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- **American Foreign Policy Towards Indonesia :**
A case study of "Sukarno Period".
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in the Political System of Pakistan.
- **Pakistan and the Admission of New Members**
in the United Nations.
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA : A CASE STUDY OF "SUKARNO PERIOD".

Arshad Syed Karim¹

INTRODUCTION

The Netherland Indies (Indonesia) came into world picture after the signing of the Armistice and the final conclusion of the Second World War. It also came under strains, stresses and pressures of the "power bloc." Naturally, the United States, greatly concerned about the future of democratic institutions, began to take increased interest in that country. There were some important points in the period immediately following the Second World War. Indonesia was badly hit by war and needed assistance for social economic, and political reconstructions. So the leaders of the United States felt a moral and humanitarian obligation to create close contact with Indonesia. Also, Indonesia struggling for independence, began to look hopefully towards the United States, and her attitude towards imperialism.

The importance of Indonesia to the United States can be considered under two main headings. Firstly, Indonesia after the war constituted a

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power vacuum. Secondly, American interest in Indonesia was important for economic reasons.

The purpose of this paper is to throw light on the attitude of the United States government towards Indonesia during the first fifteen years of her independence. This includes America's approach to the colonial people of Indonesia in their struggle for independence. The attitude of the United States government is also studied partly from the point of view of what being America's commitments in Western Europe had upon American action in Asia. Finally, the United States became vitally concerned with the growth of communism in that area.

Importance of Indonesia

Indonesia, formally known as the Dutch East Indies, is the largest and most populated country in the Southeast Asia. It has a vast mineral resource. It exports 40 per cent of the world rubber, 20 per cent of its tin, and a good amount of tea, tobacco, spices, copra, coffee and petroleum.¹

The Dutch ruled the East Indies for about 300 years. Their rule was a kind of indirect, maintaining local institutions especially laws and customs, thus gained a reputation for model colonial administration.² But it never meant that the country

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1. "Southeast Asia : Critical Area in a Divided World." *The Department of State Publication*, 5841, Far Eastern Series, 65, June 1955, p. 15. See also Rupert Emerson, *The Netherlands Indies and the United States*, (Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1942), pp. 23-4.
 2. Virginia Thompson, "Empire's End in Southeast Asia," *Headline Series*, 78, (New York, November 20, 1949), p. 9.

was autonomous, local council or assembly was by any means democratic.³ Indonesia was of great significance to the Netherlands. As Arthur Keller holds, "The Netherlands will be far poorer without Indies . . . it is the Indies which make Holland a world power."⁴

Growth of Nationalism in Indonesia

Throughout World War II, strong winds of nationalism blew across the orient, creating vast political transition and a breakdown of the system established by the western colonialism. The growth of nationalism in Indonesia developed out of the Dutch rule. During the war the colonial powers in this case Holland, could not provide any security to the Indies, and the defeat of Holland in the early stages of the war further accelerated the nationalistic feelings. The slogan, "Asia for Asiatic" gained impetus.

The European Revolution had a great effect on all colonies for the awakening of nationalistic feelings. introduction of industrial change and development brought new feelings of independence to the colonial soil. During the nineteenth century Indonesia had started building industries of tea, rubber, cotton and tin. These were also influence on the Indonesian people for their national independence.

3. Amrey Vandenbosch, "The Netherlands Indies," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. CCXXVI, p. 91.

4. Arthur Keller, "Netherlands Indies as a Paying Proposition", *Far Eastern Survey*, IX, 1940.

The early nationalist sentiments were voiced in 1908. Its main aim at first was the educational and economic improvement of the people. It was followed by an organized call by Sarakat Islam in 1911, for economic independence from the Chinese traders and settlers. By 1916, this organization grew into a full-fledged political party.⁵ This was the time when communist forces in Russia were gaining tremendous power and its effects brought the communist party of Indonesia into existence in 1920.⁶

Further, indication of nationalist movement was seen through the formation of *Partal National Indonesia* (PNI) in 1927 under the leadership of Achmed Sukarno.⁷ This was a radical party which advocated the adoption of the principle of non-cooperation and mass action for the achievement of complete independence. In 1928, Sukarno managed to unite many nationalist organizations into a Federation of Indonesian National Political Parties (PPKI),⁸ thus establishing the nationalist movement on a mass basis for the first time. Sukarno was arrested in 1929 and the PNI was officially dissolved, but Sultan Shahrir and later Mohammed Hatta continued the activities of the PNI.⁹ In later

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5. Willard A. Hanna, *A Note on Indonesia*, (New York : American University Field Staff, 1956), p. 5.
 6. Bernard H. Vlekke, *A History of East Indian Archipelago*, (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1943), p. 346.
 7. Philip F. Vandiviers, *Background Influences of Present-Day Indonesia*, (Berkley : University of California Press, 1959), p. 6.
 8. Willard A. Hanna, *Bung Karno I*, (New York : American University Field Staff), p. 9.
 9. Vandiviers, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

years until the occupation by Japan in March 1942 many movements for independence were launched.¹⁰ With the occupation by Japan a new tactic was adopted by the Indonesian leaders. A kind of agreement was reached among the three big leaders that Sukarno and Hatta will collaborate with the Japanese whereas the third leader Shahrir will organize an underground movement to resist the new invaders.¹¹ The harsh rule of the Japanese further intensified the nationalistic feelings.¹² On their part, the Japanese began to associate more and more with the collaborating nationalist leaders. This leadership publicly declared independence on August 17, 1945.¹³ The first reaction of the United States over this development was voiced in a State Department Press released on September 23, 1945.¹⁴

The United States government has viewed with increasing concern in the Netherlands East Indies. It had hoped that conversations between the Indonesians and the Netherlands authorities would have resulted in a peaceful settlement recognizing alike the natural aspiration of the Indonesian people and the legitimate rights and interests of the Netherlands . . .

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10. Sidney B. Bay, "Revolt in Netherlands Indies," *Current History*, Vol. IX, December 1945, p. 544.
 11. Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story*, (New York: John Day, 1948), pp. 9-14.
 12. Sultan Shahrir, *Out of Exile*, (New York: John Day, 1949), p. 19.
 13. *Ibid.*, pp. 249-53.
 14. U.S. *The Department of State's Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, p. 1021.

The United States recognizes the primary responsibility for arriving at agreement lies with the Netherlands authorities, as representatives of the territorial sovereign, and the Indonesian leaders.

The Japanese capitulation not only left a power vacuum in the Pacific, but also left the whole of Southeast Asia with a deep confirmation of its dislike, and distrust of foreign rule, coupled with, for the first time, armed and partially trained native populations ; the stage was set for a struggle between the old order and the new.

U.S. Relations With Indonesia : Contact Prior to Indonesian Independence.

No contact was found between the U.S. and the Netherlands Indies prior to World War I. After the war the U.S. emerged out as a big power and normal trade relations were established between those two countries which continued to increase. And by the year 1940, the U.S. was the chief consumer and supplier of the Netherlands Indies. Later the U.S. realized that the Indies was not only important for raw materials but was also a vital strategic area. In 1940, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, officially recognized the importance of the Indies. In these words, "the Netherlands Indies is very important and even the United States depends substantially upon them for some of the most important commodities."¹⁵

15. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1940.

After the defeat of Holland in World War II, the United States got a free hand in direct dealing with the Indies. While the United States government was concerned about violence and the national chaos, there was no possibility of direct U.S. intervention. After the surrender of Japan, the British troops arrived in Indonesia in October 1945. The main task of the British troops was to maintain the law and order until the time the lawful government of the Netherlands, which was in exile in London, can take up the administration.

The return of the Dutch authorities in Indonesia was that the provisional government of the Republic started fighting and also negotiations. In the beginning the Dutch were not willing to negotiate, but after a year they also agreed for the negotiations. During all this time the United States played a passive role in Indonesian affairs. Secretary Hull, in his "Memoirs," describes the United States position : ¹⁶

At no time did we press Britain, France or the Netherlands for an immediate grant of self-government to their colonies. Our thought was that it would come after an inadequate period of years, short or long depending on the state of development of respective colonial peoples, during which these people would be trained to govern themselves.

So until 1945, as far as Indonesia was concerned all that the U.S. State Department could do was

16. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, (New York : Macmillan and Company, 1948), p. 1599.

to "hope that all parties in the Netherlands will see the necessity of an early resumption of conversations looking towards a peaceful solution of the conflict."¹⁷ In November 1946, the British withdrew their forces. Until this time the U.S. policy towards Indonesia was one of "keeping aloof." In the meantime the nationalist uprising and sporadic fighting continued during 1946. Under considerable pressure the parties agreed to sign the Liggadjati Agreement on November 15, 1946. This agreement provided a ground for the common desire of the parties to inaugurate new forms of voluntary cooperation.¹⁸ But inspite of hope raised in the Agreement, the Republican looked upon the Dutch plan as a means of emasculating the independent movements channeling it in the direction of Dutch interest. There were violations of the Agreement, which resulted in fighting, followed by negotiations. As the efforts for sincere negotiations failed, the Dutch proceeded, in July 1947, to restore order by "police action." Even after the Dutch "police action" the policy of the U.S. was one of "keeping aloof."

Perhaps being an ally the U.S. could not afford to question the "Dutch Imperialism" in Indonesia. Fighting and hostilities continued and the Indonesian question was brought to the notice of the United Nations, Security Council in July 1947.

17. U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, December 23, 1945, p. 1022.

18. For complete text of agreement see *The Department of State Bulletin*, March 14, 1948, pp. 323-26.

After the question was brought to the notice of the Security Council the U.S. took more interest in the Indonesian affairs. As hope for any peaceful settlement was fading, the U.S. of its own free will volunteered the use of its good offices for settling the dispute.¹⁹ The U.S. could not take any practical steps of her offer, because Indonesia did not accept the offer. The U.S. was caught in a dilemma, she was sincerely in favour of Indonesian independence and on the other hand, could not afford to displease her European ally in going directly against the Netherlands. Mr. Finkelstein, criticizing the U.S. policy at this time, said that, "Washington programatically acknowledged the Dutch preponderance of force in its efforts to achieve peaceful settlement."²⁰

However, American government was still working on the Committee of Good Offices, of which Dr. Frank Graham was the chairman. In spite of negotiations fresh fighting broke out in Indonesia in December 1947.

By this time the U.S. very clearly accused the Dutch. The American Delegate, Mr. Philip Jessup, called for a Security Council meeting and in a sharp warning to the Dutch said :²¹

....The United States is unable to conclude that the Netherlands has either consistently or

19. U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1947, p. 387-

20. L. S. Finkelstein, *American Policy in Southeast Asia*, (New York : American Institute of Pacific Relations 1951), p. 18.

21. U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*, January 2, 1948, pp. 94-5.

conscientiously endeavoured to exhaust all possibilities of resuming negotiations and the United States fails to find any justification for renewal of military operation.

The Good Offices Committee, however, helped in renewed negotiations, and finally both parties agreed to meet upon the neutral territory provided by the U.S. naval transport, the U.S.S. Renville. At the outset of the discussions on December 8, 1947, the G.O.C. was able to secure complete acceptance of its proposals of the Indonesian Republic. On the other hand, the Dutch placed many reservations on any acceptance made by their delegation.²² Expressing its satisfaction on the agreement reached, the U.S. State Department stated that "the full and unreserved support of the U.S. is placed behind the acceptance of the Renville Agreement by the Security Council."²³ But the agreement did not last long. The Dutch and the Indonesian accused each other of truce violation. As time went by, several incidents occurred. The G.O.C. tried to get both parties to negotiate. But, the efforts failed and renewed fighting broke out in October 1948. On December 13, 1948, the Netherlands started full scale military operation.²⁴ In the Security Council at Lake Success on January 7, 1949 the U.S. position was presented by Mr. Jessup.

22. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Statement of Senator Graham on Indonesian Situation," *Congressional Record*, 81st Congress 1st Session, 1949, Vol. XVC, Part 3, p. 3922.

23. U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*, February 20, 1948 p. 143.

24. U.N. Documents S/1144, December 13, 1948.

Condemning the Dutch and supporting the struggle of the Indonesian people he said :²⁵

The U.S. can find no adequate justification for military action taken by the Netherlands in Indonesia- In many important respects reasons put forward by the Netherlands are not supported by the Committee of Good Offices..... The Government of the U.S. looks with admiration on the efforts of the Indonesian people both in the Republic and elsewhere to gain their independence and has seated fastly sought to support them.

