

The Journal of Political Science

- **The Federal Polemic**
- **Iran-Iraq Conflict in Historical Perspective.**
- **Indo-Soviet Relations (1950-71) : India as Potential ally against China & U.S.A.**
- **Philosophy of Local Self Government.**
- **Hindu Philosophy as a Basis of Indian Nationalism.**
- **Quaid's Views on the System of Government for Pakistan.**
- **BOOK REVIEW**
CORRUPTION (A Third World perspective).

*Published by the Department of Political Science,
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.*

Vol. IX

No. 1, 2

Editors :

**Saeed Osman Malick
Hameed A. K. Rai**


Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.

The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College Lahore, Pakistan.

***Published by Raf Hameed Ali Khan, Manager of the
Journal of Political Science.***

**Printed by ; Shaukat Ali—Bukhari Printing Press,
Paisha Akhbar, Lahore.**



Journal of Political Science

Vol. IX


Summer, Winter, 1986


No. 1, 2

CONTENTS

1. The Federal Polemic
—*Ahmed Husain* ... 1
2. Iran-Iraq Conflict in Historical Perspective
—*Nasreen Javeed & Javeed Ahmed* ... 17
3. Indo-Soviet Relations (1950-71) : India as Potential ally Against China & U.S.A.
—*Aqila Khawaja* ... 33
4. Philosophy of Local Self Government
—*Dr. Sardar Muhammad Mian* ... 55
5. Hindu Philosophy as a Basis of Indian Nationalism
—*Arshad Syed Karim* ... 65
6. Quaid's Views on the System of Government for Pakistan
—*Mehmood Ali Shah & Naudir Bakhat* ... 79
7. BOOK REVIEW
CORRUPTION (A Third World perspective) ... 91

*The Journal of Political Science, Government College,
Lahore, Pakistan.*





THE FEDERAL POLEMIC

Ahmed Husain

A modern state is conspicuous by its dimensions in territory and population. By and large, the territory is very vast and the population is spread in different regions with different cultures existing side by side, commonly termed "Cultural Pluralism". It is inevitable in a modern state. Hence, it has to make constructive contribution for political stability and economic development. Of all the political systems, federalism is salutary for this purpose. It is working successfully in a number of developed countries like the U.S.A. It is also in vogue at present in a number of developing countries like, India, Nigeria and Pakistan.

The main feature of the federal system is division of powers between the Federal Government commonly called the Central Government and the federating units. The division of powers is mentioned in a written constitution. It is primary responsibility of the Central Government to maintain political balance according to the constitution and be watchfull of the political ambitions of the federating units, which may under the pressure of negative tendencies of cultural pluralism deviate

from the federation on the plea that the constitutional provisions are inadequate to fulfil its ambitions. It is the responsibility of the Central Government to remind by negotiations, the recalcitrant federating unit of its loyalty to the federation and as a last resort federal military intervention may take place. The example of such intervention is the U.S.A., Nigeria and Pakistan.

Federalism is an important feature of the American Political System. The fifty components of it are known as states and have their own sets of political institutions. The Federal Government is supreme in the constitutional matters and is the final arbiter about national unity. "From 1798 to 1865 there were periodically heated debates as to the extent of federal powers over the several states of the United States. Many states believed that if a state should find a law to be unconstitutional it could declare it null, void and unenforceable within its boundaries. As friction developed between the Northern and Southern States, the South further developed this doctrine of nullification and finally claimed the right of any state to withdraw or "Secede" from the Union".¹ This Federal Polemic was finally settled with the total collapse of the confederate Government in 1865.

Throughout the American Civil War, President Lincoln maintained the legal principle that the states were indestructible that they were never out

1. Ellsworth J.W. & Staluhe A.A., *Politics & Political Systems* McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1976, p. 190.

of the Union for the simple reason that they could not be.² Hence, the federation was indestructible composed of indestructible³. This conclusion was reached after the successful military action against the seceding Southern States.

Like the Civil War in America, Civil War was also fought in Nigeria to uphold the principle of undestructive Federal Union. A Civil War was fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Republic of Biafra formerly Eastern region of the Republic of Nigeria, to determine whether a federating unit could arbitrarily decide to secede from the federation formed constitutionally. Finally, it was decided after heavy loss of lives and property in January, 1970 that the Nigerian Federation had to remain intact and the Eastern Region had no legal ground to secede. Earlier in 1966, the Head of the Federal Military Government made it clear in unambiguous terms to Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the Military Governor of Eastern Region that if needed, force would be used to keep the federation intact. Eventually, he was forced to take military action as a last resort, to maintain the Nigerian Federation.⁴

However, there was a deviation from this established federal tradition in Pakistan. East Pakistan a federating unit of the Federation of

2. Morison, Commeger & Leuchtenburg, "*The Growth of the American Republic*" Oxford, University Press, 1980, p. 753.

3. *Ibid*, p. 754.

4. J.H. Peice Halies *Institutions of West Africa*, Hutchinson of London, 1977, p. 190.

Pakistan seceded despite desperate Military action. The culmination of this Federal polemic due to the recalcitrant federating unit can be understood by analysing the regional political development since the creation of Pakistan to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971.

The state of Pakistan came into existence after a long political struggle launched by the Muslims of British India which passed through many political phases, starting as loyalist with the formation of the Muslim League at Dhaka in 1906, it finally culminated in acceptance of the demand of separate Muslim State in South Asia both by the Congress and Britain. This shows that it was the Muslim public opinion under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam which forced the Congress to yield to the minority community demand for partition of British India⁵. The Quaid became the first Governor General of Pakistan "The Creation of Pakistan in 1947 would have proved impossible had it not been for the role played by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It was Jinnah who persuaded the British that partition was both necessary and morally correct. It was Jinnah who took the measure of the Congress Leaders and who deftly frustrated their hopes to rule over a United India".⁶ It was a misfortune that father of the nation died very early in 1948. He enjoyed unstinted support among the masses and main reliance was also put on him to give a viable

5. C.M. Naivi (Ed.) "*Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan*" Vanguard Books Ltd. Lahore Pakistan. 1984. p. 139.

6. Shameen Hussain Kadri, *Creation of Pakistan*, Wajidalis Lahore 1982. p. 381.

political system to the country. His untimely death created political problems of serious nature which needed a leader of national outlook like him but unfortunately Pakistan lacked in such leadership.

The Federation of Pakistan comprised of five federating units viz., East Pakistan, West Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan. All the five federating units affirmatively supported the creation of a new Muslim State under the British Government's Policy, announced on June 3, 1947. In Bengal, Punjab and Sind it was the decision of the elected Muslim members of the three provincial assemblies to accede to Pakistan. In the province of Frontier it was decided by referendum with a majority of 289,244 votes as against 2,874 to be part of Pakistan. Lastly, in Baluchistan the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of the Quetta Municipality met and unanimously decided to be part of Pakistan⁷.

By and large, it was the final verdict of the elected representatives of the areas forming Pakistan that the new state came into existence. Hence, the decision was binding on all citizens living within the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan and they had to pay allegiance to it. Precisely, the citizens had to be loyal and willing to make sacrifices for the new country which was achieved after colossal sacrifices both human and material⁸.

