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PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY : SOME IDEOLOGICAL STRANDS

Khalid Javed Makhdoom, Tariq Hussain Tariq

Pakistan did not emerge just accidentally as a consequence of partition in 1947. Instead, it had a strong ideological base traceable especially as back as in the Mughal (Muslim) period followed by alien British dominance. Since partition was the culmination of the Muslim opposition to the Hindu myth of secular unity, idealism in Pakistan's ideology was Islamic which stemmed primarily from its 'Two-Nation' theory. and since Pakistan had to confront hostile India soon after its independence, realism in Pakistan's ideology was resistance to all sorts of threats to its security and stability even by seeking foreign assistance.¹

As such, the fundamental problem of Pakistan since 1947 was national survival. The leadership right from the beginning attempted consciously or unconsciously to sort out at least some solutions to that problem in the light of Islamic ideology. An objective assessment of this hypothesis requires us to review Pakistan's foreign policy dimensions with reference to its geopolitical position.

In the global framework, Pakistan is virtually

between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, while horizontally between India and the Middle East. Hence, Pakistan is in the neighbourhood of the two most populous Communist powers of the world, China and the Soviet Union ; and three major regional power——China, India, and Iran (especially of the pre-Khumini period).² Since its Northern coast provides access to the oil-rich Middle-East, Karachi is the only outlet to large parts of landlocked Asiatic Russia, Afghanistan and China. Before the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, it could also be located as a member of East Asia with East Pakistan easily accessible to China through the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).³

Another discernible aspect is that the British defence strategy in India before 1947 was in favour of 'buffer state' formation. For instance, Britain supported Afghanistan, and Tibet to retain their independence against China and the Soviet Union. It, then, also allowed the inner layers of tribal belts on both North-Eastern and North-Western frontiers——such as Nepal, Sikkim and Bhuttan, as well as the North-Western tribal regions of Pakistan——to serve as a bulwark against any possible threat from China and Russia.⁴

But the British withdrawal in 1947 made both Pakistan and India vulnerable to the North. Whereas, the historic land routes to the sub-continent, mainly located in the North-West, further indicated the strategic location of (West) Pakistan in terms of defence of the whole region, A strong

Pakistan was, therefore, in the best interest of India as well, suggesting the two countries' mutual interdependence for regional security.⁵

Realizing the strategic importance of Pakistan, its leaders had over since the freedom movement proposed a joint Indo-Pakistan defence. For example, in response to the Hindu fears that the creation of Pakistan would mean revival of Muslim empire to Hindu detriment, Quaid-e-Azam suggested as early as in 1940 that Pakistan would guard the Northern frontiers while India should look after the South and Western parts of the subcontinent. In his opinion, the foreign rulers would rule over Pakistan first to rule over India. He, therefore, recommended to the proposed states of Pakistan and India to join hands in defence after independence and say to the world: "Hands off India"⁶ This outlook persisted in Quaid-e-Azam's thinking. Even after independence, he stressed the need of Indo-Pakistan mutual cooperation for defence on land and sea.⁷

Unluckily, this dream of Quaid-e-Azam could not come true when the British withdrawal left behind intricate problems, exposing Pakistan more to foreign threat including those emanating from India. In this respect, transfer of power was greatest of all events which hit Pakistan hard. We should recall that the British had entered into a military agreement, according to which Pakistan had a legitimate right to receive at least one-third and India two-third of the total military hardware

left by the British. This, Pakistan's share comprised of light Infantry Regiments and thirty-four Engineer Corps. Out of thirty-eight vessels of the Royal Indian Navy, Pakistan was allotted sixteen including two frigates and two sloops. Likewise, for Pakistan Air Force, the share stood at two squadrons of the Royal Indian Air Force out of ten.⁸ But the actual share, released later by the hostile Indian government, was not more than 2 percent of Pakistan's legitimate right.⁹ In addition, India also inherited about twenty-six ordinance factories in full running condition, while Pakistan had none.¹⁰

Against this appalling military imbalance, Pakistan inherited almost the entire defence burden in the subcontinent. It included the defence of the North-West 'tribal belt'¹¹, where eighty percent of the Royal Indian army was normally stationed before the British withdrawal.¹² The threat from the North, which the British felt paramount before 1947, was now retained by Afghanistan largely on assumption of the Soviet and Indian support.¹³

Added to it was Pakistan's land exposure to India, four times bigger and much stronger neighbour with which there was a traditional antagonism.¹⁴ The two countries were divided by an artificial boundary drawn at the time of partition.¹⁵ In the absence of natural barriers, according to Roderick Peattie, there was every likelihood of trampling over weaker Pakistan by taking advantage of the pre-existing communicational facilities.¹⁶ When the Indian army really started marching along

the international border as well as in Kashmir,¹⁷ Pakistan confronted an unprecedented challenge. A new front, apart from the one of 800 miles in the North-West, was opened. It was the entire international border in East and West Pakistan, approximately 2,000 miles, plus 500 miles long cease-fire line to defend in Kashmir.¹⁸ Thus, the overall defence burden that Pakistan had to carry was much heavier than that of British India.

Another intricate problem, relevant to defence, was of disorganization in Pakistan's infant armed forces. There was no unit purely Muslim in character at the time of independence. Most of the Muslim units of the Royal Indian armed forces were still stationed in the Far East and the Middle East since the W.W. II. While India, on the contrary, got properly equipped and trained units of Hindu origin like Dogras, Marhattas and Sikhs. Even the administrative units of the Royal forces, located in New Delhi during the British period, fell to India.¹⁹

Weaker Pakistan was, therefore, logically apprehensive of the perceivable threat structure taking shape in the region against its very survival. With the Indian aggression in Hyderabad Daccan, Junagarh and Kashmir, Pakistan was soon left with two options in its foreign policy. Either to yield to the Indian hegemonial pressures; or to evolve some kind of defensive shield both at home and abroad. Pakistan embarked upon the latter proposition. It relied more confidently on Islam as an

ideological shield which did not just distinguish (Muslim) Pakistan from (Hindu) India, but could at the same time attract the whole Muslim world support against India on the principle of Muslim brotherhood. Then, Pakistan also searched abroad a potential great power, having at least some 'ideological proximity',²⁰ for strategic military and economic assistance.

Haply, Pakistan's search for a potential great power soon got direction. The post-World-War II polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union made many nations suspicious of the Soviet Communist designs.²¹ Consequently, they moved closer to the United States which, by virtue of its 3 to 1 margin over the Soviet GNP, emerged as the richest nation and the chief aid giving country of the world.²² Pakistan's adherence to the American bloc was, therefore, consequential predominantly to the post-War bloc formation.

A similar development, though of lesser dimension, was presented by the South Asian regional system. Communist China soon emerged in Pakistan's neighbourhood as an "extra area actor" with growing capacities precipitating its role potentials.²³ Although China did not take long to be involved in the U.S.-Soviet bipolarity, its interests specifically in the region were evidenced by its competition with India on ethnic heritage in South and South-East Asia. For instance, in Malaysia, the Chinese had outnumbered the indigenous Malaysians; in Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, and Sri Lanka, they

had acquired a considerable degree of political significance.²⁴ Similarly, the Indian ethnic identity was no less accountable in the same region. It every sixth Ceylonese was an Indian (approximately 80,000), then every fifteenth individual in Burma was of Indian origin. In Malaysia, the Indian community surpassed many others and stood as the third largest (approximately 700,000). The district of Fiji comprised of 140,000 Indian majority, outnumbering the indigenous Fijis.²⁵

This regional ethnic competition between China and India was indeed of much import for Pakistan. It was a factor which determined the Sino-Indian spheres of influence, sometimes overlapping and sometimes juxtaposed to each other. It was projected more alarmingly when many Indian militant parties like Hindu Mahasabha stressed 'Akhand Bharat', an idealist federation of Indian dominance in the regions of allied faiths of Hinduism and Buddhism. They demanded of their government to materialize the dream of 'Akhand Bharat' by unifying vast areas of Pakistan, Tibet, China, Japan, Thailand, Indo-China, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Nepal :²⁶

In contrast to the Mahasabite claim, the Chinese government published an official map in 1954, showing almost equally vast regions allegedly taken over by the 'imperialist power' from China between 1840-1919 and identified as Chinese areas to be reclaimed. The map include : the Russian

Far East possessions, encircling Sinkiang, Afghanistan and Palmir region near North Kashmir ; Outer Mongolia ; all of North-East Assam ; Ladakh in Eastern Kashmir ; Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan ; Korea ; Vietnam ; Laos and Cambodia ; Thailand ; Malaya ; Singapore ; and, Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean.²⁷

Even though China and India did not lay formal claims on these areas, they were at least conscious of fair treatment and equal rights of their respective residents there.²⁸ However, the impact of the two competing rivals was considerably wide. They demonstrated it in the wake of the Sino-Indian conflict on Tibet in 1959. Hence, China and India emerged during the 1960s as the two potential forces in the periphery of Pakistan, out of which China prevailed by defeating its rival in the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

In any case, Pakistan presented a remarkable contrast in the Sino-India conflict on regional ethnicism. Unlike Sri Lanka or Burma, for example, it was carved out of the Indian subcontinent as a result of the prolonged Hindu-Muslim distrust, Pakistan's creation out of partition, therefore, damaged the Mahasabite ethnic myth on one hand and heightened Indian antagonism on the other. On that account, Pakistan could hardly contemplate its future in the many Indians' cherished 'area of peace'.²⁹ The more suitable choice for it was to resist Indian hegemony and accept Chinese cordiality.

Pakistan's geopolitical position, as such, inevitably influenced its foreign policy design. Its proximity to the three Asian powers : India, China and the Soviet Union, consequently minimized the chance of its real neutrality in world politics. India was persistently hostile to Pakistan ; whereas China, and the Soviet Union, although physically dominating in the region, were ideologically far away from this country. In the global context, therefore, Pakistan stood exposed to the inter-bloc rivalries much because of India. The strained Indo-Pakistan relation of the early phase not just made that hostile neighbour the pivot in Pakistan's foreign policy, but also drove it away from the Soviet Union and closer to the Western bloc. China could be found in between the two blocs for its valued friendship with Pakistan, though with lesser material importance because of its minimal aid-giving capability.

