


THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE



Published by
Department of Political Science
GOVERNMENT COLLEGE - LAHORE (PAKISTAN)

Vol. XV

1992

No. 1, 2

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Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

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The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

*Published by Rai Hameed Ali Khan
Manager of the Journal of Political Science*

Printed by : Shaukat Ali - Bukhari Printing Press
 Mohani Road, Lahore.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Vol. XV

Summer, Winter,

1992

No. 1, 2.

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Published by the Department of Political Science
Government College, Lahore - Pakistan

THE POWER DISSEMINATION IN PAKISTAN

AHMED HUSAIN

Will and not force is the base of law. This is precisely the cardinal point of a democratic government in a modern state. The exercise of the will is through the elected representatives of a nation chosen by the eligible voters based upon the principle of one man vote with open political competition and opposition between organised political parties for all important political offices¹. This procedure precisely is the cornerstone of democratic government. Deviation from it creates difficulties and ambiguities and the power is not crystallised in an institution. Hence, its diffusion in various authoritative agencies leading to political complications to adopt liberal parliamentary democracy on the western model.

The above mentioned political standard could not be formed in a number of developing countries due to lack of a number of prerequisites for the success of the political pattern. Pakistan was no exception to it. In Pakistan due to unique political situation of cultural pluralism and its negative assertion augmented by geographical distance between the two wings of country created power dissemination. The tendency towards it was further aggravated due to weak political leadership after the death of Quaid-i-Azam. He was the founder of the new state. It was his indefatigable leadership which enabled the All India Muslim League to create Pakistan. The Quaid as Governor-General exercised constitutional and extra-constitutional powers till his death. But afterwards the location of political power became difficult and three pronged tug of war started in governmental organizations, i.e. the head of the state, the legislature and the two political elites.

Since Pakistan had the legacy of British parliamentary method. An experiment of which was started in British India in 1858 and culminated in the Act of 1935. Therefore, it was expected that the

Pakistan National Assembly would be a supreme political institution. Nonetheless, due to some intractable problems faced by the new state some emergency powers were also given to the Governor General. A small number of British trained civil servants opted for Pakistan. Therefore, some reliance was made on them to salvage the country from initial multifarious problems. The above three institutions worked together to build the nation to overcome the problems and have smooth system of administration. All worked in such an intermingled way that the location of the political power became difficult and a new political system emerged with power sharing position of the political elites i.e., bureaucracy and military. Thus the genuine democratic institutions became fragile.

The year 1953 could be mentioned as a year which showed that underneath the facade of parliamentary democracy the political elites were also vying to share power. At that time Kh. Nazimuddin was the Prime Minister. He was a pious man and was inclined towards influence by the Ulema. The martial Law was imposed in Lahore on March 6, 1953 due to anti-Ahmadis riots.²

The initiative for imposition of Martial Law came from Iskander Mirza who was the Defence Secretary. The Military brought under control the deteriorating law and order situation in Lahore. This showed the weakness of the Kh. Nazimuddin government and it was primarily on this plea that the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the Prime Minister even though he was enjoying the support of the majority of the members of National Assembly.³ About the imposition of Martial Law it was the pressure of the bureaucracy and carried out by the Military⁴. In this way the two political elites co-operated to weaken the democratic process.⁵

It also exposed the indiscipline among the leaders of the Muslim League. In 1953 the leadership of the Muslim League was indecisive about the important national issues. It was the same party which had started campaign for an independent Muslim state in 1937 under the indefatigable leadership of the Quaid and had attained its goal of an independent Pakistan within ten years. The weak Muslim League leadership shifted the decision making power

in the hands of G.G. Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat who believed in authoritarian rule.

He was the first finance minister of Pakistan. The Quaid called him a "wizard" when he magically produced a surplus budget for the first year of independence.⁶ By the end of 1948 Ghulam Muhammad had acquired complete control over the financial and economic management of the country. The provinces were made dependent on the centre about financial matters. By making the provinces dependent upon the centre he led the way for ascendancy of the Military as a political elite. Because as a general rule the more decentralised the regime, the harder it is, to overthrow it by a coup d'etat.⁷

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 it was decided in the interest of stability and progress of the country to revive full powers of Governor General. Meanwhile, Kh. Nazimuddin stepped down by the cabinet division and became Prime Minister. On the other hand Ghulam Muhammad a strong member of the Cabinet was elevated to the position of G.G. He with the backing of Major General Iskander Mirza, the Secretary of Defence, and General M. Ayub Khan Commander-in-Chief formed the powerful trio to control the civil administration and weaken the democratic institutions particularly the National Assembly, with the intention to make it subservient to the G.G. Who in the normal circumstances had to be a constitutional head. Moreover, in the absence of strong well disciplined parties and effective electoral system, the legislature could not help but fail to exercise control over the bureaucracy.⁸

The Constituent Assembly had to draft a new constitution. This assignment was entrusted to it after independence in 1947. The task was not completed till 1954. In the same year a number of veteran politicians elected to the Constituent Assembly did not appreciate the discretionary powers of the G.G. by which he had dismissed Kh. Nazimuddin ministry in 1953. A constitutional amendment was proposed that the G.G. should be stripped off this powers and the National Assembly should control the executive on the model of British House of Commons. Before this amendment

could be carried the G.G. dissolved the Consembly and dismissed the federal government on October 24, 1954. "In England the right of dissolution lies with the Crown. In earlier times it was used by the crown to get rid of an uncongenial Parliament at a moment favourable to its own friends prospects of success. But with the democratization of the constitution and the rise of the convention that the cabinet requires the confidence of the House of Commons, it naturally happened that the initiative in this matter passed into the hands of the Prime Minister.⁹

The outgoing Prime Minister M. A. Bogra criticised the members of the Consembly for neglecting the constitution making task. Nevertheless, a few days earlier he had declared that the constitution making was complete and the House could adopt it. This showed the demagogy of the political leadership. They did not protest against the undemocratic step by the G.G. and a number of former ministers joined the new cabinet alongwith Iskander Mirza and General Ayub, headed by, Bogra known as 'All Talents' cabinet.

By and large it is believed that an election is an important measure to stabilise democratic institutions. In Pakistan the national electoral process was delayed on one plea or other till 1958. Finally the General Election was promised in early 1959 under the 1956 constitution. All the political parties started campaign by the middle of 1958. President Iskander Mirza had aversion for the concept of the popular sovereignty, the manifestation of which was General Election. He believed in limited political power for the masses and a firm control on the political institutions. Hence, the abrogation of the constitution and sharing of power with the Military.¹⁰

To enforce the concept of limited political power the 1962 constitution was introduced. It granted limited powers to the National Assembly.¹¹ It introduced the Presidential form of government, the first in the Commonwealth of nations, with the Basic Democrats as an electoral college. The Constitution gave the President full financial powers and made the legislature subservient to the executive which was an anomaly in a democratic practice familiar in the country as a legacy of the British Raj.

The National Assembly was chosen indirectly, which implied that the members of the electoral college could be pressurised to have the desired results. There was emphasis on development through the Basic Democracies rather than growth of political institutions leading to the supremacy of the will of the people. The Ayub period was the period of power sharing by the two political elites of the country and alienation of the rulers from the ruled. The Ayub system could be described as a 'modernizing autocracy'.

There was artificial interest aggregation based upon concoctions of facts and analysis which camouflaged the true aspirations of the nation hence the gap, which could not be bridged. The political elites oriented government decided in 1968 to celebrate the ten years rule by President Ayub Khan under the caption of "Decade of Reforms" which gave ignition to the smothered fire of despondency and deprivation against the Ayub regime and political agitation started throughout the country.

While handing power to the Military Chief, the President violated the Provisions of 1962 Constitution by which the President had to be succeeded by the Speaker of the National Assembly. Ayub Khan stated for this anomaly that otherwise Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's regional antonymy would have liquidated the central government and the army¹². Succinctly, the Ayub era politically was a period for struggle to reintroduce the concept of one man one vote and with its achievement again started the process to hold General Election for introduction of parliamentary ascendancy.

As election is an important indicator of the evolution of democratic institutions. The regular periodical elections and transfer of power to the majority political party is the success of democratic political system. Once the election results are announced, within the specific constitutional limit the party elect has to be installed in power. One must give due credit to Agha Yahya Khan for having organized fair and impartial elections in December 1970. But he confused the transfer of power process. He hesitated to transfer power to the Awami League, the declared majority party after the 1970 General Election. This was against the concept of popular sovereignty reflected in a modern state. This

led to political crisis of the worst type and dismemberment of the country in December 1971.

The main cause of the debacle of 1971 was due to the inherent geographical location of the two parts of the country. The distance between East and West Pakistan was of about one thousand miles of foreign territory. Due to the distance the process of national integration could not be successful. The most formidable problem of nation building in Pakistan was the integration of Bengali sub-nation.¹³

In a federal system difference may arise between the Centre and the federating units. As a last resort the Military on the orders of the federal government prevents recalcitrant unit from secession. For example, in Nigeria the costly civil war lasted for about thirty months, from July 1967 to January 1970. Due to the Military action, the Federal Republic of Nigeria remained intact¹⁴. Similar was the case in Indonesia and the U.S.A. Geographical contiguity is an essential feature of the success of federal system.¹⁵

The All India Muslim League's Legislators Convention on April 9, 1946, dropped the demand of two 'Independent States' and resolved for a single 'sovereign independent state'. The main purpose of the change was to keep Muslim Bengal in the fold of one independent state. The resolution locked many practicalities like defence¹⁶. During the Indo-Pak war of 1965 the problem of defence of East Pakistan caused anxiety among the East Pakistanis.

The induction of last point "federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia" in the six points of the Awami League in 1966 and incorporated in the 1970 election manifesto indicated the isolation of East Pakistan during the above mentioned war¹⁷. It finally led to the creation of Bengla Desh in Dec. 1971. The amendment to the constitution of 1973 endorsed the secession of East Pakistan.

The General Election under the Constitution of 1973 was held in March 1977. Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto's PPP got a landslide victory by capturing 155 out of 200 seats. The PNA got only 36 seats and according to a political observer both sides were surprised by

the election results. The opposition started mass political agitation which led to serious nature of law and order problem followed by military intervention on July 5, 1977.