Like other new states Pakistan was divided

-
7. Ishtiq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*. Karachi, 1979. p. 301.
 8. Qadeeruddin Ahmad, *Pakistan : Facts and Fallacies* Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1979. p. 187.

culturally. The main cultural difference was between East Pakistan and West Pakistan had 22% of affluent Hindu population which was integral part of the society. Hence, due to this sizeable minority the influence of Hindu dominated West Bengal, the part of India, continued unabated and was derogatory to the growth of Pakistani nationalism. Though for its growth nomenclature was changed from East Bengal to East Pakistan in 1956. On the other hand, there was no such problem in Western part of Pakistan.

The real problem about difference in outlook in East Pakistan, came on the surface during the language controversy in 1952. The Muslim League Government of Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin decided to make Urdu as an official language of Pakistan. Bengali the popular language of East Pakistan was not even considered due to its Hindi origin. It was feared that if Bengali was adopted as national language then the Hindu cultural dominance would further increase. Kh. Nazimuddin was a veteran leader of the Muslim League. He was fully aware of the difficulties faced by the Quaid at the hands of the Congress for creation of Pakistan. The Congress had endorsed the scheme of partition reluctantly with the hope that eventually India would remain united. The All India Congress Committee resolved on June 14, 1947. "The A.I.C.C earnestly trusts that when the present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their perspective and the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and

discarded by all"⁹. Kh. Nazimuddin was a national leader and wished Pakistan to be politically strong and united. He feared non-Muslim dominance in East Pakistan. Hence, keeping in view the past experiences in United India he decided in favour of Urdu alone as a national language of Pakistan. He actually echoed the statement of the Quaid made in 1948 that "Urdu alone would be the national language of Pakistan"¹⁰.

The suspicions of Hindu influence from West Bengal and interference in internal matters of East Pakistan was due to the liaison of the non-Muslims and some influential Muslims with Calcutta. There would have been no such thing had the non-Muslim population of East Pakistan like West Punjab migrated to India. The Punjab had also sizeable Hindu population with common culture. But it was politically against partition of India. However, after partition they migrated to India and Punjab was saved from facing minority problem like East Pakistan. Secondly, East Pakistan was isolated from other federating units by a distance of one thousand miles of Indian territory. The problem of distance could not be overcome till the end. Due to it everything was intricated which gave rise to suspicious and mischievous propaganda, against the Central Government based in West Pakistan. Had the capital been in East Pakistan there would have been less antagonism against it.

9. *op.cit*, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, p. 295.

10. Syed Nur Ahmed, *From Martial Law to Martial Law*, Vanguard, Lahore, 1958. p. 288.

The long delayed provincial election in 1954 further aggravated the regional problem in East Pakistan. The 1954 provincial election in East Pakistan was won by United Front headed by A.K. Fazlul Haq of Krishka Sromik Party and Suhrawardy of Awami League. It was a vote against the Muslim League Government at the Centre, which had supported the provincial government in the elections.¹¹ The election was contested on 21 point manifesto. Two points of it clearly indicated that due to geographical distance Western region was considered to be an alien territory with its own separate interests. One was to demand full and complete autonomy for East Pakistan leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency with the Centre. The second was to abolish the visa system between East Pakistan and Indian Bengal.

It was this demand which led to the dismissal of the victorious United Front Chief Minister Fazlul Haq in 1954. During his visit to Calcutta, the Capital of Indian Bengal, at one reception he said, he hoped with the help of the people of India, to remove the artificial barriers between the two Bengals".¹¹ On the other occasion he declared that he did not believe in the political division of a country and was not familiar with the two new words Pakistan and Hindustan.¹²

There were also political differences between the other four federating units of Pakistan. But

11. K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan*, Islamabad, P.O. Box 1230, 1976, p. 18.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the common and contiguous territory made things easy for them and in most of cases the differences were amicably resolved. East Pakistan was an isolated federating unit, with vicinity to West Bengal and common culture. Hence, a tendency to share problem with it, as a substitute to the other federating units of Pakistan. It may be proper emotionally but politically it was a blunder. Referring to the United Front Chief Minister, in his statement in Calcutta actually he contradicted the 21 points election manifesto. It was mentioned in it that "Foreign Affairs" would be the Central subject. On the other hand he made a policy statement about relations with India which was a federal subject following under 'Foreign Affairs'. There were also non-Muslim leaders of the Congress Party in East Pakistan who benefitted economically by smuggling of goods across the border worth millions. They were based in Dhaka and Narayanganj. This loss of national wealth transpired during the campaign launched through an Ordinance by Prime Minister, I.I. Ghundrigar in 1957. It was called "Operation Close Doors" and was headed by General Umrao Khan the General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan. According to him "It was a miracle that Pakistan's wealth had been so widely looted for many years and yet the economy did not collapse".¹³ However, this ordinance could not become law due to political pressure of the Awami League¹⁴.

13. Syed Nur-Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 386.

The political gap between East Pakistan and the Central Government kept on widening due to emotional contact with West Bengal. Relationship with Indian Bengal was close but at the same time it could not solve the various problems faced by Pakistan for which the proper authority was the Central Government of Pakistan. Hence, the development of suspicion, on both sides.

Present, is a democratic age. It is believed that the people should be allowed to control government through their elected representatives. Hence, the decision to hold first General Election in Pakistan in 1970 was hailed as a panacea for all political ills. Particularly, It was hoped that the election results would bring forth amicable relations between East Pakistan and the Central Government, and federal bonds would be cemented. It was presumed that the elected representatives would be able to reach an agreement for strong federal structure. Unfortunately, the suspicion existing between East Pakistan and the Central Government further deepened and eventually led to the dismemberment of the country in 1971.

Deep rooted suspicion had already damaged Pakistani nationalism as can be seen by the statement of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the founder and first President of Bangladesh made after secession of East Pakistan in 1971. According to him. "He had been working for the secession of East Pakistan for sometime"¹⁵. This statement can

15. Mujili's television interview with David Frost (London weekend Television) January 16, 1972.

be corroborated from the political events which took place after declaration of six point programme for regional autonomy on February 12, 1966, by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman President of the Awami League.

Main reason for enunciating these points was that in Indo-Pak War of September 1965, the problem of territorial distance was fully exposed and East Pakistan was left undefended during the 17 days War¹⁶. The remedy suggested by Mujib to base the future constitutional system on his six-points was tantamount to declaration of detach from Pakistan. Particularly his second point that "The Federal Government would control only defence and foreign policy, leaving all other subjects to the federating provinces of East and West Pakistan", would reduce the Federation to the level of a loose confederation which was against the modern trends in federalism. Mujib's proclamation destroyed once and for all, the all Pakistan character of the Awami League. Consequently, criticism of his policy at the Central level and aggravation of the political situation in East Pakistan.

