The Journal of Political Science



Published by the Department of Political Science
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Vol. XIII **1990** **No. 1,2**

Editors :

Ahmed Husain
Hameed A.K. Rai

Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.

The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Published by Rai Hameed Ali Khan
Manager of the Journal of Political Science

Printed by : Shaukat Ali - Bukhari Printing Press
Mohni Road, Lahore.

The Journal of Political Science

Vol. XIII Summer, Winter, 1990 No. 1, 2

CONTENTS

1. Prospects of change in an Age of Modernisation: An Islamic Perspective. *Dr. Mohammed Sarwar.* 3

2. The Military Instrument and Strategic policy in a Democratic order: Theoretical Reconsideration of some unresolved issues concerning Nigeria. *Dr. Celestine O. Bassey.* 15

3. New Directions in Comparative Politics in America. *Dr. Theodore P. Wright Jr.* 33

4. Power, Peace and Thomas Hobbes. *Dr. Mrs. Hina Qamber.* 41

5. The Six Point Formula: Controversy regarding Authorship. *Dr. Syed Humayun.* 53

6. Origin of Local Government in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. *Mohammed Abuzar Wajidi.* 65

7. Balochistan: An Introduction. *Nadir Bukhat.* 71

8. Book Review. 79

The Journal of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Department of Political Science
GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, LAHORE
M.A. Part-I



Department of Political Science
GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, LAHORE

PROSPECTS OF CHANGE IN AN AGE OF MODERNISATION: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Dr. Mohammed Sarwar

Muslim's claim to the infinite truth of the teachings of Islam and the universality of its character can be well apprehended in regard to the prospects of its implementation in an age of modernisation. Undoubtedly, Islam can cope up with the problems generated by the modern technological civilisation and has full potentials to face the modern ideological challenges.

The major cause regarding the under-estimation of the role of religion has been the assumption of the leadership role by the Western nations due to the their supremacy in material advancements. As the pace of change has been accelerated by the advancements in science and technology, the Muslims lagged behind rapidly due to their backwardness in this field. As a result, most of the Muslim societies of Asia and Africa got subjugated by the colonial powers during the last two centuries.

The colonial rule inculcated a sense of inferiority in the Muslim's mind. Long established institutions were toppled by the Western masters while the Muslim's thought suffered stagnation. The succeeding generations opened eyes in an atmosphere of serfdom. The idea of Western superiority was indoctrinated in Muslim minds through effective techniques. The newly educated classes of the Muslims developed a Western orientation and thereby an apologetic attitude got developed in the intellectual field. The religious educational institutions of the Muslims, however, remained a citadel of Muslim intellectual legacy during this phase.

When most of the Muslim societies got independence after World War II, they were confronted with a potential challenge of secularism working in the guise of either Socialism or that of Western Liberalism. The new societies in most cases failed to tackle the problems emerging from the sway of modernisation as these were in developing stage. Nevertheless, there emerged the forces of resistance in Muslim societies and responded to all such challenges. An analysis of the working of two political systems, i.e. Pakistan, a country created in the name of Islam and Islamic

Republic of Iran after the overthrow of Monarchy will be helpful in evaluation and appraisal from this point of view.

Pakistan at the Cross Roads.

Creation of a separate homeland in an age of territorial nationalism is an episode unique in the modern history, later the birth of Israel being an other example. The Muslims of South Asia under the redoubtable leadership of Allama Iqbal and Quaid-i-Azam, turned the tide of a universal trend, namely the Secular Nationalism, and struggled for the creation of an Islamic polity. Muslim's zeal to see the revival of Islamic socio-political order was so deep and strong that they fought vehemently against all forces of obstruction with great sacrificial spirit.[1]

It was an established fact during the period of struggle for freedom that Islam would be the basis of the Ideology of Pakistan. The passing of "Objective Resolution" in 1949 by the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, was the initial official recognition of this commitment. The Resolution incorporated the basic principles underlying the features of future political systems.[2] The differences arose, however, among different segments and political factions regarding the interpretations of ideological, injunctions, which was one of the factors in delaying the task of constitution - making in Pakistan. The peculiar class structure of the society also added to such difficulties. Moreover, the vested interests, in the form of political elite and civil-military bureaucracy played a negative role.[3] Thus the system had to operate under stresses and strains accelerated further by political instability.

Certain positive steps, however, were taken in the right direction, but they proved half-hearted. Different labour reforms and even other socio-economic reforms aiming at the betterment of general masses, could not bear anticipated results, as the requirements of an overall change were not fulfilled. Under President Ayub's regime there was industrial development, but it did not bring basic changes in the economic system. The only significant change in this context was the addition of a powerful industrial class in the ranks of political elite:

As a reaction to the working of the monopoly system, the secular and the socialist elements in particular, exploited the situation in their favour and joined hands under the charismatic leadership of the P. P. P. Chief, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and that of Sh. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman in the East wing. The

new political leadership used all political techniques to get political power, plunging the country in political upheavals and turmoils. The country had to pay a heavy price for that when East Pakistan got secession from the federation in 1971.

The new government in Pakistan, adopted policies which deviated from the old lines but these were not supported by a deep rooted planning. Most of the so called revolutionary steps were taken and implemented in hurry without giving consideration to nurture necessary environmental and institutional set up.[4] The policy makers also lacked training, experience and zeal to work for the success of the new order. The policy of nationalisation of industries for instance, was introduced and executed in like manners, and as a result it bore unanticipated results. Some reforms might have been introduced with good intentions in order to improve the general conditions of the masses but even the limited gains of these reforms were lost due to inflation and the devaluation of Pakistani currency. Unemployment, decrease in production, loss of quality in manufacturing business and acute industrial unrest, further aggravated the situation.[5]

After the imposition of Martial Law in 1977, the new government, perceiving the impact of Islam on the national life, initiated gradually the process of Islamisation. Zakat, Salat and Hadood Ordinances were promulgated[6]. Drinking, race course and other after-dark gathering places were either sealed or their activities gradually curtailed[7]. The purpose was to put the nation on the road to Islamisation of individual and collective life and rid the people of the evils of drinking, adultery, theft and faulse allegation of adultery.

In the beginning, there were public hangings and whipping in the execution of laws[8]. Positive steps were taken towards the introduction of interest free economy[9]. As a beginning, government corporations, such as House Building Finance Corporation, the National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan, were authorised to provide assistance to the less fortunate elements of the society so that they could find adequate shelter and make gainful investments without interest. Positive steps were also taken towards the reconstruction of education system. The Zia regime also reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology in order to bring together notable members of the scholarly religious community and coordinated their functions with experts in the Ministries of Law and Religious affairs as well as with members of the Central Cabinet[10].

The Zia-ul-Haq regime, thereby set lofty ideals as goals of the system, yet the actual achievements fell short of those targets partly due to the short-comings in the decisional apparatus and partly due to the cumbersome administrative routine. Moreover, the new structure lacked the support of team work capable of doing work with missionary zeal. Even the religious elite, which was given a respectable status in the statecraft, did not fully cooperate; rather a notable section remained hostile to the regime. An inner weakness of the military regime, that is its non-representative character, further aggravated the political situation.

Thus even the positive steps towards ideological goals, could not bear expected results. This has been an irony with the political system that the constitutional framework and other reforms in different directions, could not change the spirit of the political system. The system continued to pass from one crisis into another. In most cases, the decision makers and the political elite, remained secular in their private and public life.

Islamic Revolution of Iran - From Serfdom to Liberation

After the overthrow of a very powerful monarchy, the new Islamic revolutionary regime of Iran undertook a clear-cut policy regarding the Islamisation of society. The new revolution had at its back a life long struggle of the "Ulema" and other freedom fighters, which actually started during the Tobbaco Revolution of 1882 and culminated in the final collapse of the Shah's regime in February, 1979. During this struggle, the people had to give unprecedented sacrifices especially during its phase of Jungle Revolution (1916-22) and in the Resistance Movement under Dr. Mussadiq. The uprising of June, 1963 and 1964 further cost many lives of the freedom fighters[11]. At this juncture, Ayyatollah Khomeini gave a heroic resistance and stood resolute when a number of religious leaders compromised with the existing situation. Ultimately the Imam was exiled but he left behind him a legacy which acted as impetus to the revolutionaries. The leadership role in his absence was later assumed by Dr. Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Shariat Madari and Ayatollah Taleqani. The last phase of the Resistance Movement had been stained with unimaginable sacrifices that the Iranians gave for the revolutionary cause.

Planning for the Future :-

A notable feature of the Liberation Struggle is that the leadership remained responsive to all the contemporary challenges

throughout this period. A group of freedom fighters, "Mujahadeen Khalq", was organised and disciplined on the lines of Guerilla warfare. They were also imparted religious education in addition to the knowledge of modern sciences. The leadership prepared a comprehensive planning not only for the final breakdown but evolved a framework for a substitute system as well, i.e. they had done home work for the post revolutionary phase. Even during the period of acute turmoil, they continued studying and observing the working of the contemporary revolutions in addition to doing their other duties, and thus kept themselves abreast with fresh knowledge and the dynamic spirit of Islam[12]. The teachings of Dr. Ali Shariati in particular, inculcated missionary spirit in the workers and attracted even the Western oriented intelligentsia, the secular groups and a considerable number of socialist. His direct appeal to reasoning and the beauty of style attracted such elements. In fact, there was no confusion in the minds of the Revolutionary leadership regarding the basic objectives of the Liberation Struggle[13].

Mode of Action

The Islamic Revolutionary leadership thought it expedient to monopolise political power immediately after the overthrow of the Shah. In order to stabilise the results of revolution and save it from the counter-revolutionary forces, the leadership could not afford to have an apologetic attitude or adopt any so called liberal policy. As a matter of fact, the handling of a situation emerging as an aftermath of a revolution, demands some extra ordinary steps which are generally avoided during normal circumstances. In pursuance of the objectives of revolution, the regime did resort, of course, to high handedness. The government did not show any weakness in the execution of Islamic Laws and remained resolute and uncompromising in such matters. Credit goes to the leadership that it translated the ideals into practice and presented a beautiful synthesis of traditionalism and modernism[14].

DIMENSION OF CHANGE

New Socio-Cultural Patterns:-

The Islamic revolutionaries of Iran had developed a perception regarding the true spirit of the process of change as envisaged by Islam on the one hand, and the requirements of the modernisation, on the other. They initiated changes on new lines in all phases of the national life. Moreover, all possible means were adopted to transmit Islamic values and inculcate

revolutionary spirit in the minds of the younger generation so as to stabilise the results of revolution.[15] For this purpose the entire educational structure was overhauled. Tehran University remain closed for years as the new regime took the educational output injurious to revolutionary goals and regarded it as a legacy of the old rotten system.[16]

Syllabi and curriculum at all stages was revised and brought in line with the Islamic teachings and the contemporary requirements. Teachers training programmes got special attention and thereby every effort was made to develop an ideological orientation in this community. Anti Islamic elements in the educational institutions were given warnings to change their life style and mould their attitude in the light of Islamic teachings. New text books and other reading material for students was published on fresh lines. Anti-religious cultural activities and modes of behaviour in the educational life were discouraged. The revolutionary government gave special attention to raise the educational standards especially in the field of science and technology. Concrete steps were taken in the direction of adult education.[17]

The Islamic regime effectively used the services of the youth and channelised their energies in the attainment of revolutionary goals. Young men were imparted military training on large scale and organised as "Revolutionary Guards". Undoubtedly, they rendered useful services in a period of reconstruction and development and also fought vehemently in war with Iraq. Thus second line of defence has been well organised and disciplined on new lines in order to foster grassroot changes in the society and save it from the counter revolutionary forces. They are fully equipped to shoulder responsibilities as the inheritors of the new system.[18]

To foster cultural values and norms of Islam and annihilate borrowed values of the West, very effective measures have been introduced by the new government. For that purpose, profound changes have been initiated through the electronic media. In this connection, new ethical code was prescribed for the information media, and censorship laws revised. Islamic moral standards are being encouraged in all phases of social life in a very effective and scientific manner.[19]

The claim of Western societies to champion the cause of women's rights and their condemnation of Islamic culture in this

regard, is nothing but a negation of facts. The whole propaganda is based on misconceptions and underestimation of Islamic values. Leaving apart the theoretical supremacy of Islam in this context, the example of Iranian society can be cited in its modern perspective. Women are given respectable status in Islamic Iran and their rights fully safeguarded. They are allowed to work in various branches of national life within the limits prescribed by Shariah. As a matter of fact, Islamic culture has discriminated the field of activities allocated to women, and within these limits they are allowed to carry on their activities. The concept of Women's Rights, in fact, is a relative term and it must be interpreted as part of the cultural norms of every society. It should not be judged in the light of Western norms.

It is notable that the cultural values of Iran have always been non-Western. It was the secular system under the Shah of Iran, that had imbued the Iranian culture with Western cultural norms in the guise of modernisation. Religious educational institutions had a long standing in that society and deep imprints on its cultural legacy. The memories of the incidence of "Karbla" viz, martyrdom of Imam Hussain, served as symbolic value held in esteem by the Iranian society.[20] The religious legacy gave momentum to the revolutionary cause during liberation struggle. The new government took all possible measures to revive and restore such values.

Towards Economic Reformation:-

It is the economic aspect that has drawn special attention of the contemporary ideological movements. The Socialist elements in particular, exploited the issue of poverty prevailing in most of the Third World nations in order to expand the sway of Red Imperialism. The new, regime even in the post-revolution period, gave special attention to improve the economic conditions of the masses. Iranian economic system under Shah's government, had been modelled on capitalistic lines, hence a repository of capitalistic and feudalistic trends. It has been substituted by a new economic system which portrays a combination of Islamic principles of economic justice and the modern devices of a mixed pattern of economy. Such means of production have been collectivised as can not be left for private profit-making. Big enterprises and industries, as oil industry, ship building etc. , are completely nationalised.[21]

During the pre-revolutionary days, the whole pattern of economy was shaped under the American influence and would

serve the interests of it's White Masters. The policies affecting such sensitive issues as the quantity of oil production, defence, armaments and ammunition matters, all were shaped from the point of view of American interest. At present, economic planning is chalked out in the interest of the nation, while the people's representatives at different stages are given participation in the economic decision-making.[22]

As a result, the new economic policies bore unprecedented fruits to an extent that the country not only got rid of its dependence on foreign aid, it rather paid all the outstanding foreign debts. This seemed a landmark at a time when the country had to face many crucial problems as an aftermath of a violent revolution and the disastrous results of war with Iraq.[23]

The government initiated many schemes for the welfare of the poor as it is held responsible, from Islamic standpoint, for the provision of basic needs of life to all the citizens. The residential schemes, for instance, were introduced under which houses were provided to the common people on easy instalments. The new Labour Reforms aimed at the betterment of this important segment of the society. Land-holding sealing was a significant aspect of agricultural development; while the surplus land taken from the big land lords was distributed among the small cultivators. The new economic policies produced astonishing results in such a short span that many Western experts and Technocrats and the Neo-Marxists got stunned and their economic analysis, in most cases, exposed.[24]

Structural Changes in Political Perspective:-

The post-revolutionary phase of a political system is always a period full of turmoil in which the normal democratic norms and processes cannot be acted upon. But the Islamic revolutionary government showed remarkable efficiency to normalise the situation in a short period and initiated steps towards the development of a participant culture. The political decision to set the ideological foundations of the new system was taken through a referendum. People by a ratio of 98% votes decided in favour of Islamic Republic. Later elections for different political offices and returning the candidates to the legislature, viz Majlis Shoora, have been held at regular intervals.[25]

The political system, however, is not structured purely on the Western democratic lines, it rather presents a combination of the political cultural heritage of Iran, the traditional Islamic

institutions and the modern democratic norms. The electoral process of the new system, for instance, ensures a mixture of qualitative and quantitative principles. The ideological framework of the political system signifies the paramount position of "Sharia" viz, Rule of Divine Law that negates rule of men.[26] The smooth functioning of this system and its marvellous output is mainly due to the strict adherence in theory and practice.