Mr. Jessup's statement clearly meant a change in the U.S. policy. This change was perhaps a clear indication that the U.S. surveying the entire situation of Southeast Asia, reached a conclusion, that making friendship with Indonesia will help in getting support from other countries in that area. Moreover, the American public opinion, after the second "police action" by the Netherlands, was very sympathetic towards Indonesia.²⁶ The U.S. Senate also favoured the Indonesian Republic. On February 7, 1949, in adopting the "Brewster Resolution," the Senate favoured immediate condemnation of the Dutch policy. The "Brewster Resolution" also provided immediate ceasation of direct or indirect financial aid to the Netherlands Government and opening of bonafide negotiations with the

25. U.N. Security Council, *Official Records*, 402nd Meeting, January 21, 1949, p. 3.

26. Alstair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, (New York : Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 366-7.

Indonesian Republic.²⁷ The Netherlands Government realizing that her allies are now not supporting her, agreed for negotiations, and a Round Table conference at the Hague was called on August 23, 1949. Agreements were reached and on November 1, 1949, the new Republic of Indonesia was born. The U.S. recognized the new Republic on November 3, 1949.²⁸

Trade Contacts

In the determination of American foreign policy towards any country, trade is a major consideration. Indonesia with its rich natural resources could be a great help to the U.S. During World War II the American nation was almost completely dependent on the Indies for certain imports.²⁹

Before World War I trade contact between the U.S. and the Netherlands Indies were virtually non-existent. However, after the war the U.S. trade with the Indies increased considerably.³⁰ The investment of the United State's businesses in the Netherlands Indies was primarily concerned with strategic materials, particularly oil and rubber, during the pre-war period with all these commercial interests and with an eye on the future trade America could not afford to neglect Indonesia.

27. *Congressional Records*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, Part I, p. 831.

28. U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 14, 1949, pp. 752-3.

29. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Foreign Commerce Year Book*, 1949.

30. Jan O. Brock, *Economic Development of the Netherland Indies*, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations' (1942), p. 129.

Moreover, Indonesia occupied a very strategic geographical position in Southeast Asia.

Objectives of the U.S. Policy Towards Indonesia

At the end of World War II, John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, stated the overall objective of the American Foreign policy. These objectives were, he said, "(1) to provide for the security of the U.S. and the maintenance of international peace, and (2) to bring about in the relation between ourselves and other states mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges which will promote international welfare and understanding."³¹ In implementing this policy as it relates towards Indonesia, the American Government attempted to maintain a position of non-involvement. With its policy of non-involvement, the U.S. reaffirmed its earlier *status quo* position, as well as its non-involvement policy.

The determinants of American policy towards the colonial dependencies of Southeast Asia, which in terms of Indonesia also, can be divided into three major categories. These are : (1) commercial relation ; (2) ideology of American people ; and (3) international involvement.

In projecting future U.S. foreign policy towards any area of the world, it is essential, first of all, to define the assumptions on which this policy is ex-

31. John Carter Vincent, et al., "Our Far Eastern Policies in Relation to Overall National Objectives." *American Future in the Pacific*, (New Brunswick ; Rutgers University Press, 1947), pp. 3-4.

pected to be based. The U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia and particularly towards Indonesia seemed to have been based on the assumption that in the days ahead the cold war strategy between the United States, and the Soviet Union would henceforth be focussed not on preparations for a military showdown, but on plans for economic and ideological competition. Therefore, if this assumption is correct, the U.S. policy towards Indonesia as in any other non-Soviet Bloc countries should have as its main objective not the military build up or use of force, but strengthening their political stability, their economic development, the improvement of their social welfare and expansion of their educational facilities.

U.S. Relations with Indonesia since 1947

Indonesia became independent on November 1, 1949. The Constitution of the new Republic was promulgated in August 1950. The main objectives of the Constitution were described in its preamble, the principle of Pantgasila was adopted as the guiding principle.³² The Pantgasila had some influence in Indonesian foreign policy. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the states receiving military aid were to pledge to contribute to the defensive strength of the Free World, but those getting economic and technical aid were not requir-

32. Pantgasila are five principles of coexistence which India and People's Republic of China had jointly agreed upon as a basis for relations among nations. The five principles include ; (1) respect for each other territorial integrity and sovereignty ; (2) non-aggression ; (3) non-interference in each others internal affairs ; (4) equality and mutual benefit ; and (5) peaceful coexistence.

ed to make this commitment. Indonesia came under the later category. The exception to these laws was the signing of an agreement between U.S. and the Indonesian Republic in 1951, under which arms were supplied to Indonesia to strengthen her constabulary. In January 1952, the communist and the Masjuni Party opposed any military alignments. As a result, the Sukiman Cabinet resigned, but Indonesia kept out of military alignment like the SEATO.

In the fiscal year 1955, Indonesia received about seven million dollars from the U.S., largely in technical aid, and in 1956 about eleven million dollars.³³ In 1956 the ties between the U.S. and Indonesia were strengthened. President Sukarno visited the U.S. and addressed the Congress on May 17, 1956. His gestures were very friendly and he wanted the American people to understand and respect the feeling of Nationalism in Indonesia.³⁴ The Indonesian President's visit created a better understanding between the two countries. Vice President Nixon made a return visit to Indonesia in July 1956 and created a very good impression.³⁵

Political instability led President Sukarno to suggest a new formula of government in 1957; the formula included the abolition of political parties and establishment of a "guided democracy." But this formula did not work and the internal instabi-

33. Russell H. Field, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1845-1958* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958), p. 160.

34. U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 14, 1956, p. 929.

35. *Ibid.*, July 16, 1955, p. 83.

lity and economic problems of Indonesia not only continued but increased. Disputes over West New Guinea with the Netherlands and over Borneo with Malaya further complicated the situation. One particular episode, though was temporary did harm the U.S.-Indonesian relations. This was the issue of Pardang Revolt, in 1958. It was suspected by Indonesian leaders that the U.S. was encouraging and supporting the revolt. A rebel bomber piloted by an American, Allen Pope, was shot down by the government forces over Ambon on May 18, 1958.³⁶ The revolt was suppressed by the government and by that time the U.S. very clearly decided not to give any evidence for more suspicions on the part of Indonesia and the U.S. government thereafter clearly opposed the rebellion and supported the Sukarno government.³⁷

When Indonesia was granted independence by the Netherlands, the question of West New Guinea was not discussed and it remained a part of Netherlands Empire. The Indonesian government claimed that part of West New Guinea which was governed by the Dutch. Controversies grew and the Afro-Asian countries supported the claim of Indonesia, and interpreted that issue as a case of Dutch imperialism.³⁸ Threat to peace in that area over this issue brought the case before the United Nation General Assembly. Here once again the

36. Fifield, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-11.

37. Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1963, p. 41.

38. Fifield, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

U.S. did not support the Indonesian claim wholeheartedly and remained absent from voting.³⁹ Later during President Kenedy's administration the U.S. showed favour to Indonesia and with her great moral support the matter was decided in favour of Indonesia after negotiations between the two parties.⁴⁰

The most important point and also quite controversial for the American policy makers that might have a far reaching effect on American-Indonesian relations, was the financial assistance to Indonesia. Since its independence Indonesia had been receiving financial help in different categories. Between fiscal year 1951-59 the U.S. had given 373 million dollars to Indonesia.⁴¹ In 1962 and ending 1963 the U.S. had further given 138 million dollars. Since independence Indonesia received 780 million dollars as aid and grants from the U.S.⁴² "The Economic situation of Indonesia is chaotic and so is the Eight-Year Plan...." So must be any new programme," observes Mr. Hanna, "unless the Indonesian government achieves such thorough going reforms as would constitute at least a 90 per cent shift in policy directions."⁴³ But in spite of this observation President Kenedy recommended to Congress to pass this foreign aid bill in which aid

39. *Loc cit.*

40. *U.S. Review*, September 1962, pp. 39-43.

41. Fifield, *op. cit.* p. 268.

42. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review*, June 14, 1963, p. 8010.

43. Hanna, *American University Field Staff, op. cit.*, January 1963, p. 1.

to Indonesia was included.⁴⁴ Growing opposition was voiced in the Congress for aid to Indonesia. Representatives William Bromfield (R-Mich) and John Pilcher (D-Ga) were bitterly opposed to any aid to Indonesia.⁴⁵ Apart from government aids and different agencies and firms had have their aids and investments in Indonesia. General Lucius Clay in his economic aid report to President Kenedy observed : "We do not see how external assistance can be granted to this Indonesia nation...unless it puts its internal house in order, provide fair treatment to foreign creditors and enterprises, and refrain from international adventures."⁴⁶

Conclusion

Indonesia came under the direct control of the Netherlands about 300 years ago. The Dutch rulers could not understand the nationalistic movement which started in the early part of the 20th century. Failure to understand the nationalistic sentiments led to a wave of anti-western feeling in the country.

In early stages that intensified nationalist movements, the U.S. could hardly interfere in the affairs of Indonesia. The reasons was that the Dutch after World War II, became the allies of the U.S. and the U.S. could not question the sovereignty over her colonies. However, this does not mean that the U.S was totally inactive between the years 1945-1947. The U.S., during this period watched the

44. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review*, June 14, 1963, p. 2910.

45. *Loc cit*.

46. *Business Week*, April 27 1964, pp. 59-60.

nationalistic uprising closely and hoped that a peaceful settlement of the dispute would arise.

The U.S. became deeply concerned about the Indonesian problem in July, 1947, when the Dutch started unilateral "police action." Even at this stage, the U.S. was passive and did not make any direct approach to declare her sympathy for the Indonesian people. It may perhaps be said that if the U.S. had condemned the Dutch Colonial Policy, it would have raised the prestige of the U.S. in the eyes of Asians. The U.S. became involved in August 1947 when the Indonesian question was brought before the United Nations. Since then, the U.S. became more active. It was mostly because of the U.S. efforts that Renville Agreement was signed, though the agreement did not produce any lasting solution. In October 1948 the Dutch started their second "police action." At this time the U.S. could not continue its "keeping aloof" policy, and condemned the Dutch action on January 7, 1949. The change in the U.S. attitude was necessitated by the growing anti-western feelings in Indonesia, and also because of the democratic principles were on test in Indonesia. Moreover, the U.S., having taken up world leadership among "free nations" was concerned about the freedom of Indonesian people. The Hague Round Table Conference and the mounting pressure on the Netherlands, brought an end to colonialism in Indonesia. On November 1, 1949 the Republic of Indonesia came into existence.

After the attainment of independence, Indonesia under the leadership of Sukarno, followed an independent foreign policy, on the pattern of former Indian Premier, Nehru's neutralism. In following a neutral policy, Indonesia had always, due to her past experience, condemned western colonialism. As far as the U.S. is concerned, Vice President Nixon, on, July 4, 1956, declared his government's view of recognizing the independent foreign policies of free nations. Irrespective of the foreign policy of Indonesia, the U.S. has given substantial aid to Indonesia, in the post-war period. Also she has supported Indonesia in her claim for the West New Guinea.

A few important issues certainly created problem for the American policy makers. These issues were : (1) growing strength of the communist party of Indonesia , (2) growing Indonesian indebtedness of the U.S.S.R. ; (3) Indonesia's time to time claim of adjacent territories. That developed a growing opposition in the U.S. Congress for any kind of aid to Indonesia. It was suggested that American national interest called for strengthening the economy of Indonesia ⁴⁷ American economists recommended foreign credit of 350 million dollars with 90 million dollars as the U.S. contribution. At first the U.S. government was prepared to join in this programme, but after Indonesian opposition to Malaysia developed in the Fall of 1963, it withdrew its offer. The future policy of Indonesia towards

47. *American University Field Staff*. January, 1963, p. 2.

the U.S. and others thus depended upon the aid or refusal of aid Indonesia receives from the rival power bloc.