With the announcement of dismemberment of One Unit in West Pakistan a demand was also made in East Pakistan that the nomenclature of the province should be changed to Bangla-Desh. According to Maulana, Bhasam the region was populated by Bengali speaking people traditionally known as Bangla-Desh¹⁷. This means that on the eve of

16. Keesing's Research Report, *Pakistan: From 1947 to the creation of Bangladesh*. Charles Serilener's Sons, New York, 1971, p. 96.

17. Morning News, Karachi and Dacca, Dec. 8, 1969.

General Election in 1970 the demand for Bangla-Desh had become common in East Pakistan. The supporters of Mujib were campaigning with Joy Bangla (Victory to Bangla-Desh)¹⁸. There was also interference by India in the internal matters of Pakistan. All India Radio, from its station in Calcutta was broadcasting a programme every evening entitled Apper Bangla, Oupper Bangla (this side and the other side of Bengal), openly supporting the cause of Bangla-Desh¹⁹. The above election campaign from within and without the country was against the Legal Framework Order promulgated on March 30, 1970 by President Gen. Yahya Khan, for the future constitution of the federation of Pakistan. The election campaign was directly against territorial integrity of Pakistan. Surprisingly, no serious notice was taken of this constitutional violation. Presumably, the official view was that the Awami League would not get absolute majority from East Pakistan. The political pundits were of the opinion that National Assembly seats from East Pakistan would be shared by Awami League alongwith other political parties with national organisation. However, the election results in 1970 completely baffled those who under estimated the regional appeal heralded by the Awami League. It captured 67 National Assembly seats out of 169 allocated to East Pakistan²⁰.

18. G.W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakishan*, G. Hurst and company, London, 1974, p. 121.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

20. *The Bangla Desh*, Vanguard Books Ltd, Lahore 1979, p. 130.

Since the announcement of Six-Points manifesto in 1966, the Awami League unavowedly criticised the role of Central Government vis-a-vis East Pakistan. It enabled it to engender hatred in East Pakistani nationalism. In this way it laid emphasis on negative cultural pluralism and thus became purely a regional party²¹. The results of the National Assembly Election in 1970 further confirmed it. About making the future constitution by the National Assembly, the Awami League Chief said, "We want to frame a constitution and we shall frame it on the basis of Six-Point Programme. Pakistan's politics is the politics of conspiracy and intrigue. Conspiracy had not yet stopped it is still going on. But since the Bengalees have learnt to shed blood, no one can stop them any more. We must frame the constitution on the basis of six-points²²."

The Central Government of General Yahya Khan conducted a fair and impartial election in 1970. The proof of which was the landslide victory of Awami League in East Pakistan. The main purpose of 1970 election was to stabilise the federal structure in Pakistan. With decision making majority in the National Assembly, the Awami League leadership was oblivious of the rights of other federating units in West Pakistan. Therefore a deadlock and problem of law and order in East Pakistan which was a component part of the Federation of

21. To Check regionalism in Nigeria only five national political parties were allowed by the Nigerian Election Commission to participate in 1979, General Election.

22. Statement in Dacca on February, 9, 1971.

Pakistan. When the negotiations broke down, the Central Government had to deploy army for internal security in East Pakistan.

Historically this action of national army had been justified both in the U.S.A. and Nigeria. In both cases the secessionist federating units were subjugated by Military intervention. Afterwards in both the countries there started nation building process which made them all to forget the bitterness of past and political unification was successfully achieved. Even though the Civil War took place in the States over three hundred years ago and in Nigeria the Federation with all its component units was restored in 1970 but in both cases constructive national integration was achieved after Military action.

Similarly, to save the federation of Pakistan Military intervention took place in March 1971 in Eastern federating unit. Nonetheless, it proved to be inadequate to check recalcitrant federating unit, from secession. Hence, the emergence of Bangla-Desh as a new Muslim state in South Asia. In case of Pakistan the failure of military action was due to lack of geographical contiguity, which made it difficult for the Central Government to have quick access to East Pakistan. Resulting in, disintegration of the country.

Before 1947 United India was ruled by the laws passed by the British Parliament. The main policy was primarily to maintain law and order. The

economic development was restricted to the requirements of the Imperial power. The Indian society was static. Some areas were reserved for recruitment of personnel for armed forces and others for industrial development. For example, Punjab and Frontier were recruiting provinces in the Indian Army. Calcutta was developed as an industrial and commercial city. The area comprising East Pakistan was less developed in comparison to West Bengal which became part of India.

The Central Government of Pakistan did envisage development plans for the eastern province alongwith development of West Pakistan, keeping in view the requirements of federal system. From the very inception adequate representation was given to East Pakistan in all spheres of life. The scathing criticism of the Central Government till the creation of Bangla-Desh would have been justified had there been no representation given to East Pakistan at the national level. Whether one was an original Bengali or a settler did not carry any weight because fundamentally a federal government has to work for national integration. This is particularly important in a developing country so that there should be created harmony in the society and obduracy due to cultural pluralism should be discouraged. There was criticism of the economic policies of the Central Government which was partly exaggerated. Apparently a belief pervaded in East Pakistan that they were entitled as of right of preferential treatment, independent of individual

merit²³.

On the eve of secession it was believed that the panacea for all political and economic ills was the creation of an independent state of Bangladesh. Thus with the help of Indian Military the object was achieved in 1971. As far as, solution, to the manifold problems faced by Muslim Bengal are concerned they are still there even though secession took place about fifteen years ago. The process of development in general is very slow and complicated. It is due to this reason that the countries which became independent after World war II are termed "Developing".

23. Rushbrook Williams, *The East Pakistan Tragedy*, Tom Stacey Ltd., London, 1972, p. 24.

IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Nasreen Javeed & Javeed Ahmed

The Iran-Iraq conflict, perhaps is going to be the longest in the history of the 20th century. It has entered into the seventh year and it seems that it will continue for another couple of years. Several efforts have been initiated by the United Nations, Islamic Conference, and individual nations to persuade both the parties to resolve their difference with negotiation instead of war. Till recently, nothing tangible has been achieved by these efforts. Iran is adamantly sticking to two pre-conditions to any negotiation. The first is that Saddam Hussein should leave the power and second is, that Iraq should agree to pay damages of war which runs in billion of US dollars. Whether these pre-conditions are justified or not is a separate matter, but these conditions have created a war hysteria which has been causing hundreds and thousands of human lives, deteriorating the economies of both the nations, and further destabilising the regional security. On the other hand Iraq triggered war with the consideration that weak and disorganized army of Iran would easily be defeated and the

grounds for repossession of the lost territory would be paved. The expectations were frustrated because the domestic dispersive tendencies in Iran converged to unity and the postrevolutionary royal demoralized army took it as an opportunity to show loyalty to the new regime and retaliated with strength. Iraq has been trapped. Though Iraq has directly or indirectly tried to get out of it, yet the interested parties want continuity of war. The monarchies in the Arab world are afraid that if Iranian forces won, their strongholds would be toppled.