Hence, ever since its inception, Pakistan has has acquired three fundamental ideological strands in its foreign policy. First, it worked for Muslim world's solidarity. The purpose was many-fold : to project Pakistan's earnest desire for the formation of an Islamic bloc (Pan-Islamism); to secure Muslim world's support for the ideological dispute on Kashmir ; and, to prove that (Muslim) Pakistan was a nation different from (Hindu) India because of the Islamic personality. Second, Pakistan developed closer relations with the Western great powers. The underlying objective was to seek

strategic assistance in the fields of defence and economic development from such a super power (the United States) with which it had no ideological conflict vis-a-vis approach towards Communism. And third, by adhering to the West, Pakistan also sought deterrence against enemy India: ever since the ideological Two-Nation theory suggested that any threat posed by (Hindu) India must be resisted for Pakistan's survival; and that Muslim-Kashmir should be a part of Muslim-Pakistan, it was unjustly occupied by India. In this pursuit of seeking deterrence against India, Pakistan could even rely on Communist China which maintained traditional friendship, as opposed to the Soviet Union and expressed no ideological threat.

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HEGEL AND MARX: MUTUAL CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP*

Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary

To understand Marxist philosophy one must understand its major philosophical foundation: Hegelian thought, particularly the dialectic. While Marx has been accused of having turned the philosophy of Hegel "on its head", he himself admits of having stood Hegelian dialectic "on its feet."¹ Given the importance of Hegel's influence on Marx, it is necessary to understand the former's philosophy before dealing with the philosophy of the latter.

I. The Philosophy of Hegel

Our relatively distinct but indirectly interrelated aspect comprise Hegelian philosophy: a philosophical method (*The Science and Logic*), a phenomenology (*The Phenomenology of the Spirit*), and a political philosophy (*Philosophy of Right and Law*.)

The underlying singular principle in all Hegelian thought is the nature of reality.² Spirit (Geist) is the chief metaphysical assumption which is the prime mover of history which alone can realise the

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absolute idea. Hegelian phenomenology is the study of the alienation and consciousness of the spirit——it creates the world and realises itself through recognition of the world.

Hegel's epistemological assumptions reject traditional logic which posits that a split exists between subject (realm of being) and subject (realm of thought). There is a unity between object "(thing for itself)" and subject (thing in itself) and reality is found, not in the phenomenal but, noumenal world, Hegel says. Therefore, to study modes of pure thought is to progress towards reality.

(A) Hegel's dialect takes place only in the realm of thought because thought is the true reality.³ He himself says that his logic can be understood as "the realm of pure thought⁴: The central assumption of the dialectic is that every idea gives rise to its own negation, that every idea contradicts itself. The basic components of Hegel's thought are Being (thesis). Non-Being (antithesis), and Becoming (synthesis). As a matter of course, a tension between Being and Non-Being builds up into a critical level and both are sublimated into a synthesis (Becoming). This is the Negation of the Negation, the union of the opposite. "Aufheben" (to cancel", "to preserve", or "to lift,") is the word Hegel uses for this process. The synthesis (Becoming) in turns becomes a new thesis (Being), and the entire process begins again. This process of self-contradiction, to Hegelian dialectic, is the motor

force of history. The state of sublimation is the stage of "reason"—all opposed characteristics are reconciled in a new mode of thought.

(B) Hegelian philosophy of history is the dialectical interpretation of history. The spirit (geist), which creates the world is not aware that the world is a part of itself, and it is alienated from the world and, hence, itself. The spirit appears as thesis, the world as antithesis (the negation of the spirit). World history is the reflection of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis process and sublimation of the spirit occurs when the spirit realises that nature (the world) is part of itself, subject (spirit) and object (world) are joined, and the spirit is "twice born".

(C) Hegel's phenomenology pervades all of his philosophy which explains how spirit and man can obtain real freedom through a dialectical process of awareness. The first stage is the realm of bare sensation, of phenomenal existence. The second stage is the development of the distinction between subject and object. The spirit (and the individual) distinguishes between self and the external world. Finally, in the stage of reason, self comprehends the external world as his own.

(D) The fourth major aspect of Hegelian philosophy is Hegel's political philosophy which centres on the state. The state consists of three components: civil society, political state, and ethical community. Civil society is the realm of egoism.

which includes most of the economic activities. Ethical community is the real of altruism. Political state is the supreme political authority, it fuses (synthesises) civil society and ethical community so that private interests become synonymous with the public good.⁵ According to Hegel, the state uses its political authority in order to actualise freedom.

II. Critique of Hegel

Hegel's dialectic, and his application of this method to the understanding of history, present the best and the worst aspects of his philosophical system. His metaphysical motion of the spirit as the prime mover of history injects an element of teleology into the dialectic. History is moving towards some goal. The dialectic in a perpetual motion machine it finishes on sublimation (one end) only to begin again. Hegel's dialectic is overflowing with potential but he does not make use of it—— he does not develop the "material" aspect of it.

The application of dialectic to the interpretation of history is a second major advancement of Hegel, and again he does not develop its practical, humanistic potential. The spirit has been assigned every role. Man is only an instrument in the spirit's self-consciousness.

In short, Hegel's philosophy provides with a group of radically new concepts whose practical potential is not fully developed. He provides one

with the dialectic, phenomenology and the dialectical interpretation of history yet he gives no idea as to how to exploit these concepts for the development of man.⁶

THE MARXIST CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE

1. Feuerbach

Between Hegel and Marx there is an important name Feuerbach, who re-directed Hegelian philosophy. In fact, Marxian criticism of Hegel cannot be understood without studying Feuerbach.

In the *Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach applies Hegelian dialectic to the material world which is absolutely un-Hegelian. He states, "I do not generate the object from the thought but the thought from the object" ?

For Feuerbach man's superiority over other forms of life is due to

- (i) His ability to contemplate and :
- (ii) His consciousness of I-Thou relationship. Yet the tragedy besieging him is that he has placed himself under a delusive canopy of divine superiority despite the fact that it's God who is man's creation and not vice versa. This misunderstanding has damaged him to the extent of alienation. Religion cannot restore him what he has lost because it is itself an implementation of divine superiority over him. Feuerbach,

however, influenced Marx in the latter's rejection of the Hegelian conception that thought precedes (and creates) the material world. Yet, there is a difference after all. Whereas Feuerbach gives credence to senses in the perception of the material world, Marx focuses on the world of social relations influencing (and influenced by) man who has the ability to change the world.

Both Feuerbach and Marx agree that an end to man's alienation begets freedom. Marx analyses the theme of alienation more humanistically and concludes that man's worth becomes the cause of his alienation in a capitalist society. That worth (or value) is his labour. He feels alienated in a capitalist society because his labour does not benefit him but the capitalist whose social role is that of a perfect exploiter.⁶

This situation leads to another proposition ; how to attain human emancipation ? Unlike Hegel and Feuerbach Marx evolves his own dialectic—a union of theory and practice—to cope with problem. He strongly stresses man's action for the attainment of emancipation. Here he makes a qualification : he is not in favour of political emancipation—hence political revolutions—because it divides society between state and civil society. Human emancipation can come about only when man becomes aware of his species-nature, when he

has transcended his individualism and egoism. This means an end to private property.

Marx's Materialist Interpretation of History

Marx's Interpretation of history is purely a study of human history. He begins with the assumption that reality stems from the material world and that consciousness is determined by life and not vice versa. History, he says, develops because of man's productive capacities, production initially goes to satisfy the basic human needs (the first historical act) only to give way to new needs to be fulfilled as such (a dialectical process). To satisfy these needs, men enter into social relations in which the individual's role is determined by the division of labour. Since the division of labour forces people to specialise in a particular type of productive activity, it establishes the base for some people to gain power over others.

The division between mental and manual labour is very significant with Marx because it establishes a foundation for a two-fold class division, society is then divided into the class which does not physically labour. The class relying upon mental "labour" is able to control superstructure and to perpetuate the class division of society.⁹

According to Marx, the study of history can be accomplished by looking at the interactions of three forces :

- (i) The material productive forces (geography, technology, and labour).

- (ii) The relations of production (class relations, which are synonymous with property relation), and
- (iii) Superstructure (the realm of politics, religion, education, culture, philosophy, ethics, of all non-economic institutions in the society).

Yet, a distinction should always be made however interesting the superstructure may be, it's the structure of society (the mode of production) that determines the life of men.

In fact, Marx's theory of history can be interpreted as containing two dialectical relationships : the first existing within the mode of production, between the relations of productive forces. The *Thesis* of this dialectic are the feudal relations of production, the *antithesis* consists of the material productive forces of capitalism, and the synthesis is the new mode of production : capitalism.

Marx's Critique of Capitalism

Marx's criticism of capitalism is humanistic in the sense that he condemns it for what it does to human beings. He rejects the classical economic contention that work is a sacrifice——a negative thing. Rather, he asserts that work is a positive, creative activity. For Marx, capitalism is contrary to everything man should be. Yet it is a historical necessity in order for human freedom to be possible.¹⁰

Marx's ambivalent approach to capitalism, his view of it as both necessary and evil raises the

question of why something that is detrimental to man's realisation of his nature is a historical necessity. Marx deals with this contradiction by injecting an element of teleology. Capitalism, he argues, is necessary because it leads to a higher goal: communism. Communism is the realm of human freedom and man's realisation of his species-nature.

According to Marx, there are features of Capitalism :

- (i) Commodity production.
- (ii) Wage labour.
- (iii) Surplus value.

Commodity production is indicative of the pronounced division of labour under capitalism. Marx distinguishes between a product and a commodity. The former has only use-value while the latter both use-value and exchange-value.

In wage labour Marx discusses how the workers sell their labour power to the capitalist, and this labour-power itself becomes a commodity. Besides being exploited in a purely material sense, the worker experiences increasing alienation. Labour is supposed to be a creative and fulfilling activity for man, but wage labour becomes pure drudgery. The expansion of wage labour throughout the economy leads to commodity fetishism. Commodities that are produced by human labour become impersonal entities that are viewed as separate from social relations that produced them. The money from (exchange value) that these goods take on obscures

the human character of the labour that produced them. Men see the products of their labour as something alien to them, and their alienation increases.

Surplus value is that part of the proletarian's labour that is accumulated by the capitalist. In the capitalist production process, goods are sold for their exchange value. However, labour is paid only the amount required for subsistence. The difference between the exchange price of a good and the subsistence wage of the labour is the surplus value. Surplus value gives the impression that capital itself is earning money—is producing—when all that it is really doing is appropriating value that was produced by wage labour. Surplus value becomes the capitalist's profit; some of it goes for his personal consumption of commodities, the rest is reinvested and becomes accumulated capital.

Given the macabre conditions of labourers during the contemporary capitalism Marx concluded that capitalism contained the seeds of self-destruction. He says that the more productive capital and the application of machinery expands, the more competition among workers expands and the more wages contract. This will increase the misery of workers, and they will be ready for revolution.

