust in Zia, and would not be politically ambitious like Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. On the other hand General Chisti believed that Zia was Simply "the best sycophant to win over Mr. Bhutto"²¹. In a way, Zia proved to be a much shrewder politician than Bhutto had ever been. He did not want Prime Minister Bhutto to win over the opposition leaders over the demand of dissolution of the national assembly and holding fresh elections. When finally decided to yield to the pressure and agreed to the terms of the opposition. He invited his most trusted cabinet members and General Zia together and told them he would "break the deadlock" next day. But next day a coup had taken place in the name of operation "Fairplay". If we analyse all the angles of the alleged election rigging and movement of Nazam-i-Mustafa, levelled by the opposition alliance PNA it can be concluded that the dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of twice elected Prime Minister was uncalled for and it would have been advantageous for political advancement to leave the political parties to reach an amicable solution the atmosphere for which had become congenial

on the eve of the coup.

President Gen. Zia ul Haq ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly on May 29, 1988. He also dismissed Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and his Cabinet. The dismissal revolved around the eighth amendment to the Constitution. President Zia like his two former predecessors President Iskander Mirza and President Ayub Khan had no faith in the parliamentary form of government and the political parties. A suggestion was made to him to become head of a political party like President M. Ayub Khan. The Pir of Pagaro had repeatedly offered General Zia the presidentship of the Pakistan Muslim League²². He considered that the multiplicity of political parties was not consonant with Islam²³. Hence, the nonparty basis elections for the National Assembly were held on February 25, 1985. The joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate was held on March 23, 1985. President Zia nominated Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister. The newly elected parliament had its inaugural session on March 23, 1985. While addressing the parliament, the President emphasized the point that, as its members were elected on a non-party basis, they should keep functioning without political parties²⁴. This advice was particularly important with reference to eighth amendment to Article 58(2) the President has been empowered to dissolve the National Assembly, when a situation has arisen in which the Federal Government cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and when an appeal to the electorate is necessary²⁵. Prime Minister Junejo was a nominated head of the government. But he wanted to enjoy the status and reverence of an elected Prime Minister. Before him was the example of Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto. He strongly believed that he was fully experienced to enjoy full administrative status envisaged in the Constitution. In fact he wanted to establish President-Prime Minister relationship on Ch.

Fazel Elahi and Z.A Bhutto precedent. Hence, he contested the authority of the President to be the Chief guest on the inter-services parade on March 23, and flag hoisting ceremony on August 14, independence day²⁶.

The members of the National Assembly had also incurred the displeasure of the President by electing Mr. Fakhar Imam and not Kh. Muhammad Safdar as Speaker of the National Assembly. There was total confusion about power, divergent orders were given by the President and the Prime Minister to the administrative staff. Apparently, the power seemed to be slipping from the hands of the President. It was against this background that on May 29, 1988, the President dismissed the Junejo Government and dissolved the National Assembly under Article 58(2) of the Constitution.

This power was given to the President under the eighth amendment. He had promised to retire from military service at the time of lifting of Martial Law. He believed that he was a bridge between the defence services and the elected government. He ignored the demand of the nation to have full democracy²⁷. He was justified to dissolve the National Assembly and dismissal of the Prime Minister, because the eighth amendment was approved by the National Assembly, and it was subservient to the President.

In August, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed the government of Motharma Benazir Bhutto. The hostile attitude formed by General Zia ul Haq was continued by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was his close associate and remained Finance Minister during martial law regime. This was the major reason for his action against her Govt. in 1990. The elections in 1988 were held on party basis. The Pakistan People's Party which had boycotted nonparty basis

elections of 1985 took part in the elections under the leadership of Mothrama Benazir Bhutto. The 1988 elections resulted in a split mandate in favour of the two major political groups²⁸. The leader of PPP with the majority of 93 seats formed the federal government. The IJI was returned in a majority in the largest province Punjab. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected unanimously, but he was a candidate of the opposition. All of them came to power during Zia regime. The Benazir government was against the eighth amendment and for the President it was sacrosanct. He also connived at the hostile attitude of Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif towards the Centre.

President did not like the move by the ruling party to talk about the annulment of the discretionary powers given to him by the eighth amendment. The differences between the two began with the President's refusal to appoint a person belonging to ANP as Governor of the Frontier Province as Benazir government had pledged to, the matter became worst when it became public that the two questioned each other's jurisdiction regarding the appointment of the services Chief as transpired with the "Sirohey controversy". The situation became more complex when the President did not appoint persons recommended by the Prime Minister as judges of the Supreme and High Courts. The President, who had been elected by PPP votes had become alienated from the Prime Minister²⁹. The President was also under the influence of the opposition led by Mian Nawaz Sharif. All of them had enjoyed political powers during the military rule of President Zia with this background and dislike of the PPP President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used his discretionary powers under Article 58(2) of the Constitution and dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on August 6, 1990³⁰. With charges of horse trading, non-compliance with the provisions relating to the Council of Common Interests

and National Finance Commission, Corruption and nepotism, and misusing government authority and resources for political and personal gains³¹. The Supreme Court full bench consisting of twelve learned judges dismissed the petition against dissolution in limine in December, 1991. Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah agreed with the result of the petition because already fresh elections had taken place. However, he was of the view that the order of Dissolution of the National Assembly passed by the President of Pakistan was "bereft of legal justification and was not sustainable under the provisions of the Constitution and law"³². Secondly to him the following facts were ignored by the President:-

- (a) The IJI had also indulged in horse trading.
- (b) The IJI Government created practical difficulties for the Federal Government in the Punjab.
- (c) After dissolution the President appointed the leader of the very Assembly as the Caretaker Prime Minister
- (d) In the Punjab, Mr. Nawaz Sharif was allowed to continue as Caretaker Chief Minister. In Sind, Jam Sadiq Ali the dissident member of PPP, was installed as Caretaker Chief Minister
- (e) No references were filed by the President against the Ministers of any other political party except those of PPP in spite of the fact that there were allegations of a serious nature against them also. Thus the purpose of dissolution was to tarnish the image of Pakistan Peoples Party toeing with the policy of President Zia ul Haq introduced by him to hold non-party elections in 1985, to obliterate the PPP³³.

On April 18, 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and his Cabinet. The immediate cause of the exercise of his discretionary power to dissolve the Assembly was open and blatant

confrontation demonstrated by Prime Minister on the National Television during his address to the nation he had frontal attack on the personality of the President. He vehemently stated that he would not follow any instructions of the President.

The bellicose utterances made by the Prime Minister Nawaz on the national television and prompt retaliation by the President Ghulam Ishaq surprised a number of political observers because both of them had the same political background and were very close allies of military general turned politician President Zia ul Haq. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif started with an exceptional advantage of having clear two third majority support in the parliament and having amicable governments in the four provinces of the federation. At the Centre the PPP majority had been reduced from 93 to 44 and that of the IJI enhanced from 55 to 106. P.M Nawaz Sharif felt so confident about his strong political position that he decided to start the policy of vengeance against his political opponents³⁴.

It was this complacent attitude towards the national politics that made the house divided within the ranks of the ruling alliance and it was beginning of the end of the Nawaz regime. All this happened within 29 months of assuming power. The President gave Nawaz Sharif full support in the beginning. He ignored the controversy between PML President Junejo and PM Nawaz on the appointment of the Speaker by the ruling IJI. Sharif had to withdraw his nomination of Aslam Khattak and he had to accept a compromise candidate Mr. Gauhar Ayub Khan³⁵. In this way he had to succumb to the pressure of the party old guard.

At the same time he did not take into confidence the parliamentary party. The legislative process was almost ignored. For example, the draft of the twelfth amendment was the product

of the kitchen cabinet. In its original decision, the Law Ministry, the IJI parliamentary party and not even the Muslim League's Executive Committee was consulted³⁶. Twelfth amendment was adopted in a record time of 50 minutes . His approach to the national politics alienated a number of senior Muslim Leaguers. At the death of Muhammad Khan Junejo he aspired for the office of President of the party³⁷.

This precipitated serious political crisis which also affected the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister. The four members of the Cabinet resigned in April 1993³⁸. One of them happened to be the son-in-law of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He had already annoyed the President by drafting a proposal to altering only two provisions of the Eighth Amendment transferring the power to appoint and dismiss services Chief to the Prime Minister and diluting the President's power to dissolve the Assembly by making him share this with the Senate. For this he appointed a committee charged with the task of drawing up the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill³⁹. It was the consequence of a serious clash between the President and the Prime Minister over the appointment of a new Army Chief following the death of General Asif Nawaz.

Although in May, 1993, Nawaz Sharif was restored to office by the Supreme Court judgement of 10 to 1. By it, he regained office and not power. He seemed to read the Court judgement as a licence to pursue the perilous policy he toed in the pre-dissolution period, but without the necessary political support.

He called a joint session of the parliament and despite of protest by the opposition got a resolution passed to impose Governor's rule in Punjab, under Article 234, of the Constitution. He tried to implement the resolution described as a Presidential

proclamation on the night of June 29-30, without reference to the President, with the help of the Rangers. The legality of the proclamation was declared dubious. Hence, the rangers refused to comply with the orders of the Central government.

The political crisis of 1993 which began early in the year was precipitated by Mr. Nawaz Sharif's bid to become all powerful⁴⁰ For governmental stability, political peace is just as important as parliamentary majorities. This was the lesson of 1977 and also that of 1993. The aftermath of the political crisis in 1977 was the dissolution of the National Assembly and military take over. The political crisis in 1993 was resolved by Prime Minister Nawaz's acceptance of the military proposal to dissolve the Assembly and call for fresh elections. This approach by the Military towards national politics was an important constitutional landmark in the political history of Pakistan. Nonetheless, Premier Nawaz Sharif deviated from the practice of Quaid-i-Azam to consult the League Organization before taking decisions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1) Michael G. Roskin- *Countries and Concepts*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1992: P.21
- 2) Ibid. P.25
- 3) J.D Derbyshire and I Derbyshire- *Political Systems of the world*, Chambers, Great Britain, 1989: P.32.
- 4) David F. Pringle- *Head of State and Head of Government*.
- 5) Editorial, "Revolution", Dawn, August 11, 1957.
- 6) Khalid B. Sayeed- *The Political System of Pakistan*, National Book Service, Lahore, 1988: P.73.
- 7) Ibid. P.74
- 8) W.H. Morris-Jones- *The Government and Politics of*

- India*, Universal Book Stall, New Delhi, 1965: P.85
- 9) Khalid B. Sayeed- *Op.Cit*: P.93
 - 10) American Embassy (Karachi) to the Secretary of State, telegram: 682, September, 1958.
 - 11) Ayesha Jalal- *The State of Martial Rule*, Vanguard Lahaore, 1991: P.276.
 - 12) John Plamenatz- Electoral Studies and Democratic Theory: A British View, *Political Studies*, VI (February, 1958) P.9
 - 13) Election Commission, Government of India Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52 (Delhi Manager of Publications 1955): P.10
 - 14) Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose- *War and Secession*, Oxford University Press, Lahore, 1992: P. 23
 - 15) Wayne Ayees Wilcox- The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958 Summer 1965: P. 142-63
 - 16) J.D Derbyshire and I. Derbyshire- *Op.cit*.P.32
 - 17) Stanley Wolpert- *Zulfi of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993: P.262
 - 18) *Ibid*. P.263
 - 19) General K.M. Arif- *Working with Zia*, Oxford, Karachi, 1995: P.112
 - 20) Stanley Wolpert-*Op.cit*. P.270
 - 21) General K. M. Arif- *Op.cit*. P.233
 - 22) Dr. Safdar Mahmood- *The Constitution of Pakistan*, A.H Publisher, Lahore. 1994: P.193
 - 23) General K.M Arif- *Op. Cit*. P.235
 - 24) Dr. Safdar Mahmood- *Op.Cit*. P.193
 - 25) General K.M. Arif- *Op.Cit*. P.237
 - 26) Ibid. P.238
 - 27) Ibid. P.248
 - 28) Mushtaq Ahmed- *Jinnah and After*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, P.158

- 29) The Nation, November, 1989, P.4
- 30) Jan Mohammad Dawood- *The Role of Superior Judiciary in the Politics of Pakistan*. P.86
- 31) Dawn May 27, 1993: P.13
- 32) Jan Mohammad Dawood, *Op.Cit.* P.114
- 33) General K.M. Arif- *Op.Cit.* P.232
- 34) Jinnah and After- *Op.Cit.* P.160
- 35) Newslines November, 1990.
- 36) The News, August 7, 1991
- 37) The News, June 6, 1993.
- 38) Khaleej Times, April 5, 1993.
- 39) The News, March 3, 1993
- 40) The News, July 22, 1993.

RISE OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

M. Ikram Rabbani

The massive upsurge of the ethnic movements in Pakistan is a major destabilizing factor for the country's political, economic and social order. Pakistan lost its Eastern wing on account of ethnic antagonism. The dismemberment of the country in 1971, became the most detestable chapter of Pakistan's tortured history. The forces of ethnicity were the potent factor in parting of the ways, just 54 per cent of the population saying enough is enough, we do not want to live with you. It is, however, most unfortunate to see that the dismemberment of the country and subsequent humiliation of the Pakistan Army did not stir national conscience and no one ever felt ashamed of this. Neither were any tears shed nor was any one taken to task and punished.¹

The unfortunate event is a stigma and living example of the two prominent factors of political conflict that has ridden the political set-up of the country ever since its inception in 1947. The first being the struggle for evolving a constitutional framework and to establish a democratic order. The second represents the conflict between different ethnic groups over the distribution of power and resources between the provinces and the centre. These two important factors of Pakistan's political situation have immensely spread out the ethnic feelings in Sindh and Balochistan and some parts of Punjab and NWFP, which is a potent threat to national security.

'Ethnicity refers to a sometimes rather complex combination of racial, cultural and historical characteristics by which societies are occasionally divided into separate, and probably hostile, political

families. At its simplest, the idea is exemplified by racial groupings where skin colour alone is the separating characteristic. Almost anything can be used to set up ethnic divisions though after skin colour, the two most common factors are religion and language. Although racial political divisions have always been vital where they exist. It is probably only in the last two or three decades that other forms of ethnic politics have become vital, though this is not to say that the actual divisions have not been long established and of personal importance.

Ethnicity raises the whole socio-political question of national identity. That is why ethnic politics are at their most virulent and important in Third World countries whose geographical definition owes often far more to European empire-builders than to any ethnic homogeneity. Probably one needs to distinguish between the politics of ethnicity in advanced societies and the Third World scenario. In the advanced societies, it is somewhat of a luxury, given the overall strength of national identity and the relative importance of other basic political issues related to organizing a productive economy. Whereas in the Third World, ethnic divisions may be absolutely central to the problems of organizing a working political system at all²."

Ethnic conflict has political, economic and administrative reasons. They include inequitable distribution of resources, strong central control over provinces, denial of democratic rights to the people, domination of particular province or ethnic group in the bureaucracy and armed forces, threat of cultural domination and hostile and negative role of the media. These factors have immensely contributed to the prevailing ethnic malaise tormenting Pakistan at present.

Pakistan, after its emergence as a sovereign state in 1947,

comprised of a unique geographical location. It has been appropriately called a "double country"³. Comprising a total area of 365,529 square miles, it was made up of two unequal regions (East Pakistan 55,126 sq. miles, West Pakistan, 310,403 sq. miles) separated from each other by more than a thousand miles. It was accompanied by the establishment of a governmental structure over territory which was not only located apart geographically but was ridden with strong ethnic divisions. The western wing consisted of four major ethnic groups---Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathanis and Baluchis. A fifth important category comprised of the Muhajirs(refugees) from India, who were the migrants from UP and Bombay"⁴.

In direct contrast to the ethnic dissimilarity of West Pakistan was the homogeneity of the Eastern Wing. East Pakistan contained 54 % of the total population of Pakistan and was almost exclusively Bengali by culture and history. This acute diversity of culture and ethnic patterns, between the two parts of the country, in fact, contained the seeds of ethnic discord and posed a formidable challenge to the leaders of Pakistan after independence.

Muslim League, being the founder party of Pakistan, was the only effective forum which could weld the divergent ethnic groups together and was in a position to bring home a unified national structure. It represented the aspirations of the peoples of the two wings and was fully capable of building a political and social base which could meet the wants of different ethnic groups in Pakistan. The Muslim League was expected to play a role similar to that performed by the Indian National Congress, by forming a national government through parliamentary elections which could ensure a degree of mass participation in the political structure⁵.

Pakistan's political set-up during its infancy had been plagued with certain impregnable disadvantages which made it difficult for the Muslim League to play the desired role of a combining element of different ethnic groups. Pakistan's political difficulties began with the deaths of Quaid-i-Azam and its first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan which severely plugged the political and administrative process in the country. Moreover the Muslim League widely lacked in the administrative exposure which could have enabled it to arrest the maladies that befell Pakistan's political and administrative set-up in the beginning. "A geographically and ethnically split country was to be run by a political party like Muslim League, which had neither the organization nor the experience of its counterpart, the Indian National Congress, is used to explain political instability and the erosion of democracy in Pakistan"⁶.

The Muslim League's inability to perform the role of the unifying force was much due to the fact that there were acute imbalances and hierarchies of power within the party. Most of the Muslim League leadership came from the Muslim minority provinces in North India. They had occupied key positions in the Muslim League during freedom struggle. The Muslim majority provinces such as Bengal had no roots or supremacy in the hierarchical set-up of the party. After partition, the migrants from Muslim minority provinces of India, because of their control on Muslim League, were able to establish their control in the central government as well. The bureaucracy mainly consisted of the migrants from the Muslim minority provinces who monopolized the formulation and implementation of policy matters. The ethnic background of the senior civil servants was similar to that of the central Muslim League leadership. The only ethnic group, which sought mentionable representation in the center, was the Punjabis mainly on account of their dominance in the army.

Regional and ethnic rivalry between the Punjabis and the Bengalis and the Punjabis and other groups like Sindhis, Pakhtoons and Muhajirs rapidly swelled adding to the problems already faced by the Muslim League leadership to develop a homogeneous political climate in the country. Consequently the civil bureaucracy and the army assumed dominant position in the body politic of Pakistan. It further accelerated the ethnic polarization because the dominance of the civil bureaucracy and army meant the supremacy of the West Pakistan groups.

Prime Minister Liaqat Ali's assassination in 1951 put the bureaucracy in an unassailable position who acquired absolute and exclusive authority in decision making. They mostly made decisions keeping in view their own interests and ignoring the other groups like the Bengalis. It naturally created ill will and pushed the disgruntled groups away from the national mainstream. The precarious situation could easily be avoided if the Muslim League would have called for elections. The elected representatives could easily check the dominance of the bureaucracy to re-establish the political supremacy over the administration. The reluctance on the part of the Muslim League to resort to the parliamentary democracy in fact was totally linked with the ethnic priorities.

One of the major cause of the rise of ethnicity in Pakistan, therefore, was the inability of Muslim League to set up a political order in the country and subsequently its subservient posture before bureaucracy. There was no representative institutional framework which could prevent the party from becoming a vanquished cartel of the bureaucracy. The members of the central bureaucracy were either refugees from Muslim minority provinces or from Punjab. The members of the elites from Bengal, Sindh,

Baluchistan and NWFP were obtrusively excluded from the power structure of the country. "A political structure incapable of accommodating four of the five provincial elites could not have been expected to provide a stable government"⁷.

Pakistan took nine years in producing its first workable constitution in 1956. One of the reasons for this inordinate delay in constitution making was the reluctance on the part of the power bloc at the center to share power with the Bengalis. The power elite in Pakistan, in the very beginning demonstrated their qualms in extending due share to the Bengalis in the political and administrative spheres. Resultantly the piqued tendency exhibited by the central bureaucracy in accommodating the Bengali elites gave roots to a sense of animosity between the West Pakistan bureaucrats and the Bengali politicians who were soon disillusioned. In 1952, Ch. Muhammad Ali and Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, objected to Khawaja Nazim ud Din's constitutional proposals embodied in the Basic Principles Committee Report, on the ground that they were detrimental to the interests of the Punjab"⁸ There were other leaders too, in the Punjab who were opposed to giving due representation to the Bengalis in Assemblies. "Some of the leaders of Punjab, such as Mumtaz Daultana were even against parity for East Pakistan"⁹.

Before 1955 West Pakistan consisted of four provinces. The Eastern wing, in contrast to West Pakistan, comprised of Eastern Bengal as a whole. There were few states like Bahawalpur and Khairpur in West Pakistan which further diluted the unity and strength of West Pakistan as against East Pakistan which was a unified entity. The population of East Pakistan in 1951 was 41.9 million and that of West Pakistan 33.7 million which provided a formidable edge to East Pakistan.

Numerical superiority compelled East Pakistan to protest vociferously for its interests which the West Pakistan bureaucracy and Muslim League elite had always liked to negate to the Bengalis simply out of arrogance and monopoly of governmental power. In order to debilitate the impact of East Pakistan's numerical strength, the Muslim League elite, in collusion with the West Pakistan bureaucracy, blatantly engaged themselves in a tussle to disperse the voting power of East Bengal. A plan was devised whereby some form of parity could be achieved vis-a-vis East Pakistan. Accordingly four provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated into a single province, West Pakistan. Through this merger two provinces were created: East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Both were given equal representation thus reducing the aggregate Bengali majority."¹⁰

The One unit documents were drafted by the former chief minister of Punjab Mumtaz Daultana who had acquired wide scale publicity on account of being an expert in political shake-ups. Daultana fully employed his political capability in preparing and authoring the One Unit plan which was primarily a brain child of Ayub Khan. "The combination of force and cunning that the document recommended should be used in integrating West Pakistan, suggest that the author must have modelled his plan on Machiavelli's Discourse"¹¹.

In 1952 the central government desired to enforce Urdu as the only official language of the country. The Bengalis sharply reacted to this ill advised move of the central government. They visualized this move as an attempt by the West Pakistan bureaucracy and Muslim League hierarchy to deface their cultural heritage by imposing an alien language on them. Intense linguistic riots erupted in East Bengal which confirmed acute Bengali resentment over the west's desire to induct its cultural dominance over the

East Bengal. The Bengali speaking aspirants for administrative positions in the government agencies found this proposal profoundly discriminatory and against their interests. The 'Vernacular Elite'¹² of the Eastern Bengal, too, expressed its unalloyed repudiation of the language proposal and demanded that the 'Bengali' should be made official language. The move rightly aroused public indignation and became highly instrumental in sowing the seeds of ethnic dissensions.

In March, 1954 elections to the provincial assemblies were held. Muslim League had to face an annihilating defeat because it stood for a strong center. The voters, in large number, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Muslim League as the party miserably failed in representing the masses at the central level. The protest vote also echoed people's anger against the provincial government for having allowed the police to open fire on the students of Dacca University who were protesting in favour of the Bengali language.

The height of the ethnic antagonism could well be judged by the manifesto of the United Front, a coalition of the anti-Muslim League parties, which fought the elections on the basis of a 21 point manifesto demanding a relatively weak center. It demanded the recognition of Bengali as official language and complete autonomy for the East Bengal in all subjects except defence, currency and foreign affairs. The manifesto also asked for the establishment of an armament factory and Headquarters of Navy in the East Bengal. It also demanded financial autonomy and East Bengal's absolute freedom from the center.

The United Front won the elections by vast majority which was a sufficient evidence of the Bengalis wanting a weak center and absolute provincial autonomy. The overwhelming backing for the United Front programme was the first indicator of Bengali

frustration with the political structure set up by the Punjab-Mahajir elite at the center.

United Front, under A.K. Fazal ul Haq, formed the ministry. Soon after the ministry was inducted, there were bloody riots in the industrialized areas between the Bengali and non-Bengali Muslims. The government did not take any action against the miscreants which greatly infuriated the central government. Fazal-ul-Haq was summoned to Karachi for talks. The Chief Minister, during the course of talks, made a stunning statement by questioning the very idea of the creation of Pakistan. He said that with the help of the people of India he hoped to remove the artificial barriers that had been created between the two "Bengals" because the Bengalis were "bound" by a common language and heritage and they have had age-long traditions"¹³. In an interview Fazal ul Haq asserted that "Independence will be the first thing to be taken up by my ministry at the negotiations between the center and East Bengal"¹⁴. During a visit to India the Chief Minister spoke against the partition of India at the 'Sarat Bose Academy' and suggested the unification of Bengal"¹⁵.

The rebellious demeanour and irresponsible antics of Fazal ul Haq provided a genuine pretext to the central government to intervene. The center quickly responded to the heightening of tension because of the thoughtless statements made by the Chief Minister. Consequently the United Front ministry was dismissed on May 29, 1954 and governor's rule was imposed on the province. Iskander Mirza, a military bureaucrat and the then Defence Secretary was appointed Governor of East Pakistan. The Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, after taking action against the province, said that the center will never allow the province to again get on with the risks of disintegration.

Thus the roots of the political and ethnic conflict lay in the provinces. Particularly the province of Eastern Bengal fervently demonstrated its hostility towards the policies adopted by the centre for its subjugation. The rise of the 'Vernacular Elite' was a significant turn of the political history of Pakistan. They watched with deep anguish the constitutional development and were visibly perturbed with the working of the constituent assembly which acutely lacked in the representative semblance. The Bengali concern grew deeper on the constitutional acrobatics by the constituent assembly which they perceived as undermining the Bengali majority at the center and also "leave Eastern Bengal with a quantum of autonomy that would continue to Keep East Bengal as a 'Colony' of West Pakistan"¹⁶

With regional tensions reaching the highest proportions, the alarming signals began to sound. Despite that the authorities turned a deaf ear to these signals and did nothing to extinguish the smoldering embers of ethnicity and political grievances. "The failure of the central government to heed to the warning signals, and accommodate Bengalis meant that the events of 1952 and 1954 marked the first stage of the process leading to Bangladesh"¹⁷

In addition to the political and social factors, economic disparity during 1947-58 had also contributed a great deal in giving vent to the ethnic strife between the East and West Pakistan. There were acute economic imbalances prevalent in the two culturally apart wings of Pakistan. The political turmoil in the initial years of independence, in fact, was based on the hard core of economic injustices. The Bengali people's resentment was essentially based on the feelings of economic injustice. In the economic race East Pakistan had been consistently falling behind: the per capita income of East Bengal was eighty per cent of West Pakistan's per capita income in 1951-52, in 1969-70 the ratio had

been decreased to sixty percent. The gap between the two provinces had widened considerably over the two decades"¹⁸.