An ideological polity that seeks to initiate multi-dimensional changes in the whole system, is bound to be somewhat totalitarian and authoritarian because extra-ordinary steps are to be taken with full vigour. The legal action, therefore, has to be extended even in those areas of life which from Western point of view, are supposed as beyond the jurisdiction of the state's sphere. That accounts for certain atrocities which might have been committed at the initial stages of the post-revolutionary period. Moreover, such political decisions might have been taken, which by that time had not gained credibility, hence leaving a bitter taste in public mind.[27]

In order to achieve the goals of the revolution and to save it from counter-revolutionary forces, the political power was monopolised by the religious elite immediately after the overthrow of the monarchy. Only staunch and the most committed persons with unblemished integrity, were assigned important political offices. Even the first rank liberal leaders were gradually eliminated from the political arena. The past experience regarding the role of leftist elements in particular, who had deceived them at different stages, made the revolutionary leadership much sensitive in this context. The rigidity and uncompromising attitude in matters of principles and staunch commitment to the cause on the part of the leaders, have been mainly responsible for making the revolution a great success.[28]

During the post-revolutionary period, Ayattolah Khomeini gave proper attention to seek the cooperation of all segments and groups. They were given proper participation at all levels in decision-making process. Changes initiated in the socio-cultural fields, evolved supportive values through a well knit process of political socialisation. The electoral system secures the popular representation on the one hand and adequate representation of talent and by ideologically committed persons on the other. Special provision is made in the new constitution regarding the organisation of "Guardian Council", a body representing theologians and jurists who are assigned the task of judging the

validity of laws and government policies in the light of "Sharia".[29] At the top of this hierarchy stands the supreme office of "Faqih" (Wilayat-i-Faqih) occupied first by Ayatollah Khomeini and later by Ayatollah Khamnaee.[30]

The Iranian political system is to a greater extent modelled on normal democratic norms; while it incorporates the true spirit of Islam. During the period of re-construction, the Islamic regime worked with an open mind and gradually accommodated necessary changes, which they thought were expedient from national point of view. Thus certain liberal policies, of course within ideological limits, were reinforced once the period of turmoil of the post-revolutionary phase was over.

The Iranian pattern of an ideal change can serve as a beautiful model that can be utilised by other Muslim countries who are dedicated to the Islamic cause. The study of the challenges the Iranians confronted, the knowledge of the traps and conspiracies hatched by the secular and anti-Islamic elements and by the big powers, an appraisal of the missionary zeal and sacrificial spirit with which the Islamic revolutionaries of Iran gave a valiant fight and an analytical understanding of the ideological and intellectual contribution of their scholars, all will be helpful for Muslims in a period of Islamic Resurgence.

References

1. Esposito, J.L. *Islam and Politics*, (1st ed.) Syracuse University Press, 1984. Ch.3 p.58.

2. Sarwar, Muhammad, Ideological Imperatives of the Political System of Pakistan, *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Lahore. Vol. XXII, N.4 (Oct. 1985).

3. Laporte Robert, Jr, *Power and Privilege*. Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, Berkley: University of California, 1975 p. 91.

4. Burki, Shahid Javed, *State and Society in Pakistan*, 1971-72, London. The MacMillan Press, 1980 p. 52.

5. Annual Report, 1972, Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, p.11.

6. Iqbal, Afzal, *Islamization of Pakistan*, Vanguard, Lahore 1986 p.108.

7. (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance No.VI, VII, 1979 Feb. 10. 1979, Govt. of Pakistan, Offence of Zina.

8. Murderers of a small boy, Pappu, were publicly hanged in Lahore camp Jail, see the *Pakistan Times*, 23 March; 1978.

9. These included a beginning towards interest-free economy, efforts to introduce Zakat and Usher and enforcement of Islamic penal laws, for theft, robbery, drinking, adultery and protection of freedom of beliefs. See: *The Pakistan Time*, 3rd Dec. 1978.

10. Ziring, Lawrence, *Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development*, England, W.M. Dawson and Sons Ltd. 1980, p.54.

11. Irfani Suroosh, *Iran's Islamic Revolution*, Lahore, Vanguards Books Ltd.1983, pp.85-87.

12. *Ibid*, Ch.6.

13. Sarwar, Muhammad, *Islam and Modern State System: A case study of Iran and Pakistan* (Urdu) Maktaba Tameer-i-Insaniat, Lahore 1990 pp. 97-99.

14. *Ibid.*

15 Hiro, Dilip, *Iran under the Ayat Ollah's*, Routledge and Kagan Raul, London, 1985 p.99.

16. Irfani, Suroosh, *Op. cit.* p.207.

17 Siddiqui, Kalim, *Issues in the Islamic Movement*, 1982-83, The Open Press, London, 1984 pp.162-166; Also See Dilip Hiro, *op. cit.* p.256.

18. *Ibid,* p.251.

19. Esposito, *op. cit,* p.191.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Siddiqui, Kalim, *op. cit.* PP. 252-54.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.* PP.54-56.

24. Sarwar, Muhammad, *op. cit.* pp.101-104.

25. Irfani, Suroosh, *op. cit.* p.198.

26 Hiro, Dilip, *op. cit.* p.109.

27. *Ibid,* pp.124, 128-129.

28. Sarwar, Muhammad, *op. cit.* pp.106-107.

29. *Iran Times*, 25 May, 1979; *New York Times*, 25 May, 1979.

30. Sarwar, Muhammad, *op. cit.* pp.107-109.

THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT AND STRATEGIC POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC ORDER: A THEORETICAL RECONSIDERATION OF SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES CONCERNING NIGERIA

DR. CELESTINE O. BASSEY

"A large army amidst a democratic people will always be a source of great danger"

de Tocqueville[1]

The civil-military conundrum remains one of the most intractable issue-area in any consideration of the process of democratization in Nigeria. Although the fiction of political neutrality of the military propounded by a generation of liberal scholars has been largely debunked in the African context, the strategic implications and dimension of the interplay between military institutions and societal political processes remain unresolved policy issue.

Partly this reflects the complexity of the problem itself, particularly the fact that the use and usability of military power in pursuit of national objectives takes place under various conditions and differ greatly in their character. Largely, however, because systematic inquiry into strategic phenomena exhibiting the conceptual, theoretical and methodological convention readily seen in other regional subsystems, are yet to have a major impact on security policy analysis concerning Africa.

Reduced to fundamentals, the core-complex of the issue revolves around the fundamental policy question as to whether in any given conflict situation involving either the manifest use of military force as an instrument of prevalence, or in which military power acts as a counter in diplomatic bargaining, is it the military - institutional or civilian view point that should prevail? Or, as it may be in line with doctrine of "civilian supremacy" in a democratic order, and as Clemenceau once trenchantly noted, would the express use of military force (war) be considered "much too serious a matter to be left to the generals"?

As events during the Second Republic (The Nigeria - Cameroon border crisis of May, 1981 and Nigeria - Chad border

crisis of April - June, 1983) attest, such a dichotomy of outlook on potent policy question between the professional military and civilian elite, if strong enough and left unchecked, tends to produce tension and in an extreme case may push the military into open rebellion against the civilian authorities. As reported in Africa Confidential[2] this was the case after the Nigeria - Chad border "fiasco", the political handling of which infuriated nearly all senior officers involved and may have expedited the overthrow of Shagari's administration.

This paper basically revisits this contentious policy question in the light of the experience of the Second Republic, as a basis of prognosis for action in the Third Republic. It argues that while capitulation to military view point on matters of strategy ("relation of military force to national purposes") in a democratic order is constitutionally unsound and politically untenable, the relegation of military point of view may equally engender undesirable backlash and likely to prove counterproductive. What is, therefore, required is a dialogue between political and military minds, since " a separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both".[3] This can be maximised and sustained through an integrated, innovative and representative national security Management "regime" which combines the functions of the National Defence Council and the National Security Council of the defunct Second Republic. Such a novel institutional arrangement and design, it will be contended, will facilitate co-ordination and thereby ensure balance and coherence in strategic policy response to advance situational challenges.

To enhance comprehension of issues involved, the first section below establishes the theoretical parameter of the complex interplay between the military instrument and societal political imperatives as a backdrop for the examination of the empirical data on the "border crises" that follows. The paper then concludes with an extrapolation and analysis concerning future contingencies.

The Military as Instrument of Statecraft: Security and Crisis Management

The complex relationship between the imperative of national security, crisis management and military power stems primarily from the pervasive view that the international system - as a threat system - is anarchical. Thus military force constitutes or is often

seen to constitute the ultimate basis of "diplomacy and of all contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of state."[4]

However, this perspective, although dominant, nevertheless represents but one of the alternative conceptions, explanations, and projections about the role of military power in the resolution of conflict. It is preeminently "realist" in orientation, one that derives from Hobbesian conceptions of the global arena in which the "high politics" of military security frames and informs the "low politics" of economic and social affairs.[5] Against this dominant perspective is what Stanley Hoffman has called the modernist school of thought which, unlike the realist, assumes multiple, channels of contact between societies, an absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role for the use of force."[6] This modernist thesis - which became a prominent contender to the realist paradigm in the late 1960s and 1970s - is largely based on what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye termed the condition of "complex interdependence."

The existence of these competing paradigms on international/regional interaction notwithstanding, the historical as well as contemporary prevalence of inter and intra-national wars and military alliances have sustained the view that until the nation-state system is radically transformed and superseded by a different international order, then military power, and the capacity for armed coercion which it sustains, is likely to continue to play a significant part in international/regional politics and conflict resolution. As a result, in both theory and praxis, it has become fashionable to regard military power as but one of the multiple techniques of statecraft, taking its place alongside diplomacy, sanctions, propaganda, subversion, etc.

Thus, whether conceived in terms of its direct or indirect employment, military power has become in the modern era the legally sanctioned instrument of violence which states use in their relations with each other, and, when necessary, in an internal security role. It forms the "backdrop against which all diplomatic activity takes place", and, as William Kaufman has noted ruefully, it is not easy to see how inter-nation relations could be conducted, and "international order maintained, if military power were totally absent."[7] To the extent that foreign policy objectives are outward - directed (that is, concerned with " acquiring something of value coveted by a foreign actor", then there are virtually no values of concern to states that do not directly or indirectly impinge on considerations of national military power calculus.

Conversely, in a defensive or non-acquisitive mode, the sheer imperative of preserving physical security - territorial integrity - from external intrusions (such as foreign interventions in civil wars; e.g. Nigeria 1966-1970), has invariably entailed the expansion of national "power of resistance" as a counter to such a threat (real or perceived). This complex interplay between policy objectives and military power under-scores the commonplace assertion in the literature that defence or security policy should reflect the fundamental assumptions and objectives of foreign policy and, when necessary, provide the means for their actualisation. Conversely, foreign policy objectives should be reflections of and be limited by the ability of the armed forces to give them a military underpinning.

In this regard, the expansion of national military power has been considered by most governments as indispensable to the preservation of the basic values on which their survival as socio-political entities rest (national security). Similarly, in terms of crisis management, considerations of military power have acted as counters in diplomatic bargaining so that in any serious dispute, diplomacy becomes a "trial of influence and strength, including military strength even though it is also a test of wits and skill."[8]

Both these issue-areas (Security and Crisis management) are inextricably linked. On the one hand, since crisis management (or crisis diplomacy as some analysts prefer to call it) is by definition concerned with "the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war,"[9] it paradoxically does contribute to the preservation of those values from which states, security policy derive their *raison d'etre*. On the other hand, by enhancing the defence component in foreign policy (military power), security policy provides leverage for policy - makers in crisis management.

This consideration notwithstanding, the "power - security" hypothesis - which views capacity for armed coercion as the unalterable underpining of contemporary international system - has definite limits in both theory and praxis, as the debate between the "realist" and "modernists", alluded to above, suggests. This is all the moreso since in the pursuit of security policy objectives statesmen often employ a combination of different means, both military and non-military.. Nevertheless, in specific historical circumstances in which the military instrument has tended to dominate policy responses the choice in every instance depends

on a multitude of factors, including ideological and normative convictions, expectations concerning the psychological and political developments in the camp of the opponent, socio-economic factors and inclinations of individual policy-makers.[10]

Translated into the African situation in general and the Nigerian context in particular, any consideration of the military as an instrument of security and crisis management is hampered by one ambiguity and two unknowns. The ambiguity concern the very notions of "security" and "crisis management" as they apply to Nigeria in existing and likely conditions. The unknowns are :-

(i) the changing phases and postures of Nigeria in the African regional subsystem, and ;

(ii) the state of the international system in a future "sufficiently close to make it relevant for present day planning and sufficiently remote to allow for the crystallisation and implementation of new approaches and policies."[11]

As an analytical category, the concept security has been problematic at best. The reason lies, first, in its ambiguity (both in its objective and subjective content) and second, in the demonstrable fact that as a defence and foreign policy goal, security is, in the words of Bernard Brodie, "an infinitely expansible concept": an ideology which legitimises a number of crucial trends in the contemporary order.[12]

Although traditionally associated with the protection of the "irreducible minimum" (to use Hans Morgenthau's phrase) of a state's interests *vis-a-vis* other units and forces, the debate about the idiom of national security takes on a further dimension (and often becomes confused in the process) when the argumentation shifts from strategic premises to the interdisciplinary matrix of political and military sociology. The level of debate can be transformed from one focusing broadly on the conceptual assumptions regarding the conceptions of national security concerns (involving abstract national goals, purposes, and priorities) to one focusing on the objects of security (that is who or what is actually to be secured or preserved).

While these operational distinctions raise profound questions and cannot be dismissed lightly (given the prevailing conditions and realities in the continent), their theoretical import or boarders

on the logical and methodological problems of devising/focusing on different questions about the same phenomenon, and seeking or adopting alternate or different analytical perspectives/approaches on the issue. In the context of the present analysis, and from the standpoint of the "disciplinary matrix" of strategy, the nation of security measures, in an objective sense, "the absence of threats to acquired values" of state and, in a subjective sense, "the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[13]

Thus in some ways security can be defined and computed by the threats which challenge it. As a consequence, the security policy of a state may be seen as "that set of decisions and actions taken by a government to preserve or create an internal and external order cogenial to its interests and values primarily (although not exclusively) through the threat or use of force."[14] It is in this domain of state sovereignty that the logic of war as politics finds its provenance.

Similarly, just as the utility function of the military as instrument of security has raised serious conceptual and substantive problems, its use and usability in crisis management is even more controversial. Part of the problem lies in the very nature of the crisis situation: It is "intractable and far from amenable to precise manipulation and control."[15] Further explanation for the lack of consensus may be found in the problem of devicing perspectives on the utility of military power as instrument of prevalence in situations that threaten the high-priority goals of state. Yet, if "manipulation and control" through the threat of force are central to crisis diplomacy (as most strategists contend), then it is difficult to see how the leverage offered by coercion can be neglected in crisis resolution.

This is all the moreso, since central to the process of crisis management is the "manipulation of risk" through the threat of military action as counter in diplomatic bargaining. Such consideration of military power is generally at the core of crisis diplomacy, as "the aim of conflict resolution is to accommodate, formally or informally, the national wills and interests in a particular international conflict; and military force is a form of power that sustains will."[16]

In a conflict between unequal actors - such as between Nigeria and its immediate neighbours - the threat to resort to force by the superior power constitutes one of the most potent weapons in the resolution of crisis. As Harold Helson has noted about

Nigeria "the task of defending itself against external aggression has always been made easier by the fact that the country is surrounded by much smaller and weaker neighbours reluctant to bring their disputes with Nigeria to a more than occasional border skirmishes."[17] That these "skirmishes" have been extremely infrequent compared, for instance, with the incendiary nature of Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours, is largely attributable to anticipation among Nigeria's immediate neighbours that it may resort to military strength in a serious conflict. Thus, to conclude in this instance that if the exercise of power requires "manifest intention" then this mechanism allows the strong state (in this case Nigeria) to "enjoy the fruit of power without deliberately weilding it".

