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THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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EDITORS NOTE

This is the first issue of the " Journal of Political Science " to appear independently. In the recent past it was published under the joint auspices of the Departments of History and Political Science and was known as the " Journal of History and Political Science ". However owing to certain technicalities issues for the year 1977 and for 1978 failed to come out under its banner. The Department of Political Science therefore, took the initiative and decided to launch its separate publication. It has done so successfully in a modest way.

The paramount aim of the Journal is to promote research and provide scholars with a forum to project views on such socio-political themes as would help to enhance understanding particularly of political issues and the polity of Pakistan.

It is in this context that Hameed A. Rai attempts to unravel the problem of political stability in India and Pakistan against the background of their constitutional development during the years 1947—1958. He digs deeper into the past to finally infer that political consensus is the objective correlative of the dynamics of emerging nations. Dr. Sayed Riaz Ahmed makes piquant observations on business and the changing social values in Pakistan. He asserts that business values are modifying traditional values of the family and the Campus and are

on the way of fast becoming operative values of urban life.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema turns to a European Chapter and traced the history of the institution of Ecclesiastical sanctuaries of the Middle Ages till their erosion by the resurging spirit of the Renaissance and Reformation.

But this particular issue is a very modest attempt. It is hoped that the Journal will strive to maintain a high level of scholarship and offer its reader stimulating fare especially on Pakistan.

SAEED OSMAN MALICK

Hameed A. Rai

POLITICAL STABILITY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
(From 1947 to 1958)

INTRODUCTION

The theme of political stability of India and Pakistan has significance both at the national and international level. It can be examined and analyzed in various ways. The problem, as studied in this paper, seeks to identify some basic dimensions of the political process at the national level. It also seeks to analyze the political dynamics of the genesis and the rise of the independence movement as led by Hindus and Muslims.

Two limitations restrict the scope of the study with a view to bringing the problem within more manageable proportions. Firstly, an analytical framework, based on a number of concepts available in comparative politics, has been drawn up to analyze the political process. Secondly, the period under study extends from 1947 to 1958. The period represents, on the one end, the common start of India and Pakistan and, on the other, the departure of Pakistan from the efforts to evolve a democratic system of government.

The analysis presented in the study is based on two types of data. The statistical evidence has been abstracted from "Cross-Polity Survey" in order to determine similar as well as diverse trends in the polities under study. The historical evidence has been used to provide a rationale to the statistical evidence. History is not conceived in this study as a chronicle of events. Rather, appropriate

ensembles are borrowed from various writers who have recorded and analyzed important events of the Indo-Pak history.

POLITICAL LEGACY

Historically speaking the sub-continent of India and Pakistan has long been under the traditionalistic authoritarian governmental set-up. Although the traces of the earliest Indian civilization are found in the archeological remains of Harrapa and Mohenjo-Daro, Aryan invaders and Alexander the Great could be designated as the forebearers of the authoritarian pattern of government. It may be noted that these were alien rulers. But the Mauryan and the Gupta period, being Hindu dynasties, were no better than alien pagans insofar as the rights and interests of the populace were concerned.

Before the advent of the Mughal period, the sub-continent was repeatedly invaded by Mahmud Ghaznvi and also by Mohammad Ghuri and was later ruled by an off-shoot of his dynasty for some length of time. The Mughals who occupied the throne for about two centuries, too evolved patterns of administration on a centralized and authoritarian basis like their predecessors. There was no popular participation even in the government of Akbar the Great, the most enlightened of the Mughal emperors.

This brief overview of the long history of the sub-continent underlines the traditionalistic authoritarian rule as the most important single fact characterizing the polity before the British Colonization. Another important social consequence of the Mughal rule in India may, however, be noted before going into the British period.

The sub-continent professed and practised Hinduism before the Muslim invaders set foot on India. True, Buddhism caught the imagination of many an Indian and flourished as a potent religion, especially in the days of Ashoka (273-232 B. C.), the greatest of the Mauryan emperors. It surely was regarded as a "particularly tolerant and contemplative off-shoot of Hinduism."[1] Besides, its inspiration wore out rather rapidly in the sub-continent.

Mohammad Bin Qasam (early eight century) who set his foot in India in the province of Sind was the first one to sow the seeds of the spread of Islam.

The successive invasion of Mahmud Ghaznvi (998—1030) and Mohammad Ghuri (late 12th and early 13th centuries) established Islam as a viable, competitive and growing religion in Hindu India. The long reign of Mughals accelerated the spread of this new religion in a foreign land.

The introduction of Islam into the almost religiously monolithic community had far-reaching political consequences. Instead of producing any Hindu-Muslim synthesis which Akbar the Great envisaged in his Din-e-Ilahi, the community was divided into two rival camps. Panikkar observes :

> The main social result of the introduction of Islam as a religion into India was the division of society on a vertical basis. Before the thirteenth century. Hindu society was divided horizontally by castes. Islam split Indian society into two sections from top to bottom.

1 : Norman D. Palmer, "India," in *Major Governments of Asia*, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (New York : Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 242.

... It was two parallel societies vertically established on the same soil. At all stages they were different and hardly any social communication or intercourse of life existed between them.[2]

The political significance of this vertical social schism lay in the serious clash of interests and in the different directions interest articulation was to take.

The political heritage of the British featured not only the traditionalistic authoritarian government but also a vertical political and social schism in the community they were to rule for a long time. While the British made good administrative use of the schism, they did not change the authoritarian structure of the government. The establishment of the means of transport and communication, institutions of banking, bureaucracy and judiciary, education and training and the provision of some industrial base to the agrarian society did produce changes in traditionalistic social pattern. As a result of these changes, the society acquired modernistic characteristics.

The story of the independence of India and Pakistan is, to a large extent, an interplay of the desire to get rid of the authoritarian but modernistic alien rule and the forces of Hindu-Muslim schism, The latter was accommodated in the national freedom movement by the demand for two separate states. Through successive measures for self-government (1861-1946) India won freedom in 1947 but split herself up in two states, India and Pakistan.

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2 : K. M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History* (London : Macmillan & Co., 1948), p. 162.

THE PROBLEM

The political legacy of India and Pakistan was modernistic authoritarian government on 14th August 1947. The two nations have gone their ways since then. The style of Indian political system was constitutional and that of Pakistan constitutional authoritarian. The lack of change in the political style had been coupled with unstable governments in Pakistan. The transfer of power in India, on the other hand, had been systematic and peaceful.

The reasons for the inability of Pakistan to cast off her legacy were varied and many. It had been pointed out that the areas comprising Pakistan were the poorest regions of the entire sub-continent, especially Sind and East Pakistan. These regions were not industrially developed and their industrial potential was low. Hindus controlled the industrial and commercial activities. Thus, they were dominant at the expense of economically and culturally backward Muslims.

The skilled manpower coming to Pakistan was poorly endowed. The administrative personnel were inexperienced and small in number. The territorial split of East and West Pakistan by over one thousand miles of foreign territory created additional problems. The partition of the provinces of the Punjab and the Bengal posed administrative problems for which the resources were lacking.

These facts point out the unfavourable circumstances which Pakistan inherited along with so many others. They certainly exercised influence on the condition of the polity. But these problems were not so powerful and profound as to incapacitate the nation to meet the basic requirements of evolving a stable political system. And

some of the above-mentioned problems were overcome somewhat successfully.

So, the problem remains as to what were the internal stresses which impeded the growth of a stable system in Pakistan. The analysis, which follows, takes into account the unfavourable circumstances, with a view to finding a common denominator to explain the different political conditions of India and Pakistan. The unfavourable circumstances provide a setting in which to analyze the problem. But they do not provide evidence strong enough to justify the inference that the malingering instability of Pakistan could have been avoided if the circumstances were not so unfavourable.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

If the obvious historical explanations fail to identify the reasons for the political conditions of India and Pakistan, how can we analyze the essential forces to provide at least a partial explanation for the situation as existed during the period under study? The problem can be examined in a number of ways. One of the ways could be to identify the essentials of a political system and analyze the requirements for the maintenance of such a political system.

The framework which is employed here is eclectic in nature insofar as it draws on a number of sources. While doing so, the choice has been made rather arbitrarily as the limitations imposed by time and the available data set the perspective for this exploratory study. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to draw up a scheme which is logically consistent and empirically valid.

Eisenstadt lists three attributes of a political system on which there is a considerable agreement amongst the

scholars in the field of comparative politics.[3] These attributes are as follows :

1. The political system is the organisation of a territorial society having the legitimate monopoly over the authorized use and regulation of force in the society.

2. It has defined responsibilities for maintaining the system of which it is a part.

3. Therefore, its organization imposes secular sanctions in order to implement the society's main collective goals, maintain its internal order, and regulate its foreign relations......All social roles or groups fulfilling these distinct functions in a society, regardless of what other tasks they may perform, constitute the society's political system.[4]

The maintenance of these essentials of a political system is undoubtedly a function of many variables. A detailed discussion of them would fall outside the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that one of the crucial variables in the functioning of a political system is political consensus. The concept can be translated into simple terms by looking at it from the point of view of agreement on common national goals.

There would, however, be disagreements on issues which may be considered basic by certain standards in a society. In a way, disagreement on social, economic and political problems indicate the degree of responsiveness

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3 : S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Polit.cal Systems of Empires* (New York : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

4 : *Ibid.*, p. 5.

a system has. What is conceived here is minimal consensus on the common goals of a community. The measure of this minimal consensus is the existence of a common referent. This referent is not just a common ideology. Nor is it a precept. It is translated into the structure of a political system. From this point of view, the contitution of a country, its conventions, its institutions may reflect the nature and type of this referent.