Several efforts have been made to explain the basis of Iran-Iraq conflict. The most significant effort is of Tariq Ismail (1982). He has analysed the conflict in historical and legal perspective and delineated that the present conflicting conditions are the result of personality conflict. There is no doubt personality conflict has stalled the peace efforts, yet it has not served as a prime cause of this conflict. The personality conflict approach makes the explanation of the present conflict narrow and limited. The other point of view has been projected by most of the news media. Lewis (Feb. 22, 1981), a columnist of the New York Times explicated this war in terms of 'unjust territorial adjustments'. He has contended that Khomeini's expansionist designs have failed to accept Iraq's historically just territorial claims of Shatt Al-Arab.¹ The special

1. Anthony Lewis, 'Iran-Iraq War' *The New York Times* (daily) February 22, 1981.

Middle East correspondent of News Week (October 15, 1980) has enumerated Iran-Iraq conflict in the same perspective. This approach has been biased and more in line of toeing American broader interests.

It is very difficult to understand the present conflicting conditions between Iran and Iraq with any particular approach. It needs a combination of many aspects to find the cause and dimension of the conflict. Jeffery has stated.

“The Iran-Iraq conflict is historically deep rooted, emotionally entrenched in nationalism, and internationally intrigued by the interested powers.²

The Iran-Iraq conflict can be studied in three historical settings.

- (i) Fifteenth to eighteenth century,
- (ii) Eighteenth to twentieth century, and
- (iii) Iraq's independence and after.

In each historical period, the issues and dimensions of conflict have been different. The effort is being made to explain those issues and dimensions in their historical context.

National Identities of Iran and Iraq

Iran shares borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union, and Iraq. To the South and Southwest is Persian Gulf and Shatt Al-Arab. With an area of 1,648,000 square kilometers

2. Hussain Jeffery, 'Why Iraq Invaded Iran' *The Pakistan Times* (daily) March 24, 1981.

(636, 296 square miles), and a population approximately forty million, Iran has the potential for a modern productive economy. Iran has been rich in raw material in general and oil in particular. The country has been ruled by monarchy for centuries, but in 1979 the monarchy has been finished and replaced by an Islamic revolutionary elite.

Iraq, on the other side did not have national identity prior to 1936. The area that constitutes Iraq, used to be a part of Mesopotamia, and was under the suzerainty of Ottoman empire. The Ottomans did not recognize the economic significance of this area, therefore left it unprotected. No army was stationed on regular basis. NP Iraq shares borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. There is no ocean link except Shatt Al-Arab. The population is approximately 11 million, and area is 443,000 square kilometers (170,000 square miles). The economy is based on agriculture and oil. This place has been historically very important. The war of Karbala, which changed the course of Islamic history, was fought in this area. Iraq as an independent state emerged after the fragmentation of Ottoman empire in World War I, but complete rights to govern and conduct her foreign policy were obtained in 1936.

Roots of Iran-Iraq Conflict during Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century

The Iran-Iraq conflict during sixteenth to eighteenth century can be understood through *the expansionism of Safavids' and Ottomans' empires,*

and economic significance of Shatt Al-Arab. Iraq being a part of Mesopotamia remained unprotected by the Ottoman empire. These conditions existed because the Ottoman rulers used to get allegiance of most of the nomadic and settled tribes of the area. In the event of insurgency, the army used to be despatched to subdue it. On the completion of the expeditions the army used to return to the capital. On the extreme east of Mesopotamia, Persian empire was not a threat, because it was constituted of tribes, whose inter-tribal conflicts did not pose any danger to the Ottoman emperors.

Iran before sixteenth century, was an abode of various tribes, i.e., Medes, Parthians, Scythians, Archaemcids and Persians. Ismail was the founder of modern Persian empire. He established Safavid dynasty and declared Shia'ism as the religion of the dynasty. The Shias were a small minority in Persia, but Ismail wanted to expand his base either by converting other minorities or encouraging migration from Shia centres. At that times, the majority of the Shias were centered in and around Basra, Kerbala, and Koofa. Ismail invited a large number of Shia scholars from those areas.³ He granted them large estates and shared powers in the decision making. This encouraged considerable number of Shia migration to Iran. Due to his association with the religions leaders, he was tempted to invade an unprotected Mesopotamia to include

3. Nikki Keddie, *Roots of Revolution ; An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*. New Haven, Yale University Press 1971. p. 11.

Shias' religious centers to his dynasty. In this venture he was helped by Shia leaders. He was also positive that victory would extend the territories of his empire, which remained unmaterialized during his life time.

Ismail organized his forces and invaded Mesopotamia in 1504 and captured it. Hardly, he could establish his dynastic stamp on this area, the Ottomans recaptured the area. Persian king retook in 1529 and lost it again to Ottomans in 1543. This win and defeat process continued, but the Persians failed to establish their permanent foothold in this area. From 1504 to 1757 eight wars were fought in which thousands of people were killed from both side. There were three treaties which were concluded to avoid war. In those treaties, the Safavids' claim on Mesopotamia was not accepted, but the security of the people and some economic privileges were assured.⁴ The Safavids' rulers, during their occupation of the area, found out the economic importance of Shatt Al-Arab.⁵ The economic privileges which were assured in Amassia (1555) and

-
4. Tariq Ismail *Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict*. N. Y. Syracuse University Press, 1982, p. 3.
 5. Shatt Al-Arab is a conjunction of rivers Euphrates and Tigris which leads to Persian Gulf and then to the Indian Ocean. For centuries, this root has remained centre of civilizations. This waterway has been an economic life-line of the area. The land has been very rich in agricultural products and in the remote past Mesopotamia was considered to be a bread-basket of the Middle East. On the east side of this waterway laid a long stretch of desert going to the land of Persia. It was known Arabistan, (Now name as Khuzistan) and was inhabited by Sunni tribes who extended their allegiance to the rulers of Ottoman empire and not to the Persian kings.

Zuhab treaties (1639) were concerned with Shatt Al-Arab.

The Safavids' rulers considered that the control on Shatt Al-Arab meant control on the agricultural economy of the area and expansion of their dynasty. This could not be done because the Ottomans, though did not station regular army in this area, yet whenever the threat lurked on their empire, battled to dispel it.

Roots of Iran-Iraq Conflict during Eighteen to Twentieth Century

The reasons of the failure of the Persian supremacy in Mesopotamia were the tribal structure of Arabistan, and the Shia religion of Persian rulers. It was extremely hard to seek allegiance from the sunni tribes of the area. With several defeats and losses of human and material resources, the Persian rulers still did not want to abandon their expansionism as well as to forget the economic benefits of Shatt Al-Arab. The rulers continued their efforts to conquer the area and the Ottomans' retaliated them.

During this period, the emergence of other actors in the region, gave a new dimension to Iran-Iraq conflict. In the eighteenth century the British and Russian emerged as empires and started expanding towards centres of old civilizations. In the middle of this century, they obtained commercial concessions from the Ottoman rulers, and also

sought permission to use Shatt Al-Arab waterways for transportation of raw material to their markets.

A new development in Mesopotamia provided an opportunity for the Britishers to establish centres of commerce and power in and around Shatt Al-Arab. In 1751 the Persian ruler invaded Arabistan and tried to capture Shatt Al-Arab. He was resisted by Ka'ab tribe (one of the largest and powerful tribes of Arabistan) and was defeated.