These considerations will be illuminated in some details in the next section below in the analysis of the two border crisis in which conflicting outlook between the military and civilian elite was most prominent and in which the attempt by the Nigerian General Staff to impose its vision of systemic security on a democratically elected government was fiercely resisted. Furthermore, given the significance of these events for the stability of the Nigerian state, it may also be necessary to address two interrelated questions as they bear on the issue of the strategic functions of the military. First, in a system of civilian supremacy, under what conditions (and why) is the military most likely to engage in legitimate, constitutionally acceptable political activity? And under what conditions (and why) is it most likely to move beyond constitutionality and to oppose the civilian authorities. As suggested below, these questions are no doubt a function of the larger issue of the degree of civilian control of the military in praetorian systems such as Nigeria.

The Border Crisis Reconsidered

The foregoing analysis of the theoretical parameter of the interplay between policy and strategy in respect of security and crisis management highlights the potency and limits of this policy means (the military) in the dynamic condition of the African regional environment. As suggested above, two cases involving the contentious policy issue of civilian constitutional imperatives and military professional outlook will be revisited in this section as a basis of prognosis regarding the future.

The first is the Nigeria - Cameroun boarder crisis of May, 1981 in which consideration of military force (on the part of Nigeria) acted as a counter in the diplomatic bargaining that

followed the killing of five Nigerian soldiers on routine border patrol. The second is the border confrontation in the Lake Chad Basin, (April - June, 1983) in which Nigeria's military power was activated to dislodge Chadian forces from two strategic islands. Both incidents were marked by strong policy disagreement between the military and civilian elite and in the latter reportedly led to a withdrawal of political support for the government by a power group of senior officer,[18] with disastrous consequences for the Second Republic. For reasons of analytical clarity, these two cases will be considered sequentially below.

(i) Nigerian Military as Instrument: Crisis Management

The Nigeria - Cameroun border crisis of May, 1983 (precipitated by the killing of five Nigerian servicemen on a routine border patrol) highlighted some of the tension that has existed on the frontier between the two countries since the Un-organised plebiscite of 1961 resulted in a reintegration of the West Cameroun into the Republic of Cameroun. From the onset, the handling of the crisis was bedeviled by contrasting policy orientations between the dominant civilian elite and the military professionals of the National Defence Council. The military advocated deterrence through punishment to intimidate the "enemy and make him behave." The civilian elite, on the other hand, advocated a course of peaceful settlement reminiscent of the Gowan era.

What followed, however, was to a considerable extent a classic cases of crisis - management by the Shagari administration, involving a skilful combination of diplomatic bargaining and threat of coercive violence. Despite the Jingoistic public outrage and pressure from the military establishment, the Nigerian government desisted from arbitrary retaliatory measures, while at the same time, impressing upon Cameroun (through an ultimatum and troop deployment) its determination "to take actions it considers appropriate to protect the live and properties of Nigerian citizens" if its demands were not met.[19]

The eventual compliance of the Adhidjo government in the Cameroun with Nigeria's demand - compensation for the families of the victims and an apology - may be ascribed to a number of factors highlighted in Klaus Knorr's crisis model, cited above. Preeminent among these were, first, Cameroun's estimate of the cost (financial, international loss of face, domestic weakness, etc) of complying with Nigeria's ultimatum. These costs were in the

final analysis tolerable compared with the second factor: its estimate of the costs of defying Nigeria's ultimatum.

These involved the calculation that Nigeria would actually execute the threat if defied (given its military capacity to do so and the unprecedented level of public outrage in Nigeria), and the probable consequence in terms of material and human losses. It was fairly obvious to the Camerounian authorities that annexation of the disputed area was one of the ultimate objectives if retaliatory action had to be taken.

A third factor was Cameroun's bargaining position and skill relative to Nigeria. The bargaining skill of a government is an important determinant of the outcome of crisis, that is, whether it "ends in peaceful adjustment, or unresolved deadlock, or causes the eruption of military hostilities."[20] Thus, one obvious strategy of the Ahidjo government was to endeavour to defuse the crisis through the passage of time: (a) protracted negotiations; and, (b) offering minimal concessions to induce Nigeria into commitments that would make Cameroun's compliance with its ultimatum unnecessary.[21]

Nigeria's rejection of the proposals of the Ahidjo government (on the grounds that it had never worked in the past, apparently a reference to the defunct Permanent Joint Boundary Consultative Commission) drastically reduced the latter's room for manoeuvre and increased the pressure for compliance. In the final analysis, it was arguably the second factor - Cameroun's anxiety or anticipation that Nigeria might resort to its military strength if its demands were ignored - that prompted its eventual compliance with the ultimatum. Such anxiety was not without reason, since Nigeria's military build-up in the disputed zone continued unabated throughout the crisis.

Thus, despite the virulent criticism and pressure on the Shagari administration, the President's refusal to permit, in these situations until all diplomatic persuasions had failed"[22] was no doubt a display of statesmanship. A military response to such provocation may undoubtably have engendered a sobering effect on Cameroun's military in the short-term. However, the long-term political fallout (especially if Nigeria had unilaterally annexed the disputed area) in terms of future ramifications for the regional sub-zone is difficult to foresee.

This consideration, notwithstanding, the imperative of national security (the protection of life, property and economic resources of the country) may in the long-run necessitate limited punitive or deterrent measures as was to be the case in the Lake Chad basin. In a condition of tenous civilian control over the military and widespread indiscipline among members of armed forces in many African countries, absolute adherence by Nigeria to the provision of "international law relating to the non-use or threat of use of force in relations between states may be a costly mistake.[23]

More public outrage and official government warning failed to deter elements of the Beninois armed forces from occupying Nigerian villages in Sokoto state (April, 1983) or impressed Habre's forces in the Lake Chad basin (April - June, 1983). In this respect, one cannot but sympathise with editorial sentiment expressed in Punch (Lagos), that, "it is high time, therefore, that those who provoke her unnecessarily learnt they cannot forever ride on Nigeria's lenience....." unless and until this is done, "there may be further attempts by midgets to test Nigeria's resolve and willingness to act swiftly in defence of her vital national interest....."[24]

Nevertheless, while subsequent events since 1981 have generally vindicated this editorial position, the inherent dangers and logic of such argumentation call for circumspection. For example, since it has been in Nigeria's security interest to expedite the demise of the French strategic presence in West Africa, a retaliatory defence posture on the part of Nigeria may only compel these countries to seek the protective umbrella of France as never before. The bilateral defence accords which France signed in the early 1960s with Franco-phone black Africa states (except Mali and Guinea) remain in operation in many countries. These accords afford France the right to "intervene" at the request of the local government.[25] The next section examine the confrontation in the Lake Chad basin in which Nigeria's military power was employed coercively in order to preserve the *status quo* by the sheer military feat of attack or defence.

(ii) Nigerian Military as Instrument: Security

Nigeria's resort to coercive violence to dislodge regiments of Chadian forces from the Island of Kinsara (April - June, 1983) was a timely reminder of the chequered and potentially explosive situation on its highly amorphous frontier. But unlike the May, 1981 incident, during which the military functioned largely as a

counter in diplomatic bargaining, the Shagari's administration unleashed its military forces on Chad.

However, Nigeria's response to this particular incident cannot be understood or judged in isolation from earlier provocations involving its Eastern and Western neighbours (Cameroun and Benin). Institutional (especially the military and legislature) and public (media, university students, trade unions and the masses) reactions to these unwarranted provocations" made it almost impossible for President Shagari to eschew the use of force in the Lake Chad basin incident. As the *Africa Research Bulletin* notes:

Some newspapers have accused his government of once again being "spineless" in the face of "aggression particularly unwelcome comment during the run-up to Nigeria's elections in August.[26]

Such an accusation was apparently directed against the strict operational limitation imposed on the generals in the conduct of the reprisal campaign against Habre's forces.[27] As reported by *Africa Confidential*,[28] following the 1983/84 coup in Nigeria, the political handling of the border battle with Chad infuriated nearly all senior officers involved and may have expedited the overthrow of Shagari's administration. It is not surprising that one of the ring-leaders in the coup - General Babangida - disclosed that the coup was first planned for July, 1983, that is just after the cessation of hostilities in the Lake Chad basin.[29]

Some Policy Implications

While from a purely military standpoint, the frustration of the officers regarding the conduct of both border crises examined above can be understood, it has to be remembered that war as Clemenceau is reputed to have said, is "much too serious a matter to be left to the generals." It has been one of the distinguishing traits of the "military mind" - the 'groupthink' factor - in conflict situations that operational imperatives tends to dominate all other aspects of policy. In this respect, General MacArthur's defiant comment in relation to the Korean stalemate - that "in war there is no substitute for victory" - touches a responsive chord in most, if not all, military establishment.[30]

Nevertheless, if war is too deadly a business to be left to the generals, it is also much too serious to be left to the politicians. What is, therefore, required as Henry Kissingar has persuasively

argued, is a "dialogue, between political and military minds." As he put it:

> .... a separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military policy to become identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an overconcern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely military advice."[31]

There is substantive evidence to support the view of a lapse in "dialogue" between military and political elites during both the border crises of May, 1981 (with Cameroun) and April to June, 1983 (with Chad). The reason was, perhaps, primarily organisational. As the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Shagari had the constitutional mandate to "determine the operational use of the Armed Forces" subject, of course, to the provision of Section 167 (4a) which empowered the National Assembly to amend the "powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces." However, the President was required under section 131 of the constitution to seek advice from the National Defence Council "on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Nigeria."

The National Defence Council consisted of the President (Chair), the Vice-President, the Defence Minister, Head of the Combined Armed Forces, and the Army and the Navy. One significant omission was the Minister for External Affairs - Ishaya Audu. As was anticipated and forewarned by a number of foreign policy scholars,[32] this omission was to create avoidable divergences in crisis management between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Defence Establishment. Commenting on the exclusion of the Minister of External Affairs from the National Defence Council, Akindele, for example, wrote:

> If war is diplomacy by other means, as Clausewitz has correctly stated, it is rather difficult to understand why the Minister for External Affairs, charged with the statutory duty of assisting the President to formulate and implement foreign policy, has been excluded from membership of the Council.[33]

it became fairly obvious from decision-making process during the two border incidents involving Cameroun (May, 1981) and Chad (April to June, 1983) analysed above, that it was the Ministry of External Affairs rather than the National Defence Council, which became the dominant bureaucratic agent in the resolution of the conflicts.[34] As a consequence, the military establishment's perception and position on the changing operational environment tended to be ignored or relegated. Given the potentially volatile and unstable (praetorian) civil-military relations in Nigeria, it was to be expected, as was reported at the times that a "secret" meeting of senior officers, including Suhari, decided after the "border fiasco" that the army would not support Shagari politically.[35]

Despite such lapses in co-ordination among "political and military minds", what is, however, impressive about the entire border episode was the quickness and decisiveness with which the politician Shagari dictated the limit of what was acceptable to the Generals. Thus reminding them, in Clausewitz's words, that "the subordination of the political points of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse."[36]

For Clausewitz, as well as most contemporary strategists, policy direction and control of war are paramount, irrespective of one's attitudes towards war's desirability. If policy creates war, the "political object" - the original motive for the war will thus determine both military objective to be reached and the amount of efforts it requires. Thus a conception of international conflict resolution in terms of "military victory" verses "political victory" would be contradiction in terms. As Clausewitz aptly notes: "there can be no question of purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or of a purely military scheme to solve it."[37] When war is divorced from "political life in our thinking we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."[38]

Seen in this context, it is thus to be concluded that the Shagari administration's skilful combination of "stick and carrot" approach effectively contained the crises before it escalated into senseless conflagration with incalculable consequences for the policy of "good neighbourliness" which Nigeria had carefully cultivated and formalized in the ECOWAS treaty. If the barrier was broken, there was no way of knowing the consequences and

future ramifications of invading Cameroun or Chad. Yet it is also to be granted that in any given conflict situation, the choice of means may depend not only on their availability to decision-makers, but also on their expected cost and efficacy. In this regard the extent to which different instruments of power are of unequal effectiveness also limits the substitution of one for the other.

The major problem with techniques of influence other than military is their historically - proven ineffectiveness. This is preeminently the case with the diplomatic instrument and with the various uses of national or collective economic power and propaganda to coerce or influence foreign governments. This is not to imply of course that diplomacy ends when "the shooting starts" or that military force is always a more reliable instrument of foreign policy whenever diplomacy fails to secure policy objectives. Furthermore, what strengthens the necessity for a mutually reinforcing relationship between the military and diplomatic means is not merely that war, as Ken Booth puts it, has become "a deadly business",[39] but also that in so far as both means lie at the root of the "sovereign equality of a political community", their exercise by governments are necessarily inseparable. Henry Kissinger explains why:

> It is an illusion of posterity that past international settlements were brought about entirely by reasonableness and negotiating skill. In a society of "sovereign" states, a power can in the last resort vindicate its interpretation of justice and defend its "vital interests" only by the willingness to employ force. Even during the period of seemingly greatest harmony, it was understood that a negotiation which failed did not return matters to their starting points but might call other pressures into play. The motive force behind international settlements has always been a combination of the belief in the advantages of harmony and the fear of the consequences of proving obdurate. A renunciation of force, by eliminating the penalty for intransigence, will therefore place the international order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible member.[40]

In the light of this consideration it may on the balance be argued that the decision to activate Nigeria's military power

against Habre's forces does not represent a fundamental departure from its defence policy posture towards its neighbours. It signified rather a policy of measured response based on a compelling need for deterrence and restraint, if further armed infringements on its territory are to be effectively contained. Since such an option requires a sound military policy, the reflection of professional military view point in both the management of the crisis and conduct of war was imperative. In future contingencies, this dialogue between political and military minds could be sustained through an innovative and representative national security management "regime" which combines the functions of the National Defence Council and the National Security Council of the defunct Second Republic. Such a novel institutional arrangement and design will facilitate co-ordination at the policy level and thereby ensure consensus and coherence in strategic policy response to situational challenges.

NOTES

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* edited and abridged by R.D. Heffuer (N.Y.Mentor, 1956) P. 278

2. *Africa Confidential*, Vol.25, 12, 6 June, 1984, pp.1-2.

3. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1957, p.422

4. Charles Reynolds, *Theory and Explanation in International Politics,* (London: Martin , 1973) p.174

5. For an elaboration on this view, see Hans J. Moregenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (N.Y.: Knopf, 1978).

6. Stanley Hoffman, "Choices" *Foreign Policy* (12 Fall, 1973), pp.3-42

7. William Kaufman, "Force and Foreign Policy" in Kaufman (ed), *Military Policy and National Security*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956) p.234

8. Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) p.20

9. Phil Williams, *Crisis Management*, (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1976) p.30

10. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) pp.393, 396

11. George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) p.3

12. Brodie, *War and Politics*, (London: Collier Macmillan, 1973) p.345

13. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962) p.150

14. Edward Kolodzie J. and Robert Markavy (eds), *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, (Lexington: Lexington, 1982) p.13

15. Oran Young, *The Politics of Force*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp.6-7

16. Knorr, *On the uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, p.20.

17. Harold Nelson, "National Security" in Nelson (ed), *Nigeria: a Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: The American University Press, 1982) p.238

18. *Africa Confidential*, 24, 12 June 8, 1983, p.8 and AC 25, 1, January 4, 1984, p.1

19. *West Africa*, 2 May, 1981, p.1149.