West Pakistan, in comparison to East Pakistan, was able to go through its economic struggle rather swiftly during 1951-58. Undoubtedly the resources from the East Pakistan contributed significantly in this economic battle of West Pakistan, yet in abundance available resources of West Pakistan, too, had a fat share in West Pakistan's economic growth. West Pakistan, due to its fertile land and advanced agriculture and relatively strong industrial base, contributed a major portion of Pakistan's earnings. East Pakistan, on the other hand, lagged behind in agricultural and stable industrial base mainly due to the neglect of the British rulers. Despite that the Bengalis heavily resented the economic prosperity of West Pakistan and strongly believed that West Pakistan's economic well being was more due to the East Pakistan's earnings in the foreign exchange, industrial profits of East Pakistan and central government's taxes. The main grievance of the Bengalis was that West Pakistan's economic growth had taken place partly at the expense of the Eastern wing, that the East had contributed to the western development, that resources had systematically been transferred to the west, as a result of which the west had experienced an acceleration and the East a corresponding retardation in economic development"¹⁹.

The Bengalis were left to believe that they would have been much happier and better off without their political partnership with West Pakistan which only brought them miseries and the scourge of under development. Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that the economic inequality between East Pakistan and West Pakistan did much to air the ethnic discord and became a pressing reason for parting of ways in December, 1971. The disgruntled Bengalis were compelled, by the events of 1951-58, to

finally wage struggle for safeguard of their political and economic interests. This could be possible only through the power in the center. The Bengalis naturally launched their endeavours to get into the echelons of authority. The only way left open to the Benglis, to put an end to the Punajabi-Mahajir domination, was through the democratically elected government in which, by virtue of their numerical majority they could think of rising as the controllers of the central government. Their campaign for the establishment of a democratic order was, therefore, basically directed at eliminating the supremacy of a minority ethnic group that has so blatantly deterred their march toward progress and well-being. Nevertheless, the genuine and justifiable endeavours of the Bengalis for the protection of their rights were continuously frustrated by the West Pakistan bureaucracy which decided to cling to power and never allow the Bengalis to become sovereign. Consequently, the events of 1951-70 eventually led to a catastrophic end and the country was disintegrated in 1971 giving way to Bangladesh to emerge as an independent and sovereign state.

The unfortunate happenings of 1971 had a long history behind them, the history of a newly born country which had to face multifarious problems with the very outset. More acute problem that Pakistan had to face was with respect to the nation-building because of certain inherent short-comings which the creation of Pakistan carried with itself. Though Pakistan was an old society, it was a new state as well²⁰. It shared with other new states many characteristics---a long history of colonial domination, a plural society and a so-called socio-economic political structure. Pakistan was truly a new state and a new nation faced with the stupendous task of nation-building in the very beginning.

The most formidable problem of nation building in Pakistan

after its inception was the smooth and unhindered integration of the Bengali sub-nation. The Bengalis were not only the largest ethno-cultural sub-group in Pakistan but actually constituted a majority of country's population. Bengalis with their own territory were never really the part of ethnic divide in the West. They were not only linguistically and culturally different, but racially too. Their presence always meant one more contender in the constant and vicious power struggles which have stalked the land since its inception. With their perennial bickering over sharing of resources, many in the West viewed their departure as 'good riddance'²¹.

Despite this national humiliation, however, we did not learn a lesson to avoid such a debacle in the future. Subsequent governments in the remaining Pakistan did not like to learn from the past events and kept on with the same style of governance that pushed the Bengalis away from the rest of Pakistan.

The emergence of Bangladesh as a culmination of the political turmoil in East Bengal during 1947-70, left its enduring impact on the political conditions of the remaining Pakistan. A similar demand for democratic set up crept into Pakistan posing a threatening challenge to the future generations. It was evidenced when some regional elites on being excluded from power structure in the former West Pakistan, came out to push the demand for a democratic government. For instance, in Baluchistan and NWFP, NAP launched the campaign under the leadership of Abdul Wali Khan, demanding that democratically elected government be inducted in the center. The respective upper classes of the two provinces fully supported NAP move.

Sindh

With the imposition of Martial Law in 1977, the struggle for democratic rule received tremendous impetus. Once again the movement was being motivated by the domination of various ethnic groups at the hands of another who happened to be in a more dominant position. The province of Sindh erupted with ethnic upsurge during 1977-87. The severity of Sindhi re-action to the ethnic domination put in mind the bitter and woeful state of affairs that prevailed in the former East Pakistan during Bengali agitation for their rights.

One of the reason of the rise of ethnicity in Pakistan was that the various ethnic groups developed a sense of pride in their own ethnic background. The Sindhi very soon began to talk about the ancient civilization of Indus Valley. The Pathans began talking about Khushal Khan Khattak and the Punjabis about their rich literature and tales of heroism. Thus, the people always talked proudly about their own civilizations, heroes, poets and saints. While praising their own ethnic background and heroes, they usually tended to belittle or denigrate the leader of other groups. This tendency became highly instrumental in airing the ethnic consciousness in Pakistan.

With the imposition of Martial Law in 1977, the assemblies were dissolved and the PPP government dismissed. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of the country and PPP's chairman, was deposed and involved in a murder case and subsequently committed to the gibbets. Bhutto's party had won the 1970 elections in the western part of the country. When East Pakistan was separated, Bhutto was asked to form the government in the remaining Pakistan. Bhutto thus became the first Sindhi politician, popularly elected, to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

With Bhutto ascending the premiership of the country, plans were initiated for the economic, political and cultural uplift of the Sindhis at the cost of other ethnic groups residing in the Province of Sindh. Bhutto being a hard core Sindhi, was naturally interested in the amelioration of his Sindhi brethren. Job opportunities for the Sindhis were created in the Government departments in Karachi as well as in other parts of the country. The teaching of Sindhi language was made compulsory in the schools which gave considerable boost to the Sindhi culture. In order to bring the Sindhis in prominence, merit policy was not followed. A Sindhi with no educational background and holding no prescribed qualification was preferred on other candidates who belonged to other ethnic groups. In these days, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, the "talented cousin" of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the Chief Minister of Sindh who left no stone unturned to give a boost to the Sindhi culture and scrapping other cultures from the province. It was because of his abrasive handling of the political issues that linguistic riots erupted in Sindh.

Bhutto was the first Sindhi leader who had occupied an eminent position in the country. He was also the first Sindhi prime minister who took practical steps to redress the discrimination shown to the Sindhis in the past. His physical elimination by the military regime under General Zia, therefore, impeded the process of betterment he had started for the Sindhis. The action of the military regime, with preponderance of the Punjabis, deeply antagonized the Sindhis. Bhutto's hanging was understood as an act of intolerance on the part of the Punjabis toward the demand for due share in power by the other regions of the country. 'The ferocity with which Sindh erupted in 1983 was perhaps the most ominous legacy of Bhutto's hanging'²². 'Thus Bhutto's trial was seen in Sindh to be motivated by the Punjabi elite's intolerance of

competing claims to power from other regions'²³. The Supreme Court verdict, four Punjabi judges committing Bhutto to the gallows and three non-Punjabi judges acquitting him, further strengthened the apprehension of the Sindhis of their discrimination by the Punjabis which Bhutto had resolutely endeavoured to put an end to.

Repressive and vindictive steps were taken against the PPP which intensified the ethnic hatred that already had taken roots with Bhutto's hanging. Sindhi officials were more frequently replaced by the military officials. The large scale appointments of the army officers to the top civilian positions initiated the process of military colonization of other institutions²⁴. Military intrusion into foreign service, for example, was evident in the fact that 43% of Pakistani ambassador in 1982 came from the military²⁵. The widespread of the army's control over civil society always predictably had ethnic implications.

The outburst of resentment over dictatorial measures adopted in the province of Sindh, came to the fore in 1983 in the form of civil uprising. A coalition of political parties with ppp being conspicuously prominent, launched the MRD, Movement for the restoration of Democracy. As the movement urged the end of military rule, it turned into a regional brawl due to military's concentration of suppressive tactics in the province of Sindh. It promptly invited attention of other areas of the province and quickly extended to the urban and the far flung rural areas who zealously participated in a ruthless series of riots which took the army four arduous months to bring the situation under control. 'The scale and ferocity of the rioting were upsetting enough but demands for a separate Sindhi- nation state were more threatening and heartbreaking indicators of how swiftly the situation had deteriorated²⁶."

There were quite a few other political factions who were mainly responsible for mustering support for the MRD agitation. PPP played a major role as it commands large support from the Sindhis. Amongst other prominent political groups, Sindhi Awami Tehrik (SAT) was the most formidable political group which took part in the MRD. Rasul Bux Paleejo, one time an ardent 'Maoist' was the leader of SAT which is now the most vocal political force for the Sindhi nationalism. The other important groups during MRD. movement were Jiye-Sindh and Sindhi-Hari committee. Jiye-Sindh represents hard core Sindhi nationalists and was led by the veteran Sindhi leader Late G.M.Sayed, a staunch advocate of the rights of the Sindhis.

The MRD movement was a spontaneous explosion of Sindhi umbrage on the suppressive measures the military regime had adopted in the province. It was not a well planned and cohesive strategy. The Sindhis were so greatly cheated off that they quickly responded to the MRD to fulminate against the army regime. The Sindhis are in minority in their own province, the fact that has developed a deep sense of loss amongst the Sindhis. They rightly suspect the other groups, more dominant and numerically stronger, of having exploited their weakness of being in minority. Greater political and constitutional safeguards are required to pull them out of despair and develop a sense of involvement in the mainstream of national affairs. The solution of the Sindhi problem, therefore, lies in greater participation in government and a larger share in the resources for the economic betterment of the province.

The removal of popularly elected government and its replacement with the military bureaucracy, dominated by Punjabis and Pashtoons, and Bhutto's execution, provided immense spur to

the rise of nationalist movement in Sindh. The allotment of cultivable lands to the retired army officers and civil services in the northern districts of Sindh, established, settlers colonies, became potent symbol of punjabi/army exploitation²⁷."

The regional aspirations were formally clothed with language when Mumtaz Bhutto ex-chief minister and governor of Sindh and the 'talented cousin' of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, delineated a scheme of confederation. He demanded that Pakistan should be made a confederation. The proposals of the confederation were almost similar to that of Awami League's six point programme which formed the basis for the Regional Autonomy Movement in East Pakistan²⁸."

Although the confederation proposals were unrealistic, ambiguous and exuding malicious and separatist tendency, yet these proposals manifested acute Sindhi sense of alienation.

NWFP

In contrast to Sindh, the situation in NWFP has been comparatively happier. This is due to the fact that a considerable section of Pashtoon elite have made their way into the power structure of Pakistan. The Pashtoons also have acquired a sizeable strength in the civil bureaucracy and army in comparison to the Sindhis and Baluchis. This factor has helped greatly in cultivating a sense of belongings within the NWFP and consequently a greater feelings of ethnic homogeneity have taken place in the province. The soviet intervention in Afghanistan, too, left its positive impact on the economic, social and political aspects of the NWFP. The 'Afghan Miracle²⁹' played a decisive role in crushing the serpent of Pakhtoonistan. The influx of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and especially in the NWFP made a dispersing impact on the tepid

movement for Pakhtoonistan. The movement automatically collapsed with large number of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan because the refugees would have been the part of Pakhtoonistan. With the refugees residing in Pakistan in large number, a de facto Pakhtoonistan came into being extinguishing the politically and perfidiously motivated movement for Pakhtoonistan. The Afghan refugees had left their hearth and home to permanently settle in Pakistan. NWFP, being a Pashtoon region was the most tranquil and prosperous place to opt for a permanent abode. The refugees, therefore, were accorded gracious hospitality by the local people and the government. The generous hospitality and lack of friction was more due to the ethnic affinity with the refugees than for any political reasons.

Economic development in the province were greatly helpful in destroying the possible regionalist and ethnic polarizations in the NWFP. Migration to other parts of the country and to the Gulf region, provided tremendous economic boost to the Pathans. A great number of Pathans migrated to Punjab and to Karachi for seeking employment and better sustenance.

The Afghan refugees carried with them the vices of arms and drugs smuggling which marked their adverse impact on the Pakistani society. The culture in Pakistan experienced a substantial influence on its pattern due to the Afghan refugees, militant and anti-social attitudes of life. The first and immediate influence of the Afghan refugees was the wide scale militarization of civil society due to the large influx of arms. Sophisticated arms and ammunition were openly seen and available in the market.

Another characteristic of the Afghan refugees presence in Pakistan was in abundance availability of drugs. The Afghan refugees were generally accused of having been involved in the

ensnaring business of drug smuggling. The drug smuggling heavily affected the social norms in Pakistan as it not only left a substantial number of addicts but also became highly instrumental in the moral perversion of Pakistani society. This caused hostility between the refugees and host population of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan feared that the refugees will never return to their country and would become a permanent source of pollution of Pakistani society.

The presence of refugees invited the Afghan and Russian wrath on Pakistan. The Russian and Afghan authorities launched a series of hot chase against Afghan guerrillas understood to be hiding in Pakistan under the garb of refugees. The Afghan secret service KHAD, adopted a ruthless policy to shatter the Government's nerve. It made important cities of Pakistan such as Peshawar and Karachi, the target of its most gruesome policy of shattering the civilian life. Peshawar was the worst hit area where constant bomb blasts created havoc amongst the innocent population. Karachi also became the target of these explosions where refugees were understood to be hiding. This was done to create misunderstanding between the refugees and the host population and the government of Pakistan.

BALUCHISTAN

Baluchistan, a relatively docile and calm region, has exhibited clear signs of discontent with the central government since 1979 onward. Attitudes of some of the political groups and especially the ethnic elite of Baluchistan have stiffened. Some of the notable Baluch leaders have made open statements about their frustration with the central government polices and have declared that accommodation with the central government is not possible and consequently their aim is to establish an independent

Baluchistan³⁰." Atta Ullah Mengal, the former Chief Minister of Baluchistan, in an interview, yelled out at the central government by expressing his deep sense of alienation. 'Under Ayub and Bhutto we fought an internal war. We took it as an internal conflict between the government and the people of Pakistan. We thought of ourselves as people of Pakistan and we were loyal--but now the situation has changed altogether. We have declared that there is no room for us in Pakistan and ours is a fight for independence³¹.

During Ayub's and Bhutto's regimes Baluchistan was neglected and the initial years of Ayub's regime saw clear exploitation of the Baluch people in every walk of life. The Baluchis were denied their due share in the governmental hierarchy i.e. the military and the Bureaucracy. 'Baluchis have been by and large, excluded not only from the central government but also from positions of authority within Baluchistan³². In addition to that, sheer negligence on the part of the government to take up projects for the economic and political development of Baluchistan, furthered the feelings of alienation that already prevailed in the province. Bhutto's resort to the use of military in 1970 to bring the Baluchis on to their knees further drifted them away from the rest of the nation. The Baluchis took to the hills to frustrate government's move to subdue them but had to pay a heavy price for their confrontation with the world's best army.

The government, in order to redress the grievances of Baluchis, released heavy funds for the developmental work in the province. A network of roads and bridges was constructed which considerably improved mobility within Baluchistan. The improvement of infrastructure also facilitated the exploration of natural resources. However, the exploration of natural resources escalated Baluchi's anger due to the prospective use of these

resources outside the province. These sentiments revived the bitterness of the East Bengal over the use of jute revenue for industrial development in Punjab and Sindh. Sui gas was supplied on priority basis for use in the industrial areas of Lahore and Karachi which caused a great deal of resentment amongst the Baluchis who claimed rights of ownership on the gas. The royalty rate of the gas were much below the expectation of the Baluchis who thought that the rate should have been at least 45% as was the case in other gas producing countries. The 12.5% rate of the royalty paid to Baluchistan, was taken by the Baluchis as grossly inadequate and as such sheer exploitation of the people of Baluchistan who produced gas. This added to Baluchi's anguish whose sense of loss and deprivation was grievously reinforced over this blatant transfer of economic resources of the province.

However, the Afghan crisis and demolition of the autocratic regime of the Shah of Iran and internal rifts, played a significant role in re-shaping the political strategies in Baluchistan. The external developments were a major factor in promoting the geopolitical importance of the province which attracted a massive inflow of resources. In 1982 a special development programme was launched funded by the US, the EEC, Japan and Saudi Arabia. The USAID has financed the ambitious Baluchistan Area Development Programme (BALAD). Five new air ports have been built, a naval harbour is near completion at Gawadar and three fishing harbours are under construction³³.

Baluchi hostility toward the central government died down to a great extent due to external developments and internal wranglings. Differences between the opposition and other political groups widened. These differences were reflective of the Baluch uprising during Bhutto's regime. Though the split within the political elite of Baluchistan, has helped in appeasing the ethnic hostility, it has

at the same time given roots to the internal animosity between the various groups which may be a dangerous situation politically.

Due to the split, two dominant political groups emerged on the political horizon of Baluchistan. One group was led by the late Gaus Bux Bizenjo which stood for provincial autonomy within the constitutional framework. The group formed Pakistan National Party by defecting from a more militant group. The other group was led by Bizenjo's former political colleagues, Att Ullah Mengal and K.B. Mari, which advocated armed struggle to achieve independence.

The situation did not improve much during Zia's military rule as Zia did not intend to hand over power to the Baluchis. Though Zia had disbanded Hyderabad tribunal, set up by Bhutto to try some of the Baloch and Pathan leaders, no indication of transferring the power or involving the Baluchis in state's affairs, was ever given by Zia. Zia's uncompromising gestures greatly perturbed the Baluchis as the continuation of army's rule meant the perpetuation of Punjabi domination.

THE MAHAJIRS

The ethnic resurgence in Sindh and Baluchistan made its fomenting effect on the Mahajir's feeling of ethnic pride. The rise of ethnicity especially in their province, gave a fillip to the so far tepid feelings of ethnic consciousness of the Mahajirs. The Mahajirs were awesomely startled over the severity of the Sindhi nationalism and feared being submerged in the Sindhi ethnic onslaught. Being part of the province of Sindh the Mahajirs quickly realized that if they do not rise to the occasion to resolutely thwart the Sindhis endeavours to establish their hegemony on the province, their numerical majority will be

reduced to the subdued minority and their ethnic identity would be dispersed.

The Mahajirs are the migrants from North India and Bombay. The partition of India re-shaped the existing pattern of the ethnic groups in India. There were two categories of migrants from India. One category was of those migrants who were forced out in the wave of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Punjab, the other being those who came to fulfil their dream of living happily ever after with their Islamic brethren".³⁴

Nevertheless the desire of living happily with the Islamic brethren was not the only factor which forced the migrants to leave their homes. There was an other pressing reason which had compulsive impact on the migrants to opt for Pakistan. It was the fear of Hindu domination which would have been the worst and blatant once the partition would have been completed. 'The Urdu-speaking Muslim North India, having enjoyed the fruits of Muslim rule, feared subservience in post-British, democratic India. So they parted company with Hindus despite community of language, ethnicity and culture'³⁵.

In fact there was nothing left in India for those who chose to live in Pakistan. In a newly born country there were plentiful of fortunes awaiting the new entrants and the migrants being very shrewd, quickly jumped on the available opportunities in the newly born Pakistan.

The Indian migrants, who call themselves as Mahajirs (refugees) after having lived in Pakistan though not very happily yet prosperously for fifty years, are those who were in minority and who migrated from the Urdu-speaking minority provinces of India. After landing in Pakistan they found themselves outside the four

main ethnic divisions of West Pakistan. They found it difficult to adjust themselves in the ongoing cultural patterns of West Pakistan. Also they found it difficult to identify themselves by a nomenclature in the presence of the existing ethnic groups who had their own language, culture and way of life. "For want of another word in Urdu (identifying them with their language and culture) the word Mahajir has stuck to them ever since"³⁶.

The mahajirs consider themselves as the makers of Pakistan and claim to have sacrificed their belongings for the sake of Pakistan. They do not acknowledge the contributions of any other group or section in the freedom movement. "Pakistan was not achieved as a result of a war of liberation led by a Punjabi general and the genocide of Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims had absolutely no bearing on the decision to partition India. At any rate most of the casualties in the inter-cine carnage took place after August 1947, when Pakistan had already been achieved"³⁷

The perception of the Mahajirs about the struggle for Pakistan is not based on realities. They are of the view that as the prominent leaders of Pakistan movement did not come from the areas forming the present Pakistan or did not belong to any of the principal ethnic groups of Pakistan, as such no credit can be given to the Punjabis or any other group for having contributed in the freedom movement³⁹.

It is highly contemptuous on the part of the Mahajirs to have set aside the sincere contributions of the Punjabis and other nationalities for the cause of Muslim freedom movement in the sub-continent. The motivational reason behind this antagonistic view may be the sense of alienation and insecurity that may have developed in the Mahajirs on finding themselves an ethnic minority in Pakistan. The Mahajirs have been the closest allies of

the Punjabis in crushing other ethnic groups in Pakistan through religion and Urdu based nationalism. In their bid to subjugate other cultures the Mahajirs became instrumental in ripping the national unity apart and developing linguistic hatred. "But their cultural arrogance and social disdain for their co-religionists led first to Bangladesh, then language riots in Sindh and finally even Punjab drew away from them"³⁸

However one genuine difficulty the Mahajirs had to face in Pakistan was their inability to merge themselves in the ongoing cultural patterns of Pakistan. Though they were not absolutely alien to the existing cultural set up of Pakistan, still they could not adjust themselves in the cultural and social structure of Pakistan for one reason or the other. Particularly the Mahajirs found it extremely difficult to become a part of the Sindhi culture which was totally different from that of the Mahajirs. The Mahajirs who settled in Punjab found no difficulty and with the passage of time were amalgamated in the Punjabi way of life. But those who moved to Karachi or other parts of Sindh faced innumerable problems in adjusting with the Sindhi way of living. The cultural dissimilarity obviously developed an acute sense of alienation in the Mahajirs who proudly took themselves as the descendants of the Mughal Empire.

The cultural arrogance and inherent aversion for other ethnic and cultural groups compelled the Mahajirs to rise to establish their ethnic superiority through fair or foul means. In order to accomplish their objective of laying their ethnic superiority over others, they first of all confronted with the Sindhis, in whose national rise they saw the seeds of their subservience to the Sindhi domination. They vehemently opposed the Sindhis claim over the whole of the province and demanded a separate province for the Mahajirs comprising of Karachi, Sukkur and Hyderabad.

The Mahajirs, despite their utmost endeavours, failed to dislodge the Sindhis. In order to put greater pressure on the Government Mahajirs changed their strategy. They now made the Punjabis the target of their campaign and launched a blistering movement against the Punjabis. The Mahajirs have developed a loathing about the Punjabis and consider them as an inferior and backward ethnic group. They abhorrently believe that the Punjabis have monopolized power in the new state of Pakistan which was created by the Urdu-speaking Muslims of the United India. They blatantly charge the Punjabis of having obstructed the freedom movement and being responsible for the emergence of Bangladesh. They are of the determined view that if Pakistan is to survive then Punjab has to be split into two ethnically based units by carving out Saraiki and Potohar provinces.

Undoubtedly the Mahajirs are justified in striving for their ethnic identity within their new geographical environments. It is their genuine and natural socio-cultural requirement. Their need is understandable and one is prepared to give due weight and recognition to this impulsive demand of the Mahajirs for their ethnic identification. But the use of political violence, distortion of history and the deceitful methods, that the mahajjirs have employed for the accomplishment of their designs for subduing other ethnic groups, is highly objectionable.

The strategy adopted by the MQM (Mahajir Qaumi Movement), the forum of the Mahajirs, to meet its objective is based on hatred and rancour towards other ethnic groups. It is not likely to succeed for it has been launched at a time when all parts of the country are trying to come out of the narrow regionalism. A clear indication of a healthier and positive thinking emerged when the political parties contesting elections in 1990 and 1993 on

religious and ethnic grounds were rejected by the people. It marked a liberal and positive trend towards democratic and multi-ethnic feelings. At present Pakistan is a unified entity presenting a fusion of national ideas ignoring the clamorous discord of the MQM. Ethnic problem, though still unresolved, has lost much of its venom since Zia's regime. At present a greater political cohesion prevails than a decade ago. On the ethnic front there is now greater hope than despair. A great deal of detestation for the ethnic rivalries have developed during the last decade. The present political and power set up in the country displays a happier situation with the diversified political elements involved in the power sharing and other political matters. The opposition, too, is a mingling of the different factions of the political elites of the country. Mian Nawaz Sharif, leader of the PML(N) faction and a Punjabi to the hilt, has formed an opposition alliance with a zealous pashtoon nationalist Abdul Wali Khan. He has attracted substantial votes in the province of Sindh, known to be the power base of the PPP. The opposition alliance of Mian Nawaz Sharif and Khan Abdul Wali Khan contains some great names of Sindhi political leaders like Mumtaz Bhutto, Pir of Pagara and Hamida Khurro as the closest political comrades of Nawaz Sharif. Similarly PPP, the ruling party, has formed a coalition government with the PML(J) in the center and the province of Punjab. The PPP, with a Sindhi dominated leadership, commands a large vote bank in Punjab and NWFP.

By launching a Punjab bashing campaign MQM, in fact, has demonstrated its paucity of political insight. The anti-Punjab movement is not a best policy as it is bound to invoke Punjab's bitter resentment which will certainly push the Punjabis away from the Mahajirs. In fact the Mahajirs, by advocating the redemarcation of the provincial boundaries, want the Punjabis to react as fanatic provincialists to prove that the Mahajirs are not

alone in thinking in narrow terms. But the Punjabis approach to national issues is never in terms of ethnic priorities only, but their view of national problems is more rational and broader.

The MQM is grossly mistaken to believe that Punjab's division will pave the way for the subsequent division of Sindh and other provinces. It is a sheer miscalculation of the facts. The MQM's clamour for the redemarcation of provincial boundaries and Punjab's division is not likely to revive the forgotten slogan 'Jag Punjabi Jag, Teri Pag noon Lag gia Dag' to set a precedent for other groups to follow and eventually for the Mahajirs to press more intensively for carving out a Mahajir province. It is high time for the Mahajirs to realize that the artificial ethnic and cultural cleavages existing in Punjab are not likely to gain ethnic, political and economic significance once the democratic process gets going smoothly. 'Even if the thesis is accepted that more provinces corresponding to all ethnic stripes of the country are good for the nation's future, Mahajirs will still be without one. They are neither a race nor a tribe, nor are heirs to tradition that other share with them. Their homesickness about UP, Lucknow, Allahbad, Delhi and Kawnpur is understandable but it does not make them an ethnic group. Nor does their tracing Khan Liaqat Ali Khan's family lineage to king Naushervan Adil. Nor indeed does their speaking Urdu. If this language is the sole defining criterion of Mahajir identity, then all Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtoons and Baluch deserve to be called Mahajir too. For three generations they have all happily taken over-dose of Urdu, whether in government schools or in Fatima Surraya Baiyas' dramas on the PTV. Quite unlike the Bengalis, who could not take it and parted ways in 1971³⁹.