This emboldened the leaders of the tribe and they started trying to establish independent empire of their own. The tribe controlled the waterway and invaded the west side of Shatt Al-Arab. This led to a direct confrontation with the Ottoman empire. Withdrawal of allegiance invited Ottoman army to subdue them. The Ottoman rulers wrongly sought help of the Britishers to deal with the situation. Ka'ab's insurgency was succumbed but paved a favourable ground for the Britishers to have more concessions in the use of Shatt Al-Arab. In the post 1768, the Britishers developed commercial links with the Persian empire. They got concessions in drilling, refining and exporting of oil and latter permission to export raw material was also obtained.

On the other side Russia had already developed economic and political links with the Ottomans and some economic concessions were also achieved from Persia. By the nineteenth century the Middle East had become a focus of Russo-British expansionism,

Russo-Persian conflicts (1804-13 & 1826-28) and Russo-Ottoman wars (1806-12 & 1828-29). The Russian monarch with military successes got both territorial, economic and political gains. As a result, British imperialist policy became obsessed with Russophobia (fear of Russian' designs on the British sphere of interests).

Weaknesses of both Persian and Ottoman empires gave enough chances and opportunities to the Russian and British empires to manipulate the Persian-Ottoman rivalry. Though Persian and Ottoman empires were not strong enough to counter Russo-British moves, yet they continued fighting on Mesopotamia and Shatt Al-Arab in 1771, 1793, 1821, and 1823. In the inconclusive war of 1823, both the empires arranged an agreement, known as Treaty of Erzeroom. Under this treaty, for the first time the Ottomans accepted some claim of the Persian empire on the Arabistan, but did not recognize the Persian sovereignty over it.⁷ The rivalries kept smouldering under this agreement. This agreement did not give more concession or security to the Russo-British interests in the area, therefore, both Russia and Britain were displeased. By 1838, the Persian Qajar rulers had gone very weak and became dependent on the help and advice of the British and Russian elements. The rulers were trying to keep balance between Russian and British forces.⁸ In order to obtain more concessions in Persia Mesopotamia, the Russians and Britishers

7. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

8. *Teal.*, *op. cit.*, Kedie, p. 23.

joined hands to exploit the rivalry. They suggested another agreement to settle the boundaries between Persian and Ottoman empires. The joint commission in which the Britishers and Russians were significant, prepared an agreement, known Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 to be signed by the involved parties. Two aspects of this treaty were important, i.e. the British and Russians will act mediators in future conflict ; Persian sovereignty was extended to the Eastern bank of Shatt Al-Arab.⁹ The treaty was accepted by Persian rulers, but rejected by Ottoman monarch. The Russians and the Britishers did not want to displease the Ottoman monarch, therefore restored Ottoman's sovereignty over Shatt Al-Arab. This part of the treaty, which some Iranian scholars and leaders express, was not shown to the Persian ruler, therefore was not signed. This treaty was framed around Russian and British interests and not on the future interests of Persian or Ottoman empires, consequently left a gap for rivalries to germinate.

By the end of nineteenth century, the German entry in the region gave a new dimension to big empires' conflict of interests in the region. The German emperor started expanding his economic interests beyond his empire. The Britishers and Russians were already amassing huge economic benefits from the Middle East. The Germans wanted to share the economic wealth of this area. The German efforts led to the grant of rail-link from Baghdad connecting Konia and Gulf, which was

9. *Teal., op. cit.*, Ismaili, p. 12.

latter obstructed by the Britishers. The Britishers compelled the Ottoman ruler to accord them more concessions. This gave birth to a triangular game of interests which flared the conflict and Shatt Al-Arab was used as a manipulative card. Ismail is correct in saying that 'It was imperial chess game played in the Middle East'.¹⁰

The turn of the 20th century witnessed enormous changes in and around Middle East. The First World War broke out between Axes and Allies. Germany and Ottoman were among Axis and remaining competing imperial powers were on the other side. The Qajars were overthrown in Persia and replaced by the Phelvi dynasty. This conspiracy was hatched by the Britishers. The Ottoman empire was fragmented after defeat, and Russia embraced communist revolution. In these changes, the Britain came out to be the dominant empire whose interests were hegemonic and unchallengeable. Out of the pollarization of Balkans, Iraq emerged as a separate monarchical system to be tutelaged by the British government. Though the British became a power in the region, yet did not try to settle this issue. Perhaps it was for the best interest of the British empire to let this bone of contention remain, so that to have an instrument of manipulation in their hands. In 1936, the army overthrew the monarchy lessened the influence and patronage of the British.

Independence of Iraq and aftermath

With the independence of Iraq new dimension

10. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

to the age old conflict was added. Ottoman empire ended and along with it the claim on waterway. The Britishers accepted Iranian claims in that area under peace armistice in which Iraq was not made a party. The Britishers kept the Iraqi monarchy weak and dependent. Immediately, after coup in Iraq, the Persian ruler Reza Shah deployed army on the border to establish authority over the border laid down under treaty of Erzerum of 1847. Not finding any resistance, Iran extended jurisdiction till the middle point of Shatt Al-Arab. Iraq was too weak to retaliate, therefore took the issue to the League of Nations. As League was dominated by Allies, and on the other hand Britain had more confidence in Iran instead of Iraq, so nothing was resolved. Iraq was under the supervision of the British, and did not have enough strength to reject and resist the Iranian claims on the area.

The outbreak of World World War II in 1939, changed the political scene of the Middle East. Many new nationalist forces started emerging and the British power was replaced by American interest. The British, in order to secure their economic interests, concluded an agreement of mutual understanding which gave birth to the Baghdad Pact and latter CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). It did not work out for a long period, because it was not serving American interests, and moreover the inner rivalry of Iran-Iraq undermined the objectives the Britishers wanted to secure. American replaced Britain in Iran, Turkey and Israel. America began a huge

programme of militarily equipping and training these nations on the pretext of containing the Soviet influence. It was an effort to create watchdogs in the area to safeguard American interests. Consequently, the opposing forces of these watchdogs were compelled to seek help and aid from Soviet Union. Egypt, Syria and Iraq befriended with Soviet power. This set a stage for super powers to play their role.

Iran in early 60s unilaterally dropped the treaty of 1937 and invaded Iraq and captured islands of Abu-Musa, Greater and Small Tunb. Iraq was too weak to recapture the islands. Iraq took the case to the United Nations in search of peaceful settlement, but was frustrated due to the indifference of the super powers. Iran continued her hegemonic position with the help of both Britain and USA. In 1975, Algier agreement was signed, which served the interests of the American and British empires and extended Iranian claim on Shatt Al-Arab more than what was laid down under 1847 and 1937 treaties.