To elucidate the point, the political legacy of British India constituted a referent for the leaders of the freedom movement. The authoritarian structure of the alien government was a rallying point for those who wanted to remould the political system on democratic pattern. A consensus on the need to change the system led them to create consensus on other issues. Thus, the network built by minimal consensus functions as a springboard to deal with subsequent problems. Spiro postulates :

> Politics is the process by which a community deals with its problems. A community exists among people who are aware of pursuing common goals. .... A political system, therefore is a community that is processing its issues, while the basic prerequisite for community is consensus, though minimally on common goals, the basic prerequisite for a political system is dissensus.[5]

The distinction between political system and community underlines two things. Firstly, it points up the importance of minimal consensus for a community.

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5 : Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics : A Comprehensive Approach," *American Political Science Review* (September 1962), p. 577.

Secondly, it shows that the degree to which a political system is responsive can be guaged by the amount of dissensus it makes room for. So while dissensus is necessary for a democratic (mass participative) system, minimal consensus in the form of identifiable referents is the basis on which it will rest. The maintenance and further development of the system will depend on how many common referents a community has.

A political system, however, is not a static system. The issues emerge, get formulated, resolved and solved. A new referent is added to the stock. The accumulation of consensus is also indicative of political change and development. Almond has conceptualized this dimension of the problem in terms of the acquisition of a political capability by a political system. Political capability is defined as a performance capacity of a system which leads to adaptations in relation to its social and international environment.[6]

Performance capabilities may be :
  (a) integration and mobilization capability ;
  (b) participation capability ;
  (c) international accommodative capability ;
  (d) welfare or distribution capability.[7]

Of these, only the first two should concern us here. If a system devises some structure for increasing the participation of people into political process or perform certain functions which enhance the mobilization potential of the system, it becomes more flexible to meet new

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6 : Gabriel Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist* (June, 1963), p. 3—10.

7 : *Ibid.*, pp. 6—7.

problems. The incapacity to acquire new political capability hinders political change and thus political development.

Political development may be a trend from traditional society to modernizing society or from authoritarian to participative and constitutional political system. It is in the latter sense that political development becomes a matter of concern in the present study. Not that it is an exhaustive definition of the process ; it gives a dimension to the examination and analysis of the politics under survey.

Political development can also be looked upon as an aspect of nation-building. Nation-building has found various interpretations in the literature. It is a process of national integration as well as an instrument of economic growth. National integration is a function of establishing national identity either through personal identity or concurrent with personal identity. Here, national integration and thus nation-building would be used in the sense of cementing common loyalties and co-cooperative attitudes. In this sense, consensual potential of political process assumes a critical importance for the process of nation-building.

To sum up, it is postulated that the development of a political system is influenced by the amount of consensus a community manifests on its common goals. Every issue processed represents an advance on the consensual potential of a polity. The consensual potential may be augmented by the acquisition of a political capability rendering a polity more mobile than before and a step closer to national unity.

FORMULATION OF AN HYPOTHESIS

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 set up Constituent Assemblies in India and Pakistan with the charge of drawing up constitutions for their respective states. The National Congress was the dominant party in India and the Muslim League in Pakistan. Both parties had fought for national freedom. The ideologies of these two major political parties were, however, significantly different. The Congress was by and large secular in its plans of action. The Muslim League was the product of communal schism.

The difference in ideology was the motivating force for much of the national freedom movement. Although the Congress opposed the partition of India and stood for a unified India, the impact of the movement on both Hindus and Muslim came from the cultural, sociological and religious differences between the two communities. There is no denying the fact that the orientation of the Congress remained consistently secular insofar as the strategy of winning freedom was concerned.

The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 mainly through the efforts of men of moderate and western outlook such as Dadabhi Naoroji, W. C. Bonnejea, Surrendranath Bannerjea, Pherozeshah Mehta and D. E. Wacha, under the guidance and leadership of an English Civilian, Mr. A. O. Hume. Dadabhi Naoroji, the main exponent of Indian nationalism, had faith in the British democratic rule. He examined the pros and cons of the British rule and outlined its blessings in the form of the "new lessons learnt amidst the darkness of Asiatic despotism only by the light of free English civilization."[8]

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8 : S. N. Hay in Wm. Theodore de Barry (ed.) *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1958) p. 671

Similarly Surrendranath Bannerji expressed his faith in England and in social progress while underlining the need for Indian unity.

The gradualness with which these men saw the arrival of freedom did not appeal to masses. The movement soon passed into the hands of extremists. In this period we find the religiously anti-Muslim and anti-British motivational orientation. Mother India was seen to have suffered at the hands of alien heathens and the redemption of the honor of Durga (the Goddess Mother) became the cardinal symbol of the freedom movement. Bankin Chandra Chatterji exhorted :

> We think the land of birth to be no other than our mother, herself. We have no mother, no father, no brother, no wife, no child, no hearth or home. We have only got the mother. . . .[9]

This sentiment found its expression first against Muslims and later against the British. Chatterji says :

> In every country the bond that binds a sovereign to his subjects is the protection that he gives ; but our Mussulman King—how does he protect us ? Our religion is gone ; so is our caste, our honour and the sacredness of our family even [10]

When the British seized power from the Mughals, the resulting despondency was put in these words : "Alas, my mother ! I have failed to set you free. Once again you will fall into the hands of infidels. Forgive your son."[11]

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9 : *Ibid.*, p. 710.
10 : *Ibid.*, p. 713.
11 : *Ibid.*, 71 ゛.

With Bal Ghangadar Tilak Hindu revivalism became a political force. Aurobindo Ghose described nationalism as the work of God. That these trends of thought were deeply ingrained in the masses were borne out by the agitation against Curzon's partition of Bengal in 1905. These extremists :

> ... greatly extended the appeal of the (national) movement and brought within its scope many who might not otherwise have been influenced by it.[12]

The Congress leaders, however, did not discard these extremists. They often found themselves in a dilemma :

> They might disapprove of the attitude of extremists, but they could hardly condemn it without incurring the charge of lack of patriotism, or of not being good Hindus.[13]

While the extremists were growing in strength and popularity, the leadership of the Congress passed into the hands of M. K. Ghandhi.

This was a good omen for the Congress as well as political India. Ghandhi put a check on the extreme sectionalism and made an impact on the masses by his message of passive peaceful disobedience. He not only involved the middle classes but also the masses in his plan of translating the slogans of freedom into practical work. Thus he attempted a political synthesis of divergent interests—of extremists and moderates, of middle classes and masses, of the educated and the illiterate—by showing the way to win freedom. Here we see the signs of consensus on Indian nationalism shaping the tone and momentum of the movement.

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12 : Sir Percival Griffiths, *Modern India* (New York : Frederick A: Praeger, 1958), p. 66.

13 : *Ibid.,* p. 66.

Ghandhi tried to bring the Muslims in his political plan. He threw the weight of the Congress with Muslims in launching the Khilafat movement against the British. The Indian Muslims had been angered by the intentions of the British government to deprive the Turks of their homeland after World War I. Mohammad Ali Jauhar the leader of the Khilafat movement, organized demonstrations with a view to bearing pressure on the British in India. The support of the Congress lent a new lease of life to the Hindu-Muslim Alliance stipulated by the Lucknow pact of 1916.

But differences of opinion soon crept up which undermined the political unity of India sought by Ghandhi. The reasons why Muslims could not find organized expression of their feeling in the Congress plan were deep seated. Muslim nationalism had suffered various setbacks before the "Sepoy Mutiny of 1857." Muslims could not take pride in the heathen past of Hindus. They looked towards the Muslim world as the source of their inspiration. The cultural roots, thus, were not co-extensive with territorial bonds.

Muslims were rulers of India. They lost their domination of India as an accident of history. So was it thought. This feeling was strengthened by the belief that Hindus weakened their authority and prepared the way for the western aggressor. This and other factors made Muslims almost paralyzed in their thinking and action. "The sense of a common attitude toward a common history, which contributes so much to the feeling of unity among a people almost wholly dissipated."[14]

When the freedom movement gained currency, the religious schism became the most important single force.

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14 : Hay, *Op. Cit.*, p. 740.

The fear of Hindu domination was so great that it bent itself easily to mutual communal distrust, suspicion and animosity. Muslims feared that with the departure of the British one form of domination will be exchanged for another. The parliamentary form of self-government implied "majority rule." As Hindus outnumbered Muslims by 3 to 1, the apprehension caught strength that freedom will substitute the British Raj with the Hindu Raj. These apprehensions were confirmed by the militant Hinduism of extremist Congress leaders.

Earlier Syed Ahmad, by laying emphasis upon education and scientific knowledge, sought to wake up the sullen and unreconciled Muslims. The loyalty to the British was advocated as a good thing. But any association with the Indian National Congress was bad as it was not the way of freedom but of domination. Syed Ahmad "believed that the people of India were not sufficiently integrated to be able to run a democratic government without its becoming a disguised rule of the Hindus over the Muslims."[15] The teachings of Syed Ahmad had a profound influence upon the religious thinking of the Muslims of the sub-continent.