An election is a democratic process to bring governmental change. At the same time the electorate expects from the national political leadership to provide an opportunity to them to elect candidates of their choice by fairplay. The same thing happened with Prime Minister late Z. A. Bhutto. The allegation of rigging by his government gave a way to the opposition. The nine party alliance mobilised a mass movement to topple a civilian government with the help of military.¹⁸ The two General Elections of 1970 and 1977 were baffling for Bhutto. The result of 1970 made his party the largest in West Pakistan and in 1977 confident Bhutto had to face insurmountable criticism for alleged partial rigging. The aftermath of 1977 brought in power the Military Chief General Ziaul Haq. Zia claimed that elections on the basis of adult franchise were un-Islamic.¹⁹

Like General Ayub he wanted controlled civilian political participation. For this Ayub had introduced "Basic Democracies" and Zia introduced the concept of a non-party elections. This approach towards representation could not be defended in a modern state. This is particularly relevant about Pakistan. The formation of a new Muslim state primarily depended on the efforts of the All India Muslim League which was formed as early as 1906 to safeguard the political interests of the Indian Muslims vis-a-vis the majority party All India Congress. Zia's decision to hold non-party elections did not give strength to the political institutions. Similarly, his earlier decision to have a nominated legislature refuted the competency of the Muslim electorate during the General Election 1945-46. It was after the above mentioned election that the British government conceded the Muslim League demand of Pakistan. Zia had ruled out in October 1980 general elections as a risk to national unity and solidarity. He declared: "as long as I am at the helm of affairs and there is with me the overwhelming force of Islam loving people we will not let the country go into the hands of anti-Islam and secular elements."²⁰

Maintaining his posture of hatred for democracy backed by a number of political leaders General Zia decided to hold non-party elections in 1985. This decision was arrived unilaterally apparently for the unity and prosperity of the nation. His decision was in line with the approach of military generals towards the politicians in other developing countries. By and large the approach of military leaders is community without politics, consensus by command. By civilizing and downgrading the politics, the military prevent society from achieving its political ambitions.²¹ Nevertheless, the rejection of genuine democratic process by Gen. Zia was based upon the checkered political history of Pakistan. His advent to power was the third occasion when the regional differences and the failure of the national political parties made the political institutions weak leading to political instability in the country. It provided the military as an organised political elite to step into office. The Ayub regime assumed power to "save the country from disintegration". In 1969 he handed over power to General Yahya apparently on the same slogan followed by Gen. Zia in 1977.

The non-party election of 1985 became a misnomer with the formation of Muslim League parliamentary group with Mr. Junejo as its leader. The Muslim League government was dismissed by President Zia on May 29, 1988 and thus did away with the political facade he had created to keep the political parties at bay. He exercised the discretionary dismissal power given to him in Article 58 of the 1973. Constitution by the eighth amendment.²² This action of President Zia was democratically the most unkindest of all. It seemed that the Junejo government was working democratically with emphasis on social and economic development. Its greater contribution was in the national political field when it introduced a good number of new energetic and young leaders; better substitute for the old League leadership. The group was headed by Mohammad Nawaz Sharif Chief Minister of Punjab, largest province of Pakistan.²³

President Zia following his policy of mistrust for the political parties declared that the general elections scheduled for November 1988 would like 1985 be held on no party participation. Before the election date he died in an air crash in August 1988. Nonetheless,

during his life the Supreme Court decided on June 20, 1988 in *Miss Benazir Bhutto versus Federation of Pakistan* that the political parties were eligible to participate in the elections scheduled to be held on November 16, 1988. It also declared certain provisions of the political parties Act 1962 null and void being inconsistent with the fundamental rights mentioned in Articles 17(2) and (3) of the Constitution. The article deals with freedom of association: Every citizen not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan.²⁴

The 1988 elections enabled the PPP leader Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto to become Prime Minister on December 2, 1988.²⁵ The PPP received 38.7% of the votes nearly identical to its 1970 share of 38.9%. However, whereas Z. A. Bhutto's government was able to function with the comfort of an emphatic majority in parliament, his daughter was forced into seeking supportive partners. In 1970 PPP had won 81 seats, constituting 59% of the Assembly. The same proportion of votes cast gave it a mere 43% of parliamentary seats in 1988. The same aggregate total of voting share, produced a hung verdict.²⁶

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly on August 6, 1990 by invoking the discretionary power given to him in Article 58(2) by the eighth amendment to the 1973 Constitution. The President strongly censured the PPP government. He emphasised that the step had been necessitated in the highest interest of the Constitution, national integrity and people's welfare.

The elections took place on October 24, 1990. Consequently, 217 members were elected to the National Assembly which included three former Prime Ministers. Mr. Mohammed Khan Junejo, Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. Mr. Gauhar Ayub Khan was elected speaker of the house by securing 146 votes, he belonged to IJI. An opponent who belonged to PDA secured only 47 votes. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif the leader of majority party was elected Prime Minister by securing 153 votes; against him M. Afzal Khan got only 39 votes. He took oath on

November 6, 1990 as thirteenth Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁷ It was for the first time in the parliamentary history of Pakistan that an elected Prime Minister handed over charge to the newly elected Prime Minister. He within ten years of his political career achieved the highest political office in the country. He became a provincial minister in 1981 and thrice became provincial Chief Minister. Mr. M. Nawaz Sharif is the third Prime Minister belonging to Punjab. Ch. Mohammad Ali and Malik Feroz Khan Noon are the two other belonging to the province.

The 1956 Constitution though envisaged a parliamentary form of government by which the executive is controlled by the legislature but the emergency powers exercised by the President upset this tradition. For example, President Iskander Mirza dissolved the National Assembly arbitrarily. He firmly believed that "some underdeveloped countries have to learn democracy and until they do so they have to be controlled."²⁸ To avoid the weakness of the 1956 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution provided a system strictly on the Westminster model but the eighth amendment created constitutional recrudescence by giving vast powers to the President to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the Prime Minister in his discretion. This has made the political institutions weak and untrustful. The power dissemination will continue unless the proper political sovereignty of the electorate is not fully enforced, reflected through the elected all powerful national assembly. Meanwhile, the power would be shared by the President, National Assembly through the Prime Minister and the political elites.



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CHINA AND ASIA: THE DRAGON STIRS

AHMAD FRAZ KHAN

Great shifts in international politics are comparable to the subterranean movements of tectonic plates. Once in motion, they are both unstoppable and unpredictable, and you never know precisely, when and where, the pressure building up underground will find release.

Such a release, it may be argued, came when the Soviet Union collapsed to give way to the reorientation of the whole world. The most profound effects of this demise are being felt by Asian countries — due to their immediate neighbourhood: it has given birth to some new states and has sent shock waves into others. Its decreasing power has correspondingly increased the magnitude of others' power, most notably China, and has sent others into hibernation, most notably India — whose weapon supplies mainly stemmed from it. It has also caused other changes, whose impact is yet to be fully felt by others.

The main beneficiary of this demise and its related developments is China. In the following pages we will try to decipher present trends in China, which, of course, are a precursor to its future. We will see how its economy is fairing? Will it disintegrate like Soviet Union? How have the changed economic realities coupled with realisation of after effects of the US hegemonic behaviour in the region worked to make China an emerging economic giant? How have lessened security threats increased its notoriety and its potential for destabilising behaviour?

I

After 30 years of experiment with variants of central planning, China initiated several changes in its economic system in 1979 that went beyond usual tinkering and addressed some of the root causes of the socialist economy's disease. These changes entail a series of

reforms, but the most conspicuous of these — and which mainly concerns us here — is opening China to foreign commerce, investment and loans, and partial liberalisation in China. The two-pronged economic policy of partial liberalisation inside China and its relations with the outside world first came together in the special economic zones.

After the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese government imported selected industrial equipments and technologies from the west in 1960s and 1970s. These imports were undertaken only intermittently, however, and it was not until Mao's death that the momentum was maintained for sustained Sino-foreign interaction through the adoption of a spate of new policies designed to attract foreign investment and technology imports. The new policies included the establishment of four special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979, the designations of fourteen coastal cities as open for foreign investment in 1984 and designation of coastal economic development zones in 1985. Primarily modelled on Taiwan's Export Processing Zones, these were originally designed to attract private foreign investment that would bring in technology and managerial know-how; they were also developed to encourage hard currency earning exports through tax holidays and lower tax rates, reduced tariff, modern infrastructure, flexible wage and labour policy, and less bureaucracy.¹

These zones have caused a massive economic activity in the coastal areas: "From an airplane booming southern Chinese (Guangdong) province looks like one huge construction site"².

These centres are attracting huge foreign investments with Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan leading the way. Taiwan investment since 1987, now officially exceeds \$3 billion. In 1991 alone Taiwan invested \$840 million, a 41 per cent increase over the previous year. Indirect trade between the two countries, through Hong Kong, is growing since 1988 at roughly 40 per cent annually; valued at \$77 million in 1979, it increased to \$4 billion in 1991 and is expected to reach \$7 billion during 1992³.

Hong Kong is responsible for two-thirds of total foreign investment in China. Four-fifth of investment in Guangdong, which totalled at almost \$3 billion in 1991 — and rose by 30 per cent in the first quarter of 1992 — originates in Hong Kong. The 16,000 Hong Kong-owned factories in the province export \$11 billion worth of goods annually, and employ 3 million Chinese workers, in comparison with the 680,000 Hong Kong workers employed in manufacturing in Hong Kong itself.⁴

Foreign Trade Table No. I

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total Trade (in billions of dollars)	102.8	111.7	115.4	135.7
Trade Balance (in billions of dollars)	-7.8	-6.6	8.7	12.4
Exchange Rate	3.71	3.71	4.77	5.30
Trade Relative to GNP (in per cent)	27.3	26.1	31.4	36.7
Share of Total Trade (in per cent)				
Hong Kong	29.4	30.9	35.4	36.6
Japan	18.4	16.9	14.4	14.9
United States	9.7	10.9	10.2	10.5

Exchange Rate: yuan per dollar, annual averages.