Mr. Alden observed in 1955, "Indonesia's policy of active neutralism is so deeply and firmly rooted in the experience for her colonial past that there is little likelihood that the country will, in foreseeable future, become part of the free world block."⁴⁸ But it was also evident that "the delicate matter of sovereignty is a greater factor. Having recently won her independence, Indonesia is determined not to loose freedom of action by tying herself to one bloc or another."⁴⁹ This is true for Indonesia, and also a reminder for the U.S. policy. To put it into President Sukarno's own words:⁵⁰

Over half the world the burning words which freed the American word of independence have been closely studied as a source of inspiration and a plan of action. Yes, this period is the period of Asian and African resurgence.....Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world, for U.S., of Asia and Africa, it is the main spring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have, the key to much of post war history. Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking no torrent of words, and no Niapara of Dollars

48. Robert Alden, "Indonesia Backs Neutrals Aims," *New York Times*, June 7, 1955, p. 8.

49. *Loc cit.*

50. Address to the Congress by President Sukarno, U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, June 4, 1956, p. 29.

will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment.

At the end of the period under review the U.S. showed her relation with Indonesia in an unhappy way when the U.S. Senate on August 13, 1964, voted overwhelmingly to prohibit any aid to Indonesia and to end the training of Indonesians at American military schools.⁵¹

To sum up, we can conclude with the words of Mr. Herbert Faith, when he remarked :⁵²

---But further deterioration in Indonesian relations with America is by no means a necessity, and even if Indonesia becomes decisively estranged from the U.S. it could conceivably maintain close ties with, and receive sizable aid from France, West Germany the Netherlands, and Japan.

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BUREAUCRACY : PARTICIPANT IN DECISION—MAKING IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN

Dr. Muhammad Sarwar

The bureaucrat's task is to carry out policies decided by political leaders. As such their function is confined merely to the execution of political decisions made by their political masters, wherever their own partisan or ideological convictions. In practice, bureaucracies in most of the countries have become active participants in decision-making.¹ In modern governments with extensive social and political responsibilities bureaucracy acquires a political influence far greater than the existing rules suggest. Especially in complex industrial societies, technicality and complexity of policy matters necessitate expert knowledge. Bureaucracy accumulates skill, experience and specialised knowledge which politicians can hardly hope to match ; as officials

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1. The term 'bureaucracy' conjures up images of inefficiency and red tap, viz, unnecessary delay, producing greater of employees. But these are exceptions not rules. Here it is used in technical sense referring to class of administrators devoted to the task of execution of rules, having certain noteworthy features such as rule-making on set patterns irrespective of personal motives, recruitment on merit, security of service, established rules of promotion, transfers, impartiality and anonymity, and disciplined hierarchy. For Detailed study See F. A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro, Readings in Public Administration, Harper and Row, New York, (1983) pp. 164—168.

are permanent politicians are formal transient. So administrative agencies are also involved in developing policy proposals that constitute important source of information for decision-making. To a degree this is desirable and unavoidable since the execution of laws requires bureaucrats to apply statutes to real-life situation.

Delegation of much discretionary authority is a normal practice in modern societies.² Bureaucracies do not merely initiate proposals, rather exert pressure for their adoption. Thus practically the policy comes to be determined by them. Bureaucracies often act like interest groups and can also ignore decisions made by the political leadership ; lethargy and outright resistance can delay or sabotage virtually any programme, and can block or restructure an unwanted reform.³ Nevertheless, such issues as discretion of bureaucracy, political control over the bureaucratic elite, role in a period of national reconstruction and development, are generally conditioned by the nature of a political system and cultural legacy of a society,

In liberal democracies, the government no longer holds monopoly on decision-making ; rather it

2. John C. Whalke and Alex N. Dragnich, *Government and Politics*, (New York : 2nd ed, 1971), p. 477.

3. James. E. Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 41.

It is to be noted that despite central control the bureaucratic resistance can thwart the desires of the Soviet political leadership. The Soviet bureaucracy sabotaged the political decision relating to industrial policy when Stalin was still in power. For details See : David F. Roth, Frank L. Wilson, *The Comparative Study of Politics*, (2nd ed) New Jersey, 1980) p. 295.

must share it with a number of non-political bodies. The political leadership's ability to control politics is thus limited not only by the difficulty of imposing control on large and complex societies but also by the fact that many decisions are made by autonomous groups beyond its control. This accounts for limited discretion of civil service in multi types of socio-economic activities. Moreover, civil service in most of the western liberal societies preserves the tradition of remaining loyal to political leadership. Political neutrality and responsiveness to political control are firmly established as norms of the civil service in such systems. Its general record of partisanship and acceptance of political directions is good.

The broad scope of governmental activity in Communist Nations gives the leaders much greater control over their social systems than is the case in liberal democracies. As the government owns and controls all enterprises, political leadership ultimately controls all social organizations and state-controlled bureaucracies provide all services. The apex of political leadership is located in the party rather than the official government offices. The party is in effect a counter-bureaucracy charged with overseeing the governmental bureaucracies. It controls the appointment and removal of key bureaucratic officials.⁴

4. Stephen White, John Gardner etc., *Communist Political System ; An Introduction*, Macmillan Press, London, (1982) pp, 19-24.

In developing countries, the major reason of the civil servant's important role in policy-making is that the political leadership has been either too weak to control the bureaucracy or it has been domineering to an extent of making it an instrument for political regimentation. In both cases bureaucracy could resort to wide discretionary authority, *i.e.* either as a domineering group or as an ally of the ruling elite. No doubt bureaucracy may be source of innovation and political initiatives, which is particularly valuable in developing countries where interest groups are poorly established and technically competent advice is not readily available to political leaders. But the bureaucracies in the developing societies have invariably acted as powerful interest groups. Their size and complexities make political control difficult. It requires trained, perceptive and powerful political leaders prepared to spend a considerable amount of time and energy mastering the bureaucracies they oversee. Such leaders are unusual in developing polities.

The glimpses of the typical role of civil servants in a developing polity can be traced in an appraisal of Pakistan's bureaucracy. With independence Pakistan inherited from its colonial past a well-developed bureaucracy. Under British rule it was subject to control by the British Colonial Office but was not politically accountable to Indian Legislature, nor in fact to the British Parliament. Furthermore, the scope of the bureaucracy's activities was broad, including the formulation and application of policy

and even judicial tasks. As a result the bureaucracy was more highly developed than other political institutions. But it was foreign in that it was tainted with involvement in colonial rule and manned at the upper levels by British civil servants. It was small in size, hence more organized, disciplined and effective. Secondly demarcation of cadres was clear ; old ICS class filled decision-making positions as well as key posts on all levels. They enjoyed wide discretionary authority. The bureaucratic elite was oriented to Western Values as most of them were Englishmen.

After independence a serious vacuum occurred in the administrative set up as number of civil servants was limited. The first effort was the filling up of this vacuum with native Pakistanis. But it weakened the civil service by overloading it with young and inexperienced officers. The new bureaucratic class, however, emerged with the requirement of the new order. But it was closely modelled on the British Colonial Civil Service. So public administration remained imitative rather than indigenous. The heritage of colonial rule continued to shape administrative practice long after expatriates were replaced by native personnels. The new bureaucratic elite continued the policy of administrative system reflecting colonial trends.⁵ Their luxurious way of life made them aloof from the rest of the society. Karl Von Vorys while commenting

5. Khalid Bin Saeed, *Pakistan : The formative Phase*, Karachi : Pakistan Publishing House, 1960.), p. 351.

on their role remarks that the CSP class recruited at their early age was "too inexperience to cope smoothly with adjustment problems in a society which has its own ascriptive pattern of authority and where they are viewed as strangers with some fear and much suspicion."⁶

As a matter of fact, in a period of national reconstruction governments have to rely much on organised structures viz. bureaucracy. It can play a valuable role as a disciplined force in politically unstable societies. Pakistan Civil Service has, of course, been the mainstay of the state during political upheavals. The bureaucracy stood when other segments of society faltered and collapsed. It conducted the business of government and helped forge a new state.⁷ The bureaucrats in Pakistan fully exploited their position and tried to become the actual policy-makers. The actual need was the development of such institutions as could feed for long term planning and for policy-making.

The bureaucracy could not cope up with the requirements of a new socio-political order.⁸ Commenting on the style of bureaucratic decision-

6. Karl. Von vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton University Preee, (1965), p. 116.

7. For a detailed study, See : Braibanti, R. Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan, in J. Lapa Lombara (ed) Bureaucracy And Political Development, Princeton University Press (1963) pp. 360-440.

8. A new service structure was proposed in Cornilius Report in which the supremacy of the CSP class was curtailed. The demand was made for the publication of this report in the last days of Ayub rule. Herbert Feldman, From crisis to crisis. Pakistan—1962-63, (LHR ; Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 169-73.

making, Ziring writes : "Schooled in an imperial tradition, the civil-military bureaucrats stressed authoritative decision-making and frowned upon debate and controversy"⁹ He further says :

CSP Officers were accused of harbouring colonial mentality, of being little more than "brown englishmen" in the conduct of their duties. The CPS, by tradition, training and experience had become a closed corporation ; a definite sense of superiority reinforced the notion that the CSP was the saviour of Pakistan and its dealings with the public only tended to exaggerate paternalistic instincts which grated the sensibilities of the attentive public.¹⁰

During Ayub period the civil servants actively participated in decision-making, thus the military regime tried to use bureaucratic machinery as a vehicle of socio-economic change. so much the government depended on this class that certain military officials got annoyed. The real problem was that there was too much politics in the civil service. During Yahya period the bureaucracy had to be practically excluded from active participation in policy-making. The major reason was the hostility of General Pirzada and certain other Generals

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9. Lawrence Zirling., *Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development*, England, Dawson Ltd., (1980) p. 87.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 9 ; See also ; Lawrence Ziring and Robert Laporte, Jr. 'The Pakistan Bureaucracy : Two Views' *Asian survey* Dec., 1974, Vol. XIV number 12, pp. 1090-92 *et* Saq : For an explanation of the process that led to the accumulation of decision-making power in few civil servants see ; Robert Laporte Jr. *Power and Privilege : Influence and decision-making in Pakistan*, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1975) pp. 55-75.

against this class.¹¹ This also accounts for the removal of three hundred senior government officials under a Martial law regulation in October, 1968.¹²

Earlier Ayub Khan had made slight changes in the service structure to control CSP by introducing military personnel training at Civil Service Academy. But the Constitution of the "Second Republic" provided old guarantees to civil service that existed under the constitution of the "First Republic"¹³. Under Yahya Khan, government administration took a distinctly military cast, certain military officers replaced CSP officers. The distance between the Army and the bureaucracy was greater than at any other time in the history of Pakistan.

This class suffered great loss of prestige and influence under PPP's regime along with elite central service which had 800 members in 1972. After assuming political power Mr. Z. A. Bhutto struck down on this class with wholesale dismissal of some 1,300 civil servants.¹⁴ Influence of this class was

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11. Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-47*, LHR, 1980, p. 99 ; Fazal-i-Muqem Khan, *Pakistan's crisis in leadership*, National Book Foundation, (1973) Karachi, p. 19.
 12. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100. (Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.*).
 13. Robert Laporte, Jr. *Power And Privileges : Influence And Decision-Making in Pakistan*, Berkley, London, University of California, 1975, p. 118.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 12 : In his various statements during 1968-70, Mr. Bhutto had strongly criticized the role of civil service. Commenting on the political situation in Pakistan in 1968, he said : "The system adopted in our country is anything but *Laissez faire* all the leavers are so controlled by the government that it can direct the flow of wealth into the

(Continued)

curtailed more than that of the military in decision-making. The Government, however, continued to use this class as information source to feed decision-making. Final decision was made by a political rather than an administrative leaders.¹⁵ 'Bhutto wanted alternatives, not decisions' was commonly heard in Islamabad. The Constitution of the "Third Republic" did not include guarantees for civil servants. It is worth mentioning that the unified service structure introduced by this regime was also designed to curtail the influence of CSPs. So all this altered the elite nature of civil service.

Bhutto's personal dislikeness of certain civil servants, and the need to curtail their power, were important reasons for Administrative Reforms announced on 20th August, 1973. As certain policies of the PPP regime, especially those relating to nationalisation, were not liked by civil servants, the left of the party in particular, was against this

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pockets of whomsoever it pleases In this way government servants, not to speak of ministers from the managing personnel of the vast enterprise of getting rich through participation in authority." Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (eds) *Awakening The People*, Karachi, Feroze Sons, p. 114. It is to be noted that the dismissed civil servants were not given a fair trial. The White Paper issued by the government of Pakistan quotes relevant records to show how a determined effort was made by the Establishment Division to prevent the Federal Service Tribunal from functioning as an independent judicial body. See : 3rd White Paper Vol. II as reported in the *Pakistan Times*. 24 Jan, 1979.