The Muslim thought was, however, influenced by a number of other religious opinions as well. While Syed Ahmad brought rationalism to the Muslim nationalism, Iqbal gave it spiritual complexion. He postulated that a community should be organized on a righteous basis ; such a community for him, was the community of Islam. It has its foundations in the acceptance of God and the Law (as laid out in the Holy Quran and Hadith).

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15 : *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Iqbal was the first one to articulate the idea of a separate state for the Muslims. He believed that Islam is "organically connected with the social order and in India needs an autonomous area for the expression and development."[16] The marriage between religion and politics thus postulated, however, did not capture the fancy of the people to arouse them to action at once.

There were other scholars who were more religious than Iqbal but had faith in unity of India. Mohammad Ali Jauhar spread his concern for Muslims all over the world as is evidenced by the Khilafat movement. At the same time he was an ardent supporter of Indian nationalism. He maintained :

> Where God commands, I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second and a Muslim last and nothing but a Muslim. But where India is concerned, I am an Indian first, an Indian second and an Indian last and nothing but an Indian.[17]

Other Muslim Congress leaders fell in the same category. But these dual loyalties could never be reconciled in the Muslim freedom movement.

Another influence on the Muslim thought in India was exercised by the preachings of the Ulemas, a group of learned theologians. These ulema represented various sects of Islam. Without going into the content of their preachings, it is sufficient to note that their line of

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16 : Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Presidential Address*, Allahbad *Session*, (Delhi : Muslim League Printing Press, 1945).

17 : Quoted in Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, (London : Faber & Faber, 1951), p. 43.

reasoning was to represent another diverse element in the search for consensus amongst the Muslims on the general direction of their national movement.

These prominent influences and different shades of opinion reflected themselves in the formation of political parties and religious groups. There were as many as seven political parties which professed the confidence of the Muslims. Khudai Khidamatgars (red-shirts), Ahrars (nationalist Muslims) Khaksars (organized on fascist-Nazi pattern), All-India Momin Conference (claiming to represent 45 million Muslims) Shia Political Conference and Jamiat-ul-Ulema. These parties supported Indian national unity and were also religious in their outlook. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema was especially popular among Muslims since the Khilafat movement. The Krishak Porja party was organized under the leadership of A. K. Fazul Haq in Bengal.[18]

A. K. Fazul Haq in particular and leaders of all other parties in general were to play a critical role in the nation-building of Pakistan after independence.

Muslim League, which came into existence in 1906, was the creation of "an aristocratic clique of Nawabs and other hereditary leaders."[9] Since this is the party which won Pakistan, further analysis will be restricted to the dynamics of this political party. It may be worthwhile, however, to note that the Muslim Leage was as popular or otherwise as other political parties claiming to represent the rights and privileges of Muslims. Therefore, it did not enjoy the confidence of all the Muslims as the

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18 : S. Natarajan, *Indian Parties and Politics* (Cambridge : Oxford University Press. 1947), P.P, 17, 22.

19 : Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan : A Political Analysis* (Newyork : Frederic A. Praeger, 1962), P. 25.

Congress did in its early and subsequent stages of development.

M. A. Jinnah, the supreme leader of Pakistan movement joined the Muslim League in 1913. He had been a member of the Congress for over a decade before shifting his loyalties to the Muslim League. The reasons of his doing so were that he saw no difference in the aims of the two parties and he wanted to be the architect of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was the result of his efforts to bring about a raproachment between the Congress and the Muslim League.

The overwhelming victory of the Congress in 1937 and the views of extremist Congressites persuaded Mohammad Ali Jinnah that there was no hope of establishing modus vivendi to understand the Muslim position in the freedom plan. The slogan of separate homeland for the Muslims was adopted in order to safeguard the interests of a community, which had different socialization, by Jinnah after much thought. With this shift in the position of the party, Muslims became one after Jinnah and the Idea of Islamic State.

The ascendency of the Muslim League owes to another historical accident too. It was evident in the elections of 1936 that the Muslim League did not command te support of the Muslims :

> The Muslim League was much less successful (as compared to the Congress) ; less than a quarter of the reserved Muslim seats were won by Leaguers and nowhere were they able to form a ministry.[20]

The domination of the Muslim League, however, came about through the blunder of the Congress.

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20 : *Ibid.*, p. 31.

The Congress leaders resigned from political offices in protest of the Viceroy's unilateral decision to declare India at war with Germany in September 1939.

> Of the three ministries which remained in office, the Punjab was Unionist and Sind and Bengal were Muslims. Both the Premier of the Punjab and the Premier of Bengal while retaining their political independence, recognized the authority of Mr. Jinnah and the League. Later it became possible to form League Ministries in Assam and NWFP.[21]

Thus, the League acquired political power through a historical accident.

This popularity of Muslim League could not be broken by other parties as they had no slogan better than a separate Muslim State. Although Muslim League was trying to adopt a progressive program under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah, Islam was recognized as the prime mover of the freedom movement. In the face of this, most of the Muslims were hesitant to do anything that might obstruct possible gain to the community. Above all, no single party could muster a majority and there was lack of co-ordination between the various parties.[22]

The League, thus, did not represent a political synthesis as the Congress did. True, the Mahasaba (a militant organisation), Depressed Class League and Scheduled Castes Federation (organizations of untouchables) and the Sikhs vied for power. But they did not gather any substantial following outside the small group they represented. The fight for a separate homeland symbolized the Islamic ideology which excited the common man. This symbol-

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21 : *Ibid.*, p. 32-33.
22 : *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

ization afforded the Muslim League the status of the Muslim majority party. While the Congress shaped the synthesis on the basis of "eagerness to learn from the British whatever would contribute to their own advancement and a desire to preserve their own national identity by returning to Hindu traditions long neglected"[23], the Muslim League aroused Muslim masses in the name of Islam.

This sentimental appeal contained neither an agreement amongst various Muslim political leaders on the fundamentals of the Muslim State nor realization by the masses of the meaning of their demands. Binder has analyzed that during the Pakistan movement two conflicting forces or theories were allowed to co-exist. These were the forces generated by the Modernists and the Fundamentalists. The Modernists were legislative, legalistic, nationalistic and democratic. The Fundamentalists relied on Islamic theory of State in its romantic and rigid form.[24]

> Jinnah was a realist who never permitted his vision to be obscured by emotionalism. Though an ardent Muslim, he did not wear his religion in his buttonhole, whereas the Muslim masses were steeped in sentimentalism and religiosity.

The political slogan of Islamic State was adopted by Mr. Jinnah as a political strategy. Thus, "Mr. Jinnah led the Muslim nation rather than reflected its opinions"[26]

23 : Hay, *Op. Cit.*, p. 739.

24 : Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkley & Los Angles : University of California Press, 1961), pp. 70-75.

25 : I. H. Qureshi in Wm. Theodore de Barry (ed.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 833

26 : Kieth B. Callard, *Political Forces in Pakistan* (New York : Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 20.

The above analysis suggests that the establishment of Pakistan was not the result of a political consensus but of "Sentimentalism and religiosity." Whatever consensus there was, it was only skin deep. The consensual potential of Pakistan movement was at the lowest. The Congress amassed consensus on fundamental issues through a definition of their issues in secular terms. The Islamic ideology of Pakistan, was not susceptible to as clear a definition.

It is hypothesized that the political development of Pakistan was blocked by the low consensual potential on the basis of Pakistan while India had a relatively high consensual potential on more than one referents. For Muslims symbol and slogan of Islamic state was the only common referent. India possessed not only consensus on the basis of the freedom movement but also on the type of secular democracy which was to be built subsequent to freedom.

III. A PARTIAL EXPLANATION

Statistical Evidence

To state the differences between the polities of India and Pakistan the work of Banks and Textor has been used.[27] Although the matrices constructed by the authors indicate only tendencies, the significance of the data lies in the classification of those characteristics which portray important relationships between different polities. The technique of "pattern search and table translation" has been employed by Banks and Textor to sift characteristics relevant to 115 polities of the world.

The "computer printout" is the result of the applica-

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27 ; Arthur S. Banks & Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : The M. I. T. Press, 1963).

tion of the above-mentioned technique. The resultant data have two distinct advantages for the present analysis. Firstly, all available statistical information has been trans-lated into grammatical sentences which facilitates orderly analysis. Secondly, the methodology of "Cross-Polity Survey" is designed to help discover patterned co-occur-ances and inter-relationships in political institutions, structures and behaviour.[28]

The raw data presented by the "printout" has been screened to identify the characteristics relevant to the present study. The following technique has been used. To start with, all the characteristics pertaining to "polities located in East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia" were isolated. Next, all these characteristics were identi-fied throughout the "printout" in order to pinpoint those on which India and Pakistan either matched or varied.

Similar Characteristics

India and Pakistan matched on the following charac-teristics. Both are polities which attained independence after 1945. They are not historically Western. The political modernization of India and Pakistan is of the type of developed society modernizing under tutelage. This characteristic states the historical type rather than period type. In so far as periodization of political modern-ization is concerned, both polities are in the advanced stage when transitional phase has been completed prior to 1945. Both fall into the category where the regime's leadership's charisma is pronounced.

The economic developmental status of India and Pakistan is underdeveloped which means that both have a reasonable prospect of sustained economic growth by the mid-1970's. The population in two polities was large

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28 : Ibid., p.p. 13-41.