The State, Revolution, and Communist Society

Since the state depends for its existence upon the distinction between the public (political) and

private (civil society, egoism) sphere, Marx argues that the state is only a temporary phenomenon. It arose in the later stages of feudalism when the distinction between public and private sphere arose. It arose because of the rise in private economic activity, and the distinction between public and private spheres was accompanied by the distinction between mental and manual labour and the split between town and country. Marx says that the state will disappear when public and private interests are again merged into community interest.

Marx's theory of revolution proceeds in a dialectical manner. First, the material preconditions for revolution must exist. Capitalism must have matured. The first stage of revolution overthrow and destroys the bourgeois state. Now, it becomes a proletarian state as distinct from the bourgeois state.

The second stage of revolution occurs when the proletariat takes over the state apparatus and establishes a dictatorship, but one by the proletariat. It is not a conventional dictatorship, but one by the proletariat against the bourgeois. The state is used to abolish the relations of production and the division of labour which means elimination of the classes themselves. When there is no class, the state itself becomes an anachronism. The third, and final, stage of revolution comes when the state itself will disappear.

This process of revolution is dialectical. The

bourgeois state is the thesis which is negated by the proletariat (antithesis): the entire process is sublimated through the establishment of communism (synthesis),

As regards the communist society, Marx says that the communist society will use the wealth created by capitalism as a base from which to progress, and this expropriated capital will furnish an abundance of wealth. History—in that it is shaped by changing modes of production—will end.

The key to the nature of communist society can be found in Marx's view of human nature. With the establishment of communist society, man will be free to explore completely the potentialities inherent in his nature. He will at last be transported from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. With the creation of a new man and with the synthesising of public and private spheres, man the species is free to make his own history and man the individual is able to explore his full potential.

Marxism Since Marx

If it can be assumed that history moves by a dialectical process (as Marx argued), then it can also be assumed that the contradictions within any single phase is sublimated into a new era. If this were true, then observers of society would be most likely to become aware of the old contradictions just as the new phase was beginning.¹¹

It appears that Marx (and Lenin, for that matter) was writing an analysis of capitalism at a time when this mode of production was changing gears, was sublimating itself into a *newer* phase of capitalism. If one accepts this to be the case, then one must argue that Marx and Lenin cannot be taken as unquestioned sources on the future of capitalism. They were both writing at a time when capitalism was in transition. Marx did an excellent job (and Lenin, an adequate one) of explaining the *past* development of capitalism, but their predictions concerning the future development of capitalist mode of production were obviously wrong. (All of this would seem to support Hegel's argument that philosophers can be nothing more than "the owl of Minerva flying at dusk").

But how has capitalism changed? There have been two major transitions in capitalism—one domestic and one international. Both have been effected with the help of the bourgeois state. When Marx wrote he noted the tendency for wages so remain at the subsistence level and for unemployment to increase. He saw the misery of the worker steadily increasing. However, since the 1860's there has been a general trend in the Western industrial countries for wages to increase and for unemployment to decrease. This trend towards greater material prosperity of workers seems to contradict Marx's predictions.

The second major transition in capitalism has

been its imperialistic expansion. Although there was some internationalization of capitalism before Marx's time (his notion of "big industry" talks about a type of international capital), the expansion of the capitalist countries changed abruptly with the "New Imperialism" of the 1870's. Between 1870 and 1914, the countries of Western Europe expanded colonially in Africa (and neo-colonially into Asia and Latin America). The United States, a nascent industrial power, also began its extra-continental expansion during this period.

Both of these transitions were aided (if not instigated) by the bourgeois state. Legislations appeared which shortened the work week, increased wages,, and eventually redistributed power downward to a middle "class". The state was also the mechanism for the colonial ventures of the European countries (and the U. S). The state was not responsible directly for the changes in capitalism. It was not directly responsible for the increase in wages and the decrease in unemployment. Indirectly, however, it has significant impacts. By limiting the working day to ten and later to eight hours, the state effectively increased the wage of workers. (If we assume that the worker will be paid a subsistence wage regardless of how long he works, then decreasing the work day effectively raised the hourly wage and decreased surplus value—i.e., profits). In addition, the legislation prohibiting child labour and limiting female labour had the effect of eliminating most

children and some women from the labor force. The job openings created by this elimination absorbed a large portion of adult male unemployment in the labor force. These laws also worked to raise the wage level because the wage rates paid to adult males were substantially higher than those paid to women and children. This was due to the widespread belief that the cost of substitutes for a woman (or a child) was less than that for a man.

Other changes in the structure of capitalist society have also taken place. Unionization of labor, for example, has greatly enlarged the bargaining power of many workers. Higher wages among unionized workers served to increase manufacturing wages in general, and this transferred consumption power downward to the middle strata of capitalist society. This downward re-distribution of income helped to get capitalist society out of the overproduction/underconsumption rut by increasing consumption dramatically. With the increasing productivity of labor in manufacturing (owing to the rising organic composition of capital) manufacturing jobs would tend to decline, as Marx had predicted. Occurring at the same time, however, was the rise of the service sector as an area of employment. This sector has absorbed a progressively large part of the labor force in capitalist society. The state has been a major employer in this sector.

One can properly understand the role of the state in altering the structure of capitalism only if

one views the bourgeois state as a semi-autonomous entity. Lenin seemed to feel that the bourgeois state was in the hip pocket of the capitalists (particularly the finance capitalists). If this had been the case, capitalism may not have survived. The bourgeois state sought to preserve capitalism as a system, but not to save or obey individual capitalists. By using its power to transfer consumption power downward and to take symbolic actions against business (e.g., anti-trust policies), the state has used a palliative to :

1. Keep the contradictions of capitalism from reaching a critical level and
2. Keep people from gaining consciousness of their alienation and exploitation.

It has created a society of community fetishists. This can be interpreted in two senses. First, in Marx's sense, people no longer see the human component (i.e., labor) in the commodities that they purchase. Second, in a coarser sense, people are commodity fetishists because they live to consume commodities, not to create. Indicative of this is the newest trend in American pseudo-radicalism; consumerism. This movement emphasizes the quality of products (an admirable goal) rather than the fulfillment inherent in the *act of production*. Trade unionism is also directed at the consumption end of the production process. Its purpose is to increase the consumption power and leisure time of its constituents, but not to increase their fulfillment as producers.

The ideational superstructure in general has been effective in spreading the belief that the goal of production is consumption. (It would be intellectually shallow and overly simplistic to argue that this is a conscious conspiracy). While working to live men now also work to have leisure ; yet very seldom do they live to work. This emphasis on consumption, this widespread view that work is an instrumental and not a fundamental goal, has meant that alienation does not produce consciousness and revolution—it produces malaise. Instead of bringing revolution, alienation leads to ulcers, to suicide, spouse and child beating, to mental depression, to worker sabotage of plants, to alcoholism, to bureaucratic impersonality and hostility, etc. Alienation is internalized and individualized. The state has responded well to (and has thus reinforced) this internalization of alienation. It has created hospitals, mental institutions, welfare bureaus, and universities to treat the individual symptoms of a social disease.

All of this leads to the following question : How fundamentality has capitalism changed since Marx's time ? The answer is disheartening. Capitalism has been changed to the extent that a middle "class" of consumers has been created (while at the same time this and the lower classes have no real power—political or economic). In developed countries, the state guarantees a minimum consumption standard for its population, and the mechanisms of this minimum standard (i.e., the welfare

bureaucracies) tend to cement the lower classes where they are. The material burdens of exploitation (which, to an extent, have been lifted from most of the populations of developed countries) have been forced upon the developing countries of the world through the mechanisms of colonial and neo-colonial imperialism. The exploited classes see the individual and not the social nature of their exploitation and alienation.

Capitalists themselves have, since before the time of Lenin, seen the merits of oligopoly and the catastrophic effects of real competition (Marx had an unwarranted faith in capitalist competition). For the most part, they have decided to avoid price competition and to restrict their 'competitive drive' to the senseless babble of mass media advertising. Capitalism, with most of its ill effects, continues. However, the contradictions inherent in capitalism have not risen to anywhere near a critical level. The developed capitalist states have been primarily responsible for holding these contradictions within limits. What remains to be seen is whether this new phase of capitalism represents a freezing or merely a sedating of the contradictions of capitalist production.

If Marx was such a poor predictor of the future of capitalism, then why should one pay attention to him at all? The answer depends upon what one is searching for intellectually. Does one seek predictive capability or explanation and understanding?

As a predictor of the wage rate of European industrial workers, Marx was probably surpassed by the analysts of sunspots. However, sunspots explain for us nothing about how societies have developed and about how to study them. Marx has given us a framework for studying not simply capitalism as it developed in Western Europe, but also an approach for studying societies that are non-European and are on pre-or a-capitalist planes of development. Marx's framework is a dynamic, one not a dogmatic one. He greatly feared dogmatism, the static view of the world, because he knew that different societies developed in different ways. This fear of dogmatism led him to declare : "I am not a Marxist".

A more revealing statement about Marxism was made by Schumpeter :

Things economic and social move by their own momentum and the ensuing situations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain way whatever they wish to do——not indeed by destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing the list of possibilities from which to choose. If this be the quintessence of Marxism then we all of us have got to be Marxists.¹²

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HOBBS THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT OR THE CIVIC VISION

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"Nobody knows when the middle ages ended and the new era began."¹

Twelfth century is considered as medieval in the history of political thought, while sixteenth century is supposed to be modern or early modern. Then intervening time is, by no means, blank or without some secular, institutional or intellectual development. Some development must have been taken place. However, whatever emerges out of the sixteenth century, is, in all respects, something new and different. It was the century when we find more order and unity in political thought. But now the political thinker have common focus of attention, namely the modern sovereign state.

"Since antiquity till now, the phenomenon of the state has always been the quest of social philosophy, but the great philosopher (for example Aristotle) could not describe the complete identification of society and state."²

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However the phenomenon of state firstly drew the attention of the European thinkers, as they were the real observers of such phenomenon, Karl Marx pointed that :

“Hobbes, Spinoza and some others viewed state by human eyes and drew its laws from reason and experience, and not from theology.”³

So the philosophers of all the times have always been trying to answer the question ; What is the state ?

For example, Plato assumed that we have a word like state, and it must be organized according to the real sense of the word. There must be the entity of the word. Hobbes, however, like a true radical nominalist, and unlike many other philosopher, is not concerned with sociological enquiry.

Traditionally, there are two views about society. From one point of view, society is prior to individual, as it is assumed by Aristotle. The second view point is about the primacy of the individual. Hobbes is in favour of second.