15. Asif Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State : The case of Pakistan*, England, Dawson Publishing, (1979) p. 76.

class.¹⁶ Through the introduction of Agrarian Reforms heaviest blow was struck to absentee landlords especially at high ranking civilian officials who were to surrender all lands in excess of 120 acres acquired during their tenure of service or after retirement.¹⁷

The bureaucratic elite, on the other hand, remained non-co-operative. Having lost their former power and prestige they showed little enthusiasm for the new programme, nor submitted any creative schemes themselves. In order to substitute the arrangement, Mr. Bhutto established a cell of assistants on the pattern of think tank to assist him in technical affairs.¹⁸ There was considerable overlap between politics and the civil services during this period, while the recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats was presumably based on merit, political loyalty and service to the regime often

16. Qamar-ul-Islam, head of Planning Commission, was critical of policy initiatives taken by the regime. In order to break the source of their power and peculiar character and training Dr. Mubashir Hasan initiated certain steps. For instance, doors of civil service were opened through other ways apart from competitive examinations. See: Shahid Javed Burki, *State And Society in Pakistan, 1971-77*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1980, pp-102-03; "Between 1973-74 the Establishment Ministry inducted 1374 officers into government service, a number three times as large as the one that would have been possible under the old system." So political motive could be visible behind Administrative Reforms. *Ibid.* p. 102.

17. *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 2 March, 1972.

18. Hassan Habib., *Public Policy: Formulation And Review with Particular Reference to Pakistan*, Karachi, Wajid Ali's Publications, 1976, p. 95; For detailed comments on the new civil service structure. See: Lawrence Ziring And Robert Laporte." *The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two views' Asian Survey*, Vol. XIV No. 12. December, 1974. pp. 1092-93.

influenced entry into and advancement within the bureaucracy.

The introduction of Administrative Reforms was one of the steps taken by the PPP regime to change the influence structure. But the elite structure remained intact although there was slight reshuffling in its composition. Later, the political change in 1977, brought corresponding change in the influence structure. The traditional elite-civil military bureaucracy-once again entered in the decision-making arena. There has been increase in the power of bureaucracy under military rule to the point that it has been the chief partner of the military in governing the country. As a result the entire political process underwent depoliticization and political decision-making assumed the colour of administrative style of decision-making.

Experience of Pakistan and many other Middle East countries shows that bureaucracy ceases to be an effective instrument for achieving the economic and social change to which modernising regimes are at least committed. So bureaucracy has proved less useful as an agent of development. An effective bureaucracy coupled with a vigorous modernising elite is probably a prerequisite of economic progress, unfortunately this combination is rarely achieved.

PAKISTAN AND THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Hameed A. K. Rai

There are two main theories for the recruitment of Members for an International Organisation of sovereign states.

The first is known as the "Principle of Universality" which advocates that the strength of any such Organisation depends on its including the greatest possible number of States : the fewer the States outside it, the greater will be the number of the Members pledged to carry out its discipline and to perform the duties which it imposes.

The second method is called the "Principle of Selectivity". Its advocates maintain that, as a rule the strength of a public International Organisation depends not on its including the greatest possible number of States, but on its including the greatest possible number of "like-minded" States, such as can be entrusted to work together harmoniously and therefore efficiently.

It is clearly impossible to choose between the two rival principles on their theoretical merits alone. The choice must depend on the functions of the particular organisation for which the choice must be made in practice. If the function makes

efficiency dependent on universal membership, selectivity has little to commend it. A via media between the two extremes has been suggested by an American writer in the following words :

“Controversy over Membership questions is endemic in International Organisations, and it is complicated by the fact that genuine difference concerning the constitutional merits of principles governing Membership policy are subtly mixed with competing claims based upon calculations of political advantage. From a purely constitutional point of view, no principal can be singled out as the “right one” but the theoretical ideal might be formulated as the “rule of essentiality”. According to this concept, membership policy should be rationally adopted to the functional purposes of each specific institution. States should be accepted or excluded, sought after as members or left alone, on the basis of judgment as to whether their participation is essential to or incompatible with the realization of the aims of the Organisation.”¹

For example, the membership of Norway might be deemed essential in the IMCO, a maritime shipping organisation but might not be, at the same time. essential for the Chad to be a member of this Organisation.

I. Inis L. Claude, *Swords Into Ploughshares*, 2nd ed. (New York ; Random House, 1950), p. 96.

Membership in the League

The League of Nations never formally accepted the principle of indiscriminate universality, as expounded by some states like Argentina.

It did, sometimes, ignore dubiously qualified or politically unpopular states, but on the whole, it sought to encourage rather than to discourage the potential applicants. This attitude of receptivity was developed from "admission by invitation" as an alternative to application by would be members.²

Membership in the United Nations

In the case of the United Nations, the Moscow Declaration of 1943 stressed that for a general or quasi-universal international organisation, universality was recognised as "an ideal towards which it was proper to aim."

In the Charter of the United Nations, Article 4, which regulates the admission of new members, states :

- "(1) Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States, which accept the obligations contained in the present, Charter and, in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
- (2) The admission of any such State to Membership in the United Nations will be affected by a

2. Alexander Rudzinski, "Admission of new Members : The United Nations and the League of Nations", *International Conciliation*, No. 480, April 1952, p. 164.

decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

Thus, there are five objective qualifications for membership : Statehood : "peace-lovingness" ; acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter ; ability to carry out these obligation ; and finally, willingness to carry them out.

In certain cases, some of these qualifications, *i.e.*, Statehood and "peace-lovingness" may cause genuine difficulties of interpretation. If these are to be decided by an impartial Tribunal—in the case of an applicant State—there is no problem, but in the United Nations these are adjudicated by the Security Council and the General Assembly which are, in composition and function, political organs. Both of these organs decide by a majority vote, but in the Security Council the majority, however massive it may be, can always be stultified by a single negative vote of a permanent member.

In this situation, it is a matter of secondary importance whether a given application for membership does or does not satisfy the five substantive requirements laid down in the Charter. For practical purpose, the decisive test will be whether the candidate is or is not acceptable, to all the permanent members of the Security Council. It is, thus, the attitude of the permanent members rather than the provisions of the Charter which has been the sole obstacle to the achievement of universality in the United Nations.

The Positions of the United States and the Soviet Union

The deadlock on the admission of new members which lasted until 1955, was the result of the policy of "competitive exclusion", adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Each of them had at one time followed the notion that applicant states should be admitted *en bloc* in order to achieve the ideal of Universality.

Within a few months after the establishment of the United Nations, applications for membership were received from 'eight countries'.³ The United States proposed in the Security Council the admission of all eight applicants, "to accelerate advancement of the Universality of Membership". This was, in effect, a "package proposal" that was rejected by the Soviet Union, which insisted upon a consideration of each application individually. The result was, the admission of Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden; a Soviet veto against Ireland, Jordan and Portugal; and the failure of Albania and Mongolia to secure the required minimum of seven votes in the Security Council.

This precedent set the pattern for the future; henceforth, the Soviet Union proposed admission *en bloc* and the Western Powers demurred.

States which desired admission can be divided into two groups; political members of the Soviet bloc in the United Nations, which were denied

3. The States were Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Jordan, Afghanistan, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland and Sweden.

necessary support of seven members of the Security Council ; and potential adherents to the Western bloc, which were consistently blocked by the Soviet veto.

Thus the membership problem had been subjected to the "politicization" which had become a characteristic feature of the United Nations. The Soviet policy of preventing the admission of non-communist States unless Soviet proteges, were simultaneously accepted, and the American policy of denying seats to the Soviet Satellites even at the expense of States acceptable to the United States, acquired an importance for political prestige which exceeded their objective political significance.

From the legal point of view the United States position was sound. The Charter lays down the conditions that would be members should be "peace-loving" and be deemed to be "able and willing" to abide by the obligations of membership. Thus, the United States, by influencing its friends to cast a negative vote on the application of new members, did not pass the legal bounds. Moreover, the United States criticism of the Soviet position was supported by an advisory opinion of the international Court of Justice that no member can properly justify its vote to exclude applicants on grounds other than stated in Article 4 of the Charter ; and that "every application for admission

should be examined and voted on separately and on its merits."⁴

The Soviet position, on the other hand, though weak from the legal point of view, was clearly in accord with the constitutional ideal of Universality.

Professor Innis L. Claude has beautifully depicted the cold war picture on the Membership question, with regard to the positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R., as follows :

"The United States is to emphasize the political primacy in the United Nations by admitting only such states as are likely to follow American leadership ; failing this, it is prepared to accept the exclusion of all candidates. The U.S.S.R. , on the other hand, seems not to aim so much at excluding American-sponsored applicants as at making sure that they will not be admitted without its own proteges.

For the United States, it is one group or nothing ; for the Soviet Union, it is both groups or nothing. The United States seeks a political Victory ; the U.S.S.R. seeks to avoid a political defeat. The membership struggle is a typical display of the political practices of a self-confident majority and a defensive minority."⁵

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4. Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice, 28th May, 1948. *Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinion and Orders, 1948*, pp 57-66.
 5. Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

Pakistan's Role

As Pakistan experienced a good deal of hardship for its membership in the United Nations it was well aware of the difficulties which other newly independent states had to face in the United Nations for their membership. Since becoming a member of the United Nations, Pakistan has taken a special interest in helping new States to gain admission.

The year 1947—when Pakistan was admitted to the United Nations—was the beginning of the Cold War and there was a deadlock in the Security Council on the admission of new members. The first Soviet “package proposal” which came after the coming into force of the peace-treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in September 1947, was blocked. The Soviet contention was that the United Nations must either admit all these ex-enemy states, or none of them. Thus, the applications of Italy and Finland received a Soviet veto and the three East European “People’s Democracies” failed to secure the required minimum of votes.

In an attempt to resolve the deadlock, some of the members tried to make acceptable varying interpretations of Articles 3 to 6 and 27 of the United Nations Charter.

The representative of Australia, while interpreting Article 27, expressed the view that since the Charter merely required a recommendation from the Security Council, the unanimity of five

permanent members was not necessary. Therefore, the real decision has to be taken by the General Assembly and it was empowered to reverse a rejection by the Council.

The representative of Pakistan, declared that he could not agree with the views of the Australian representative.

“The question of membership in the United Nations”, he said “was dealt with in Articles 3-6 of the Charter. Article 4 provided that the applicants should, in the judgment of the United Nations as a whole, be able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. It did not say that judgement should be made either by the Security Council or the Assembly alone. The wording of paragraph 2 clearly showed that the final decision should be taken by the Assembly, subject to a recommendation from the Council; the object of the Article was that States should be admitted only with the approval of both.”⁶

The representative of Pakistan stressed further the role of the Security Council, and said :

“If the Charter had considered that the function of the Council was in any way inferior or ancillary to a decision by the Assembly, it would have been worded differently. It would have stated that the Assembly should take a decision

6. G.A.O.R., 2nd Session, First Committee, 100th Meeting, 8 November, 1947, p. 360.

after considering the opinion of the Security Council. The object of the Charter was clearly that successful applicants should have the approval of both organs.”⁷

In the same meeting, disapproving the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union, the representative of Pakistan said :

“ he did not believe that a member of the Security Council was justified in opposing the admission of a State which it agreed was fully qualified, on the grounds that other States were not also admitted. That was not a valid argument and was contrary to the Charter. No member was justified in taking an unreasonable attitude, simply because another delegation was being unreasonable.”⁸

The representative of Pakistan also appealed to the permanent members of the Council to observe a policy of “reasonableness” ; and supported a Polish proposal that the five permanent Member of the Security Council which had primary responsibility in the matter, should consult together for resolving the differences and arrive at a solution on the issue of membership.

In 1948, in the Special Session of the General Assembly, Pakistan supported Burma’s admission to the United Nations ; Burma was admitted unanimously.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

In the third session, of the General Assembly, in 1948, the Ad Hoc Political Committee considered the application of Eleven States, which had been rejected by the Security Council, and recommended to the General Assembly to send back these applications to the Security Council for reconsideration. It adopted ten draft resolutions. Pakistan submitted a proposal for the admission of Ceylon, which was adopted in the form of amendment to resolution 'J'. The General Assembly adopted all the resolutions forwarded by the Political Committee. Pakistan voted in favour of all the resolutions.