(between 17 and 99.9 million people) and the density of population was medium (between 100 and 299 people per square mile) with a high population growth rate (2% or above). Both are religiously homogeneous and linguistically heterogeneous. The degree of urbanization is low (less than 20% of the population in cities of 20,000 or more and less than 12.5 % of population in cities of 100.000 or more) in both India and Pakistan. They have extreme sectionalism. The newspaper circulation is less than one hundred per thousand.

The statement of the common characteristics narrow down the range of the analysis. It also isolates the area or areas where a polity is strong and viable. The subsequent statement lays out the variant characteristics of the polities under study with a view to showing the degree of their political development.

Variant Characteristics

The status of the regime was constitutional authoritarian in Pakistan and constitutional in India. India was significantly Westernized through a colonial relationship and Pakistan was partially Westernized. The party system was stable in India and unstable in Pakistan. The electoral system in India was competitive whereas it was partially competitive or non-competitive in Pakistan. The political system type was mobilization in India and unascertainable in Pakistan. The legislature was fully or partially effective in India. The function of the legislature in Pakistan was unascertainable.

The representative character of the regime in India was polyarchic and in Pakistan it was pseudo-polyarchic. The horizontal power distribution was significant or limited in India and negligible in Pakistan. In India political

tical enculturation was high or medium and low in Pakistan. In India the leadership was non-elitist and in Pakistan ambiguous. The autonomous groups were fully tolerated in politics in India and the converse was true of Pakistan.

Interest articulation by associational groups was significant, moderate or limited in India and negligible in Pakistan. Political parties in India performed the function of interest articulation, significantly or moderately and in Pakistan in a limited or negligible measure. The role of the police was politically significant in Pakistan and not so in India. The participation by the military in politics was neutral in India and interventive in Pakistan. The freedom of the press in India was complete and in Pakistan intermittent or internally or externally absent. [9]

The above layout of data shows a clear dichotomy as between India and Pakistan on the following characteristics :

1. Freedom of the press. (complete and intermittent).
2. System style (mobilizational and limited mobilizational).
3. Constitutional Status of the Regime. (constitutional and constitutional authoritarian).
4. Representative character of the regime. (polyarchic and limited polyarchic).
5. Current Electoral System. (competitive and

29 : Since "A Cross-Polity Survey" does not provide paging on "computor printout" material, it has not been possible to give precise citation for each characteristic analyzed under the sub-headings of similar characteristics and variant characteristics.

partially competitive).

6. Political Enculturation. (high or medium and low).

Before attempting further analysis, it must be pointed out that the "printout" states the dichotomy in tendentious terms. The above presentation is in positive terms. This has been prompted by two considerations. India and Pakistan belonged to the aerial grouping of South Asia in which many polities did not display these characteristics, but showed only a tendency toward them. But since these characteristics were identified through thorough-screening, it was thought excusable if the existing characteristics are stated in positive terms. Secondly, the statistical measure used to show the inter-relationship of various characteristics is Fisher's "v". It gives only a measure of association rather than Fisher's exact test of significance.

The dichotomous characteristics bear significant measure of association to each other. Since our problem pertains to political development "constitutional status of the regime" was selected as an independent variable and its association with the rest of the variables was examined to avoid repetition, it is sufficient to say that the constitutional status had positive significant association with the government stability, representative character of the regime, political enculturation and so on. The authoritarian status bore negative significant association to the other characteristics.

The measure of association does not, however, indicate any direction. Basing our judgment on historical evidence that has been presented in the preceding pages, the first political capability of India and Pakistan appears to be the Legislative Assembly to draw up the political

formula which would change their political legacy of authoritarian rule. The acquisition of this political capability led both India and Pakistan to apply themselves to the task of constitution-making. So, it is assumed that the change in the constitutional status was the first point of departure from the common Indo-Pak political legacy.

The "printout" does not also show as to why India became constitutional and Pakistan remained constitutional authoritarian. The partial explanation to this lies in the political forces and political personalities of India and Pakistan. The analysis in the following section will try to identify the major forces which created the difference between the two polities.

The rest of the characteristics listed above can be considered as various political capabilities of a system. India acquired them as she acquired constitutional status. The measure of association which exists between various characteristics unmistakably points out that a change in one is followed by a change in the other. As we have assumed that the capability of constitutional style was the first one to be cultivated by India, it follows that the other charactistics emerged subsequently.

The above theme is set in a better perspective when the reasons of present political conditions of India and Pakistan are analyzed. Such analysis must draw of necessity on existing historical records as no other data are available. The nature of this data may be questioned on the grounds of its being impressionistic and opinionated. The objection is valid insofar as interpretations of history are concerned but not where historical facts constitute data. Even in the matter of interpretations, the quality will be conditioned by the experience, interest and expertise of the historian analyzing the events. The following

analysis draws on the historical facts as well as the inter-pretation of the leading authorities.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

Before India and Pakistan could settle down to the task of constitution-making, they had to face the problem of communal riots and territorial consolidation. The solution of these problems was not found immediately. It got woven into the political process and affected other aspects of political dynamics. Thus, the existence of these problems influenced the capacity of the system to deal with other problems.

The influx of refugees which resulted from the communal rioting was handled with equal efficiency or inefficiency by India and Pakistan. Palmer reports in the case of India :

> On the whole, the refugee problem has been brought under control, but even today, more than a decade after independence, thousands of refugees huddle in improvised shelters in Delhi, Calcutta and other large cities of India.[30]

As regards Pakistan, Thinker observes :

> The disjointed provincial governments had to receive and feed the refugees and allocate houses and land to them. Somehow, all this was done.[31]

The refugee problem, besides creating an economic and social problem for Pakistan, created a political problem. Callard analyzing the political forces in Pakistan,

30 : Norman D. Palmer, Op. Cit., p. 27
31 : Hug Tinker, Op. Cit., p. 70.

observes : "A further cleavage lies in the distinction between refugees and native population."[30] It was largely the result of the economic status of the majority of the refugees who were poor peasants from East Punjab and small shopkeepers from other towns. India did not have to face any such problem as she received mostly the merchants, bankers and traders, doctors, technical personnel and teachers of higher education. Rather it increased the impact of the problem for Pakistan. This disadvantage represented another source of political disunity in Pakistan.

The integration of more than 500 princely states into the Indian Union posed no serious problems to India. Except for the states of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir; all other states acceded to India without any political problem. The integration and the democratization of these states was a "bloodless revolution." The states of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir were incorporated into the Indian Union by the use of unconstitutional means by India.

The use of these unconstitutional means produced more stresses and strains for the state of Pakistan. She was bedevilled not only by the problem of reconciling to the virtual loss of three Muslim states to India but also by the integration of the princely states within her own frontiers. As the interim constitution of Pakistan (slightly modified Government of India Act 1935) assured certain legal guarantees to the States, so, the legal aspects of the relations between the acceded States and the Federation of Pakistan in the future constitution turned out to

32 : Keith B. Callard, Op. Cit., p. 12.

be a "major political question." 33

These two early issues of national unification left one more common referent in the form of territorial consolidation and hence another source of disintegration. The territorial consolidation of India also showed the degree of consensus already existing in the country. The process of the integration of states was smooth in India as "the essential character of the Indian State after the achievement of freedom was largely determined before the British government decided to withdraw from India."34

The Constitution-making

The work on the constitution-making in India went in full swing soon after independence. The first draft of the constitution was ready in six months for public discussion. It was put into operation on January 26, 1950 and since then it is in force. The main objections, as Tinker proints out, came from orthodox Ghandians and from the critics of the British. Ghandians wanted to have new social order based upon village council. As the constitution was largely patterned after the Government of India Act 1935, it was criticised by some as an embodiment of slave mentality. But "few persons in the assembly or in the country at large challenged the basic character of the document."35

One noteworthy fact must be recorded at this stage. It has been seen above that the extremist element in the Congress equated nationalism with the work of God and drew their inspiration from Hinduism. There was hardly

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33 : Dawn, June 22, 1954 quoted in Wayne A. Wilcox, op. cit., p. 165.

34 . Palmer, op. cit., p. 282.

35 : Ibid.; p. 293.

any discussion regarding the religious basis of the State. The constitution of the Indian Union vested Sovereignty in the people of India.

There was such an accord on the goals of the nation and such a confidence in the leadership of the Congress and Pandit Nehru that no real conflict took place during the process of constitution-making :

> . . ., the new constitution was welcomed as a worthy embodiment of the people's will by the moderate, liberal minded, Anglicized leaders who represented Indian opinion in its first, post-independence phase.[36]

The State of Pakistan was established to provide a homeland where Muslims could live according to the tenets of Islam. This became a major issue early in the process of constitution-making. The Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on the "Aims and Objects of the Constitution." It laid the foundations of the constitution and indicated the broad outlines of its structure. The text of the resolution began with these words :

> In the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful; whereas Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; . . . [37]

Further discussion on the constitution-making was

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36 : Tinker, op. cit., p. 48.

37 : Quoted in G. W. Choudhry, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (Lahore : Longmans, Green & Co. (Pakistan Branch), 1959), p. 49.

captured in the frame-work set by the above politico-reli religious tenet.