20. Knorr, *On the uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, p.110

21. The reference here is to Cameroun's proposal for a Joint Commission of inquiry into the incident.

22. See *Daily Times*, (Lagos), May 20, 1981.

23. For the issue of Civilian control of the military in Africa, see, for example, Claude Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality", in Welch (ed)., *Civilian Control of the Military*: theory and cases from developing countries, (N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1976); and David Goldsworthy, "Civilian control of the Military in Black Africa" *African Affairs*, 80, 318 (January 1981) pp.49-74.

24. Punch, (Lagos), 20 May, 1981, p.4

25. See Arthur Gavshon, *Crisis in Africa*, (Harmandsworth: Penguin, 1981).

26. *African Research Bulletin*, Vol.24, 6, (15 July, 1983).

27. Ibid., Vol. 25, 12 (6 June, 1984).

28. *Africa Confidential*, 25, 1 January, 1984, p.1

29. General Babangida, in an interview with Agence France Presses. See the editorial of *West Africa*, 30 January, 1984, p.195.

30. Admittedly, the exact meaning of Mac Arthur's Statement has since been a subject of controversy. However, all the contextual evidence are that Mac Arthur was displaying a typical impatience, characteristic of a commander used to total involvement, for total victory: "of carrying home the war to the enemy" and in so doing, *dictating* rather than negotiating a settlement. See Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (N.Y: Viking, 1964), p.461ff

31. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p.422.

32. Bolaji Akinyemi (ed), *Foreign Policy and the Constitution*, (Lagos: NIIA, 1979)

33. R. Akindele, "External Affairs and War Power under the Draft Constitution: in Akinyemi (ed), *Foreign Policy and the Constitution*.

34. *See African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 20, 5, (June 15, 1983), p.6826 and Vol. 20, 6, July 15, 1983, p.6862.

35. *Africa Confidential* 24, 12, June 8, 1983, p. 8 and *AC* 25, 1, January 4, 1984, p.1

36. Clausewitz, *On War* edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.598. Put differently, "War" according to Clausewitz, "has its own language but not its own logic".

37. *Ibid.*, pp.379-380

38. *Ibid.*, pp.605

39. Ken Boeth, "Teaching Strategy: An Introductory Questionnaire" Survival, March/April 1974, p.79

40. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p.4.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theodore P. Wright, Jr.

New Directions in Comparative Politics is the title of a collection of articles edited by Howard J. Wiarda in 1985.[1] Other recent reassessments of this subfield of Political Science are Louis J. Cantori and Andrew H. Ziegler's *Comparative Politics in the Post-behavioral Era*[2] and Lawrence C. Mayer's defence of the behavioral approach, *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance*[3].

As one can tell by these titles, there has been great ferment in this academic field since about 1970. As Sidney Verba, Co-author with Gabriel Almond of the pathbreaking study, *The Civic Culture*[4] comments in his essay in the Wiarda volume, "the state of the discipline is rather like the state of the world, - appalling." Others characterize the post behavioral epoch by the breakdown of consensus among political scientists as to goals, frameworks and paradigms. However, it is questionable whether the behavioral approach ever dominated either teaching or research in comparative politics as much as its leading exponents thought. The traditional, "configurative" method was quietly practiced by many journeyman political scientists, especially in "area studies". As evidence, I assigned my postgraduate students for several years each to survey the contents of a major American political science journal for a period of years and they found very few genuinely comparative articles, except for a few in Europe. The reason is, I think, that there is not enough time in graduate school to learn a completely different culture as well as the statistical methods favoured by behavioralists and the two attract different kinds of minds. So genuinely comparative studies across a range of countries tend to be superficial while configurative research is not explicitly comparative.

Robert Dahl's summary article, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science"[5] noted in 1961 several characteristics of the behavioral revolution: 1. it focussed on individuals and groups rather than on larger, formal political units like the state; 2. it sought to explain the observable facts of political life by empirical methods, theories and criteria of proof acceptable to the conventions and assumptions of natural science; 3. it insisted on research being rigorously systematic through precise hypotheses

and ordering of evidence, quantitative where possible, rather than by unprovable speculation or impressionistic observation; 4. it denied that inquiry into how people ought to act is a legitimate concern of research in political behaviour. Values are to enter the analysis only as determinants of behavior in accord with logical positivist philosophy; 5. the utility of research should be judged pragmatically by its results; 6. the political scientist as scientist should avoid prescription.

In comparative politics and especially in the new subfield of political development, the behavioral approach produced under the sponsorship of the American Social Science Research Council great efforts to create "grand theory" which attempted to generalize at the level of whole political systems and to portray political development as a unilinear process, leading inexorably towards the type of liberal, capitalist democracies manifested in the West. A series of volumes published by the Princeton University Press epitomized this enterprise.

This huge and costly joint effort swept all before it in the 1960s in the United States if not in Europe. It also had the inadvertent consequence of propelling to the top of the profession a generation of Jewish scholars (e.g. Almond, Apter, Binder, Eckstein, Hoffman, Lipset, Rostow, Verba, Weiner) whose predecessors of that religion had suffered much discrimination in academia.[6]

Why then did this homogeneous movement fragment in the 1970s and remain, as Lawrence Mayer puts it, "promise without performance"? Wiarda suggests several reasons, but even if these had not been operating, another tendency intrinsic to American academia needs to be mentioned first: because of the prime requirement of originality (read novelty) for the doctoral dissertation, for acceptance of manuscripts by editors of professional journals, and in the composition of professional meeting panels, novel ideas have a rather brief life in the social sciences and humanities.[7] "Deconstructionism" is a current example of a fad in the latter. Therefore, there is a premium put on dreaming up new concepts, neologisms, jargon and typologies or "theories" while "paying scant attention to the imperatives of rigorous testability rendering the task of replication exceedingly difficult, if not impossible", as Mayer says. Thus by 1970 a new generation of political scientists was on the scene eager to make its mark by undermining the "feet of clay" of the idols of the behavioralist generation.

A second factor at work in breaking down consensus in Comparative Politics was the disastrous involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War followed by the equally traumatic experience of Watergate which led to the first resignation in disgrace of an American president. This double blow disillusioned many political scientists of both generations about far more than the legality and morality of the particular foreign war; it caused them throughout most of the 1970s, until the Tehran hostage crisis, to question all authority, including academic and professional. As the slogan of the 1960s "counterculture" put it, "never trust any-one over thirty." As a result a substantial minority in our discipline were impelled to turn to "Old Left" or "New Left" Marxism which had been practically taboo during the Cold War because it was the ideology of the country's chief foe. They adopted "neo-colonialism", "dependency theory" or "world capitalist system" as frames of reference. These all blamed underdevelopment on the capitalist "First World". Other critics more constructively pointed to the unbalanced emphasis of behavioralist comparativists on system "inputs" (parties, elections, pressure groups, public opinion) to the neglect of "outputs" in the shape of public policy. They sought to devise more precise and reliable ways of measuring and evaluating actual and alternative policies. Still other critics castigated the inherent conservatism of the behavioralists' structural-functionalism. That is, they argued that "system-maintenance" or political stability ought not to be the only or main criterion, but that sometimes change, even violent change might be for the good of the largest number of people.

A third reason for comparativists to shift priorities was that the development theories and the policies based upon them simply had not worked well in practice, except, perhaps in East Asia. Economic development in terms of per capita gross national product was slowed in some countries like India by population explosion and civil strife; where it did rise sharply, as in Ayub's Pakistan, maldistribution caused class antagonism and governmental instability. Even in the best cases, newly discovered environmental pollution pointed to unanticipated costs of industrialization. Warfare, famine and ethnic conflict belied the rosy projections, like Rostow's "takeoff stage", of the early 1960s. Even senior political scientists had a crisis of confidence in their approach. Samuel Huntington in his widely used textbook, *Political Order in Changing Societies*[8], suggested that development, if not modernization, might be cyclical and could even produce political decay.

Fourthly, in view of this "loss of nerve" by American political scientists, some Third World leaders, intellectuals and envious academics turned hostile to well-financed and patronizing American researchers and began to make it more difficult for them to gain access to their countries. The author himself was barred in 1982 as a foreigner from further research in India on the problems and politics of the Muslim minority. Younger American graduate students responded by abandoning comparative politics for other subfields closer to home or by choosing the easier venue of Europe for their field work. Their place was taken in our postgraduate departments by foreign, usually Third World, students who wanted to write their dissertations on their own countries, often with "axes to grind", rather than to undertake truly comparative research.

American "area" specialists (South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America), burdened in graduate school by the need to learn an "exotic" foreign language like Arabic or Chinese and by lengthy mastery of materials from several other disciplines such as history, anthropology, economics, religion in addition to major and minor fields in political science, have been mostly resistant to the demands of the behavioralists that they be truly comparative and they were profoundly sceptical of the abstract levels of generalization expected for grand theory. And it must be said that the theoreticians have seldom respected and consulted the area experts but have relied on a small stable of favored but not always objective Third World spokesmen.

Finally, Wiarda observes that just as the confidence and cohesion among Western comparativists has weakened, some indigenous though usually Western-trained political scientists have rediscovered their own cultural heritages and proposed that their countries' politics be analyzed in terms of quite different but historic paradigms and values, thus challenging the universality of modern political science. Western phenomenology has abetted this endeavour. One of the most striking examples is the project of the late Ismail R. Faruqi and his followers in the Association of Muslim Social Scientists to Islamize their discipline from the ground up, as well as the other social sciences.[9]

From the foregoing rather gloomy diagnosis can we predict any trends for the near future, say the next decade in the field of comparative politics? Easiest to foresee is a continued decline of government and foundation funding of scholarship, especially of

expensive, large scale group projects like Almond's because of U.S. budgetary crises and economic recession. On the other hand if European integration prospers, scholars from the old continent may recapture the dominance and initiative in the social sciences which they lost with the Jewish diaspora from Germany and the destruction of World War II. They already have better access to some of their former colonies, like India, than American researchers do because they are less likely to be suspected of espionage. As an adjunct to this reversal, one might speculate that Japanese scholarship and models of development may become more attractive, at least to fellow Asians, than the "irrelevant", because exceptional, experience of the United States.

Within American political science one may hazard a guess that the next century, if not the 1990s, will see a decline in the disproportionate representation of Jews in the social sciences including comparative politics. The practical disappearance of anti-Semitic discrimination in more lucrative occupations such as banking, law, stockbroking and manufacturing has already diverted the talents of many of their "best and brightest", as recently deplored by President Michael Sovern of Columbia University. What is more, Jews are no longer "outsiders" in America, but "insiders" and so logically can be expected to lose the advantage which Robert Merton ascribed to the former of being able to see through the myths of the societies in which they live with greater objectivity than members of the dominant ethnic group can.

Who will take their place as coiners of neologisms and spinners of ever more new theories? Not probably the WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) whom they so easily displaced in the 1950s, but rather the principle of "ethnic succession" points to Chinese, Lebanese, high caste overseas Indians, Armenians and other "middleman" minorities with the facility for abstraction and language manipulation of that adaptible type of minority. Among Muslims, this would indicate Ismaili Khojas, Memons, Daudi Bohras, Ahmadis rather than mainstream Sunnis despite the latter's traditions of scholarship among the ulema, comparable to Jewish rabbis. The other source of comparativists already appearing is women of all breeds who are flocking into academia in America, but who so far are ghettoized by their heavily polemical focus on studies of only their half of the human race.

A prediction which may seem unlikely in view of the contemporary crises of Communist states throughout the world, is that Marxist scholars in what we have called the Third World will

break loose from their thralldom to Moscow and Peking and rethink both their doctrines and their programs in ways more appropriate to their own cultures, not simply in the guise of "dependency". If they do, they will be prepared to take advantage of the inevitable popular disillusionment in the 1990s with the excesses of libertarian market capitalism when it turns out to be just as exploitative as the old imperialism. Here the work of Asghar Ali Engineer of Bombay who cornbines Islamic learning with Marxist analysis may be a harbinger of things to come.[10]

Can we speculate usefully about the content of what will be compared between polities in the next generation? It seems doubtful that there will be any great revival of interest in topics on the "input" side of the political process such as parties and elections outside of the Western World where they are well established and the former Soviet block in Eastern Europe where they are being re-suscitated.

Subjects which produced coteries of specialists in the 1970s (environmental issues, ethnicity, political economy) and 1980s (terrorism, women's role, human rights) will continue of their own momentum and spread to the Third World scholars whether or not they produce any policy changes. An example of a specialty which flowered and may continue to flourish in the 1990s because there is a lucrative market for it is "risk assessment", that is, estimates of future political stability in a country for the sake of potential investors.

Comparison, it has been assumed so far, is between sovereign states. Is it conceivable that with increasing world economic integration sovereignty will decline in significance, as is already happening in Europe and the state will be replaced as the relevant unit of comparison by other categories such as ethnicity, religion, gender, age cohort, social class, regionally or world wide but across nominal state boundaries? Research in this format would depend on the availability of data for these categories, previously gathered and, therefore, bounded by states.

In making all of these projections for comparative politics research, I do not mean to imply that I agree with Cantori and Ziegler's subtitle that we really are in a "post-behavioral era". Instead, Robert Dahl's conclusion in 1961[11] seems to be still valid: "the behavioral mood ..... will be ..... incorporated into the main body of the discipline ..... it will not disappear because if has failed ..... but rather because it has succeeded." Its emphasis on

empirical research, operational definitions for political concepts, where possible are now widely practiced even when expectations of achieving "grand theory" are now modestly reduced to aspirations for "middle range theory", applicable to only one culture, or even to Wiarda's "islands of theory" amidst descriptive studies.

What I miss in most South Asian political science publications is efforts to compare with cases outside the subcontinent. India-Pakistan comparisons, while tempting because so many potential variables such as British colonial rule can be held constant, is bound to be invidious if done in terms of European values. More fruitful, for instance, if politically sensitive, would be comparisons between Pakistan and Israel as religiously-based nation states, or between India and Turkey as self-designated secular states. One of the few examples of which I can think is a comparison between separatist movements in East Pakistan and Biafra (Nigeria) made by William Richter and an Africanist colleague.[12] Other policy problems such as federalism, language, education, population, bureaucracy, the military role, have included case studies or comparison with one or another South Asian state when published in the West, but not, if my impression is correct, when carried out in Pakistan. Book stores and libraries are full of monographs on Pakistan Studies, but little if anything on Pakistan as an example of broader, even worldwide categories or generalizations. I suspect that part of this reluctance to compare outside South Asia is due to the continuing concentration on British, American and Soviet institutions in study and research on foreign governments at the college level. While this is understandable in view of the colonial institutional and linguistic heritage of Pakistan, I fear that it is conducive to a feeling of inferiority which would diminish if more attention were paid to other Third World countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Comparative research does not have to be statistical to be illuminating.

REFERENCES

1. Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985). For an earlier assessment, see James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *Comparative Politics, the Quest for Theory* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981)

2. Louis J. Cantori and Andrew H. Ziegler, Jr., eds., *Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1988)

3. Lawrence G. Mayer, *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance*, (Newbury Park, CAL: Sage Publications, 1989)

4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965)

5. Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest", *American Political Science Review* Vol. LV, 4 (December, 1961), 763-772.

6. For some of the consequences of this ethnic shift see my "The Sociology of Knowledge: Jewish and Muslim Impact on American Social Science", *American Journal of Islamic Social Science*, IV, 1 (September, 1987), 89-100.

7. Mayer, *op.cit.*, pp.276, 285

8. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

9. E.g., Mona Abul-Fadl, "Paradigms in Political Science Revisited: Critical Options and Muslim Perspectives", *American Journal of Islamic Social Science*, VI, 1 (September, 1989), 3-46

10. E.g., Asghar Ali Engineer, *Islam and Liberation Theology* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990)

11. Dahl, *op.cit.*, 77 0

12. William L. Richter and E. Wayne Nafziger, "Biafra and Bengladesh: The Political Economy of Secessionist Conflict.", *Journal of Peace Research*, 13, NO. 2 (1976): 91-109.