Sources: China Daily (various issues, 1989-1992); Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1988 [China statistical yearbook, 1988] (Beijing: China Statistical Information & Consultancy Centre, 1988). Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1991 (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe). "Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on 1991 National Economic and Social Development", Beijing Review, March 23-29, 1992.

Japan, though belatedly but surely has realised the opportunity huge Chinese market provides. It has recently released a \$5.7 billion credit package held for a time by what Japanese business community viewed as the Tiananmen contretemps. Japanese companies have poured in a total investment of \$3.2 billion between 1986 and 1991. During first six months of 1992 Japanese companies have signed investment agreements worth

\$850 million — a jump of 130 per cent over all investments in 1991. Today about 200 Japanese companies, including Toyota, Canon, Toshiba and Mabuchi Motors, have operations in China's northeast. Other companies like Toshiba and Mitsui & Co. have also made their plans public to set up factories. The JVC has already set up a factory near Shanghai.⁵

Other foreign investments are pouring in as American (\$1.8b. in 1989), Canadian, European and Australian firms attempt to escape the pinch of recession at home. In 1990, the year after Tiananmen, more than 7,000 foreign investment contracts valued at \$17.8 billion were signed — an increase of 47 per cent than previous year. In first quarter of 1992 alone, the value of new contracts was \$6.54 billion, an increase of 140 per cent.⁶

Selected Economic Indicators

Table No. II

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Inflation Rate (in per cent)	18.2	10.1	2.0	3.4
Saving Interest Rate (in per cent)	8.4	11.1	9.8	7.9
Real Interest Rate (in per cent)	-9.8	1.0	7.8	4.5
Saving Deposits (in billions of yuan)	380.0	515.0	703.0	911.0
GNP (in billions of yuan)	1,402.0	1,592.0	1,769.0	1,958.0

Inflation: National consumption-spending inflation index, comparable to the American consumer price index.

Saving Interest Rate: Rate on 12-month deposits, annual averages.

Real Interest Rate: Savings interest rate minus inflation rate.

Sources: China Daily (various issues, 1989-1991); Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991 [China statistical yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1991). "Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on 1991 National Economic and Social Development", Beijing Review, March 23-29, 1992.

All this economic frenzy keeps Chinese economy bursting with life. During the first eight months of 1992, its real GNP grew at an annualised rate of 14 per cent and industrial output by 20 per cent.

Since 1978, the country's real GNP has grown by an average of 9 per cent a year, a rate that doubles the size of the economy every eight years. It has more than \$40 billion in foreign exchange reserves.⁷

Foreign trade of China has surged forward from a meagre \$20 billion in 1978 to a staggering figure of \$135.7 billion in 1991, with a trade plus of \$12.4 billion.⁸ Its trade with the former Soviet Union in 1991 stood at \$6 billion and with South Korea it is expected to be \$5 billion in 1992.

China's overall exports rose at an average of 13 per cent throughout 1980s, and that rate has been sustained during the early 1990s. If this continues, by the year 2000 China's export will reach \$160 billion to \$210 billion annually, catapulting the country among the world's top dozen exporters.⁹

An ambitious new plan that could give a powerful impetus to China's regional trade is a proposed international free port and development zone at the mouth of Tumen River, where China, Russia, and North Korea meet along the Sea of Japan. Referred to at times as the future "Rotterdam of Asia" the project, to be jointly developed by China, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Russia, has received a grant of \$3.5 million from the United Nations Development Programme for an initial feasibility study¹⁰.

Chinese pragmatism has also contributed towards the same. One example of it is devaluation of yuan. After being pegged since July 1986 at an overvalued rate of 3.71 yuan per US dollar, it has witnessed a steady decrease as shown by the Table No. I.

Some Chinese observers argue that the economic liberalisation pursued mainly in south, with other areas scrambling to get on board has widened the historical gap between two Chinas: one rich and relatively open to the outside world (the "gold coast"), the other poor and inward-looking (the "west" comprising two-thirds of country's territory and one quarter of its people, many of them members of minority nationalities). The difference between the gross value of the industrial production of two Chinas, which was 256 billion yuans in 1981, widened to 679 billion yuans by 1987. The

per capita gross domestic product of Guangdong reached \$1,230 in 1991 — roughly three times China as a whole and comparable to Thailand. What some are calling the “Republic of South China” (Guangdong, Fujian, Taiwan, Hong Kong), with a population of 120 million and a combined GDP of \$320 billion has a per capita GDP of \$2,670. The first China has also benefited disproportionately from the right to retain a portion of hard currency earned from exports, which was granted to local authorities beginning with the SEZs; Senzhen, for example, retained all such earnings till 1991, although now it keeps only half of it. Critical observers claim that “loosening the bonds” (that is, the partial privatisation of economy and partial marketisation) has helped the coastal provinces to prosper and devastated many in the interior¹¹.

The development in coastal regions has never been intended to be a prairie-fire phenomenon. Nor does it yet add up to a coherent national, regional or even province-wide system. As expected, it has created disparity in regional development and triggered a debate about the very rationale of export-driven economy.

Open criticisms of the coastal development strategy were offered at the National People’s Congress session held in 1988. Delegate Li Naiqian, for example, cautioned that haste only made waste in adopting the strategy and that the Guangdong experience in reprocessing may be cost-effective after all, let alone applicable to the rest of China. Arguing that China’s economy is not developed enough yet for a genuine international competition, particularly during a low-growth period in the world economy, Li countered that Chinese economic development must rely on domestic demands rather than export-orientation¹².

Also at the NPC, inland leaders dismayed at the growing inequalities between coastal region and interior, which they attributed to the central government’s coastal slant, offered a stream of both open and veiled criticism¹³.

The debate has, however, failed to put brakes on coastal development strategy. Government continues with its strategy hoping that economic benefits will neutralise the negative effects, because communists’ survival depends upon economic development.

This determination of communists augurs well for China. Continued political suppression will bring stability, on the surface minimum, needed for foreign investment which will keep China sprinting on the road to progress.

II

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the biggest question Chinese communists are facing is that will they also meet the same fate as their brethren in the USSR? After all both drew their ideological origin from Marx, Engles and Lenin. Will China meet the same fate as Soviet Union did? Or Russia represents China's future. By this is meant: if the centripetal tendencies in Russia continue to grow, will it split into more entities?

Chinese leadership exhibited special interest, as they could see some similarities between reforms of the two countries, in the coup in Moscow in August 1991, hoping that if military gains stronger hand, chances of cooperation between the two communist armies will grow, and the USSR will return to socialism. However, as the coup collapsed, a sense of disappointment set in. The media became extremely nervous about making any comment on the subsequent events, and the leadership was increasingly dismayed by the subsequent collapse of 'socialism', as even understood by Gorbachev.

Can these events in the former USSR provide parallels for China? At least in short term, the answer has to be an emphatic "No". As we have argued before, Chinese communists' brag is that they can feed their people. It was not so in the former USSR. Chinese economy is growing impressively and there is no popular discontent in China. Debate on disparity in development has not assumed a troublesome proportion and will not be tangible for next few years.¹⁴

In the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev not only allowed but actively encouraged political reform as a prerequisite of economic reforms — with a consequence all can see now. Contrary to this, Chinese communists are not ready to tolerate, as shown by

Tiananmen tragedy, let alone encourage it. They are keeping a vigilant eye on the political backlash of economic reforms. They are not allowing the formation of any trade union on the pattern of Solidarity, not even in south. They are also not allowing civic bodies to be strong enough to cause any political problem.

It is also noteworthy that leaders of CCP have not demonstrated the same kind of disagreement over the pace of reforms as did the leaders of CPSU.

The deference to seniority is still saving China from any Yeltsin. Deng, the most senior figure still alive, exercises authority and even power, however infirm he may have become. This shows that there are strong chances that China will escape the fate former USSR met.

Will it fall into the next trap of being a Russia? After all autonomous regions represent 60 per cent of total land of China¹⁵, and as predicted by the Dalai Lama¹⁶.

Here again the monolithic nature of China will defy the fate Russia is feared to meet. Han Chinese account for about 93 per cent of the population, whereas Russian account for 80 per cent of population. Even in autonomous regions which are christened after ethnic minorities, Han Chinese account for a major part of population.

Occasional disturbances in Tibet or Xinjiang provinces have been put down by coercive measures¹⁷. This coercion is being followed by an increase in the budget for minorities. During 1991 the budget for minorities was increased by 25 per cent¹⁸. Most of these minorities live in poor regions and they depend heavily on Beijing for economic assistance and it gives latter a big leverage to control them through economic remote control.

It is also not in the interest of the west to make China a confrontational state by provoking unrest inside it. The west, already seems to have been lost in the Balkans without a compass, cannot afford to have another power vacuum in central Asia.

Communists are also not allowing west any access to the sensitive regions — Tibet, Xinjiang — and seem ready to fight to stay in power. Their reforms hold enormous implication for the other Asian countries. If China goes through internal convulsions, it will send shock waves throughout the region. As an Indian proverb observes, "if the elephant moves, the grass will be flattened."

The arguments show that China will not only escape the tragedies the USSR met or Russia can meet, but will remain intact to grow more strong, as augured by its impressively working economy and monolithic nature of its nationality.

III

After the World War-II, American hegemonic behaviour rendered most of the countries of the region semi-sovereign states. Now as America is being forced to withdraw — due to its own economic compulsions and born-again nationalism in the region — from the region, big changes are expected to take place. Yet over the short term, while these inchoate changes work themselves out, relations between the United States and Asia could be quite tense and unstable, in large part because there is no intellectual framework for these changes. The current framework has two competing poles — on the one hand, the economic success of the region elicits intense admiration; on the other hand, Asian success provokes fear and mistrust — both of them inappropriate for making sense of the fundamental changes taking place in the region. Can America conflate them? Of course, not. Because Americans have failed to understand Asian culture and its inhabitants, and consequently develop an intellectual framework for a lasting behaviour.