Be that as it may, there was a deep disagreement on the nature of the Islamic State. Although Islamic government, Islamic State and Islamic Constitution were the slogans of the Pakistan movement, no one was quite sure what these slogans meant. No one had any definite plan for an Islamic constitution. When independence suddenly came, earlier disagreements between the Ulemas and the politicians, the local provincial interests and the federal forces and the leaders of East and West Pakistan crept up once again.[38]

Not only was there lack of political communication between these two groups, but there was also lack of unity in the intelligentia in their understanding and application to practical circumstances of certain aspects of Islamic legal theory and theology. The practical form that the constitution-making process gave to the intellectual controversy between traditionalists and modernists determined that both should state their positions with a clarity not to be found elsewhere.[39]

Binder has identified four important groups in the struggle for consensus on basic issues of the constitution. The political orientations of these groups were profoundly influenced by religious positions they took. The Ulemas pressed their claim for the recognition of their institution for interpreting and representing the unity, continuity and divine guidance of Muslims. The politicians were divided into two groups : (a), modernists who stressed the importance of Ijma (consensus) and rationality in Islam and

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38 : Binder, Op. Cit., p. 70-71.

39 : Ibid, p. 72-73.

(b), romanticists who wanted to establish an Islamic State on a model of Caliphate. The model of Caliphate was, however, vaguely conceived. The third group was composed of fundamentalists who believed in Ijma and Ijtehad (re-interpretations of the tenets of Islam) but with certain qualifications. They wanted to establish an Islamic State on the pattern of early Caliphate. The fourth group was represented by the Board of Talimat-e-Islamia which was actually a combination of the Ulemas and the Fundamentalists.

These bargaining groups in the Constituent Assembly did not have a common concept of Islamic State. The lack of consensus on the basis of the State, manifested itself in the deliberation of other issues too. Though these issues were not directly related with the controversy over religion and state, they were the by-product of religion as a unifying bond. The bitterness and mistrust generated by the discussion of these issues soon revealed that the Pakistan movement never enjoyed a consensus, so necessary for evolving an abiding political system.

The problem of the quantum of representation of the provinces in the federal legislature was the first vital indicator of the tensions between East and West Pakistan.

The Muslims of the Undivided India were united in a rather unique way under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and fought for Pakistan without any sense of distinction as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis and so on. But soon after the establishment of Pakistan, provincial

40 : *Ibid*, pp.

or regional feelings began to manifest themselves. East Pakistanis felt that they did not have a fair and adequate share in the central government and administration.41

The second issue in the East vs. West controversy arose out of the distribution of powers between the federal and provincial governments. East Pakistanis demanded maximum autonomy while the centre which was the stronghold of West Pakistanis resisted it. Thus, Wilcox finds :

> Federal politics are territorial politics par excellence and the need in Pakistan was for a national purpose. The federal protection given to provincial and state leaders was particularly serious because of the almost complete lack of political consensus.42

It may be argued that political consensus in Pakistan was not realized owing to a number of factors peculiar to the polity of Pakistan. We have already recorded some of the unfavourable circumstances. In addition to those, the first significant national accurance was the death of the Quaid-e-Azam the charismatic leader of Pakistan movement, in September 1948. Three years later, Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, was assassinated. Secondly the Muslim League lost its sense of mission after the establishment of Pakistan. It degenerated into an arena for internal battles and personal rivalries. Thirdly, the geographical, cultural and economic differences between East and West Pakistan posed a unique political problem.

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41 : Choudhry, *op. cit.* p. 115.
42 : Wilcox, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

These are historical fact and cannot be overlooked. It may also be pointed out that India was not a victim of any such disadvantage. Pandit Nehru, India's charismatic leader, lived long enough to translate political precepts into practice. The Congress did not undergo any disorganization. The territories constituting India formed one compact land mass and were not separated by any foreign territory.

Admitting these facts, it seems rather convincing to shift onus from dynamic political forces to the isolated and almost unrelated happenings. The influence of leadership and political organization on the direction and growth of a political system can hardly be discounted. But howsoever great and profound this influence may be it cannot indicate any causation or for that matter correlation between any two political phenomena. Nor is it asserted that the existence or absence of political consensus demonstrates the position of political prime movers.

Rather, the natural sequence of history and contingent causes of political reality show the relative importance of various variables of political development. So, it is maintained that the circumstances peculiar to Pakistau are important factors but not prior determinants of the retarded growth of the system. The low consensual potential appears to be prior in infuence on the political development of Pakistan. The events of October 1954—July 1955 and the period following the constitution in March 1956 upto the promulgation of the Martial Law in 1958 underline the importance of political consensus.

Pakistan had been in the throes of constitution morass for a long time owing mainly to the East-West conflict

and the religious controversy of the Islamic State. East
Pakistan, annoyed by the way representation question was
handled at the centre, defeated the official Muslim League
by putting up a formidable opposition of the "United
Front" in the provincial elections. "Suddenly, the whole
basis of Pakistan politics was blown away by the provin-
cial election of March 1954 in Bengal."[43] This meant
that neither the Muslim League nor the Prime Minister
could speak for East Pakistan. Ghulam Mohammad, the
then governor-general, dissolved the Constituent Assembly
as it had lost the confidence of the people.

This was a narrowly legalistic, authoritarian and
fallacious approach to the problem. But it surely revealed
that the lack of agreement among the representatives of
people could be exploited for personal aggrandizement.
At this juncture :

> The nature of constitutional authority was
> becoming cloudy. The Constituent Assembly
> had exhausted whatever mandate it had original-
> ly received; the Muslim League had ceased to
> represent any kind of 'Freedom Movement' and
> the politicians were, in the eyes of ordinary
> public, representatives merely of their own selfish
> interests.[44]

Another brilliant and apparently successful attempt
at forging agreement between different groups was made
in the shape of adoption of the constitution in 1956. But,
"the adoption of the constitution did not result in any
lessening of political strife. The government at the centre
and in the two provinces depended upon party coalitions

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43 : Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
44 : *Ibid.*, p. 77.

which were always on the verge of dissolution."[45]

Webb finds that one of the reasons for continuing instability of Pakistan was the impossibility of Islamic ideal becoming constructive political force. Munir report, while analyzing the causes of Punjab communal riots in 1953, revealed the explosive possibilities of Muslim sectionalism.

It observed :

> Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Mussalman into a citizen of the present and future world from the archaic incongruity that he is today.[46]

Webb concludes :

> Indeed, anyone who wants to understand the causes which led to the establishment of Martial Law and the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution in October 1958 might well begin by studying the Munir Report.[47]

The unfavourable circumstances, therefore, may have contributed to the quantum of consensual potential but did not play as balancing forces between unity and disunity. The unity was held in balance rather by the deeper conflicts of political dynamics which have been outlined above.

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45 : Callard, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

46 : *Report of the Court of Enquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II of 1954. t) Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances cf 1953,* (Lahore : Government Printer, 9: 4), pp. 231-32.

47 : Leiester Webb, "Pakistan as an Islamic State." *The Australian Outlook,* XIV (August, 1960), P. 162.

OTHER CORRELATES OF NATION-BUILDING

This brief treatment of the subject may generate the criticism that so many correlates of nation-building have been left out of the discussion. It was done on purpose. As the issues of language disparaties, regional economic imbalances, elites and masses, communal and national loyalties and traditionalist and modernist pulls were common to both India and Pakistan, discussion on them was reserved till a tentative partial explanation for the existing status of the polities was stated.

The issues, as listed above, are considered neither peripheral nor incidental to the process of nation-building. The present analysis seeks to link these issues to the main thesis that a consensus on common national goals lends a performance capability which facilitates resolution, formulation and disposal of other issues.

In evidence of the above position, only the issue of language disparaties would be examined here briefly. The statistical evidence presented in the last section shows that India like Pakistan is a multi-lingual state. The solution provided by India took the form of certain political structures indicating the amount of consensus embodied in them.[48] Pakistan resolved the issue only in the form of a verbal commitment which did not seep into the polity.

To meet the rising demands of linguistic groups, Andhra was created as a separate state in 1953 and later on the submission of the Report of the States Reorganization Commission 14 states and 6 centrally administered

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48 : This should not give the impression that the language problem was solved by consensus. in India The adoption of Hindi as the National language simply filled the gap for the time being. It was solved later, by recognising the status of different regional languages.

territories were created on the basis of the spoken languages.

The solution provided by Pakistan resulted in the adoption of both Urdu and Bengali as official languages with the proviso that necessary efforts should be made for the development and growth of a national language. It was not mentioned as to how this effort would be made.

It is not suggested here that India was able to meet the problem fully. Linguistic and regional problems are still troublesome in India. But a structure has been provided through which a solution would eventually be found. In Pakistan :

> It was clear from the day of its adoption that the formula could satisfy none. . . . It tried to accede to the demand of the Bengalis and at the same time sought to maintain linguistic unity. . . . In fact, an analysis of the formula would show that the framers of the Constitution wanted to postpone the issue for the next twenty years when they expected a better.environment for a solution of the problem.[49]

SUM-UP

An attempt has been made in the preceding pages to show the place and importance of political consensus in the growth and development of a system. It has been stated on the support of statistical and historical evidence that the flexibility and stability of a political system depends on the acquisition of new performance capabilities.

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[49] : Choudhry *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30.

The capability which is newly realized by a political system may be any political structure or function. The adaptation of the system will follow on the acquisition of this capability. The constitutional style of India and Pakistan was brought under examination as a new capability, since both polities started as successors to authoritarian regimes. It was found that the early existence of high consensual potential won India the constitutional style of government and thus led to the acquisition of new performance capabilities. The political development of Pakistan remained retarded and unstable as she had to muster sufficient political consensus to change her style of government from authoritarian to constitutional.