POWER , PEACE AND THOMAS HOBBES.

DR. MRS. HINA QANBER

In 1988 the 400th birthday anniversary of Thomas Hobbes was celebrated all over the world, especially, among the philosophical Societies, and a lot of his work appeared in which his theory and its role for the development of political philosophy was analysed. No doubt, each philosopher will analyse his ideology according to his own point of view; and, of course, it will vary from person to person. However according to Marxist philosophy Hobbes deserves a higher grade of appreciation as a philosopher and as a political thinker.

Although pre-Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the theory of materialism was inconsistent and was unable to apply the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life, yet Hobbes, in every respect, was the first modern thinker and scientific materialist.[1]

According to F. Engels, " ... Hobbes is the first modern materialist in the sense of 18th century)...".[2] Hobbes is the man who, not only systemised, but also developed Bacon's materialism.[3] However as Marx-Engel critcised, that Hobbes systemised Bacon's materialism without furnishing the proof of Bacon's fundamental principle, that is, "the origin of all human knowledge is based from the world of sensations" (the proof was supplied by Locke afterwards). Rather Hobbes had shattered the theistic prejudices of Bacon's materialism.[4]

But, even then, Hobbes is great, because, using the basic Principle of Bacon's theory he developed the theory free from the theological inconsistency and refurnished consistently the mechanical materialism which not only became the foundation of scientific materialism but also was a requirement of the mathematical Sciences which in those days (as we observe) was the fundamentals of mechanics.

Having the perception and feelings of our times (20th century), Hobbes developed his way of gnoseology, which, afterwards, was continued by Locke. Contrary to the note of Bacon about the role of speech (language) in the process of knowledge, Hobbes developed structural theory which was

continued by Locke and then by the other philosophers. Thus we may say that Hobbes is the founder of the materialistic theory of speech of the Modern Ages, which was neglected by his predecessors: and was used in the 19th century and is now being used even in the 20th century.

On the basis of the theory of human nature established by his predecessors (Montaigne, Descartes and others),# Hobbes successfully continued materialistic study about the people, about their nature and about the motives (circumstances) which force them to be frightened; and on the basis of such theory, he established social, political and government theories.

While establishing the government theory he is very well informed about the problem of power and peace; and he handled it very carefully. He exposed the lineament of power more clearly than anyone had since Machiavelli, more systematically than anyone had ever done, and than most have done since. But he also asserted the equal natural rights of man and tried to put the two things together to get a theory of right and obligation as well as a theory of peace.

Moreover his ideas about the peace are very close to the ideas of the present century which motivated him to establish his theory of government and political power. This is the main reason that has happened to the 20th century man to bring him closer to Hobbes than were the men of the intervening centuries.

Hobbes is one of the thinkers who play key role in the foundation of present Soviet theory of government and politics to establish the peace all over the world; and recognizing the existence of the people in the society peacefully.[5]

Hobbes is the founder of the theory of natural rights with the help of which people can recognize their rights and they can live

---

#*Montaigne Michel de* (533-1592); a French Philosopher of the Renaissance. His main moral principle is that man should not passively wait for his happiness, which religion promises him in heaven; he has a right to strive for happiness on the earth.

Descartes Rene (1596-1650); a French Philosopher, Mathematician, Physist, Physiologist. His materialistic teaching on nature, his theory of the development of nature, his materialist physiology and his mechanistic method influenced the materialistic philosophy of that time.

with basic needs, sharing their happiness for the development of peaceful life.

Hobbes system was not yet completed but sooner it got the name of a paradox. But, as we study him, we come to a conclusion that his theory is unchanged; rather it was continued by Rousseau and Locke and was further strengthened by the progressive people of capitalistic society of that time.

Burgeois character of the philosophy of Hobbes as a whole, and his political study in particular, however, can not be ignored.

Burgeois society's culture became even more multifacted and profound after the English revolution of 17th century, which was the most mature of the early burgeois revolutions: while the Renaissance culture largely had taken its bearings from the doctrines, ideas and works of science and arts of the antique time. The 17th century culture, developing on a different production base and in new socio-historical conditions, was increasingly aware of its superiority over antiquity. This awareness of superiority in a considerable, if not in the predominant degree, was determined by the huge accomplishments of scientific (primarily Mathematical and natural-scientific) knowledge which in the 17th century surpassed that of all the previous centuries.

The progressive philosophy of that century, burgeois in its, main content, was developing in a complex interaction with religion on the one hand and sciences on the other. The culture of feudal Middle Ages society in its various forms had not all disappeared from the historical scene even in the most advanced countries like Netherlands and England, feudal socio-economic relations were not completely ousted by burgeois relations. Therefore it was not only religion that remained throughout that century the political force: but also scholasticism as a philosophical system, close to religion, continued to dominate in a number of Universities and in some countries (especially the backward ones). It was recognized as the official philosophical doctrine.

Progressive philosophy in its main struggle with scholasticism already relied not so much on antique philosophical doctrines, as had been the case during the Renaissance period, but rather on the ideas emerging in the process of the intensive development of sciences. Progressive philosophy's dependence on these ideas was so great that it generated a new form of

philosophy usually called mechanistic materialism. Its conflict with the predominant religion and scholasticism serving the religion was the acutest in comparison with all the previous centuries, although mechanistic materialism was not capable to relinquish the concept of God which continued to be taken as the basis of Man's cognitive relations with the world.

The intensive interaction between progressive philosophy and science was accompanied by the elaboration of differentiated methodological problems which rendered gnoseological issues more concrete and profound. In this context the issue of correlation between the sources of sensual and properly rational cognition was especially developed thoroughly. After the issue of recognizability of the world this is the second gnoseological problem. A more profound understanding of the sensual component of knowledge reflected the greater role of experimental natural sciences in the cognition of nature as well as the vastly expanded sphere of human social and individual experience as a whole.

On the other hand, continuous growth of Mathematical knowledge as well as a stronger need for its theory, predetermined a deeper going elaboration of rational, reasonable and the intuitive components of knowledge. The problem of the correlation between the sensual and the factors of knowledge had been raised even by ancient philosophers, but it was only during the epoch, especially during the 17th century, when it reached the greatest depth as compared to the preceding history of philosophy. The philosophers who regarded experience as the main component of knowledge formed the school of empiricism; on the contrary, those who saw the decisive sphere of cognition functioning in the mind, constituted the school of rationalism.

According to Hobbes, those relations which characterised for the natural conditions of the people, virtually, represent the transference of the past typical acute problems.

However, the existing character of mutual relations between the people, particularly, in the burgeois society has prevailed. The idea of "war - all against all " is absolutely concrete struggle consisting of the base of capitalistic society and is the base of Hobbe's starting point as well as an unhesitated defect.

C. B. Macpherson points out that Hobbes was a scientific analyst of power and peace.[6] But it does not mean that his social

philosophy leads us to establish or justify burgeois society. In those days burgeois society posed itself the most developed and progressive society in the history of mankind. That is why the theory of such society (assuming that it was founded by the well known thinkers of the time) when was exported to the other countries, leaving only one stage of its development, was given a general character and that is why it was challenged very soon, and, even, now.

And, of course, the main problems concerned are the problems of war and peace. "what is war - asks Hobbes - but the same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or by deeds; The time remaining is peace..."[7]

Again the condition of war to Hobbes, in fact, realizes for man what is peace:"... private appetite is the measure of good and evil, and consequently, all men agree on this that peace is good and, therefore, also the way or means of peace, which are...justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy and the rest of the laws of nature are good, that is to say, moral virtues and their contrary voices, evil...".[8]

Peace, to Hobbes, means self preservation and war, as he writes; ..." war contradicts the self interest of man...."[9]

Hobbes tells us that the nature of man is to search for peace and this is the most appealing element of Hobbesian philosophy that man, by nature, is peace loving," .. nature seeks man to search for peace."[10]

To ensure peace on the earth is one of the most urgent problems of today. The nations have suffered from wars down the centuries, There has not been a single period of any remarkable length in the history of human beings that has passed without war. In the 20th century wars have become particularly destructive, as military techniques has developed considerably and armed forces and the scope of military operations expanded.

Hobbes is more important today, that is, in the 20th century, than he has been. Modern political inquiry can not deny so even ignore Hobbesian bold claims about peace.

Political theory is important not only how it deals with politics, but also for its practical value. None of the great political

thinkers of 17th century gives us political science in its real sense because each of them has flaws and gaps in his political theory. Political theories, in fact, provide us an abstract model for the political order. Then it is upto the politicians how they implement it. However no theory of the relations of man and the state can be in its true form unless it gives proper consideration to the place of man in the state. Not only the place of man in the state, but also the burning matters of power and peace which are also related to man itself.

That is why, even in this century, we got close to Hobbes, who deals with problems of power and peace scientifically. Hobbes tells us how the study of power is key to the understanding of politics and society. However this fact was realised by the people only after more than two centuries.

As a true analyst of power, Hobbes appreciates it when it is in the hands of sovereigns only. Power in the hands of every man, to Hobbes, is destructive and harmful; and is the main cause of the state of nature, as he writes:"...it is necessary for all that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature, that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list...".[11]

Hobbes deals with the subject of power scientifically. To him, as he writes"...the greatest of human powers, united by the consent, in one person; natural or civil that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as the power of common wealth ...".[12]

The theme of power is one of the greatest themes of "Leviathan". Hobbes uses the term power not as an instrument in the hands of sovereign to fulfil his needs and private ends, but an instrument for the achievement of peace and security for the individuals who constituted it. As he indicates:"...desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power..."[13] Further he says:"...desire of ease and sensual delight disposeth men to obey a common power...".[14] Power, to Hobbes, means to change the condition of men, to change the life of men ; and if it does not change, then it must be abolished.

Thus power, to Hobbes, is an instrument for the right ordering of the state; and, consequently, for the achievement of peace. He dramatically puts the two things together to achieve a stable state.

Hobbes, in fact, wants to show how power is important for the achievement of peace, which is always in the nature of man . His main concern is peace and the security of the state. According to him, peace and the security of the state must be achieved at any cost.

So we may say that the 20th century has brought us closer to an appreciation of Hobbes on power and peace. Our century has compelled us to show new interests in his subject matter - the power relations (necessary, possible and desirable) between men, in his purpose to find a way to peace and commodious living.

If there is no established government, says Hobbes, then "... the life of man will be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short...".[15] That is why men have given up the savage life for the greater advantages of organised and civilised life established by the law and government.

If we go through our Globe, we note and realize that the state themselves are still living in the condition of tense, struggle and race. We seem to live yet in the uncivilized society where men used to live in the condition of war,"...such war, as is of every man, against every man...".[16]

We are living in a period in which the use of force, violence and terrorism is playing a predominant role in human society. This phenomenon is not only combined to the relations between states, but it can also be observed between governments and governments, between government and individuals; and between the individual and individual. M. Gorbachev is right in saying that:"... mankind is at a crucial point in the new space age. And it is time to renounce the Stone Age mentality when the main concern was to have a bigger stone...".[17]

Nobody can deny Hobbesian these words:"...but though there had never been any time, where in particular men were in a condition of war one against another: yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are continual jealousies and in the state and posture of Gladiators: loving their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed one another: that is their forts, Garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms ; and continual spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war...."[18]

Is the state of nature, now - a - days, not identical with that of Hobbesian state of nature. This is the reason Hobbes appeals his reader even today. Whatever he presents before us, is a true analytical research not only about men, but also about the highest institution of the state. Thus his philosophy is for all times when there exists state.

This is not true that his "Leviathan" speaks only to the men of 17th century. Observation of Hobbes, as we remarked earlier, is universal. Whatever he observes, he observes with respect to human nature, which hardly changes.

If the nations of the world are still living in Hobbes state of nature, then we have to admit the fact that natural state of Hobbes is still with us. Although the organised civil society has diminished it, yet it is present, not only in the behaviour of men, but in the behaviour of the nations as well.

Our generation is more conscious of the words like war and peace. Lenin emphasised that :"...an end to wars, peace among nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence - such is our ideal...".[19] Further he says:"... democracy is manifested in the question of war and peace...".[20]

Hobbes told us these facts even in the 17th century. War, to him , is the condition:"....where every man is enemy to every man: and , consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities, ...no commodious buildings, no instruments of moving, ...no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society: and , worst of all, continual fear and danger on violent death...".[21]

Peace expands civil life. Peace is an ideal towards humanity to which humanity should always strive. Peace is the condition in which all abilities and capacities of men get more fixed; and peace enables them to be flourished. In our century, the need to control the use of power and eliminate violence from the relations of the state, is more needed and desirable than ever. The anti war movement has an important word to say in restoring the destiny of mankind. The simple reason is that, now - a - days every nation in the world is struggling to be a nuclear power, and wants to be as powerful as her neighbour. The arm race among the states, as depicted by Hobbes, is a continuous and constant fear of violent death.

Man is an excellent work of nature. He is not created for violence or to live in the condition of tense uncertainty. The most valuable quality of man - his reason, makes him able to conquer the moon. Science should be used for the best services of man. Humanity is not for disaster. Peace should and must be secured for humanity. The world has already experienced two disasters; the need is to prevent the conditions which may result in another disaster. Most of the world agree that peace is good and it must be secured for the coming generation. But there are a few who are concerned with a lust for power. They are those who always destroy attempts for peace; and in Hobbesian words:"... it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual war is ...".[22]

If the nations, like individuals, live in a state of nature without any law, then humanity has nothing to do with it. The scene which the world exhibits to the observers, at present time, is, obviously, one of the general instability, insecurity and increasing conflicts, both, within the nations and between the individuals. The fear of annihilations is a Damocle s' sword over human beings wherever they may be living in the civilised society. The hot spots of our planets are; Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine and Kuwait. The Afghans, Lebanese, the Palestinians and the Kuwaitis tragedy is not only the tragedy of Afghans, Lebanese, the Palestinians and Kuwaitis but that of humanity. It is a crime against humanity; and it is a crime against peace.

In our days war politics should be abolished in the relations of the state and should be adopted a policy which can assure peace, or there should be a society of nations to establish peace.

But one may ask about the role of already established institutions like UNO, Security Council and the General Assembly., Have all these institutions served the causes for which they were established. None of them prove themselves as the real representatives of the nations of the world. Their decisions always serve the interests of super powers. The third world countries are still looking for an institution which can help them to exist.

These days the only philosophy that can be adopted by the man, who , on one hand longs for scientific progress and on the other hand, desires human happiness: is the philosophy of peace, good will, brotherhood and love for all.

Our confused and difficult world need immediate steps, if it is to escape another disaster; and among these the most important is the mutual respect, not only within each country , but also on the international level. We should be apologetic towards the dogmatism of the left or the right. There is nothing right or left; the need is , that of the scientific approach towards human problems. The concept of scientific progress and mutual forbearance should be strictly observed.

For, without these beliefs, life on our politically divided but technically unified planet, will hardly continue to exist.

The deeper our knowledge of human needs and of the laws of social interaction, the greater is the chance of increased insight into the nature of human ideals. The positive spirit is needed to solve the problems of our age. The human ideal is not laid in heaven, but is rooted in fundamental needs; and is attainable by rational efforts. Fanaticism, dogmatism, chauvinsm and many other issues depict irrational attitude and are contrary to what reason and good sense demand of us. The sooner we get rid of them the better it is for mankind.

In fact, Hobbes has been drawing our attention to these issues and is preaching for the peace, not only from the last centuries but even today and in future; and, in fact, his ideas about peace last till the existence of this universe; and, hence we may conclude that:

> "...creative legacy of Thomas Hobbes, firmly, leads us to the treasure of spiritual, sacred and holy culture..."[23].

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Marx-Engels. "*About Historical Materialism*". Progress Moscow 1989, p. 301.