This poverty of philosophy stems from the reality of postwar US hegemony in the region which has been more unilateral and overwhelming than in Western Europe. These cavalier manners can be best symbolised by its frequent apologetics for forgetting to "consult" with its allies in the region about monumental shifts in the US policy like opening relations with China, withdraw troops

from Korea, or forgiving debts to Poles (which caused angry resentment in Japan).

The American adopted a two-pronged policy to keep the region under tight control. One aspect of this policy was a virtual monopoly on the means of violence and the whip hand in important foreign policy decisions. The other is economic — the maintenance of the US market open to Asia's capitalist up starts. This policy denied the states of the region a national agency to conduct domestic politics and economics.

Now let us see how this policy, in practice, turned out to be. Take the example of South Korea. Even after the Korean War, the Korean peninsula continued to be an armed-to-the-teeth tinderbox as Washington created, under its nuclear umbrella, a modified version of Japan's pre-war military empire, using South Korea's military as a regional gendarme to protect not just the Republic of Korea, but also to fight communist insurgents in Vietnam in 1960s. Vietnam's 17 parallel was to have been another *cordon sanitaire*. Thus former colonies and dependencies, not to mention GI's stationed at the bases in the Pacific, were to do their bit protecting the big enchilada, the Japanese archipelago. The result was to put South Korea on geopolitical fault line, with the Korean military as a back stop to Japan's defence — all of this added up to a political disaster for the Korean people. Korea's civil society came under the tight grip of the state, which was, in turn, thoroughly penetrated by the United States; thus, South Korea became a semi-sovereign state. It has a vast military establishment, it does not fully control, and its foreign policy is essentially dictated from without. This was a great deal for military which became the dominant force in political life.

Since South Korea was a direct bulwark of containment, its politics ended up with a hard-core military authoritarianism which was, in turn, allowed to have a more insular political economy to feed those in power. The economy became increasingly sealed and orchestrated from above. But it was allowed to be so long it occupied innocuous place in the pores of international market. In 1980s when the United States began a frontal assault on South

Korea to liberalise its commodity and financial market, the authoritarian state went into a tailspin. The power of South Korean state had been predicated on its ubiquitous ability to control developmental resources, to mold the investment pattern by selectively allocating credit, to supplant and supplement the market, and thereby to create and control a huge constellation of entrepreneurial forces. The US demands for economic liberalisation helped to shift power from the state to society, and from domestic to international sphere as US firms sought to enter the Korean market and exploit their comparative advantage in the agribusiness, high-technology, and service industries. The military regime collapsed in 1987, as Korea's *haute bourgeoisie* sat on the side lines, silent spectators to a massive revolt began by students and workers, and swelled by members of middle class. This was an unexpected outcome for a regime that had been so tightly embraced by the Reagan administration: it became a victim of the antinomies in the US foreign policy¹⁹.

The most effective weapon used by the United States in its economic domination of Asia was single-market dependency. The three Northeast Asian economies are remarkably dependent on the US market. In 1988 the United States absorbed more than a third of all of Japan's exports, about 40 per cent of South Korea's, and 44 per cent of Taiwan's. This is comparable to the trade pattern of the former East European bloc, with its single market dependence on the former Soviet Union²⁰. The political side of this exercise is obvious. As scholar Albert O. Hirschman once argued, a large economy that can absorb a great portion of the exports of a small economy, but itself export a relatively small share of tradeable goods to that economy, thus determines the trade and political relations of its trading partners.

The other countries of the region have also suffered at the hands of America in the same manner which we are unable to discuss here due to space constraint. The smaller East Asian countries have also been subjected to similar pressure and have even less leverage on the United States. Besides their politics are much too brittle and their societies much too fragile to

accommodate demands for liberalisation, open market and democratised state without setting of tidal waves of changes.

As the discussion shows Asian states were not allowed by Americans to develop a structure to accommodate the change Americans are imposing now. Asians are resisting the US bid to re-make their societies.

In view of Catholic and Confucian cultures the state can be benevolent, protective, exemplary, bountiful and generous — and it can be harsh and disciplinarian. On the other hand, liberal political theory maintains that state power is always problematic, if not dangerous. In view of many Americans, the state is vacuity in which interest group contend and conflict. According to pluralist theory the state is merely a referee that maintains rules and the political orders and thus lubricates the market and the society. These assumptions are so strong that it is often difficult even to discuss alternatives to the US political pattern; state intervention or state autonomy conjures up in the liberal mind the Fascist regimes of Europe in the 1930s, and there discussion ceases and shouting begins.

This intellectual poverty of Americans coupled with the end of cold war — which, hitherto, did not allow Americans to restructure other societies on their own pattern will spell disaster for the US Asian policy. With shift from security to economics, the American pressure for restructuring is bound to grow, and so will be the resistance.

The Asian reply to American so far has been to reduce single-market dependency with an eye towards Europe and to other neighbours. Recent figures suggest a dramatic shift is underway. For instance, Japan's dependence on the US market has dropped from 33 per cent of its total worldwide trade in 1986 to 25 per cent in 1991.²¹ That is what has caused a collective dash towards Chinese market.

With South Korean model in mind, ASEAN states are also now less inclined to put their all eggs in American basket. That is why they are trying to create a trade bloc on the pattern of single-

market of Europe and North America. ASEAN economic ministers recently met in Manila (on October 22nd, 1992) to discuss ways to create a group that would bring together 320 million consumers. Their interest seem to be serious, if not yet a commitment. Because they are dismayed by the prospect of an open world trading system, governed by GATT, giving way to a system of protected trading blocs.²²

Now the big question mark which looms large over Asia is who is going to fill the vacuum being created by the demise of the Soviet Union and increasingly inward-looking Americans. The commitment to shrink the US overseas engagements has been reiterated by Americans through the mandate they gave to Clinton. As far as economic leadership is concerned, that seems to be a prerogative of Japanese in foreseeable future, provided they don't decide to lead militarily as well. Will they? They won't, is the answer.

Japanese diplomacy has been a "Trader's diplomacy" as put by one Japanese scholar "a diplomacy of the economy, by the economy and for the economy".²³ In short, Japanese experts believe that continued emphasis on a purely economic role is more consistent with Japan's real interest as well as its self-preception. "After all", wrote Shibusawa Masahide, "one can contribute best by doing what one is most experienced at and has an aptitude for."²⁴ Few nations have been fortunate enough to have been able to acquire by peaceful means, what they failed to get militarily. Any repetition of Japanese military aggression is unimaginable as the "pacifist" spirit in Japan today is based solidly on the knowledge that the ultimate battle would be nuclear war with no winner and a horrible aftermath. One proof of it is Japan's defence spending, which remains the lowest—that is one per cent of its GNP—in a region which possesses six of the world's eight largest standing armies (China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea and Japan) and increasingly modern defence industries. It has, hitherto, been avoiding any direct participation in Asian balance of power. Japanese have been advocating that other countries should maintain a balance of power in the region, by lending support to the idea that the United States and Japan engage in a division of labour in maintaining peace, with Japan handling economics and the

United States military defence.²⁵ Now, with the other partner of Japan becoming less credible and demise of the common enemy i.e. the Soviet Union, inherent contradictions of this marriage of convenience are bound to grow worse, as shown by the recent trade war between the two. In future if this trend continues, will Japan choose a new partner for the same division of labour? If so happens, China with its military might, which by the sheer dint of number of strategic nuclear warheads and global arms trade which ranks fifth in the world, qualifies to be the most strong candidate for the same slot.

On the top of it, China is creating single-market dependency not only for Japan but also for the rest of economic giants of the region. Its 1.2 billion people virgin market is a temptation no country can resist. Especially when the East Asian economies, with an exception of the Philippines, are developing at more pace than the rest of the world.

The preceding argument shows how the economic realities of the region have changed to work in favour of China and how it has emerged the most successful and dynamic economy, and is expected to remain so in the future also.

IV

One of the most dramatic changes in the region, which have improved the security of China, is the demise of the former Soviet Union. China and Moscow, now neither view each other as a security threat, a fact underscored by Moscow's decision to sell China advanced weapon systems. Russia and Kazakhstan have announced that they will respect agreements signed by China and the former Soviet Union regarding the reduction of troops along the border and resolution of territorial disputes, a pledge China has reciprocated.

With this demise came the collapse of Vietnam's land-based threat, triggered by its expansionist aims. It was removed when bulk of Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia in

September 1989 and it conceded Chinese role in the ensuing peace process. The former USSR was the major source of weapons, and with its demise the source also dried down, leaving Vietnam alone to take humiliation of its past mistakes.

Another offshoot of the Soviet Union's demise is added significance of China in Korean Peninsula. Russia no longer vie China for political influence over North. It gave China a chance to prod North into dialogue with South, which resulted into signing of "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation" and a "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula²⁶." China has a substantial interest in defusing tension in Korean Peninsula, as a demilitarised and unified Korea can contribute to the development of China's Manchurian region. It would also permit Chinese forces in the Shenyang Military region to be drawn down and, in addition, Korean unification would facilitate the withdrawal of US force from South Korea giving China a greater role.

Collapse of the USSR has also robbed India of its confidence to look China in the eye. The writ was clear and loud when Rajiv Gandhi conceded Tibet to be part of China and both countries started dialogues on border disputes.

All these developments have lessened, if not eliminated, land-based threats to China's security. This improvement in China's security has freed its army for other adventures in the region. These fears mounted when in mid-1985 the Central Military Commission directed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to re-orient its military strategy from a general nuclear war to the preparation for local and regional wars on Chinese periphery.

The clout of the PLA was enhanced tremendously in the wake of Tiananmen Square tragedy. Since then, it has enjoyed three consecutive years of budget increase in real terms: 12.5 per cent in 1990, 15.3 per cent in 1991 and 13.9 per cent in 1992. These actions of China have increased its nuisance value in the region and its potential for destabilising behaviour has increased correspondingly.