The province of Sindh, ever since the eruption of ethnic clashes, has witnessed the worst sort of lawlessness and bloody

riots. Scores of people are being massacred every day. Indiscriminate killings of the innocent people have become the scenes of the day. In 1992 there was a massive break-down of law and order and eventually the army had to be called for restoring the peace and order in Karachi. The situation in the interior Sindh has deteriorated and become worst. Incidents of highway robberies, attacks on trains and kidnaping are reaching to the alarming proportions.

Karachi once used to be the most peaceful and joyable abode. The city flourished with brotherly and fraternal feelings. It was a beaming place which hardly had any ill will, ethnic, factional or religious polarization. The people lived happily and shared each other's sorrows. There were no crimes and the inhabitants did not suffer from any sense of insecurity and fear.

However, the serpent of lawlessness, hatred, crime and ethnic antagonism have crept into the tranquil environs of the city of Karachi. It were the arms and drug peddlers, in collusion with those wielding power, who began to change the pattern of the city with their nefarious movements. The arms and drug peddling, not only left its loathsome impact on the civil society of Pakistan, but also imported with it the vices of sectarianism and ethnicity to further pollute the civil, political and social climate of the province.

The history of bloody and lethal clashes, lawlessness and factional hatred can be traced back to the internal factors. The political parties with ethnic leanings have multiplied. These parties are backed by the authorities who want to exploit them to meet their own designs. A rift was created in the MQM on the behest of those who were in power. The unified MQM was becoming a dominant political force in Karachi which the authorities

immensely abhorred. A group of defectors was patronized by the authorities to give birth to MQM (H). The MQM (Haqqiqi) ruthlessly put a wedge into MQM (Altaf)'s unity and its political effectiveness suffered a severe blow. The decoits and outlaws are given asylum by the government functionaries, politicians and members of the parliament in order to create lawlessness in the country. "The decoits are virtually running a parallel government in Sindh, and it is not unoften to find senior police officials as part of the kidnappers network, receiving their own share of the ransom money"⁴⁰. The statement is said to be pronounced by a senior journalist as quoted by a former government official in his research paper.

With the breakup of MQM into two rival factions, the law and order situation in Karachi worsened. The parted groups, led by fanatics frequently resort to bloody clashes against each other on petty matters. Intra-factional warfare takes place every day killing the rivals in cold blood. Recently there was a killing in Karachi on a large scale in which nearly more than 100 persons were ruthlessly killed. To make the things worse, it is often stated that one group or the other is operating under the patronage of some official agency and, therefore, enjoys a kind of immunity from law⁴¹. The ethnic factor with acute dissensions in the MQM ranks have complicated the political issues and adversely affected the law and order situation of Karachi.

It is high time to give serious pondering to the alarming slide in the lawlessness in the province of Sindh and evolve a workable formula for the solution of ethnic problem. The government, on a number of occasions, have claimed the situation being under its control which, however, is a blatant distortion of the factual situation. The situation is obviously slipping out of hands with indiscriminate and wide scale killing. The ethnic discord has

turned into sectarian clashes which is more dangerous for the national unity as it is bound to let a free hand to the religious fanatics to settle their scores. The sectarian factions launch lethal attacks on each others religious shrines and places killing innocent worshippers for none of their faults. The ethnic factor has spread its tentacles to the widest affecting every other issue in an antagonistic manner. The apathy on the part of the government and the political parties is criminal. The best time for action is when the ill-will starts seeping into the national stream and not when its natural consequences raise their heads. We have lost the opportune time in allowing the situation to reach the present impasse.

The situation should be handled with utmost caution and thoughtfulness. Political, administrative and constitutional methods should be adopted for the proper diagnosis of the disease. For the political solution of the problem, dialogue between the government and the MQM should be restarted with profound sincerity. The government should show magnanimity and take initiative to accede to the genuine demands of MQM. The MQM, too, should express its sincerity in solving the problem and desist from adopting a hard and uncompromising posture. Sticking to the demand of separate province for the Mahajirs is very harmful not only for the country but for the Mahajirs as well. The hardliners within the MQM should understand that their insistence on a separate province for the Mahajirs is bound to boomerang. If a separate province is chalked out for the Mahajirs, it will disturb the administrative and judicial set up of the province. Moreover, the Sindhis would never agree to the vivisection of their province. The Sindhis, in their bid to oppose the division of the province, will win over the sympathies of other provinces who will support the Sindhi cause to avert the eventual division of the their own provinces.

The Mahajirs should also bear in mind that they have invested the most in Pakistan and have the most to lose if Pakistan is destabilized. 'They uprooted themselves in 1947 for the sake of a new home. If the new homes were to crumble, the Mahajirs would lose the most, as an amorphous group seen by India as the main catalysts of Indian division'⁴².

The people of Karachi should be given due share in the governance of their city. The government must accommodate the Mahajirs in the power structure in view of their strong presence in the provincial parliament. One way of reducing the ethnic tension is to ensure meaningful participation of the people of the deprived areas in the affairs of the government. This would require an end to the policy of exploitation by the dominant ethnic groups of the less powerful ethnic factions.

Use of army to tackle the ethnic issue would rather deteriorate the situation beyond control. The indefinite and prolonged involvement of army in the ethnic crisis and its preoccupation with the law and order problem in the province arising out of ethnic polarization, is likely to expose its discipline and professional skills to the perils which cannot be visualized in the beginning. Moreover, army's engagement in civil matters will render our defence priorities acutely vulnerable, a probability which our enemies would eagerly welcome. Thus it is highly imperative to keep the army away from indulging in the sensitive ethnic discord. This measure will, to a greater extent, restore the confidence of the Mahajirs and would immensely help in extinguishing the smoldering embers of ethnic malignancy. The Mahajirs, who at present are greatly disillusioned with the government policies, would be enticed into a dialogue with the government if the army is withdrawn from the civil duty.

Constitutional cover would be required to implement proposals for cure of ethnic strife. The adoption of constitutional measures with the consent of all the concerned and aggrieved ethnic groups, the ruling party and the opposition can go a long way in dispelling the ethnic rivalries. The 1973 constitution does not provide adequate solution to the ethnic issues. New developments in the political and economic spheres demand substantial changes in the 1973 constitution in order to meet the expectation of the different ethnic factions. There have been no meetings of the CCI and NFC during 1973-91 and major policy decisions were taken without the consent of the provinces. Consequently a sense of deprivation developed amongst various ethnic groups who began demanding new constitution with greater provincial autonomy and less central control. The advocates of confederal scheme proposed that the center should keep only four subjects i.e. foreign affairs, defence, currency and communication.

The time has come to consider ways and means seriously for settling the ethnic issues effectively through political and constitutional means. As long as the centralized structure is not replaced with a decentralized set up, and the provinces are not given their due share in the economic and political matters, Pakistan's domestic and external security threats are not likely to disperse.

In the meanwhile there must be a total renunciation of violence and hostilities. A strict adherence to the national parameters and a staunch commitment to democracy must be manifested by all political and ethnic groups. The eruption of violence in Karachi, on the eve of observance of the mourning day for Kashmir in which innocent people and the police officials and government functionaries, were killed in large number is highly

deplorable. The MQM chief Altaf Hussain had asked his followers from London to observe the mourning day to express MQM's concern for the Kashmiris cause. However, the way the day was mourned by the Mahajirs, on the call of their 'Pir' left much to be desired.

The MQM will have to review Its strategy of using violent methods in order to pressurize the government to accede to its demand of separate province for the Mahajirs. If the MQM expect sympathy for their cause, they must exhibit respect for the sensitivities of others, and not rub them the wrong way. No one denies that the Mahajirs heavily contributed towards making Pakistan. But at the same time they equally benefitted out of it. Those who did not migrate to Pakistan, and even today pay the price for our freedom with their blood, are the real heroes. Those who migrated demonstrated their faith in the concept, and held it together in a critical time. But within the constraints of their varying historical experiences, geographical situation, socio-political consciousness, the 'sons of the soil' contributed their share to the making of Pakistan. Above all they welcomed their new comrades and allowed them to take up the reins of government⁴³.

The time is for strengthening the federal political set-up in a way in which every group gets its due share in the country's resources. Centralization of power can be beneficial if there is no authoritarian and unrepresentative government at the center. A centralized system, working in a democratic way with minimal ethnic diversity, is not likely to provoke centre-state tensions. Economic disparity among various regions is another factor to air the centre-state tensions and to develop a sense of alienation ultimately leading to parting of the ways. Whereas, 'any attempt to force a division on Sindh could well mean a replay of what

happened at the time of the division of Punjab and Bengal in 1947⁴⁴.

Pakistan with a strong central government is very prone to the ethnic and linguistic conflict. Three glaring features, responsible for proliferating the ethnic hostilities i.e. ethnic and linguistic diversity, economic disparity among regions and unrepresentative and authoritarian central government are reflected in the violent history of ethnic conflict in Pakistan- The 1971 catastrophe, the rebellions of the Baluchis in sixties and seventies and the 1983 uprising in Sindh. Therefore, in order to develop national integration, Pakistan is in dire need for an adhesive framework based on an acceptable distribution of economic and political power among ethnic groups. A stable distribution of power requires at the very outset, the revival of a genuine electoral process to form the representative governments at the central and provincial levels which could restore the confidence of the disgruntled ethnic groups. Our inability in the past to absorb conflict between ethnic elites has already led to the dismemberment of the country. The outcome of 1971 was a direct result of the dominance of the minority ethnic group imposed through military rules⁴⁵.

REFERENCES

1. Syed Salam, "Rise of Ethnicity in Pakistan" *The News International*, September 11, 1994.
2. David Robertson, *Dictionary of Politics*, pp 111,112.
3. Richard Weeks, *Pakistan* P-3
4. Omar Noman, *Pakistan, Political and Economic History since 1947* p-8
5. Ibid, p-9
6. K.B. Sayeed, '*Politics in Pakistan*', The nature and Direction

of Change. p-32

7. Omar, Noman, '*Pakistan*', op cit p-13
8. I, Hussain, '*Political Development*' 1947-54, p-72
9. K. K. Aiz, '*Party Politics in Pakistan*' p-62
10. Omar, Noman, '*Pakistan*' op. cit. p-10
11. K. B. Sayeed, '*The Political System of Pakistan*', p-77
12. Raunaq, Jehan, '*Pakistan, Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press) 1972. pp-38,40.
The term 'Vernacular Elite' is referred to the lower middle class or poor Bengalis who spoke Bengali language and were proud of the Bengali nationalism. The 'Vernacular Elite' also existed in the pre-independence days in the Eastern Bengal. They resented the economic prosperity of the Urdu speaking Non-Bengalis. The 'Vernacular' Elite of the lower middle classes hailed from rural areas or small towns. They were mostly the lawyers, teachers, low paid civil servants and shopkeepers. Fazal ul Haq was their most prominent leader. The Vernacular Elite were very vocal during linguistic agitating and were for the total autonomy of East Bengal.
13. K. B. Sayeed, '*Political system of Pakistan*, op. cit. p-73.
14. S. Maron, *Pacific Affairs* , June 1955.
15. Ibid.
16. K.B. Sayeed, '*Pakistan*' op. cit. p-40.
17. Omar, Noman, '*Pakistan*' op. cit. p-14
18. Nadeem, Qasir, '*Pakistan studies, An Investigation into the political Economy*, Oxford, p-72
19. Ibid
20. Geertz, '*Old Societies*'
21. Syed, Salam, '*Rise of Ethnicity*' op cit.
22. Omar, Noman, '*Pakistan*' op cit p-193
23. Ibid.
24. S. E. Finer, '*Military and Politics in the Third World*', p-84.

25. H.A. Rizvi, 'Paradox of military rule in Pakistan, *Asian Survey*, May 1984.
26. Dawn, 17th August, 1983.
27. Omar, Noman, '*Pakistan*' op cit p-196.
28. Ibid
29. Nadeem, Qasir, '*Pakistan Studies, An Investigation into political Economy 1948-88*, Oxford. p-115.
30. S. Harrison Interview of Baluch Leaders. pp-60-70
31. Interview of Atta ullah Mengal in Omar Noman. pp201-202.
32. 'The Baluch are deprived of jobs in Balochistan'. *Nedae Baluchistan*, London, 1.1.1980.
33. J. Rashid. 'Pakistan and the Central Command' *Middle East Report*, July-August, 1986.
34. Syed. Salam. Rise of Ethnicity in Pakistan *The News International*, 11 Sept, 1994.
35. Anwar. Ahmed. Ethnic politics and History, *The New International*, 23 Oct.1994.
36. Syed. Salam. Rise of Ethnicity in Pakistan, op cit.
37. Syed. Salam. Pakistan's Ethnic Politics, History Demystified, *The New International*, 22 Sept. 1994.
38. Anwar. Ahmed. Ethnic Politics and History, *The New International*, 23 Oct. 1994.
39. Syed, Talat Hussain. 'The Federation's future' *The News International*, Sunday, Oct.16,1994.
40. M.H. Askari, Alarming slide into Lawlessness. Dawn, 16 Nov. 1994 The Statement has been quoted in the said article by the author which refers to a senior Sindh Govt. official quoting the above statement in his research paper titled as "theory and practice of criminal justice in Pakistan".
41. Ibid.

42. Mehdi. Masood. Time for Ethnic Reconciliation. Dawn, 14 Nov.1994.
43. Anwar. Ahmed. Ethnic politics and History, The News International, 22 Oct. 1994.
44. M. H. Askari. Time for political solution. Dawn, 23Oct.1994.
- 45 . Omar Noman. op. cit. p-202.



POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN.

Dr. Abdul Hamid Khan.

This paper is designed to assess the most popular theme in developmental politics in a society like Pakistan. The word 'democracy' is desired by every one whether involved in the arena or out side of the political activities. The development of Pakistan has revolved around ethnicity, religion and democracy. We have to deal with this subject in the context of political development which is spread over half a century.

The concept is universally accepted that democracy is known where people participate in conducting the affairs of the state. Generally this word is derived from the Greek words of 'demos and kartia' which denote power of the people¹. It is normally the formation where people rule over themselves either directly or indirectly through their representatives. The consent of people needs explanation. Democracy by the people denotes that people by all means govern and their will is supreme; and democracy for the people accepts that government stands for the welfare of the people. Thus, democracy in its modern connotation demands a full participation and co-operation from all sectors of the people with a spirit of tolerance. It rejects Aristocratic government where some are born to rule and others to obey.

Pakistan after its emergence in 1947, had been involved in democratic process alongwith its political development.

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, wanted to see democratic country based on the principles of Islam. The sketch of democracy in his mind was on

the pattern of British which governed Indo-Pak sub-continent for more than one and a half century. Muhammad Ali Jinnah remarked, "Let us lay the foundations of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles"². The religious scholars (Ulema) of the sub-continent opposed the democratic state because they were not hopeful that both the system could go together.

If we look into history of democracy in Pakistan, many ups and downs are visible. For about one quarter of a century, the country had been under the military control directly or indirectly. Democratic process had always been suppressed. Keith Callard observed, "Islam had not encouraged systematic opposition"³.

In the early phase, the Western democracy had been introduced in the political edifice through the India Act of 1935 with some modification. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his short life after the emergence of Pakistan, set an example of a dynamic personality as a governor general. He never went beyond his political power.

Quid's inaugural speech to the constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 is supposed to be 'Magna Carta' with respect to democracy and giving equal status to the minorities. He was clear in his speculation, He said, "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed... that has nothing to do with the business of the state.... You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims not in religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in political sense as citizens of the State". This statement had been criticized by many. The question arises if he deviated from ideological foundation based on two nation theory. But the answer is that Jinnah had strong conviction in democratic norms. To him,

all people living in Pakistan were equal citizen having equal rights. Quaid-e-Azam always had a very clear concept of democracy. Answering to a question in a press conference in New Delhi he said, "When you talk of democracy, I am afraid you have not studied Islam, we learned democracy thirteen centuries ago"⁴. He was against one-party government in Pakistan. Before the emergence of Pakistan, in an interview to Associated Press of America on 8th November 1945 Quaid-e-Azam did not expect that Pakistan would have one-party government. An opposition party or parties to his contention were good correctives for the party in power⁵. Quaid-e-Azam wanted democracy, but in an Islamic fashion.

The constitution-making process definitely affected relationship between the two wings. Language problem between East and West Pakistan is one of the cause of non co-operation in the making of first constitution of the country. The basic principles committee of the first Constituent Assembly published the report, but both the wings were not agreed on 'parity'. The approaches of Awami League was not agreed to the allocation of the seats. Jinnah Awami League opposed bicameral legislature at the centre. The parity formula to them would heighten provincialism. Mujibur Rehman, then the secretary of East Pakistan Awami League, also opposed the parity formula. In West wing the press also condemned the Basic Principles Committee report⁶.

There were great discussions on Islamic provisions of Basic Principles Committee that no legislature could enact laws repugnant to the principles of Islam. A Hindu member of Pakistan National Congress, K.K. Dutta, believed that such a limitation could curtail the power of the legislature which was against the established principles of democracy⁷.

An acute controversy was waged over the nature of constitution between secularist-modernists religious ulema and liberal politicians. Objectives Resolution was the only guide line which had been adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March, 1949.

The first constituent Assembly was dissolved by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and it was the first blow to the democratic and political institution. The second Constituent Assembly could provide the first constitution in March 1956 which had a sketch of parliamentary form of government. The Constitution of 1956 was to some extent borrowed from the practice established in the Government of India Act 1935. Under this Constitution, Pakistan stepped towards a democratic way and General Iskander Mirza became the first President with Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as the first Prime Minister. For the first time, Western type of parliamentary system was the guide line to run the administration in Pakistan⁸.

Although the constitution of 1956 was introduced on March 23, 1956, it could not satisfy the expectations of different groups in Pakistan. For instance, the parity system and unicameralism were still the matters which lacked recognition of elites in East Pakistan.

The parliamentary democratic values of the House had always been injured by some groups. There were five prime ministers who were frequently changed during two and a half years⁹. There was a cabinet but the real power were exercised by the President, Iskander Mirza. The Western oriented president did not respect the democratic values of the West. He brought the tradition of dictatorship in the guise of president in parliamentary form of government. Even not a single election was held during the

enforcement of the constitution of 1956.

This situation came to an end soon when on 7 October 1958, president Mirza and General Muhammad Ayub Khan (c-in-c) imposed Martial Law. The constitution of 1956 was abrogated, National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved. General Ayub Khan took over as chief martial administrator and president of Pakistan. The rule of democracy came to its end. Ayub Khan and his cabinet concluded that democracy in Pakistan did not suit the temperament of the people of Pakistan.

The Constitution Commission headed by Shahabuddin examined the causes of the failure of democracy in Pakistan. The commission observed the system of parliament as defective. Its observations were based on the views expressed by various groups:

- (i) Lack of proper elections and defects in the late constitutions.
- (ii) Undue interference by the heads of the state with ministries, political parties and by Central Government with the function of the governments in provinces.
- (iii) Lack of leadership resulting in "lack of character in the politician and their undue interference in the administration". The Commission concluded this chapter on the same causes of failure of parliamentary system¹⁰.

G. W. Choudhry, as a honorary adviser, agreed with the above reasons given by the Constitution Commission, and added that real threats came to powerful executives supported by the powerful bureaucracy¹¹. Since bureaucracy had been involved in the decision making process with the politicians, the dictation of the bureaucracy could not be understood by the parliamentarians.

Ayub Khan with the help of bureaucracy wanted to legitimize his military rule and introduced a system of local government known as 'Basic Democracies'. It was apparently a training system for the public participation from basic Units of local government to province level. But ultimately it was used as an electoral college with indirect election to the office of the President of Pakistan and the members of the assemblies¹². This system of indirect elections was the cause of resentment particularly in East Pakistan.

The political agitation against Ayub Khan and his presidential form of government began in 1968, which ended in March 1969 when another Martial Law administrator General Muhammad Yahya Khan took over as Chief Martial Law administrator. The constitution of 1962 was abrogated, and thus presidential form of government came to an end.

Since its inception to 1969, Pakistan experienced two political systems but could not bring fruit for the development of healthy democratic process.

In February 1966, a meeting of opposition parties was held in Lahore. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman from East Pakistan wanted a radical change in the constitutional order and used the occasion to publicize his six points as follows for the eventual separation of both the wings.

1. Pakistan should be a federation under the Lahore Resolution of 1940 which implied the existence of two separate entities.
2. The federal government should deal solely with defence and foreign affairs.
3. There should be two separate, but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have separate fiscal and

monetary policies.

4. The federated units would have the sole power to tax; the central governments would be granted funds to meet its expenditures.
5. Separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. The federating units would be free to established separate trade links with foreign countries.
6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia.

The majority of West Pakistan politicians refused to entertain Mujib's programme as they were the least interested in his design¹³. General Yahya declared that he would return the government to civilians. He agreed to draft a new constitution and to hold general elections. He, therefore, terminated One-Unit and reconstituted original provinces of West Pakistan from 1st July, 1970. He issued Legal Framework Order (LFO). Elections were held under LFO on the basis of adult franchise (one-man one-vote). Awami league on the basis of population won the majority of the seats. This party did not participate in election in West Pakistan and similar ssituation was in East Pakistan where no party except Awami League could get majority. This was clear sign of resentment in both the wings. This situation had been a great obstacle in a healthy democratic process. Nothing can be said which wing was at fault. The tragedy of secession of East Pakistan (which required a detailed study) was felt with great shock which was the result of authoritative decisions.

Pakistan survived only on the basis of democratic values. Some people blamed that elections in 1970 were the real cause of secession of Eastern wing. It is a wrong observation as elections are indeed necessary to maintain democratic political system of any country.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto joined in the government of Yahya. He was very popular as foreign minister and he threw out the resolution offered by Poland to end the war in eastern wing. He resolved at that time a thousand years war with India. This slogan excited the people of Western Wing. "General Yahya Khan was persuaded to resign the presidency and Bhutto upon his return was sworn in as president and Martial Law Administrator of what was left Pakistan¹⁵.

Bhutto era was very significant in the development process of democracy. He was elected representative through general election. His government operated in two levels i.e. identification of Pakistan and solidarity with the Muslim world. In domestic politics, a new coalition was formed among feudals, middle classes, and labours in industrial sector. The remarkable step of Bhutto's regime was to frame the constitution of 1973. This constitution had been agreed upon by all the major political parties. Out of 133 members of the National Assembly 125 casted in its favour. It was based on parliamentary form of government. Z.A. Bhutto enjoyed great powers on his becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan. The power of the President unlike the constitution of 1962, were nominal. The Bhutto era lasted for five and a half years during which democracy was restructured in the parliament. His period was almost known the reformative which gave consciousness against feudal system. He was dynamic in his struggle. His period might have lasted much longer than it did but for the serious flaws in character of the man who guided the country during the period of adjustment and change¹⁷.

His contribution towards the readjustment of democracy is a record on the pages of the constitutional and political history of Pakistan. His personal ego was an obstacle in his way. He was unique in political area as he never bothered about his nearest

colleagues. Consequently, his companions in the struggle for the restoration of democracy left him alone. General Zia-ul-Haq intervened when the dialogue between Pakistan People's party and Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) were at its height. He imposed Martial Law again in the country. The pretext for Zia-ul-Haq was that Pakistan stood on the threshold of a civil war¹⁸. To pacify the feelings of the people, he however promised to hold election within 90 days.

Although he failed to hold election as promised General Zia-ul-Haq constituted a Majlis-e-Shura consisting of nominated members. This Majlis was replaced with an elected assembly. The leaders of defunct parties formed a new organization i.e. Movement for the restoration of Democracy (MRD). It consisted of eleven parties including Pakistan People's Party. Zia-ul-Haq was of the opinion that political parties were the main cause to disturb the process of smooth democratic values. He, therefor setup a commission to undertake an indepth examination of the recommendations regarding the system of government. This commission submitted its report on 31st July 1983.¹⁹

Zia did not like the political parties. He decided to hold a referendum which was unique of its type. This referendum was held on December 19, 1984. the voters were asked to say 'Yes or no' to the following question.

Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunction of Islam---.²⁰

It proved to be a gateway for Zia-ul-Haq to remain in office of the President for another five years. Elections were held on

February 25, for National Assembly and Provincial assemblies on February 27, 1985.²¹

General Zia-ul-Haq gained some objective inside and outside the country. The greatest step which Zia-ul-Haq took was the 8th Amendment in the constitution of 1973. Initially, this amendment gave vast powers to the President, even more than the Prime Minister. Then, the same amendment stood as a great check towards the parliamentary form of government. It divided the federal level between the Prime Minister and the President. After its enactment, Zia-ul-Haq lifted Martial Law on 30 December, 1985 and thus put back Pakistan on the path to democracy.

Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo worked with Zia-ul-Haq for quite some time. But both could not pull on together as there were doubts about the distribution of powers between the two. Consequently, Zia-ul-Haq decided to move against Junejo. He dismissed Junejo cabinet on May 29, 1988, by blaming him and his cabinet for incompetence, corruption and failure in promoting Islamization in the society²². After this prompt action, General Zia-ul-Haq was all alone in the political process.

Unfortunately Zia's aircraft met with accident on August 17, 1988, three miles away from Bahawalpur in the province of the Punjab.²³ Ghulam Ishaq Khan became acting President. He had a life long experience as a Civil Servant in addition to his being a finance minister in Zia's Cabinet. Perhaps for that reason, he was sufficiently apprehensive about PPP's attitude towards bureaucracy. His first pre-occupation was to protect the interests of the powerful military and civil bureaucracies. In October 1988, the Lahore High Court declared the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies as malafide, illegal and arbitrary. But the judges ordered the elections to go on as planned in November

1988.²⁴

Pakistan People's Party once again came in political arena under Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The other parties composed an alliance i.e. Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). This was a great turn in the history of democracy in Pakistan. For the first time there was a contest between the leftist and the rightist. Ittehad (IJI) contested on Islamic grounds, thus providing an impetus for working in favour of Islamization.