2. Marx-Engels. "*Letters*" (in Russian). P. 384.

3. Marx-engels "*Collected Works*". Progress Moscow. 1982, p. 379.

4. *Ibid.* p. 379.

5. "*Times*" Jan. 4, 1988(Micheal Gorbachev - Man of the year 1987.

6. Hobbes Thomas. "*Leviathan*" Edited and introduced by C.B. Macpherson penguin Books, 1983. p. 12.

7. "*The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*. Edited by Sir William Molesworth. 11 volumes. London, 1839-1845. Vol. 2, Chapter 1, p. 11.

8. Hobbes Thomas. *op. cit.* p. 216.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid*

11. *Ibid.* p. 212.

12. *Ibid.* p. 150

13. *Ibid.* p. 162.

14. *Ibid.* p. 161.

15. *Ibid.* p. 186.

16. *Ibid.* p. 185.

17. Gorbachev M. "*Selected speeches and Articles*". Progress Moscow; 1988, p. 473.

18. Hobbes T. *op. cit.* p. 187-188.

19. Lenin V. I. "*Collected Works*. Moscow Vol. 21, p. 293.

20. *Ibid.* Vol. 30, p. 319.

21. Hobbes T. *op. cit.* p. 186.

22. "*The English works of Thomas Hobbes*". Vol. 2 , p. 11.

23. Meerovsky B. V. "*Hobbes*" (in Russian). Moscow, 1975, p. 195.

THE SIX POINT FORMULA: CONTROVERSY REGARDING AUTHORSHIP

Dr. Syed Humayun

The Six Point Formula had remained the most volatile political issue in united Pakistan. It had very boldly and effectively presented the Bengali political demands and grievances which they had articulated against the central political system ever since independence. It unleashed an unprecedented regional movement which united the whole mass of bengali people under the umbrella of the Awami League. Instead the great political crisis of 1971 which ultimately resulted into break up of united Pakistan also emerged centring the issue whether the Six Point Formula should be accepted in toto or not. Authorship of the Six Point Formula, thus , makes an interesting study.

The authorship of the Six Point Formula is still shrouded in mystery. So far no official explanation has been presented by the Awami League circles to clarify the position. Different sources have, however, speculated upon the authorship of Six Point from different angles. Some of these views are nothing more than slogan-mongering primarily directed to discredit the Awami League by showing the nefarious design in the Six Point Formula itself; other are quite well founded and deserve attention. Below an attempt has been made to explain and examine these different views.

According to one view the Six Point Formula was the outcome of international conspiracy[1]. The upholders of this view maintained that certain foreign powers had been actively engaged in dismembering Pakistan right from its very inception. the Six Point Formula, they pointed out, was part of these powers, strategy to weaken the very foundation of Pakistan ultimately leading to its final breakup[2]. In this connection Indian role, according to the votaries of this view, had been most active. They maintained that India had never reconciled herself to the creation of Pakistan[3]. Right from 1947 she had been, it is said, trying hard to undo the partition scheme so that Pakistan could be brought under the fold of Akhand Bharat[4]. The Six Point Formula was an Indian bombshell, intended to strike at the root of Pakistani nation. So the votaries of this view maintained that the Six Point was drawn by some high officials of the foreign Ministry of India[5].

Some think that the actual architects of the Six Point were the communist Hindus of West Bengal who had migrated from India to put this so called economic programme in practice[6]. Furthermore, the Indian involvement could also be traced, according to this view, from the fact that the All India Radio regularly broadcasted programmes publicizing sheikh Mujib's actions and his Six Point[7]. In India Sheikh Mujib's role was generally eulogized as fighting India's War[8].

It is alleged in certain other quarters that the Six Point was CIA-sponsored scheme[9]. According to this view, the United States of America used the Six Point as a blackmail tactic to force Pakistan to forgo her new foreign policy overtures, initiated during early sixties to improve its ties with the communist blocs, especially with China and Soviet Union. Perhaps United Pakistan's peculiar geography and its excessive emphasis on religious foundation of statehood also appeared absurd to U. S. policy makers and hence they were anxious to reshape the subcontinental state system on a rational basis. Whatever may be the reason, the U. S. entanglements in United Pakistan's domestic affairs was intensified. This suspicion had gained more grounds from the ambivalent policy that the U.S. diplomatic agencies had pursued vis-a-vis the two wings of United Pakistan[10]. The U.S. double-dealing policy towards United Pakistan, it is alleged, became more obvious especially after 1960. Khwaja Nazimud-din, a veteran Bengali Muslim League leader,[11] said in a press statement that he was contacted by American Ambassador and persuaded to work for the secession of East Wing.[12] The United States had also been accused of plotting to establish a United States of Bengal[13] during mid-sixties. The idea was getting wide circulation among the educated young Bengalis and was evident from the fact that the issue was freely discussed both in public and private meetings of different Bengali student bodies. While the U.S. Government had categorically denied the charge of being involved in any way in undermining the territorial integrity of Pakistan,[14] the activities of American economists, at Dacca, financed by Ford Foundation, casted doubt about U.S. Policy towards United Pakistan.[15] It has also been alleged that while the U.S. provided economic aids with the stint that such aid should be used in West Wing, she on the other hand, incited the Bengali economists and politicians to campaign against economic injustices in East Wing.[16] An equally popular view in certain circles in East Wing was that M.M Ahmed, a Qadiani and Chief Planner of Ayub Khan's economic policies, also acted as CIA agent to wreck the economic foundation of the country. His

economic policies, it was said, prompted the Bengali economists to articulate the economic demands of the Six Point Formula.

In addition, there were rumours that the Soviet Union also had a hand in the formulation of the Six Point Formula. This was evident, according to these rumours, by its keen interest in propagating the Soviet Ideology in East Wing.[17] Although the Communist Party was banned in United Pakistan, it remained very active clandestinely throughout the length and breadth of East Wing ever since independence.[18] Even as early as 1951 the Cominform (in a political note published in its organ, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy) praised the role of the Awami League for "unleashing a struggle against feudalism and colonial domination" and the local Communist Party took it as a hint that the party should work through the Awami League and other popular front organizations.[19] Thereafter, the Communist Party members infiltrated all the Bengali regionalist parties and organizations which, in turn, began to emphasize more on secularism, anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism and above all the issue of regional autonomy. Indeed it would not be wrong to say that the leftist forces had been the most potent factor in influencing the Muslim Bengal youth, and extremist regional demands raised in the Six Point Formula were first articulated by the leftist forces in early 1950s.

Another view concerning international conspiracy suggested that Great Britain was also deeply involved in the Six Point politics. It argued that Great Britain, like India, had also reluctantly agreed to partition scheme and so it was in favour of rearrangement of the subcontinental state-system. Moreover, it had consistently interfered in the internal affairs of United Pakistan and thus tried to undermine Pakistan's territorial integrity. It is quite evident from the private and public statements of the British leaders, press and other mass medias.[20] An aggressive policy of brainwashing Bengali intellectuals and young men was pursued at the different British educational institutions where they used to go for higher education and training. As early as in 1960s an organization called East Pakistan House was formed in London. The House was alleged to have openly worked for independence of East Wing[21] through organizing seminars and discussions, and publishing pamphlets and weeklies such as *Asian Tide* and *Purba Bangla*.[22] One of its early pamphlets entitled *Unhappy East Pakistan*,[23] reiterated the same injustices, neglects and exploitation as the Awami Leaguers depicted in its literature on the dismal East Wing situation. Significantly enough many of the

University teachers who were in the forefront of the Six Point Movement were London-educated.

To sum up, these interpretations suggest that there had been an international conspiracy to disintegrate Pakistan and the Six Point was used as an instrument to that effect. But Sheikh Mujib rejected the allegation by stating that "The Six Point was not imported from abroad.[24] 'It is', he further said, 'the product of our soil. It has come from our heart.'[25] Furthermore, the theory of international conspiracy has never been substantiated by any sound evidence.

According to some, the Six Point was drafted by Altaf Gauhar,[26] a very close and powerful Information Secretary of President Ayub Khan. They argued that the main purpose to present the Six Point was to divert the public attention from the 'Tashkent fiasco'[27] which was embarrassing and as a matter of fact threatening Ayub Khan's regime. The bogey of East Wing secession was, therefore, revived by this new scheme to rally support for Ayub Khan in his effort against this dangerous menace[28] S.M. Zafar, Law minister in Ayub Khan's cabinet, narrates a fascinating account in his book, *'Through the crisis'*, highilighting the role of Altaf Gauhar in drafting the Six Point. "These six Point are", Altaf Gauhar is reported to have said, "lifted from a book in India which was written by some Bengali suggesting the separation of West Bengal from India. Many people here do not know this. Thus there is nothing original in these points.[29] This statement was made, according to Zafar, in all seriousness.[30] Zafar's view was further substantiated by Pir Ali Muhammed Rashidi, a former central minister and well-known Sindhi politician. Rashidi disclosed that Sheikh Mujib personally told him (Rashidi) that a very close bureaucrat of Ayub Khan had handed over this Six Point to him when he came to attend the opposition parties conference at Lahore.[31] But Altaf Gauhar later denied that he had any hand in the framing of the Six Point. [32] He thus regretfully remarked; "although ... the President (by which he meant Bhutto) was ... entirely aware as to how the Six Point Programme came into being, yet in his book "*The Great Tragedy*" published in September 1971, he insinuates that it was drafted by me though I am not referred to by name."[33]

A strong view maintains that the Six Point Formula was not framed by one single individual or agency. It was the natural culmination of historical forces.[34] It was the outcome of the Bengali grievances and discontentments which had been

expressed in the form of language demand for making Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan, the proposals of the Grand National Convention (1950), the 21- point United Front Manifesto and so on. Sheikh Mujib simply aggregated all these regional demands of East Wing articulated by leaders of different opinion at different times. Sheikh Mujib himself is on record saying that "these demands are no new points invented afresh by me or any individual but in reality long standing demands of the people and pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfillment for decades."[35] The Six Point, therefore, had a historical growth.

Another view is presented by Herbert Feldman[36] who says that the Six Point was the brain-child of some Bengali intellectuals, who were dissatisfied with the Central Government because of its apathetic and indifferent attitude towards East Wing. Feldman has not identified who were these Bengali intellectuals. He, however, said that the original draft prepared by these intellectuals consisted of only four points. These points were as follows :

1. The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of the Legislature elected on the basis of universal adult franchise and direct voting.

2. Federal Government should deal with two subjects, defence and foreign affairs; all other residuary subjects should vest in the federating units.

3. Regarding currency, either of the two suggestions might be accepted :

   a) Two separate freely convertible currencies might be introduced, or

   b) One currency for the whole country might be maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions were to be made in stopping the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. A separate banking reserve was also to be made for East Pakistan.

4. Separate fiscal and monetary policy was to be adopted for East Pakistan.[37]

The suggestion that the Six Point was framed by Bengali intellectuals[38] seems to be quite convincing. On January 13, 1974, the Reuter carried a news in connection with 'Bangladesh Presidential Election' and stated that Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhry,[39] had played an important role in the drafting of the Six Point.[40] It is also said that Dr. M. Ahmed had acted as constitutional expert to the Awami League which had been clamouring for maximum autonomy during the framing of the 1956 Constitution.[41] He had also written a series of articles on the issue of provincial autonomy and advocated the points which were later incorporated in the text of the Six Point Formula. One of his articles entitled, Problem of Constitution Making, was included in special 'Emancipation of Bangladesh Supplement' published by prominent East Wing media just at the height of 1971 crisis.[42] It is also significant to note that he together with some colleagues of his department (i.e. Department of Political Science of the Dacca University), was closely associated with the Awami League during the 1971 crucial parleys.

In support of the contention that the Bengali intellectuals had framed the Six Point, we may also refer to Rahman Sobhan, an economist and academician of Dacca University. His views expressed at a seminar on Greater National Integration organized by the Council of National Integration, in Lahore during October, 1961 are quite suggestive of his involvement in the drafting of the Six Point. He said:

> "Instead of having two regions perpetually quarrelling over the share of resources, let the economy be split up not just for analysis but functionally into two economies..... such a policy would have to be implemented in a framework of Regional Economic Authority. Each Wing would have full control over its resources. This would mean that all incomes from revenue and foreign exchange would be under the control of the Regional Administration. From their resources contributions would be made to the Centre for maintenance of foreign affairs, general administration and defence.
>
> Foreign aid would be singled out for special treatment. Here all foreign aid could either be divided on the basis of population or at least 50/50 basis.

> Alternatively each wing could get foreign governments to set up separate aid missions and would do its own lobbying for aid."[43]

It may be noted that Rahman Sobhan was an economic expert in the Awami League team during the crucial negotiations of March, 1971.[44]

The suggestion that the Bengali intellectuals drafted the Six Point Formula has been comprehensively elaborated by Feldman who narrated how that draft was first shown to Nurul Amin, a veteran Bengali leader.[45] But finding Nurul Amin unresponsive, these intellectuals went to Sheikh Mujib who at that time, was going to attend the opposition leader's conference at Lahore. Feldman sums up Sheikh Mujib's reaction as follow: "Seeing in the draft a crystallization of what he wanted but had not been able to enunciate so precisely, Mujib seized upon it and carried the proposals to Lahore."[46]

Another view regarding the authorship of the Six Point has been presented by a very close source to the Awami League recently.[47] According to this view, the formula was originally drafted by a small group under the guidance of Tajuddin Ahmed, General Secretary of the Awami League, and then finalised by Sheikh Mujib, Tajuddin and Ruhul Quddus, a Bengali CSP officer (one of the accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case) towards the end of 1965. The Formula was disclosed to other party members at the Council meeting of the Party held in February, 1966.[48]

To sum up, it may be said that the Six Points Formula was the handiwork of the Bengali intellectuals, more particularly that of Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed Chaudhury and Rahman Sobhan. Their ideas and views were then thrashed out by few top-notch Awami Leaguers which were thus presented as the Six Point Formula.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the statement of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Chief of Pakistan Muslim League, in the *Pakistan Times*, May 23, 1970, p.9; the statement of Khan Abdus Sabur Khan, the Secretary-General of Pakistan Muslim League, in the *Pakistan Observer*, July 12, 1970, p.13.

2. *The Pakistan Times*, May 23, 1970, p.9.

3. See H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), p.315; V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) P.384; M.A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay: Longmans, 1960) p.242.

4. S.M. Burke observes, "Almost till his dying day Nehru nursed the wish for India and Pakistan to come constitutionally closer..... (because) there is no other way for India and Pakistan" Quoted from Lok Sabha, Debates, April 13, 1964, col. 10717. See S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975) p.9.

5. Safdar Mahmood, *A Political Study of Pakistan* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1972) p.292.

6. Quoted by A.T.R. Rahman and Zillur R. Khan *Provincial Autonomy and Constitution Making: the Case of Bangladesh* (Dacca: Green Book House Ltd. 1973) p.104; Also see *Pakistan Observer*, July 28, 1970.

7. Safdar Mahmood, *The Deliberate Debacle* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976) p.46; Also see Dr. Hasan Zaman, *East Pakistan Crisis and India* (Dacca: Pakistan Academy, 1971) p.xvii; G.W.Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C.Hurst and Company, 1974) p.99.

8. K.K. Shukla, General Secretary of the West Bengal Unit of the All India Congress Committee was reported to have said, Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman was fighting India's War." Quoted in Hasan Zaman, *op. cit.*, p.V.

9. This is the view of the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders regarding the authorship of the Six Point. See Moudud Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971* (Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1979) p.96.

10. Herbert Feldman, *End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976) P.78; Also see G.W. Choudhury, *op. cit.*, p.120. Mr. Choudhury writes, 'But the role of the U.S.Consul General in Dacca Mr. A. Blood, was dubious and seemed to be detrimental to Pakistan's vital national interests.