Its naval power is another source of worry for others. It has more territorial disputes with others than any other power in the world, and its willingness to use force to settle them makes the region funk. The extent to which the Spratly Islands have emerged as a potential regional flash point serves to highlight this particular trend. Situated in South China Sea, they are claimed in whole or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. The problem, of course, is that none of these claimants accepts the claims of others and has gone some way towards militarising the archipelago. Relatively rich fishing grounds, the possibility of commercially viable undersea deposits of hydrocarbons and phosphates, and territorial imperative make the contest for the islands, reefs, islets and sandy cays of the Spratly groups a matter of increasing security interest, even for countries in the region such as Indonesia, which are not directly involved in the dispute. Most particularly the armed clashes between the PRC and Vietnam during 1988 and the occupation by the former in 1989 of an atoll claimed by Vietnam have raised the spectre of an open conflict escalating to involve others in the region.

China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are also locked in a dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands farther north in east Chinese sea.

This concern has been spurred by the expansion of the Chinese navy and the widespread perception that, as one analyst has noted, the long-term priority of the Chinese government "is to establish China as a major regional sea power with an extended sphere of influence".²⁷ The South Sea Fleet currently includes two submarines squadrons, five destroyers and twelve frigates and is still growing as the PRC puts an increasingly greater share of its defence spending into navy.²⁸ It is also interested in purchasing an aircraft carrier, the Varyag, that Ukraine is building.

Against this background, on February 25, 1992, the National People's Congress adopted "The Law of the People's Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas", which, according to article I, will "enable the People's Republic of China to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial waters and its

rights to exercise control over their adjacent areas, and to safeguard state security as well as its maritime rights and interests". Article 2 says China's territorial sovereignty includes "the mainland and its offshore Islands including Diaoyu Islands, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands and other Islands that belong to the PRC"²⁹.

The waterways of Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly vital for littoral states, whose trade and economic development heavily depends on these routes. For example, Japan's 60 per cent of oil imports and 40 per cent of its foreign trade are transported via the Straits of Malacca, and the Lombok Straits. Any violence in these straits would not only affect regional, but also international, trade and economy very badly. So the world will have to weave China into international web, and that too on Chinese terms, because pressures don't work when it come to Chinese affairs — we will discuss it later.

Another aspect of Chinese potential for destabilising behaviour is its arms sale to the world. During the late 1970s and into 1980s, the PRC increased its arms transfers considerably, and, for the 1980-1990 it rose to overtake the United Kingdom as the world's fourth largest exporter of weaponry to the developing countries.³⁰ Looking at 1990 alone, China ranked as the third largest exporter of conventional weapons to the developing world (behind the United States and Soviet Union), with \$2.59 billion worth of arms transfer agreements.³¹

China has also provided medium range missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia (and perhaps to Syria); agreed to export nuclear technology to Algeria, Iran and Pakistan; and maintained its on-going arms transfers to Burma, Thailand and Sri Lanka. More specifically, China has provided training to some twenty-three liberation movements, small arms to perhaps as many as forty-five recipients, and military-related construction projects in Pakistan and Tanzania. As for major weapons: during 1949 to 1990, 14 countries have installed the PRC missiles; twenty countries have imported Chinese aircraft; twenty-three countries have imported

Chinese naval vessels; and twenty-five countries have received Chinese armour and artillery.³²

The compartmentalised nature of Chinese political-military structure and the specialised roles of individual military sector within that structure explain why this sale would continue.³³ Arms sales not only produces hard currency and validates military's achievements but also enhances Chinese political influence. For example, the sale of DF-3 intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia off set Taiwan's influence in that key nation. On July 21, 1990, Saudi Arabia established full diplomatic relations with the PRC and broke ties with Taiwan. Moreover, the sale paradoxically led to positive conversation between China and Israel and to increased military ties between the two countries.

The arms sales is likely to not only continue but expand as more regional conflicts erupt due to the end of cold war, and the PRC's western competitors will be under the US pressure to curb arms transfers, and because the former Soviet Union is unlikely to continue producing arms at a higher scale.

Embargoes and threats by foreign powers against Beijing in protest of its domestic behaviour will have no impact on Chinese arms sales: they do not directly affect the individuals responsible for domestic policies or foreign actions. Attempts to penalise China, moreover remind its leaders and many of its peoples of the nation's tragic history in dealing with foreign countries. Punitive actions thus have no meaningful consequences except to evoke pledges from leaders, who have little control and to force arms exporters to be more secretive.³⁴ Such is the past, present and likely future of Chinese arms trade.

V

China's future role is bracketed between two certainties: one is that it will grow more strong and its central geographic position in Asia will dictate that it has a role to play in almost every regional issue. If present trends continue, by the early twenty-first century, China will join the United States, Japan and the EC as one of the world's four leading economic powers. Its military machine, already

powerful, will only gain strength. its influence will increase accordingly.

Another is, China continues to have a large potential for destabilising behaviour, as shown by its arms sales, nuclear assistance policies and its naval power capable of disrupting world trade. The extent to which China will contribute to regional and international stability will depend on its leadership's perception of the costs of roguish behaviour. It would behoove western governments to enlist China in as many international regimes as possible, and it would be in the interests of other Asian states to begin dialogue with Beijing on the establishment of some kind of regional security structure.



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DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON BALOCH TRIBAL POLITICS

NAUDIR BAKHT

Political and social systems of Balochs in particular and in Balochistan in general have historically been tribal for centuries together. The tribal life in ancient times was completely class-less and the livestock, green fields and pastures were commonly owned. The concept of individual ownership was very much alien to the tribal life. With the passage of time the tribes made a switchover from complete nomadic life to the agrarian economy. Each tribe had its common lands where "Hashar" or "Ashar" system was adopted for co-operative cultivation.¹ This system was adopted not only for cultivation but also for anything which an individual could not do by himself. Hence, the spirit of collectivism prevailed all over the tribal life.

The sardars stem for the ancient tribal life, where the tribal society was utterly class-less and all the tribalmen were equal, no body had any edge over the other. The evolution of tribal life raised the need of a man who could be more vigilant, seasoned and capable enough of the protection of life and property of the tribe. He was primarily to regulate the tribal life by keeping the tribal code intact. The most ancient traceable figure of the sardari system is "*Kamash*" the white beard man. The *Kamash* was chosen by the tribe. The passage of time made clans and divisions. Latter these *Kamashs* elected a sardar over themselves. The Sardar did not have any advantageous position in the tribe, rather it was difficult to distinguish his status from a common man.²

The status of a classical tribal leader is narrated in a famous Balochi Uman (folk tale) "Hani and Shani Murid" in these words:

"Mir Chakkar and me are equal. Being sardar if he is superior to me, it is only a bit, (like a coin of twenty-five paisas) otherwise both of us are equal and Rind Balochs."³

The tribal life was regularized by a tribal code and it was incumbent on every tribalman to abide by it. The deeds of good and evil could be measured by the compass of the tribal code.

Rules of Honour

There were certain Rules of Honour in the Baloch tribal society which still influence their (Baloch's) actions to a great extent. It was incumbent on a tribesman:

1. To avenge blood.
2. To fight to the death for a person who had taken refuge with him. The refugee was called 'Bahot' and was entertained by his protectors so long as he remained with the latter.
3. To defend to the last property entrusted to him.
4. To be hospitable and to provide for the safety of the person and property of a guest.
5. To refrain from killing a woman, a Hindu, a menial or boy of younger age.
6. To either pardon an offence on the intercession of the women of the offender's family, or to dismiss the women by giving each of them a dress as a token of honour.
7. To refrain from killing a man, who had entered the shrine of a "Pir", so long as he remained within its precincts.
8. To cease fighting when a "Mulla", a "Sayed", or a "Woman", bearing the "Qur'an" on his or her head, intervened between the parties.
9. To punish an adulterer with death.⁴

Evolution of the Powers of Sardars

The classical Baloch tribal chiefs or Sardars did not occupy any advantageous position in the tribe but the socioeconomic developments enhanced the status and powers of the sardars. They started taking more facilities and privileges from the tribe. The sardars levied taxes upon the tribesmen. These taxes elevated their socioeconomic status in the tribal life and placed them on a very high pedestal. This discrimination created a class-system in the

tribal society whereupon the tribal chief stood at the top of the hierarchical echelon.

The sardari institution remained undiluted for centuries till the modern era when the Baloch came under the British overlordship in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. As a part of its concerted plan to perpetuate its rule in this vitally strategic area, the British Government began to systematically deface the entire socio-political structure. The sardars who were always the best representative of the people were compelled through gold and gun tactics to take side with the alien rulers against the interests of their masses. The jirga system was corrupted and manipulated. A wedge was drawn between the people and their sardars, who became the paid agents of the British masters.⁵

Post Independence Era and Sardari System

In the post independence era though a slow but steady change is observed in the socio-political culture of the Baloch tribes. The tribesmen are coming out of the clutches of the tribal system, even a few sardars are raising a voice against the sardari and tribal system, they believe that the Baloch can march with the time only if they are acquainted with modernism.

I conducted a survey to get the general opinion, whether the tribalmen aspire for the free democratic society or they want to continue the tribal life full of vendettas, keeping the sardari system intact. I managed to gather the opinion of the Balochs⁶ who are living in Quetta and its adjacent areas.