Hobbes writes : that men are not, by nature, political, unlike bees and ants. They have their individual thinking and individual desires. They have individual good, that, certainly, conflict with the common good. They do not agree simply. They can disagree on certain matters. They can originate disagreements by discussion. Men only agree by covenant.⁴

This is how Hobbes state emerges by covenant. He stresses that people can only unite through a contract. Agreement or covenant is a real source of relationship between men, these are conditions of peace.

Part two of "Leviathan", entitled of commonwealth, provide details about Hobbes legacy to the world. To him, men love not only their own liberty, but they also want to dominate other. However, the need is that they must be restrained in both directions. This is the only way they can escape from the miserable condition of "war of all against all", which is the result of their own passions. There must be some visible power to make them.⁵

Hence Hobbes does a great theoretical mistake, not because of his personal limitations, but because of the typical illusion of the era. Social nature, of man was, even, known to Aristotle. His ideas about the social nature of man are almost typical, like Hellenic culture theory. He named man political; that is, social animal. According to Aristotle man, by nature, belongs to organization ("POLIS") and can not live outside of it.

"Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman. . ."⁶

Because of emergence and rapid development of capitalistic relation, and generated by them the

individualism, the character for society (consisting of independent parts of its constituents and formal independent mercenaries) created a new thinking about isolated individuals ; that is, the study of man the basis of everything. With this point of view, it is hard to explain : how and why did men get united in the society and founded state to rule them over ? Why and how did they start to live together ?

Moreover, nominal stand on faith of individual, rather than, on primary and absolute selfdependence was a result of the struggle against religious slavery (as religion in those days, was an absolute power dominating the state), which was initiated by the great political thinker. Hobbes, of course, is one of them. To him, church is a corporation, like other corporation ; and it must be controlled by, and subordinated to the state.

Hobbes wants to construct a society from the collection of individuals. To him, covenants are the only ways of constructing obligation. He writes :

“...law of Nature, which is this, that men perform their Covenants made...”

A commonwealth is constructed :

“...when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the

Right to present the person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative ;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men."⁸

Hobbes' theory of social contract has many typical weak points, which have always been pointed out by a number of philosophers.

M.M. Goldsmith, for example, writes: as it is clear by Hobbes that there is no natural or supernatural authority, then how did the mob of people become a group? How are they able to form a society without some order?."⁹

After the establishment of contract, as F. E. Carritte remarks, there are no obligations among men, either of love or duty. The question arises: how do they keep a covenant among themselves without any obligation one to another? "¹⁰

Hobbes' answer to all that is :

"Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life ; and consequently a Law of Nature."¹¹

To him, covenant always bound to our interest, and no covenant bind contrary to our interest ; as he writes :

“keep or not keep covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to one’s benefit.”¹²

Hobbes’ philosophy is completely based upon human nature, rather than on any tradition or supernatural authority. To him, government is nothing, but greatest reflection on human nature. Hobbes himself admits the fact that :

“Covenant as’ with out the sword are but Words.”¹³

Man can not live peacefully without some coercive power, because, by nature, he is ambitious and rapacious. Passions of men can not be controlled without restraint.

Hobbes, in fact, is a king of logic ; all types of criticism left his position safe and sound. For example he writes ; although mens, passions urge to war, but some of them, like, fear of death, and the desire of peace and commodious living, lead men towards state. Reason suggests men articles of peace (laws of nature). Articles of peace, in fact, establishment of contract is to bind future actions by words ; such bonds have strength.

“...BONDS, by which men are bound and obliged, have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evil consequence upon the rapture.”¹⁴

Before Hobbes theory of social contract, the concept of "Contract" had been considered as the character of liberty as well as rebellion. If the ruler broke the bond, he must be resisted. But Hobbesian theory made it upside down, His contract is a surrender as well as a guarantee. While discussing the causes of rebellion, Hobbes denies that sovereign, in certain case, may be resisted. According to him, if it is permitted, then the door will be open to disorder and disobedience; and as a result of it—the death of commonwealth.

Hobbes stresses that the contract establishes relationship which is based upon justice. This factor, not only, secures the peaceful relationship among the men, but also the existance of state itself. The state the sovereign is responsible of protecting his subjects. The subject and sovereign have no more relationship, as the sovereign fails to protect them.

Hobbes calls his state Leviathan, but the problem is : to hunt Leviathan in such a way that it should explain, clearly, the individuals, relation to it, the conditions which justifies his resisting. These are the burning questions for theory of state to face.

When we compare Hobbes' Leviathan to Plato's Republic, we come to know that, when Plate suggests that state is like an organism, there must be a specialization of function for the common

good, he actually wants to construct a model state for the rejection and counter action against the two growing tendencies of 4th century—equalitarianism and individualism. In a similar way, Hobbes' Leviathan is a state which discusses the problem of its age. These were the problems of two incompatible tendencies—individualism on one hand and absolutism on the other.

Hobbes' philosophy seems to be a combination of individualism and absolutism. He, at a time wants to be the both. Hobbes is hopeful that his theory will be proved, a guide to a ruler, to deal with the contemporary unrest and confusion.

Hobbes' theory of state is logically drawn from his theory of law and morality. The foundation of state is based upon the rational desires of man to achieve self—preservation. Science of state is constructed deductively, like geometry. The desire to achieve security, which man possessed in the state of nature, is perhaps the only reasonable desire of man, which is, not only, responsible of removal of that ridiculous condition' but, also, for the establishment of strong state power. Power should be strong enough, because, if it would not be, then the danger of back to the state of nature is still there."¹⁵

Hobbes stresses, full obligation to the sovereign. His aim is a powerful government--powerful enough to control the ambitious nature of man.

Another reason to erect such a kind of power,
is :

"...as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another..."¹⁶

since such a power

"...is more than Consent, or Concord ; it is a recall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person."¹⁷

Now they are united in one, in the sense that all coming consequences of man's contractual acts are, his own acts. But one can find an impossible gulf between Hobbes' two assertions : firstly—reason directs men to their own good, secondly mans' obligation to obey the sovereign, and all the acts of the sovereign are his own acts. For example, if the sovereign injures any one, it mean the person is injuring himself ; and, by the same argument, if one injures the sovereign, he must be injuring himself. There must be no difference between these injuries.¹⁸

But Hobbes puts his argument in the sense that the sovereign is the result of mens' own voluntary act, since their wills and their voices are united in one person. That is why, all the acts, according to that contract, are the acts of man's own acts.

Here we conclude that, even in the civilized societies men are still living in the condition of state

of nature, as described by Hobbes. Fear and threat are the characteristics of such societies. Men are still living in the condition of fear ; fear of snatching away, not only their properties, but also their lives.

Hobbes' contract theory is much criticized, but all criticism left Hobbes' position unthreatened. Critics doubt the fact of such kind of contract. According to them, there is no need for it to be made, or if it is made, it must be a contract in the sense of the contract, because, otherwise, it makes the makers, children.¹⁹

According to these critics Hobbes escapes from the aspect of hypothetical character and natural conditions and the way out of it.

Hobbes, in fact, is trying to convince his own contemporaries to acknowledge full obligation to sovereign. The message, to countrymen, civilized men-are those who are not living in the state of nature. His message to them is : unless the full obligation, they are in constant danger of going back to the state of nature. They should and they must acknowledge full obligations to the sovereign for their own self interest.²⁰

Hobbes message is, the message of obligation, the message of peace. His main problem is not contract, he is not stressing on the contract, but on full obligation. His addressed man is the man living in a society torn by civil wars. His message

is for a man, who is living in an imperfect society- the society which can not guarantee him the security of life and commodious living. What Hobbes says, he, really, means it. The only solution, for a crashed society by civil war, to establish a perfect society, powerful enough to guarantee them peace as well as peceful life.

Thus, from the political system, suggested by Hobbes, it may be concluded that, it, almost, depends upon the postulate, of, what he himself thinks about it and not what it ought to be. His reader feel disappointed when he does not find, in his philosophy, the answer of the main problems like : what type of charrceter, political order should play ? How can it be ideally constructed ? What type of political life of an individual should be ? Hobbes is hardly concerned with these matters. He always stresses on the human nature that is, what mans' nature is and what not. He fails to give any solution to the question what it should be. His major concern is : How should the state be constructed and how should politics be conducted ?

He focused his attention on the begining of the state, rather on the other important matters of its existence. But, as it is proved by experience, human beings have never been without social control: Societies can not remain without certain form of social direction. They change, gradually, from one form of social authority to another. Man, by nature, it a social animal. He has a natural tendency towards society. He can not

fulfil his desires without it. Law of nature and reason can not be, the alternatives of the society. Man alone is not self-sufficient ; and that is the only cause of society, Government and laws.

Hobbes, in fact, draws a very dark picture of human nature. But the question is does this picture confirm his pessimistic ideas or not ? His main proposition is, that people are worried about their security, and the fear of death is the first motive of their behaviour.

No doubt, safety of life, is a valuable service assigned by the Government, but, as Aristotle points out, that Government must provide necessary environments, to citizens for happy and good life.

As far as Hobbes' second postulate is concerned that is, fear of death is a universal character, we can not deny, because, even till now, man is afraid of death ; and, of course, this is possible. But this is not true, that acceptance of everything, for a man, is to avoid death. History shows that men can sacrifice their lives to overcome their depressions. They take the risk of their lives in many other cases, for example, in defending their convictions.

Hence Hobbes' concept of social contract, in all respects, is considered to be one sided.

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THE AGITATIONAL POLITICS

Ahmed Husain

A number of independent countries emerged on the world map due to disintegration of British and French Empires after the World War II. The countries had political leaders of national level due to which struggle for independence was consummated successfully. However, the situation changed after independence. There lack of education and parochialism proved to be an impediment in creation of viable political institutions respect for law and public authority.¹ This led to mistrust among politicians and finally took the shape of agitational politics politics based on confrontation rather than dialogue. It has two aspects : Legislative and Public. Sometimes, the political opposition has to use extra-constitutional methods to change unsavoury policies of the Government both inside and outside the legislature. The main reason for this is that the politicians in power create artifical public opinion to perpetuate their rule and thus hoodwink the opposition.