The results of the election were in favour of PPP that won 92 seats out of 204 Constituencies. Elections were postponed in three constituencies. Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) got 54 seats²⁵.

A new party Muhajir Quami Mohaz (MQM) came in the political field for the first time and won 11 seats out of 13 in Karachi. Acting President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, called on to form a government at the centre which took over under Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan on December 2, 1988. Ten days later Ishaq Khan was elected as the President in a joint session. Benazir Bhutto government got welcome with the hope of democracy after several decades of military rule.

Benazir governments's first priority was to remove Nawaz Sharif from the Punjab Assembly. She selected Farooq Leghari as the leader of the PPP's parliamentary group. The relations between Centre and Punjab government were strained. "Nawaz Sharif government became enemy, determined to embarrass Bhutto at every possible occasion. It also signaled to other provincial leaders that Bhutto was not prepared to work with them on terms other than her own"²⁶. Benazir Bhutto did not follow the policy of Nationalization which her father initiated in 1972. She was in favour of privatization. This change in her policy disappointed some of her colleagues in Pakistan People's Party. She could neither enforce her control, nor could she gain support

on her policies mainly because of raw leadership in her party lacking in political experience.

The fragmentary nature of political system in the post military phase had at least three levels of conflict: ideological, ethnic and personal. " In post military system a leader has to be firm and yet flexible and this system presents a challenge to the quality and skills of the leadership"²⁷. Benazir Bhutto had been very careful because her party fell prey to some religious, ethnic and other parochial groups which came into political process. The elections that were held in November 1988 brought individuals and political parties irrespective of their political differences to a platform to run a democratic process in the country. Ghulam Ishaq Khan had a vast experience as compared with Benazir Bhutto who was young, inexperienced but outspoken. With her skill, she tried her best to bring the country out of military hegemonic system in favour of a democratic political order.

In theory, the democratic process demands tolerance and consultation over controversies on the matters of national significance. For that purpose, the foremost duty of both the government in power as well as the opposition is to strive for an atmosphere of negotiation inside the parliament. Contrary to that, in Pakistan, the change was for a struggle between the leadership and the opposition.²⁸

However, the crisis was resolved on August 6, 1990 when President dismissed the Prime Minister and dissolved the assemblies with a promise for another elections in October. These elections were held on 24, and 27 October for National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies, respectively. As a result, Pakistan People's Party failed to secure more than two fifth votes actually cast. In this election Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI) had got the total

seats 105 which PPP along with the alliance got 45 seats²⁹. IJI won majority seats in National Assembly. Nawaz Sharif was elected leader of the House and Prime Minister of Pakistan. Benazir with PPP sat on the opposition benches. This was a healthy sign of democracy, as she accepted to play the role of opposition with an open heart. This election introduced some of provincial, regional and ethnic parties and this time Muhajir Qumi Movement (MQM) was the siding party of IJI. Awami National Party headed by Khan Abdul Wali Khan in North West Frontier Province and Jamhoori Wattan Party of Nawab Akbar Bugti in Balochistan gave up their separatist tendencies and resolved to work with IJI to develop a Pakistani nation³⁰.

- The government of IJI worked till July 1993. Both IJI and PPP had been in confrontation during this period. We think no service to the democratic institutions was rendered because both the parties were hostile to each other. The result of the 'tug of war' was dangerous for Nawaz Sharif Government. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan took the benefit of 8th amendment in the Constitution of 1973 and once again dismissed the Prime Minister and dissolved National Assembly. Elections were again held on October 6, 1993. In these elections PPP once again came into power while Muslim League (Nawaz Group) was second on the list. Benazir Bhutto after taking oath as Prime Minister assured the nation to solve the problems which they are confronting for the past four decades. She claims the inheritor of the party with the hand of the people that her father Z.A Bhutto had given in her custody. Her father in his letter to Benazir from the Central Jail Rawalpindi on June 21, 1978 on the occasion of her birth day remarked " The paradise of God lies under the feet of the people. What gift can I give you from the cell out of which my hand cannot pass? I give you the hand of the people. You are the heir to an inheritor of the most ancient civilization, the most progressive and the most

powerful"³¹.

CONCLUSION:

Pakistan existed in the form of parliamentary system where major two party system for the first time emerged in the history of Pakistan. The healthy traditions of democracy could not be installed in the polity. It was mainly due to illiteracy, lack of political training and institutions. The parliamentarians were mostly feudals from landed aristocracy or at the most industrialists. People by their actions, protested and demanded for a democratic government. Minor parties, including religious, demanded middle class participation in pursuit for Pakistan's ideological goals. Contrary to that, the politicians, despite having their mandate from the masses, forgot their promises and used autocratic tactics in the guise of democracy. In countries where democratic values are mature due share is given to the defeated parties and they have their voices in conducting the state affairs. But in society like Pakistan democratic values were always crushed by one political party or the other. Opposition always tried to defeat the government not only at the floor of the parliament but even at every nook and corner. However, future of democracy appears rather to be shining, provided military and bureaucracy both help in the process of democracy.

REFERENCES:

- 1) Anup Chand Kapur, *Principles of Political Science*, Delhi: Premier Publishing Co. 1957, pp. 234-235.
- 2) Dr. Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan*, Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1986. p.120
- 3) Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London: G.

Allen and Unwin 1968. p.125

- 4) Daily *Jang*, 5th July, 1947.
- 5) *Ibid.* 9th November, 1947
- 6) Riaz Ahmed, *Constitutional and Political Development in Pakistan*, Karachi: Pak American Commercial Ltd. 1981, pp. 23-24.
- 7) *Ibid.*, p.29.
- 8) *Ibid.*, p.78.
- 9) Golam W. Choudhury, *Pakistan: Transition from military to Civilian Rule*. England: Scorpion Publishing Ltd. 1988, p.19.
- 10) Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *The constitutional Foundations of Pakistan*. Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., (n.d) p.367.
- 11) G.W. Choudhry, op. cit., p.20
- 12) *Ibid.*, p.23
- 13) Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, England: Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, pp. 185-186
- 14) Saeed Shafquat, *Political system of Pakistan and Public Policy*. Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1989.p.35. P
- 15) Shahid Javeed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood*. Lahore: Pak. Book Corporation, 1991, p.61.
- 16) Saeed Shafqat, *op.cit.*, p.38
- 17) Shahid Javeed Burki, *op.cit.*, p.62
- 18) Dawn, July 6, 1977.
- 19) Government of Pakistan, *Ansari Commission's Report on Form of Government*. Islamabad, (n.d), p.vii.

- 20) Saeed Shafqat *op.cit.*, p. 75.
- 21) *Ibid.*, p.76.
- 22) *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, May 30, 1988.
- 23) *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 18, 1988
- 24) Shahid Javed Burki, *op.cit.*, p.96.
- 25) *Ibid.*, p.97.
- 26) *Ibid.*, p.101.
- 27) Saeed Shafqat, *op.cit.*, p.63.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p.67
- 29) *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, October 25, 1990.
- 30) Shahid Javeed Burki, *op.cit.*, p.108.
- 31) Sajjad Bokhari, *Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto: The Leader of Today*, Lahore: H. Fiction House, 1993, pp. 35-36.

LEADERSHIP IN BALOCHISTAN.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS.

Mrs. Neelam Firdous and Nadir Bakht.

Balochistan has been conventionally a tribal society. Its tribal culture has emerged from the traditional, nomadic life. The Balochs have been leading the free, nomadic tribal life,¹. The baloch carvans along with their livestock have been roaming about in search of water, meadows in mountains, Vales of Balochistan, and Southern Punjab. Traditionally they have democratic institutions of tribal chiefs and Jirga system. The elder of the group (later transformed into tribe) used to act as their chief and the protection of life, honour and properties of the tribe was the duty of the tribal chief,². He used to discharge his duties in consultation with the elders of tribe. Hence, with the passage of time developed a democratic and just tribal system, supervised by the sardar or the tribal chief, among the Blochs,³.

Their (Baloch) tribes, for centuries together, has been living free of any central government's control, in the Vales of Balochistan, and in some other regions, now parts of Punjab and Sindh. When any power tried to snatch their freedom the lofty and high mountains became their forts and provided them strong fortifications for defence; and the snatchers of their conventional, historical, traditional liberty met with total failure. Their chiefs have been kind, merciful, cooperative and best custodians of their lives, honour and property.⁴

Their leadership emerged from themselves, stayed with them and worked with them,. The tribal chief has been a symbol of prestige and honour for them. On many occasions their tribal

chiefs sacrificed their lives for the honour of the tribe. The British expansionists, for the promotion of their imperialistic designs made every effort to occupy the mineral treasures and enslave the tigers of the Vales; but the freedom fighters kindled the light of freedom by providing the fuel of their hot blood. The leaders of the time like those, had the characteristics discussed by psychologists and political scientists in their research works.

Leadership & its characteristics.

Before analyzing the role of the leadership it seems better to discuss various dimensions of leadership and the literary origins of leadership.

Historically the concept of leadership was derived from leadership in religious sectarian setting or in groups of primary relationships. Leadership is a world wide used phenomenon to indicate a person who is capable of handling people under numerous conditions. Literarely the term leadership refers to authoritative control, guidance, exert and exercise authority; capacity to lead and having ingredients of personality which cause men to follow,⁵.

There is a great variety of ways in which one individual stands out from others in social situations and in which one may said therefore, to be "leading" the others. Leading implies a shared direction; and this in turn , often implies that all parties to the leadership relation have a common goal or at least similar or compatible goals. Hollander & Julian say, "leader" influence suggest a positive contribution toward attainment of these goals,⁶. Thus , any act of leading implies an inter individual relationship and leading is one form of inter individual influence. Simply the leadership is the act of leading " with four basic elements on this

relation. As Hollander & Julian pointed out that:

1. The leader, with his characteristics of ability and personality and his resources relevant to goal attainment.
2. The followers who also have relevant abilities, personality characteristics & resources.
3. The situation within which the relationship occurs.
4. The task with which the interacting individuals are confronted⁷.

Many psychologists have defined the term leadership as quoted by Andrews, "Dubin explained, Leadership is the exercise of authority and the making of decisions. Hemphil defined, leadership is the initiation of acts which result in a consistent pattern of group interaction directed toward the solution of mutual problems. Stogdill explained, leadership is the processes of influencing group activities towards goal setting and goal achievement. Cattell pointed out, the leader is the person who created the most effective change in group performance. Reuter explained, leadership is an ability to persuade or direct men without use of the prestige or power of formal office or external circumstance"⁸.

one of the earliest definitions, still widely adopted, Pigors, who indicated that leadership is the concept applied to the personality environment relation to describe the situation when a personality is so placed in the environment that his "will" feeling and insight direct and control others in the pursuit of common cause. Viewing the concept of leadership many questions arise to answer, for example, what are the characteristics of a successful leader? What precisely leaders do and what kinds of leaders are the most

successful and effective?⁹.

Recent researches conclude that a man becomes a leader not only because of personality attributes also on the basis of various situational factors and the interaction between the leader's personality and the situation. Many psychologists have studied leaders and leadership for example, Bass, Krech and Crutchfield, Carter and shaw etc. and concluded, two major theories identify the characteristics of leadership. The trait or universal and situational characteristics make a man leader. It means some individuals are born leaders and some individuals are made leaders by the situation. In recent years, both the trait (or universal) and situational theory; have given way to the transactional theory; this theory assumes that both the characteristics of persons and demands of situation determine, who becomes leader.

Regarding psychological aspects, a leader however is one who is respectfully perceived to perform acts of leading and who holds influence over other members. It depends on the style of leader that what type of leadership will be more effective. whether authoritarian, democratic or laissez, as:

- 1) In authoritarian type, leader tells the group what they should do.
- 2) The democratic leader guides the group into making its own decisions.
- 3) The laissez fair leader responds only when he is asked to by the group.¹⁰.

Politically it is true that only effective leadership can furnish integrative direction as a cure to sick societies. The concept of

leadership was reinforced with research on primitive government institution, e.g, tribal chiefs and leaders of small city states vested with absolute authority. Such studies confirmed the notion of status and hierarchy to the concept of leadership. Power and authority is well understood and exercised even in modern and civilized societies,¹¹.

Throughout the history, there have been the evidences of leadership, with trait and situational theories, George Washington, Queen Victoria, Hitler and in Sub-continent, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Nehru and Gandhi are the examples of trait theory, whereas sometimes situation creates a leader, for example, the emergence of Sant Gernail Singh Bhindranwala during the famous event of Golden Temple. Usually, it happens that when the situation is over, the leader is also out of sight, whereas trait theory produces long lasting leader for example, the renowned figure of Muslim history "Hazrat Umar".

The concept of leadership in developed countries exercises a little bit different practice. Here the population enjoys the democratic leadership in which people and leader have more coordination and communication and as well as people have liberty to make their decisions. Shaw concluded that followers are happier in groups with democratic leaders,¹². The democratic leadership flourishes in developed countries because of high rate of education among people, where people well understand the roles of leaders and as well as leaders also realize their responsibilities in achieving group goals and objectives.

Leadership in Balochistan.

After having detailed discussion on the pre-requisites, classifications, qualities, characteristics and objectives of leadership, let us switch over to the application of this criteria over

the leadership and we endeavour to gauge the heights and levels of these characteristics concentrated in these personalities. The leadership, in Balochistan has many golden and historical adventures, achievements at its credit. They struggled very hard to protect and maintain their freedom, honour and integrity. The study of the psychological and political dimensions of leadership presents a clear picture of selfless devoted and freedom loving, popularly, conventionally, chosen leaders. The high mountains had established high morality in them and when so ever their honour and integrity was challenged they protected it by the sword and saved their traditional liberty,. But we regret to say that some Baloch leaders has also been at daggers drawn, Mir Chakkar and Mir Gawahram had been fighting against each other for about twenty five years and their war crushed the Balochs by Balochs,¹³. Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri believes that with an army of about 90 thousand soldiers he (mir Chakkar) could establish a strong empire,¹⁴. It is also believed that had there been a great ambition or the greater empire. Mir Chakkar could conquer even India with such a big brave army as Zaheer-ud-Din Baber did with a very small army of about 26 thousand,¹⁵. Here the psychological and political analysis present Mir Chakkar Kahn in quite a different model where he, beside his marshal power could not lead his nation to the glory and he did not own the universal characteristics hence he just destroyed his own nation by his deficiencies,¹⁶.

Mir Chakkar Khan at a later stage realized his wrong decision and said that he had lost every thing in this futile war and nothing had left for them rather this useless and futile war has brought miseries and disaster to him and his nation,¹⁷. Mir Rameen, the son of Mir Gawahram killed a few camels of Mst. Gohar Jatni who has been in the protection of Mir Chakkar. Mir Chakkar attacked Mir Gawahram to take revenge of the killing of these camels,

hence the disasterious war started between both the leaders which ultimately ruined all the two with their men and material¹⁸. This war (Baloch vs Baloch) brought both of them to a complete destruction.

Conclusion.

There are various factors which form personality of the leader. the leadership in Balochistan seems to own almost all the qualities of a leader narrated in the "trait" theory of leadership; but we regret to say that the leadership could not attain ever cherished objectives and could not bring laurels to their men. Why it was so, it was because the leadership could not concentrate on the central point and the personalities could not articulate all of their resources to strengthen their nation. Had they reconsider their strategies then the history could narrate different tails of bravery ad wisdom.

It is also concluded that leaders of most groups and organizations in modern and civilized society rely on coercion or "brute force"¹⁹. To maintain their obtained standards and to not allow to shift the leadership from their families. Hence, the leadership is suggested to adopt democratic, popular styles and devices to give mass participation in decision making process, which had been a normal practice in classical Baloch Society; The democratization will enhance their status & height in the tribal civic society; and they will lead their nation to the destiny of success and prosperity.

REFERENCE

- 1) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*, (Urdu) Pg.7, 1994, Frontier Post Publications, Lahore.
- 2) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*,

- (Urdu) 1994, Frontier Post Publications, Lahore.
- 3) Janmohammad, *The Baloch cultural Heriage*, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1982.
 - 4) Professor Bugti has elaborated Baloch Political Culture and tribalism in detail. For further information please see, *Balochistan Political Culture and tribalism*, Fiction House 1995, Lahore.
 - 5) Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Govt B,P, 1986, U.S.A.
 - 6) *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Sills, L.David, 1968, New York.
 - 7) Fiedler. E.F, *A THEORY OF LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS*, 1967, Mcgraw-Hill Inc, U.S.A.
 - 8) *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*. Sills, L. David, 1968, New York.
 - 9) Mckeachie. J.W. and Doyle. L. c. *Psychology*, Second Edition, 1970, U.S.A. and Canada.
 - 10) Fiedler. E.F, *A THEORY OF LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS*, 1967, Mcgraw-Hillo Inc, U.S.A.
 - 11) *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Sills, L. David, 1968, New York.
 - 12) Mckeachie. J. W. and Doyle. L. c, *Psychology*. Second Edition, 1970, U.S.A, and Canada.
 - 13) Gashkori, Mohd Sardar Khan, Vol 1,P. 93-94.
 - 14) Justice Mir Khuda Bux Merri, *Balochistan Tareekh Ki-Aieny Mein*, Vol, 1, P. 294.
 - 15) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*, (Urdu) P.38, 1994, Frontier Post publications, Lahore.

- 16) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*, (Urdu) P.39, 1994, Frontier Post Publications, Lahore.
- 17) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*, (Urdu) P.39, 1994, Frontier Post Publications, Lahore.
- 18) Bugti, Aziz Mohd, *Balochistan, Shakhshiat-ki-Ainey Mein*, (Urdu) P.44, 1994, Frontier Post Publications, Lahore.
- 19) Krech & Crutch Field and Ballachiey. L.E, *Individual in Society*, 1963, McGraw-Hill, U.S.A.

ULEMA AND MASHAIKH'S ROLE IN PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

Ghulam Sarwar Rana

The preaching of religion had started along with the advent of Islam in the Sub-Continent Pakistan and India and Muhammad bin Qasim gave more importance to religious preaching than Conquest. Muslim conquerors, traders and Ulema took full part in the propagation of Islam. But the measure of success achieved by the great mystics in this field could not be matched by any body else. They arranged religious education side by side the propagation and continued both the missions with unrivalled perseverance. It was much before Sultan Mahmood of Ghazna that Hazrat Sheikh Safi ud Din Gaazroomi had settled in Uch Sharif, the famous spiritual center of Bahawalpur. A large number of people embraced Islam as a result of his preaching Hazrat Ismail Bukhari had started teaching Quran and Hadith (traditions in Lahore) before the arrival of Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi in the Sub-Continent. He was followed by Abu'l Hassan Ali bin Usman Hujweri, known as Data Gunj Bakhsh, one of the earliest and the most venerated of Muslim Mashaikhs of Pakistan and India, who flourished in the eleventh century¹. His reputation as a practising Sufi and as the author of the most celebrated and widely read treatise on the principles of Sufism and the practices of the Sufis has stood the test of time as well as the physical limits of geography and sectarian and national man-made barriers.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century his magnum opus, the *Kashful Mahjub* has attracted the attention of European orientalists, who have done much to re-awaken interest in the study of Mysticism². According to Philipp Hitti. Mysticism traces its origin to the Quran and Hadith³.

Though religious scholars and eminent Mashaikh's did priceless service to Islam and played a brimful role in strengthening the roots of Islam in the Sub-Continent and enlightened every corner with spiritual miracles and benefaction, yet more effort was required to keep the light of Islam burning. The modus operandi of these Muslim Mashaikh's was to serve the oppressed people of their area, to protect them against the tyrannies of Royal Courtiers and government functionaries⁴.

Hazrat Bhauddin Zakariya of Multan an eminent saint of Suhrawardy order has been a very successful preacher. He used to take to the emperor the applications of the victims. Muslims and non-Muslims of feudal lords and government functionaries through his persistent and devoted efforts in South Western Punjab. He brought into the fold of Islam a large number of tribes of which Khichchi tribe is worth mentioning. One of his disciples, Moosa Nawab brought Andhraar and Jhak Tribes into the fold of Islam. His another disciple, Hazrat Jalalud Din Bukhari, converted Chaddhar, Sial, Daahar and Waaran tribes to Islam. Kharal, Munj and some other tribes embraced Islam at the hands of his grand son Hazrat Makhdoom Jahanian, Jahan Gasht.⁵

Similarly another Sufi Saint of Suhrawardi cult, Hazrat Sayeed Ahmad commonly known as Sakhi Sarwar, had started preaching in Punjab before the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate and converted to Islam many tribes of which Jaat tribe is the most prominent. Hazrat Shahbaz Qalander and Haji Ishaq Sindhi spread Islam in Sind. Sheikh Jalal ud Din Tabraizi Suhrawardy and Hazrat Jalalud Din Mujarrad Sylhati were active in North Bengal and Assam.⁶

The greatest Saint of the Chishtiya order Sultan ul Hind,

Hazrat Khawaja Mueenud Din Chishti Sanjari Ajmeri spread the light of Islam in Rajputana. On the way to Ajmer, he stayed in Delhi for a short while and converted countless persons to Islam. His disciples propagated Islam in every part of the country. He set up preaching centers in many cities of Rajisthan. Pure Muslim localities like Nagore, Sawaalay and Khaalo came into existence through his efforts. Hazrat Khawaja Qutbud-Din Bakhtiar Kaaki spread Islam around Delhi. Hazrat Baba Farid-ud-Din Ganj Shakar Muslimised Wattoo, Sial and Tiwaana tribes. He has a great role in converting tribes of Southern Punjab to Islam. His grand son Hazrat Taj-ud-Din Muslimised Rajput tribes in Bikanair and continued his mission despite intense opposition of non-Muslim Rajputs.⁷

Hazrat Khawaja Nizam-ud-Din Mahboob-i-Ellahi continued preaching around Delhi and sent his outstanding Caliph Hazrat Burhan-ud-Din Ghareeb, alongwith his forty companions to preach Islam in Deccan. Hazrat Shah Kaleem Ullah Jahanabadi, Hazrat Khawaja Noor Muhammad Maharvi, Hafiz Muhammad Jamaal Multani, Hazrat Khawaja Shams-ud-Din Sialvi, Hafiz Peer Meher Ali Shah Golarvi, Hazrat Peer Haider Ali Shah Jalalpuri, Khawaja Ghulam Farid of Chaachraan Sharif, Hazrat Mian Shah Muhammad Chishti Hashiarpuri, Hazrat Mian Meherban Ali Chishti Gaushankary (buried in Dalla Germian, Sheikhupura) and Peer Amin Shah Bhervi have been spreading the Chishtiya order.⁸

From Qaadiria cult, Hazrat Sayyed Muhammad Ghaus Qaadri, Shah Sikandar Kethli, Hazrat Mian Mir, Shah Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dehlavi and Shah Abu-ul Maali Lahori converted thousands of people to Islam in their respective areas. A Caliph of Hazrat Muhammad Ghaus Qaadri Hazrat Makhdoom Sher Shah brought nearly 1,25,000 persons into the fold of Islam. Later the

preaching activities of Aala Hazrat Faazil Brelvi are as illuminating as a bright day. He not only brought the non-Muslims on the right path, but also launched a jihad against non believers. Other luminaries in this field include Hazrat Khawaja Abdur Rehman of Bharchoondi Sharif, Syed Deedar Ali Shah Alwari, Maulana Shah Naeem-ud Din Muradabadi and Maulana Sardar Ahmed Faisalabadi.⁹

An eminent personage of Naqshbandia order Hazrat Khawaja Baaqi Billa, Caliph of Hazrat Khawaja Amalagi Came to India on the direction of his Peer, who said, "Go to India, where your great order shall flower". He made Delhi the centre of his preaching and spread Islam through his activities.

And Almighty Allah chose Hazrat Khawaja Baaqi Billah and Mujaddad Alf Saani for the improvement of the situation in the dark and dinghy period of Akbar and Jahangir. The Hindus were always in overwhelming majority as regards the population and as such the unit with them would automatically amount to the finishing up of their (Muslims) Individuality as a separate Nation in the Sub-Continent. This type of ideology for the first time appears to be working in the days of Mughal Emperor Akbar (963-1014 A.H), when in the form of Deen-e-Elahi what was really intended to merge Islam into Hinduism. At that time Mujaddad Alf-e-Saani the greater Muslim Mystic appeared on the scene and sternly opposed the Deen-e-Ellahi of Akbar at the risk of his life. Through his writings (i.e letters) the Mujaddad proved the supremacy and self-dependence of Islam.

In the same period another eminent personality of Naqshbandia order, Khawaja Khaawind Mahmood, known as Hazrat Eeshaan, was busy in preaching Islam. He found his way into Kashmir through the efforts of Hazrat Ameer Kabeer Sayyad

Ali Hamadani, and it was he and his colleagues, who converted the valley into the Muslim majority area. Similarly Hazrat Mujaddid's sons Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Maasoom and Hazrat Muhammad Saeed and his Caliphs did remarkable work in this field¹⁰.

In the recent past, Saaeen Tawakul Shah Ambaalvi, Shah Abul Kher Dehlavi, Syed Meer Jaan Kabuli, Shere Rabbani (Lion of God) Hazrat Mian Sher Muhammad Sharaquri, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah Saani (the Second) Alipuri, Hazrat Peer Hafiz Jammal Ali Shah Muhaddis Alipuri are illuminating candles of Naqshbandia order¹¹.

Allama Fazle Haq Khairabadi was a courtier and adviser of Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah. He took active part in the independence movement and it was due to him that this movement got prominence. He was the dead enemy of the British Imperialists and wanted to throw them out of the country¹².

Muslim came to India as conquerors and ruled in the Sub-continent for over a period of one thousand years. Naturally, therefore, it were the Muslims, who could and really they did resist the British in taking over the rule of the Sub-Continent and that is really what we find in the 1857 struggle for independence.

Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan is known as the Imam-e-Ihle-Sunnat, because of his outstanding services rendered for the cause of Islam and particularly in saving the Islamic Faith from destruction at the hands of the Wahabis and also because of the stand he took against the political movement of the Hindu Muslim Unity. Banning of cow slaughter and Non-Co-operation against the British Government, all these movements had in fact been started at the instance of the Indian National Congress and the

real purpose of these movements was to merge the Muslims into a Hindu majority. Thus he was in fact the real originator of the Two Nation Theory, which later on became the basic slogan of the All India Muslim League and resulted in the achievement of Pakistan.¹³

The urge to uproot the British Rule remained active and the candle of independence continued to burn in the hearts and soul of the Muslims for ever, in order to rush this innate urge and finish it up once for all, therefore, the British-cum-Hindu diplomacy took up other tactics. One such tactic was the idea of Hindu-Muslim Unity which actually was planned by the Hindus.

Muslim community was against the leadership of Mr. Gandhi Outrightly and let it be stated with absolute frankness that Muslims in general did not like the leadership of non-Muslim in any movement, however beneficial to them and Mahatma Gandhi's lead in the matter was highly resented¹⁴.

According to Dr. Lal Bahadar it was openly remarked that the Ulema who regarded the Holy Quran as the last guide in all matters could hardly feel the need of following the lead of a non-Muslim. The Muslims feared lest they should loose their separate identity under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi"¹⁵

The most eminent theologian of Ahl-i-Sunnat School was Maulana Ahmad Rida Khan of Bareilly. He was born at Bareilly on 14th June, 1856. He was a jurist of eminence, his intellect was penetrating and his rulings commanded respect. The poet of East Sir Muhammad Iqbal wrote about him "the Maulana's rulings bear witness to his intelligence, his intellectual calibre, the quality of his creative thinking, his juristic competence and the profundity of his theological learning.....if there had been no extremism in his

temperament, he would have been Imam Abu Hanifa of his times". The extremism of which Allama Iqbal has alluded refers to Maulana Ahmad Rida Khan's attitude towards some leaders of the Deoband School and his action in holding them outside the pale of Islam¹⁶.

In the beginning of the Khilafat Movement Ali Brothers went to him convincing him to affix his signatures on the fatwa regarding Non-cooperation. He is reported to have replied, "Maulana, our politics are different to your support of the Hindu-Muslim Unity. I oppose it". When he saw that they were annoyed he said, "Maulana, I am not opposed to Political freedom, but I am opposed to Hindu Muslim Unity" ¹⁷

Ahmad Rida Khan's caliphs are spreading far and wide all over India and Pakistan and also in the Islamic world nearly 35 Islamic States and 30 in Indo-Pak Sub-Continent¹⁸.

Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan was pious like Ahmad bin Hanbal and Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani. He had true acumen and insight of Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Abu Yousaf. He commended the force of logic like Razi and Ghazali, bold enough like Mujaddid Alf-e-Saani and Mansoor Hallaj to proclaim the truth. Indeed he was tolerant to non-believers, kind and sympathetic to devotees and affectionate of Holy Prophet as per version of Justice Syed Shujaat Ali Qadri¹⁹

Mr. Justice Naeem-ud-Din of the Supreme Court of Pakistan has rightly pointed out, Imaam Ahmed Raza's grand personality, a representation of our most esteemed ancestors, is history making, and a history unicentral in it self.

You may estimate his high place from the fact that he spent all

his life time in expressing the praise of the great and auspicious Holy Prophet(P.B.U.H) in defending his veneration in delivering speeches regarding his good conduct (Seerat-i-Tayyaba) and in promoting and spreading the law of Shariah, which was revealed upon him for the entire humanity for all times. His renowned name is "Muhammad" the Prophet of Allah the Almighty (P.B.U.H). The valuable books written by the cyclopaedic scholar like Imam Ahmad Raza the "Lamp of Light" in my view, which will keep enlightened and radiant the hearts and minds of the man of knowledge and insight for a long time²⁰.

Actually Mashaikh's role in the Pakistan Movement is a bright chapter in Muslim History. Due to the eminent Divine's support of Mashaikhs to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League, the goal of Pakistan would have remained a far cry and a dream. When the pro-Congress Ulema were Showering Volleys of Fatwas dubbing Hazrat Quadi-e-Azam and the Muslim League, a party of infidels, it were the Mashaikh who gave all the support to the Muslim League by exhorting their disciples to join the Pakistan Movement. Hence it is an undeniable fact that nothing is left if these divine's role is taken out of the Pakistan Movement²¹.

Allama Iqbal highlighting the dynamism of Naqshbandi order wrote; "This is an order of freedom loving militants. Imam Rabbani Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi Mujaddid Alf-e-Saani, Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Maasoom, Hazrat Khawaja Safi ud Din and Ameer-e-Millat Peer Sayyed Jamaat ali Shah belong to the same order. They rose up and entered the field of Jehaad, and after bringing the religious leaders out of monastries exhorted them to confront the enemies of Islam²²".

Amir-i-Millat Peer Jamaat Ali Shah (1841-1951) toured the entire Sub-Continent and awoke the Muslims from their deep

slumber. He played a commendable and vital role in resisting the onslaught of hipocracy and the Shuddhi Movement and took full part in Khilafat Movement, Tehreek-e-Hijrat, Kashmir Liberation and Aligarh University and Shaheed Ganj Mosque, Hijrat Movements and Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam, in short all movements concerning Muslaim interests. When All India Muslim League was founded in Dacca in 1906 for the safeguard of the right of the Muslims he volunteered his support. He directed the followers to support the Muslim League. A renowned activist of the Pakistan Movement, Peerzada Muhammad Anwar Chishti states, "In 1936 Peer Sahib told my father that he wanted his son (Anwar) to devote his life for the Muslim League as a soldier of Hazrat Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. During a hot mid day in April, 1936, when All India Muslim League Working Committee session was going on in Barkat Ali Muhammadan Hall of Moachi Gate, says. I presented during the interval my spiritual and temporal father's letters to Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah introducing me to him as a very good speaker and saying that we have dedicated this young man's life for the Muslim League. Both of them praised my eloquence and asked Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah to accept me as his soldier. Highly pleased at this gesture of dedication Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah addressing Maulana Shaukat Ali Said; "This youngman is our first crusader in Montgomery (now Sahiwal District)"²³.

In April 1938, Hazrat Ameer-e-Millat toured Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Kohat. After exposing the underlying reality of the Congress Policy, he gave convincing arguments in favour of Muslim League in his speeches. He exhorted the Muslims to unite under the banner of Islam, because Hindus can never be the well-wishers of the Muslims. In 1944, he addressed a big meeting at Dasoocha (Hoshiarpur) and explained the importance of Muslim League and also exposed the mechinations of the Hindus, and the

Britishers who were encouraging Aarya Samaajists and Brahmans²⁴.

In 1946 an event was described by Maulana Hasrat Mohani (Leader of freedom Movement) as under:-

"One day I reached Quaid-e-Azam's house after the morning prayer believing that, he will be alone and accessible for a chat to my heart's content. The servant seated me in the drawing room and himself went to inform Hazrat Quaid-e-Azam. Sitting there my eyes fell on an inner door which opened into a side room. Maulana got up and after lifting the curtain peeped through the door to see who was inside. There was light inside in a corner of the room, some gentleman was prostrating on the prayer rug towards the Qibla before his creator. In this state of prostration, his entire body was shivering as if overcome by an intense emotion". Maulana Hazrat Mohani says the gentleman was nobody else, but Hazrat Muhammad Ali Jinnah, remonstrating before the creator of the universe²⁵.

In 1945, a declaration in favour of Pakistan Movement was issued by Hazrat Ameer-e-Millat entitled as "Pakistan Movement, and the Saints". The notable idea of the declaration was that Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah is the best advocate of the Muslim Cause and Muslim League is the only representative Party of Muslims. So all of them should unite for the struggle of Pakistan. His proclamation was favoured and supported by all the Mashaikhs of the Sub-Continent including Sajjada Nasheen of Gurdaspur, Hazrat Sayyed Muhammad Fazal Shah, Amir Hizbullah Jalalpur sharif, Hazrat Mian Meharban Ali Sajjada Nasheen Garhshankar Sharif (Hoshiarpur), Hazrat Mian Ali Muhammad Bassi Sharif, Hazrat Ghulam Saddidud Din Taunsa Sharif, Hazrat Sayyed Muhammad Hussain Sukhu Chak Gurdaspur. During the Annual

meeting of Muslim League in 1945, he delivered his Presidential address and said, "Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan put forward the two-nation theory and Allama Iqbal impressed the people that now Mr. Jinnah took upon himself the duty of materializing this two-nation theory demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims. It is an accepted rule and principle that an experienced lawyer is always engaged whether for a Muslim or non-Muslim in a case. Now our case is against the Britishers and Hindus and Muslims have engaged Quaid-e-Azam as their pleader²⁶.

On September, 1945, biweekly "Al Amaan" published Hazrat Sayyed Jamaat Ali's statement appealing to the Muslims to vote for the Muslim League candidates. He also emphasized and said, "May Allah give long life to Mr. Jinnah, who is the only leader of the Muslims and really deserves the title of Quaid-e-Azam"²⁷.

Hazrat Pir Manki Sharif personally came and offered his unconditional support. Pir Sahib said, "It is the time to serve Islam and the nation. Let us give a helping hand to Mr. Jinnah". Obeying the orders of Pir Jamaat Ali, Pir Sahib Manki Sharif called a conference of eminent scholars, Mashaikhs in Naushehra (Peshawar) to speed up the Muslim League campaign in N.W.F.P. This conference was headed by Hazrat Pir Maasoom Badshah Naqshbandi Chora Sharif (Attock) and Hazrat Amee-e-Millat was the guest of honour. More than five hundred intellectuals and leading scholars including Syed Muhammad Naeem-ud-Din Muradabadi, Maulana Abdul Hameed Badauni, Peer Sahib Taunsa Sharif, Khan Ghulam Sadid-ud-Din, Peer Muhammad Abdul Latif of Zakodi Sharif, Haji Fazle Haq, Peer Sahib Karbogha Sharif attended this conference. He strongly supported Mr. Jinnah and Muslim League in his illuminating address. All the participants promised to sacrifice their belongings for the cause of Pakistan²⁸.

On 30th October, 1945, the daily Wahdat published his earthshaking statement in favour of Muslim League. He said; "Allover India Muslim League is the only political party which is protecting Muslims' rights. So it is binding on every Muslim to help the Muslim League. Those who are opposed to Muslim League are the foes of Islam. Therefore, it is binding on the Muslims not to attend their funeral prayers and do not allow them to bury their dead ones in their graveyards"²⁹.

The annual meeting of All India Sunni Conference was to be held in Banaras. Congress Leaders conspired to disrupt the meeting. They prepared a resolution according to which Mr. Jinnah was denounced as an infidel and apostate. Hazrat Peer Sahib got wind of the plan, but remained cool. When he stood up to deliver Presidential address, he spoke in a voice, "People dub Jinnah as infidel, but I call him a Saint. People express their opinion, but I say it in the light of Quran and Hadith.

"Those who believe in their Allah and obey Him, Allah creates love and reverence for them in the hearts of the People (Quran)"

On this occasion a Committee was constituted to formulate a programme and strategy for Islamic Government comprising of the religious leaders; (1) Sadrul Afaazil Hazrat Maulana Sayyed Muhammad Naeem ud Din Muradabadi (2) Sadrus Shariat Hazrat Maulana Muhammad Amjad Ali Azami (3) Muballigh-e-Islam Hazrat Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui Merathi (4) Mujahid-e-Islam Hazrat Pir Abdur Rehman Bharchondi Sharif of Sind (5) Hazrat Pir Muhammad Amin ul Hasnat Manki Sharif (6) Hazrat Maulana Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri Lahori (7) Muhaddis-e-Azam Hind Hazrat Syed Muhammad Muhaddis Kachhochvi (8) Fakhre-Ahl-e-Sunnat Maulana Muhammad Abdul

Hamid Badayuni (9) Hazrat Pir Syed Aale-Rasool Ali Khan Ajmeer Sharif (10) Hazrat Al-Haj Bukhshi Mustafa Ali Khan Mysori Madni (11) Hazrat Maulana Barkaat (12) Mufti-e-Azam Hind Hazrat Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan Brelvi (13) Sheikhul Islam Kh. Muhammad Qamar-ud-Din Sial Sharif³⁰.

On 14th August, 1947, Muslims of India achieved an independent State after a long and hectic struggle. Pir Jamaat Ali sent greeting telegrams to Mr. Jinnah and other leaders. He wrote to Mr. Jinnah, "To achieve a country is easy, but to run a country is very difficult. May Allah bless you with the ability to run the country". He died on 30th August, 1951 at the age of 110 years³¹.

Pir Sahib Manki Sharif Hazrat Pir Muhammad Aminul Hasnaat (1923-60) son of Pir Abdul Rauf was born in Peshawar. He took active part in Pakistan Movement. In 1945 he invited Quaid-e-Azam to visit N.W.F.P. Quaid-i-Azam stayed in Peshawar for many days and also visited Manki Sharif. Surkhposh planned to attack Quaid-e-Azam. When Pir Sahib came to know of this plan, his disciples stood on both sides of the road with weapons in their hands. In such a way Quaid's conveyance safely reached Manki Sharif. Congress and Surkhposh influence declined in N.W.F.P. due to his hard work and Muslim League became popular. Sarhaddi Gandhi Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib had a firm hold on the N.W.F.P. only Pir Sahib had the guts to neutralize their influence³². He took an active part in organizing the anti-Nehru demonstrations during Nehru's Frontier visit in Oct, 1946, played an important role in the Civil Disobedience Movement against the Frontier Congress Ministry, remarkable part in the referendum, organized the tribal raids on Kashmir³³.

In 1945 Quaid-e-Azam wrote a letter to Pir Sahib "I am

reaching Peshawar on the 20th to attend the Frontier Conference and I am looking forward to meeting you personally and have the pleasure and the honour to talk with you"³⁴.

After the creation of Pakistan, he led "Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat" alongwith Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, under the guidance and leadership of Pir Jamaat Ali Shah. He also complained to Liaquat Ali Khan that the promised Islamic Law were not enforced and condemned the Provisional regime of Hon'able Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan for its oppressive rule. To improve the economic conditions of the people of Hazara, a factory should be opened at Abbotabad. As the people of Hazara were poor and already burried under taxes. The house tax should be rescinded. P.C.R and other black laws should be repealed and Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, Master Khan Gul and other persons convicted under these laws should be released or tried in open court³⁵.

He was well acquainted with every thing and pointed out that Rs.63000/- had been provided for the construction of bungalows for the Hon'able Minister and Rs.70000/- for the increase in the C.I.D staff to Combad Commission in the budget for the current year. He contrasted that 33% of the budget expenditure on Police in N.W.F.P against 12% in Punjab³⁶.

The leadership of the Barelvi group of Ulema passed into the hands of Maulana Naeem-ud-Din of Muradabad. He unlike the Ulema of Jami'at-i-Ulema-i-Hind was convinced early, sometime in 1938 and 1939, that the British would not be able to retain their hold on the Sub-Continent for long. To him the question as to who would inherit the power was crucial. He reached the conclusion that the Muslim majority Provinces should be constitute into a separate State. Therefore, when the Pakistan resolution was

passed, the Ulema belonging to this School of thought, who had supported the Muslim League even earlier in its struggle against the Congress, decided to work for the establishment of Pakistan. The organization was given a new constitution and a new name: from All India Sunni Conference it became "Jamhuriya-i-Islamiyah". The body was so pledged to Pakistan that Maulana Naeem-ud-Din said in a letter addressed to Maulana Abu-ul-Hasnaat, the organizer of Punjab Branch, Jamhuriyah-i-Islamiyah can in no circumstances give up the demand for Pakistan, whether Mr. Jinnah himself remains its supporter or not. Our purpose is not served with Cabinet Mission Proposals³⁷.

Pir Abdur Rehman (1892-1960) and his son Pir Abdul Rahim (1910-1971) rendered commendable services in the Pakistan Movement. Jamaat-e-Ahyaa-e-Islam was founded to organise Sindhi Muslims. All the Mashaikh were united under the banner of "Jammiat-ul-Mashaikh". Both the Parties went on creating favourable climate for the Muslim League. A newspaper "Al Jamaat" was also introduced. When both the parties became popular, they merged themselves with Muslim League in the annual session held in 1943 in Karachi. During the struggle for Pakistan, British Government demanded of Quaid-e-Azam to prove his majority in the Assemblies of Muslim majority provinces. At this critical juncture Pir Abu Rehan Rehman Bharchoondvi met with all the Muslim members of Sind Assembly, majority of whom were politically Congressites. On his instruction they willingly voted for Pakistan Movement. British and Hindues were disappointed as they were not prepared for such a turn of event³⁸.

Hazrat Mian Meharban Ali Chishti Garhshankari was the son of Hazrat Mian Qurban Ali Chishti. He took an active part in the Pakistan Movement like Hazrat Mian Ghulam Ullah Sharqपुरi. He neutralized the influence of Unionist Party and Ahrar to some

extent in Garhshankar Distt. Hoshiarpur. Number of Muslim League meetings were convened at the Haveli of Rtd. Subedar Major Niaz Ahmad Khan and Dargah Sharif of Hazrat Mian Umar-ud-Din Garhshankari. Hazrat Mian Sahib used to preside over all the Muslim League meetings and provide every possible support till the creation of Pakistan.³⁹

Hazrat Pir Syed Ghulam Muhi-ud-Din (1891-74) son of Pir Syed Mehr Ali Shah (1859-1937) of Golra Sharif actively participated in Pakistan Movement. Famous journalist and an active worker of Pakistan Movement Mian Muhammad Shafi (1914-93) a witness about his services: "In the Sub-Continent when the battle of truth and untruth was fought in the fifth decade of the present century and Muslims demanded the right of self-determination for the elevation of Islam from the Muslim League platform, Pir Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din was one of those Mashaikhs of Punjab, who wholeheartedly supported Quaid-e-Azam. He appealed to his myriad disciples to struggle for the Muslim League's victory in general elections. The greatness of their characters could be judged by the fact that Unionist leaders Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana (1900-1975) and Nawab Allah Bakhsh Tiwana were the disciples of Golra Sharif and Sial Sharif, but Kh. Muhammad Qamr-ud-Din Sialvi and Kh. Syed Ghulam Muhy-ud-Din Golarvi boldly supported Muslim League in the larger national interests of the Muslims of India⁴⁰.

Hazrat Pir Abdul Latif Zakori Sharif bin Pir Muhammad Abdul Qadir joined N.W.F.P Muslim League in 1935 to serve the Muslims in political and social fields, besides his mission of spiritual and religious guidance. In the Muslim Leagues session which passed the Pakistan Resolution 1940, he participated with thousands of disciples. In the elections of 1945-46 and the referendum in N.W.F.P, he played a vital role. The colour of the

Congress ballot box was red and that of Muslim League green in the referendum. Pir Sahib used these colours with metaphorical connotations in his speeches. "Gentleman, flames of hell are red, faces of British are red a face of a Monkey is red, destructive hurricane is red and the box of infidels is also red, whosoever casts votes into red box, would be thrown into the red flames of hell, on the other hand, gardens are green Roza-e-Mubarak is green, Robe of Hazrat Ali and banner of Hazrat Imam Hussain are green, flag and ballot box of Muslim League are also green, whosoever votes for Muslim League shall live happily in the lush gardens of the Heaven⁴¹.

Hazrat Khawaja Qamar-ud-Din Sialvi (1906-1981) did remarkable job for independence alongwith Ahle-e-Sunnat Mashaikh. British Government tried to lure him to keep away from rectitude, but he could not be won over.

In 1944, Prime Minister of Punjab Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942) requested him in a letter not to support Muslim League, because its leader Mr. Jinnah belong to Shia Sect. Khawaja Sahib retorted "does your leader Mr. Choataraam belong to Ahl-e-Sunnat?"⁴².

In 1947, Muslim League lead a Civil Disobedience Movement in Punjab against the government of Khizar Hayat Tiwana. He was the President of Sargodha Muslim League. When he offered himself for arrest, the blood of the toadies and sycophants of the British rulers started boiling and the dormant sentiments woke up. His disciples boldly faced the flags of Police and rendered the soil of Sargodha with their sacred blood.

In general elections of 1946, Tiwana family of Sargodha fought on the ticket of Unionist Party against Muslim League candidates

without caring for his personal relations with Tiwanas. The same year he joined "Banaras Sunni Conference" to accelerate the struggle for independence⁴³.

Syed Zain ul Abideen Gilani (1885-1960) was the President Multan Muslim League. He gave out Hindus, Congressites and Ahrarians a hell in Multan. He attended the historic session of Pakistan Resolution in 1940. When Quaid-e-Azam was informed of his valuable performance, he embraced him and nominated him, member of All India Muslim League. During the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1947, he had the government machinery paralysed. On 2nd March, 1947, Khizar Ministry collapsed and was replaced by governor rule. On the next day Gilani Sahib tore off British flag from the offices of Deputy Commissioner and Municipal Corporation offices and mounted the flag of Pakistan, when Pakistan was yet to be born⁴⁴.

Hazrat Pir Ghulam Mujjadad Sarhindi of Dargah Sharif(Sind) (1883-1958) inherited hatred for British Government and actively participated in Tehrik-e-Hijrat, Tehrik-e-Khilaafat, Anjuman Hilal-e-Ahmar, Tehrik-e-Masjid Manzil Gah, and Tehrik-e- Tark-e-Mawalat. In 1924, he joined Muslim League and was elected the Sind Muslim League Councillor. He played a vital role in popularizing Muslim League in Sind. During 1946 election, he made a whirlwind tour of Sind to help the Muslim League candidate. He was the main character behind the victories of Qazi Muhammad Akbar and other Muslim League workers⁴⁵.

Hazrat Makhdoom Syed Raza Shah Gilani of Multan (1896-49) gave an exemplary support to Muslim League in 1937. He rejected Khizar Government's offer of Ministry and remained consistent to his mission. He was a member of All India Muslim League Council, provincial Muslim League Council and Working

Committee. He took active part in Tahrik-e-Shaheed Gunj and did not care for the Government's opposition. In 1938 when the uncrowned King of Muslims of Multan, Hazrat Syed Zain-ul-Abideen Gilani (1885-1960) President Muslim League was sent to jail at that time lead the movement and warned the Government that if the uncrowned King of Muslims was not released within 24 hours the Government would be responsible for the consequences. The British authorities bowed down to this ultimatum and released Shah Sahib the next day⁴⁶.

Hazrat syed Mahmood shah Gujrati (1922-1987) took active part in Pakistan Muslim League. During the 1946 Civil Disobedience Movement, he went to jail for the first time in his life. He continued his activities even in the jail. He was elected to Punjab Muslim League Council at the age of 22. He worked day and night for Pakistan Movement. He travelled far and wide and carried the message of Muslim League and the ideology of Pakistan to the masses⁴⁷.

Hazrat Deewan Aal-e-Rasool, Ajmeri ordered his disciples to vote for Muslim League. Deewan Sahib was one of those 12 members of the Religious Scholars Committee, which was formed in Banaras Sunni Conference in 1946. In the 1946 elections, he made an historic speech, "At present the most important problem is to prove our claim that Muslim League is the only representative party of the Indian Muslims, so that the Quaid-e-Azam is the established Leader of the Muslims. Enemies of Islam wanted to shatter our claims to pieces and we have to prove our claim with utmost stead fastness. I appeal to all the Mashaikh of my order/cult in the name of Hazrat Khawaja Garib Nawaz to come out of their monastries and serve Islam in this hour of need and try their best for the Muslim League's success"⁴⁸.

Hazrat Syed Ahmed Saeed Shah Kazmi (1913-1986) migrated to Multan from Amroha (Muradabad) in 1935 and performed a valuable role for the Pakistan Movement and arranged meetings from the Muslim League's platform. He participated in the All India Sunni Conference Banaras in 1946. On return, he spread the message of Muslim League to every town and village. He valiantly faced the hostility of Congress and Ahraar, carried on his struggle for independent homeland alongwith Ahl-e-Sunnat Ulema. He had no parallel in retorting the comments of Ahraar and Congress orators⁴⁹.

Hazrat Pir Muhammad Shah Bhairwi (1890-1957) of Sargodha, Hazrat Pir Syed Muhammad Fazal Shah Jalalpur (1894-1966), Hazrat Syed Maghfoor ul Qadri (1908-1970), of Garhi Ikhtiar Khan Distt. Rahim Yar Khan, Hazrat Peer Muhy-ud-Din Lal Badshah Makhadvi (Attock) (1908-1963) and Hazrat Mian Ghulam Ullah Sharaquri (1891-1957) were the true companions of Hazrat Quaid-e-Azam. they participated in Civil Disobedience Movement and worked day and night for Muslim League alongwith their disciples. Their services for Pakistan Movement are highly commendable. During 1945-46 elections they canvassed for the Muslim League and suffered even the hardships⁵⁰.

Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani's reputation as scholar was well established and he had already gained fame as a convincing and powerful speaker and writer, before he became interested in the Muslim League⁵¹.

The sacrifices and role of Mashaikh-Uzzam for Pakistan Movement must be part of syllabi (curriculum) for the knowledge of our younger generation.

The Movement of Mashaikh was inspired by the ideology of

Islam and the Sub-Continent was partitioned off from India solely because of the Muslim desire to demonstrate the efficacy of the Islamic way of life⁵².

The followers and successors of these Mashaikhs and scholars have heavy burden on their shoulders. They are now responsible for discharging the same duties at the same standard in order to maintain and uplift the society on the same lines. They ought to eradicate all evils developed and prevailing at present in the society and use all possible methods full of sweat and fascinating manners for its purification. As ever lasting orders of Allah the Almighty and Gracious:-

"Invite towards right and truth in a manner that appeals the most to the hearts"; and "Hold the string of Allah tightly and be not divided"⁵³

Prophet Muhammad(P.B.U.H) has rightly pointed out, "To kill a Muslim without any cause or fault is to deny the existence of God and to abuse a Muslim is to humiliate and let down himself"⁵⁴.