The representative of Pakistan declared in the General Assembly that his delegation would always support an application for admission to the United Nations, provided that :

“The applicant was a sovereign state, that its statehood and sovereignty had been established and that its application was not a means of establishing legality of either of those factors. Moreover, the applicant must be a peace-loving state, able and willing to discharge the obligations placed upon member states by the Charter. His delegation would support such an application, irrespective of the bloc to which the state would adhere after it had been admitted to membership.”⁹

The question of the admission of Israel was

9. G.A.O.R., 3rd Session, 176th Plenary Meeting, 8 December, 1948, p. 791.

included in the Agenda of the General Assembly on 7 March 1949 and was referred to the Ad Hoc Political Committee by a vote of 31 to 18, with 17 abstentions. Pakistan voted against at both the occasions. Speaking in the Committee, the representative of Pakistan stated :

“.....that the recommendation of the Security Council did not comply with the terms of Article 27 of the Charter as it had not received the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Council. Moreover, the United Kingdom had, both generally and specifically, made it clear that its abstention could not be construed as an affirmation. He contended that the Committee had before it no Security Council decision which had been taken in accordance with the terms laid down in the Charter and proposed either returning the recommendation to the Security Council or obtaining an advisory opinion from the international Court of Justice.”¹⁰

The representatives of Lebanon presented a draft resolution for postponing Israel's admission until it accepted the General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1948 on Jerusalem and the refugee problem. Pakistan, with Brazil, Denmark, Syria, Turkey and the United Kingdom supported it, but the draft resolution was rejected by the Committee by a vote of 25 against to 19 in favour, with 12 abstentions.

10. *G.A.O.R.*, 3rd Session, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 42nd Meeting, 3 May, 1949, pp. 182-183.

A draft resolution, jointly sponsored by Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, The United States and Paraguay recommending that the General Assembly admit Israel to the United Nations, was adopted by 33 vote to 11, with 13 abstentions.

The General Assembly, adopted the resolution recommended by the Committee by a vote of 37 to 12, with 9 abstentions.¹¹

Pakistan voted against, along with other Muslim States except Turkey, which abstained.

Israel's failure to implement the United Nations Resolution was the ostensible reason for Pakistan's opposition. This was supplemented by Pakistan's Ideological policy to support the Muslim cause.

The general question of admission of members was also discussed in 1949. The Soviet Union repeated its "package proposal" but now included eight other applicants, in addition to the five previous states. The deadlock in the Council continued. The general assembly again, by Resolution A to K 296 (IV), decided to recommend the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, South Korea, Portugal and Nepal, to the Security Council for reconsideration. Pakistan voted in favour of all the resolutions.

11. The States which voted against Israel's admission to the United Nations were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, El Salvador, Greece, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom abstained.

G.A.O.R., 3rd Session, 207th Plenary Meeting, 11 May, 1949.

At the Fifth Session in 1950, the General Assembly had before it the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and three draft Resolutions.

The joint draft resolution sponsored by Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, Sweden and Syria, requested the Security Council to keep the applications under consideration in accordance with the terms of Resolution 296 (IV). It was supported by the representatives of France, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

A U.S.S.R. draft resolution recommended that the Security Council review the applications of Albania, Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, and Nepal for admission to the United Nations.

El Salvador, submitted a draft resolution calling upon the Security Council to reconsider the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal for admission to membership in the United Nations and asked the Secretary-General to invite each of these Governments to send an observer to the Session of the General Assembly and its Committees.

A number of representatives including those of Argentina, Egypt and Pakistan who favoured all the three resolutions stressed the principle of the universality of the United Nations and expressed regret that so many countries which could make a

substantial contribution to the work of the United Nations were excluded for reasons which had nothing to do with the Charter.

After the debate, the General Assembly adopted the joint draft resolution by 46 votes to 65, with 2 abstentions.¹² The other two draft resolutions were rejected by the Assembly.

The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion on 8 March 1950, rejected the view of the Argentinian representative that the General Assembly can admit a new member after a rejection by the Council. This coincided with the view expressed earlier by the representative of Pakistan.

“However, the deadlock in the Security Council continued and the great Power, notwithstanding the opinion of the Court, allowed themselves to be guided by political considerations rather than to consider all pending applications for membership on their merits.”¹³

Speaking in the Assembly on the question of admission of new members, the representative of Pakistan asked :

“ is there not a single applicant from among those who have hitherto been blocked, or perhaps at least one from each side, which may be regarded as fulfilling the conditions laid down in Article 4, and whose admission

12. *G.A.O.R.*, 5th Session, 318th Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1950, *Resolution 495 (V)*.

13. K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations* (New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1960), p. 247.

may be recommended by the Security Council as a token of the fact that the permanent member of the Security Council are now prepared to move forward in respect of this question on some reasonable basis ?"¹⁴

In the same Session, Indonesia was admitted unanimously to the United Nations.

In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the question of the admission of new members was discussed in the First Committee. The representatives of Australia, China, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece, India, Iraq, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, The Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United States said that in order to give the Organisation the universal character all the States which fulfilled the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter should be admitted.

The representatives of Pakistan, Iraq, Mexico and Norway, felt that the questions of membership could not have a satisfactory solution unless the powers which had the right of veto feel the obligation to seek agreement.

A Peruvian draft resolution by which the Assembly would state that a State desirous for membership should be peace-loving and accept the obligations of the Charter; be willing to settle disputes by pacific means in International law; according to the advisory opinion of International

14. *G.A.O.R.*, 5th Session, 23rd Plenary Meeting, 25th December, 1950, p. 97.

Court of Justice, no United Nations member is entitled to lay conditions, which are outside the scope of Article 4 of the Charter, on the admission of a new State ; invite all States which had applied or may apply for membership to present to the Security Council and Assembly, all appropriate evidence relating to their qualifications under Article 4 of the Charter, and recommend that the Security Council reconsiders all pending applications as well as the new applications in the light of such facts as applicant States may present and that it base its action exclusively on the conditions contained in the Charter and on facts establishing those conditions. The revised draft was adopted as a whole by 36 votes to 9, with 12 absentions. Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution.

A U.S.S.R. draft resolution by which the Assembly would recommend that the Security Council consider the applications of Albania, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and also Libya for membership in the United Nations was adopted as a whole by 2 votes to 12, with 25 abstentions.

India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Burma, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria from the non-aligned bloc voted for the resolution.

The representative of Pakistan abstained and while explaining his vote, said that he would have preferred that the Assembly's recommendations should cover all pending applications.

A joint draft resolution was submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and was also adopted as a whole by the Committee by a vote of 41 to 6, with 11 abstentions.

The General Assembly considered the three resolutions forwarded by the Committee. The Peruvian draft resolution was adopted by 43 votes to 8, with 7 abstentions. A motion that the U.S.S.R. draft required two-thirds majority was adopted by 29 votes to 21 with 5 abstentions. The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was not adopted as it failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority. The third draft resolution was adopted by 36 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions. Pakistan voted in favour of both the resolutions.

In the meantime, Pakistan was elected a member of the Security Council on 13 December 1951, for a period of two years, to start its term from 1st January, 1952. On 6 February 1952, the question of the admission of members was discussed. Two draft resolutions, one by France for the admission of Italy and the other by the Soviet Union for the "simultaneous admission of fourteen State"¹⁵ were submitted.

The representatives of Brazil, Chile, France, and Greece, opposed the U.S.S.R. draft resolution. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in the interests of the Organisation to broaden its basis, he would abstain on the U.S.S.R. draft

15. The Fourteen States were 'Albania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya.

resolution. In the voting, the French draft resolution recommending for the admission of Italy received 10 votes in favour and 1 against, but was not adopted because of the Soviet veto.

The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was rejected by 2 votes in favour (the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan) to 6 against, with 3 abstentions (Chile, France and the U.K.).

It should be noted that the Pakistan delegate, for the first time, moved its professed position of considering all the applications for membership, separately, and voted in favour of the Soviet draft resolution for "simultaneous" admission of 14 States. The reason for this was explained by the representative of Pakistan at a later meeting of the Security Council. Making a reference to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, he said :

"The Security Council will recall that my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. We did so for the following reasons ; First, voting for the U.S.S.R. draft resolution seemed to us to be easiest and quickest way out of the paralysis with which the Council is seized as regards the question of the admission of new members. Secondly, we believe that there are a large number of countries in the list contained in the U.S.S.R. draft resolution whose admission to the United Nations would be a source of great strength to the Organisation. Thirdly, we believe that to be useful and real the United Nations must reflect as faithfully as possible the political state of the world

.....if there are States which do command a position of authority over areas, territories and peoples, we say that whatever view may be held as regards the internal administration of those States, it is better for them to be within the purview and orbit of the United Nations than outside it. That is why we voted in favour of the Soviet Union's draft resolution."¹⁶

On 8 June, 1952, in the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. proposed an item "simultaneous admission of 14 States" to be included in the provisional agenda. The U.S.S.R. also submitted a draft resolution to that effect.

The U.S.S.R. proposal to include the item in the agenda was rejected by the Security Council by a vote of 7 to 1 with 3 abstentions (China Pakistan and the United Kingdom). The Council then adopted unanimously a joint proposal by Chile and the Netherlands which included the U.S.S.R. proposed items—"The Admission of New Members: consideration of General Assembly Resolution 506 (VI)."

A Greek proposal to postpone consideration of the question was adopted by the Council by 8 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions (China and Pakistan).

A Pakistani-Chilean draft resolution urging the permanent members of the Security Council to consult each other on the basis of General Assembly request contained in Resolution 506(VI), was considered unnecessary and was not put to vote, for the

16. S.C.O.R. 600th Meeting, 16 September, 1952, para 14, 51.

permanent members showed their readiness to hold consultations.

The U.S.S.R. draft resolution for "simultaneous" admission, submitted on 8 June, 1952, was discussed by the Council between 2 to 8 September, 1952. The representatives of Brazil, China, France, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and The United States opposed the word "simultaneous". The Council then rejected the U.S.S.R. draft resolution by a vote of 2 in favour (U.S.S.R. and Pakistan) to 5 against, with 4-abstentions (Chile, France, Turkey and the United Kingdom).

Pakistan also submitted a draft resolution recommending the admission of Libya to the United Nations. Pleading the case of Libya, the representative of Pakistan appealed to the members of the Security council :

"Our conduct with regard to the application of Libya at this occasion", said Professor Bokhari, "is a supreme test of whether we, as members of the United Nations consistently carry out our own moral obligations. Apart from that, I think it would be a wonderful spectacle for the world of today that in three years' time a subject people should be helped by the United Nations first to achieve independence and sovereignty, and then to achieve full membership status along with the rest of us in this Organisation. I do not think that anyone around this table should have the heart to mar that spectacle. Therefore, I strongly appeal

to my colleagues to take an exceptional view of the application of Libya and unanimously to support its membership."¹⁷

The representatives of Brazil, Chile, China, France, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States spoke in favour of the Pakistan draft resolution. They pointed out that the General Assembly had adopted a favourable decision, without a single opposing vote. Libya was fully qualified for membership and the United Nations had a heavy responsibility towards that country since it was responsible for Libya's independence.

The representative of the Soviet Union reiterated his delegation's view that :

"Libya's application could not be regarded as a new one and declared that the U.S.S.R. had never opposed in the past and did not then oppose the admission of Libya to membership in the United Nations on the same basis as other, equally eligible, States."¹⁸

The Pakistan draft resolution was not adopted because of the Soviet veto. The votes were 10 to 1, with no abstentions. The applications of Japan, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were also not recommended for the same reason.

The Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution recommending the admission of North Vietnam to the United Nations. This was rejected by the

17. *S.C.O.R.* 600th Meeting, 16 September, 1952, para. 26.

18. *Ibid.*

Council by a vote of 10 against to 1 in favour (the U.S.S.R.), with no abstention.

Here for the first time, in the Security Council, Pakistan voted against the admission of a State to the United Nations. The representative of Pakistan while explaining his vote said that in his Government's view North Vietnam was not fulfilling the qualification for membership, under Article 4 of the United Nations Charter.

In the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, in 1952, the question of the admission of members was considered by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. A five-power draft resolution, recommending the establishment of a Special Committee to make a detailed study of the question of the admission of new members and report it to the 8th Session of the General Assembly, was adopted as a whole by a vote of 45 to 5, with 8 abstention. The representative of India, speaking on this resolution, considered that it was difficult to see how a Special Committee such as proposed by the five-power resolution would yield better result than the Security Council. If an agreement was possible, he said, there was no reason why it could not be achieved in the Council rather than in such a Committee. If agreement was not likely, there was no reason to establish a Special Committee to ascertain the fact.

The representative of Pakistan, Chile and Haiti also considered that the agreement by the Permanent Members of the Security Council was a prerequisite of any solution.

Poland submitted a draft resolution by which the Assembly would request the Security Council to consider the applications of Albania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya, in order to submit a recommendation on the "simultaneous admission of all these States to the United Nations.

The representative of Pakistan stated that the States listed in the Polish draft resolution, fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Charter and deserved to be admitted. He therefore supported the draft resolution. The representative of India also supported the Polish draft resolution, making it clear that he interpreted "simultaneous admission" to mean a series of admissions that took place at the same time, none of which was dependent upon the admission of one or several of the others. Although it provided neither an absolute nor a complete remedy, the proposal had the advantage of increasing the membership of the Organisation, thereby enabling it to be more representative, of the world as it was. Similar views were also expressed by the representatives of Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines and Syria. The Polish draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 28 against to 20 in favour, with 11 abstentions. Pakistan also supported resolutions for the reconsideration of the applications of Japan, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and Jordan, which were adopted.

The General Assembly then considered the report of the Political Committee on 2 December, 1952. Resolution A (originally the five-power Central American draft resolution) for the establishment of a Special Committee was adopted by a roll-call vote of 48 to 5, with 6 abstentions. The representatives of Burma, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Liberia and Pakistan abstained. Pakistan voted for the resolution's Part B to C which requested the Security Council to reconsider the applications of Jordan, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya, and Jordan.

In the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, in 1953, the Ad Hoc Political Committee again discussed the question of the admission of members and passed a resolution for the establishment of a Committee of Good Offices. The representative of Pakistan, speaking about the deadlock on admission, stressed the importance of the principle of the universality of the Organisations :

"The United Nations", he said "could not be a monopoly of the privileged nations at the expense and detriment of other nations. The Charter was based upon the principle of the peaceful co-existence of all political, economic and social system of the world."¹⁹

The resolution recommended by the Committee was adopted by the General Assembly. The Committee of Good Offices, with Egypt, the Nether-

19. G.A.O.R., 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 11th Meeting, 14 October, 1953, p. 55.

lands and Peru as members, was established. Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution.

In the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, in 1954, Australia introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee, jointly sponsored by Australia, Pakistan and Thailand, which was designed to break the "log jam" in the admission of new member and to which the Secretary-General had referred in his annual report with the suggestion that a beginning in breaking the deadlock might be made with some of those cases which did not directly enter into the balance between conflicting camps.

The joint draft resolution also provided that the General Assembly would note that the signatories of the Geneva Agreement had expressed their conviction that Laos and Cambodia were peace-loving states within the meaning of Article 4, able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter, and should, therefore, be admitted to the United Nations. It would request the Security Council to take note of that declaration. The Soviet bloc opposed the draft resolution.

Another joint draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Cuba and El Salvador asked again, recommending the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal. By a United States amendment the name of the Republic of Korea and Vietnam were added to the list of applicants.

The U.S.S.R. repeated its draft resolution, by which the Assembly would recommended to the

Security Council to reconsider the "simultaneous" admission of 14 States. This draft was also supported by Indonesia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and Syria. But some representatives, including those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran and Pakistan, stated that they would have voted for the U.S.S.R. draft resolution if it did not provide for "simultaneous" admission of a number of States.

A joint draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Cuba, El Salvador and India, provided that the General Assembly, noting the growing general feeling in favour of the universality of the United Nations and the views of the Committee of Good Offices, would: (1) express appreciation of the efforts of that Committee; (2) send back the pending applications to the security Council, together with a full record of the discussions, for further consideration and positive recommendation; (3) suggest that the Council consider the desirability of invoking the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Charter²⁰ to help resolve the problem; (4) request the Committee to continue its efforts; (5) and request the Council and the Committee of Good offices to report to the Assembly during the current session, if possible, and in any event, during the Tenth regular Session. This draft resolution, generally supported by the members was adopted unanimously by the Committee. An Indian and

20. Article 28, para 2 of the U.N. Charter provides that the Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it wishes, be represented by a member of the Government or other specially designated representative.

Indonesian motion not to vote on the other draft resolution was also adopted by a vote of 25 to 24, with 6 abstentions. In consequence, no vote was taken on the other three draft resolutions. The General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution recommended by the Committee.

In the Tenth Session, 1955, the question was again discussed in the First Committee. A 29-power draft resolution, introduced by Canada, and to refer the question back to the Security Council, was adopted as a whole by a roll-call vote of 52 to 2, with 5 abstentions. This was adopted by the General Assembly, in the same form, by 52 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions.²¹

In the meantime, the Soviet Union announced in the Security Council that it would withdraw its veto from the applications of sixteen states.²² The U.S.S.R. then introduced a draft resolution to that effect, which was approved by the Security Council, by 6 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions (Belgium, China and the United States).

In the General Assembly, a 41-power draft resolution, with Pakistan as co-sponsor was submitted for the admission for those sixteen states, whose admission had been recommended earlier, the same

21. *G.A.O.R.*, 9th Session, 552nd Plenary Meeting, 8 December, 1955 Resolution 918 (X). China and Cuba voted against, but Belgium, France, Greece, Israel and the United States abstained.

22. The Sixteen States were Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and Spain.

day the Security Council. The Assembly adopted it without any vote, since there was no objection.

The American abandonment of opposition in principle to "package deals" and both Soviet and American concessions regarding the content of the package, marked the end of the "Membership problem" which had existed for several years. Once the "log jam" had been broken in 1955, the new States, which emerged from the ashes of European Colonialism were henceforth admitted to the United Nations without any significant hinderance, with the exception of divided States which remained as an issue of the Cold war.

In 1956, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Japan, Ghana, and Malaya were admitted to the Organisation. Pakistan co-sponsored resolutions for their admission. In 1957, the applications of South Korea, South Vietnam, North Korea and North Vietnam were discussed in the Political Committee. Pakistan supported recommending the applications of South Korea and South Vietnam, but abstained on those of North Korea and North Vietnams. The reason for abstention was explained by the representative of Pakistan in the following words :

".....If however, a draft resolution was presented that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam accepted the obligation set forth in the Charter, particularly those of Article 1 and 4, the Pakistan delegation would examine

those applications and vote in accordance with the principles he had just outlined.”²³

It should also be remembered that Pakistan voted in favour of the Resolution in 1950 which branded North Korea as an aggressor. Thus, on principle, Pakistan's abstention did not seem to be a deviation from its stand on admission of new members.

In 1958 and 1960, Guinea, Cameroun, Madagascar, Somalia, Congo, Dahomy, Niger, Ivory Coast, Chad, Congo, (Leopoldville), Gabon, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria were admitted as new members to the United Nations; Pakistan was a co-sponsor to the resolutions of fifteen of them. Welcoming the new States, the Pakistani representative said :

“—...on behalf of the Government and people of Pakistan, I warmly welcome the admission of the States of Africa and of Cyprus to the United Nations. Belonging to a country which became free only a few years ago, we still retain the memory of the first ecstasy of becoming free. The tremendous upsurge of freedom which we have witnessed in the African Continent during the last year or two now reaches culmination in the admission of all these States to the United Nation²⁴.”

23. G.A.O.R., 12th Session, Special Political Committee, 20th Meeting, 28th January, 1957, p. 2.

24. G.A.O.R. 15th Session, 865th Plenary Meeting, 20 September, 1960, para 62.

In 1961, in the 16th Session, the General Assembly admitted Sierra Leone, Mongolian People's Republic, Mauritania and Tanganyika to the United Nations. Pakistan voted for the admission of these states, except Mauritania on which it abstained : The reason being the claim by Morocco that Mauritania had been a part of it, even before the French gained control of the area. Now, Morocco has become independent ; therefore, Mauritania should be restored back to it. But French Colonial power was willing to give independence to Mauritania. It is necessary to mention that the population of Mauritania is also Muslim. Thus, Pakistan did not like to displease Morocco by voting in favour of Mauritania's admission, but at the same time was happy that another Muslim State has come into being. The only course left for Pakistan was to abstain. The representative of Pakistan, explaining his abstention said that "future developments would be only in the interests of the people of Mauritania."

In 1962 Rwanda, Burundi, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Algeria, were admitted to the United Nations. Pakistan had been actively pleading the cause of Algerian Muslims in their struggle for independence. Thus, welcoming Algeria to the United Nations, the representative of Pakistan expressed his jubilation. He said :

"It is difficult for me to give adequate expression to the emotions of joy and happiness we feel today as we see the delegation of

Algeria led by Prime Minister Ben Bella, take its rightful place in our midst. For seven long years the people of Pakistan watched—often with anguish, on occasions with anger, but always with admiration and hope—the unflinching struggle of their brothers across the ocean to break the shackles of foreign bondage, become a free people and thus be enabled truly to mould and shape their course of destiny. Their sorrows were our sorrows their sufferings found an echo in our hearts. Today, as that long struggle reaches culmination, with hearts elated with joy, we welcome the representatives of Free Algeria here and acclaim and salute the leaders of a people that fought bravely, triumphed honourably and remained true to their cherished goal.”²⁵

In 1963 and 1964, Kuwait, Zanzibar, Kenya, Malawi, Malta and Zambia were admitted. Then from 1965 to 1968, Gambia, Maldives Islands, Singapore, Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, Barbados, Republic of Southern Yemen, Mauritius, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea were admitted new Members to the United Nations U.A.E., as Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Camaroon, Capeverde, Chad, People's Republic of China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Seychelles, Suriname, and Zimbabwe were

25. *G.A.O.R.*, 17th Session, 1146th Plenary Meeting, 8 October, 1962 para. 168-170.

admitted to the the United Nations. Pakistan supported their admission. After the resolution of deadlock on the issue of membership, the new-comer states had been generally admitted by acclamation without any significant hinderance.

Conclusion

Pakistan's position on the admission of new members had been almost completely consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It had supported the admission of all new states except Israel to the United Nations. Pakistan's policy on the Memberhip question had been mainly guided by its neutralistic attitude as it weighed each case on its merits. This seems to be in accordance with Pakistan's non-aligned policy which it followed from 1947 to 1952.

The Afro-Asian influence had been prominent because Pakistan fully identified itself with them by supporting the admission of all the new emerging States to the United Nations.

The Muslim influence had also been dominant on Pakistan's policy as Pakistan pleaded strongly the admission of all Muslim States to the United Nations by sponsoring and supporting resolutions. It has shown a special fervour for the Muslim cause as it, first, vehemently opposed the creation of Israel and later opposed its admission to the United Nations.

The Cold War and alliance politics had not shown any affect on Pakistan's policy. This might had been, because of the reason that when Pakistan

joined the Western Military Pacts in 1954 and 1955, the deadlock on the membership issue was on the verge of resolution. It had not sided with either of the blocs and had supported every measure which was taken to widen the representation of the Organization towards its goal of universality. This neutral attitude and respect for the United Nations Charter has been expressed by the Pakistani representative in the following words :

“It is regrettable that the efforts made during the last seven years had not culminated in a compromise. The only visible change in the situation was that, instead of going to the root of the problem and diagnosing the real cause of the dilemma, an effort was now being made to violate the provisions of the Charter by twisting them right and left to serve the purposes of one party or the other. Such an attitude was hysterical rather than practical. The peoples of the United Nations which had promised to respect the letter and spirit of the Charter, seemed determined to drift further and further apart. Instead of practising tolerance and striving towards unity they seemed to have agreed to accomplish nothing. Such a deplorable state of affairs should be brought to an end if civilized and peace-loving nations were to survive. If an atmosphere of mutual understanding and reciprocal concession could not be created it was preferable to admit failure and to face its consequences rather than attempt

flagrantly to violate the provisions of the Charter which should be preserved for posterity.

For the Pakistan delegation the provisions of the Charter stood inexorably in cold print and the ingenuous submission of certain members were unacceptable. Any attempt to short circuit the provisions of the Charter or to make them serve partisan political ends would jeopardize the very foundations of the United Nations. There was no grounds for reading between the lines, however great the desire to attribute to certain articles more meaning than they actually contain.”²⁶

Pakistan's position on this question had not been influenced by its power relation with India : As the question had been mainly a colonial one except for the admission of few European states. Therefore, there had not been any clash of interests between India and Pakistan. Their stand on this question had been almost similar.

Pakistan had also emphasised the importance of small states with respect to their role in the United Nations. It had attempted to make it clear that the United Nations, as an Organisation, should not be considered as a mistress of the Great Powers, but rather a Universal Organisation designed to promote the well-being of the human race through beneficent co-operation.

26. G.A.O.R. 8th Session, Ad. Hoc Political Committee, 4th Meeting, 5 October, 1953, p. 13,

IDENTIFYING HAZARDS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE PROCESS

Dr. Shafqat Hussain Chaudhry

The concept of Peace keeping has proved relevant in many conflict situations and useful in several ways. Applied as an ad hoc measure, though, in almost all conflict situations over the past about four decades, the process of U.N. peacekeeping has piled up a wealth of experience and lessons that may eventually render peacekeeping more effective. Any future attempt at resolving an international conflict needs to be preceded by identification of the nature and causes of problems involved in the peace process in the field. The present discourse, therefore, aims at pointing out those problems of the situation that stem from war, and the war-like environments prevailing after the cease-fire. The U.N. Peacekeepers step in when the belligerency or strife has, in principle, come to an end, yet the war-like activities have not been completely halted. They are, thus, faced with a state of affairs where hostilities are still at rampant with destabilizing impact on the cease-fire. There are several sources of friction inhibiting smooth flow of peace process. In the following, these problems and frictions alongwith their causes and origins are discussed.

Broadly, the problems relate to the confusions created by the war itself, but the geography of the area and strategical positions of the combatants also create overlapping, and hence problematic situations. Resultantly no well-defined or ascertainable cease-fire line (CFL) persist. Therefore, the greatest menace to peace process emanate from the obscurity of CFL which makes it difficult to know the precise location of the respective armies at the time of cease-fire. The fact of being ignorant about the exact point of location of the armies at the time of cease-fire restricts ability of a peacekeeper in persuading parties to stop firing.

The usual justifications for violating the cease-fire would be the alleged occupation of a certain territory by the opposite side, not under her control at the time of cease-fire. The occupying party would deny and counter-allege the same. The fact of the matter is that immediately after the cease-fire both the combatants always try to take advantage of the vacuum and try to bring under control a few more areas preferably of strategic importance. Consequently, clashes would take place in order to eject the opponent. A peacekeeper would be caught up in the middle of a bewildering situation of conflicting claims.

Once a cease-fire has gone into effect, another problem crop up due to recognizable geographical features of the area. Unlike a river, canal or road which provide a neat straight line of cease-fire, the deserts and sparsely populated areas would have no well-defined and ascertainable geographical

features for determining a cease-fire line. To illustrate this problem through an example let us consider the situation that existed after the cease-fire of 1965—war between India and Pakistan. In several sectors, the fighting occurred around villages which were no more than a group of scattered mud huts, thatched roofs, huddled around a well with occasional track crossing, one ridge looking much the same as other. Prior to cease-fire, Pakistan army had advanced to a considerable distance into Indian territory in the Rajasthan desert. It was not an advance on a broad front though. Given the geography of the area, the two armies could not have possibly confronted each other all along the boarder. They concentrated on villages of strategic importance without necessarily taking over every village that came along the way. The Pakistani troops might have captured, let us say, a group of three villages but there might be a fourth one, behind or around those villages, left unoccupied. Indians might decide to establish a claim over this fourth village. They might even move troops into it although there was supposed to be a freeze on movement of this kind after the cease-fire had gone in to effect. They might then send fires or lay ambushes to make life uncomfortable for Pakistanis in the other three villages hoping to induce them to withdraw. The Pakistan troops on the other hand might retaliate in order to eject Indians from that fourth village. The result was recurrence of fighting. In fact rival claims of control over territories, preceding the cease-fire, has been one the common excuses

for starting shoot out and or violating the cease-fire. No doubt parties are expected to stay where they are at the cease-fire time and it is quite illegal to overthrow the other. Both would act to resist in similar cases, on similar ground and contention. The U.N. observers or peacekeepers would have no sure way of finding which point of territory was under whose control at the time of cease-fire. Without an immediate demarcation of CFL, they cannot effectively ask a party to withdraw from the territory occupied illegally after the cease-fire. It takes considerable efforts and time to stabilize a cease-fire, let alone a cease-fire line.

Another source of friction has been an attempt to nibble away at the position of the opposite side. For tactical gains or in order to place oneself in a strategically better position, a party would edge forward which obviously would be resisted by the opposite side. This would be dangerous and destabilizing trend, jeopardizing peace process.

With the intention of strengthening forward positions, the conflicting parties may also resort to mining, protective wiring, digging trenches, bunker-building and adding more troops. Such defensive lay outs would make one side apprehensive of the motives of her opponent. Irritated by the defensive activities around the forward locations, a party might cause shooting to break out.

Physical proximity of the rival troops could be yet another source of trouble. In a conflict ridden area, sometimes, the troops of disputants

happen to be physically in very close positions. The closer they are to each other, the greater the chances of provocation and hence eruption of hostilities. Such a situation constituted a major obstacle toward a normalization of relationships between Turkish and Greek communities in Nicosia (Cyprus). "The area within which the U.N. soldiers were able to operate was the width of a narrow street on either side of which the opposing armed forces were entrenched. In a situation, where a shouted abuse, a thrown brick, or the accidental discharge of a rifle could bring about an immediate shooting response, the U.N. soldiers on observation duty or patrol could do little to prevent the exchange of fire. Sandwiched in between as they were, they could but observe and report, though this was no easy matter when their field of observation was restricted to tens not hundreds of yards."¹

After the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, similar situations existed where the troops were dangerously close to each other. At the BRB Canal, each army could glare at and even make provocative gestures to the opponent from their bank of canal. Informing the Secretary-General about the situation, the field commander General Bruce McDonald wrote that "from a purely military point the present cease-fire is hazardous in certain localities because incidents are virtually unavoidable

1. Rikhe, Harbottle, Egge., *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping And Its Future*. Yale University Press, 1974. p. 104.

when the positions held by troops of the opposing sides are as close as they are now, that is, sometimes fifteen or twenty yards apart."²

A problem may also emerge when a party tends to use the presence of UN peacekeepers in the field to ensure a solution favourable to its own interest. For example in 1967, Israel refused to withdraw its armed forces from the western sphere of the Gulf of Aqaba, thus creating problem for the UN. To explain the problem, a speech excerpt from the General Assembly proceedings may be quoted. "The object of that refusal is clearly to exert pressure on Egypt to make it accept a settlement of the question of navigation in Gulf. If possible, Israel hoped to achieve the same result through the United Nations Emerging Force. Thus under the conditions laid down by Israel for the withdrawal of its troop, all matters still pending between the two countries must be settled to the satisfaction of Israel under pressure exerted on Egypt by UNEF which must replace the Israeli forces along the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba."³

A tremendous hazard to the peace process came from accidental shooting which could be sparked off by a number of factors. A wandering animal in the middle of night, might run over a minefield. The sound of the blast might make one party suspicious of the intentions of the other. One would think that "the bastards (others) are at

2. U.N. Document, S/6719. Add. 1. 5 October, 1965.

3. U.N. Document. G.A.O.R., 11th. Sess., 651st. Mtg.

it again, heralding (sic) attack on us.”⁴ Test firing close to the forward areas was another cause of accidental rupture of the cease-fire. Test or practice firing, even though not aimed at the opposite camp, would easily provoke the other side. Her troops, hearing what seemed to be battle sounds from across the CFL, would become nervous and tense. In particular, when they are in close proximity to the other side, they might shoot out simply of excitement, fear or suspicion. Such incidents could spark off a full-scale fighting.

Continued violation of each other's air space for observation or reconnaissance could be another source of trouble. Shooting incidents may take place on account of even marginal over-crossings in the air space. There could not be sure way of detecting air violations by the peacekeepers unless the parties agree to a total ban on observation flights.

A hazard to peace process relate to extensive patrolling also. Militarily, every army in the world is taught to dominate no-man's land and the best way to achieve it is by patrolling. Such an activity would inevitably result into clashes because the patrolling troops might run into each other. Added to this could be the problem of high crops in the forward areas. The crops would be not only hazardous to the observation task of the peace-

4. Comments of Major General Bruce F. McDonald, Chief officer of UNIPOM, during an interview with the author in Ottawa on 8 January, 1976.

keepers but also arouse suspicions of the parties about possible infiltration.

In addition to the problems essentially stemming from the geographical and strategical aspects of the conflict for field, political factors would also play their part in making the situation worse for UN peacekeepers. Fighting provides an opportunity for demonstrating heroism. Acts of heroism create stories for home consumption but they also put strains on the peace process. Some of the cease-fire violations take place as a result of an urge and enthusiasm for heroism. After the cease-fire, an adverse military situation is always an acute irritant for a country. Pressure from public and press might induce a foreign or defence minister to pressurise the army to rectify the adverse situation. Surely, in order to recapture the lost territory, use of arms and hence violation of peace is inevitable. Sometimes, in addition to the regular troops, there are the para-military groups and the irregular elements or units who are not officially under the control of a country. These armed elements, not in uniform, may still continue occupying new positions or may not yet cease firing. Simply for political face-saving, party concerned would not assume responsibility for these irregular elements. Indeed their presence and activities in the war zones would be embarrassing for the parties and, all the more, jeopardising to peace process.

The crux of the problem, however, is the mutual mistrust of the parties concerned. Unless the parties to a conflict are sure of the sincerity and good intention and behaviour of each other, uncertainty would prevail and persist. That means, restoration of trust, goodwill and confidence in each other is the single most vital element in efforts at removing hazards to the peace process. The UN attempts to do that.

THE U-2 INCIDENT

Dr. Farhat Mahmud

Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced in the Supreme Soviet on 5 May 1960 that the Soviet Union had shot down a U.S. spying U-2 aircraft over Sverdlovsk. He left some doubt concerning the origin of the flight stating that the U.S. spy plane "must have been based" on the territory of Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, countries bound to the United States in the "agressive CENTO bloc," and issued a "most serious warning" to those countries which place their territories at the disposal of aggressive forces and thus make it easier for those forces to act against us. The Government of these countries . . . are playing with fire, for retaliatory blows will hit these countries too and they will pay for their short-sighted actions.¹

Khrushchev's statement was followed by a series of lies on the part of Eisenhower administration and, needless to say, by Pakistan. The United States State Department immediately denied the flight of any spy mission. It stated that the U-2 was probably a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) meteorological plane that had taken off from Adana, Turkey, and was reported

Dr. Farhat Mahmud as hrecently come back after a long stay in Canada and U.S.A.

1. *Dawn*, 6 May 1960.

missing. Its pilot might have lost consciousness through lack of oxygen, which he had reported, and "accidentally violated Soviet airspace."² Such flights, a NASA statement of 5 May 1960 explained, had operated "from bases in . . . Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines" since 1956. According to NASA, Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2, was a civilian employed by Lockheed Aircraft.³ In actual fact, as has been often stated since, the plane did not belong to NASA, but to the CIA, and Gary Powers was not an employee of Lockheed, but of the Central Intelligence Agency. Lincoln White, the Director of the Office of News in the State Department, once again stated on 6 May 1960 to the newsmen with great emphasis; "Now our assumption is (that) the man (Gary Powers) blacked out. There was absolutely no—N-O-no—deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace. There never has been."⁴

The Pakistan Foreign Office issued a stronger denial about the U-2 having taken off from a U.S. base in Pakistan stating that the Soviet leaders appeared to have a "pathological conviction" that foreign bases existed in Pakistan. "There are no bases in Pakistan. The allegation made by Mr. Khrushchev so far it refers to Pakistan is, therefore, wholly incorrect."⁵ It was actually Pakistan's

2. U.S. Department of State Statement of 5 May 1960. Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, 23 May 1960.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Quoted in David Wise, *The Politics of Lying, Government Deception, Secrecy and Power* (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 49.

5. *Dawn*, 8 May 1960.

denial which was wholly incorrect because, according to Marchetti and Marks :

From 1956 until the end of 1969 the U.S. Air Force operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan which was primarily an intelligence facility. For several years before Gary Power's abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA's U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal take off point for reconnaissance flights over . . . the Soviet Union.⁶

Khrushchev revealed on 7 May that Gary Powers had been captured alive, and according to his testimony⁷ he had flown from Turkey to Peshawar, stayed there for three days, and was flying from Peshawar to Bude in Norway, taking photograph of sensitive Soviet Military installations, when he was shot down.

The U.S. State Department, having not counted on the pilot being captured alive, had to admit that a U-2 "probably" had flown over the USSR "to obtain information." Such flights were necessitated by the "excessive secrecy" practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the "free world," by "apprehension over surprise attack," and by "legitimate national defence." However there was "no authorization of any such flights" as far as the authorities in Washington were concerned.⁷ The statement of the State Department tacitly admitted that it had

6. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York : Dell, 1975), p. 285.

7. *State Department's Statement of 7 May 1960 in the Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XLII, No. 1091. pp. 818-819.

told a lie the previous day and, what was worse, that extremely sensitive and dangerous undertakings were carried on by the agencies of the U.S. Government without authorization or knowledge of the President. The Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, therefore, took care to point out two days later that the President had issued "directives" to gether "by every possible means" the information required to protect the United States. He admitted conducting "extensive aerial surveillance" over the Soviet Union, and implied, with what looked like arrogance of power, that the U.S. would continue doing so. The United States, Herter said, would continue to take "such measures as are possible" to lessen the danger of a surprise attack on its territory.⁸ Finally, President Eisenhower in his press conference of 11 May 1960, described the intelligence gathering as a 'distasteful but vital necessity,' and assumed responsibility for authorization of espionage of the Soviet Union in every feasible way. "Eisenhower," wrote David Wise.

Often liked to emphasize that America's 'moral' and 'spiritual' power was the true source of its strength. Yet this man, who projected such a persuasive image of personal honesty, was hopelessly impalled on a lie and finally forced to admit it publicly to the nation and the world.⁹

Premier Khrushchev, in his statement of 7 May

8. *Statement by Secretary Herter*, 9 May 1960, in *Ibid.*, p. 816.

9. David Wise, *Politics of Lying*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

1960, while revealing Gary Powers' itinerary and his capture, left some room for Pakistan to accept mistake and express regrets to the Soviet Union : It was possible," Khrushchev said, "that the countries where American aircraft were based did not know what was being done by the Americans. But they ought to know for their own good, because they might be the sufferers of the Americans playing with fire."¹⁰

The Government of Pakistan refused to take Khrushchev's hint. The Pakistan Foreign Office, as if the issue was how many days Gary Powers had stayed in Peshawar and not whether the U—2 had flown from the American base, described as "without foundation" Khrushchev's allegations that the American aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union had remained in Peshawar for three days. Meanwhile President Ayub Khan, in London for the Conference of Commonwealth Heads of State, ordered an "inquiry" into the situation, and stated that if the Soviet allegation were found correct, a protest would be lodged with the United States. The Pakistan Foreign Secretary, also in London, clearly feeling that the Foreign Office was not distinguishing itself with its statements, advised it not to issue any more statements on the matter pending the proposed inquiry.¹¹

At the Czechoslovak National Day reception in Moscow on 9 May 1960, an "unsmiling and grim"

10. *Dawn*, 8 May 1960.

11. *Ibid.*, 9 May 1960.

Premier Khrushchev talked to Norway's Ambassador, Oskar Gunderson, and to the Counsellor of Pakistan, Salman Ahmad Ali, who was deputizing for the Ambassador at the reception. Khrushchev warned :

If you continue to let the Americans fly from your air bases into Russia, then we will not only shoot down the U.S. planes but will have to aim our rockets at your bases as well

...Those whom you lease your territory operate against us. Their lands are far from us, but your lands are near, that is why as a warning to remote targets, we shall find the range of the near ones.

He went on to warn the Pakistan Counsellor specifically : "Peshawar," Khrushchev said, "had now been marked on a map and a ring made around it by Soviet defence forces. In future if Peshawar was used as a base against the Soviet Union then immediately retaliatory measures would be taken."¹²

Commenting on Khrushchev's warning, a spokesman of the State Department said that it was typical that the Soviet Union should single out as the objective of its threats small countries which bore no responsibility for the recent incident. The United States, he said, would stand by its allies subjected to "intimidation" by Khrushchev. Asked if they included Pakistan, he replied, "That is

12. *Ibid*, 11 May 1960.

correct."¹³ The Pakistan Government, assured of United States' support, put up an insolently bold front to the Soviet Union. President Ayub said in London: "After all, Russian threats are not new things to us. We are not afraid of such threats."¹⁴ *Dawn*, always close to the Government since the creation of Pakistan, in a positively offensive and abusive editorial, saw nothing "unusual" about the U-2 incident, and naturally, therefore, nothing wrong in the U-2 using Pakistan as a base to spy upon the Soviet Union. The fault, if it lay anywhere, was Khrushchev's of the Soviet Union and its people: "Mr. Nikita Khrushchev has turned out to be the world's cleverest showman and the Communists continue to overshadow others as the past masters in the art of propaganda. Thus an incident, which is by no means unusual, has been magnified beyond all proportions." The newspaper recalled the U.S. proposal for 'open skies,' and therefore the blame for flights like the U-2 squarely rested at the door of the Soviet Union and her 'flashy and boisterous leader.' "His blatant threats of using rockets against all and sundry," *Dawn* wrote, "particularly the weaker countries who are his neighbours, show him up not as a man of peace or even as a normal human being, but as a cruel bully." The newspaper ended by advising the U.S. to continue spying because of her obligations to the 'free world,' and the Pakistan Government to continue

13. *Ibid.*,

14. *Morning News*, 11 May 1960.

on the course they were already following, because "After all, if war does come none of us will escape its ravages, and whether we punctiliously keep our own bases inviolate or not, the Russians are not going to spare us on that account. They are not that sort of gentle people."¹⁵ President Ayub, still in London, stated that Americans were Pakistan's friends. The Pakistanis did not know where the U.S. planes went after taking off from Pakistan.¹⁶ Pakistan also absolved itself of any responsibility for the U-2 flight. Ayub Khan said that Pakistani inquiries showed no aircraft had taken off from Peshawar in the direction of the Soviet Union. In case an aircraft had been diverted in the course of the flight, Pakistan would protest to the United States.¹⁷ Back in Pakistan, in his press conference of 17 May 1960, Ayub Khan was questioned about the Soviet threat to eliminate the bases in case another U-2 flew from Pakistan. He answered: "These harsh things have to be faced. If such a thing comes, Pakistan is not going to be alone." He added:

If the attack comes, we will see. If the attack comes, Pakistan will face it. Pakistan is not completely helpless. Pakistan hoped that such an attack would not come. But if it does the source from where it comes will not remain unattended. The retaliation may not come from Pakistan, but somewhere else. —

15. *Dawn*, 11 May 1960.

16. *The New York Times*, 14 May 1960.

17. *Dawn*, 14 and 15 May 1960.

Militarily, the free world has to live under the umbrella of American nuclear deterrent. So long as there is strong government in that country and there are wise men at the helm of affairs in that country, the free world has reasonable cause to assure itself that if a nuclear attack comes, they can seek protection under American efforts.

His greater worry was that the American nuclear deterrent would not be able to stop communist "infiltration and subversion," and that situation, as far as the "free world" was concerned, would be "far more dangerous and more likely to happen."¹⁸ In the same press conference, Ayub Khan said that the Soviet Union was not so foolish as to risk a world war simply to cripple Pakistan. He was himself being less than wise in not realizing that if a world war did come, the Soviet Union would have to eliminate the bases the Americans could use in Pakistan.

The U-2 incident ended with a protest being lodged by the Pakistani Government with the United States and an assurance obtained that there would not be a repetition of the incident. The assurance was readily given because President Eisenhower had already declared in Paris, where his meeting with Khurushev ended in a fiasco because of the U-2 incident, that "the flights were sus-

18. *Ibid*, 18 May 1950,

pended after the recent incident and were not to be resumed.”¹⁹

The American “communication base in Pakistan needless to say, was allowed to continue its “surveillance.”

The People’s Republic of China criticized the U-2 incident as “Eisenhower’s Gangster Attitude,”²⁰ but unlike the Soviet Union, did not say anything against Pakistan.

The attitude of the Pakistan Government during the U-2 crisis was irrational, and, to say the least, showed insolence towards a neighbouring Super Power, which was bad diplomacy. At the same time, Ayub Khan’s attempt to rationalize, openly, even a nuclear attack on Pakistan revealed the ultimate limit in his following the U.S. cold war policy. It showed a little too much reliance on United States’ readiness to go to a nuclear war in defence of Pakistan. Lastly, it manifested his lack of knowledge about the huge destruction a nuclear attack would cause on Pakistan and a callous disregard for the lives of Pakistan’s common man. President Ayub, with the military background, was satisfied that if Pakistan were attacked, then the Soviet Union would be attacked too. In what way that would benefit Pakistan, the President did not say.

Just how much destruction a nuclear attack on Pakistan would cause? *I.F. Stone’s Weekly*, quoting

19. President Eisenhower’s Statement of 16 May 1960, in *United States Department of State Bulletin*, 6 June 1960.

20. *Peking Review*, 24 May 1960.

the *Consumer Reports* for January 1962, reported that,

a 100-MT bomb would.....set afire an area as large as Vermont, and a 1000-MT bomb would 'easily do the same for an area equivalent to the states of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania all put together.

Even elaborate shelters with their own air and water supplies, sealed off from fire, deep enough to survive blast, somehow able to guarantee exit from under tons of rubbles, would still be unable to guarantee survival in the permanently scarred and poisoned (with radioactivity) land-scape that thermonuclear weapons are able to create.²¹

This is how the area of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, to be rendered unlivable by a single 1000-MT bomb, compares with Pakistan.²²

State	Area in Sq. Mi.	Province in Pakistan	Area in Sq. Mi.
New York	49,576	Punjab	62,245
New Jersey	7,836	+ Bahawalpur	17,508
Pennsylvania	45,333	N.W.F.P.	22,598
Total	102,745		102,351

21. *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, 8 January, 1962.

22. Source for areas of States in the U.S. and the Provinces of Pakistan ; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1973.

In other words, a 1000-MT bomb would completely destroy the whole of the Punjab including Bahawalpur, the North West Frontier Province and a part of another province also. Still, the *Dawn* editorial of 11 May 1960, in response to Khrushchev's threat was captioned, "So What ?"

It was puerile thinking, to say the least, on the part of the framers of Pakistan's foreign policy which led to the incidents like the U-2.

The absurdity of their attitude apparently did not occur to the framers of this policy. They were satisfied that they were being guided correctly and that it was the only honourable course for a people to sing for their supper, however ridiculous the words, music and the rendition were.²³

The Pakistan Foreign Office did not distinguish itself also in handling the crisis once the incident had occurred. Besides showing the ineptness of the Foreign Office, the U-2 incident exposed the blind adherence of the Government of President Ayub Khan to the cold war policies of the United States. The belief of the Pakistani rulers that the U.S. would start a nuclear war with the Soviet Union in case of an attack on Pakistan showed an element of naivete. There was element of naivete about the magnitude of the destruction which the nuclear weapons could cause, and the Government

23. M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan : 1947—1964", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, 1964, pp. 247—248.

of Pakistan not only showed disregard for sovereignty and territorial integrity of a neighbouring Super Power, but also a callous disregard for the lives of the Pakistani people. The attitude of the Pakistani policy makers towards the Soviet Union throughout the U-2 crisis was arrogant, to say the least, and they failed to realise that the Soviet Union would have actually bombed Pakistan in order to remove it as a base of operations for the United States in case of a nuclear war. This could have happened in case of a war between the Super Powers over any issue around the world like Laos (1961), Berlin (1961) or the Cuban crisis (1962). The U-2 incident also shows that the confrontational policy followed by the Government of Pakistan towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s is not a new phenomenon.

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