Survey and its report

The ancient tribal life was characterized by fraternity, equality and justice. Whereupon the sardar was at the top of the hierarchical echelon. He was the fountain of justice. The just character of the sardars is narrated in many folk tales.⁷ But the sandemanization defaced the pristine beauty of the sardari system and in the words of Sardar Mengal, "Sardars became the tools of the government."⁸ This change immensely deteriorated the image of the sardars and in reply to a question only 25% found the

Sardari System useful in the pragmatic society, while 73.33% opposed it and 1.66% did not reply. (Sr. No. 1 Tab. 1)

Table - 1

S.#	DESCRIPTION	No Reply	Yes	No
1.	Sardari system is useful even today.	1.66%	25.00%	73.33%
2.	Sardars are more sympathetic to the tribesmen.	----	45.00%	55.00%
3.	Sardars are playing a positive role in the national politics.	3.33%	35.00%	61.66%
4.	If the sardar is gentle and sympathetic he is better than the modern elite.	3.33%	73.33%	23.33%
5.	Sardari system provides better protection to the life and property of the tribesmen.	6.66%	41.66%	51.56%
6.	Tribal leader should be a popularly elected leader.	1.66%	75.00%	23.33%
7.	Sardari should not be a hereditary.	5.00%	85.00%	10.00%
8.	Not only the Royal Family but every tribesman should get the right to be elected.	5.00%	91.66%	3.33%

Although the social norms are rapidly changed in the contemporary society but in Balochistan we still find much respect for the social and tribal code. The tribalmen still remember the just, sympathetic and heroic character of the tribal chief that is why although 55% opposed the sympathetic behaviour of the

prevalent sardari system yet 45% which is unignorable and sizeable number of society (tribal), has a firm belief that the sardars are more sympathetic to the tribesmen. (Sr. 2 Tab. 1)

In the contemporary society the politics has come out of the drawing room and the street politics is more popular now-a-days. Similarly in Balochistan the tribesmen also feel that beside the sardars the common men should also get adequate representation in the national politics for 61.66% of the surveyed are not satisfied with the role of sardars while 35% still feel satisfied, 3.33% did not reply. (Sr. No. 3 Tab. 1) A very substantial majority of 73.33% very strongly believe if the sardar is gentle and sympathetic he is better than the modern elite, only 23.33% do not agree while 3.33% did not reply. (Sr. No. 4 Tab. 1)

During the survey it was very keenly observed that the tribesmen (41.66%) feel more secure and protected in the tribal life perceiving the sardar the guardian of their life and property, 6.66% did not reply while 51.56% had the contrary view. (Sr. No. 5 Tab. 1)

In the classical tribal society the sardar was considered to have been bestowed with mystic qualities He was sympathetic, considerate, philosophical and virtuous. He as honest, austere, well mannered, judicious and brave The office of sardar was not hereditary. It was an elective post which required great personal qualities for the man who held it. Not only the heads of the tribal sub-sections and divisions participated in the election but the electoral college practically consisted of all important individuals in the tribe.⁹ Hence a very heavy figure of 75% feel that the tribal leader should be popularly elected, 23.33% negated it, 1.66% did not reply. 85% believed that the sardari must not be hereditary, only 10% did not agree, 5% did not reply. (Sr. No. 6,7, Tab. 1) Almost everybody (91.66%) believed that not only the royal family but every tribesman should get the right to be elected, only 3.33% negated it, 5% did not reply. (Sr. No. 8 Tab. 1)

Unlike most of the primitive monarchies and some of the Asiatic principalities where there was no limit to the powers of the

ruler, the Baloch Chief had considerable checks on his authority. There was no statute law to guide the governmental machinery. The guiding factor was the Baloch code of conduct and traditions which had stronger influence than any law prevalent in any contemporary society.¹⁰ But the colonial powers delegated immense powers to the sardars to carry on their new assignments. Now the tribesmen (85%) aspire for the revival of the classical sardari system while 10% oppose it, 5% did not reply. (Sr. No. 1, Tab. 2)

In the ancient and medieval epoches, the sardar could not act contrary to its principles evolved throughout centuries. He was answerable in his actions not only to jirga, which was the custodian of tribal code and which the sardar followed in his public as well as his private life, but to every member of the tribe.¹¹ He was an administrator and leader of the tribe, a large number of tribesmen (76/66%) want the restoration of this position, 16.66% oppose it and like to see him stronger, only 6.66% did not reply. (Sr. No. 2 Tab. 2)

According to the Baloch social norms and conventions the legal and social status of the sardar and common tribesman was equal.¹² A very large majority of 78.33% aspired for this lost equality, 16.66% has the contrary view, 5% did not reply. (Sr. No. 3 Tab. 2) The recent developments have brought a wave of reorientation and a positive change in every walk of life. The Baloch (83.33%) want more developments in their areas, 13.33% did not reply. (Sr. No. 4 Tab. 2)

Table - 2

S.#	DESCRIPTION	No Reply	Yes	No
1.	The powers of sardars should be curtailed.	5.00%	85.00%	10.00%
2.	Sardar should be merely an administrator.	6.66%	76.66%	16.66%

3. The legal and social status of a tribal chief and a tribalman should be equal.	5.00%	78.33%	16.66%
4. Sardars work for the development of their areas.	3.33%	13.33%	83.33%
5. Sardari system hampers the process of modernization.	3.33%	83.33%	13.33%
6. Political and economic development means the end of sardari system.	1.66%	78.33%	20.00%
7. Sardari society should be replaced by the free democratic society.	---	95.00%	5.00%

The surveyed tribesmen (83.33%) feel that the contemporary sardari system hampers the process of modernization, 13.33% have the opposite view, 3.33% did not reply (Sr. No. 5 Tab. 2) To 78.33% the political and economic development means the end of sardari system, 20% do not agree, 1.66% did not reply. Everybody looks for the comforts of free modern society, that is why an overwhelming majority of 95% favours the replacement of sardari society by the free democratic society, only 5% oppose it.

Conclusions

This survey is conducted in Quetta and its adjacent areas, where the people are closer to the comforts of modern society. The common man is thinking to come out of the sardari society. They aspire for the free democratic society. They avail the right to express their will and wish freely and frankly. But in the remote areas the common man is far behind the pace of the time.

Mr. Z. A. Bhutto during his fortnight (26th March, 76 to 9th April, 76) visit of Balochistan on 9th April addressing a public meeting said that "The sardari system represented the reactionary forces and today with great courage, I announce that legally the sardari system is being brought to an end. This is the end of sardari

system. From today, there will be no sardar in Pakistan. In the whole of Pakistan, the sardari system is finished; the most tyrannical, the most cruel, the most dishonest system which has been prevalent for centuries has been brought to an end through the law." ¹³ The same day, at Rawalpindi, as the National Assembly was not in session the President of Pakistan, Ch. Fazal Elahi, issued an ordinance abolishing the sardari in Pakistan. ¹⁴ Although the Prime Minister abolished the sardari system and the President of Pakistan issued an ordinance to wipe it out, but practically speaking the sardari system could not be abolished by this ordinance because this system had roots in society. It is the educational, economic and political development that brings about a change in society. Now the educational, economic and political developments have paved the way for democratization and one can feel its impact.

Sardari system in itself is not cruel or bad. The sardars are the symbol of our honour and prestige. The masses (73.33%) believe if the sardar is gentle and considerate he is better than the modern elite. In Britain, if the monarchy can survive, for the traditionalism of the society, why the sardari system can not survive here in Baloch conventional society. But, for it, the sardars will have to feel the pulse of the masses. They will have to accelerate the pace of development for the prosperity of their tribes as a few sardars are already doing so. It is the democratic era and finally the masses will be the victorious.



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1. Hashar or Ashar is a method of co-operative cultivation. In accordance with which all the villagers, friends, tribesmen get-together for cooperative cultivation. It is common both in Balochs and Pashtoos. This cooperative method is used not only for cultivation but for anything or work where communal help is wanted. This tradition is still alive. For more details please see "*Balochistan Through The Ages*", selection from Government record, First Ed. in Pakistan, Quetta, 1979, Nisa traders, PP. 227, 299, 431-32.
2. Jamaldini, Abdullah Jan, "Kabile Key Sardar Jabar Hukimran Kaisey Baney, *Lail-o-Nehar*, Karachi, Unees Hashmi, 1970, PP. 19-20.
3. Naseer, Gull Khan, *Balochistan Ki Kahani - Shairon Ki Zabani*, Quetta, Balochi Academy, 1976, P.109.
4. *Balochistan Through The Ages*, Op cit. P. 310.
5. Janmahamad, *The Baloch Cultural Heritage*, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1982, PP. 158-59.
6. Here, no classification on the basis of tribe, clan, age, education, is made and the opinion is gathered from 400 Balochs by giving 25% representation to the female.
7. One may find many examples of just characters of tribal chiefs in the folk tales as are described in Mir Gul Khan Naseer, *Balochistan Ki Kahani - Shairon Ki Zabani* and *Balochi Ishqia Shairey*, both published by Balochi Academy, Quetta.
8. *Balochistan Assembly Debates*, Vol. II, No. V. PP. 82-84.
9. Janmahamad, Opcit. PP. 159-60.
10. Janmahamad, *Ibid*. P. 158.

11. Janmahamad, Ibid. P. 158.
12. The Baloch Sardars and common tribesmen had equal social & legal status as is narrated in the folk tale "Hani & Shani Murid".
13. Awan, A. B., *Balochistan*, historical and political processes, London, New Century Publishers, 1985, PP. 292-93.
14. Awan, A.B., Ibid. P. 293.



THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

SYED AHMAD UD-DIN HUSSAIN

It is wrong to say that President Wilson alone was the author of the League of Nations. Private initiative also played an important part in this direction. During World War-I, many suggestions were made from time to time for the creation of an International Organization to check wars in the future.

Popular interest in the possibility of such a League began to manifest itself in the United States after the outbreak of the said World War and grew rapidly during the period of American neutrality. A "League to Enforce Peace" was published by a group of public leaders, including many outstanding Republicans. The organization held a conference in Independence Hall, Philadelphia in June, 1915 and adopted a four point programme which received wide publicity. It called for submission of all justifiable international disputes to arbitration, the submission of all disputes to a Council of Conciliation and convocation of periodical Congress to codify international law.

At another conference in Washington held in May, 1916, President Wilson declared thus: "We are Participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world (peace), must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy.... the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations...."¹

On 22nd January, 1917, President Wilson addressed the American Senate on a "World League for Peace" in these words: "In every discussion of the peace that must end this war, it is taken

for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power.....”

When the United States entered the World War-I, President Wilson insisted in his war message that peace in future could never be maintained except by a world-wide partnership of democratic nations. To quote him, “It must be a League of honour, a partnership of opinion”.

In 1915 a draft was published known as “Proposals for the Avoidance of War” and a preface was written to it by Lord Bryce. “The League of Nations Society” was set up in 1915 and “the League of free Nations Associations” was started in 1918, a Committee of the British Foreign Office with Phillimore as Chairman, prepared a draft convention.