In a legislature the opposition primarily adopts the constitutional process of asking questions to

ventilate the public grievances. It also follows the device of an adjournment motion to check the omissions and commissions of the Governments. When the opposition is numerically small it also uses unconstitutional method to 'Boycott' the session to attract public opinion. The Boycott may be for full session or for a day. For example, the Quaid-i-Azam, President of the Muslim League ditedred the Muslim League Parliamentary group to boycott the first session of the Constitutional Assembly called for December 9, 1946. This drastic decision was taken by a constitutionalist like Quaid-i-Azam because he had dealt with the Congress High Command since 1936 and realised that the parliamentary wing of the Congress would outright oppose the concept of "Two-Nation Theory" the basis of Pakistan. The second example of boycott is by the opposition in the Parliament of Pakistan during the Seventh Amendment Act 1977 passed on May 16, 1977. It provided for a referendum by September 30, if the Prime Minister considered it necessary to obtain a vote of confidence from the people. The same day the Senate also passed the amendment. All this was decided in a day because the opposition had boycotted the amendment proceedings in the Parliament.²

Outside the legislature the political agitation takes shape of demonstrations through public meetings, media and street processions. The nature of demonstration outside the legislature is peaceful as well as violent, depending upon the nature of its

demand and duration. By and large, the political demonstrations start peacefully with three alternate results: Firstly, it fizzles out within a short time due to lack of public response. Secondly, negotiations take place between the Government and Opposition and finally a compromise is reached. Thirdly, the intensity of agitation increases with the passage of time and eventually it becomes a violent movement.

The first example is of the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.) formed in March 1973. The disobedience movement started by the U.D.F. for the restoration of NAP and JUI Governments in the provinces of Frontier and Baluchistan fizzled out due to lack of public support. The second example is of the All India Muslim League's demonstration against the Khizer Government in Punjab. On February 16, 1947, the League's agitation was called off officially after a compromise, with the Punjab Government, about the public meetings and political prisoners. Finally, on March 2, 1947 Khizar Ministry resigned and Governor's rule was imposed in the province.³

The example of the third category of political agitation is the PNA movement started in March 1977. It was composed of nine political parties viz, the Khaksar Tehrik, the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the Kashmir Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat-i-Islami, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, the

National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Muslim League. The movement in the form of street agitation started peacefully but later on it became violent with the increase of public support. The protest was started by PNA against the alleged rigging of March, General Elections by the ruling Pakistan People's Party. The main contention of the PNA leadership was that a number of senior members of the ruling party had misused their political power and used the governmental machinery to win undeserved support from the electorate. On the other hand, the Chairman of Pakistan People's Party and Prime Minister of Pakistan late Z.A. Bhutto denied these allegations in a Press Conference and told that irregularities were made during the elections on both sides *i.e.*, PPP and PNA candidates.

To understand the underlaying purpose in this controversy which later on took a very serious turn and eventually led to Military intervention in Pakistan on July 5, 1977, the role of election, in a developing country has to be understood. In developing countries, elections have different meanings and play different roles in the different political systems. They may be considered variously as devices for legitimacy, identification, integration, participation, socialization, as well as for political choice and political control.⁴

Elections introduce the important element of accountability into a political system, and provide a means by which such, accountability is achieved

in greater or lesser degree. A civil politics is one in which the public interest is served by men accountable to their community and accountability is the process by which political development occurs.⁵

Coming back to the election 1977 and its results, the political agitation started by the PNA was based on twofold idea ; Communication and accountability. The PNA as an alliance of nine political parties had communicated with the voters on their manifesto Nazim-i-Mustafa⁶ and had received tremendous response in the political meetings viz-a-viz conducted by the ruling PPP. Hence, there arose hope of winning majority seats in the election by PNA. Prime Minister's popularity however, was much higher than all the political leaders contesting the election. This he demonstrated in an election procession which he led in Lahore on the eve of March, General Elections. This is only one example of his popularity. Actually where ever he went he was welcomed spontaneously by his crowds.

Later on, when they found that some of their senior members of the Alliance had been defeated by declaration of the election results they wanted accountability for it from the responsible government functionaries. To press their demand, the peaceful agitation was started by the PNA, which the ruling party allowed to precipitate into a political crisis and took an ugly turn and became a violent movement, in which many valuable lives of citizens

of Pakistan were lost. Between March 14 and May 17, 1977, 4653 processions were taken out, including 248 by women 92 by members of the legal profession, 18 by Ulema and 248 by students. Two hundred and forty one citizens belonging to both political parties were killed and 1,195 injured and 13900 locked up in various jails.⁷ Hence the military intervention on July 4, 1977, to save the country from complete destruction. The Military in developing countries has also to play "national" role alongwith its "traditional" role. Because, by and large, political institutions are amorphous in developing countries and there is political intolerance among national leaders. Thus whenever, there arises serious nature of political crisis, the military intervenes to keep the country united. On July 5, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff assumed as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).

Born in Jullunder, in undivided Punjab, in 1924, Zia was commissioned in 1945 from the Royal Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. His group was among the last to be commissioned from the academy before Britain gave independence to India and Pakistan in 1947 and he served in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia at the end of World War II. After 19 years in various staff and command appointments, General Zia, then lieutenant Colonel, was made instructor at the Command and Staff College in Quetta. During 1966-68 he commanded a cavalry regiment and on promotion to Colonel in

1968, was attached to an armoured division. He was made a brigadier a year later and commanded, successfully an armoured brigade, a division, and a corp. A Major General from 1972, he was President of the Military Courts that tried several army and air force officers alleged to have plotted against the Bhutto Government 1972.

Between 1972 and 1975 Zia attended advanced command courses in the U.S. and the U.K., and in April 1975 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. In March 1976 Bhutto who had become Prime Minister in 1973 after stepping down as President, made him Chief of Staff of the Army. He retained that position combining it with that of Chief Martial Law Administrator.

In proclamation issued on July 5, 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator said the Constitution of the Country had not been abrogated but some of its provisions had been suspended. Beside it Fazal Elahi Chaudhry was to continue as Head of the State, while the Chief Martial Law Administrator would be the Head of the Executive.

In a nationwide broadcast on Radio and Television General Zia-ul-Haq declared that he had no political ambitions. "I was obliged to step in to fill the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have accepted this challenge as a true soldier of Islam". His sole aim was to organize free and fair elections and hoped that political parties would cooperate with him in this task. He lauded the spirit

of Islam demonstrated by the recent movement launched by the PNA. He said, "it proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of the Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country."⁸

There were three main point which were emphasised by the Chief Martial Law Administrator about military intervention in July 1977. First that it was due to the failure of the democratic system that the military had to intervene. Democracy works through political parties. The ruling party and the opposition has to share responsibility about the National Political issues. However, if there is a political catastrophe the Military has to intervene and control the civil Administration. Since the French Revolution of 1789 the Military as an institution has become national oriented due to two factors. The mercenary aspect of the Military became outdated and the military officers were also recruited from the middle class. Secondly, he declared that the Military had to play the role of a referee and had to conduct fair and impartial elections without being partisan after-which the soldiers would go back to the barracks. There was already example of fair and impartial elections conducted by the Military regime under late President General Yahya Khan in 1970. The only snag about the results of that election was that it brought on top the Awami League in East Pakistan and the PPP in West Pakistan which eventually resulted in

dismemberment of Pakistan by secession of East Pakistan. The Election was conducted for integration of two wings of the country, but unfortunately the opposite of it happened as aftermath of the election.

Thirdly, Islam formed the Ideology of Pakistan and no stone would be left unturned for its propagation and implementation. These were the three main points on which the Zia regime laid stress.

Thus to fulfill his pledge to hold early elections the CMLA appointed on July 15, Justice Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain acting Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, Chairman of the High Powered committee to prepare election laws alongwith this he also had to perform the responsibilities of the Chief Election Commissioner.

The elections are conducted by a large number of persons working under the Election Commission. Much depends upon their efficiency and impartiality. To have neutral personnel to conduct the elections it was decided to appoint the Election Staff from the defence forces and the judiciary. It was also decided to ensure that the election rules provided maximum safeguards against electoral malpractices. A code of conduct was also drawn up to ensure that elections were conducted impartially. So that it should be a fillip for political maturity of the electorate. As we have seen elsewhere elections also provide for an opportunity to have accountability of the elected representatives.

To enable the electorate to have full confidence in their elected representatives and to have no doubts about their accountability, a Martial Law Order was issued which required all candidates for the October polls to declare their assets and liabilities as in 1970 Election. The candidates who had previously held public office were also asked to give details of their assets which they amassed during the period of their political influence.

To fulfil his comitment, the CMLA fixed October 18, as the election day. Both the PPP and the PNA started preparing for the forthcoming elections. The way in which the opposition had started political agitations against the ruling people's party of late Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto in March 1977. The election campaign logically had to be vociferious and acrimonious. The PPP leadership was confident that with nationwide organisation of the Party and impartial election machinery the party was bound to succeed at the polls. It was a mass party and it had a large number of political workers for example to work as polling agents and to conduct corner meetings for party candidates. The PNA had no such organisation. Because the nine parties forming the Alliance had primarily come together for the election purpose alone. Before, there was the COP formed by five oppositipn parties in 1965 Presidential election. It was an election alliance alone. Thus PNA was handicapped in this respect viz-a-viz the PPP.

Secondly, late Z.A. Bhutto had a charismatic personality in which there were a few political leaders in the third world to match. All these factors made the PNA leadership to lay emphasis on accountability prior to elections. So that they should get some political benefit of Nazim-i-Mustafa campaign launched by them during the previous election. With this factor and a number of others in view on October 1, General Zia-ul-Haq announced the postponement of the elections until the process of accountability was completed.

We have already seen that the election was postponed partly on demand of the opposition leaders. The following are some of the comments made by the political leaders, belonging to PNA and PPP about the election scheduled for October 18, 1977. The main contention of the PNA leadership was that accountability should precede the election so that offenders of law should be brought to book.

First, to comment about accountability of the political leaders who had been in power was Pir Pagaro, president of Pakistan Muslim League. He demanded on September 20, that the "most important issue was the accountability of former Prime Minister Bhutto and his colleagues and the question of law and order in the country should be settled first and then election should be held".⁹

Second to reiterate the demand made by Pir Pagaro was the PNA Chief, Late Maulana Mufti

Mahmud. According to him, "accountability of former Assembly members and the verdicts of High Courts and the Supreme Court were essential before elections".¹⁰

Third, was Mr. Sherbaz Mazari, President of the National Democratic Party (NDP). According to him there was no harm to postpone the October polls in the interest of the country. However, there must be concrete reasons, to justify postponement of elections.