11. Khwaja Nazimuddin served as the Chief Minister of East Bengal, as the Second Governor-General and then as Second Prime Minister of Pakistan. He died in 1964.

12. Quoted in *Urdu Digest* (Lahore: November, 1971) p.54.

13. Lawrence Ziring, *Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1971) p.43. A map of the proposed United States of Bengal comprising East Pakistan, West Bengal, Sikkim, Bhuttan, Nagaland and Assam, has been reproduced by Muhammad Abbas Ali in his book "*Salvation of East Pakistan*" (Sialkot: 1971) p.30.

14. Lawrence Ziring, *op. cit.*, p.43.

15. G.W. Choudhury, *op. cit.*, p.120.

16. See Urdu Digest, *op. cit.*, p.56.

17. For Leftist Movement in East Pakistan, see Marcus F. Franda, "Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, 10, No.8, August, 1970, p.588-606; It is also said that the Communists were the main force behind the Language Movement of 1948 and 1952. See the statements of Chief Ministers of East Bengal, Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin. See the proceedings of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly 8, No.3 (March, 1952) p.155-160.

18. For the operation of leftist forces in early years of independence, see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, *Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh* (Dacca: Bangladesh Book International Ltd., 1975) p.3-10; Also see Tariq Ali, *Military Rule or People's Power*? (London: Janathan Cape, 1970) p.51-62.

19. See K.G. Mustafa, : "Awami League Manifesto: Hopes and Realities", *Holiday (Dacca Weekly)* June 14, 1970, p.2.

20. Altaf Hussain Qureshi, *Chay Nukat Ki Sachchi Kahani* (Urdu) (True story about the Six Points) (Lahore: Maktaba Urdu Digest, 1969), p.58-59; Also see K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Pakistan: A Study of British Attitude Towards the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971* (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1974), chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9.

21. Moudud Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p.76. Mr. Moudud Ahmed served as Secretary of this East Pakistan Movement during 1966-67.

22. This Organization also arranged famous British lawyer, Sir Thomas Williams to defend Sheikh Mujib in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Moudud Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p.103.

23. Moudud Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p.76.

24. *The Pakistan Observer*, February 2, 1970, p.1.

25. *Ibid.*

26. See S.M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore: Book Centre, 1970), p.35; also see G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p.134; Onlooker, *Over a Cup of Tea* (Karachi) p.262.

27. Z.A. Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Karachi: A People's Party Publication, 1971) p.8.

28. See G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p.134; see also statement of Wahiduzzaman, a former Ayub Khan's Minister, in *The Pakistan Times*, July 8, 1970, p.1.

29. S.M. Zafar, *op. cit.*, p.35.

30. *Ibid.*

31. See Pir Ali Mohammed Rashidi, "Another glimpse from my memories", *Jang*, Karachi, September 4, 1985.

32. See Altaf Gauhar's case before Sind Baluchistan High Court, *The Morning News*, Karachi, October 4, 1972.

33. *Ibid.*

34. See the statement of Abdus Salam Khan and Ataur Rahman in the *Pakistan Observer*, February 14, 1970 and August 2, 1970 respectively. Both the leaders contention was that the Six Point demand was nothing new.

35. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, *6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live* (Dacca: Published by Tajuddin Ahmed, General Secretary of the Awami League, Pioneer Press, 1966) p.1.

36. Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) p.180.

37. *Ibid.*, p.179.

38. Kamruddin, in his book, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and The Birth of Bangladesh*, has this much to say about the Six Point Authorship, "Some even suspected that the writer was the author.....Even the Inter Service Intelligence of the Pakistan Army believed that he had some hand in the matter. The misunderstanding, the writer thinks, arose because he had a hand in the formula placed before the Grand National Convention in 1950

and also because he began to write the present book in 1965 just after the end of the conflict." Kamruddin Ahmed, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and Birth of Bangladesh* (Dacca: Zahiruddin Mahmud Inside Library, 1975), p.204.

39. Dr. M.A. Chaudhury was Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Dacca, during the 1971 Crisis. He also acted as Vice Chancellor of the Dacca University besides other important assignments after the emergence of Bangladesh.

40. *The Morning News*, Karachi, January 18, 1974.

41. Fazlur Rahman, *Pakistan, One Indivisible* (Karachi: Pakistan Educational Publishers Ltd., 1960), p.54.

42. See the *Morning News*, Dacca, March 22, 1971.

43. See Rahman Sobhan, "Indivisibility of the National Economy of Pakistan," *The Pakistan Observer*, October 23 and 25, 1961. This article was again reproduced under the title, "Two Economies in Pakistan," *Morning News* (Dacca: March 22, 1971).

44. See Rahman Sobhan, "Negotiating for Bangladesh: A participant's views," *South Asian Review*, Vol. 4, No.4, July 1971.

45. Feldman, *op. cit.*, p.180.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Moudud Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p.94.

48. *Ibid.*

ORIGION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUB-CONTINENT

Mohammed Abuzar Wajidi

Local Government is generally defined as an institution which deals with matters concerning the people living in a particular locality. It encompasses only those affairs which the national parliament decides to be dealt with at local and not national level but under the control of the central government.[1]

It is also described as having nothing to do with security, national defence, bank rate, taxation, international trade; it acts rather as a housewife in that it makes our surroundings fit to live in, keeps the streets clean provides education to children, builds houses and does all similar jobs which enable us to lead a civilized life.[2]

Local authority occupies a wide range of subsidiary and dependent positions in relation to parliament and the central government. A local authority is in any case likely to be dependent upon central government for its financial needs.

Local government is mainly concerned with the town planning, its development and modernization. The ordinary citizen knows that the local authority provides many services which are necessary in civilized life. The services be roughly classified as environmental and personnel, and includes the protection of life and property by an efficient police and planning of streets and open spaces in the interest of safety, health and even beauty.

The personnel services include the schooling of children, specialized services of the hospitals in case of accident and disease and for general health care and treatment, and the help of the social welfare services for the needy. In short, local government has been established to ensure good life for the citizen.[4]

Modern Local Government is meant to carry out different works such as planning of towns and the countryside, prevention, control and eradication of infectious diseases, and the education of children. These different works are carried only by elected councils, each of which looks after some part of the jigsaw pattern of local government.[5]

Local Government is not a theoretical necessity rather it is needed because it provides effective means of carrying out important public services which do not fall in the purview of the higher tiers of government.

The need for Local government is in fact allied to the concept of "Local democracy" conceived as Local-self government within existing traditional boundaries. Local authority provides the essential ingredients of a democratic society, i.e. elected representatives who are close to those whom they serve and who form an easy channel of communication between public opinion and the council.[6]

In most countries, powers are divided between different areas and agencies of government in conformity with what Arthur Maas calls the basic values of "modern democratic society. Liberty, equality and welfare"[7], without which local democracy and local government cannot be maintained. He has elaborated his views stating that the values of liberty are promoted by different tier of government which protect the citizens from arbitrary rule and concentration of power; equality is considered as providing the opportunity to people to vote and to take part in as many public bodies as possible. Welfare goals are promoted by the allocation of powers so that government services may effectively meet the social and economic need of the society.

The individual's allegiance to his community is also one of the important factors in democratic government. This can only be created if the people have a sense of participation in decision making. As Paul Ylivisker has noted "loyalty is created by setting boundaries, not the other way round".[8]

James W. Felser says that "Sound state-craft is that which converges at the point of the individual citizen. The citizen judges its effectiveness in terms of efficiency, the cost and quality of services, and convenience.[9]

It is also concerned with democratic control, which means that representation must be accessible and responsive.

Similarly, Bleddyn Davies asserts that territorial justice and healthy local government are opposing claims.[10]

In the contemporary society, it may be noted, the problem of local government and democracy are interrelated and since the times of John Stuart Mill, Local Government is considered as integral part of democracy not only in England but also in this sub-continent.

In the sub-continent, the concept of local institutions is the product of the present century. However, history tells us that the local government in the subcontinent dates back to the Mughal Empire.

Rold F. Alderfer summarizes the evolution of form and structure of local government in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.[11]

For thousands of year, the Indian way of life was agricultural, with village as the centre of social life as well as its dominant political institution. Empires might rise and fall invaders may come and go, but the villages lived and existed in much the same form as we see today. History has recorded the ups and downs of the state vis-a-vis the villages sometimes dominant, other times co-operative and sometimes even independent. Villages in ancient India had the same structure and composition as those in rural areas in other part of the world. They usually consisted of five hundred to a thousand houses built close together, isolated from the outside world, almost all their affairs governed and regulated by custom, community leadership in the hands of the councils of elders and perhaps a headman; cultivated land was worked by individual families, but there were common forests and pastures. Jawaharlal Nehru had described the village as an almost independent entity governed by its elected Panchayat. At times a number of villages or small towns were joined together under a Raja or Chief who was sometime elected and sometimes hereditary; or groups might cooperate with each other to build community facilities. The Raja who was the Chief could not just do what he liked; he himself was subject to the Aryans' laws and customs, and he could be deposed by his people ..... One important characteristic of the Indian village society, however, differentiates it from the rest of the world: This was the age old system of castes and communalism. The village council had both executive and judicial powers. According to Shukra-Natisai, a descriptions of the Indian village written about 800 A.D., land was distributed by panchayat, taxes were collected by it and paid to central government for the village as a whole, the Panchayat settled disputes between inhabitants and groups within the village and financial, educational management and security

staffs. The state's officials, the King's men were interested primarily in keeping law and order and in collection of revenue for the central government. In all other respects the villages are able to operate on their own, and through the centuries there evolved a completely workable and indigenous system of agriculture, commerce, crafts, land use, family relationships and security based substantially upon mutual aid.

Humes and Martin have said that a form of limited representative government existed in many villages of India long before it developed in the European cities.

The system of rural local government in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent from the time of East India Company's rule until 1864 exhibited a tendency to expand and consolidate strict administrative authority which reduced the importance of the Panchayat system.[12]

Although there was no organized local bodies for the purpose of local self government in Indo-Pak sub-continent, before the British rule in India it does not mean that there was complete absence of local government or municipal services. When we try to trace the evolution of local government institutions in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, we find that local government was not something novel, it had only assumed a new form under the British rule. Municipal Administration was made an efficient instrument of relief to the imperial finances and later it was regarded as an instrument for providing relief to the district officer from some of his work.

It has been mentioned that village Panchayat system existed in ancient India. It comprised an elected council having both executive and judicial powers. The Aryans are believed to have transplanted the Panchayat system in the sub-continent from their original habitat when they arrived here. The Panchayat performed its task and existed till its abolition by the colonial rule in the mid-nineteenth century.

It is important to note that the nineteenth century marks the beginning of the growth of local government in India.

No doubt that there were no such highly organized corporate local bodies in Pre-British India, but a system did exist. The local administration in pre-British India was called "Area Administration" were the *Subedar*, the *Shiqedar*, the *amil*, the *mir deh* and the

mugaddam. It is also interesting to note here that the institution of city *Kotwals* had also existed in Towns. This was very significant in Local Administration. The *Kotwal* was responsible for maintaining law and order in the town. He was also assigned additional responsibilities in area administration such as administration of jails, regulations of markets and public resorts. In fact the Mughals contributed substantially in the sphere of local government administration. They developed the office of "*Kotwal*" who, under the emperor, served as pivot of the Municipal System. The institution of "Khanqah" too was established as centre of poor relief; there were kitchens to provide food for the travellers and the destitute. Thus the institution of "Khanqah" (Centre of poor relief) provided basic amenities to the people.

The "Muhtasib" in addition to his normal duties as the public adjudicator also looked after street maintenance and prevention of encroachment on thorough fares. He was also considered as the custodian of public morals and also had other similar civic or municipal responsibilities.

But with the downfall of the Mughals in India, the local communities began to disintegrate and the spirit of local government was generally lost. Local government in its present form envolved from the experiments by the Britishers in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Local government has been variously defined and in different milieus and times. Its functions too have varied a little both quantitatively and qualitatively. One thing, however, remains : It has always been the centre of all Centripetal forces and has always served as an agent of change at the grass roots level. The institutions of local government in the sub-continent as shown above, goes back to two or three millennia, but in its present form, has evolved from the experiments of the British Colonial rule.

FOOT NOTES

1. P. Stone, *Local government for Student* (Macdonald & Evans Ltd., London, (1963) p-1.

2. *Ibid.*

3. K.B. Smellie, *History of local government* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949) p-7.

4. *Ibid.*

5. K.B. Smellie, *Op.Cit.*, p-8.

6. For details see, "*Local Government in National development Possibilities and Pitfalls*" by William G. Colman, Cento symposium on *The role of local government in National development* February, 1965.

7. Arthur Maas, *Division of Powers an areal analysis in Arthur Mass (ed) Area and Power; A theory of local government* (Free Press 1959) p-9 to 10.

8. Paul YIVisaker, *Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal division of powers in Arthur Mass*. p-37.

9. James W. Felser, *Area and Administration* (University of Albama Press 1949) p-10.

10. Bleddyn Dans, *Social Needs and Resource in Local Services*, (Micheal Joseph 1968) p-23.

11. Alderfer F. Harold, *Local government in Developing Areas*, (Mac Graw hill Book Company, New York, 1964) p.69-70.

12. Shahid S. Rizvi, *Local Government in Pakistan A study in clash of ideas* (The centre for Research in local government, Karachi University, 1979) p-1.

BALOCHISTAN
AN INTRODUCTION

Nadir Bukhat

It is situated between 24° 54, and 32° 4 N and 60° 56 and 70° 15, E. Balochistan is bounded on the South by the Arabian Sea,[1] on the North by Afghanistan, and the North West Frontier Province, on the West by Iran and on the East by Sind, the Punjab and a part of Frontier Province.[2] The Province covers a total area of 131855 square miles. The area which is almost wholly mountaineous lies on the great belt of ranges connecting the Koh Safed with the hill system of Southern Iran. It, thus, forms a watershed, the drainage of which enters the Indus on the East and the Arabian sea on the south while on the North and West, it makes its way to those inland lakes which form so general feature of Central Asia.

ORIGIN OF THE NAME :

The name of Balochistan is derived from the Baloch,[3] whose migratory hordes gradually extended eastwards from southern Iran in the seventh century; until they eventually took up a position in Kachhi about the 15th century.[4] It is also reported that this name was given by Nadir Shah, the great Persian monarch, who, as St. John remarks, after driving the Afghan invaders from Persia, made himself master, and placed a native chief over the new province, formed out of the districts bounded on the north and the south by the Halmand valley and the sea, and stretching from Karman on the West to Sindh on the east. This newly formed province, called, Balochistan or the country of Baloch.[5]

SCENERY :

The traveller who enter the passes of Balochistan finds himself among surroundings which are essentially different. The general outlook resembles that of the Iranian Plateau and takes as a whole, it is attractive and its peculiarities are not without a certain charm.[6] Although it is barren sunburnt mountains, deserts and stony plains yet they have the beauty of their own. There are also level valleys of considerable size in which irrigation enables much of the cultivation to be carried on and rich crops of all kinds to be raised.[7] The flatness of valleys due to the scanty rainfall distinguishes Balochistan from the Eastern Himalayas. Within the

mountains lie narrow glens whose rippling water courses are fringed in early summer by the brilliant green of carefully traced fields. Rows of villows will interlacing festoons of views, border the clear water while groups of children and women in cotton shawls complete a peaceful picture of beauty and fertility. Some places are more beautiful than Quetta on a bright frosty morning when all the lofty peaks are capped with glistening snow, while the date-groves which encircles the Mekran are full of picturesque attraction. The frowning rifts and gorges in the upper plateau makes a contrast to the smile of the valleys. From the loftier mountain peaks magnificent views are obtainable.