Nevertheless, the conditions were changed in Iran after the over-throw of Muhammad Reza Shah and with the institution of Islamic revolutionaries the American influence in Iran had met a severe setback. The diplomatic relations were broken and Americans were kept hostages. At the same time Khomeini declared that Islamic revolution will be exported to other areas of the region, which clearly meant that monarchies around Iran had

to be replaced by Islamic revolutionaries. This provided an opportunity for USA to reassert her influence in the region. The American, through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Persian Gulf states persuaded Saddam Hussain to attack the eastern side of Shatt Al-Arab. At that time Iranian revolutionary government was still in the process of consolidation, her army was disintegrated and there was a serious crisis. Saddam Hussain became victim of the super power intrigue and attacked Iran. He thought that his forces will capture the area within a couple of days. Instead, the Iranian became united and the invasion was repulsed. Saddam Hussain made a serious mistake. The war has been prolonged and costing considerable loss in men and material.

The conflict is still unresolved. There is no doubt that in the whole history of conflict Shatt Al-Arab belonged to Iraq, but due to the imperial designs of the past regims of Persia and Ottomans, conflict of interests of Britain and Russia, and later American-Russian rivalry have been exploiting the issue to gain more hegemony in the area.

It has been historically true that the conflict between or among the region's forces has always served the interests of the external forces. The continuity of Iran-Iraq conflict is still serving the interests of America and U.S S.R. The Americans are selling huge military supplies to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other powers which are being funneled to the conflicting parties through direct or indirect means.

America has won Iraq, but has lost Iran. Russians are also looking for an opportunity to establish their influence in Iran. Presently, the Soviets are engaged in Afghanistan and are seemingly quite. Perhaps Russian are waiting for a time when Iran would be compelled to seek their help. The expansion of Russian influence in Iran means complete decline of American hegemony in Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The Americans will either try to hatch another conspiracy to overthrow the present regime or use indirect resources to recultivate and reassure their friendship with Iran to secure their interests and hegemony.

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1950-71

INDIA AS POTENTIAL ALLY AGAINST CHINA & U.S.A.

Aqila Khawaja

Today the Soviet Union maintains the most extensive relations with India in economic, political, cultural, and military fields. These relations between the two countries with a total population exceeding 800,000,000 have become a vital factor in world affairs.¹

The Soviet goals in South Asia have mainly been power political rather than ideological gains. India's policy of Satellitism has encouraged the Kremlin to achieve her objective in Asia, through India.

The Soviet approach to India has been decisively influenced by the events in Communist China and Pakistan. Reference to the Soviet Policy toward these two nations are, therefore unavoidable in discussing Soviet-Indian relations. Among the questions asked are : What are the Soviet objec-

1. Roy, Hemen, *Indo-Soviet Relations*, Jalco Publishing House, Bombay, 1973, p. front flap.

tives in India and to what extent have these objectives been realized? How did the Soviets deal with India's clash with Communist China and Pakistan?

The Soviet Union gave unreserved support to India's policy on such sensitive issues like Kashmir and Goa. New Delhi also received unequivocal support to play the role of a Great Power in international affairs. In 1959 when China posed a threat to India, Moscow began to regard India as a potentially valuable partner in Asia. This relationship continues until present day inspite of some tensions and disagreements.

The major emphasis of this paper is on the motives of Russian's which led them to extend their friendship towards India. Moscow was interested in India's non-aligned policy, which could weaken the western influence in Asia. This served Moscow's regional and global needs.

The Soviet Union wanted to be the only big power in Asia. She considered Communist China as a barrier in Asia. Russia wanted to prevent Chinese expansionism. The Soviet saw India as a stepping stone for their policy goal and to maintain influence in the Indian Ocean. India was a helpful ally for the Russians.

The Soviets wanted to tilt India's neutrality toward Moscow, with all these factors, India emerged as a focal point of Soviet foreign policy and the leading recipient of Soviet foreign aid pro-

gramme. Moscow wanted to increase her prestige in Asia. Being a big country in Asia and the Third World Soviet Policies could be carried through India effectively.

Russia established relations with India just before Indian independence. In April 1947 the Soviet Union and India announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.

In his last months Stalin noted that Soviet policy would have to become more flexible.

The necessity to create a more flexible Soviet foreign policy was evident. The Stalinist approach had brought about an anti-Soviet coalition of powers in the West which in turn led to an alliance system encircling the Socialist.²

The leaning towards India occurred in Post-Stalin Period.

Several month after the death of Premier Stalin there were indications that a basic change in the Soviet attitude toward the Nehru Government was in the offing. Over the next two years the USSR made a series of gestures, designed both to gain New Delhi's confidence and to diminish Western influence in India.³

The "Stage of Seige" neutrality of the cold war had been conducive to the Stalinist order of the society. Khrushchev sought to bring an end

2. Stein, Arthur' *India and the Soviet Union*, University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 36.

3. Ibid., p. 32.

to the reign of terror within the USSR. With the escalation of cold war, Soviet military expenditures had grown. Achievement of the domestic and external objectives of the new Soviet leadership was in large part contingent on a reduction in East-West tension.

Moscow shifted away from the sterile "two camps" approach to a view that recognised the growing "third force" in international politics. This shift gave way to a more flexible position, that allowed for a group of newly independent nations not committed in either camp. The significant non-Communist Asian nations are Japan, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. In 1954-55 Japan and Pakistan were firmly tied to the United States. The Soviet Union began to court India and Indonesia, which had asserted a preference to remain outside the American-sponsored alliance system. A focal point of the Soviet interest lay in India, the largest and by far the most populous of the non-aligned nations. India had demonstrated an independent foreign policy during the Korean war period. Equally important was the Soviet need to counter the Western alliance system around the Southern perimeter of the Communist world.

Unlike the United States, the USSR sought no formal alliance with India. To neutralize Anglo-American influence in South Asia in itself would be significant. Without India the anti-communist alliance in South-East and West Asia would be without the most important

geographic linchpin.⁴

This policy took advantage of the strong feelings of anti-Western imperialism and the residue of anticaptitalism which existed among elitist elements in the emerging nations.

By 1955 a constant pattern in Soviet policy began to emerge, Moscow encouraged the concept of an Asian "Peace Zone," praised India's role in world affairs, increased its trade with India, and pledged economic and technological assistance. The immediate goal of the Soviets in these gestures seemingly was to reinforce Indian non-alignment in the cold war with the possibility that in the future Indian support might be enlisted for Soviet policy. Nehru, K. M. Panikkar, and K.P.S. Menon were receptive to any indication of change within the communist world. Nehru was able to respond quickly to the Soviet initiative in 1955.

At a time when the United States was sponsoring arms aid to Pakistan and the creation of the "Southeast Asia Treaty Organization" Moscow was hailing Nehru's plea for the abolition, of nuclear weapons. India was praised as a nation which was,

"becoming an important factor in the strengthening of peace and security in Asia—one which would never join the Americans in the pursuance of their aggressive plans."⁵

4. Ibid., p. 39.

5. Ibid., p. 41.

The American efforts to draw Pakistan into military alliance did not go unnoticed in the Soviet Union. The Soviets criticized that this had touched the Indo-American relations to the lowest point. The main emphasis of the Soviet policy was directed at demonstrating the aggressive attitude of the United States towards India and contrasting with it the disinterested friendliness of the Soviet Union toward the Indian people.