A Commission of 19 members was set up in February 1919, the tentative draft of the covenant was presented to the Peace Conference as a whole for its consideration. While doing so, President Wilson observed thus: “A living thing is born, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing we are called upon to make definite. It is a guarantee by world against aggression. Armed force is in the background in this Programme, but it is in the background and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort because this is intended as a Constitution of peace, not as a League of War But is not in contemplation that this should be merely a League to secure the peace of the world. It is a league that can be used for cooperation in any international matter.”²

On 28th April, 1919, the revised document was adopted unanimously at a plenary session of the conference. The covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles which was signed by the German delegation on 28th June, 1919. The first 26 Articles of the Treaty contained the covenant of the League of Nations. On 10th January 1920 the League of Nations, as permanent general international organization of a nearly universal character officially came into existence. Its headquarters were located at Geneva in Switzerland.

“Modern International organization”, stated Mangone, “With its wide array of institutions evolved from the conferences of the proceeding centuries.

Functions of League

The main functions of the League of Nations were the maintenance of the International peace and Security and the promotion of International cooperation. According to preamble of the covenant of the League of Nations, “The High contracting Parties, in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings, of international law as the actual rule of conduct among the government and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealing of organized people with one another, agree to this covenant of the League of Nations.

The League was to make efforts to reduce the size of the armies of the various states to such an extent that those were just sufficient for the maintenance of law and order and defence from foreign aggression. The League was a guarantee against aggression.

Collective Security under League of Nations

It is desirable to discuss the problem of collective security in the light of the provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 10 of the covenant of League of Nations provided that the members of the League were to undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League. In the case of any aggression or threat or danger of any aggression, the council of the League was required to advise upon the means by which the above obligation could be fulfilled. Article 11 declared that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any member of the League or not, was a matter of concern to the whole League. The league was required to take any action that might be

deemed wise and effective to safeguard the peace of nations. If any such emergency arose, the Secretary General was required to summon at once a meeting of the Council on the request of any member of the League. It was declared to be the friendly right to each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depended.

Article 16 provided that if any member of the League resorted to war in disregard of the provision of Article 12, 13 or 15, it was *ipso facto* to be deemed to have committed an act of war against all members of the League. The latter were required immediately to subject that member to financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking states and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not. It was the duty of the Council in such a case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League were severally to contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. Any member of the League who violated the covenant, was to be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the council.

In the case of disputes involving non-members, they were required to be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such disputes, upon such conditions as the Council thought to be just. If the invitation was accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 26 were to apply. After giving the invitation, the Council was required to institute immediately an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as might seem to be most effective under the circumstances. In case a non-member State rejected the invitation of the League, all the members of the League were required to take collective action against that state. If both the parties to the dispute rejected the invitation the Council was to take such measures and make such recommendations as could prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.

After the establishment of the League of Nations, five major efforts were made to establish a system of collective security.

1. Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance

The first effort was the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was approved by the Assembly of the League in 1923. It declared that "aggressive war is an international crime and (the contracting parties) severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission."³ It provided that within four days of outbreak of hostilities, the League Council would name the aggressor and indicate the measure of financial or military assistance to be furnished to the victim of aggression. However, military aid was to be required only of states in the same hemisphere as the aggressor. The obligations to use armed forces extended only to signatory states, not to League-members as such. The non-League states also could accept the treaty. The Draft linked up security with disarmament. It was provided that unless a state agreed to limit or reduce its armaments and had already taken steps to do so, it would not receive general assistance. According to Kellor, "The Peg upon which all else hangs is disarmament."⁴ Although the scheme failed, it emphasized the importance of security in the disarmament programme.

2. Geneva Protocol

The second effort at collective security was made by the Geneva protocol of 1924. Its Preamble declared that "a war of aggression constitutes a violation of the solidarity of the members of the international community and an international crime". The signatories were to agree "in no case to resort to war", except in the resistance to aggression or with the consent of the Council or the Assembly of the League. They were also to agree to "abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against a foreign state". An aggressor state was defined as one which went to war without following the procedure for the Pacific settlement of disputes. The Council of the League was to decide the aggressor in doubtful cases and also apply sanctions against the aggressor. Unlike the Draft Treaty, the Protocol did not expressly provide for

military sanctions. However, like the Draft Treaty, it invited the acceptance of non-League states. It was much more of a League measure than Great Britain, the Protocol failed. According to Sharp and Kirk, "with the lapse of the Protocol, five years of hard conscientious effort to devise an international security system on a world-wide scale came to naught."

3. The Locarno Pact

The third attempt at Collective Security was made by the Locarno Pact of 1925. Seven treaties were signed. There was treaty of mutual guarantee of France-German and Belgo-German frontiers between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy. There were arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France. There were arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia treaty for mutual assistance in case of aggression by Germany.

The major treaty referred to the Western Frontiers of Germany with France and Belgium had secured the same. It was provided that the Powers "Collectively and Severally" guaranteed both "the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France" as fixed by the treaty of Versailles. The demilitarization of the German territory west of a line drawn 50 kilometers east of the Rhine as stipulated under the treaty of Versailles was also guaranteed. Germany, Belgium and France agree that they would in no case attack or invade each other in case of a flagrant breach of the demilitarization formula, in fulfillment of the sanctions of the Article 16 of the covenant of the League of Nations, or as a result of the action of the League against a state which was the first to attack a member of that body. They also undertook to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy". All the signatories to the treaty pledged themselves to help that country which was the victim of aggression. If the question of the violation of the treaty was a doubtful one, the matter was to be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for normal disposal. The treaty was to come into

force only after the entry of Germany into the League of Nations and was to remain in force till such time the council of the League by a two-third majority might decide that the League "ensure sufficient protection to the high contracting parties".

The four arbitration treaties and conventions provided that all disputes between Germany and the other signatories "which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitration tribunal or the permanent court of International Justice." However, this provision was not to apply to "disputes arising out of the events prior to the present conventions and belonging to the past" and hence was not binding in the case of problems which arose out of the peace settlement. The France-Polish and Czechoslovakia treaties provided that if the signatories to the main treaties were made to suffer from a failure to observe the undertakings of Locarno, "they would lend each other immediate aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked resource to arms".

4. Kellogg-Briand Pact

The fourth effort at Collective Security was made by the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. This pact which is also called Paris Pact, was signed on 27th August, 1928 by the representatives of 15 states. By the end of 1930, it was accepted by 61 states. The preamble of pact contained the following declaration: Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind, they (the states) persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their people should be perpetuated and all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means — thus uniting civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war an instrument of their national policy

As regards the provisions of the Pact, the signatories solemnly declared "in the names of their respective peoples that they

condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." They also agreed "that the settlement of solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by Pacific means". The Pact was to be ratified by the high contracting parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirement and was to take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification were deposited at Washington.

The Pact mentioned no sanctions. It asserted no positive obligation to seek a peaceful settlement. Technically at least, it did not outlaw war. It merely "condemned" and "renounced" war and different interpretations could put on these terms. Moreover, reservations excluded were of self-defence and allowed each state to be its own judge. In spite of this, the Pact was declared as the only one of the five major efforts to achieve security by collective action before 1935 in which the United States joined and it was the only one entirely outside the League of Nations.

5. General Acts

The fifth effort at collective security was the General Act of 1928. Using the various Locarno Treaties as models, a Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations drafted a series to form agreements "to serve as standardized multilateral system of conciliation for all disputes of arbitration for those of a legal nature and of arbitral procedure for other disputes."; The Assembly collected those into a General Act and opened it to accession in September, 1928. The Act had the virtues of a kind of elective system, permitting states to choose what they wanted by way of methods for the settlement of their disputes and making generous provision for partial adhesion, and denunciation. By 1935, 23 states had acceded to the Act. The General Act has been regarded as the most important single efforts of the League of Nations to establish a system of Collective Security.

Causes of Failure

However, the League failed in its main object of maintaining peace in the world. In spite of its efforts for two decades, the whole world was involved in a war in 1939. By the time, the machinery of the League of Nations had completely broken down. The failure of the League can be attributed to many causes:-

1. It was unfortunate that the covenant of the League of Nations was made a part and parcel of the peace settlement. It would have been better if it had been kept separate. There were many states which considered the treaty of Versailles as a treaty of revenge and were not prepared to ratify the same. By not ratifying the treaty, they refused to be the members of the League. The absence of the great powers from the international organization weakened her and was partly responsible for ultimate failure.
2. It was felt that the League of Nations was dominated by England and France and consequently, the other states began to lose their confidence in that organization.
3. The rise of dictatorship in Italy, Japan and Germany also weakened the chances of success of the League.
4. Small nations lost their faith in the effectiveness of the League, principle of collective security was not applied in actual practice.
5. The League failed because authorities and the peoples of the various states had no say in the deliberations of the League.
6. Another cause of the failure of the League was that while Great Britain and France joined the League, they did not change their behaviour.

According to Simonds and Emeny, the League failed as it was based upon a major assumption which proved to be false.⁵

According to Anthony Eden, the failure of the League was due to two causes. The idea of one-nation, one-vote, led to South Africa being as important as the Soviet Union, or Costa Rica as the United Kingdom; that was not a sound basis because it was not a basis of

truth. The League, though conceived as universal, was in fact never universal.⁶

According to Potter, the League of Nations failed in so far as it failed because the people of Germany, Japan and Italy preferred to support their Governments in career of imperialistic conquest, and because the propels of England, France and the United States discouraged their governments from taking effective action early enough to stem the tide of Axis aggression. Again, it was not the League of Nations but the Nations of the League which failed in so far as there was failure.⁷

Prof; Gooch, has wisely observed the League of Nations as "International Institution without public spirit."⁸

According to Potter, "If measured by what other international organizations had accomplished in the past, the League's performance even in the Security field rates, very high, indeed higher than, with the exception of a very few highly special and limited agencies."⁹

Conclusion

The principle of Collective Security had been put on its first real test in the most favourable circumstances. There was not the shadow of a doubt in any quarter that the invasion of Abyssinia was a gross violation of the Covenant; it appeared no less clear that the acceptance of Italy's challenge was an imperative necessity if the moral authority of the League were to survive. Fifty nations supported the application of economic sanctions, and the majority of them would probably have agreed to military sanctions. Yet in view of their size of geographical position, most of the league members could have made only a minor contribution if hostilities had broken out. Of the Great powers, one the U.S.A. had never been a member of the League, second, that Japan and Germany had ceased to be members, while Italy: was the aggressor. There remained only Great Britain and France, for Russia could not have given much effective help. Thus the risks of war were very unevenly shared; and Collective Security while in theory it involved

the collective action of all, in practice depended on the sacrifices of the few.