REFERENCES

- 1) *Maqalat Hazrat Data Gunj Baskhsh, 1990* Auqaf Department, Government of Punjab, September, 1991. P-46
- 2) *Maqalat Hazrat Data Gunj Baskhsh, 1992* Auqaf Department, Government of Punjab, September, 1993. P-53
- 3) *Maqalat Hazrat Data Gunj Baskhsh 1993*, Auqaf Department, Government of Punjab, August, 1994. P-38
- 4) *International Mashaikh Conference, Lahore, 1994.* P-5

- 5) Ibid P-6
- 6) Ghulam Sarwar Rana *Akabreen-i-Chisht*, Lahore, 1982: P 47-51
- 7) Ibid. P-52
- 8) Ibid. P-63
- 9) Farooqi Iqbal Ahmad *Tazkarah-i-Ahl-e-Sunnat-wa-Jamaat* Lahore, 1975: P7-9
- 10) Syed Anwar Ali- *The real achievement of the Human Life*, Lahore: P-230
- 11) ?
- 12) Sayed Anwar Ali- *The real achievement of the Human Life*, Lahore: P-232
- 13) Op. Cit. P228-229
- 14) Syed Awar Ali- *The real achievement of the Human Life*, Lahore: P-134.
- 15) Dr. Lal Bahadar- *The Muslim League-its history, activities and achievement*, Delhi: P-141
- 16) Qadi Abd-un-Nabi Kawkab and Hakim Muhammad Musa Amritsari- *Maqalat-i-Yum-i-Rida*, Lahore: 1968: P23 and 27
- 17) Muhammad Masud Ahmad- *Fadil Bareilvi our Tark-i-Mawalat*, Lahore: 1971: P-45
- 18) Liaquat Ali Khan- *Amir-i-Millat Mohy-ud-Din Saani*, *Monthly Sayyarah Digest*, Lahore, May, 1981: P-52
- 19) Marrif-i-Raza, Karachi, 1983: P-122
- 20) Imam Ahmad Raza Conference Souvenir, Karachi, 1988: P-11
- 21) Syed Raees Ahmad Jaffery- *Quaid-i-Azam Aur Aun-Ka Ahed*, Maqbool Academy, Lahore, 1966: P-40-45
- 22) Muhammad Din Kaleem- *Naqshbandi Number*, *Monthly Arafat*, March, 1988.
- 23) Personal Interview- Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah grand son of Pir Jamaat Ali Shah, 3rd August, 1971.

- 24) Syed Raees Ahmad Jaffery- *Quaid-i-Azam Aur Unka Ahed*, Maqbool Academy, Lahore, 1966: P40-45
- 25) Personal Interview- Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah grand son of Pir Jamaat Ali Shah, 3rd August, 1971.
- 26) Daily Nawa-i-Waqat, 8th May, 1947 with reference to Chaudhary Habib Ahmad Tehrik-i-Pakistan and Nationalist Ulema Albayan, Lahore, 1969: P923-924
- 27) Dabdaba Sikandari News Paper, 29th March, 1946: P-150
- 28) Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi- *Ulema Role in Pakistan Movement*, Karachi, 1990: P-337
- 29) Liaquat Ali- Ameer-i-Millat Mohy-ud-Din Saani, Monthly Sayyarah Digest, May, 1981: P-53
- 30) *Iqbal Key Hazoor* Edited by Syed Nazeer Niazi, Lahore: P-269.
- 31) Almi Mashaikh Conference Numbner, 1994, Lahore: P27,28
- 32) Muhammad Sadiq Kasuri, *Akabar-i- Tehrik-i-Pakistan*, Kasur, 1970: P53,54
- 33) Muslim League in N.W F.P, Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1990 (Biographical Notes): P-46(2).
- 34) Letter; Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Delhi, Central office All India Muslim League, November 18, 1945.
- 35) I.P.G DAD (Diary No.56, Dated 24.4.1954): P-23
- 36) I.P.G DAD Op.Cit: P-4
- 37) Ghulam Moin-ud-Din Naeemi, *Tadhkirah al-ma'ruf ba hayat-i-Sadr-ul-afadil*, Lahore, n.d P183-186.
- 38) Daily Nawa-i-Waqat 19th November, 1971: P-1
- 39) Mian Umar-ud-Din- Kullah-i-Faqir, Lahore, 1992: P1,2
- 40) Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, Dated 26th June, 1974: P-2
- 41) Maqbool Jehangir- Aik Roshan Chirag, Daily Imroze, Lahore, 29th August, 1981

- 42) Justice Peer Muhammad Karam Shah Bheervi Qamar Zia Bar, Daily Imroze, Lahore, dated 29th August, 1981.
- 43) Daily Imroze, Lahore, dated 23rd March, 1974: P-5 "Tehrik-i-Azadi Kay Roshan Chirag".
- 44) Akhbar-e-Jahan, Karachi 23rd August, 1967
- 45) Muhammad Sadiq Kasuri- Akbar-i-Tehrik-i-Pakistan, Lahore, 1976: P183-186
- 46) Daily Sangh-e-Meel, Multan 8th March, 1975
- 47) Daily Nawa-i-Waqt 23rd March, 1974: P-1
- 48) Syed Raees Ahmad Jaffery- Quaid-i-Azam Aur Unka Ahed, Maqbool Academy, Lahore, 1966: P402-404.
- 49) Monthly Zia-i-Haram, Lahore, June, 1975: P-49
- 50) Daily Nawa-i-Waqt 8th May, 1947
- 51) Ch. Habib Ahmad; *Tehrik-i-Pakistan and Nationalist Ulema Albayan*, Lahore: P83,84
- 52) A. Aziz, *Discovery of Pakistan*, Karachi: P-11
- 53) Al Quran Surah Al-i-Imran No.103
- 54) Al Hadith.

LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

A Case Study of Punjab Local Government

Ghulam Murtaza Shah

Almost all the countries of the world have a system of local government irrespective of the nature of their political system. Nevertheless, different countries have different patterns of local institutions, but the underlying spirit of all is to secure participation of the people in public affairs at local level. Local government is a school for democracy and it provides an opportunity for the start of a political career, hence is an important source of political recruitment in a progressive society. Through active participation in policy-making at local levels, people become politically vigilant and learn self-reliance.

Local Self-Government in our country is an interesting and significant indicator of the general relationship between the citizens and the government. The many services which citizens need for the normal comforts of life are, to a greater extent, provided by local authorities. Many leading statesmen began their career in the institutions of local government. Moreover, local elections have often been regarded as barometer of national trends.

DEVELOPMENT:

The present structure of local councils and committees, has its roots in Basic Democracies as introduced by Ayub regime, but significant elements however, are discernible much earlier. The Britishers introduced reforms of local government through different phases. The government introduced many reforms

starting from Punjab Municipal Act 1884, Later followed by 1911 Act. For rural areas, the District Board Act was introduced in 1853. In the early phases, Local institutions were powerless, and most of the seats were filled through government nominees.

In Pakistan, a comprehensive scheme of local government was introduced in the shape of Basic Democracies in 1959. The Ayub regime tried to use the system as a vehicle of socio-economic change. But an important political aspect of the system was disliked all over, viz., the B.D., system constituted an electoral college, for return of the members of National and Provincial Assemblies as well as for presidential elections. Moreover, the system was not free from bureaucratic control.

In 1960, the Municipal Administration Ordinance was enforced for the whole of Pakistan and under it local institutions were set up on the pattern of Municipal Committees. This act was followed by Punjab People's Government Ordinance 1972 and Punjab local Government Ordinance 1975, later substituted by the Punjab Local Government Act 1975. It is to be noted, that elections were never held under these ordinances as a result, local institutions could not play their role as schools of democracy during this period. The last of the series is the present "Punjab Local-Government Ordinance 1979" enacted and enforced on 31st, July, 1979.

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE:

The present structure of local councils and committees envisages a comprehensive system in which local units have to operate with their own authorities, resources and established procedures. It has been so framed as to fit into the present requirements. The system has shown remarkable potentialities in attracting and activating the people to participate in decision-

making at local level, in urban and rural areas.

An important feature of the local government system under 1979 ordinance is that it incorporates an element of functional representation, as seats are fixed at different tiers of local councils for peasants, workers and women. Hence an effort has been made to equip these institutions with expertise through popular representation.

Another outstanding feature is the fixation of seats for non-muslims on the basis of separate electorate, which is undoubtedly de jure recognition of an important institutional symbol of ideology of Pakistan. Moreover, through separate representation, the minorities have been provided better opportunities to have their voice heard in decision-making and safeguard their interests. Such steps can foster healthy trends in public life.

Local councils are for the first time made independent of the excessive control of District Magistrate / collector or Commissioner. It is expected that functioning of the system may promote stabilizing effects on our political system in general. It is worth noting that the structure provided in the Punjab ordinance exists in other provinces as well with minor modifications.

In this paper my focus will be on the representative aspect of the structure of local councils, that involves composition of different units of local councils, the basis of representation, qualifications of members etc. I shall not be concerned with administration of service, budgetary affairs and functional aspect of this system.

COMPOSITION:

The ordinance provides a five tier system of local councils in

addition to two coordination committees at district and divisional level. Local councils include union councils, Zila councils, Town Committees, Municipal Committees and Municipal Corporations¹.

Government may by notification demarcate the area of local council and specify the category to which it falls. Normally union council is a rural unit comprising a village or a number of villages. The boundaries of a Zila Council coincide with that of a revenue district, excluding its urban and cantonment areas.

The government may notify an urban area having a population exceeding 5000, but not exceeding 10,000, as the area of a town committee². Normally the population of a Municipal Committee and that of Municipal Corporation exceeds 20,000 and 5 lacs respectively; but the government has been invested with discretionary authority to raise the status of a unit having less population. Thus the government may demarcate any urban area as Municipal area having a population exceeding 10,000 but less than 30,000³. Similarly an area can be declared as Municipal Corporation having a population exceeding 30,000, but not exceeding 5 lacs⁴.

Under the present ordinance the government will notify demarcation of boundaries of each unit of local councils and is entitled to alter, extend or curtail or diminish the status of a local Government, and can reconstitute the boundaries of any local council⁵.

LOCAL COUNCILS AS LEGAL ENTITIES:

Each unit of local councils is to be treated as legal entity having certain rights, privileges, duties and liabilities. It can acquire and hold, under the law, movable and immovable property and can sue and be sued in its corporate name. These units have

also corporate existence and have a perpetual succession, viz., old members are substituted by newly elected ones.

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE:

The government is authorised to set up District and Divisional Coordination Committees in each district and division respectively. The number of members in each such committee will be fixed by the government⁶. Chief function of such committees is to coordinate the activities of all local councils within their respective jurisdiction. The committees can also be vested with the task of settling disputes arising between local councils.

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE:

System of representation adopted for the elections of local councils, presents a beautiful mixture of popular and functional representation framed within the ideological requirements of our society. The following categories of persons are to be elected for each unit of local councils. It is to be noted that the system precludes any provision of nomination in the composition of councils.

- a) **Representation of Muslims:** The number of Muslim members in each unit of local councils shall be determined as follows:-
 - i) **Union Council:** Such number of members not exceeding 15 as are determined on the basis of population of one thousand per electoral unit¹.
 - ii) **Zila Concil:** Such number of members as are determined on the basis of population of 50,000 per electoral unit.
 - iii) **Town Committee:** The number of Muslim seats in a Town Committee is to be determined in the manner

given below:-

- a) Population exceeding 10,000 but not exceeding 20,000 _____ 9 members.
- b) Population exceeding 20,000 but not exceeding 25,000 _____ 12 members.
- c) Population exceeding 25,000 but not exceeding 30,000 _____ 15 members².

iv) **Municipal Committees:** Such number of Muslim memers are to be returned as given below:-

- a) Population exceeding 30,000 but not exceeding one lac _____ 15 members.
- b) Population exceeding one lac but not exceeding 2 lacs _____ 20 members.
- c) Population exceeding 2 lacs but not exceeding 3 lacs _____ 25 members.
- d) Population exceeding 3 lacs but not exceeding 5 lacs _____ 30 members.
- e) Population exceeding 5 lacs _____ 35 members⁷.

v) **Municipal Corporation:** Representation of Muslims will be according to the ratio given below:-

- a) Population exceeding 5 lacs but not exceeding 10 lacs _____ 50 members.
- b) Population exceeding 10 but less than 20 lacs _____ 75 members.
- c) Population exceeding 20 lacs _____ 100 members.

b) **Representation of NON-Muslims:** Government will fix the

number of Non-Muslims in local councils in proportion to their population, subject to the condition that at least one seat will be reserved in each local council.

c) **Representation of Peasents, Workers and Women:** Muslim and Non-Muslim members both are qualified to be elected for these seats according to the details given below:-

i) **Union Council:** One seat will be reserved for peasents.

ii) **Zila Council:**

a) In Zila Councils seats will be fixed for peasents on the basis of 5 percent of the total number of Muslim seats subject to the minimum of one and maximum of three.

b) One seat will be reserved for workers.

c) The number of women will be equal to five percent of the total seats reserved for Muslim members, subject to a minimum of one and maximum of three.

iii) In Town Committees, Municipal Committees and Municipal Corporations, representation of workers will be on the basis of five percent of the number of Muslim seats subject to a minimum of one and a maximum of three. Women's representation will also be equal to the number of workers in each unit.

MODE OF ELECTION:

Except as otherwise provided in the ordinance, election of all local Councils shall be held on the basis of adult suffrage through secret ballot. Nevertheless, the mode of election for seats reserved for peasents, workers and women, shall be indirect, as they will be elected by the elected members of respective local councils. The

representation of non-Muslims will be secured through separate electorate.

Single member constituencies will be formed for filling the seats reserved for Muslims. But for the return of Non-Muslims, the entire local area of a local council shall form one electoral unit.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN:

Members of every local council shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from amongst themselves. The term of their office coincide with that of local councils if they are not otherwise removed in the prescribed manner. After the election of seats reserved for Muslims and non-Muslims through direct vote, the newly elected members of local councils in addition to electing the aforesaid office-bearers, shall also vote for filling the seats reserved for peasants, workers and women.

QUALIFICATIONS:

All citizens of Pakistan of 25 years or more are qualified to contest the election of local councils, provided their names are registered as voters in electoral rolls of that constituency from which they intend to stand as candidates. The new ordinance, however, categorically prescribes certain disqualifications.

DISQUALIFICATIONS:

The disqualifications prescribed in the ordinance are, more or less, same as prescribed for the candidature of legislative assemblies under 1973 constitution of Pakistan.

A person shall be disqualified to be a candidate for election

- i) If he loses citizenship of Pakistan.

- ii) He is an undischarged insolvent.
- iii) He is of unsound mind as declared by a competent court.
- iv) He is convicted for offence involving moral turpitude sentenced to imprisonment for at least six months or more within the last three years.
- v) Government servants, both civil and military personnels, are also debared.

It is to be noted that no person is entitled to be the member of a union council and a Zila Council at a time although he can contest for the seats of both the units. In case a person is elected to both the seats he has to resign from one seat.

NON-PARTY ELECTION:

No candidate contesting election should be a candidate or a nominee of a political party, nor he should draw or receive any financial or other assistance from any political party for election purpose. Candidates are expected not to use the name or document or insignia or any anything indicating his association with a political party.

The underlying purpose of this provision of the ordinance is that the elected members of local council should be wholeheartedly devoted to the uplift of local cause and that they should serve all people of locality irrespective of their party affiliations. Elections on party basis at local levels, in particular, create and perpetuate more tension and friction as compared to elections at national level.

TERM:

The term of office of local council shall be four years commencing on the date on which it holds its first meeting. The government, however, can extend its term for a period not exceeding six months.

REMOVAL:

Members, Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of local councils are liable to be removed prior to the termination of their tenure:-

- i) If any such person incurs any of the disqualifications enumerated in the ordinance, or
- ii) If he remains absent for three consecutive sessions of local council without reasonable cause.
- iii) He is guilty of gross misconduct.
- iv) He refuses to take oath of office.
- v) He fails to submit the declaration of assets or liabilities within prescribed time limit⁸.

The power of removal shall be exercised by such officers or authority appointed by government. In case of the removal of Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen, they will Cease to be even the members of local councils.

VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE: Chairmen or Vice Chairmen of a local council can be removed on the basis of motion of no-confidence passed by two third of the members of local council electing him, subject to the conditions:-

- a) Such motion shall not be moved before the expiry of six months of his assumption of office.

- b) In case of failure of such motion, no such move can be made against him before the expiry of six months from the date such motion was made.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL:

The election authority shall, by notification, appoint an officer to be an election tribunal for such area as may be specified. The election authority has the right to transfer any election petition from one tribunal to another in the province and is competent to provide for the manner in which an election petition is to be presented and heard.

APPRAISAL:

The structure of the present system of local councils is definitely a step forward toward self-government at local level. All possible steps have been taken to satisfy the participatory urges of the people, and to motivate people for resource mobilization and national reconstruction. An all embracing control of the executive has been curtailed, in order to encourage initiative on the part of the members. Nevertheless, local councils need enough resources to perform their duties. So new sources of revenue have to be explored. The government has to follow a more liberal policy in the matter of grants-in-aid and the borrowing powers of local councils.

The channels of political socialisation and political communication should be fully employed to emphasize on the people the great importance of local councils in national life of the community and thereby induce them to take interest in them. In fact, without a solid system of local self-government, foundations of democracy remain weak and shaky.

REFERENCES

1. Government of the Panjab. A Handbook of Law, Rules and Instructions, Local Govt. and Rural Development Deptt.
2. Govt. of the Panjab, The Panjab Local Govt. (Admendment) Ordinance, V of 1980.
3. The Panjab Local Govt. (Amendment) Ordinance, No.II of March 3, 1982.
4. The Panjab Local Govt. (Admendment) Ordinance No.III of 20 March 1982.
5. " Ordinance No. VI of 20 May, 1982.
6. " " No. 10 of 13 July, 1982.
7. " " No. XII of 21 Oct., 1982.
8. " " 20th Jan. 1983.
9. " " No. VII of April 12, 1983.

POLITICAL TRENDS IN BALOCHISTAN

Naudir Bakht

The process of political development in Balochistan had been slow but surely it is gradual and evolutionary. Tribal society is conventional and based, generally, upon the tribal conventions norms and values, The communication is direct and effective. A very useful and strictly Baloch custom of exchanging current news is called "HALL", by which a travelling baloch is asked for news by those whom he may chance to meet on his way.¹

The modern english system of education has not long history in Balochistan. Before the arrival of the British usurpers the classical oriental maktab system of education prevailed through out Balochistan. The British administrators did not consider the maktab system as an educational system, as it is mentioned in the Gazetter of Balochistan (Sarawan) "education is practically non existent and no organized system of public or private instruction exist².

Instead of spreading the network of educational institutions they built jails and spread the chain of jails to the small and large towns of Balochistan. The Gazetter of Balochistan shows the details, "The district jail at Sibi, which was built in 1886 at a cost of Rs. 20114/- has accomodation for sixty seven male and eight female prisoners. There are also subsidiary jails at Shahrig, Harnai, Kohlu and Nasirabad which can hold from fifteen to twenty prisoners each. Convicts whose terms of imprisonment do not exceed three months are kept in the subsidiary jails, those whose terms exceed three months but are less than six months are detained in the Sibi Jail, while those whose terms exceed six months are sent to the Shikarpur Jail, murderous, fanatics,

sentenced to life imprisonment under section 2 of the Frontier Murderous Outrages Regulation (IV of 1901) are sent to the Hyderabad Central Prison..... European convicts (are sent) to the Jail at Karachi³."

Subsidiary Jails

Imprisonment not exceeding three months	Shahrig, Harnai Kohlu, Nasirabad
Imprisonment exceeding three months but less than six months	Sibi Jail
Imprisonment exceeding six months	Shikarpur Jail
Murderous, Fanatics, Life imprisonment	Hyderabad Jail (Central Prison)
European Convicts	Karachi Jail
Juvenile Prisoners	Reformatory (Shikarpur)

The freedom fighters continued their struggle against the foreign rule. The British rulers introduced a system of "Payment of Fine or Compensations" to discourage and to stab the poor local indigenous population. Under this new system in the district (JHALAWAN) nearly every crime is punished by payment of compensations or fine and imprisonment is only inflicted in default of payment or failure to find security, the period being indefinite and release being obtained on the payment of compensations or Fine⁴. The education was completely ignored and no attention was paid to it. However, during 1900-I only Rs.9000/- were spent on education while in the similar period in the head of Levies (including postal levies) the sum of Rs. 8,75,000/- were spent. In 1902 on education only Rs. 9000/- were spent but on levies (including postal levies) Rs. 8,54,000/- were spent, and in 1902-3 on education only Rs. 10,000/- but on levies Rs. 8,79,000/- were incurred⁵.

Head	Year and amount	Year and amount	year and amount
Education	1900-1 Rs. 9000/-	1902 Rs. 9000/-	1902-3 Rs. 10,000/-
Levies including postal levies	Rs. 8,75,000/-	Rs. 8,54,000/-	Rs. 8,79,000/-

The above figures show that the foreign rooted British rulers spent heavy amounts on Levies and other administrative devices while no attention was paid to education and the tribes were deprived of their basic and significant right.

SARDARS AND BRITISH ADMINISTRATION:

Sardar who had been the custodians of their tribes and the protector of their lands and honour were chosen by the British and they planted their pupits who could serve their objects. Balochs had their traditional Jirga which acted as a court of Law. Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a Shahi Jirga unknown in Baloch legal and administrative annals where only Sardars and aristocrats could sit. The Sandeman system broke up the traditional pattern and accorded immense authority to the sardars over their subjects. They were made responsible for maintainting law and order. Each of them was allowed to keep a certain number of levies paid by the government. The system was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people⁶. In this way whole of the Baloch Jirga (completely democratic) and Sardari System was replaced by Sandeman branded new set-up. Richard Issac Bruce in his "Forward Policy" says, "The tribal leaders

whether Baloch Tumandars and Makadams or Afghan Sardars and Maliks and the tribal levies are the back-bone of the Frontier Officers Political Arrangements⁷

"The monthly allowances were sanctioned for the principal tribal chiefs out of the grant in 1894. The sardars receiving these allowances held themselves responsible for the maintenance of peace and order among their tribes, for preventing their tribesmen from doing damage in the territories of the Khan (Khan-e-Kalat) and the British Government and for the surrender of offenders. Each Chief (tribal Chief) receiving Rs.300/- or Rs.400/- per mensem was to maintain one writer, four sawars for carrying on the affairs of his tribe, those receiving Rs.200/- per mensem to maintain one writer and three sawars, those getting between Rs.70/- and Rs.100/- to keep one sawar. In a few cases modifications have been made since 1894 in the allowances sanctioned for the chiefs (tribal chiefs) and the present (1906) distribution is shown in the following table

Name of the Chief	Monthly allowance paid	No. of Writers	No. of Sawars
Sardar Passand Khan Zarakzai	Rs. 400/-	I	4
Sardar Shaka Khan Shahzai	Rs. 300/-	I	4
Nawab Kaisar Khan Magsi	Rs. 300/-	I	4
Wadera Sardar Khan Rind	Rs. 300/-	I	4
Sardar Kahera Khan Bizanjau	Rs. 300/-	I	4
Sardar Shahbaz Khan Gurgnari	Rs. 300/-	I	4
Sardar Mohammad Ali Khan Jattak	Rs. 200/-	I	3
Sardar Zehri Khan Musliani	Rs. 200/-	I	3
Sardar Pahar Khan Sasoli	Rs. 200/-	I	3
Sardar Sultan Mohammad Haruni	Rs. 200/-	I	3
Sardar Mazar Khan Bajoi	Rs. 100/-	--	1

The above table shows that some of the tribal chiefs were paid by the British Government and they worked for the promotion of the interests of the British but simultaneously there were some tribal chiefs and the tribal men who had the Lion's Heart and Eagle's Eyes they were making every effort to break the chains of slavery whereupon they were put behind the bars. The jails were filled by the freedom fighters but they were never frightened by the brutalities of the British Indian rulers.

Annual average for five years ending in 1891-98	Criminals 3700	Civil 10848
Annual average for three year ending in 1900-1	3917	8010
1902-3	4161	7340

The above table shows great unrest in the tribal masses and they did not accept the foreign rule, they continued their struggle against the alien government and for the restoration of their indigenous, conventional, democratic system and status.

SURVEY AND ITS REPORT;

The Balochs are not restricted and confined to the slopes, vales and plains of Balochistan but they are also dwelling in large numbers in the fertile lands of Sindh, Central and Southren Punjab. Baloch Sardars take an active part in the regional, provincial and national politics. If they are struggling for the preservation of the Baloch National Identity, on the one hand, then on the other hand they are turning every stone to improve the lot of their tribe. This survey is conducted at Qetta. Every effort is

being made to restrict the survey to the Balochs. The opinion is picked from 500 tribesmen.

The tribal life is conventional and traditional. Sardar owns the most significant place in his tribe and tribal life, society. About 42% believed that the sardar is generally more sympathetic to his tribesmen, while 55% are frustrated and have the other view, 5% did not bother to reply. These figures show a slight change in the mass behaviour¹⁰. Although the tribal masses are frustrated but still they believe (90%) that the sardars have better understanding of tribal culture and problems, so, they can better represent them, here only a small number of 10% have the different views.

The Baloch tribesmen are more conventional in their approach, and about 64% which is a very considerable majority believe that the social, economic and political problems of a tribal society can better be resolved by the practical application of tribal traditions and conventions. Only 28.78% have the other idea, while (7.22% did not reply.

Sr. No	Description of Question	Yes	No	No reply
1)	Generally sardars are more sympathetic to the tribesmen	42%	53%	5%
2)	Sardar can better represent their tribesmen	90%	10%	---
3)	Social, economic, political problems of a tribal life can better be resolved by tribal traditions and convention.	64%	28.78%	7.22%
4)	Sardars should play a significant role in the provincial politics.	75%	25%	---
5)	Sardars ought to represent their tribes even at the federal level.	75%	22%	3%

The tribal masses 75% believe that their sardar should play more significant role in the provincial politics. They want to see them in a more active position. While 25% do not feel happy and have the other views. Similarly a very large majority of 75% believe that the sardars ought to represent them not only at the provincial level but also at the Federal level, for at the federal stage they can be more effective in the salvation of their problems; only 22% think in a different way, 3% gave no reply.

The sense of deprivation is developed at a very high degree and a very sizable majority (62.30%) do not feel satisfied with the role and performance of the sardars in the national politics and they want something more from them. However, a very small figure of 19.70% showed satisfaction over their output, while 18% did not bother to reply.

Sr. No	Description of Question	Yes	No	No reply
1)	Are you satisfied with the role and performance of the sardars in the national politics.	19.70%	62.30%	18%
2)	Do you feel satisfied with the role of the politicians other than the sardars	18%	54%	28%
3)	Tribal traditions only are not sufficient and the tribal chiefs may be acquainted with the modern education	84%	12.55%	3.45%
4)	An elite having no tribal background can not be successful in the tribal areas	95%	3%	2%
5)	Sardars should be replaced by the modern elite	37.70%	49.34%	14.96%

It is worth noting that if the tribesmen are not happy and

satisfied with the working of the sardars then simultaneously they (51%) are also not pleased with the performance of the politicians other than the sardars; this aspect needs serious attention of the political scientists and the politicians, that the masses are not very much pleased of their role, just 18% showed their pleasure, while 28% did not show any response.