“The Soviet Union tried her utmost to exploit the anti-American feeling granted by the U.S. decision to arm Pakistan.”⁶

The Soviet press took full advantage of India's opposition to U.S. decision to arm Pakistan and gave wide publicity to it. India's opposition to the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan had been of considerable importance to the Soviet approach to India. The rise of anti-American feeling in India produced a great stir in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders were obviously happy with the development in India.

“The more Pakistan's entry into the Western alliance became evident, the more the Soviet Union extended its support to India.”⁷

Moscow did not fail to exploit the feeling of general discontent against Washington by promptly cultivating India and other non-aligned countries. So far as India was concerned, the Soviet leaders

6. Roy, *Indo-Soviet Relations*, *op cit.*, p. 40.

7. Kapur, H., “The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Relation,” *International Studies*, (Jul-Oct), p. 154.

launched a massive movement of friendship.

What brought India close to the Soviet Union was the decision of the U.S. Government in 1954 to extend military aid to Pakistan. The Soviet leaders grasped the opportunity thus presented, and an era of growing Soviet-Indian friendship began.⁸

The South Asia subcontinent by far the most populous and, next to Japan, politically and economically the most advanced region in non-communist Asia became the focus of Soviet interest. The USSR desired the "friendship" of both India and Pakistan. Confronted with the necessity of choice, she preferred India. Her choice making became simpler when Pakistan made herself unavailable by joining an American anti-communist alliance and India gave her "non-alignment" a pro-Moscow bias.

"Khrushchev and Bulganin visited the Kashmir Province, over which India and Pakistan were in dispute. Soviet support of India's position on Kashmir, was due to Moscow's antagonism toward Pakistan's participation in Baghdad Pact."⁹

In the summer of 1954 the Sino-Soviet differences over the policy to be followed toward Nehru and other neutralist leaders of Asia accelerated the Soviet desire to build up closer relations with India. In the fall of 1954 when Khrushchev visited

8. Suri, Surindar, *Politics and Society in India*, Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 1974, p. 249.

9. Dallin, J. *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin*, J.B. Lippincott Company, New York, 1961, p. 309.

Peking, he found Mao-Tse-Tung a difficult and uncompromising ally. He realized that if the Soviet Union wanted China's friendship and support, she would have to sacrifice her national and international goals.

Mao raised the issue of Sino-Indian border dispute and demanded unconditional Soviet support against India. The Soviet leader argued that Nehru was a "progressive" leader and it was in the interest of the Socialist countries to build up friendlier relations with him in order to turn India against the West.

Soviet Union has come to look upon India as a vital link in any projected barrier to Chinese expansionism. It was in Russia's national and international interest that led Khrushchev to continue his friendly approach toward India even at the risk of animosity with communist China.

"It was also likely that the Soviet decision to pursue the post-Stalin line toward India was influenced by Lenin's prophecy of the importance of India for world-wide struggle against the West.¹⁰

In 1959 communist China struggled peacefully to settle border dispute with India. But Indians were inclined to test China's strength and accused Peking of alleged border violations. New Dehli falsely perceived that Massive Russian Arms build-up in India would perhaps defeat china. On this

10. Roy, H., *Indo-Soviet Relations*, op. cit., p. 47.

assumption India started nibbling chinese areas on the border which was strongly resisted and rebuffed by Chinese. The Soviets regarded the Chinese action as a challenge to their policy of peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev feared that if communist China proved her strength against India it would endanger the security of Soviet Central Asia and Soviet far East.

The Soviet Union was interested in preventing China from changing the status quo in inner Asia. Khrushchev indicated that he wanted India as an ally to halt the Chinese moves for expansion in inner Asia. Nehru attempted to build up solid relations with the Soviet Union and to neutralize Moscow in a future conflict with Peking.

“Had Sino-Soviet relations been on even keel, generally, the chances are that Moscow would not have responded to New Delhi’s plea. But the combination of Soviet disagreement on a number of other issues apparently tipped that balance in India’s favor insofar as the USSR’s stand on the Himalayan border question was concerned. Moscow was not concerned with the merits of the disputant’s claims as such, but with the timing and means employed by the Chinese. The incidents were viewed as a challenge to Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence.”¹¹

USSR saw India as a counterweight to the extension of Chinese influence in Asia. With these

11. Stein, A., *India and the Soviet Union*, op cit., p. 120.

Soviet policies, Nehru seemed to holding this faith that Soviet Union will continue to give assistance and support to India and will act as a brake against China. He believed that India can exploit the growing Sino-Soviet rift to its advantages.

The Soviet Union took a strictly neutral stand on the India-China conflict and this could only mean that she wanted to attach great value to her friendship with India especially in view of the growing bellicosity against China.

In August, 1962 Soviet Union planned to supply India, MIG fighters and assist her in setting up factories for production of MIGs under licence. By supplying arms to India it is clear that Soviet Union took deep interest in India's defence as a check for China.

"It was the first instance involving a communist state in which another member of the communist block had refused to give necessary support to its dispute with a non-communist state."¹²

The Soviet Union clearly intended to diassociate herself from the Chinese position on the border issue. The Chinese claimed,

"Though the Soviet leaders assumed a 'facade of neutrality' actually they 'favoured' India and 'condemned' China and linked it as the beginning of 'difference' between China and the Soviet Union."¹³

12. Roy, H., *Indo-Soviet Relations, op cit.*, p. 81.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

The Soviet Union became the largest weaponry supplier to India. She granted India \$ 400 million credit for the expansion of the Bhilai Steel Mill and construction of other projects part of her pledge to India's third five year plan. It was apparent from the Soviet move that communist China's action in India's northern border touched off the Soviet desire to woo India with more economic and financial assistance to encourage her to continue the policy of non-alignment. Khrushchev gave top priority to India's non-alignment because it helped his own foreign policy goals.

The primary objective of Khrushchev's decision to continue to show the utmost friendship and understanding of India's problems was related to a broader Soviet decision to use India as a "future bulwark" against communist China. This trend was encouraged by growing differences between the Soviet Union and communist China on a number of ideological and international issues particularly on India.

The Sino-Indian border conflict had developed into an acute cause of tension in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev bent his neutrality in favor of India. It was a gamble in which he could hardly lose.

On the Kashmir question the Soviet Union made it clear in the Security Council, that Kashmir is an integral part of India. The Soviet leader committed themselves to support India's position on Kashmir issue in its entirety.

In August 1965 when a major armed conflict between India and Pakistan broke out over Kashmir, the Soviet Union assumed a neutral stand. India told Soviet Union that Pakistan had provoked the conflict and warned if the Soviet Union failed to condemn the Pakistani aggression it might threaten the policy of good neighbourliness, and drive away India from the path of non-alignment. The Soviets had great regard for the prestige of India as a great power playing an important role in international affairs. Indian diplomacy had considerable success in committing the Soviet Union move to India's position on the Kashmir issue. The Soviets indicated that they were basically sympathetic to India in her conflict with Pakistan.

"They gave implicit support to India in opening a second front against Pakistan in Lahore during the Indo-Pakistan conflict."¹⁴

At this stage China supported Pakistan and made it clear to India if any hostilities committed on China border by India would be met severely. India's China war of 1962 was a bitter pill which India took but now with Russian backing India ignored Chinese ultimatum.