Political consensus occupies a significant position in the political dynamics of emerging nations. The manifold dimensions of consensus represent basic problems of nation-building. They also affect the rate of growth and the degree of political stability of the country. Once political consensus gets translated in a political institution or a structure, the solution of other problems crystallizes easily. It would seem, thus, that the first prerequisite of nation-building is "a sense of national unity, a political consensus."50

50 : Millikan, Max F. and Donald L. M. Blackman (eds.), *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy* (Boston: Li tle, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 76.

BUSINESS AND THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUES IN PAKISTAN : SOME OBSERVATIONS

Dr. Sayed Riaz Ahmad

An analysis of the social values in Pakistan would show that there is a very marked difference discernable in rural and urban areas. The techniques of civilizations to which rural areas adhere are still partly or entirely primitive. Primitive techniques bring with them traditional social and political relationships and these relationships in their turn create values which are medieval. In the urban areas, however, due to increasing industrialization and commercial relationships which are genesised in the wake of technological advancement and state participation in providing social and other services the old values based upon 'status' are increasingly being replaced by 'contractual' relationships.

The purpose of this article is to make some random observations in this realm and state some ideas on the nature and extent of change which business is bringing about in the social values of urban Pakistan. Urban Pakistan is an expanding Pakistan. According to one

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estimate, by the end of this century 46% of the Pakistani population is going to reside in the urban areas. It is therefore essential that our researcher should pay some attention to this very important aspect of the society. It can be said without doubt that the values of the predominent majority of the Urban Pakistan are going to change considerably in the near future. This change is likely to serve as the most important influencing factor in the vision of the future Pakistan, the nature of its political and social institutions, the policy making styles and priorities, the expectations in regard to family, town, city and country. Unless our planners take some cognizance of these influences there is a likelihood of increasing irrelevance of existing institutions with the values of urban Pakistan, and as in less than the next quarter of a century the rise in population of urban Pakistan is going to be of a staggering order in comparison to rural areas, the problems of the planner will be made extremely diverse and highly complicated.

Business in Pakistan is today the most significant force shaping our urban life and exercise a strong influence. It determines the every day values of an urban citizen, the operative values among the commercial classes and management of corporate enterprise tend to become the operative values. It is the differences in values which decide the voting patterns of a populace. In the March 1977 elections the complete polarization in the voting behaviour of urban commercial classes and the rural peasanty are a good illustration of what I am trying to point out. Although there are many controversial political issues involved one could safely say that this dichotomy exists and perhaps also that in time to come the polarization will increase both in intensity and value primise.

To make the problems of polarization more intense there has existed a mutual distrust among the business classes on the one hand and the civil servants on the other. Prof. Edward Mason of the Harvard Advisory Group to the Planning Commission stated that a foreign observer in Pakistan, "cannot fail to be impressed with the strong anti-business sentiment, that permates the civil service."[1] One observer talking about the same conflicts attributed it to "the unconscious conviction" of the civil servants "that the decisions they make are more likely to be in the 'public interest' then those which are influenced by the random outcome of market prices".[2] This could well be one of the reasons but basically there are some fundamental causes which concerns the basic value system held dear by the opposing groups. The civil servant and the politician is predominently a rural individual who was influenced by the forces of business value system in a slow manner. The Ayub era saw the rise of commercial and industrial classes in the realm of planning and policy formulation, here the decisions began to be made to suit these classes by providing subsidies, tax-holidays, and transfer of agricultural wealth to the urban industry. A view has been expressed that industrial development during the Ayub era resulted from this transfer rather than generation of capital by the industry itself. There may be truth in this or not but the important thing is that industrial and commercial sectors were dominent in policy formulation and generated their own values

1. Edward S. Mason, *Economic Planning in Under-developed Areas : Government and Business* (New York : Fordham University Press 19.8) p. 74.

2. *The Economist* (London) December 2, 1961, p 93.

which slowly found their way into the urban thinking in Pakistan.

Talking about Mr. Bhutto's government one thing is certain. It brought in a steady stream of speeches from political platforms, newspaper and magazine articles blaming business for every social ill from mal-distribution of food, clothing and housing to lack of social services like health and education and absence of social justice. Consequently his Government brought about a widespread policy of nationalization and the number of government corporations rose to over three hundred.

The commercial classes were hit through schemes of social services, amendment of factory laws and old age pension schemes, if they did not fall within the general scheme of nationalization. Commerce has now hit back through a counter attack by joining hands with traditional forces with the result that it can be seen quite clearly that in time to come any government through its policies will have to take the interest of these classes into considera-tion and policies suited to them will have to be incorpo-rated in all future planning. One can also see quite clear-ly that by doing so the values to which these classes have held most clingingly will find greater reception among the urban people at large.

(a) *Campuses*

This is rather a sweeping thesis and I am deeply con-scious of its shortcomings. However, let me consider what is happening in our universities and colleges. Surely values are being expressed there which are not motivated through business. Perhaps, but let us look deeper. The present urban student generation has grown up with less

value input from traditional forces than any previous one. The likelihood is that as time passes the content of traditional forces is going to decrease and opposite forces to increase. This student-generation is the first to have had an almost life-long exposure to non-traditional values through television and other mass media. The traditional sex shibboleths are breaking down, the tobacco advertisements may not drive them to use a certain brand of cigarettes but they are surely creating values which cannot be termed as traditional. My experience with these students and their behaviour pattern has convinced me that they are increasingly motivated by dominent influence of business on society rather than agrarian traditional values. Of course they react in a variety of ways. Some are not aware of how much they have been influenced and imbibe these values imperceptably : Some are conscious of it and accept them as 'good things' : Yet others, with varying degrees of intensity sense the effect of business on all aspects of life and are fearful of any further domination in the future. One section labels the influence "Oppressive" and the more active among them escape it by endeavouring to establish some kind of "counter culture" through political activities.

(b) The Family

Family has been the most fundamental human institution for thousands of years. Plato called it the Natural Institution. While other human institutions have been created and discarded the family has survived with minor adjustments. We in the East have looked at the family not only as "natural" but sacred. Its break down has

been equated to social ill and its survival and authority as social virtue. The philosopher took the family as the basic term of reference for building up the edifice of state authority and legitimacy until the rise of machinistic theories of state.

The traditional family concepts still survive in rural areas but take the case of urban Pakistan where the husband and wife are co-contributors in the family economy. It is not difficult to encounter people who look at the family as, primarily, a financial institution usually without being aware that this is happening. Their number is increasing at a tremendous rate. Success is judged more and more by the amount of capital accumulation and the expansion of assets. Difficulties such as character assessination of one partner by the other, the mental torture and divorce frequently have their root in the charge that someone is "unproductive" or does not contribute sufficiently to the family success. Unconditional love in the traditional sense is giving way to a more business like relationship.

(c) Business Methods

Other institutions are adopting business methods and supporting values increasingly. Terms like efficiency, accountability, profitability, and quantative criteria have found their way with the biggest organization in the country namely the government. In one case a very conservative political party has adopted planning, programming and budgeting systems. Its leadership is of the view that it can modify the assumptions of quantatively measurable results to include the intangible aims and purposes of

religion although somehow the two appear diametrically opposed.[3]

Concluding Remarks

At this point the reader is going to find himself very concerned about the issue even though he may not be, necessarily, in agreement with the thesis presented. This is a controversial issue because most of the traditional values are wrongly or rightly equated with religion and any inroads on these values are still considered to be blasphemous. My contention is that a great majority of these values do not originate from correct interpretations of religion and Islam is in no way opposed to the contractualization of social relationship and that *status*, as the basis of relationship, which is on the way out in our urban life can in no way be equated with religion.

As has been stated at the outset the operative values of business in the management of corporate enterprise tend to become, with increasing intensity, the operative values of urban life. If this is true and likelihood is that it is, it seems clear that the future will be largely shaped by business values. The central issue then is whether or not the businessman is going to make the correct decisions and establish the necessary priorities. An enlightend businessman is therefore the basic need of the society. It is only through enlightend business that the value priorities can be identified, and the growing influence of business channelized into carefully selected avenues and the establishment of a better world secured.

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3. Based on an Interview.

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ECCLESIASTICAL SANCTUARIES

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

An ecclesiastical sanctuary means a sacred place that affords refuge or right of asylum to a fugitive. The word sanctuary is also applied to the privilege itself, i e., immunity from arrest or punishment, etc. It refers to all places of refuge, including those reserved for the preservation and protection of birds and wild animals.

The institution of sanctuary has a long history, and was in some form at every stage of human civilization. There is no doubt that initially it sprang from religion, and was gradually institutionalised as the power of the church grew. Thus "the Greeks regarded the seizure of anyone who had secured the protection of a deity, a serious religious crime".[1] The practice was also observed in ancient Rome, where temples and altars etc., served as sanctuaries for men fleeing from law. Christian churches and monastic establishments provided similar protection to fugitives wanted by the state. Islam enjoined upon the Muslims to respect the sanctity of the mosque, and to avoid the use of force within its precincts. Perhaps the best known sanctuary among the Muslims is Khana Kaba. Even before the advent of Islam Khana Kaba enjoyed the privilege of offering sanctuary to fugitives. All tribal fueds were dormant among the Arabs while on pilgrimage to the Kaba. Similar status was enjoyed by the temples, pagodas and other holy places among the Buddhists, Hindus and Jains etc. The Christians not only tried to

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1. Hennesey, J. : 'Right of Sanctuary-Then and Now', *America* Vol. 125, December 4, 1971, p. 482.

carry over the tradition but also contributed towards the strengthening of the inviolability of the sacred Christian places. The present article merely reviews these efforts and highlights the reasons of eventual erosion of ecclesiatical sanctuaries within the Christendom.