The readers must be pleased to observe a change in the tribal phenomenon, though they have a strong love for their tribal conventions and centuries old traditions yet they understand the significance of the modern knowledge, education and 84% believe that the tribal chiefs must have knowledge of day to day scientific developments and philosophic changes. A very small number of 12.55% ignores this aspect, 3.45% did not reply. The tribal people have keen love for education and are looking for better opportunities.

The tribal society has a peculiar system of conventions, norms and traditions. It is essential for every administrator to have a strong and comprehensive knowledge of tribal behaviour. A very heavy and decisive majority believe that without a proper background of the tribal culture, no administrator can claim successes and because tribal chief has better knowledge of tribal culture and norms hence he can be more successful in the salvation of the problems of tribal life. A very meager number of 3% ignores it, 2% showed no response.

Although the pace of political developments is faster, still 49.34% are of the opinion that the sardars can more successfully serve their people and they may not be replaced by the modern elites because sardars have more love and sympathies for them, just 37.70% want the change while 14.96% have no interest.

Conclusions:

Sardars conventionally have been sympathetic, kind, merciful and generous to their people. They were popularly chosen and had the mandate behind them. This system had been functioning quite successfully for centuries together but the British usurpers changed the character of the ever cherished Sardari System and Sandemanized it to match their needs, and a few sardars were deceived very tactfully and then there occurred the sad incident of the "Carriage of the Lat Sahib"¹¹. Sardars have marvelous achievements at their credit as well and they have continuously struggled for the preservation of conventional Baloch identity even at very hard times.

The sardars are supposed to be equipped with modern education because only by acquiring education we can face the challenges of the 21st century. We are still far behind the rest of the world. We should step forward to have some serious steps for the promotion of quality and quantity of education. The tribal can be modernized without saying good-bye to the ethics, traditional institutions and cultural heritage of tribal life. We can bring about a revolution in our tribal society by the promotion of education and adoption of scientific approach in our life.

References/Notes

1. " HALL" means a customary Baloch method of direct communication.

It means availing the latest intelligence; and the traveller is duty bound to communicate it forthwith. The recipient in his turn reports the news to the first persons he joins on his way. In this way, all sorts of news are quickly circulated amongst the tribesmen. The custom is not confined to

travellers alone. It applies equally to all class of persons, including dignitaries. For more details please see, Mir Khuda Bakhsh Mari, "*Search Lights on Balochs and Balochistan*" Gosh-e-Adab, Quetta, 1977.

2. *The Gazetteer of Balochistan*, (Sarawan)
Government of Balochistan, Quetta, 1986, P.216
3. *The Gazetteer of Balochistan*, (Sibi)
Government of Balochistan, Quetta, 1986, P.230
4. *The Gazetteer of Balochistan*, (Jhalawan)
Government of Balochistan, Quetta, 1986, P.205
5. *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, (Provincial Series)
"Balochistan", New Quetta Book Stall, Quetta, 1984, P.67
6. Janmohammad; *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan* Gosh-e-Adab, Quetta, 1988, P.164
7. Bruce, Richard Issac, '*The Forward Policy*', Gosh-e-Adab, Quetta, 1977, P.125
8. *The Gazetteer of Balochistan*, (Jhalawan)
Government of Balochistan, Quetta, 1986, P.P. 204-5
9. *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, (Provincial Series)
"Balochistan", New Quetta Book Stall, Quetta, 1984 P.64
10. The behaviour is a bit changed, previously the survey was conducted in 1991 and was published in The Journal of Political Science, Govt. College, Lahore.
11. Mulla Mazar Badozai has narated the gloomy and sad incident of "Carriage of Lat Sahib" He depicted that Wadera Noor Mohammad Bangulzai had gone for pilgrimage, Mir Khair Bakhsh and Suhbat Khan refused to pull the "Carriage" of A.G.G., whie the other Sardars pulled the Agent to the Governor General's Carriage to the

Raillway Station of Sibi. For more details please see, Dr. Abdul Rehman Brahvi, A short history of Brahvi language and literature, (Urdu), Markzi Urdu Board, Lahore, 1982, P.P.117-119.

THE ORIGIN AND BIRTH OF FEDERALISM

Dr. Khalid Javed Makhdoom
Dr. Mrs. Razia Musarrat

The importance of federation can hardly be exaggerated, especially in the contemporary world where today we are passing through a process of change. Many of the federations are under stress from within. The disintegration of U.S.S.R is an eye opener. Canada is another example where the federation is under stress.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and review the historical growth of the notion of Federalism.

Federalism was first formulated in the covenant theories of the Bible¹. The principle of strong federalism was first applied by ancient Israelites and even to a few Biblical examples, beginning in the thirteenth century B.C. to maintain their national unity through linking their several tribals under a single national constitution and at least quasi federal political institution². Many such states can be found throughout western history, for example the Holy Roman Empire embraced a mixture of component units, as did the medieval leagues of Italian cities³.

The Swiss confederation traces its origin to the league of the Forest cantons of 1291⁴. Several centuries later, the Greek city states experimented with federal style institution as means for the promotion of internal harmony and co-operation, primarily for defensive purposes through association, (e.g. the Achaean and Aetolian League)⁵ and Commercial League in medieval Europe, (such as the Hanseatic League)⁶. Those came close to what were latter defined as confederations.

"Ultimately fusion of contractual elements from feudalism with political mechanism from the commercial confederacies gave rise to immediate antecedents of modern federalism⁷." The Christian states on the Iberian Peninsula created a political system which in its most advanced stages came very close to authentic federalism. During the years of the reconquest, most of the Peninsula was reorganized under the *fuero* system, which established local governments with relatively liberal political institution in order to encourage resettlement. New states were formed through feudal-style contractual relationships designed to protect local rights. Three of these states joined in a quasi federal arrangement under the crown of Aragon, each of them retaining its own constitution and governing institution as well as acquiring representation in the over all Aragonese government.

Unification of Spain under a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact for the next tow and a half centuries. But the demands of monarchy ultimately subverted them, transforming Spain into a precariously centralized state⁸. A modified form of the Greek view was developed by the sixteenth century theorists⁹. They held that federalism meant a permanent league of states united through a perpetual covenant, binding under International Law, in which the constituent states delegated enumerated powers to a general government while retaining full rights of internal sovereignty. In the sixteenth century, certain emergent civil societies, influenced by the reformation to return to scripture as political source and by the Spanish system of political organization, as well as by local necessity, began to apply federal principles for state-building purposes. The Hapsburg heirs to the Spanish crown had applied Iberian principles to the organization of their other European possessions. Their government reforms in the Netherlands provided an organizational basis for the

federation of the united provinces in the late sixteenth century¹⁰. When that country gained its independence, it established a political system which, while unable to solve the most crucial technical problems of federalism, maintained itself in federal style for two hundred years, until Napoleon put an end to its existence, leaving a residue of noncentralization that marks the Netherlands today.

The conception of federalism was revived by Bible- centered federal theologians of seventeenth century.

"Britain and New England who coined the term 'federal' from Latin foedus covenant in 1645 to describe the system of holy and enduring covenant between God and man which lay at the foundation of their world view"¹¹. The seventeenth century produced the early attempts at union among the American colonies.¹²

The Swiss, in the meantime, were developing their own techniques for combining feudal and commercial elements to create a loose confederation of Canton, which was also influenced by Biblical ideas and, perhaps negatively, by contact with Hapsburg Spain. Achieving full independence in 1648, the Swiss confederation remained loosely leagued for two centuries (except for the Napoleonic interlude), until it adopted a federal constitution in 1848.¹³

None of these systems, however, accorded to the two levels of government the co-ordinate and independent status characteristic of modern federal government.

The establishment of the American Union by the constitution of 1787 transformed the American States from a confederacy into

federal system.¹⁴ The proto-federalism of the Swiss cantons, coming at the outset of the age of nationalism, also stimulated the efforts to formulate federal theories based on modern political ideas.¹⁵ The conception of federalism was given new theoretical form by nineteenth century German and French social theorists closely related to the various theories of social contract.¹⁶ It is characterized by the desire to build society on the basis of coordinative rather than subordinative relationship and by emphasis on partnership among parties with equal claims to legitimacy who seek to cultivate their diverse integrities within a common social order.¹⁷

Johannes Althusius analyzing the Dutch and Swiss constitution, was the first to perceive that "federalism was really concerned with the problem of national unity".¹⁸

It is this phenomenon which can explain the successful formation of such heterogeneous nations such as Switzerland 1848, Canada 1867, Australia 1900. These states, United States of America 1787¹⁹, Switzerland, Canada and Australia are the most widely accepted examples of federal governments in the modern world²⁰. The German constitution of 1817, 1919 and 1949 also display various features of federalism and are often called federal.²¹

It is true that some constitutions purport to be federal but do not in fact provide a system of federal government. In Latin America, for example, four nations (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) have constitutions described as federal, but the structure of power in each case is such that the government, as distinct from the constitution rarely operates in accord with the federal principles".²²

After World War II, a new crop of federations had emerged (or been attempted). Federalism was imposed from outside, other than created from within.²³

This policy was followed by the Dutch in Indonesia, by the French in their Central and West African colonies, and more extensively by the British in East and Central Africa.²⁴ India and Nigeria are good examples of the development of such attitude.²⁵ The British government imposed a federal system on the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-63)²⁶.

The same sort seems to have inspired the states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,²⁷ Malaya and Singapore and the British West Indies.²⁸

Now we shall determine in detail how a federation is to be defined and identified. In modern terms, "Constitution which works on two levels of government, as a nation and as a collection of related but self standing units".²⁹

"Federalism is a system", according to R.L. Watts, "for reconciling the demand for union and territorial diversity within which regional and general governments are assigned to coordinate authority".³⁰

Kenneith C.Wheare, emphasizing the legal and constitutional aspect of the system, considers it appropriate for that "group of states or communities which desire to be united under a general government for some purpose and to be organized under regional government for others, and where both governments are, within a sphere, coordinate and independent."³¹ In reaction to Wheare's legalistic definition, subsequent author's broadened the definition of federalism to the point where it became virtually synonymous

with political pluralism" and social diversity.

We can assert that a federal system very comprehensively enlightens the existence of provinces independent of each other, willing to enter into a compact for the creation of a federal government "The word 'federalize' is used to describe the unification of "sovereign" states into a federal polity and also the permanent devolution of authority and power within a nation to subnational governments".³²

Now the question arises how federations come into existence? Why should autonomous governments, ever agree to cede some sovereignty to a federal power? The answer is that power is given up only when there is an expectation that more will be gained. As Dahl points out, "federation is the means of enhancing the capacity of the political system".³³ Canada and Australia were made up of former colonies of Great Britain, in each the geographic extent and historical separation ruled out the unitary government.³⁴

Ricker considers, fear of a common enemy and a desire for territorial expansion as the forces inducing the national and regional boders to strike a federal bargain³⁵. Australian federations felt that a common market would promote economic expansion³⁶.

K.C. Wheare lists common historical experience, desire for independence from colonial masters, economic benefits and common religion as factors forging unity, while linguistic and ethnic differences and desire to retain local autonomy as divisive forces³⁷.

T.H. Stevenson remarks that the "most important has been the desire of boders in a confederative state to erect a stronger central

government especially for the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, yet assure the political boders and citizens of the component parts of the confederation a broad area of local matters over which they could continue to exercise authority"³⁸. This was the main desire of the founding fathers of the United States in 1787³⁹.

Switzerland and Germany also went through this intermediate stage between complete separateness and federal union⁴⁰.

Some times it has been the other way round. In Canada, for instance, an originally unitary state was converted into a federal one by a constitution making each of them part of a federal state. This is a process of devolution or decentralization, designed to secure a more effective government⁴¹.

It was with reference to this mode of creation of federation that Dicey made his observation that federalism was the result of a compromise between two conflicting sentiments, viz, (a) the desire for national unity and (b) the determination to maintain the independence of each man's separate state.

In Dicey's words,

"A federal state is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of state rights"⁴².

This desire normally arises when a member of small independent states, locally adjacent, come to feel that if they do not unite, their independence will be threatened by more powerful states. "If they are, say J.S. Mill, "they will be apt to think that they do not gain by union with others, the equivalent of what they

sacrifice in their own liberty of action, and consequently when ever the policy of the federation, in things reserved to its cognizance, is different from that which anyone of its members would separately pursue, the internal and sectional breach will, through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the union and do not desire unity"⁴³.

Lock explains,

"free men voluntarily united in a social contract, that gave government the power it needed to protect each men's life, liberty and property from invasion by others"⁴⁴

A federation of states as we have seen, means the creation of a federal authority but of the provinces federated by the surrender of certain powers which originally belonged to the constituent provinces. As they are not surrendering them to a third party, but to themselves jointly, it follows that there should be created certain special institutions in the federal government which will represent the provinces and will on their behalf exercise the powers surrendered by them.

As we noted, the Latin America and some British colonies, federalism was imposed from without than created from within⁴⁶. India and Nigeria are good examples of development of such an attitude⁴⁷. Something of same sort seems to have inspired the three East African states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, some basic characteristic and operational principles common to all truly federal systems can be identified, and help us to understand such systems.

- i. A written constitution, supreme over all other instruments

of government, which shall only be changed according to a process specifically laid down in the constitution itself.

- ii. The allocation of definite powers to the central government and the provision of machinery to ensure the effective limitation of the powers in all spheres of government, legislation, judicial competence and executive action. This is the division of power⁴⁹, between two sets of government guaranteed by the constitution itself, federalism is not a single system, but a loose grouping of relatively autonomous confederations of federal, state and local professional agencies⁵⁰.

- iii. The creation of institution, where by (i) the spirit of the union and (ii) the rights of the provinces shall be maintained. As Freeman describes, "on the one hand each of the members of the union must be wholly independent on these matters which concern each other only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively.....each member is perfectly independent within its own sphere, but there is another sphere in which its independence or rather its separate existence vanishes"⁵¹.

In short, in a federal state, the constitution divides the power between the federal and provincial governments, each deriving its power from the provisions of the written constitution so that there is a sphere of autonomy belonging to the territorial organization called province, which cannot be withdrawn or curtailed at the will of the central organization, called the federal government. Living Stone observed that federation is more a functional than an "institutional concept".⁵²

FOOT NOTES

1. David L. Sills, *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol.5., Macmillan and Free Press, U.S.A., 1968. p.353.
2. Ibid.p.354.
3. Bernard S. Cayne others (ed), *Encyclopedia Americana*, volume, II.(Grolier Incorporated, U.S.A.,1983),p.77. The Lombard League was formed by Northern Italian cities to resist the Hohenstaufer. This notable confederation was established in medieval times. See John H. Ferguson & Dean E. Mchenary, *The American system of Government*, MacGraw, Hill Book Company, New York, 1977, p.101.
4. Ibid.
5. David L. Sills, op. cit., p.354.
6. Stanley Schindler, M.S. *Encyclopedia International*. Vol.7, American Book Stanford Press, Inc, New York, 1963. p.73. also see John H. Ferguson and Dean E. Mchenary, op.cit, p.101.
7. David L. Sills, op.cit., p.362.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p.354.
10. Ibid., p.362. Bernard S. Cayne and others, op.cit.,p.77. Also see, John H. Ferguson and Dean E. Mchenary, op.cit., p.102.
11. Ibid, p.353.
12. Bernard S. Cayne and others (ed), op.cit.,p.77.
13. David L. Sills, op.cit., p.362.
14. Stanley Schindler, M.S., op.cit.,p.73. Bernard S. Cayne and

others (ed), op.cit., p.77. Samuel H. Beer, "*Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America*" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72, No.1, March, 1978, p.13. also see Bernard S. Cayne and others (ed), op.cit., p.77.

15. Curiously, the expression "federal Government" was used by the Articles of confederation to refer to the central authority set up by the Articles. Conversely, the Swiss constitution of 1874 is a federal constitution" as it describes of itself in the preamble and some other articles (Articles. 1,2,3,5) it calls itself the "Swiss Confederation". This is due to a confusion between the two concepts confederation and federation. What makes a "Swiss confederation" a federation is that while the cantons are allowed to have their own constitutions (Articles. 5,6,.) they are bound by the provisions of the federal constitution, as regards matters which are assigned there by to the "federal authorities".-----legislative, executive and judicial (Articles, 3,5). See Durga Das Basu, *Comparative Federalism*, Prentice Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi, p.7.
16. Social contract theory, represents the separation of powers and federalism.
17. David L. Sills, op.cit., p.354.
18. Ibid, pp.362-63.
19. Just as the American system became the prototype for other modern systems, so " the American conception of federalism became the generally accepted as the most accurate usage". Ibid.p.354. also see Robert J, Lieber *Theory and World Politics*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1973 p.39. According to Lord Heldane, "the United States of American was truly federal because even after federation and the establishment of a common

Government, the states retained their state's constitution". See Durga Das Basu, op.cit., p.21. Also see Peter. Fotheringham and others (ed), *American Government and Politics*, (Faber and Faber, London, 1978) p.76." The American states sought effective unity on common problem".

20. Bernard S. Cayne and others (ed), op.cit.,p.77.
21. "German federalism, however, has not afforded a coordinate and independent position to the two levels of Government but has characteristically made the regional units (Lander) responsible for administering the laws and collecting the taxes of the central government", See Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, Macmillan Education Ltd., London, 1988, p.171.
24. Ursula K. Hicks, *Federalism Failure & Success*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., Lond 1978, P.4.
25. For detail see J.H. Price, op.cit., 59.
26. Stanley Schindler and others, op.cit., p.73.
27. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op.cit., p.171.
28. Ursula K. Hicks, op. cit., p.4.
29. Ibid.

The regional unit is called a state in the U.S.A.(Art.1,52), Australia (cf.d.106) and India (Article 1(1). It is called a provision in Canada (cf.ss 3,58). In Switzerland, the regionals units are called (cantons Articles, 1,2). In West Germany, they are called 'Lander"(preamble)(Articles 23,29). In the present work, we shall for the sake of

uniformity, refer to the general or national Government as the federal Government and the regional Government as the provincial Government.

30. R.L. Watts, *Federations: Experiments in the Common Wealth*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1966, p.130.
31. K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1963, p.33 This is a purist approach. In all federal systems, one level of Government (typically the federal) tends to predominate, were this not so, stalemate would result. So the problem with Whear's definition that it leads to a empty category. See Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op.cit. p.170.
32. David L. Sills, op.cit., p.361.
33. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op. cit. p.171.
34. John H. Ferguson and Dean E. Mchenary, op.cit., p.102. also see Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op.cit., p.171.
35. Mehrunnisa Ali, "*Federalism and Regionalism in Pakistan*" Research Series, vol.1, (Pakistan Study Center University of Karachi, Karachi, 1985),p.24.
36. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op.cit., p.171.
37. K.C. Wheare, op. cit., p.33.
38. T.H. Stvenson, *Politics & Government*, Adams & Co., New Jersay, 1973, p.234.
39. A. Appadorai, *Substances of Politics*, Oxford Univ., Press, Pakistan, 1956, p.479. Declaration of Independence (4 July, 1776), written chiefly by Thomas Jefferson, was based primarily upon the doctrines of John Lock. See T.H. Stevenson, op.cit. p.249. On the other hand Samuel H. Beer says that cause of American Revolution was liberty, the

right to government by the "consent of the governed". And by consent they meant not some presumed agreement to a form of Government delivered by social contract in the distant part, but rather a consent that closely and actively joined voter and representative. He further argues that, Federalism has often been advocated primarily as a means of accommodating levels of Government to territorial diversity. The compact theory would lead one expect this to be the major subject of debate during the framing and ratification of the constitution. Supporters as well as critics did recognize that the "sentiments, habits and customs" of the state were diverse in United States of America and that therefore," a Government which might be very suitable for one might not be agreeable to the other. See Samuel H. Beer, *Federalism, Nationalism & Democracy in America*, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.72, No.1, March, 1978, pp.10-15.

40. Rod E. Anderson, and others, *Introduction to Political Science*, (3rd ,ed), (McGraw Hill Book Company, New York,1976),p.41.
41. A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.479.
42. Durga Das Basu, op. cit., p.35. also see L.S. Rathore, Sa.A. H. Haqqi, *Political Theory & Organization*, E.B.C. Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Luckhnow, undated, p.290. In the United States of America, the fifty component states are not administrative division but constitutional members of the union, and are in o sense subordinate to the later in their own sphere.
43. A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.480.
44. Ibid., pp.25-28.
45. W.S. Livingstone, *Federalism and Constitutional Change*,

- (Oxford, 1956), p.2.
46. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop. op.cit. p.171.
 47. For detail see J.H. Price, *Comparative Government*, Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London, 1975, p.59.
 48. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop. op.cit. p.171, also see Ursula K. Hicks, op.cit.,p.6.
 49. David L. Sills op.cit., p.357. K.C. Wheare, op.cit. p.11. T.H. Stevenson, op.cit.,p.236. Stanley Schinder, M.S. and others,op.cit., p.73.
 50. John H. Ferguson and Dean E. Mchenary, op.cit.p.100.
 51. E.A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, (Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1993), pp.2-3.
 52. W.S. Livingston. op.cit., p.6-7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appadorai, A., *The Substances of Politics*, (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956)

Rod Anderson, E. and others, *Introduction to Political Science*, (3rd, ed.), (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1976.)

Ali, Mehraunnisa, *Federalism and Regionalism in Pakistan*, in Research Series, vol.1, (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 1985.)

Basu, Durga Das, *Comparative Federalism*, (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of Indian Private Ltd., 1987.)

Beer, Samuel "H., *Federalism, Nationalism and Democracy in America*," *American Political Science Review*, vol.72, No.1, March, 1978, pp.9-21.

Cayne, Bernard S. and others, (eds), *Encyclopedia Americana*, vol,11, U.S.A. Grolier Incorporated,1983.

Ferguson, John H. and Mchenary Dean E., *The American System of Government*, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977.)

Fotherngham, Peter and others (eds.), *American Government and Politics*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1978.)

Freeman, E.A. *History of Federal Government*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993.)

Hague, Rod and Harrop Martin, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988.)

Hicks, Ursula K., *Federalism Failure and Success: A Comparative Study*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2978.)

Laiber, Robert T., *Theory and World Politics*, (London:George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973.)

Livingston, W.S., *Federalism and Constitutional Change*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956.)

Price. D.H., *Comparative Government*, (London:Hutchnson and Co., Ltd., 1975.)

Rathere, L.S. and Haggi S.A.A., *Political Theory and Organization*, (Lucknow: E.B.C., Publishing Pvt. Ltd., n.d.)

Sills, David L., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol., 5, (U.S.A. Macmillan and Free Press, 1969.)

Schindler, Stanley M.S., *Encyclopedia International*, Vol.1, (New York: American Book Stratford Press, 1963.)

Stevenson, T.H., *Politics and Government*, (New Jersay: Adams and Co., 1973.)

Watts, R.L., *New Federation: Experiments in the Common Wealth*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966.)

Wheare, K.C. *Federal Government*, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1963.)

THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD.

Dr. Khawaja Alqama.

As all discussions of state sovereignty are finally trapped in the political quagmire of the correct distribution of power among state and private institutions, we should pose from the beginning the bona fide question of who actually rules the world. Who beyond the paraphernalia of ceremonies, rites and titles holds the real reins of power¹? The willingness on the part of a great many individuals to ask such questions is often provoked by the painful consequence of finding out that duly elected governments are absolutely powerless when they are confronted by ad hoc alliances of global non-governmental forces². Those forces, and here we have to disappoint all disciples of Ian Fleming and his glamorous hero James Bond, are no secret armies which plot to invade with their soldiers, tanks and planes the emerging nations. These organizations are often nothing more than a motley lot of financial conglomerates or media enterprises which, in applying the most vulgar neo-liberalists dogma, intend to make a lot of money³. Their war cries are free exchange of goods and information, privatization, monetarism, competitiveness and productivity. Their new Karl Marx is an undergraduate textbook on the merits of the free market economy. Their immutable credo is succinctly summed up every week by the commentaries and editorials of *The Economist* and *The Wall Street Journal*. For them, all power should be given to the market. The market has truly replaced as an analytic-heuristic tool the Marxian notion of surplus value.

The enterprises in question, especially in the domains of mass communication and finance, experience an accelerated expansion on a quasi-universal scale. Daily, new economic empires appear on the stage of the world economy and create their own

laissez-faire laws - which allow them to move their production to wherever it is wanted or needed; which permit them to transfer their capital to any bank in the world; and which enable them to invest in whatever endeavour they fancy and feel that it is profitable. they laugh heartily about the so-called efficacy of national laws, and they do not care about any social consequences (unemployment) their financial operations might produce. Anyway, social and cultural (national identity) losses are of no concern to them. Their textbooks will inform them unashamedly that the costs of such vicissitudes of a free market economy should somehow be nationalized. They are now in a position to speculate against the currency of one country, while at the same time they can casually provoke a recession in another, and, above all, still tell a third country that it suffers from excessive government regulation and interference⁴.

Given this situation, ordinary men and women begin to wonder what their respective governments intend to do against the contemptible exploits of those Latter-day highwaymen. Not much seems to be in the cards. If the politicians and bureaucrats are not outright acolytes of the perpetrators, they appear at best distraught and at worst incompetent and somewhat uncaring. They can only lament the fact that global transactions executed by not so scrupulous characters increase local unemployment to such a level that even the still protected middle classes begin to raise their voices in anguish and anger against their very own governments. But so far these protests had little or no impact on policies of the respective governments⁵. Even the most progressive nations are still studying the legal and administrative measures to be taken to stop the global raiders. Unfortunately, in the age of simultaneity, time is not on the side of the assiduous, yet innocuous government officials. And furthermore, in blowing the trumpet of privatization, the brave bureaucrats are inadvertently digging their own graves

and selling rather cheaply the family silver of their country, and thereby filling the vast chests of the financial conglomerates and media enterprises⁶.