Fourth was Air Marshal Asghar Khan, President of the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal. He felt that the date of election was not sacrosanct and it would be fair both for the people and the PPP leaders if the cases against them were decided before the elections. The Tehrik chief was, however, thinking of a few days or a few weeks postponement, a slight postponement, as he said, "Alone was the version of the Alliance later on joined the National Government feeling that at this stage political leaders should join the Military regime for the proper consummation of the accountability process. The opposition on the other hand led by the PPP campaigned for the elections to be conducted by the Military regime. Begum Nusrat Bhutto the Acting Chairperson of Pakistan People's Party repeatedly demanded the elections to take place on the schedule date. She opined that an election was an effective process of accountability people would not vote for persons

they reject. Maulana Kausar Niazi, acting Secretary General of the Party, also stressed the need for the polls to be held on schedule.¹¹

The PNA had come into existence on the eve of 1977 elections with a singular purpose to defeat late Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto and oust him from political power. After the indefinite postponement of the elections three component parties of the Alliance broke away from it because they did not find it advantageous politically to remain in it. First to withdraw was the Tehrik, second was NDP and third JUP. The formation of PNA was only for a limited purpose. The other issues were not so convincing to keep the component parties of the Alliance together. First they differed internally and later on differences were spelled out publically. The result of which was that the three parties left the Alliance by the time, the President of the Alliance Mufti Mahmud announced that PNA had decided to join the national government in collaboration with the military with broader national interests in view. These so called national interests were interpreted as self aggrandisement interests of PNA leaders by the leadership of three breakaway parties. There was also schism in the Pakistan Muslim League. The Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League, Malik Qasim openly criticised the decision of the PNA leadership to join the national government. Thus the Muslim League was divided into two

faction. "We need unity of thought and action on the national level, the country cannot afford agitational politics which has been the main business of politicians in Pakistan since 1968. The unity on national issues would be jeopardised by the Muslim League joining the civilian government alone. The inclusion of Muslim League or a few other parties would provide the parties outside government with a forum from where to project a hate campaign against the Muslim League as well as against the Army. It would harm the neutrality of the Martial Law Government".¹³

Finally, on August 23, 1978 a 26 man Federal Cabinet was sworn in and limited political activity started, with 15 PNA leaders in the Cabinet. Addressing a press conference after the swearing in ceremony, General Zia said that the year 1979 could be considered as an election year and that specific dates would be announced in due course. However, on April 15, 1979, the PNA decided to quit the National Government. The reason for it was made public by Mufti Mahmud. According to him the decision was unanimous. The PNA had joined the Government under the "doctrine of necessity". It had primarily two objectives before it, namely the introduction of Islamic laws and the restoration of democracy. He said that though there was no complete Islamisation of society as yet a modest beginning has been made in this direction. Similarly the official announcement about holding of elections

in November this year was another proof of redemption of PNA's pledge. Meanwhile, the former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto was hanged on April 5, 1979, followed by dismissal of his petition by the Supreme Court against the death sentence order passed by the Lahore High Court:

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was born on January 5, 1928 at Larkana, Sind. The son of a rich Sindhi landlord, he was educated at the universities of California and Oxford and became a barrister at the Middle Temple, London. In 1958, he entered Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan's Cabinet as Minister of Commerce. As foreign minister (1963-66) he was instrumental in establishing close relations with China. Disillusioned with the military regime, he left the Government in 1966 to form his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which he led in 1970 to sweeping electoral victory in West Pakistan. After succeeding late Lieut. General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan as President in December 1971. Bhutto introduced a new constitution with Islamic characteristics. From August 1973, when the new constitution took effect, he was Prime Minister. On July 5, 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the army chief of staff, seized power from Bhutto in a bloodless coup. Soon afterward Bhutto was arrested and on March 18, 1978, was sentenced to death for political murder. Proclaiming himself innocent Bhutto declined to ask for clemency. He was hanged on April 5.

The PNA component parties started preparing for the fourth-coming election to be conducted in the near future. Meanwhile, there was made an amendment in the Political Parties Act 1962, by which registration of the parties with the Election Commission was made compulsory. Secondly, the Election Commission was given discretionary powers to debar a political party from contesting elections if there were any doubts about resources of its funds or it had been critical of pedagogic role by Military in Pakistan. Moreover, there was introduced the concept of proportional representation to be allowed to the political parties *i.e.*, the political parties had to be allocated seats in the National Assembly according to the proportion of votes they got in the elections. The PNA had a further setback when Jamat-i-Islami an important component part decided to abide by registration rule and defied the resolution of the Alliance against it. Hence, the Jamiat was expelled from the PNA. The Secretary General of the Alliance Prof. Ghafoor belonged to the party and was considered very important office holder of it. The Alliance which had become weak by following contradictory policies after July, 1977 became further weak due to attitude of its component parties about the election date.

The Jamat-i-Islami was the fourth party to quit the Alliance on the question of registration. Earlier three component parties of the Alliance had withdrawn from it on the question of joining the

interim government under the military cover those were, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, JUP and NDP.

With the exit of the Jamat-i-Islami no worthwhile political party was left in the PNA with the exception of the Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara Group) which would be the real sufferer of the PNA's decision of refusing the registration and ultimately running the risk of its disqualification to contest the following general elections if the registration provision was not withdrawn. Other political parties had no political following whatsoever in the country. Even if they did not contest the election, there would be no effect on elections and Mufti Mahmood's threat of boycotting the elections would meet the same fate as his call for the boycott of the Local Bodies Elections.

The other parties left behind in the PNA were Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam which had no votes in Punjab and Sind and little following in Baluchistan and NWFP. The PDP which had no following in three provinces of Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan and had a few votes in Punjab, the Muslim Conference which was nowhere in Pakistan and some following in Azad Kashmir and the new entrant Jamiat-ul-Mushaikh which was a nonentity had no votes at all.

The Jamat-i-Islami applied for independently contesting the election in violation of the PNA decision was the belief of the Jamiat leadership that with some of the major political parties out of the

field would be open for its candidates. According to Mian Tufail Mohammad: "We are very much in the PNA fold but we have decided to contest elections separately". Pakistan National Alliance formally expelled the Jamaat-i-Islami from its fold "for violating its decision not to apply for registration and separate election symbol to contest the forthcoming election.

With the Government decision to accept the PNA's demand for elimination of the word "registration" to enable the political parties to take part in the forthcoming general elections, the way was cleared for the Alliance to participate in the elections. Consequently, the PNA answered the questionnaire comprising nine points which was issued by the Election Commission. Meanwhile, the PML had put forward a demand for more time for nomination of candidates without consultation with the PNA. This obviously opened a fresh controversy about the election. On the original schedule of November 17, 1979. The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan which along with Jamaat-i-Islami had been cleared by the Election Commission vehemently demanded adherence to the fixed election date.

The election procedure as amended had already eliminated the PPP, and NDP. About which the President Pakistan People's Party Punjab, Sheikh Mohammad Rafiq said, "Elections without the majority party of the country *i.e.*, the PPP would be a farce and a mockery."¹⁴ Mr. Mazari said

that his party believed in the sanctity of vote. Though the NDP had been elbowed out of the elections, it would accept the verdict of the people in favour of any political party. It was the privilege of the people to elect a political party of their choice."¹⁵

The JUP Chief, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani wished elections to be conducted on November 17, 1979. When there started controversy about its postponement for that he criticised the policies of the Jamiat-i-Islami and Maulana Mufti Mahmood. According to him these leaders were directly responsible for the "political crisis" about elections: They had betrayed the confidence of the people and joined the Government through backdoors. According to him, these leaders had no face to show to the masses because the promises made with the people had not been kept and the people were misled."¹⁶

The election date of November 17, 1979 was fast approaching and alongwith there was created confusion about it by political leaders associated with PNA in past or present. There were contradictory statements about postponement of the election date either to be refixed in December 1979 or March 1980. It was in the midst of this political confusion that President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq announced on October 16, 1979 the indefinite postponement of the elections and speedier measures to be introduced for Nizam-i-Islam in

Pakistan. It was mentioned that the Government had accepted almost every demand made by the political parties, about proportional representation, registration of parties, the fate of independent candidates and more time for filling of nomination papers, but unfortunately some of the leaders put party interests over and above the national interests to bring the country back to place from where it started towards General Elections. According to the President. "We have come to the conclusion that these parties are not prepared to face the electorate but at the same time wishing that the onus should be on the Government"¹⁷ It was fantastic that while some of the parties demanded more time for filling nomination papers and longer period for canvassing, at the same time they wanted the polls to be held on November, 17, 1979.

The above statement clearly explained the electioneering which was going on and demands which were being made in the country. The PNA was formed as an elections combination. Apparently its purpose was to participate in the elections of March 1977 like the previous two alliances of United Front and GOP and no more. However, it continued upto October 1979 with bitterness among its component political parties and providing controversial politics the result of which was frustration among the electorate. In a democratic system the success of the elections for political development is very important. Mainly there should be a limited number of political parties in the field, with

national outlook. So that the electorate should be allowed to have a clear choice of candidates. The formation of Alliances for election purposes has not proved salutary for developing of political institutions in Pakistan. In India there was also formed an election Alliance by Five political parties known as Janata Party in 1977. From the out set, considerable diversity existed within JP. It won majority seats in the election but came to an end in August 1979 with dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The only temporary advantage it had was defeat of Mrs. Indra Gandhi in the election.¹⁸

For success of a political party two things are very essential, leadership and organisation. In an alliance there is plural leadership which is not appealing to the masses in a developing country. Secondly, there is no permanent organisation in an alliance and the members of an alliance defy its decisions with impunity, about which there are a number of instances about working of the PNA. All this confuses the illiterate voter. Thus the conclusion is that there should be a few national political parties with offices in all the four provinces of the federation and a central office at the national level, to educate the electorate in the long term and short term national policies. The leadership should also be accountable to party hierarchy, and help in the growth of permanent political institutions. The struggle for Islamic-state took a final turn during the election of 1945-46, under the dynamic leadership

of Quaid-i-Azam, President of the Muslim League. Keeping in view, this political tradition the political parties in Pakistan have to play an important nation-building role, within the legal framework. The parties are 'basic institutions' for the translation of mass preferences into public policy.

A number of political problems are common in the developing countries. For example, Nigeria also had a problem of multi-parties on the eve of 1979 election. There were about 150 parties desirous to contest the election. But only five national parties were cleared by the Federal Election Commission (FEDECO) to contest the election. There were laid down the following rules for a party for registration with the FEDECO.

1. Register the names and address of its national officers with the commission.
2. Make its membership open to every Nigerian irrespective of his place of origin religion, ethonic group or sex.
3. Register a copy of the party's constitution with the principal office of FEDECO.
4. Have the headquarters of the party located in the federal capital and to provide for periodic election on a democratic basis.

We hope electioneering process in Pakistan would help the formation of permanent democratic political institutions to enable the people to exercise effectively their political rights by franchise.