In all probability the custom of offering protection to the fugitives and the criminals originated during the biblical times. Moses and Joshua set aside six cities of refuge (Golan, Ramoth, Bezer, Hebron, Kedesh and Schechem)[2] to which all those fugitives could go and seek sanctuary who had killed another person either unwittingly or accidently. Once the fugitive was admitted in the refuge city he was not to be handed back to his pursuers until he was tried before the priestly congregation. Similarly the Greeks accorded refuge awarding status to their temples. To force a fugitive out of the temple in pursuit of law enforcement amounted to a sacrilegious act and therefore a religious crime. The Romans extended the privilege of offering refuge to the statues of their emperors and the Eagles of Roman legions. History has recorded innumerable examples of similar nature from almost all cultures and civilizations.

The privilege of granting sanctuary was enjoyed by all places of worship belonging to the national church or religion. However, the institution of sanctuary grew up not only because it was explicitly ordained by the various religious laws, such as Mosaic Laws, but also because of

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2. *The Holy Bible*, London, 1971.
   Standard References : Exodus   21 : 13.
                         Numbers   35 : 6, 13,15.
                         Deuteronomy 4 : 41-43.
                         Joshua   20 : 2-9.

the popular belief that anyone who forcibly seized or killed a fugitive who had taken refuge within the precincts of a religious place was, in effect, guilty of violating the sanctity of the place, and would, therefore, meet a terrible fate. Consequently the desecration of the holy places for the sake of apprehending a criminal was to be avoided by the secular arm of the society. For this was bound to entail mass punishment in the form of a disaster or a curse. The curse of a priest was regarded far more dreadful and terrifying than the foeman's steel.[3] It was far safer to allow a few criminals to go unpunished who had taken refuge in sacred place than to invite divine anger and punishment for people at large. Thus the threat of dreadful consequences that may accrue from the desecration of a holy place gave birth to what is known as the ecclesiastical immunities.

Immunities and rights enjoyed by religious persons and establishments never really attained the legal status until the ascendency of church in the Middle Ages when assertion of such immunities and rights were frequently made by the religious leaders. It was only during the era of church domination in Europe that the ecclesiastical privilege of offering protection to a fugitive was given due recognition by the state. The earlier legal enactments were reinforced and extended to cover wide areas of ecclesiastical rights and immunities. Among the earlier legal enactments which regulated and secured the ecclesiastical rights and immunities to a certain extent were the "Constantine's Edict of Toleration" and the "Theodo-

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3. Trenholme, N. M. : 'The Right of Sanctuary in England', *The University of Missouri Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 5 Feb. 1903, p. 94.

sian Code".[4]   The outcome of these enactments was the legal recognition of the traditional rights and immunities of the religious establishments. "At first only the altar within the inner fabric of the church was regarded as a place of refuge but about 450 A. D. Theodosius the Younger made a new law where the limits of immunity were extended beyond the walls of the churchyard or precincts, including the houses of bishops and clergy, cloister courts and cemeteries"[5] However, it did not mean that the holy places were allowed to grant sanctuary to all kinds of criminals. Specific crimes were excluded. The Theodosian Code excluded the public debtors and the heretics pretending to be christians from the sanctuary protection. Similarly "the Laws of Justinian excluded from the sanctuary murderers, adulterers and ravishers of Virgins".[6]

With the rise of church power in Europe the restrictions introduced by the earlier enactments were gradually eroded by the various pronouncements of Popes and religious councils.[7]   Thus during the Middle Ages the sanctuary umbrella was extended to almost all kinds of criminals. Justification for such an extension was not only based on the traditional church rights but also on church's

4. Cox, Rev. J. C. ; *The Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Mediaeval England* London : George Allen & Sons, 1911, p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 5.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Ulmann, W. : 'The Right of Asylum in 16th Century: Theory and Practice,' *The dublin Review* Vo'. 214-15, 1944, p. 103.

concern for the fugitive. It was thought to be 'religion's role to temper justice by mercy, to force the state to reflection, to slow its single-minded pursuit of the law and its justice."[8] Crimes committed in the heat of passion or accidently needed careful evaluation of the situation before the punitive action could be taken. Often the fugitives were handed back to their legal pursuers with a promise that the fugitive would not be tortured or put to death.

The privilege of ecclesiastical sanctuary was further strengthened by the laws passed by the medieval kings. The Code of Laws introduced by Alfred the Great specifically emphasized that the fugitive who have taken sanctuary in a religious establishment were to be protected by law for a limited period and if anyone found inflicting harm upon the fugitive inside the walls of the holy place would have to pay compensations in accordance with the nature of the offence.[9] William the conqueror introduced laws forbidding violent seizure of a fugitive in a Cathedral or abbey church and anyone found in violation of this law was subjected to fines.[10] The outcome of royal patronisation of ecclesiastical sanctuary was that the sanctuary seeking became exceedingly popular practice among the criminals.

Although sanctuary seeking, by the later Middle Ages, had become a common practice but it was not a completely reliable source of protection as the number of

8. Hennesey, *op. cit*, p. 482.
9. Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
10. Ibid., p. 9.

violations of sanctuary was constantly increasing. The secular arm of society seldom, if ever, reconciled to this ecclesiastical privilege and regarded it as an obstruction for the proper maintenance of law and order and was, therefore, continuously working for its erosion. The civil rulers were particularly furious whenever church gave shelter to their political enemies but they were not quite ready to override the church power during the age of church domination. Still their resentment was expressed in the form of numerous violations of sanctuaries which took place from time to time at various places. There are many examples recorded in history books when civil officials entered the religious establishment disregarding the church rights and immunities in order to execute their task or orders. Thomas Becket, the archbishop of York, was dragged out of the church ; to force Longbeard out of the church of St. Mary le Bow Hubert Walter who was then archbishop and secular official ordered to burn the church ; Robert Howly, an esquire, "was slain in front of the prior's stall at the very time of High Mass" in 1378 and Duke of Exeter who had taken refuge in the Westminister was forcibly removed by Duke of York in 1454.[11] Although various explanations were presented by the civil authorities for such violations yet most violations resulted in damaging their own authority to a certain extent. The backfiring of such moves was particularly common during the age of church domination in Europe. For instance, the murder of Thomas Becket not only caused the humiliating penance which

11. Cox, *op. cit* , pp. 35-60.

Henry II had to undergo but the church of England also won the sole right to try its clergy.[12]   More shrewd kings tried to curtail sanctuary umbrella diplomatically and through the papal bulls. Henry VII managed "to increase the number of offences exempt from sanctuary" through papal bulls obtained respectively from Pope Innocent VIII in 1482, from Pope Alexander VI in 1493 and from Pope Julius in 1505.[13]

The process of erosion of ecclesiastical sanctuary started with the weakening of church power during the later part of the Middle Ages.   The arrival of renaissance and reformation not only accelerated the erosion process but also delivered the death blow to it.   Reformation exposed fully the abuses of immunities and rights enjoyed by the church.   This provided the long awaited opportunity to the civil authorities, who were always resentful of this ecclesiastical privilege, to move in and curtail this religious umbrella.   Consequently the post reformation period witnessed the radical curtailment of church powers. Since then the church has never been able to recover its lost powers and sanctuary has never been regarded as meaningful protection for the criminals.   Although the shedding blood or violent seizure of a criminal within the precincts of a holy place is not viewed with favour even today but the right to do so, if the need arises, now rests with the state authorities.   Thus ecclesiastical privilege of offering sanctuary in any meaningful sense has long disappeared.   In modern civil terms the right of offering sanctuary is seen as a function of soevereignty and claimed as such by all the independent sovereign states of the world.

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12.   Brinton, C. ; Christopher, J. B. ; Wolff, R. L. ; *A History of civilization*, Princeton, 1971, p. 244.
13.   Cox, *op. cit*, p. 319.

PAKISTAN (A study in Political System) by Hameed Ali Khan Rai, Kazi Sons, Anarkali, Lahore, [Pp. 208.

Mr. Hameed Ali Khan Rai of the Department of Political Science Government College Lahore has presented in the book under review a dispassionate and a thought-provoking study of Pakistan as a political system. The greatest merit of the book lies in its clarity of thinking and sincerity of purpose. To avoid confused and muddled thinking, Mr. Rai defines or what in philosophical jargon is called, presents a semantical analysis of the term around which he intends to weave his argument. The first chapter is devoted to the study of Islamic Ideology. Mr. Rai discusses therein, three contributory factors viz, the variety of efforts at Islamic reform, Hindu Nationalism and the increasing democratisation of the Government of British India to the evolution of Islamic nationalism in the Indo-Pak sub-continent. His theory of the Pious Sultan on which most of his argument is based deserves serious consideration. The second chapter concerns the politics of Pakistan during the last twenty five years. The author has divided the period into four parts, viz, the politics of opportunism (1947-1958), the politics of authority (1958-1968), the politics of uncertainty and confusion (1969-1971) and the politics of promise and hope (1971-72). The designations are self-explanatory and indicate the dominant mood of each political period. In the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters,

Mr. Rai discusses at length, bureaucracy, economic development, political parties and foreign policy of Pakistan. All these chapters are descriptive as well as critical. They raise issues of paramount importance and will, I am sure, stimulate serious thinking.