The conclusion which may be drawn from the history of the league is that the moral progress of our age has lagged far behind its mechanical progress.

Apart from the particular weaknesses of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security contains a paradox; if peace is to be maintained, how can force be used to limit aggression; Henry Kissinger appears to think that abstention from conflict as an end in itself creates more problems than it solves. "Whenever peace — conceived of as the avoidance of war — has been the primary object of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community.

Experience shows that the provisions in the covenant of the League of Nations regarding Collective Security were found to be inadequate when Japan attacked and conquered Manchuria, nothing was done to help China against the Aggressor. Like-wise when Mussolini conquered Abyssinia no effective action could be taken. When Hitler began to annex one state after the other to his empire, the system of Collective Security completely collapsed. Each state was worried about its own Security and was not prepared to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of others.

And since it is right to say that instead of maintaining peace the League of Nations led to a total break-down of Collective Security.



NOTES:

1. *International Politics since 1900*, by V.D. Mahajan p. 61-62.
2. *International Politics since 1900*, by V.D. Mahajan p. 63.
3. *International Politics since 1900*, by V.D. Mahajan p. 336.
4. *International Relations* by Palmer and Parkins p. 304.
5. *International Politics since 1900*, by V.D. Mahajan p. 73-74
6. *Ibid.* p. 75
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Dynamics of International Organization* by J.E. Philip A.L. Alexine p. 52.
9. *Ibid.* p. 68

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BOOK REVIEW

IQBAL AND FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTANI NATIONALISM, 1857-1947

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(LAHORE BOOK TRADERS, 1992), pp. 374 PRICE: Rs. 375.00

Individual plays an important role in shaping the course of history. This is true even when history is viewed as a movement of events on a pre-ordained course, or a product of the interplay of the economic forces, or a record of the rise and fall of civilizations in a cyclic manner. It is the individual who either by his ideas stimulates action or takes up the responsibility to lead a section of mankind at the critical moment, and thus, leaves a strong imprint on history. There are those who by their sheer hard work and innovative capability contribute to enriching the lives of people, expand their mental horizon, and open up new avenues of progress and development.

Iqbal is one such history-making personality who inspired a vast ocean of mankind in South Asia, Iran and Turkey. His ideas had a direct impact on two most significant developments in the present century — the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iqbal, thus, ranks amongst the greatest men whose intellectual impact on history is very profound.

Four major factors shaped Iqbal's thought process: (i) A thorough study of Islamic history, culture and civilization, and a strong belief that Islam offers a comprehensive social, political and economic order. (ii) A study of the decline of the Muslims and the impact of colonialism and imperialism on them as well as on the international system. (iii) A detailed examination of Western civilization and its intellectual traditions. He was impressed by their initiative, scientific and technological advancement, and the will to work towards improving the living conditions of the people.

He also benefitted from the work of some German intellectuals and from the long established German tradition of oriental/Iranian studies. However, he was struck by aggressive nationalism and capitalism which produced sharp conflicts in Europe. (iv) A strong belief that the Muslims cannot improve their conditions unless they cherish the ideals of Islam and adopt only those aspects of Western civilization which, in his opinion, were noble and adaptable, namely, intellect and knowledge.

The interplay of these factors produced a philosophy of movement and action as opposed to stagnation. The principles emphasized by him cut across the geographical and cultural boundaries as well as the limits of time. It is this philosophy, especially his contribution towards the establishment of Pakistan, that constitutes the main themes of Manzoor H. Khatana's book entitled "IQBAL AND FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTANI NATIONALISM". The book combines a review of Iqbal's socio-political philosophy and the nationalist struggle of the Muslims of South Asia. These two aspects reinforce each other and the latter serves as the political landscape for the changing contours of Iqbal's poetry.

Spread over eight chapters, Khatana's book can be divided into four inter-related subjects: (i) A rather brief political history of South Asia's Muslims from their decline to the establishment of Pakistan. (ii) Iqbal's biography focusing on the Western and Eastern influences that shaped his intellectual perspectives. (iii) His political ideas, i.e., views on nationalism, democracy, the Islamic polity, '*khudi*', '*Mard-e-momin*', and how could the Muslims equip themselves to meet the challenges of the future. (iv) His contribution towards the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, highlighting Iqbal's role in the Punjab Legislative Council, the 1930 address to the annual session of the Muslim League, the correspondence with Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his efforts to help the cause of the Muslim League in the Punjab. In the words of the author, the book seeks "to elaborate fully the contribution of Iqbal to Pakistani nationalism" and identify "his influences on the formation of the modern state of Pakistan". (p. 5)

Iqbal's poetry before his departure for Europe focussed mainly on Indian nationalism, nature, man, and dignity and equality of mankind. The stay in England and Germany enabled him to examine closely the contributions of Western intellectuals which had a noticeable impact on his thought process. he also got a first hand experience of the Western society and culture. Iqbal was impressed with scientific and technical progress of the West but lamented the lack of spirituality there. The anti-imperialist tenor of his views was quite pronounced as he viewed "the West as a great manipulator of science and technology for the sole purpose of exploitation". (pp. 103-04). Secularism, territorial nationalism and the functioning of Western democracy received a sharp criticism from Iqbal which the author bring out quite persuasively. "Nationalism in any shape or form was simply harmful to Islam since it was the very anti-thesis of Islamic universalism". (p. 155)

The author maintains that Iqbal's criticism of the West was based on the assumption that the West was determined to divide the Muslim world and that the modern nationalism led to their fragmentation. These were important causes but the decay of the Muslims could not be explained solely with reference to these causes.

Iqbal attempted to ignite the spirit of the early days of Islam amongst the Muslims and believed that an "unflinching faith in the sovereignty and unity of God" was the guiding principle of the Islamic polity. He also projected the last Prophet of Islam (peace and blessing of Allah be upon him) as a role model, an ideal and perfect personality, for all Muslims, especially their rulers.

Iqbal had a staunch belief in the superiority of mankind over all other creations of God. The man, according to him has unlimited energy and potential which can make him instrumental to change for the better. The only problem is that he is not conscious of his capabilities. He can discover his potentials by submitting completely to the will of God which in turn unleashes his inborn qualities and his real self. Such a framework of action gives a meaning and purpose to life. Only an individual with a sense of purpose and who is prepared to surrender to God can shape the

course of change. An absolute faith in, and submission to, God makes him courageous and determined person who does not submit to anybody but to Him.

"Ijtihad" has been described by Iqbal as one of the important principles of Islamic jurisprudence which means "reasoning or the proper exercise of judgement" and 'the principle of movement in the nature of Islam". For Iqbal, "Ijtihad" was a very mechanism to meet the challenges of the changed time and circumstances. The author describes how "Ijtihad" was pushed to the periphery of Islamic jurisprudence over time. This is a useful discussion in the present day Pakistani context. However, a greater reliance on Iqbal's views as outlined in his lectures "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam", would have reinforced the discussion. This would have helped to understand his modernist perspective on Islam, something the people could relate to the present-day polemical dialogue on Islam in Pakistan.

Iqbal's active role in politics, especially his contribution towards strengthening the Muslim League cause, is dealt with in chapters V and VI. His membership of the Punjab Legislative Council (1926), the Shafi Muslim League in the late 1920's, participation in the Roundtable Conferences, his appreciation of the role of the Quaid-e-Azam, and support to the Quaid for his efforts to reorganize the Muslim League are discussed in the book. However, despite the importance of Iqbal's 1930 Allahabad address and the reasons which led the pan-Islamist Iqbal to suggest a territory-based political entity for the Muslim of South Asia, these are given a limited treatment in the book. As the author moves freely from Iqbal's political philosophy to the history of Muslim struggle in South Asia, Iqbal's views on the above issues become obscure, although this has one advantage: one can get an overview of the nature and direction of Muslim struggle in South Asia.

Khatana's book will be read with much interest by the students of Pakistan Studies and general readers, especially those working on Iqbal's socio-political philosophy.

Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi

THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW

AYESHA JALAL

VANGUARD, LAHORE - PAKISTAN PRICE: Rs. 395.00

The year 1958 was an important landmark in the constitutional history of Pakistan. All the important political and economic events leading to the military intervention have been discussed and analysed with original approach based upon sources located in British and American archives in London and Washington D.C.

The book is spread over 362 pages and divided into 7 chapters. Chapter I deals with the political objectives of Quaid-i-Azam. Chapter II deals with the absence of a well-developed national political party organisation and its impact on the process of organisation in Pakistan.

Chapter III deals with institutional balance of power shift in favour of the bureaucracy and the military. Encroachment on provincial autonomy by the centre. This process was started by the balanced budget announced by Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad on February 28, 1948. Leading to increase in financial and industrial powers of the centre.

Chapter IV deals with the non-elected institutions of the state exercising political power in Pakistan. Chapter V deals with the failure of the politicians to perform their institutional duties. The political role of the military and the bureaucracy. The negative impact of economic, defence and international allies policies. The analysis of the military intervention of 1958 is discussed in the above mentioned perspective.

Chapter VI deals with Islam as ideology and culture. For this there is particular reference to the speech of the Quaid-i-Azam in the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. By which he tried to

lay down broad outlook for the relationship between state and society in the country. Finally Chapter VII deals with a conceptual framework and reviewed the political process till the elections of November 16, 1988.

A number of terms have been explained from original sources. For example, the concept of "controlled democracy" coined by President Iskander Mirza has been explained according to his plan i.e., "to greatly strengthen the powers of senior civil servants". Succinctly, it is a well documented book, salutary study of the political system.

Prof. Ahmed Husain



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