Thus, it has become imperative for any government to start an enquiry into the causes and circumstances which allow the companies in question to ignore national regulations and laws and made them apparently unstoppable in their worldwide expansion drive. Even men and women with no particular interest in world politics have discovered the awesome potential of such multinational corporations which make and break local financial markets and which provide the average citizen with his or her daily ration of infotainment⁷. When a French weekly asked the readership to select the most influential man or woman in the world, they came up with a surprising choice. It was not William Clinton, it was certainly not Helmut Kohl; no, it was Bill Gates, the chairman of Microsoft, the uncrowned king of software and the latest pretender to the throne of the Internet⁸.

The major cause for the dazzling rise of Bill Gates and his tribe has been the astonishing progress in communication technology which permits them to send messages around the globe at the speed of light. This "Big Bang" or break-through in information transfer enables any moderately talented stockbroker to connect his home market with as many foreign stock exchanges as they deems necessary for his business transactions. Such business operations utilize money in its most intangible appearance, namely in digital form. Digital or numerical money circulates among the major stock exchanges in quantities which are way beyond the comprehension of those who are not initiated in the rites and customs of the trade⁹. However, many banks were still not totally satisfied with just having the digital acceleration, so they invented what they now call derivative products. Derivative

products are a sort of lottery tickets which in turn dissimulate wagers of often more than 100 millions in US Dollars. Derivatives also have the noticeable and treasured quality that they frequently multiply risk, they profit and loss potential of a single contract, by a factor of over a thousand when compared to what is considered a normal option sale or purchase at the respective stock exchange. In such a world of quasi invisible, thus scantily controlled mega-gambling national currencies are destined to take a terrible beating, and all that even strong governments can do is to watch helplessly how the financial drama unfolds.¹⁰

Above all, what is even more disturbing to the ordinary citizen is the fact that the American media giants, the new communication empires of the United States control via satellite broadcasting his or her access to most types of international news. In their nefarious efforts to sell fiction for fact in order to make a fast buck, these media companies exhibit a tendency to create in the emerging nations a sinister, centreless cultural chaos, in which the formerly autonomous individual is quickly transformed into a violent, illiterate member of a mass that has been lobotomized by television. Such a person is on the verge of losing all coherent understanding and knowledge of his or her society. Thus the new rulers of international finance and communication have forced Third World governments into a position, in which they are no longer able to protect efficiently their national wealth, and in which they have become totally dependent on commercial rogues such as Ted Turner, Robert Murdoch and Bill Gates for the distribution of international news and often even scientific knowledge to their own people.¹¹

For the benefit of the readers, we would like to provide just two other examples in order to demonstrate *ad valorem* the weakness of national governments. The Japanese government,

noted for its commercial clout and business acumen, could not prevent against massive (private!) speculation from abroad the fall of the US Dollar and the equivalent rise of the Yen, which from the very beginning undermined their very ambitious economic recovery programme¹². Readers should also become aware that the three largest international investment funds (Fidelity Investments, Vanguard Group and Capital Research & Management) control a portfolio of over 500 billions in US Dollars. In stark contrast to this financial might stands the rather dismal performance of the United States and their Western allies to come up in a strenuous effort with barely the required sum of 50 billions in US Dollars in order to save the state of Mexico from certain bankruptcy¹³.

It seems that the newly crowned potentates of the global financial markets and mass media operate in a neo-liberalist vacuum which only obeys the dictate of the free market, and is therefore not subject to any national attachment or state interference. Here, a caveat should be issued, because the appearance those companies display to the unsuspecting observer is more than misleading. Nearly all the mega-conglomerates are domiciled in the United States or have their material basis (office, majority of investments, legal registration of the company, etc.) in that very country. And even if the government of the United States likes to point out that those companies cost them "A Bundle" in the Mexican rescue operation⁴, they cannot deny the fact that their country is the main beneficiary of companies such as CNN, Vanguard Group or Fidelity Investments. However, in pausing for a moment to give time to second thoughts, one may notice that the international enterprises in question still lack one important ingredient, namely military power, in order to be able to govern our planet without having to contend rather impotently with any unwanted political developments. Luckily for individuals such as

Jeffrey Vinik, the chief executive officer of fidelity Investments and Ted Turner, the uncontested leader of CNN, the United States are playing after their performance in the Gulf War in a "Military League" of their own. thus, it does not take much imagination or a canny ability to plot to predict that sooner or later the U.S. military will appear, when they are really needed, as *deus ex machina* in order to save the investments in the Third world of such companies as Vanguard Group or Capital Research & Management¹⁴.

A symbiosis of that kind might also bring additional advantages to the U.S. government. In privatizing the state-run social service system and many other national institutions, and handing part of their management over to large private enterprises, the United States can free an inordinately large amount of capital and might be willing to reinvest these funds into military soft- and hardware, thereby reducing, without the shadow of the slightest doubt, their rivals on the battlefield to mere cannon fodder. In giving free rein to private interests and leadership inside the United States, the American government with its already planned privatization campaign under the new Republican leadership of Dole and Gingrich may truly become the role model for a great many emerging nations. However, because a Third World country lacks at the same time economic, political and military power, such privatization foibles may really put its sovereignty at bay. In the end, a Wall Street firm will take over the treasury department of that country, and its national radio and television will be under the management of CNN. This type of privatization constitutes nothing more than an open letter of invitation to the new masters of the world, the whole tribe of Jeffrey Vinik, Bill Gates and Ted Turner, to do whatever they want to do with the national wealth of the Third World country in question and the minds of its citizens.

FOOT NOTES.

1. Sita C. Amba-Rao, Business Social policy in the Third World: Response of Multinational Corporate Management, in Kenneth E. Bauzon's edited *Development and Democratization in the third world, Myths, Hopes and Realities*. Crane Russak, Washington, London, 1992, PP 253-263.
2. Mubashsir Hasan, (Finance Minister in Z.A. Bhutto's Cabinet 1972-77). "On being powerless in power, *Race and class*, Vol. XXVIII, No.4, 1978.
3. Kenneth E. Bauzon, Democratization in the third world - Myth or reality, in K.E. Bauzon edited, op, cit, PP 11-13.
4. Ibid, PP. 13-14.
5. Mahbub ul Haq, *The poverty curtain, choices for the third world*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, Karachi, 1976. (See specially Part 3, No.9, PP. 169-183).
6. Thomas R. Callanghy, Vision and Politics in the Transformations of the Global Political Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third World in Robert. O. Slater and other edited, *Global Transformation and the Third world*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, Colorado - 1993. PP. 164-165.
7. Ibid, P. 175.
8. Philip Elmer Dewitt, Mine, All Mine, *Time*, June 5, 1995. PP. 32-41.
9. Ibid PP. 38 -39. (Interview with Bill Gates).
10. See Report by Michael Hirsh, Down, Dawn, Down. *News*

Week, March 20, 1995 PP. 8-13. also see an interesting report by Daniel Pedersen and Melissa Roberts on P. 15. A billion - Dollar Mystery.

11. Rosemary Righter, *Whose News? Politics, the Press and the Third World*, Burnett Books, London, 1978,(See specially Chapter 7, The real cultural imperialism. PP. 212-230
12. See News Week cover story, "The Amazing Shrinking Dollar, and the forces that are driving it down"
March 20, 1995.
13. K.E. Bauzon, Democratization in the Third World - Myth or reality? In K.E. Bauzon edited *Deve-Lopment and Democratization in the Third World*, Op.cit, P-14.
14. Dr. Farida J. Aziz, *the New World Order - the 21st Century*, F.J. Aziz consultancy and institutes for Social, Political and Military Studies, Strategic and International Affairs, Islamabad, 1992. Also see the following articles. Larry Diamond, The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order, *Current History*, Vol 93, No.579, January, 1994. Lewis A. Dunn, Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear Powers, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No.1, 1994. William. E. Odom, How to create a true world order, *Orbis*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 1995.

AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN.

Mrs. Qamar Zafar

HIGHER EDUCATION.

It was really not a happy augury that, at the time of independence, Pakistan of today inherited only two Universities. Firstly. The universities of Punjab, established in 1882, was however, fully established and was functioning on sound footings. As a matter of fact the University of Punjab started its functions as an examining body only, which subsequently, also taken upon itself the teaching functions. Secondly, the University of Sind, established in 1946 just a year prior to independence, was still toddling in its infancy. Inheritance had however bestowed upon Pakistan a few prestigious colleges at undergraduate levels, majority of which offered courses of general education. Professional, technical and vocational institutions were very few. Furthermore, the lack of staff in educational institutions, both at higher level and school level, had greatly handicapped education during the immediate post independence period.

This situation had arisen due to the migration of most of the qualified teaching personnel of Hindu caste to India. A considerable number of such vacated posts were later filled in by teachers and qualified personnel who came to Pakistan after migration. Still the remaining vacancies took considerable period of time to be filled with the qualified staff.

It would not be out of point to mention here that prior to the year 1954, the Universities were concerned with education at all levels. It was included in the responsibility of the Universities to conduct matriculation examination and frame their syllabus. On

the recommendations of the Education Commission (1959), the Boards of Intermediate were created to cater for the academic and examination needs of the secondary and Higher Secondary classes ie 9-12 classes. Thus the Universities became responsible only for graduate, post graduate and further education. The father of the nation Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, regarding the type of education, had declared, "there is an immediate and urgent need for giving scientific and technical education to our people." Further, he had also observed, "we have to build the character of our future generation to instil in them the highest sense of honour, integrity, responsibility and selfless service to nation."

In the light of the above quotations, the new nation had to evolve its own system of education. The educationist started gapping with the formulation of an action plan and setting up of an educational strategy.

As there were few professional, technical and vocational institutions, at its initiation, the need was felt for opening new institutions of higher education. Thus new colleges and Universities were set up gradually.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

It is evident that the countries having higher levels of education are enjoying much progress and privileges in all spheres of life. The economically advanced countries are at the top most rungs of the ladder of scientific and technological fields has also shown a high growth in the field of higher education. Thus, it is imperative that economically less advanced and developing countries should give more emphasis to develop their system of education across the levels and especially at higher education level, for this is the level which directly produced the persons who

are assigned the responsibility of national development in Industry, in Universities and at key position in the Government, etc, realizing the fact, therefore, Pakistan also started giving due emphasis through gradually reviewing the field of education and training.

The first Education Conference (1974) held at Karachi passed a resolution about higher education saying. "It has been felt for a long time that the system of University education comprising the curricula, examinations and teaching method is unsatisfactory and requires a thorough review in order to bring it in line with our education ideals and needs."

Later a series of periodical development programmes, as permitted by the limited resources, were planned to be undertaken for necessary gradual upliftment.

The first five year plan (1955-60) laid stress on to make up qualitative deficiencies in education and expansion of the system. The major characteristics of this plan included:-

- i) Evolution of unified system of higher education:
- ii) Strengthening of the ten existing Universities;
- iii) Separation of the Intermediate and Degree classes;
- iv) Transference of professional college to the control of the Universities.
- v) Reorientation of the functions of Universities towards teaching and research rather than examining and affiliating;
- vi) Effective establishment of the Universities in providing

guidance and leadership.

It would be befitting to mention here that the commission on National Education recognized higher education as a distinct stage from School education and recommended that matriculation examination and either intermediate classes may be disassociated from the Universities and affiliation of colleges discontinued. The Universities were therefore, entrusted with the job of teaching graduate and post graduate classes and conduct research in relevant fields.

The second five year plan (1960-65) emphasized upon:-

- i) The concept of education being as one of the most vital national investment; and
- ii) It being an important determinant of economic growth cum development of the country.
- iii) To encourage higher education;
- iv) Facilitate research at the Universities.

The third five year plan (1965-70), set for the following objectives:-

- i) To Provide an educational system facilitating expansion and strengthening teaching of science and technology, promoting political, Social and economic development.
- ii) To raise the quality of education at all levels so that it may properly fulfil its nation building tasks.
- iii) Provision of opportunities for the teachers of science to improve themselves professionally.
- iv) Consideration of establishment of institutions of Higher education; and

Expansion of facilities for study and research in scientific and technological disciplines.

The key note of this plan was a qualitative one. Vocational and technical education was another important area. In order to provide practical training, it was envisaged to set up Advisory Commission in which Industry and other employing authorities were to be fully represented.

As the country had already witnessed establishment of Universities, the University of Peshawar (1960), the University of Karachi (1951), the University of Faisalabad (1961), the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore (1961); the third five year plan (1965-70) witnessed growth of Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad (1965) and the University of Balochistan, (1970). A series of such five year plans continued in the country striving towards the uplift and advantage of education in the country. These were, the Fourth Five year Plan (1970-75), the fifth five year plan (1978-83), and the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88).

During these above mentioned plan periods more Universities made their appearance on the educational scene of Pakistan, namely, Allama Iqbal Open University (1974), Gomal University (1974) at Dera Ismail Khan, Zakaria Bahauddin University (1974) at Multan, and the Islamic University (1975) at Bahawalpur. After 1975, various Degree, Professional and Technical Colleges were raised to the status of University and respectively called Sind Agriculture University, Tandojam, NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi and Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro. The Degree College at Khairpur was raised to the level of the Second campus of Sind University, The college of Agriculture Peshawar, and College of Engineering, Peshawar, raised to the level of Universities to be named respectively as the NWFP University of Engineering and

Technology, Furthermore, the National College of Engineering and Technology at Karachi has been affiliated to the NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, while a University College at Nawabshah has been affiliated with Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro. Recently, Islamic University has been established at Islamabad, University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir at Muzaffarabad and Agha Khan University at Karachi, Also it is pertinent here to mention that, plan for one more University "Women University" is under preparation.

University Grants Commission (UGC) was established by the Government in July, 1973, so as to coordinate the programmes of Universities for greater National Development and to ensure purposeful provision and utilization of public funds for this purpose. So to say, the UGC was meant to serve as buffer between the government exclusively to deal with on the matters of the Universities. The Commission's Jurisdiction includes the preparation of programmes, Plans for development of standards of education, of higher and college level (graduate level); with concurrent supervisory hand, over the curricula taught-conduct of examinations, and award of degree at the graduate and post graduate levels. The said Commission, besides its other functions, in collaboration with scientists and experts, devised new curricula so as to achieve the positive results of the demands for new trends and practices of higher education. Thus colleges and University level courses and syllabus are being reviewed and updated ever since. Under the administrative control of the University Grants Commission, Islamabad an institution called the National Academy of Higher Education has also been established so as to impart intensive training (in service and pre service) to college and University teachers for their reorientation in new methods, techniques of teaching, knowledge, understandings and worthwhile

skills.

In the professional fields several University departments were also established, eg. Colleges of Commerce, medicine education, business administration, pharmacy, dental surgery, home economics etc. Commendable enough is that sixteen Medical Colleges, in the country, now offer M.B.B.S, Degree Programmes, which are affiliated with their respective Universities. Besides, there are also Colleges of Dental Surgery offering B.D.S Degree Programmes. For teaching and research in various medical disciplines, a prestigious institution namely Jinnah Post Graduate Medical Centre has been established at Karachi under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Health and is governed by an autonomous Board of Governor. Further to that a college of Physicians and Surgeons has also been established in Karachi. To give an overall coverage of training in various technical graduates facilities have been managed which are available at the Institute for Chemical Engineering and Technology at the University of Punjab, Engineering College Campus at Taxila, Institute of Taxila Technology, at Faisalabad Agriculture Engineering Departments of the Agriculture Universities at Faisalabad, Tandojam and Peshawar. For the training of Marines, an Academy has been established at Karachi under the Federal Ministry of Communications. There are eight colleges of Technology offering B. Tech Degree programmes. In addition the Institutions of Polytechnic Diploma courses have also been set up. The universities of Engineering and Technology also teach the disciplines of architecture, Chemical Engineering, metallurgical and mining engineering, petroleum and gas engineering, town planning and electronic etc. The Universities of Agriculture have further introduced the disciplines of horticulture, economics, rural sociology, animal husbandry, veterinary sciences, agricultural engineering, and applied agriculture. In the field of general

education, the establishment of National College of Arts at Lahore, is another achievement.

The GNP percent expenditure on education in Pakistan rose to nearly 2 in 1978. This was however much lower than what a typical Asian Country was spending in 1978. (3.04) and a developing country (4.40). During the period 1986-87, it was about 2.31 of GNP in Pakistan.

The Fifth Five year Plan (1978-83) has proposed that the per capita expenditure on education would have to be increased from 43 in 1978 to Rs. 88.00 in 1983 and envisaged an outlay of 3.1 of GNP on education by the end of the plan. It was hoped that given better planning and management, the GNP percentage expenditure on education would exceed 3.1 by 1983. All indications show that the hope of raising GNP percentage expenditure to 3.1 or higher has not been materialized due to other demanding sectors in the budget.

PARTICIPATION RATE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Participation rate of Students in higher education in Pakistan is very small compared to that of many Asian Countries. The absorption capacity of the graduates in the job market appear to be even smaller. As such the problems of unemployment and under employment of graduates gets worse.

FINDINGS

- 1) Important dimension of the problem of job market is the non availability of the requisite appropriate skills on the qualified graduates in certain as of scientific, technological and professional education. In other words, the qualified graduates with appropriate skills are not available in requisite unnumber.

- 2) Expenditure on higher education did not lead to the provision of the skills necessary for rapid economic development but was rather associated with an exceptionally high level of educated un employment.
- 3) This may partly be a phenomenon of the fact that curricula and standards are largely unrelated to the realities of the labour market.
- 4) These problems add further more to the vicious cycle of the existing phenomenon of mismatch between "higher education" and the "world of work."
- 5) To have a break through over the above said phenomena the further researchers, may in line, extend their efforts, for which the challenge awaits them to the achievement of the maximum of the goal.
- 6) There exists in the country, an uneasy and rather tense relationship between the educational sector and economy and society. While, on one hand, requested jobs are not available in sufficient numbers for the graduates dished out by the education machine, on the other hand, number of educated skilled graduates is in short supply to the potential employers. The phenomenon of "educated un-employed" and the "educated un skilled" has plagued the job market and hence there prevails the Socio-economic and Socio-cultural mileau.

REFERENCE

- 1) Also cited in the FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN (1955-60) Government of Pakistan Printing Press, P-40/c.
- 2) Government of Pakistan Proceedings of Pakistan Educational Conference (from 27th November to 1st December, 1947), Ministry of Interior (Education Division)

P.19/c.

- 3) Government of Pakistan, the first five year plan (1955-60), Karachi, Planning Board, 1966. Karachi, Government of Pakistan Press, 1959.
- 4) Government of Pakistan. The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65)
- 5) Government of Pakistan. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) Islamabad, Planning Commission 1965.
- 6) Government of Pakistan. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) Islamabad, Planning Commission 1965.
- 7) Government of Pakistan. The Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75) Islamabad, Planning Commission 1978.
- 8) Government of Pakistan. The Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83) Islamabad, Planning Commission 1978.
- 9) Government of Pakistan. The Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83) Islamabad, Planning Commission 1978.
- 10) Government of Pakistan. The Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88) Islamabad, Planning Commission P.349.
- 11) Report of the Commission on National Education.
- 12) University Grants Commission Islamabad, Statistics on higher Education in Pakistan 1987 (P.518)

BOOK REVIEWS

Oman and the world: The Emergence of an independent Foreign Policy.

By: Joseph A.Kechichian,Rand Corporation,1995, Santa Monica, CA, USA: pages 400, price \$40.00.

The book traces the political history of Oman and offers insight in to how the sultanate in less than 25 years achieved internal stability, relative economic prosperity, secure borders, and numerous diplomatic accomplishment. It identifies the genius of Sultan Qaboos's foreign policy initiatives and assesses his ability to adapt to the changing regional and international environments. It analyzes the long-term principles that facilitated the introduction of capable foreign policy initiations based on non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, respect for international law and nonalignment.

After the British decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in 1968, both Saudi Arabia and U.S.A became concerned about Oman. But there is a consensus over the short-term future of the Persian Gulf Region that its future is less threatened than it was between 1967 and 1990. Even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the area is still under pressure from the hegemonistic aspirations of three major regional powers i.e. Turkey, Iran and Iraq.

The book consists of ten chapters which include Relations with Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf Region; Oman and the West, with Russia and Central Asia, Oman and the Far East, Oman and south Asia and Africa.

Oman faced significant internal changes over the past few decades that shaped, whether by design or by accident, its foreign policy objectives. A serious populations explosion threatened to tax the countries resources to the limit, which compelled the Government to a two pronged economic liberalization and investment oriented policy. A 4 per cent annual population growth rate stood as the most ominous threat facing Oman. In past, to meet this internal challenge, Muscat adopted new economic polices that necessitated closer cooperation with, first, its immediate neighbours, including Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and second, with a variety of European and Asian States. Oman is well poised for future challenges as the Persian Gulf region enters the 21st Century.

Th book is a very good attempt on the part of the author to trace the origin of Omani State, identifies trends in Omani diplomacy, focusing on relations with the States of the Region, with the West and around the world.

Hameed A.K. Rai

Jinnah of Pakistan, Stanley Wolpert:
Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1989,

The book is spread over 415 pages with 23 topics. It covers the entire political career of the founder of Pakistan. Starting with his becoming secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji, the President of the annual session of the Congress at Calcutta in 1906(26), and finally addressing the Muslim League on December 14, 1947 at Karachi he gave the reasons for the political struggle of independence: "The Muslims were a crowd, they were demoralized, and they had to suffer economically. We have achieved Pakistan, not for the League, not for any of our colleagues, but for the masses".(355)

The provincial elections in 1937 under the Act of 1935 were important for propagation of Muslim Nationalism. Therefore, at the Bombay session of Muslim League in 1936, Jinnah was authorized to appoint and preside over a new Central Parliamentary Board and affiliated provincial parliamentary boards.(142) The election results favoured unexpectedly the Congress under the leadership of Pandit Nehru, due to which he became very optimistic about the support of Muslim masses for the Congress. According to him: "May I suggest to Mr. Jinnah that I come into greater touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League"(148). It was against this background that the annual session of Muslim League was held at Lucknow in October, 1937. There were about 5,000 Muslim delegates representing every province of India. The President of the League in his address said: "Eighty millions of Musalmans in India have nothing to fear. They have their destiny in their hands, and as a well-knit, solid, organized, united force can face any danger, and withstand any opposition to its unit ed front and wishes"(153). The response to his encouraging speech was spontaneous and on the morning of October 15, 1937, Jinnah was

donned as Quaid-i-Azam. He resented the callous attitude of the provincial Congress ministries against the Muslim minority and with their resignation he resolved for the Muslim League to proclaim "Day of Deliverance on Friday December 22, 1937"(76).

By March 1940, the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity had totally transformed himself into demand for Pakistan's leader. This is further emphasized in Madras in 1941. "We have defined in the clearest language our goal about which Muslim India was groping in dark, and the goal is Pakistan(191). The point was reiterated during Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944". The Muslims want Pakistan. The League represents the Muslims and it wants separation(230). He was never impressed by Gandhian emotionalism. Always remained firm and resolute in his public appearance. However, only once he was overpowered by sentiments at the time of death of his wife. When Rutlie Petil Jinnah's body was being lowered into the grave, he wept like a child(105). The failure of Simla Conference in 1945 made the Quaid strong politically. Though the Viceroy Lord Wavell assessed him "narrow and arrogant". (45) After independence Pakistan's Constituent Assembly met in Karachi for the first time on August 11, 1947, and unanimously elected Jinnah to preside over its meetings. (237) He as president of the consembly emphasized on the following guidelines for the new state. (i) Law and Order (ii) nepotism and jobbery and equal rights for minorities. He concluded it by saying. "That in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state." (340) Jinnah's daughter Dina never joined her father in Pakistan while he lived, she came to Karachi only for his funeral(370).

Prof. Ahmed Husain

A New Alliance for the Next Century

The future of U.S-Korean Security Cooperation.

**By Jonathan D. Pollack & Young Koocha, RAND, 1996 pages 80
Price \$ 15.00.**

The book is a work of joint efforts of Rand and Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) to assess how the United States and South Korea can maintain and invigorate their security relationship as North Korea no longer poses a major threat to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

It has reviewed the past history and present status of U.S.-ROK alliance and future challenges with the following objectives.

To identify and analyses the principal characteristics of and potential directions for long-term U.S.- ROK security cooperation.

To define a policy frame work and criteria with which both countries could evaluate the suitability, feasibility, and consequences of alternative forms of security cooperation under shifting regional conditions.

To highlight emerging policy issues which both Governments will need to address in planning for the future.

The findings of this study provides that status-quo phase with North Korea will continue until a process of peaceful co-existence starts between North and South Korea. In the second phase Accommodation and Integration will start through official exchanges and economic collaboration. The events of this phase would include.

- (1) Implementation of confidence-building measures.
- (2) Completion of Arms reduction Agreements.
- (3) A preliminary agreement on an appropriate division of Labour in military affairs

After this a structure of North-South confederation will come into being. The phase three is a post-unification stage. This would be marked by a merger of North and South Korea in which unified security and military polices would be implemented under a single sovereign entity and Korea would focus on countering regional instability and preventing the domination of the region by a single power.

To assess future options more fully, the Rand and KIDA turn their attention to how different security alternatives might develop and operate and to gauging the larger implications of future security cooperation between the United States and Korea.

Finally, the result is to demonstrate the value of developing an alliance strategy for the longer term. It is incumbent on both the United States and the Republic of Korea to fashion these opportunities and possibilities in a manner that benefits not only the two countries but Asia and pacific as a whole. Viewed in this larger perspective, now is the time to begin to plan for the next century.

Hameed A.K. Rai

CONTRIBUTORS

1. *Dr. Mohammad Arif*, Associate Professor, of Political Science, Government College, Bhalwal.
2. *Ahmed Husain*, Professor and Chairman (Retd.) Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore
3. *M. Ikram Rabbani*, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.
4. *Dr. Abdul Hameed Khan*, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Islamia University, Bahawalpur.
5. *Mrs. Neelam Firdous*, Chairman Department of Psychology, University of Balochistan, Quetta.
6. *Naudir Bakht*, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Balochistan, Quetta.
7. *Ghulam Sarwar Rana*, Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.
8. *Ghulam Murtaza Shah*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Government College, Bahawalnagar.
9. *Dr. Khalid Javid Makhdoom*, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.
10. *Dr. Razia Mussart*, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Islamia University, Bahawalpur.
11. *Dr. Khawaja Alqama*, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Islamia University, Bahawalpur.
12. *Mrs. Qamar Zafar*, Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce, University of Balochistan, Quetta.
13. *Hameed A. K. Rai*, Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.