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ATOM FOR PEACE : A FALLACY AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Nasreen Javeed and Javeed Ahmed Sheikh

Introduction

The nuclear arms race in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent has been considered an off-shoot of the development of nuclear weapons by U.S.A., Soviet Union, and their allies.¹ The rationale of India and Pakistan to be nuclear has been the same as has often been extended by the nuclear powers in terms of security, balance of power, and deterrence. There is no doubt that the factors like security, balance of power, and deterrence have played a definite role in the nuclear development in these two countries, but hatred, distrust, and sense of competition have significantly contributed towards arms race in general and nuclear development in particular.² Hatred, distrust, and competition have been deeply rooted in the historical past of the Muslims and the Hindus in the undivided continent.³

India and Pakistan came into existence on August, 1947. Some of the important factors leading to two independent states in Indian sub-continent were ;

1. The British government policy of substituting Urdu and Persian languages with Hindi ;⁴
2. Partition of Bengal and its annulment ;⁵
3. Discriminatory attitude towards the Muslims in education and employment fields ;⁶ and
4. Failure of the British and Congress governments to provide security of life and property to the minorities in general and the Muslims in particular.⁷

Each of these factors singly or collectively created more sharp lines of separateness between the Hindus and the Muslims. The sharp division fostered antagonism, hatred and distrust to the extent of leading both the communities to resort to bloody and cruel conflicts. Particularly, after 1940 when the Muslim League demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims, the leadership of the Congress not only assailed the idea of partition, but also launched a counter movement. It resulted into very violent communal conflicts in which thousands of the people from both the communities were killed.⁸

The British government held elections in 1946, in which the Muslim League won majority of seats in all the Muslim majority areas, which was a clear sign that the majority of the Muslims supported the partition. The British government conceded to partition India. The decision helped in escalating communal bloody conflict.

After partition of India, the Indian government annexed Junagardh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. Pakistan protested against India in United Nations. In 1948 Pakistan and India fought on Kashmir. The United Nations initiated cease fire and India agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Indian government did not hold plebiscite, which strengthened the already existing doubts of the leadership of Pakistan.

India being a big and large country wanted from the very inception, to establish herself one of the big powers in Southeast Asian part of the world.⁹ India has not fully endorsed the existence of Pakistan.¹⁰ When India annexed Sikkim and, Goa, Pakistan started showing concern about it and began developing army to be strong to be recognised.¹¹ In short, a conflict of 'to be big and super' and 'to be recognised' led this region into arms race,¹² whose roots are deeply grounded in hatred, (leadership) distrust, and competition.

The same factors have played a role in the development of nuclear weapons, but the leadership of both the countries, instead of following their old strategy of arms race, applied different tactics to acquire nuclear capabilities. Their 'leap-frog' policy to be nuclear have been based on duality of their commitments to peace. The leadership in both the countries said contrary to what they did to develop nuclear capabilities. The paper is going to focus on to find out and analyse *the pattern of behavior of leadership of both these countries before, during, and after nuclear development.*

After studying the history of nuclear development in both the countries, some similarities have come up. Before being nuclear India and Pakistan condemned nuclear weapons, their destructive and devastating role, and also showed their concerns to the possessors. At the same time both of them secretly or openly, sooner or later embarked upon a programme of nuclear development. During, the process of developing nuclear capabilities, the leadership changed their posture, from 'atom for destruction' to 'atom for peace. They launched a campaign to persuade the world that they had/have security problem and they wanted/want energies to cater electricity shortage. In the post development period, they have demanded more strict rules and regulations to check further nuclear proliferation.

The duality and hypocrisy in saying and doing have blinded them to see the reality and truth. This blindness has brought the humanity to a cross road, where each road leads to destruction and annihilation.

Behaviorial Pattern of India and Pakistan, During— Nuclear Development

India and Pakistan have the same historical life span and in many ways social, political, and economic development pattern have been almost the same. There is no doubt, the texture, the tone and the variations have been different. In nuclear development the projected rationale of them have been similar, i.e., 'developing nuclear capabilities for peace'.¹³ In the pursuit of nuclear development

India has become nuclear, and in case of Pakistan, it has been assumed that she has developed the capabilities to be nuclear. It is yet to become nuclear.

Different hypotheses have been extended by different scholars. Rodney (1981) ; Kaushik (1980); Ebinger (1979) ; and Wilcox, (1971) have put forth 'action—reaction model' approach. According to them India's contention had been, 'if America, Russia, and China could have it why not she'.¹⁴ Pakistan wants to develop nuclear weapon on the pretension, that India has nuclear weapon¹⁵. Some scholars have delineated 'security assumption' as basis of nuclear proliferation in Indo-Pak Subcontinent,¹⁶ While Cohen and Park, the Beatan and Meadox have argued that nuclear proliferation between India and Pakistan is based on status, prestige and power variables.¹⁷

All these approaches do help us to understand the nuclear development in Indo-Pak sub-continent. Here it will become irrelevant to challenge the comprehensiveness of these approaches. The dimension which have not been found out is, the behaviorial pattern of the leadership of India and Pakistan before, during and after 'nuclear development. 'Atom for peace' approach is to camouflage the truth of the destruction of the nuclear energy, a false garb to conceal actual intentions, and a wrong slogan to cover deception.

In the nuclear development process, the nuclear powers have played very vital role. The super

powers role has two dimension ; The first has been to provide know—how to non—nuclear powers, and giving them a lead to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the second has been to provide technology to develop the nuclear capabilities. In both these roles, the super powers have not served humanity at large, but they have followed their own limited selfish interests. They did it, with the knowledge that atom, in any form, will be destructive.

United States was the first nation who developed the technology of the process and delivery system of nuclear weaponry. The world came to know about it during W W II. Once the secret was unleashed, it was difficult to stop other competing powers to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union developed it. There started a chain reaction either to desire or to be nuclear. United States in order to divert the attention of the world, who had, already been criticised on her explosion of atom bomb on Japan used a phrase atom for peace ! United States also showed willingness to help other industrial nations to share knowledge and technology to develop nuclear capabilities.

Ideological conflict between United States and Soviet Union have helped nuclear proliferation. Both these countries have openly or secretly ; diplomatically or clandestinely helped their allies to develop nuclear capability, China, India, Israel and South Africa have developed nuclear weapons; Pakistan, Argentine, Iraq and some other countries

have the potentiality to be nuclear and they are trying for it. Nuclear weapons are destructive in every respect, but the rivalry of nations based on mutual hatred, distrust, and antagonistic competition is annihilation.

Atom for peace theorem has provided easy means to nuclear powers to extend help to others and the others under the same shield have become nuclear. Atom cannot be for peace. In terms of cost—benefit calculus, Edward Goldsmith has said, "The total energy output in building plant far exceeds its output in its life time of nearly thirty years."¹⁸ In Indo-Pakistan nuclear development race the nuclear powers played their role on the same pattern, and both the countries have been exploiting the same logic of 'atom for peace' which they know is wrong, but duality on the part of the leadership has been leading the people of the region towards destruction.

Pakistan and India obtained help through agreements from United States, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and Belgium. Soviet Union helped India to develop delivery system.

During 1947 to 1957 India was not in possession of nuclear weapons or even did not have the capabilities to develop nuclear weaponry. Indian leadership was very critical of United State's explosion of nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Writing on the subject of "Atomic Bomb and Ahimsa (non-violence), Mahatma Gandhi said sorrowfully that

the atom bomb had deadened the finest feeling that had sustained mankind for ages. "The atom bomb", he said, "brought an empty victory to the Allied arms, but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see."¹⁹ Nehru, the Prime Minister of India termed atom bomb an evil and repeatedly emphasised that India would not go nuclear.²⁵ But one of the foreign observers analyzing Nehrus statements reported, "the underlying enthusiasm in achieving nuclear technology is to become nuclear power as early as possible. This will enable her to have more bargaining leverage."²⁶

Pakistan, during this period, was busy in dealing with and solving unnumbered host of problems, like ; rehabilitation of willions of refugees from India ; developing economic means to survive ; political stability and defence problems. Constitutional enigma was the most serious and crucial of all the problems, which had hampered the process of planning in Pakistan.²⁷ In this whirlpool of problems, Pakistan had not shown any sign to acquire either the knowledge or the technology to develop nuclear capabilities, nor had expressed any concern about the Indian efforts to go for nuclear development. The leadership in Pakistan had not lagged behind in criticising the atomic explosion on Japan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan said, "the saner world opinion cannot endorse

the act of atomic explosion on the innocent people of Japan. The world should try to stop the development and use of atomic weapons."²⁸ Any way, the leaders, the journalists, and the intellectuals had been critical of nuclear developments.

In short, the pattern of criticising the nuclear development of both the countries was the same, except India had launched nuclear programme, while Pakistan had not.

By 1958 India already had APSARA, NRX, GIR and ZERLINA reactors. Those reactors were in operation, Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, addressing the National Development Council on January 14, 1961 confirmed the suspicions of the foreign observer in these words :

"Since we are approaching a stage when it is possible for us if we direct our energies to that end, to make Atomic Nuclear Weapons too".²⁹

Being aware that on this statement the world opinion might become pressurizing, Mr. Nehru held the press conference on February 20, 1961. This was an effort to minimize the possibilities to have confrontation with friendly countries, he expressed. There is no doubt, we have the resource and technology to develop atomic weapons, but before following that, path, good and bad aspects are to be evaluated. Atom bomb could be used

for peaceful or destructive purposes. India can ensure the people in India and abroad that if India went nuclear it will be for peaceful purpose".³⁰

This was an act of softening, and cyphening of their stance of critising nuclear weapons. Interestingly, on one hand India was trying to assure the world that India will not go nuclear and on the other hand had multiplied her efforts to muster more help from America, Britain, Canada, France, and Belgium in nuclear technology and heavy water. The obvious position was that India had serious intentions to develop nuclear bomb.³¹

On the initiative of nonnuclear and nuclear power Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. Both India and Pakistan were among non-signatory members. India instead of remaining silent became more critical of NPT. Dougherty observed,

'For years the Indian had conducted a semi-public debate over the desirability of acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time taking the lead in criticising NPT as effort' on the part of the armed to disarm the unarmed".³²

In the early years of the same decade, Pakistan was suffering from leadership, legitimacy, identity, economic, and political crises. The army had already instituted its position after overthrowing the Republican government and had shown serious concern about the problems. The military ruler legitimized his positin in 1962. Till this year

Pakistan did not think of developing nuclear programme of any sort. In the end of 1962, the British nuclear researchers and an eminent nuclear scientist Abdus Salam suggested the military elites to start nuclear programme for medical and agricultural fields. The government approved the suggestion and formally requested Britain and France to provide knowledge and technology for the development of nuclear programme for medical and agricultural purposes. The request was granted in 1963 and during the same year three Medical Radio Isotope Centers and one Atomic Energy Agriculture Center were installed.³³ These institutes were not in operation until 1965. More help was sought from America, Belgium, and Italy to develop nuclear programme in Pakistan.

At the international level Pakistan was critical of nuclear development in the world. Pakistan raised its opinion that there should be strict regulations to check the proliferation of nuclear weapon, but at the same time was reluctant to sign NPT. Someone asked Pakistani delegate, why Pakistan was not one of the signatory of NPT, the reply was, 'we have to see what India does. We cannot sign to cut our hands for future'.³⁴

What India was doing in the first decade of her independence Pakistan started the same strategy in the second decade.

By the beginning of the third decade, India had already five research reactors, five power generating stations, and five plants in operation and capable of developing and producing nuclear weapons. By 1967, India had enough plutonium to produce 20 bombs, and by 1972, Indian capabilities were increased to produce 100 bombs.³⁵

In India a semi-public debate was already in progress on the issue 'Should India be nuclear?'. The debate was initiated by the governing elites to find out the consensus at home and gauge the serious concern abroad. By 1968, India was ready to make an explosion, but delayed it, so that it should have enough time to plan a strategy to propagate against those who were against Indian nuclear development. Another assumption for the delay was that explosion might annoy the nuclear technology exporting countries and might in return suspend delivery of needed components.³⁶ The Indian ruling elites launched a propaganda campaign in the press, in universities and colleges, and also abroad to win consensus. The Indian point of view revolved around the following bases for becoming nuclear,

1. **Security Reason.** India was insecure from big powers struggle in Indian ocean, and also from China and Pakistan. With China, India had border clashes in 1962, which was enough reason to be exploited. With Pakistan India had three wars and number of border clashes.

2. Energy self-sufficiency through nuclear energy, and
3. It will provide more employment.

The most important issue was of security as compared to other reasons. Even this was not seriously threatening issue. America was not at all threat to the security of India, America had not been only providing uranium enriched heavy water, but also giving them enormous economic aid to neutralize Russian influence on India. America was even ready to provide nuclear umbrella to India in case of Russian or Chinese attack. India instead of appreciating the offer, expressed doubts and rejected the offer. Pakistan was by no means a threat to India, because by 1971 India had successfully outmaneuvered Pakistan and disintegrated her. As a matter of fact India became a threat to the existence of Pakistan. Chinese threat to the existence of India is a debatable issue. Wilcox, Subramanyam and Dougherty maintained that India's gradual drift towards a nuclear weapons development was against a potential strategic nuclear threat from China.³⁷ But Cohen, Park, Seshageri, Jones, and Marwah rejected this assumption. They brought forth quite reversed argument saying that China's nuclear programme was not diverted or directed against India. China had her fears from Russia and America.³⁸ Cohen and Park argued that India's "desire for international power, prestige, and status has served as political justification for a nuclear capability and has interacted with the security

rationale to widen the circles of bureaucratic and public support".³⁹

Cohen and Park's hypothesis sounds reasonable because of the comparative results of two independent public opinion polls conducted by independent study groups. The first public opinion survey was conducted in 1968, in which 38% of Indian strategic elites favoured nuclear weapon and 58% opposed it and only 4% were undecided. The conclusions drawn was as follow.

"Given that a majority of the respondents opposed nuclear armaments for the country and yet thought poorly of NPT, perhaps for the only way the Indian leadership forge a national consensus, or for that matter a consensus 'am' among the elite was by flouting the NPT (or exploding the nuclear device) and simultaneously carrying with them the opponents of the bomb (by stressing the peaceful aims of the explosion, by drawing a line between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers, and by pledging not to produce nuclear armaments".⁴⁰

The second public opinion polls were conducted in 1972, in which majority of the respondents favoured the nuclear weapons. Only 20% opposed nuclearization of India. The conclusions drawn from the polls were "the government has very successfully manipulated the security issue to muster more support for nuclear development. It shows that Indian government may feel secure to make an explosion of the bomb".⁴¹

India made an explosion in 1974 and 'tip-toed into nuclear club !⁴² At this explosion the Prime Minister of India, Indra Gandhi expressed.

"India is the first developing country to have successfully exploded A-bomb. We are proud of our scientific capabilities. It is a great achievement we have not to depend upon foreign nuclear umbrella."⁴³

P.N. Haksar, former Chairman of Planning Commission on the occasion of nuclear explosion expressed, "the rules of international game have no moral and legal code-----We will have more nuclear weapons.....We are great."⁴⁴ And the media projected ;

"Nuclear explosion and entry into nuclear weapons is a tremendous moral booster to the people.....that it had enhanced the government sagging prestige both at home and abroad."⁴⁵

India became nuclear after playing duality in the process. The new posture was that India had made an explosion which was for 'peaceful purpose'. On the other hand it stirred concern in the neighbouring countries in general, but Pakistan in particular.

Pakistan in the beginning of this decade, had found out Indian's intentions in the field of nuclear development, but was helpless to do any thing due to limited resources, and restricted technical aid in nuclear technology. Pakistan started condemning India's nuclear programme.

Some of the serious scholars on nuclear development were afraid that Indian explosion will provide incentive to Pakistan. Rodney gores observed "the probability of a nuclear arms race erupting between India and Pakistan is high enough because of their mutual historical fears and volunerabilities."⁴⁶ And further he wrote, "Efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability in Pakistan are a fairly direct response to the perceived threat from India's budding nuclear capability."⁴⁷

The political and military elites in Pakistan knew that if they openly endeavoured to become nuclear, the big powers would pressurize them to discontinue it. Therefore, the political elites secretly started making arrangements to develop nuclear bomb. Pakistan was resorting to all possible means to find the technology and expertise to make an explosion as soon as possible. The secret was unrevealed by international press report. Pakistan had agreement with France to provide Pakistan with nuclear technology as well as uranium enriched heavy water to develop the programme. American government started putting pressure on Pakistan and France to stop this programme. Economic aid to Pakistan was stopped and France was persuaded to stop despatching the components of nuclear technology. But Pakistan continued. Under the pressure Pakistan at international level initiated that Indian ocean to be declared as nuclear -free zone. India's reaction was strong and rejected this proposal.⁴⁸

Behaviour pattern of Pakistani elites has resembled with the elites of India in developing nuclear programme. The only difference had been that India very slowly and steadily pursued her nuclear programme successfully floundering the world opinion, but Pakistan's attitude had been of haste and immediacy.

India has already achieved nuclear status. At the international level India has been focussing on, that other countries should not possess nuclear weapons, particularly Pakistan. India has not signed NPT and has been opposed to international inspections of nuclear facilities. India maintained, "Pakistan's endeavors to go nuclear is not only due to an inadequate or false projection of India's nuclear policy but the failure of international efforts to check nuclear weapons proliferation."⁴⁹

India has started a campaign against Pakistan's nuclear programme. The main argument put forth by the Indian elites has been that if Pakistan developed nuclear capability, the peace of the continent will be in jeopardy and severely threatened. The propaganda campaign maintained that India's nuclear explosion was for peace, but Pakistan's will definitely be destructive. Daily Express in February, 1978, expressed ;

"Somehow India succeeds in maintaining a peaceful mien, even well armed with conventional weapons ; The addition of nuclear bomb

to her arsenal marked made in India, "will not alter that benign posture. One danger, however, does exist and that is Bhutto Bomb to match the Gandhi bomb."⁵⁰

In support of their fear the Indian and other writers have repeatedly quoted Bhutto's two remarks at different times. In 1968, when he was busy in his political campaign and he found out that India was going to be nuclear, it has been presumed that he said, "if India went nuclear, then we (Pakistanis) should have to eat grass and get one or buy one for our own."⁵¹ The second statement was a clear thought of Bhutto, which he fostered after Indian nuclear explosion of 1974. It has been expressed in his posthumously published book. He wrote :

"We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communists Powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it but that position was about to change."⁵²

It has been ridiculous that when India was making Atom bomb, it was for peaceful and when Pakistan or any other make or made it, it is dangerous and threatening. In any case nuclear weapons are dangerous who so ever possesses it.

On the other hand the riddle of nuclear development in Pakistan has been still shrowded in

mystery. There are different assumptions concerning Pakistanis capabilities of developing nuclear technology. One assumption has been that Pakistani scientists working in Holland secretly took away gas centrifuge blue print and clandestinely the ruling elites manipulated from unknown resources to acquire the components of technology.⁵³ The other assumption has been put forth that Qaddafi financed and helped Pakistan to acquire components of technology and uranium.⁵⁴ Still others believe that Pakistan developed with underground Swiss importers and exporters who managed to provide Pakistan with the required technology.⁵⁵

In the confusion of different assumptions, the American government became strict and tough with Pakistan and imposed economic and military restriction of aid. Pakistan's ruling elites have been repeatedly asserting that Pakistan was not making a nuclear bomb, and if Pakistan made it, it will be for peaceful purpose. The American government, in particular and other nuclear powers in general are pressuizing Pakistan to stop the nuclear development programme not because of Indian propaganda only, but they are afraid that if Pakistan made the nuclear bomb, it will be delivered to other Islamic countries like Lybia, which will threaten the Persian gulf and Middle East.⁵⁶

By this date Pakistan has not exploded any

nuclear device to be called nuclear, but doubts are still there and it is being presumed that Pakistan has developed the capabilities to detonate A-bomb. Pakistan has time and again shown concerns about her security problems. Pakistan has been putting forth three main lines of arguments to find out justification for her nuclear programme.

1. Security Dilemma. Pakistan has been disintegrated by India. Russia has many times threatened for serious consequences due to her close contacts with the West.
2. Pakistan has been suffering from energy shortage. Nuclear Energy programme will help cater her needs, and
3. It will bring balance in the region which has already been turned towards India.

Pakistan has been unable to sell this argument to the world effectively. On one side Pakistan's leaders have been trying to justify what they have been doing in nuclear development, and on the other side have been emphatically asserting that not been they have going for an explosion.

In 1987, the government of Pakistan, for the first time, said that if Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, that would be for peace. The tone projects that Pakistan has developed capabilities to make an explosion, but has not done yet. Under the world pressure, Pakistan has asked the world powers to persuade India either to negotiate 'No War Pact or declare to have South Asia a nuclear-free zone.

It is difficult to achieve, therefore nuclearization of the region continues.

Conclusion. The historical descriptive analysis of the leadership of the countries of Pakistan and India revealed that the behavioural pattern had been the same. Before nuclear development, the nuclear weapons had been criticised and at the same time remained busy to develop their own nuclear programme. During nuclear development the attitude was to justify what they were doing and were vocal to assure the world that their nuclear programme was peaceful. After nuclear development, the attitude had been changing. Atom will be dangerous for developing countries. At international level more strict rules were required to check otherwise, the peace of the region will be threatened. The duality has been leading to more serious in sececutly in the world.

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