Moscow continued to send military supplies to India during her 1965 war with Pakistan. But it refrained from apportioning blame, adopted an apparent posture of neutrality, repeatedly offered its good offices, and finally mediated a formal end to war at Tashkent. The aim was to prevent war

14. Ibid., p. 144.

between India and Pakistan, otherwise China might intervene on Pakistan side and pose threat to Indian security.

"The developing Sino-Pakistan relationship was to be discouraged because it opened the door to Chinese political influence in Pakistan, which might, in time, spill over into India and other neighboring countries.¹⁵

A certain Soviet cultivating of Pakistan for the purpose of containing Chinese influence would serve the long term interests of India also. The USSR has been concerned with the safe-guarding of her own vital interest, not those of Pakistan. She wanted "stability" in the subcontinent and an end to Indo-Pakistan quarrells, so that Pakistan, instead of pursuing interest that conflicted with those of India, would join India in serving the common Indo-Soviet interest in containing China.

"The Soviet initiative that led to Tashkent-Agreement has been thus interpreted in terms of power politics by Bourgeois Theorists. A policy of peace is unintelligible to those who can not go beyond the ambit of traditional Bourgeois thought. Peace and stability in India and Pakistan are essential to the Soviet Policy of establishing Soviet influence in South Asia as a counter balance to China.¹⁶

15. Syed, Anwar H., *China and Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 47.

16. Gosh, Parimal C., *India's Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union*, Ahindra Bhowmik Classic Publication, Calcutta, 1973, p. 89.

An important aspect of Soviet policy was the condemnation of Peking's role in the Indo-Pakistan War. The pro-Soviet Indian posture, suited both governments. The Indians were able to show that they were not without the support of a super power. At the same time they obtained massive economic assistance from the United States. They reserved the right to denounce American cold war policies, which they exercised quite frequently to Moscow's satisfaction.

From time to time, Moscow had urged economic co-operation between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, on the one hand and the Soviet Union, on the other hand. Then there was the well known soviet proposal for an Asian Security System. Brezhnev suggested that the nations of South and Southeast Asia were likely to organize a regional collective security system to resist foreign interference in their affairs. The proposed system had the purpose of opposing China. Soviet propaganda often warned that the empire builder's in Peking are determined to bring all of South and Southeast Asia under their domination.

The Soviet idea of Asian Collective Security was to remind the world that Soviet Union considers itself an Asian nation as well as a European power and it intends to play a more effective role in Asian security matters.

The Soviet policy was based on complete collaboration with India in economic, political and military fields. This reorientation toward India did

not come as the result of startling new discovery made by the Soviet leaders but by the exigencies of the Soviet foreign policy objectives in Asia.

The Soviet Union seriously considered the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean area and encouraged India to step in. They now committed themselves to strengthen India's navy and urged her once more to fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean after the British withdrawal in 1971.

"It was believed in Moscow that without India's support and collaboration the Soviet Union would not be able to establish her naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and Persian Gulf. Hence the Soviet wooing of India to fill the vacuum in this area was her own striving to install the Soviet Union as the successor to the British.¹⁷

Kosygin offered more economic and military aid to India as bonus for Indian ocean and advised Mrs. Gandhi not to worry about the Chinese and Pakistani threats.

Since the spring of 1968 from six to fifteen Soviet warship have been present in the Indian Ocean. This was one of the Soviet foreign policy goals.

In the summer of 1970 communist China made cautious gesture toward unfreezing relations with India. Mrs. Gandhi also showed her interest in improving the climate that had prevailed between

17. Roy, H., *Indo-Soviet Relations*, op. cit., p. 163.

the two countries since India's humiliating defeat in 1962. The Soviets became alarmed by the prospects of Sino-Indian reproachment. The Soviets continued to plant doubts about the Chinese with the Indians.

"The Soviet did not want the Indian front vis-a-vis communist China to be weakened. A change in the Himalyan Region would create new problems for the Soviet foreign policy. It would give new leverage to the Chinese and the Indians against Moscow and would burst the Soviet objectives in Asia.¹⁸

The Soviets now placed a new premium on more cooperative relations with India. They tried to minimize their differences with the Indian Government and emphasized the similarities in the respective positions on various international issues.

The Soviets started giving more arms to India. it was motivated to increase the level of Soviet prestige in India, particularly Indian armed forces. Soviet Union gave their naval assistance to India. India received naval ships, submarines, patrol boats, torpedo boats and light fighters from Soviet Union.

"The Chinese communists asserted that the Soviet Union had already secured the right to use two Indian naval bases on the Andaman Islands."¹⁹

The Soviet naval ships enjoyed extensive repair facilities at the Indian naval bases. The Soviet

18. Ibid., p. 176.

19. Ibid., p. 194.

leaders began to urge New Delhi to sign a "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" in return of Soviet promises to help India, and defend her security against foreign aggression.

"The greatest event in foreign policy sphere in 1971 was the conclusion of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and India."²⁰

The Soviet overtures opportunity coincided with the uprising in East Bengal and the American overtures to communist China. The Indo-Soviet Treaty was a political tool to neutralize the American presence in the Indian Ocean area.

From Moscow's stand point, the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971 was regarded as a long step toward establishing a more inclusive anti Chinese coalition. In July 1971 it had been known that a Chinese-American detente was coming about. With lot of assistance from Islamabad, Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Peking to arrange, among other things the first visit ever of an American President to China. Washington now was forging a new and presumable friendly relationship with Peking. The early American collaboration with India and the USSR in opposing China had clearly ended. Moscow and New Delhi both responded to this turn of events, extremely worrisome by concluding that their own anti-China coalition must now be firmed up and formalized. Further-more,

20. Imam, Zafar, *Soviet View of India*, 1957-75, Kalyani Publishers, 1977, p. 152.

as India prepared for another war with Pakistan, in which the latter might have the support of China, and she (India) wanted to have a clearcut assurance of Soviet aid.

What ever the long-term significance of the treaty, so far as the immediate present was concerned, the people of India, who welcomed it—and they constituted the overwhelming majority of the country's population did so largely in the hope that it would facilitate India's task of helping the liberation struggle of the people of Bangla Desh, and successfully call the bluff of the Pakistani (rulers), who, with the backing of China and the United States, was repeatedly threatening to start a war against India.²¹

Though the treaty has made no mention of Soviet arms aid to India, it was obvious that New Delhi would receive all types of sophisticated arms from Moscow to bolster the defence potentials.

With the revolt in East Bengal unleashed Mrs. Gandhi asked the United States Government to cancel the arms assistance to Pakistan.

On the East Pakistan disturbances China gave her full support to Pakistan and reminded New Delhi that the problem of East Bengal was domestic affair of Pakistan. Chou-En Lai informed America that Peking would militarily intervene on behalf of Islamabad. He demanded America not to

21. Prasad, Bimal, *Indo Soviet Relations, A Documentary Study*, Allied Publishers, Dehli 1973, p. 381.