RACES AND TRIBES:

The Meds, and the Jats appear to have been the inhabitants of Balochistan at the time of Arab invasion. The Meds now, as then live on the coast. The Pashtoons still cluster round their homes at the back of the Takht-i-Sulaiman. The Jats inspite of the influx of Balochs to this day compose the cultivating classes of Las Bela and Kachhi and some of the Kurks whose insolence led to the final subjugation of Sindh by the Arabs are still to be found in the Jan Valley in the Jhalawan.[8]

The indigenous races of chief importance at the present day are the Pashtoons and the Balochs. The Jats, the cultivators, now form only a small minority but many of them have been absorbed by the Balochs. Among religious and occupational groups may be mentioned The SAYYIDS, DEHWARS and the indigenous HINDUS, who live under the protection of tribesmen and carry on the trade of the area.[9] The Pashtoons and the Baloch's stature is above the mean, complexion fair, eyes dark but occasionally grey, hair on face plentiful, their heads are broad and their noses of great length. Baloch hold the Marri and Bugti hills and parts of Kachhi. The Brahvis (Balochs) occupy the great mountain band between Quetta and Las Bela. In the North-West of the province the Baloch occur again while in Nushki and the North-East of Kharan Brahvies (Baloch) are numerous.

THE PASHTOONS:

The Pashtoons as they describe themselves appear to have been living not far from their present abode in the time of Herodotos if the identification of his Paktyake with Pashtoons be accepted. At the beginning of the eleventh century they had already spread Southwards as far as Multan. The important are

the Suries and the Lodhis. Any way today we find them clustering round the Takht-i-Suleman while others have made their way South to Sibi and as far North as Dir, Swat and Bajaur.[10] The most numerous and important indigenous Pashtoon tribes in Balochistan are the Kakar, the Kakars are to be found in the largest numbers in the Zhob, Quetta, Pishin and Loralai Districts. The Tarins have two main branches, the spin Tarin and tor Tarin. The Panis include both the Musa Kheils of Zhob and the Panis of Sibi. The Shiranis live in close proximity to the Takht-i-Suleman.

THE BALOCHS:

Baloch tradition indicates Alleppo as their country of origin.[11] The latest researchers have arrived at the conclusion that they are Arians. The word Baloch means "nomades" or "wanderers" and is coupled by Ibn Hawkel and others with the work "Koch". Whatever their original habitat, the Baloch had taken up a position in close proximity to Makran early in the Seventh century and many of their tribal names bear the imprints of the localities which they occupied in the Persian Balochistan. Hence they made their way eastwards until in the fifteenth century, we find them settled in Kachhi. The Tribes of importance are the Marris, Bughties, Buledies, Magassis, Rinds. Of these the Rinds and the Magassis have been enrolled in the ranks of Brahvi Balochs confederacy; but the Marris and the Bughties appear even in the palmiest days of the Ahmed Zai rulers, to have been more or less independent.

RELIGION:

Islam and Hinduism are the only indigenous religions. The spread of Islam in Balochistan probably occurred in the very early days of Islam. In practice the baloch people are lesser religious and are more secular. They have their faith in Islam but not much orientation of the tenets of Islam. There are also the Zikris[12] they are the followers of a Mehdi who is stated to have come from Jaunpur, India, and they believe that the dispensation of the prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) is at an end, while denying many of the doctrines of Islam they have constituted their own Ka'ba at Kohi Murad near Turbat.

OCCUPATIONS:

The majority of the indigenous population are dependent for their livelihood on agriculture, the provision and care of animals

and transport.[13] The Pashtoons and the Balochs cultivate their own land. Some of the Brahvi Balochs dislike agriculture and prefer a pastoral life. Their lands are, therefore, cultivated through tenants who belong to professional agriculture groups. Women take a large part in all occupations, not only have their ordinary household duties to perform but they take flocks to graze, groom the horses, and assist in cultivation.

FOODS:

People generally take their meals twice at midday and in the evening, flesh, milk, cheese in various forms, bread of wheat and Jawar are the chief constituents.[14] People also prepare the flesh in a peculiar form "Landi"[15] in winter from well-fattened sheep and it is liked much. Onion, garlic, potatoes, tomatoes and other stalks are also used as the fresh vegetable. In the coastal regions rice and fish are eaten, while in Makran dates and dried fish form the staple diet of the people.

DRESS:

The Baloch wear a smock reaching to the heals and pleated at the waist, loose drowers and long cotton chawder. His pagri is wound in rolls round his head generally over a small skull cap. The colour is white or as near it as dirt allows. The baloch women's dress resembles those of pashtoon women but in colour generally is red or white.[16]

The Pashtoons wear a loose tunic baggy drawers, a sheet or blanket, Sandals and a Sadri. Their women wear a loose scarlet or dark blue shirt with or without wide drawers and a big chawder on the head.

STYLE OF LIVING:

Mat huts and black blanket tents stretched on poles are the characteristic dwellings of them. They are of various dimensions, some bigger and some smaller but are generally about four feet high. The walls are of matting, home spun blankets or stones laid in the mud.[17] The dwelling is partitioned in the centre by a hurdle, one side of which live the family and on the other the flocks and herds. At the back of the human dwelling are piled the felts and quilts used for bedding. Skins for water and grain are also an important thing for them.

Permanent dwellings are only in those parts where they are required for protection from the climate or where there is much cultivation. The house of a well to do person generally consists of a courtyard with about three or four rooms in a line. Their homes normally face East or South and consist of a store house, and two rooms for the summer and the winter. Outside, in the courtyard, are a kitchen and a stable for the cattle.

MARRIAGE:

In the Marri tribes the marriages take place according to the tenets of Islam, where in the presence of the notables and the nobles, the two spouses enter into an agreement known as **"NIKAH"**.[18] In such agreements, obviously there are two parties the one representing the young lady and the other the young man. In case if the father of the man or the lady has died they are represented by some one else; surely the closest relative, obviously the male relative. The husband enjoys an upper hand over the wife. He has of-course all the legal, social rights over his wife and wife is bound to act upon the dictations of her husband. The woman can see her maternal family only if permitted by the husband not otherwise. Peherson has noted the story of a man who sat outside the house of his sister who was on the death-bed but he was not permitted to see her and she died.

Although the "Marris" like other Muslims can marry four women but it happens seldom that they have two or more than two wives and generally they have one wife. The fathers or the representatives of the two sides sit and negotiate the terms and conditions of the marriage. Here the "LA'B" is also decided, (by LA'B we mean the amount the man pays for the women). Some people decide for the Baksheesh which is considered better than LA'B. Here the guests are entertained with food and the tea, these expenditures are borne by the man.

The traditions of the marriage in the Brahvi Balochs are very interesting. One day before the marriage the women apply the **"Mehndi"** on their hands, this "Mehndi" is also applied on the hands of the man and the lady. This tradition is known as the **"Nakreeze"** (Rasm-e-Hina). The women apply the "Mehndi" one day early so that it must not interfere their other things which they have to do. The Women sing songs, some dance as well. The animals like sheep and goats are altered for the food.

There is also a tradition where the "Pagris" are exchanged among the representatives of the man and the woman and also the guest Sardar. The people also express their joy and happiness by firing and shots; and the host women throw flower and water on the guests, people enjoy it much. The dress for the lady is provided by the man. The man also provides the cosmetics which are of very simple nature like oil, surma and other things. The lady is dressed in the red clothes. After putting one the "RED DRESS" the lady becomes the "WUNI", now she is encircled by the young women and her friends. They do not let the sisters of the man come near the "WUNI". Now the amount "Daspran" is paid to the "Wuni" the bride, which is considered her own property.

Lunch is served in the noon which is also provided by the man. The men also dance to celebrate this festivity, they also enjoy some games like Tug of War, and shooting.

The "Wuni" receives gifts from the guests. In the afternoon the men and women dance separately. Small boys also dance with the women. The Nikah takes place with the recitation of the Holy Quran and the consent is given by both the man and the Lady by saying Yes! Yes! Yes!. After Nikah the salt is brought and both the man and the "Wuni" taste this salt; tasting the salt means peace and happiness in the family. After the tradition of salt, the people gathered at this occasion pray for the peace and success of this new family.[19]

Five days the "Wuni" stays in her mother's tent with her and then she is departed on the sixth day. This Rukhsti is called "DAJ HERAT". Here the "Wuni" is brought in a very gracious way to the new tent which is erected specially for her. Here the sweet rice and other sweets are served on this occasion. In the end a green branch of a tree dipped in the blood of a sheep is planted outside the tent of the "Wuni" by dropping a few drops of blood on the earth.

REFERENCES/NOTES

1. Pottinger, Lt. Henry, *Safarnama-e-Balochistan-o-Sindh,* tr. M. Anwar Rooman, Nisa Traders, 1980, Quetta, p.50

2. Hughes, A.W., *The Country of Balochistan*, Indus Publications, 1977, Karachi, p.2.

3. Pottinger, Lt. Henry, *op. cit*, p.50.

4. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit,* p.26.

5. It is popularly believed that this name Balochistan was given by Nadir Shah, many writers also believe so.

6. Pottinger, Lt. Henry, *op. cit,* p.58.

7. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit,* p.4.

8. Hughes, A.W., *Ibid*, p.31.

9. Hughes, A.W., *Ibid*, p.31.

10. Bajarani, Justice Mir Khuda Bux, *Balochistan Tareekh ke Aina Main*, tr. Saeed Ahmed Rafiq, Nisa Traders, 1980, Quetta, p.456.

11. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit*, p.28.

12. Hughes, A.W., *Ibid*, p.44.

13. Bajarani, Justice Mir Khuda Bux, *op. cit*, p.416.

14. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit,* p.35.

15. Bajarani, Justice Mir Khuda Bux, *op. cit*, p.417

16. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit*, p.34.

17. Floyer, Ernest Ayscoghe, *Unexplored Balochistan*, Nisa Traders, 1979, Quetta, p.65.

18. Hughes, A.W., *op. cit*, p.40.

19. I myself have attended many marriage ceremonies, so I have expressed my observations and experience.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Baloch, Mohammad Sardar Khan, *A Literary History of the Balochies,* Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1977.

2. Floyer, Ernest Ayscoghe, *Unexplored Balochistan*, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1977.

3. Hughes, A.W., *The Country of Balochistan*, Indus Publications, Karachi, 1977.

4. *The Khelat Affairs* (selection from Govt. records), Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1977.

Urdu Books

5. Bajarani, Justice Mir Khuda Bux, *Balochistan Tareekh ke Aina Main*, Urdu tr. Saeed Ahmad Rafiq, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1980.

6. Baloch, Mohammad Sardar Khan, *Baloch Qaom Ki Tareekh*, Urdu tr. M. Anwar Rooman, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1980.

7. Naseer, Gul Khan, *Balochistan Ki Kahani - Shairoon Ki Zubani*, Balochi Academy, Quetta, 1976.

8. Naseer, Gul Khan, *Tareekh Khawaneen Kalat*, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1984.

9. Pottinger, Lt. Henry, *Safarnama-e-Balochistan-o-Sind*, Urdu tr. M. Anwar Rooman, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1980.

10. Qadari, Kamil Al, *Muhamat-e-Balochistan*, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1980.

BOOK REVIEW:

Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy: Essays in Interpretation. By Saeed Shafqat, Lahore: Progressive Publishers (1989). 280 pages.

Saeed Shafqat's volume of previously published articles is an encouraging sign that Pakistani political science is breaking loose from the pre-behavioural historical and constitutional studies which have absorbed its energies. His subtitle, however, is still from the historians' vocabulary.

Postgraduate students of political science in the United States during the period the author studied there became interested anew in public policy analysis because of the Vietnam War, the greatest failure of American foreign policy in a generation. They wanted to investigate who got the country into the disaster and asked how the policy makers had mistakenly assessed its costs relative to anticipated benefits. Next, in the 1970s, the OPEC-induced rise in oil prices caused national, state and city budgetary crises so American legislators began asking of executives more pointed questions about what the public was getting in return for the whole array of entitlements and other costly programs. This scepticism was summed up in the phrase, "how much bang for the buck?"

For political scientists, this meant a shift of attention from the "input" functions (public opinion, parties, elections) of 1960s research to the "outputs" of David Easton's "conversion process" model. Shafqat attempts half of this task for Pakistan: "how does who makes the decisions affect what the political system gets from the process", without addressing the other half: "how much output does the system get per unit of input" from various alternative policies. It may be inherently difficult to do this in a country where so much of the budget is military and secret, but given the well-known proclivity of South Asian public administration to be weak in implementation and follow-up of policy, perhaps the next priority should be more case studies in comparative policy evaluation such as Holly Sims did on agricultural development and Ronald Herring on land reform.

Shafqat's chapters are partly defined by the successive regimes which have ruled Pakistan (1947-58, 1958-69, 1971-77, 1977-88) and partly by subject matter: education (specifically

Pakistan Studies), Islamization, Bureaucracy, business groups and public economic institutions, "reform" (labour, nationalization, agrarian, health and education), and civil-military relations. As should be readily apparent, most of these are not the conventional categories of policy analysis in the West, but in view of the historic significance for Pakistan of its army, civil service and ulema, it is understandable that the author feels constrained to devote chapters to each. What is lacking, however, is a serious consideration of Islam as an alternative source of truly indigenous methods of accomplishing policy (e.g. zakaat, hudood, interest-free banking) as well as of values in terms of which to evaluate policy implementation. In short, this is a thoroughly modernist book and perspective in which Islamization appears either as a manipulated ideology or as an impediment to rational (i.e. Western) policy, with no recognition of the manifest failures of Sixties "developmentalism" and "modernization Theory" in all three "worlds": First, Second and Third. One could have hoped too that the author would have tried, at least in introduction and conclusion, to relate his findings about Pakistan, insightful as they are, explicitly to comparative policy studies either at the level of South Asia, the whole "developing world" or worldwide. Finally, this otherwise stimulating volume lacks an index.

Theodore P. Wright, Jr.
Fulbright Visiting Professor,
Government College
Lahore

***Muashrati Tahquiq (Social Research)*, by Mirza Mohammad Ahmed, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1989, pages 239, price Rs. 200/-.**

Muashrati Tahquiq is one of the latest books on research methods in Social research written in Urdu especially for the convenience of Pakistani students. The book is written to meet the academic needs of research courses given to the students of research especially in the disciplines of Pol. Sc., Sociology, Psychology, Economics and Education etc. It spreads over three parts namely Research Methods, Research Techniques and Social Statistics. The first part deals with research methods and includes such topics as, various types of research, concepts and variables, hypotheses, and library work. The treatment of each topic is so designed as to generate and promote basic understanding in research. The second part includes basic research techniques namely sampling and sampling techniques, techniques of data collection such as participant observation, Interviews and Questionnaires. Special attention is also devoted to the construction and use of Interview Guides, Interview Schedules and Questionnaires. The third part of the book which is based on Social Statistics offers guidance in Tabulation Work and Graphic Presentation of Data. This part also covers the basic concepts and calculations of Ratios & Proportions, Percentages and measures of Central Tendency of Data, such as arithmetic mean, median and mode.

Thus in my view this book not only offers a good comprehension on Research Methodology but also caters all the academic and technical requirements of independent researcher. Written in Urdu, it may also prove more helpful in promoting research in Pakistan.

Mehdi Raza Beg
Govt. College,
Lahore.

CONTRIBUTORS

1. Dr. Mohammed Sarwar, Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.

2. Dr. Celestine O. Bassey, Department of Political Science, University of Calabar, Nigeria.

3. Dr. Theodore P. Wright Jr. Fulbright Professor at Government College, Lahore, Professor, Department of Political Science, New York State University at Albany, U.S.A.

4. Dr. Mrs. Hina Qamber, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Islamia University, Bahawalpur.

5. Dr. Syed Humayun, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Karachi, Karachi.

6. Mohammed Abuzar Wajidi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Karachi University, Karachi.

7. Nadir Bukhat, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Balochistan University, Quetta.

8. Mehdi Raza Beg, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore.