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- U.N. Self-determination and Pakistan :
A case study of Algeria
- Pakistan's Strategic Interests in
Afghanistan : 1947 to 1960
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The Struggle for Regional Leadership
- Patterns of Military involvement in the Politics
of Pakistan.

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U.N. ; SELF-DETERMINATION AND PAKISTAN (A CASE STUDY OF ALGERIA)

Hameed A. K. Rai

The concept of self-determination has been defined at various times, as the right of self-government, the right of minority groups to determine their own fate. In the United Nations, however, it has been associated with the right of colonial people to independence.

One of the earliest expression of this concept is found in the opening sentence of the American Declaration of Independence :

“When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them ”

A few years later, in France, the principle appeared in even clearer terms in the early democratic phases of the Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen proclaimed, “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights—the aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”

Just as modern democracy became a vital political force in the last half of the eighteenth century as a consequence of the American and French Revolutions, similarly, self-determination emerged as an ideal having great influence in guiding the destinies of men in the beginning of the Twentieth century. In fact the very idea is an outgrowth of the democratic theory of consent of the governed and of popular sovereignty.

Even after World War I, when the growing acceptance of International responsibility for dependent peoples resulted in the first effort, under the Mandate System of the League of Nations, to institutionalise this responsibility, the principle of self-determination for colonial peoples was still slow to gain acceptance. Article 22 of the Covenant stressed not the principle of self-determination but the principle that :

“The well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.”

This gentle and evolutionary approach was suddenly shaken by World War II. In 1942, at the insistence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter proclaimed :

“The right of all people to choose the form of Government under which they live.”

The proclamation of this right in such sweeping terms quickly brought the colonial powers face to face with the practical problems involved in implementation.

Thus, despite acceptance of the principle of self-determination the Big Powers, while drafting the Dumbarton Oak Proposals, made no mention of it. However, when it came to writing the Charter at San Francisco, a different situation prevailed. Many of the fifty participating nations were either newly independent states or small ones which had frequently been subjected to the power and influence of stronger nations. For them the Atlantic Charter constituted the promise of a new era and they were determined that it should usher without delay. National independence, then was the watchword for the Asian and Arab delegations. Thus, the phrase 'self-determination' was incorporated in the Charter, in connection with dependent people.

Self-determination is mentioned specifically in Chapter I, which asserts as one of the purposes of the United Nations : "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

Chapter IX, Article 55, also emphasises the right as follows :

"with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote :

- (a) higher standard of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

- (b) solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems ; and international cultural and educational co-operation ; and
- (c) Universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

The Charter put a moral obligation on all United Nations Members for the achievement of this right in Article 56, which states :

"All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

The principle of self-determination as enunciated in the Charter has been supported by every member nation. This unanimity, however, is like a declaration from all political candidates to oppose sin. But endorsing a principle and agreeing on the manner of its implementation, especially with respect to dependent territories, are two different things, and has been frequently demonstrated in the United Nations.

From the beginning two schools of thought have developed. One consisting of the view of the Asian-Arab States, together with most of the Latin America, strongly supported by the Soviet bloc, which have been committed to the eradication of the last vestiges of colonialism. They have conceived self-determination as an instrument which

would enable all colonial peoples to attain political independence. They have, therefore, maintained that self-determination is a right which cannot be denied, that this right is embodied in the Charter, and that the signatories are committed to its fulfilment. Their arguments run as follows: The administering powers have assumed the obligation of promoting self-government in dependent territories. The United Nations itself must ensure that this obligation is carried out. Furthermore, the right of self-determination is basic to a peaceful and orderly world and to friendly relations among nations; denial of this right is likely to endanger international peace.

The view of the opposing camp, consisting mainly of the colonial powers, has vigorously protested this whole thesis. They have asserted that it was an attempt to discriminate against colonial powers. It represented an indirect effort to revise the provisions of Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter.

The assumption of more extensive responsibility by the United Nations, they said, constituted intervention in the domestic affairs of an administering power in violation of Article 2(7). Moreover, self-determination is a political principle and its application must be subordinated to other principles, particularly to the principle for the maintenance of peace. The exercise of self-determination without limitation or safeguards would be a source of friction and might disturb the friendly relations among States.

To brake the drive for self-determination, some of the colonial powers tried to give it a wide and diffuse interpretation to make its implementation more difficult.

Belgium introduced its celebrated thesis, according to which "self-determination cannot be restricted to colonial people ; it refers to all individuals, including ethnic, racial or cultural minorities incorporated within the existing State."¹

Another colonial power, the United States sought to "Universalize" the principle to include restoration of sovereignty to formerly independent states, particularly those people whose right to govern themselves has been taken away from them by the Soviet Communism."² But, as mentioned earlier, to endorse a principle and to agree on its implementation are two different things ; the United States has been caught in a similar paradox. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, while emphasising the dignity of human persons and the respect for the right of self-determination said at San Francisco:

"Dignity cannot be developed by those subjected to alien control, however benign. Self-respect is not fully felt by those who have no right of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance. Regard for justice

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1. "The Sacred Mission of Civilization : To which Peoples should the Benefits be Extended ? *The Belgian Thesis*" (Published by the Belgian Government Information Centre New York, 1953).
 2. The U.S. Participation in the U.N., *Report by the President to the Congress, 1952*, Department of State Publication 503 (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 158

rarely emanates from those who are subject to such grave injustice as the denial of freedom. Fellowship is not the custom of people who are denied fellowship.”³

The United States has paid much lip service by making lofty slogans for the freedom of people. But the real position of the United States on colonialism, has been described by Professor Leland M. Goodrich, in the following words :

“Instead of appearing as the uninhibited leader of the attack on old style colonialism, the United States found itself in the unfortunate position of having to defend one of the traditional interests of colonial powers, the interest in national security, against proposals to give greater recognition and protection to the special interests of native peoples.”⁴

In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party Government which was responsible for the freedom of India and Pakistan in 1947, was in favour of granting this right. As early as 1943, the Party's colonial platform had called for the development of political self-government “and the attainment of political rights not less than those enjoyed or claimed by those of British democracy.”

In 1944, the Annual Conference of the Party declared :

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3. Cited by Sir Zafrulla Khan in the course of a debate, G.A.O.R., 6th Session, 343rd Plenary Meeting, 14 November, 1951, p. 115.
 4. Leland M. Goodrich, *The United Nations* (London : Stevens and Sons Limited, 1960), p. 298.

"In all colonial territories the first aim of the administration must be the well-being and education of the native inhabitants ; Their standards of life and health ; their preparation for self-government without delay there must be a sincere determination on the part of those responsible for colonial administration to put native interests first in the priorities they organise In regions such as Africa, South-East Asia, and the South West Pacific, where neighbouring colonies are administered by different governments, we strongly recommended the early creation of Regional Councils to co-ordinate economic policy—trade, transport, etc.—with a view to making the interests of the Colonial people primary beyond all doubts."⁵

The Conservative Party on the other hand, held the opposite view on colonial questions. But overall British Policy was against granting self-government rapidly to colonial territories.

To give practical effect to the principle of self-determination as a legally binding doctrine, attempts were made to incorporate it into the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The General Assembly, by its resolution of 4 December, 1950, called upon the Economic and Social Council "to request the Commission on human Rights to study ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and to prepare

5. *Labour Party, Report of the 43rd Annual Conference* (London : Labour Party, 1944), p. 9.

recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its Sixth Session." Pakistan actively supported the resolution with other Asian and Arab States.

In the 1951 Session of the General Assembly, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen proposed a draft resolution that the General Assembly itself should draw up an article on the right of self-determination and insert it into the draft Covenant. By the provisions of the draft resolution the Assembly would decide that the Covenant on human Rights should include the statement "all peoples shall have the right of self-determination." Moreover, the Assembly would direct the Commission on Human Rights to assert that "all states including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing territories, should promote the realisation of that right in relation to the peoples of such territories." The Assembly request further that the Commission on Human Rights "prepare recommendation concerning international respect for the self-determination of peoples and to submit these recommendations to the General Assembly at its Seventh Session."

The inclusion of an Article on the right of self-determination they felt, was a logical fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, because it was a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of all other human rights and, therefore, must be included in the Covenants on human Rights.

They argued that the right was being violated

principally in the case of non-self-governing peoples, many of whom live in ignorance of the very existence of the right, while others, who are politically more conscious, were being deluded by promises of independence or self-government to be achieved under the guidance of the colonial powers at some indeterminate future date. The incorporation of the right of self-determination in the Covenant would thus help in the fulfilment of the objectives of Chapter XI, XII and XIII of the Charter.

The leading opponents of this move were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Self-determination, it was said, was a collective right, and as such had no place in Covenants devoted to the rights of individuals. The United States representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, despite a previous statement that the United States was anxious that the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations stated in the Charter be reaffirmed in the covenant, felt that this task should be left to the Commission on Human Rights.

The first operative paragraph in the Afro-Asian draft resolution was voted on in parts. The clause containing the terms under which the article should be drafted was passed by a vote of 36 to 11, with 12 abstentions. The States which voted against were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, The United Kingdom and the United States.

Argentina, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hon-

duras, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, abstained.

The resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 42 to 7, with 5 abstentions.⁶

In the 7th Session, the General Assembly passed Resolution 637 (VII) by a vote of 40 to 14, with 6 abstentions. The resolution stressed that the United Nations should "uphold the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations"; should "recognise and promote the realisation of the right of self-determination of the people of non-self-governing and Trust Territories who are under their administration"; and should grant this right on a demand for self-government on the part of these people, the popular wish being ascertained in particular through plebiscites or other recognised democratic means, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations."

A separate proposal calling on the human Rights Commission through the Economic and Social Council, to study additional ways and means of ensuring International respect for the right of people to self-determination, was adopted by a vote of 42 to 7, with 8 abstentions.

The Commission on Human Rights adopted two resolutions, jointly sponsored by Chile, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan and the Philippines. The first resolution recommended for a Commission to be established by the General Assembly, to conduct

6. *GA.O.R.*, 6th Session, 375th Plenary Meeting, 5 February, 1952, Resolution 545 (VI).

a full survey of the status of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination "including permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources," and to make recommendations where necessary for strengthening that right.

The second resolution proposed that the General Assembly establish another Commission for the realisation of the right of self-determination falling within the scope of Article 14 of the Charter.⁷

But when these resolutions came before the Economic and Social Council, for approval, it refused to pass them on the contention that it is not within its jurisdiction.

This attitude of the Council, was criticised by some of the states at the 1954 session of the General Assembly. A new resolution was thus introduced by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. This reaffirmed the first resolution passed by the Human Rights Commission, that the Assembly established a Commission to conduct a full survey of the status of the peoples and nations to self-determination "including permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources."

7. Article 14 states "subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter, setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

An amendment submitted jointly by Peru, Brazil and the United States to the last paragraph, by which the Assembly should give due regard to "the rights and duties of states under International law" was adopted by a vote of 23 to 14, with 19 absentions. The resolution as amended, was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 41 to 11, with 3 absentions.⁸

The General Assembly, by another resolution, requested the Commission on Human Rights to complete its recommendation and also requested the Economic and Social Council to transmit these recommendations to the General Assembly at its next regular session.

In the Commission and the Ecosoc, three specific proposals were eventually evolved, which were transmitted by the Ecosoc to the General Assembly by its resolution (586 D XX) 29 July, 1955.

Two of these proposals were made by the Human Rights Commission in 1954 and reaffirmed in 1955. The first recommended that the Assembly set up a Commission to conduct a survey of the right of peoples and nations to "permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources" and to make recommendation thereon.

The second suggested that the Assembly establish a Commission to examine alleged denials or inadequate realisation of the right to self-determination, to provide its good offices in such situations

8. G.A.O.R., 9th Session, 512nd Plenary Meeting, December 14, 1954, Resolution 837 (IX).

and to report the facts, if necessary, to the Assembly,

The third proposal originated in the Council itself and called for the establishment of an ad hoc commission to "conduct a thorough survey of the concept of self-determination."

Consideration of these recommendations were postponed at the Assembly's tenth, eleventh and twelfth sessions, in 1955, 1956 and 1957 respectively.

At the Thirteenth Session, in 1958, the matter referred to the Assembly's Third, (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee.

In support of the Council's proposal for a survey of the concept of self-determination, the representatives of Denmark, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom felt it necessary to make a study of the concept of self-determination. Such a study, they said, would help remove existing differences of opinion about the applicability of the principle of self-determination and define the scope of that principle.

The United States put forward an amendment to the Council's proposal so that the contemplated ad hoc Commission should not engage in academic discussions of such terms as "peoples" and "nations but rather in an examination of the concept of self-determination and... the means, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, for promoting conditions favourable to the attainment of self-

determination by peoples desiring it." But this amendment was later withdrawn.

The majority of the Committee's member, however, opposed the Council's proposal and the United States amendment thereto. Among them were Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Chile, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Romania, the U A.R., the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

They argued that reference in these two texts to self-determination as a "principle" ignored previous resolutions of the General Assembly and Article 1 of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, which clearly recognised self-determination as a fundamental right.

After a long debate, voting on all three proposals took place on 23rd November 1958.

The Committee rejected the proposal of the Economic and Social Council by a roll-call of 40 against to 16 in favour, with 8 abstentions.

The first proposal of Human Rights Commission was adopted by a roll-call vote of 52 to 15, with 4 abstentions. The Committee agreed that it should be left to the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to determine the composition of the proposed Commission.

A Yugoslav proposal to postpone action on the second proposal of the Human Rights Commission until the 14th Session of the General Assembly was adopted by 32 votes to 7, with 24 abstentions.

At the Plenary Meeting the General Assembly decided that the Commission contemplated in the

first proposal of Human Rights Commission, as approved by the Third Committee, would be composed of representative of nine member states to be chosen by the President on the basis of geographical distribution, and the Commission would report to the 29th Session of the Ecosoc in 1960. The President thereupon appointed Afghanistan, Chile, Guatemala, The Netherland, the Philippines, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R. and the United States. This was adopted by the Assembly by 52 votes to 15 with 8 abstentions.⁹

These efforts of many years ultimately bore fruit. The right of "self-determination" was incorporated in the Covenants on Human Rights. The right of self-determination was made specially applicable to non-self-governing and Trust territories as well as to the metropolitan states. The means of determining the will of the populations were also spelled out and a system of international accountability and supervision was also provided for, through annual reports and the operations of the Human Rights Committee.

But the real landmark in the mounting pressure against colonialism occurred in 1960, when the General Assembly passed the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

Fortythree African and Asian States introduced a draft resolution, which the General Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote and with only 9

9. G.A.O.R., 13th Session, 788th Plenary Meeting, 12 Meeting, 1958, Resolution 1314 (XII).

abstentions. The States which abstained were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

What was established was a Common Judgment of colonialism and those who abstained in the voting were, for the most part, the "diehard colonialists."¹⁰ After proclaiming the need of bringing a "speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations", the resolution declared that :

"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

All peoples have the right to self-determination ; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness, should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

10. The United States apparently was in favour of the Declaration but abstained in response to British pressure. See *The United States in the U.N. 1960 : A Turning Point*, Supplementary Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1961, pp. 20-21. Quoted in Goodspeed, S.S., *The Nature and function of International organisation*, 2nd Ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Newyork, p. 556.

All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-government territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States and respect for the sovereign rights of all people and their territorial integrity.”¹¹

POSITION OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan being in the vanguard of the era of decolonization has been particularly concerned in the United Nations with questions involving the right of self-determination or self-government. It

11. *op. cit.*, Resolution 1314 (XIII).

has been anxious that the countries still under colonial rule should also become independent. Until that happens, said Sir Zafrulla Khan, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, "the people of Pakistan would not be able either to enjoy or to appreciate to the fullest extent their own recently achieved freedom and sovereignty."¹²

Pakistan's active interest in pleading the cause of dependent people can be ascribed to the following reasons :

Firstly, being a newly independent state, it had experienced the sufferings of colonial rule, that it was her desire to contribute to the United Nations efforts for eliminating this major cause of conflict from the world.

Secondly, the question of Kashmir, to which Pakistan is a party, had been recognised by the United Nations, as a clear case for self-determination of the Kashmiri people. Thus, Pakistan's support for the right of self-determination of non-self-governing people, indirectly gives much support to Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. It was out of respect for that right that Pakistan bitterly opposed the partition of Palestine.

Pakistan had also supported the right of self-determination of the people of Indonesia, and wholeheartedly advocated the case of Tunisia, and Morocco to self-government. It had also advocated, with other Afro-Asian states, speeding up the pace

12. G.A.O.R., 4th Session, 227th Plenary Meeting, 24 September, 1949, p. 59.

of granting self-government to other dependent peoples in Africa and Asia.

Pakistan had played an important role in the emancipation of colonial people. She had been a member of the Special Committee on non-self-governing territories established at the 5th Session. Pakistan's representative, Sir Zafrulla Khan worked as the Chairman of Committee No. II, which made recommendations for a solution of the Palestine problem. Pakistan had also been a member of the Commissions for the preparation of Libya's independence and to ascertain the will of the people of Eritrea.

After making this general survey of Pakistan's participation on colonial questions, *i.e.*, self-determination, the case of Algeria is now undertaken for a study.

THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA

On 5 January, 1955, the representative of Saudi Arabia in a letter to the President of the security council, brought to the council's attention, under Article 35 (I), the grave situation in Algeria, which, he said was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. In an attached memorandum, he charged that the French Government was employing military operations in Algeria to liquidate the national uprising against colonial rule and oppression.

On 29th July, 1955, Asghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen

requested that "the question of Algeria" be included in the agenda of the 10th Session of the General Assembly.

The General Committee examined on 22nd September, the request for inclusion on the agenda. The representatives of Pakistan, Iraq and India at their request, were invited to take seats at the Committee's table.

The representative of France, while opposing inclusion of the item on the agenda stated :

"Algerian affairs were essentially within his government's domestic jurisdiction. Algeria was an integral part of Metropolitan France, and had been so since 1934. Any Algerian, whether a Moslem or a Christian, was a French citizen and from the age of 21, an elector. It was, therefore, clear that Article 2 (7) of the Charter applied to Algeria. The fact that Algeria had been conquered was immaterial since that had been true also of other provinces of France. The right of self-determination of peoples was referred to in Article I of the Charter only as a purpose ; no special method for attaining it was laid down. The omission of any specific provision in the Charter granting the Assembly's competence in that respect was significant, for it would be impossible, in the language of Article 1 (2), to "develop friendly relations among nations" by means of con-

troversial resolutions arising out of stormy debates."¹³

The representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, India, and the U.S.S.R. pleaded for inclusion of the item in the agenda, In support of their claim, they cited the following arguments.

The situation in Algeria had worsened and severe repressive measures had aggravated the difficulties between France and the Algerian Nationalists. Since 1st November, 1954, war had, in fact, broken out in Algeria. The situation had deteriorated further since the Afro-Asian group had requested inclusion of the item. International concern regarding the situation in Algeria had been demonstrated by the fact that it had been brought to the notice of the Security Council by the Saudi Arabian delegation and by the stand taken by the Bandung Conference urging the French Government to seek a peaceful solution. Article 1 (2) and (4), Article 10, 11 (2) and 14 of the Charter were cited to justify inclusion of the item in the agenda and to establish the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the question. Regarding the contention that Article 2 (7)¹⁴ precluded intervention, it was noted that until 1830 Algeria had been independent, maintaining diplomatic and treaty relations with

13. *United Nation Yearbook*, 1955, p. 65.

14. Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any such State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".

numerous states. Only 30 years later had Algeria been completely conquered. Its current status was defined in 1870 by the French Government, without, however, the Algerian people being consulted. Despite theoretical equality, in practice the Algerians did not enjoy the same rights as Frenchmen. Moreover, the General Assembly had always claimed competence in questions involving human rights, among which the right of self-determination was fundamental. Finally inclusion of the question could not any way constitute intervention within the meaning of Article 2 (7), and did not prejudice the question of competence.

The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand stated that, under Article 2 (7) the United Nations was precluded from intervening in the Algerian question. The case of Algeria, an integral part of France, was different from that of Morocco or Tunisia, which were French Protectorates. It was clear that the sponsors of the item sought Assembly sanctions for a course of action intended to bring about fundamental changes in the composition of the French Republic that obviously constituted intervention in the internal affairs of France.

The representatives of Haiti and Ethiopia doubted whether the question of Algeria was similar to the questions of Tunisia and Morocco from the standpoint of international law and expressed fears lest discussion of the matter should jeopardize the progress already made in the negotiations on North African problems.

The General Committee then decided by 8 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions not to recommend the item for inclusion in the agenda. This decision of the General Committee was over-ruled by the General Assembly. The report of the General Committee was examined by the General Assembly and the different representatives expressed views similar to those they expressed in the Committee

The representatives supporting inclusion of the item in the agenda held that discussion of the question did not amount to intervention within the meaning of Article 2 (7). The position would be different if France were required to submit the matter to settlement. But such was not the case; what the record of the General Assembly showed in comparable instances concerning the Union of South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, or West Irian was that the Assembly had invited the parties to gather in order to resolve their problems.

The argument that Algeria was a part of "Metropolitan France" was not valid in terms of political thinking or even of Jurisprudence. If such an argument were sustained, the very basis of the existence of more than one-third of the Members of the United Nations would stand challenged, since at one time or another they had been dependent territories of "metropolitan" powers. Algerian sovereignty had resided in the rulers of Algeria and their subjects before their subjugation, and their rights should be considered inalienable. The issue,

therefore, was not one of intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, but of the discussion of plain, straightforward colonial problem.

As regards the expediency of discussing the question in the United Nations, it was a matter of political judgement, and the influence of the debate on a possible settlement depended upon the way the matter was handled.

Meanwhile, the discussion would assist in allowing some of the pent-up steem to be released without explosion. Algeria was not really an integral part of France and the Algerian Arabs did not enjoy all the rights of French citizenship. More than nine million Algerian Arabs were represented in the French National Assembly by only 15 Arab deputies, and in the Council of the Republic by only 7 Arab Senators. If the Algerian "departments" were dealt with as French metropolitan "departments" they should be allowed to send 125 or 130 deputies to the Council of Assembly and a proportionate number of senators to the Council of the Republic. The facts were that Algeria was not represented "on the same basis" as were the various parts of Metropolitan France and it was governed as a colony.

Article 2 (7), it was argued, was never intended to be an over-riding provision of the Charter and a stumbling block against which the aspiration of people striving for freedom were to be shattered. Even within the framework of Article 2 (7), the principle of domestic jurisdiction was not supposed

to "prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". In this connection, it was questioned whether the General Assembly would not consider the continuous strife and bloodshed in Algeria as being a real threat to international peace and security.

The recommendations of the General Committee not to include the Algerian question in the agenda was voted upon at the 530 Plenary Meeting and was rejected by a vote of 28 to 27, with 5 abstentions.¹⁵

After the vote, the representative of France declared that this was against Article 2 (7) and that his government would not consider legal any recommendation which the General Assembly might make. He then left with his delegation and ceased to attend the meetings of the General Assembly and all its standing committees. On 25 November 1955, the First Committee adopted an Indian Procedural motion, by which the Assembly decided not to consider further "the question of Algeria", in the 10th Session of the General Assembly. This was adopted by the General Assembly without objection on the same day.

Meanwhile, the war in Algeria was going on furiously. The representatives of thirteen Asian

15. The State which voted against were Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia, Costa, Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine SSR, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen and Yugoslavia. G.A.O.R., 10th Session, 530th Plenary Meeting, 30 September, 1955.

and African States including Pakistan drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in Algeria as a violation of fundamental human rights and asked for an early meeting of the Security Council, under Article 35 (1) of the United Nations Charter to consider the situation arising out of military action taken by France. The Security Council, in its meeting on 26 June, decided by 7 votes to 2 (U.S.S.R. and Iran), with 2 abstentions (China and Yugoslavia) not to include the item in the agenda.

The question of Algeria was then included in the agenda of the General Assembly's 11th Session at the request of 15 Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan.

The representative of Pakistan, speaking in the General Debate, expressed his serious concern at the sad happenings in Algeria when he said :

“We are deeply concerned about the tragic happenings, in Algeria, of whose claim to freedom Pakistan is a staunch supporter. If wiser counsels do not prevail and the forces of repression that have been let loose in North Africa are not checked, the whole of that area will be submerged under chaos and anarchy. In respect of several of these grave situations, this Organisation has stood aside helplessly and watched the situation grow worse. My delegation feels that in such situations, the United Nations should bring in to play its resources of

reconciliation, clearly enunciated in its Charter.”¹⁶

The question was discussed in detail in the First Committee. Three draft resolutions were introduced ; one was sponsored jointly by 18 Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan, by which the General Assembly, having regard to “the situation of unrest and strife in Algeria” which was “causing much human sufferings and disturbing the harmony between nations” and recognising “the right of the People of Algeria to self-determination according to the principles of Charter” would : request France to respond to the desire of the people of Algeria to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination ; invite France and the people of Algeria to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities and the peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with the Charter ; and ask the Secretary-General to assist the parties in conducting such negotiations and to report the Assembly’s 12th Session.

The second draft resolution was sponsored by Japan, the Philippines and Thailand. By this, the Assembly would express the hope that the Algerian people would endeavour through appropriate negotiations, to bring about the end of bloodshed and the peaceful settlement of the present difficulties. It would do so having regard to “the situation of unrest in Algeria” which was causing “much human suffering and loss of lives” and believing

16. G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 60 1st Plenary Meeting, 29 November, 1956, p. 415.

that "the unsatisfactory situation now prevailing in Algeria" might be "normalised by the joint efforts of France and the Algerian people to find an equitable solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

A six-power draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Italy and Peru. By this draft resolution, the Assembly having heard the statements of French and other delegations and having discussed the question of Algeria, would express the hope that a peaceful and democratic solution of this question would be found.

Supporting the 18-power draft resolution the representative of Pakistan said :

"Pakistan's attitude is not anti-Western, but her country stood for the right of peoples to self-determination. Moreover, the Pakistan delegation understood perfectly that the national aspirations of a non-self-governing people could be fulfilled by the free association of the territory with the metropolitan country, but no such association would be fully valid without the consent of the population, concerned."¹⁷

When the three draft resolutions were put to vote, the representative of France declared that he would not participate in the voting. The 18-power draft resolution was voted on paragraph-by-para-

17. *G.A.O.R.*, 11th Session, First Committee, 830th Plenary Meeting, 4 February, 1957, p. 173.

graph by a roll-call vote. The first operative paragraph was rejected by 34 votes against to 33 in favour, with 10 abstentions and the second paragraph was rejected by 34 votes against to 33 in favour, with 9 abstentions. In view of this, the draft resolution as a whole was not voted by the Committee.

The six-power draft resolution was then adopted by a vote of 41 to 33, with 3 abstentions. A motion by New Zealand not to vote on the 3-power draft resolution was rejected by the Committee by a vote of 43 against to 24 in favour, with 10 abstentions. The three-power draft resolution was subsequently adopted as a whole by a roll-call vote of 37 to 27, with 13 abstentions. Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution.

The General Assembly discussed the Report of the First Committee on 15th February, 1957. A new 9-power draft resolution with a conciliatory text, submitted by sponsors of the 3-power draft resolutions was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 70 to 0, with no abstention, as resolution 1012 (XI), urging for a peaceful, just and democratic solution, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the 12th Session of the General Assembly, in 1957, the question of Algeria was included in the agenda at the request of 21 Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan. In the First Committee, the representative of France, stated that the fact that France, has not objected to

placing the Algerian question on the agenda should not be taken that it had changed its position about United Nations intervention in the matter. The French delegation was participating, he said, in order to make known the efforts that were being made to bring about a peaceful settlement and to refute the calumnies directed against France further stated that the moral and material support to the Algerian rebels came from Egypt, the Arab League, Morocco and Tunisia. He asserted that the countries furnishing assistance were violating the United Nations Charter, the provision of the Assembly's "Essential for Peace" resolution, and the principles of peaceful co-existence adopted at the Bandung Conference.

The offer of good offices from Morocco and Tunisia could not be accepted, he said, for both the countries were under pressure of the Algerian rebels.

The representatives of Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Israel, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom expressed the view that the United Nations had no right to intervene in the matter, since the matter fell under Article 2(7) of the Charter.

The representatives of Albania, Byelorussia, Ceylon, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine SSR, Uruguay, U.S.S.R. and Yemen, maintained that the United Nations was competent to deal with the Algerian problem. The question of competence, they said,

could not be decided by the unilateral declaration of a Member State. As French rule in Algeria had originally been installed by military intervention, its present character could be regarded only as colonial occupation maintained without regard for the wishes of the Algerian people. Furthermore, the struggle in Algeria had developed into a war and had endangered peace and security in the area, it was both the right and the duty of the United Nations to continue its quest for an equitable solution.

The representative of Pakistan in supporting the cause of the Algerian people said, "As regards the interest of the *Colons*, they could be durably guaranteed only through a generous understanding with the majority of the Algerian people."¹⁸

Two draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee; one was sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian States. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly would regret that the hope for a solution, as expressed in its resolution 1012 (XI) of 15 February 1957, had not yet been realised. Recognising that the principle of self-determination was applicable to the Algerian people and noting that the situation in Algeria continued to cause much suffering and loss of human life, the Assembly would call for negotiations in order to arrive at a solution in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

18. *Colons* means French Settlers in Algeria. G.A.O.R. 12th Session, First Committee, 920th Meeting, 4 December, 1957, p. 301.

The second draft resolution was sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Peru and Spain. Under the term of this draft resolution, the General Assembly, bearing in mind the situation in Algeria which continued to cause much suffering and loss of life, would : take note of the attempts which had been reported to the Assembly to settle the problem both through the good offices of Heads of States and by French legislative measures ; and express the hope once again that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Two amendments were submitted jointly by Canada, Ireland and Norway, to the 17-power draft resolution. By the first amendment, the Assembly recognised that the Algerian people were entitled to work out their own future in a democratic way (rather than recognise that the principle of self-determination was applicable to the Algerian people). By the second amendment, the Assembly, instead of calling for negotiations for a solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, would propose effective discussion in order to resolve the troubled situation and in order to reach a solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of the charter.

The sponsors of the 17-power draft resolution did not accept these amendments. Thus, the 17-power draft resolution and the three-power amendments were put to vote. The amendments were

voted first and were adopted as a whole by a vote of 37 to 36, with 7 abstentions. The draft resolution as amended was then put to vote. It was not adopted the votes being 37 to 37 with 6 abstentions. Pakistan voted against the amendments and later against the resolution.

On behalf of the sponsors of the 7-power draft resolution, the representative of Argentina stated that the draft resolution would not be pressed to a vote, but the sponsors reserved the right to introduce it at the plenary meeting. The First Committee was therefore unable to recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of any resolution on the question of Algeria.

In the General Assembly, when the report of the First Committee was presented a joint draft resolution was submitted by Argentina. Brazil, Canada, the Dominion Republic, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Spain and Thailand. By this draft resolution, the Assembly again expressed its concern over the situation in Algeria. It took note of the good offices offer made by the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia, and it expressed the wish that, in a spirit of effective co-operation, pourparlers would be entered into, and other appropriate means used, with a view to a solution of the Algerian question, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. This was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 80 to 0. France did not participate in the voting.¹⁹

19. *G.A.O.R.* 12th Session, 726th Plenary Meeting, 10 December, 1957, as Resolution 1184(XII).

On 15th July, 1958, twenty-five Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan, asked that the question of Algeria be put on the agenda of the 13th Session of the General Assembly. The item was included in the agenda of the General Assembly on 22nd September 1958 and was considered by the First Committee between 8 and 13 December, 1958.

In the debate in the First Committee, the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Bylo-russia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malaya, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine SSR, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., and Yugosłavia expressed regret at France's decision not to participate, in the debate on the question of Algeria and its refusal to accept the offer of mediation made by Tunisia and Morocco. They urged for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Algeria, and for negotiations between the two parties.

Belgium, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain and the Union of South Africa argued that Article 2(7) of the Charter, debarred the United Nations from dealing with the Algerian question. They further emphasized that United Nations Intervention will make the solution of the problem difficult, for General de Gaulle had declared to solve it in an honourable manner.

On 12 December, 17 Afro-Asian States submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly, recalling two previous resolution 1012 (XI) and 1104

(XII), recognising the right of the Algerian people to independence, and taking note of the willingness of Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with France, would urge that the two parties concerned negotiate with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

On 13 December, Haiti submitted two amendments to the 17-power draft resolution. By the first amendment, the Assembly, instead of "recognising the right of the Algerian people to independence," would recognise "by virtue of Article I(2) of the Charter, the right of the Algerian people to decide for themselves their own destiny." By the second Haitian amendment, the Assembly, instead of taking note of the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to negotiate, would take note, "that both the French Government and the Algerian leaders have affirmed their wish to enter into negotiations."

When the 17-power draft resolution and the Haitian amendments were put to vote, the first Haitian amendment was rejected by a vote of 48 against to 13 in favour, with 19 abstentions. Haiti did not press its second amendment to a vote. The 17-power draft resolution was then adopted by a roll-call vote of 32 to 18, with 30 abstentions.

In the Plenary Meeting of the Assembly, Ceylon proposed to delete the paragraph in the First Committee's resolution "taking note of the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Re-

public to enter into negotiation with France." This was adopted by the Assembly, by a vote of 38 to 0, with 43 abstentions. The draft resolution as amended was then put to a roll-call vote. It received 35 votes in favour to 19 against, with 28 abstentions. It was not adopted having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority. Pakistan, with other Afro-Asians, voted in favour of the resolution.

On 10 July, 1959, twenty-two Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan, brought to the attention of the Security Council, the situation in Algeria, as a threat to international peace and security and an infringement of the basic right of self-determination and constituted a flagrant violation of other fundamental human rights.

On 14 July, the same twenty-two Afro-Asian States joined by India, Japan and The Philippines requested the incursion of the Algerian question on the agenda of the 14th Session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly included the question in the agenda on 22 September and referred it to the First Committee which considered it between 30 September and 7 December, 1959.

On 2 December, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., Yemen and Malaya.

By the operative paragraph of this 22-power proposal, the General Assembly would "urge the two parties concerned to enter into pourparlers to

determine the conditions necessary for the implementation as early as possible of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, including conditions for a ceasefire."

By the preamble of this text, the Assembly would, among other things, having discussed the question of Algeria, recall previous resolutions on the question, recall Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter ; recognise the right of Algerian people to self-determination ; express deep concern with the continuance of hostilities in Algeria ; state that the present situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security ; and note with satisfaction that the two parties concerned had accepted the right of self-determination as the basis for the solution of the problem.

In addition to the sponsors, the draft resolution was supported by the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Venezuela.

The representative of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States considered that the adoption of a resolution by the Assembly would hinder the progress of a solution rather than help it.

On 7 December, the draft resolution was voted on by parts. The first three paragraphs of the preamble were adopted by a vote of 59 to 4, with 18 abstentions. The fourth paragraph recalling Article 1(2) of the Charter was adopted by 59 votes to 3, with 19 abstentions. The sixth paragraph was adopted by 61 votes to 1, with 19 abstentions. The

draft resolution as a whole, was adopted by a vote of 38 to 26, with 17 abstentions.

The General Assembly considered the report of the First Committee on 12 December. The representative of Pakistan stated that, in order to achieve as much harmony as possible, the Afro-Asian group had substantially modified the text of the resolution adopted by the First Committee, to meet the various objections expressed in the Committee. He then submitted a new draft resolution whereby the General Assembly, having discussed the question of Algeria, would recall its two previous resolutions on Algeria ; recall Article I(2) of the Charter ; express deep concern with the continuance of hostilities in Algeria. By the operative part of this new text, the Assembly would : recognise the right of the Algerian people to self-determination ; and would urge the holding of pourparlers with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution on the basis of the right of self-determination, in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

This new text, said the representative of Pakistan, represented an effort on the part of the Afro-Asian nations to go as far as possible towards respecting the views of those opposed to certain parts of the First Committee's draft resolution, particularly those referring to the scope of the pourparlers and to the number of parties which were to take part in them.

The representatives of Australia, Belgium, Ecouador, Italy, Peru, Spain, and the United Kingdom, however, differed and stressed that, in the

present circumstances, any resolution on the substance of the matter would be likely to make an early solution of the problem more difficult.

At the request of the representative of Pakistan the Assembly decided to give priority to the new draft resolution, which was voted on in parts. All the paragraphs were adopted, but when the resolution as a whole was put to vote, it received 39 votes in favour, 22 against, with 20 abstentions. It was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-third majority.

On 20 July, 1960, twenty-five African and Asian States, including Pakistan, requested the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the 15th Session of the General Assembly.

At the unanimous recommendation of the General Committee, the General Assembly referred the item to the First Committee; The First Committee considered it between 5 and 15 December, 1960.

On 9 December, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., and Yemen. Ceylon, Nepal and India also joined later. By this 24-power proposal, the General Assembly, among other things, would: (1) recognise the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence; (2) recognise the imperative need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the right of

self-determination on the basis of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria ; (3) recognise further that the United Nations had a responsibility to contribute towards its successful and just implementation ; and (4) decide that a referendum should be conducted in Algeria, organised, controlled and supervised by the United Nations, whereby the Algerian people would freely determine the destiny of their entire country.

Canada, Gabon, New Zealand, Peru, Turkey and the United Kingdom objected to the draft resolution on the grounds that it attempted improperly, to impose a referendum on a sovereign state and would encourage extremists both in France and Algeria, to persist in their present course, making a solution more difficult.

The representative of Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, and Uruguay felt that operative paragraph four went beyond the powers of the General Assembly.

The representatives of Finland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden emphasised that the popular referendum should be held under the auspices of the United Nations,

On 15 December, 1960, the First Committee adopted the 24-power draft resolution as a whole by a roll-call vote of 47 to 20, with 28 abstentions.

When the Committees resolution was considered in the Plenary Meeting, on 19th December, two amendments were submitted by Cyprus and Cameroun, the Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast, Dahomy,

Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad respectively. According to the first amendment, instead of "deciding" that a referendum "shall be held" in Algeria, the Assembly should "recommend" that it be held ; it also should be "under the auspices of the United Nations," rather than "organised, controlled and supervised by the United Nations".

The second amendment was in two parts. The first part [of the amendment proposed to replace operative paragraph four by a new paragraph, by which the Assembly would invite the parties involved in the conflict to enter immediately in to negotiations, without preliminary conditions, on a cease-fire and the circumstances for the organisation of the referendum on self-determination, including mutual guarantees for the parties concerned and international guarantees.

The second part of the 11-power amendment was intended to add a new operative paragraph by which the Assembly, with a view to facilitating contacts and the progress of the negotiations, would recommend the establishment of a special International Commission, the composition and members of which would be determined in agreement with the parties involved in the conflict. The first paragraph of the 11-power amendment was rejected by the Assembly by 31 votes in favour to 39 against, with 25 abstentions. The Second paragraph was also rejected by a vote of 22 in favour to 39 against, with 35 abstentions. Cyprus's amendment received 53 votes in favour, 27 against, with 17 abstentions.

It was not adopted as it did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority.

The Assembly then voted on the draft resolution recommended by the Committee. Operative paragraph 4 was voted on separately and received 40 votes in favour and 40 against, with 16 abstentions. It was not adopted having failed to receive the necessary two-third majority. The resolution as a whole, and as amended by the rejection of operative paragraph four, was then adopted by a roll-call vote of 63 to 8, with 27 abstentions.²⁰

On 11 August, 1961, 31 Asian and African States including Pakistan again requested that the question of Algeria be placed on the agenda of the 16th session of the General Assembly.

On 25 September, 1961, the Assembly included the item in the agenda and referred it to the First Committee which, on 30 November 1961, deferred discussion to 14 December in order not to disturb the ceasefire talks which were then being held in regard to Algeria. This item, thus, was considered by the First Committee between 14 and 19 December 1961.

In the Committee, opening the debate, the representative of Pakistan expressed admiration for those who were engaged in the struggle waged by, and on behalf of, the Algerian people. He also expressed his government's appreciation for the skill, perseverance and steadfastness with which President

20. *G.A.O.R.*, 15th Session, 956th Plenary Meeting, 19 December 1960, as resolution 1573 (XV).

de Gaulle was seeking to solve the problem. Noting that important results had already been achieved—such as the recognition of the right to independence for Algeria and the preservation of its territorial integrity, including the Sahara—he observed that the only real obstacle standing in the way of the solution of the problem appeared to be the protection of the right of the European minority. He hoped that the present occasion would be the last on which the United Nations would be called upon to deal with the question of Algeria and that negotiations between the parties directly concerned would be resumed as soon as possible.

A draft resolution, sponsored by thirty-four Asian and African States, including Pakistan, was submitted. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly would call upon the two parties to resume negotiations with a view to implementing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria.

Cuba, the U.S.S.R. and other East European States supported the cause of the Algerian people.

The representatives of various French speaking African States, Latin American Members, and some Western European Members pointed out the special character of the Algerian problem and welcomed the efforts made by President de Gaulle for a just and lasting solution. They regretted that the draft resolution had not indicated the need for appropriate guarantees for the European minority in Algeria.

The United States representative objected to the reference to an "Algerian Government," which he said, was not recognised by the majority of Member States ; such a reference, he felt, might infringe on the prerogatives and responsibilities of the negotiators on both sides.

The 34-power draft resolution was put to vote on 19 December 1961 and was adopted by the Committee by a vote of 61 to 0, with 30 abstentions. The General Assembly approved the First Committee's recommendations by a vote of 62 to 0, with 38 abstentions.²¹

On 15 November 1961, the representative of Pakistan submitted another draft resolution, on the status of Algerians imprisoned in France, as a matter of great urgency and importance. He pointed out that several thousand Algerian prisoners in France were on a hunger strike and the matter which was essentially a humanitarian question, should be dealt with urgently.

The draft resolution was co-sponsored by thirty-six Afro-Asian States. The representative of France said that the question had been presented only for propaganda purposes to discredit France.

The representative of Morocco emphasised that the present resolution only meant that the General Assembly should add its voice to the appeals already made to France by several Heads of States, including the King of Morocco and the President of Pakistan

21. *G.A.O.R.* 16th Session, 1085th Plenary Meeting, 20 December, 1961, as Resolution 1724 (XVI).

as well as various international Organisations, on the question of Algerian prisoners.

A motion by the representative of Pakistan to suspend debate on the question under discussion and for the immediate consideration of the newly submitted draft resolution, was accepted without objection.

The representative of Pakistan, speaking in support of the draft resolution, stated that the steps taken by the sponsors of the draft resolution were essentially prompted by humanitarian considerations and had no propaganda purpose. He paid tributes to the liberal policies of President de Gaulle, expressed his conviction that an appeal addressed to his government would not be in vain.

Reservations regarding the draft resolution were expressed by representative of the United States, who said that his delegation, although it was most concerned to see the Algerian prisoners treated according to the highest humanitarian standards, had doubts about the possible results of the proposed action and about the procedure followed. The draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 62 to 0, with 31 abstentions. Almost all the Western powers abstained.²²

Although the United Nations could not directly solve the Algerian problem, the discussions in the different United Nations organs were an important factor that paved the way for the solution of the

22. G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1055th Plenary Meeting, 15 November, 1961, as Resolution 1650(XVI).

problem. After a cease-fire agreement between the French government and the Algerian Nationalists, the problem was finally solved at Evian on 18 March 1962, after a long negotiation. Algeria, thus, became independent and was consequently admitted to the United Nations on 8th October, 1962,

On the question of Algeria, the feeling for Afro-Asian identification and for the Muslim brotherhood had been mainly effective in shaping Pakistan's policy in the United Nations.

From 1955 up to 1961, Pakistan, with other Afro-Asian States, asked for the consideration of the Algerian question by the United Nations and sponsored resolutions recommending solution of the Algerian question on the basis of the right of self-determination.

This outright support to the Algerian people had been in conformity with Pakistan's stated policy on human rights and self-determination, namely that all colonial people struggling to be free should be helped. This position was also in consonance with Pakistan's ideological policy to champion the cause of the Muslim people.

Pakistan was not influenced by the Western bloc on the question of Algerian self-determination, in spite of the fact that she was a member of SEATO, and associated with France as a partner in military alliance. All the Western powers—with whom Pakistan was aligned—consistently voted against or abstained on the Afro-Asian resolutions and supported France. They did not negate the

principle of self-determination, but took shelter behind Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter asserting that the question was one of domestic jurisdiction as Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France. It is interesting to note that all the colonial or semi-colonial powers supported France on the question of Algeria. The United States though professing to be anti-colonial, also voted in support of France.

As the Algerian question was common for all the Afro-Asians, being a colonial question therefore Pakistan and India had followed an identical policy. But the Pakistan delegate in the United Nations had been more active than that of India and some other Afro-Asia States on the question of Algerian self-determination.

The manner in which Pakistan pleaded the cause of Algeria, for self-determination and human rights, represent Pakistan's independent and impartial approach to colonial questions. Pakistan's policy on this question also shows Pakistan's firm belief in the United Nations Charter, as a guide for the peaceful solution of international problems.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN* : 1947-60

Khalid Javed Makhdoom

The North-Western 'tribal belt'¹ of the sub-continent, the area of Pak-Afghan conflict², was included in Pakistan because of the communal considerations. Pathans (or Pakhtoons), the inhabitants of the area, has been a part of the Sub-continent for centuries ; and they were overwhelmingly Muslim.³ Their joining Pakistan had come into effect by means of referendum arranged by the British on the eve of partition in 1947. The object of the referen-

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- * This research paper is first of the series on the subject- The forthcoming will include Pakistan's strategic interests in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
1. We are using this term at random. In fact, the area under dispute roughly covered the whole of the North-West Frontier Province or the N.W.F.P., the states of Chitral, Dir, Swat and Nagar (all Pashto speaking), and Baluchistan (Baluchi speaking); see, Arif Hussain, *Pakistan : Its Ideology and foreign Policy*, (London : Frank Cass, 1960), pp. 113-14.
 2. For details, see the history of Durand Line (the unmarked border between the two countries) and the claim of Pakistan and Afghanistan, in, Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, "The Relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, VIII, (December, 1955) ; and, S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis* (London : Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 68-90.
 3. These Pathans are generally on the both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, about seven million in Pakistan and three million in Afghanistan, A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p- 116. Our concern is only with the Pakistani Pathans who were directly effected by Pak-Afghan antagonism.

dum was to ascertain the Pathan wishes to accede either to Pakistan or to India.⁴

Regardless of these facts, Afghanistan insisted on recognizing Pathans as a nation apart from Pakistan. The Afghan claim was raised from the base that religion had nothing to do with the national status of a community. Although Pathans were Muslims, they had linguistic and cultural ties with the neighbouring Afghans.⁵ There must, therefore, be another, partition within Pakistan to let Pathans have a 'Pakhtoonistan' of their own.⁶

Afghanistan made this claim first in 1946. But Pandit Nehru, the foreign minister in the interim government of undivided India, turned it down outright.⁷ Perhaps the consideration for Nehru at that time was the indecision of Indian National Congress

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4. Out of total electorate of 572,798, over 50 percent of the voters went to the polls. Pakistan secured a clear majority by receiving 289,244 votes, against 2,874 votes cast in favour of India, S.M. Burke *op. cit.*, p. 70. See furthermore, A Group Study, "The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *Pakistan Horizon*, (March, 1956), pp. 40-41.
 5. *Ibid.* For a similar reference, see also, Khurshid Hyder, India and Pakistan Pressures—External and Internal", *Round Table*, 51, (June, 1964), p. 205.
 6. Historically being a part of the Sub-continent, 'Pakhtoonistan' was Pakistan's provincial matter. This aspect prevents Afghanistan from claiming the territory, A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 125. For ambiguity in the Afghan claim, see, W. Spain "The Pathan Borderland", p. 237, quoted in, S.M. Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
 7. Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seek Security*, (Karachi : Longman Green, 1960), p. 25.

on the question of partition.⁸ The acceptance of the Afghan claim, thus, would be tantamount to giving away a chunk of the Indian union, the idealism of Indian National Congress.

However, the phase of unpleasantness in the Pak-Afghan relations started right from the beginning.⁹ Afghanistan reiterated the claim to the government of Pakistan in December 1947.¹⁰ It was the time when Pakistan was involved in a war with India on the future of Kashmir.¹¹ To many Pakistanis, the selection of this critical hour by Afghanistan to lay its claim indicated an Afghan-Indian collusion against Pakistan. Geographically, the North-Western tribal belt is contiguous to Afghanistan as well as to Kashmir. The latter, in its turn, has common borders with (West) Pakistan and India. The Pakistani apprehension revolved around the argument that, apparently, India's interest was the encirclement of Pakistan, which it could achieve by means of occupying the whole of Kashmir territory and maintaining cordiality with Afghanistan.¹² In other words, joint Afghan-Indian movement, if

8. The Congress party decided about partition in 1947 ; see for example, Khalid Javed Makhdoom, "Pakistan : Domestic Politics and Its Impact on Foreign Policy 1947-1960", unpublished M.A. thesis, (University of Waterloo, 1976), pp. 227-28. "the historic image of India...to be restored inspite of Pakistan's creation...", Congress resolution of June 1947, in, V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of power in India*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 384.

9. Unlike the other Muslim countries, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

10. A. Siddiqi, *op. cit.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. A Group Study, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

launched simultaneously in the tribal region and Kashmir, would have been catastrophic for the infant State of Pakistan.¹³

This threat further heightened in 1955, when Pakistan adhered to the Baghdad Pact and earned Soviet indignation. The latter moved closer to India and Afghanistan. India had already been receiving extensive financial aid and support on Kashmir from the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Insofar as Afghanistan was concerned, substantial assistance was not extended for the Afghan developmental projects.¹⁵ It was accompanied by an endorsement of the right of self-determination, as desired by the Afghan government, for the Pathans of the North-Western tribal region.¹⁶ Pakistan, thus, found not only India on Afghanistan's side but also one of the super powers, the Soviet Union.¹⁷

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13. Ian Stephen, "Horned Moon", quoted in, A. Siddiqi *op. cit.* Such fears were mostly in the minds of Pakistan, and they did not have a clear evidence of India's official involvement in the Pak-Afghan tention, What can, however, be referred to in this regard in the observation of 'Pakhtoonistan Day' in the Indian cities marked with provocative speeches and publications, see, Arnold Fletcher, "Afghanistan : Highway of Conquest", p. 255, quoted in, S.M. Burke, *op. cit.* p. 75.
 14. See, K.J. Makhdoom, *op. cit.*, Chapter V ; as well as, Arthur B. Stein, *India and Soviet Union*, (Chicago, 1969), pp. 58-100.
 15. S.M. Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 206. In 1955, the Soviet aid to Afghanistan was about \$100 million. The total Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan had been double this amount, and slightly greater than the American aid since 1946, N.D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Policy*, (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Press, (1966), p. 227).
 16. See, the duplicity in the Soviet leaders policy, meant to punish Pakistan. They supported the right of self-determination for Pathans but denied the same to Kashmiris, *Dawn*, 9 January 1956.
 17. Ayub Khan felt the Soviet threat through Afghanistan, dangerous for both Pakistan and India, and said in 1959 that Pakistan's defence of the North-West was defence of the whole Sub-continent, A. Siddiqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-09.