The book is primarily written for university students, but its study will benefit all those interested in identifying and assessing the current problems of Pakistan. The study maintains a high standard of scholarship throughout. It is profusely documented and has fairly up-to-date bibliography at the end. Dr. M. Ajmal ex-Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University has written a foreword to the book.

I recommend this book to students of Political Science in particular and to educated public in general.

Prof. Dr. C. A. Qadir

FRANCIS ROBINSON, Separatism Among Indian
Muslims : The Politics of the United Province's
Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge University Press,
1974), xiii, 469, £ 9.00

Francis Robinson has written a detailed account of
the early development of Muslim politics in the United
Provinces, a key region for Indo-Muslim politics in
general, as he rightly claims. U.P. was the location of Ali
garh College, the most important educational center for
Muslims in the late nineteenth century; it was the hub of
Muslim League activity in the early twentieth century;
and it was the home of most of the leading Muslims, both
politicians and ulama, who became active in anti-British
politics after World War I. For this porvince, Robinson
seeks to answer a number of crucial questions : Why did
political alignments based on religion arise at all? What
was the attitude of government and its role in the develop-
ment of Muslim separatism ? Who were the men active
in communal politics, and why and how did they organ-
ize? He takes a hard-headed approach to politics by
asking: what were the advantages to be gained, and
what were the calculations made, by Muslim politicians?
All of these are questions which need to be asked and
adequately answered. How well, then does he accomp-
lish the task?

The work begins with an examination of the Urdu-
speaking elite of the United Provinces in the late ninetee-

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nth century. Robinson states that the class of landholders and government servants was made up of both Hindus and Muslims who has more in common with each other than with their co-religionists in the society at large. He clearly analyzes the threats to which this elite was exposed in the period 1860-1900 from the spread of western education, the reform of the bureaucracy, the spread of elective government to the local level, and Hindu revivalist movements. Faced with such threats, most of them government-initiated, the Urdu-speaking elite tended to break up into communal groups. The Muslims in particular felt threatened and began to define themselves more and more, whether culturally or politically, as Muslims. This latter development is traced in a chapter on the growth of Muslim separatism before 1900, which discussed the work of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his college at Aligarh. This educational center became a focal point for Muslim political activity during "the high point of Muslim separatism," 1900-1909, when Muslim notables sought separate electorates from a government ready to concede them in order to keep the Muslims on their side.

Subsequent chapters analyze the factional divisions within the U.P. Muslim leadership down to 1923, factions which Robinson dubs, after the fashion of the British records, the "Young Party" and the "Old Party," groups which were later joined by a third, the ulama. This analysis pointedly breaks up the monolithic view of Muslim politics. While the "Old Party" became the pro-government group, the "Young Party" chose a more nationalistic path, influenced by events in the Middle East and the World war which cast Britain in an anti-Muslim road, and by the prospect of further reforms—and the

political spoils they entailed—after the war. During the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements after the war, it was the young Muslims and their ulama allies who helped Gandhi capture the political initiative, and the Congress organization. The Young Party-ulama and the Khilafat-Congress alliances ultimately collapsed, however, not only from their inherent contradictions, but also because they led political activity too far from the concrete prizes of electoral office. Hindu-Muslim cooperation and the Khilafat movement ended, according to Robinson, not in 1.22 with the cancellation of non-cooperation and the arrest of Gandhi, nor in 1924 with the abolition of the Caliphate by Turkey, but in 1923 with renewed electoral contests.

There is certainly much more to the book than this short summary can show. Robinson's research is painstaking, his analysis detailed, his style readable, and the evidence he marshalls to support his points impressive. The book contains maps, statistical tables, illustrations. glossary, bibliography, and four appendices (pp. 358-434) containing thumbnail biographies of the men he discusses.[1]

For all its virtues, however, Robinson's work is seriously flawed. For one thing, the book, while not based exclusively on government sources, tends to adopt their tone. In spite of his reading the personal papers of Muslim leaders and the newspapers of the nationalists,

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1. This reviewer has noticed a few errors in the appendices. For example, the Bilgramis, Major Syed Hasan in APP. I (P. 36ر), and Syed Hosain in APP. II (P. 395) are Shia, not Sunnis. In App. III, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni has become Hasan. There are probably other errors.

Robinson adopts a point of view which sees most Indian politics as "chicane, obbery, and extortion."[2] In spite of his occasional references to "firm religious beliefs," he seems to view the use of religious ideas and symbolism in the political context as rank opportunism, designed to hoodwink the credulous masses and to increase circulation of the young Muslim press. This tone is more objectionable than witty. Furthermore, adopting the point of view of the bureaucrat seeking to maintain British rule is not very helpful for the historian. It is one thing to defend the *status quo* against its enemies; it is quite another to seek to understand the latter in their own terms.

The overall tone of the work is only one of the problems. Another, undoubtedly related to the first, is the central role Robinson assigns to the British government in the creation of the Muslims' separate consciousness. His analysis of the fragmentation of the Urdu-speaking elite into its religious components is highly sophisticated, but one questions whether this elite ever had the social solidarity he implies.[3] Muslim reform movements since the time of Shah Waliullah, or earlier, had emphasized Islamic purification and Muslim identity vis-a-vis other groups in society. Muslim self-consciousness was as much a product of Islamic reform movements as it was a reaction to assaults by Hindu reformers or a creation of

2. The quote is not from the present work, but from Percival Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals* (reprint edn.), p. 84.

3. Robinson himself has suggested that more research needs to be done into what kind of a group the Urdu-speaking elite was. See proceedings of a workshop on Islam in India at Heidelberg in December 1974 : *Islam in Southern Asia* Wesbaden Franz Steiner,1975.

categorization by British bureaucrats, though these latter factors certainly accelerated a process already underway.

The British government, through the patronage it doled out, and through concessions in the various reforms, is also viewed by Robinson as the chief motive force behind the development of Muslim politics, especially in the competition between factions for the spoils of office. Problems of belief, of ideology, it seems, are irrelevant. One cannot deny that the constitutional changes of the successive reforms had a great deal to do with the development of Indian politics, but there also must be a place for other, less tidy and predictable factors.[4] The differences between the "Old Party" and the "Young Party" were based on ideological differences and on differences of style and personality as much as they were based on attitudes toward working with government. In addition, there were numerous factions within the "Young Party," a fact which Robinson's binary classification tends to obscure.[5]

In his treatment of the ulama, Robinson is probably farthest from achieving an adequate understanding of his subject. He portrays them as powerful political figures

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4. For other opinions on this point, see Eugen F. Irschick's review of *Locality, Province, and Nation* (Cambridge, 1973) in *Jl. of Asian Studies*, XXXIV, 2 (February, 1975), espec. pp. 461-63, 71-2; and G. Pandey's review of the same work plus Ani Seal, *Emergence of Indian Nationalism* and Gordon Johnson, *Provincial Politics and Nationalism* in IESHR, XI, 1-2 (June-September' 1974). pp. 326-40.

5. For another treatment of th interplay of Muslim factional groups, see David Lelyveld and Gail Minault, "The Campaign for a Muslim university, 1898-1920," in *Modern Asian Studies*, VIII, 2 (April), 1974, pp 145-189.

during the pre-British period' which is highly problemati-
cal. He states that certain ulama sought to re-assert
their power within the Muslim community, but does not
really examine the nature of that influence. Much more
needs to be done on the earlier organization of the ulama
before their role in the political activity of the 1920's is
fully understood.[6] Still, it is not very helpful to describe
them as a "band of private school-masters" (P. 325),
seeking to revive their trade with "fatwa power" (P. 269)
and by ties of the "old school turban" (P. 272). This is
another instance where Robinson's tone obscures as much
as it enlightens.

Robinson's portrayal of the "Young Party" leaders
also obscures important considerations. Certainly, the
Ali brothers were no saints, but catching them with their
hand in the till gets one no further toward understanding
their tremendous popular appeal and political effectiven-
ess. For that, one has to look at their writings in the
press, their oratory, their triumphal tours throughout
India in the periods before and after World War I. These
were passionate men, with great religious zeal and polit-
ical conviction. People not only believed them, but beli-
eved in their cause. And not all this emotion and belief
was misplaced. At least, one cannot look at all the follo-
wers of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements as
misguided simply becuase they were emotional, or—more
importantly — because they sought to withdraw consent

6. Barbara Metcalf has recently completed a Ph.D. disserta-
tion on the Deoband School, 1867-1900, the University of California
at Berkely, which should greatly improve our knowledge of the
Indian ulama.

of the governed from the British government. The non-cooperators failed to oust the British at that time, but the Muslim Khilafat leaders and their Congress allies were remarkably successful in broadening political participation in India.

Robinson's work is basically the study of an elite, and does not seek to examine the nature of the interaction between the professional politicians and their followers. It is not enought, however, to analyze the deepening religious animosities of the 1920's chiefly as a result of renewed electoral competition in 1923. An adequate explanation of the development of separatism should do more than briefly mention the Mapilla rebellion, the burgeoning communal violence in 1925-22, and the effects that violence had upon the actions of the leaders. In excluding mass mobilization and its repercussions from consideration, Robinson fails to analyze adequately the anatomy of separatism. For that, considerations of myth, symbol, and ideology are necessary and they are, admittedly, much harder to get at, The explanation of separatism is still far off.

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