Inevitably, the officials of Pakistan had to neutralize the mounting Afghan threat to their national security. Their approach since 1947 had been to supply a strategic defensive shield against the Muslim hostile neighbour. On this point, both the elite segments—the ruling liberals as well as the conservative ulema in opposition—agreed that Islam was a factor indispensable to Pakistan's foreign policy;¹⁸ and that any opposition to the Islamic State of Pakistan was sinful and must therefore be resisted vigorously. This later view was expressed rather more strongly by the ulema.¹⁹

From this standard of national outlook, the officials of Pakistan adopted since 1947 a strategic policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. This policy can be explained from domestic as well as inter-state angles. Domestically, the Pakistani policy-makers concentrated on the Pathan-inhabited North-Western tribal belt. The slogan they used was that the destiny of Pathans was linked with the destiny of Pakistan.²⁰ It should also be understood that Pathans were staunch adherents of Islam.²¹ This aspect enabled the officials to attract the Pathans to Pakistan and its Islamic ideology. For instance, immediately after Pakistan's inception, an extensive ideological campaign was started in the area to

18. K.J. Makhdoom, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 and 170-74.

19. "Pakistan News", 12 June 1949, p. 371, quoted in, Leonard, Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, (California, 1963), p. 193. As per the information, sixty-five ulema signed this "fatwa" (religious verdict) in favour of Pakistan's official policy towards the Kashmir war of 1947-48.

20. A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

21. *Ibid.*

make the Pathans realise that they were as much a part of Pakistan's nationalism as the people of other areas.²² In the same process, Pakistan withdrew the regular army deployed in the region after the British period, and replaced it with Pathan units.²³ The underlying objective was to create the impression of the anti-Islamic (British) soldiers substituted by pro-Islamic (Pathan or Pakistani) defenders, in whose presence the confrontation of Muslims with Muslims had lost its significance.²⁴

This policy proved very successful. The tribesmen did not assert their independence. Most of them pledged their loyalty to Pakistan ; and fought against India in Kashmir.²⁵

Besides such ideological efforts, attention was also given to the strategic importance of the region. A special emphasis was laid on the economic needs of the tribes.²⁶ And then, planning was undertaken to integrate the area politically with the rest of (West) Pakistan. For this purpose, and to ensure enhanced participation of Pathans in Pakistan's national life, three representatives of tribesmen were included in the Constituent Assembly for the first time in 1954.²⁷ When the heterogeneous provinces of West Pakistan were dissolved into one-unit

22. See, *ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

24. See, *ibid.*, p. 119.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Malik Ghulam Mohammad, a finance minister in Liaquat's cabinet and a Governor General of the later period, specifically referred to such needs in the World Islamic Conference of 1949, see, *ibid.*, p. 123.

27. *Ibid.*

in 1955, further political integration of the tribes became easier.²⁸

Beyond the tribal belt was Muslim Afghanistan, a political anachronism with which involved the Pakistani officials in a dilemma of nationalism and internationalism. The sentiment of Islamic brotherhood required them to have friendship with Afghanistan, but the threat to Pakistan's security required treatment of the same state as an enemy.²⁹ In a bid to solve this dilemma, the officials adopted a mixed posture of resistance and conciliation. Their resistance to Afghanistan initially came to the surface during Liaquat Ali's premiership. On 9 January 1950, he said that Pakistan was willing to be friendly to Afghanistan, though definitely not at the cost of surrendering even a single inch of its territory.³⁰ In mid-1955, certain important developments were on foot. Pakistan was thinking to join Baghdad Pact in September, which eventually brought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan's favour. Within the country, a programme was set out to amalgamate the provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit. The later decision also meant the merger of Pathan areas into the state of Pakistan.³¹ The relations between the two countries had to bear the brunt of such developments. Afghanistan launched

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

30. His speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, in, "Pakhtoonistan ; A Myth", Department of Film Advertising, p. 9, 9, quoted in, *ibid.*, p. 122.

31. Referred to above.

a bitter anti-Pakistan propaganda.³² The diplomatic ties broke down and could not be restored till 1957.³³ Pakistan responded in a harsh tone. On 1 May 1955, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra warned Afghanistan : "We have tolerated the anti-Pakistan activities of the Afghan ruling junta for long....We shall not tolerate such activities any longer."³⁴

In the meanwhile, we must admit that Pakistan's opposition to Afghanistan was different from its resistance to India.³⁵ It was governed by two identical sentiments. First, the strategic anti-Communist sentiment, which suggested that Afghanistan's subservience to the USSR could effect Communist infiltration into Pakistan. To prevent it, Afghanistan should be kept away from the Soviet Union and attracted toward Pakistan.³⁶ Second, the ideological sentiment of Islamic brotherhood, Pan-Islamism, which, in Afghanistan's case, simply meant that the purpose of resistance should not be taking revenge from the neighbouring member of Islamic 'umma'.³⁷

These two sentiments, which were more strategic to Pakistan's security and less ideological in terms of Pan-Islamism, made the officials of Pakistan pacifists in their policy with regard to

32. S. Burke, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206.

33. A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

34. "Frontier Information", 10 May 1955, quoted in, *ibid.*, p. 123.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

36. See, *ibid.*, pp. 122 and 123.

37. The dilemma of nationalism and internationalism in Pakistan's Afghan policy, mentioned above.

Afghanistan. Their aim was to improve relations and not to see Afghanistan defeated.³⁸ Before Pakistan's joining the West, Liaquat Ali explained this approach. He declared : "We are ready to discuss economic and cultural questions so that we might help to improve the lot of the people of this part of the world, but imaginary political questions cannot be entertained."³⁹ And, Mohammad Ali Bogra, a prime minister whom we quoted earlier as threatening Afghanistan in May 1955, pursued a somewhat conciliatory attitude after Pakistan's going into the Baghdad Pact. In March 1956, he said that his government was willing to help Afghanistan fulfil its international economic requirements through Pakistan's territory. "But I would beg that country to believe," the Prime Minister added, "that our spirit of conciliation should never be mistaken for weakness, or want of belief in our rights."⁴⁰

Afghanistan is a landlocked country, depending on the trade facilities provided by Pakistan.⁴¹ Despite having the knowledge of this handicap of the Muslim neighbour, Pakistan refrained from tightening the transportation and communication

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38. A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 126. See also. A Group Study, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
 39. Interview to the representative of 'The Times', in "Keessing's Contemporary Archives", vol. VIII, p. 11077, quoted in, *ibid.*
 40. "Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates", quoted in, *ibid.*, p. 123.
 41. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

stranglehold' it had on Afghanistan.⁴² Besides, the interests of Afghanistan were well looked after whenever developmental projects were undertaken in the border areas. For instance, the vital Warsak hydro-electric dam on the Kabul River (on Pakistan's side of the border) was deliberately delayed by the government of Pakistan for two years until engineers prepared a plan for avoiding flood in the adjoining Afghan territory.⁴³

As such, we can infer that, during the given period (1947-60), Afghanistan posed a threat to Pakistan's security when the Soviet Union appeared to be in favour of 'Pakhtoonistan'. The Pakistan officials attempted to evade the Afghan threat mainly from a strategic platform. They publicized Islamic ideology in the North-Western tribal belt to keep Pathans loyal to Pakistan. Side by side, they adopted a mixed posture of resistance and conciliation toward Afghanistan. Such an attitude was aimed at achieving two strategic ambitions: 1) to ensure Pakistan's national security; and, 2) to prevent Communist infiltration into Pakistan, which could otherwise be made possible by Afghanistan's subservience to the Soviet Union.

42, *Ibid.*, p. 121. It has also been reported that even when there was an acute food shortage in 1953, special arrangements were made by the government of Pakistan to transport American wheat imported by Afghanistan (pp. 121-22).

43. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

The Struggle for Regional Leadership

Ghulam Mustafa Chaudhry

I. Introduction

The rivalry for regional leadership between Argentina and Brazil in the southern cone of Latin America has an historical tradition dating back to the independence of Argentina from Spain in 1828. The roots of the competition can be traced back even further to the colonization of the Plate River basin by Spain and the establishment of a Portuguese colony in Brazil in the early 16th century. Indeed, Miguel Angel Scenna in *Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad*, begins his analysis of conflict and competition between the two actors with the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1494, when Portugal and Spain agreed to the division of the New World territories.¹ The causes of rivalry are many, and the literature on the region is replete, from cultural differences to the clash of two poles of power. The record of competition includes armed conflict during the nineteenth century to more restrained forms of rivalry in the twentieth century. The latter

1. Miguel Angel Scenna, *Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad*, (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, 1975).

includes the maintenance of political-economic spheres of influence.

In this essay we will deal with the forms of competition between the two states in the post-World War II period, 1948-1977. Given the perceptions of competition and mutual distrust, how have Argentina and Brazil formulated and implemented their foreign policies in order to achieve national goals in the region? We will first summarize the general trends in Argentine and Brazilian foreign policies as discussed in the general literature. By using events data collected for the period 1948-1977, we will test several hypotheses about the forms of competition for regional leadership which have been utilized by each actor, given the changes in relative economic stability and international status of Argentina and Brazil in the international system.

II. Traditional Foreign Policy Trends

The foreign policy goals of Argentina pertinent to its regional role have generally been :²

- (1) maintenance of balance of power with Brazil ;
- (2) continuance of a high rate of exemplary economic growth ;

2. The following works deal with the development of Argentine foreign policy : Thomas Weil, *e.d.*, *Area Handbook for Argentina*, (Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), chpt. 11. M.A. Scenna, *Argentina-Brazil*. Yale Ferguson, *Contemporary Inter-American Relations*, (New Jersey : Prentice Hall Inc., 1972.) Henry S. Ferns, *Argentina*, (New Jersey, 1969). Edward S. Milensky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies*. (Boulder : Westview Press, 1978). See also piece by J. Finan in note 3.

- (3) the development of an independent role in international relations ;
- (4) a somewhat paradoxical vision of re-uniting the former members of the Vice-Royalty of the Plate (Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay) under Argentine leadership.

The maintenance of balance of power with Brazil occurred in many historical forms. In the 19th century, direct armed conflict with Brazil, or intervention in the buffer state of Uruguay was commonplace. These direct forms of conflict were accompanied through the early 20th century with arms races, particularly naval. With regard to what we will label "buffer states," Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, economic and cultural linkage served a two-fold purpose. They were important in maintaining a hispanic bloc with which to contain the Brazilians, but were also important to Argentine economic superiority in the region until after World War II. The Argentine record of economic development in the 19th and first half of the 20th century allowed for strong economic ties with regional actors. It would collapse in the post-WWII period chiefly as a result of domestic economic and political instability. Historian John Finan describes Argentina's intermittent isolationism and independent foreign policy stance as being part of a "Robinson Crusoe syndrome."³ This aspect of Argentina's

3. John Finan, "The Duality of Argentine Foreign Relations Behaviour," in H. Davis and L. Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies : An Analysis*, (Baltimore ; Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), pp. 262-264.

international behaviour is best reflected in the foreign policy during WWII during which the government maintained neutrality, amid accusations of being pro-Germany, in a hemisphere which completely supported the Allied cause. The pursuit of an international behaviour counter that of the United States during WWII, and later in the seventies with regard to trade with Cuba, is diametrically opposite to that of Brazilian behaviour during the same period. The somewhat vision of hispanic solidarity led by Argentina in the southern cone is a manifestation of both Argentina's search for international status as a world leader, and her historical preoccupation with containing Brazilian expansion in all its forms : physical, economic, political and cultural. As shall be demonstrated, the renewed calls for such a hispanic union by Peru in 1973, were marked by unusually high levels of conflict between the two center states.

The literature on Brazil's foreign policy goals can be summarized into four basic tenets : ⁴

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4. The following works are representative of the studies of Brazilian foreign policy : Luis Pinto, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Toward Latin America," and Jose Rodrigues, Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy," in Carlos Astiz, ed., *Latin American International Policies*, (Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). Philip Raine, *Brazil : Awakening Giant*, (Washington, DC : Public Affairs Press, 1974). Brady, Tyson "The Foreign Policy of Brazil," in Davis and Wilson, *Latin American Foreign Policies : An Analysis*. Norman Baily, "Brazil's Foreign Policy, *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Spring, 1974. Riordan Roett, ed., *Brazil in the Seventies*, (Washington, DC : American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), includes articles by Skidmore, Baer, Cline and Peckenham. E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil*, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1970).

- (1) regional balance of power with Argentina (so as to prevent containment by a Hispanic bloc) ;
- (2) expansion of frontiers westward and south-westward by government sponsored *bandeirantes* (peasant pioneers) ;
- (3) a world view with an emphasis on international participation ; and,
- (4) national economic development.

As stated before, the adjustment mechanisms for the maintenance of balance of power between Argentina and Brazil in the 19th century were marked by direct armed conflicts (1826-28, 1851-52) and arms races. The Brazilians seem to have been historically sensitive to repeated Argentine calls for a hispanic solidarity bloc and maintained a position favouring regional integration which would ensure a Brazilian role. The policy of expanding frontier reached its heyday under the foreign policy administration of Rio Branco (1874-1909). General Golbery Couto e Silva's book *Geopolítica do Brasil* (1967) on the subject of Brazilian geopolitics has been considered by many Argentine strategic thinkers to be an overt statement of Brazilian "Manifest Destiny."⁵ The frontier policy of Brazil has stimulated a strong adherence to the principle of "utis possidetis," or

5. For Argentine perceptions of Brazilian geopolitical expansion see the journal *Estrategia*, (Buenos Aires) or Gen. Juan E. Guglielmelli, *Argentina, Brazil y la Bomba Atomica*, (Buenos Aires : Tierra Nueva, 1976), chpt. 3. Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Geopolítico do Brasil*, (Rio : Jose Olympo, 1967).

ownership by possession. Not only did Brazil expand beyond the original boundaries set by the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1494, adhering to this principle, but there have been increasing reports from Bolivia and Paraguay as well as Argentina expressing concern over the presence of growing *bandeirante* settlements in those countries since 1956.⁶ Unlike the Argentines who have displayed intermittent periods of isolationism, Brazil has tended to be more open to European and American interactions. Thus in WWII, Brazilian military forces participated in the Italian theater alongside the Allies. After the war, and especially since the 1964 military coup, there is an increased level of international investments in Brazil (encouraged by the government), as well as increased interactions by Brazil in the international system. Of special importance since the 1964 coup, and the simultaneous decline of Argentina's economy, is the integral linkage of foreign policy as a tool of national development. Tyson, Skidmore and others see national development as the overriding policy since 1964, which contains aspects of the other three trends of Brazilian foreign policy. This is reflected in General Ernesto Coicoll's inaugural speech in 1972.

"... we will give emphasis to our relations with our neighbouring sister nations, both on the continent and beyond the sea. We will

6. See J. F. Braido, "Inquiry into Brazilian Settlers in Paraguay," *Migration News*, 1974, J. E. Guglielmelli, *Argentina, Brasil*, 1976.

encourage our diplomacy to be able to discover new opportunities and be of particular help to our foreign commerce, in order to guarantee an adequate supply of primary materials and essential products and access to the most modern technology that we do not yet have."⁷

In summary, most of the literature, as indicated above, generally describes the two center actors as being on a conflictive, or at best competitive course of interaction. However, not all authors agree. Brazilian Helio Jaguaribe describes the Argentine-Brazilian relationship as one of "conflictive-cooperation"⁸ Jaguaribe points out that within Latin America, Argentina and Brazil are one another's best trading partner. This relationship will be tested below.

III. Hypothese and Methodology

Given the previously stated trends of the two centers of the southern cone, we can begin to construct several hypotheses about their interactions in the region. In this research we chose to examine the period 1948-1977, so as to test for changes in the patterns of competition for regional leadership. This time framework can be further subdivided into two periods, 1948-64 and 1964-77, which reflect critical changes in both the internal politics and economics of Argentina and Brazil as well as changes in the international system which affect national goals.

7. Tyson, "Brazil," in Davis and Wilson, p. 244.

8. Helio Jaguaribe, "El Brasil y America Latina, *Estudios Internacionales*, January-March 1975.

A. Period 1 : 1948-64

In the first period, 1948-64, both center actors experienced internal political conflict resulting in either military coups or near states of anarchy. Similarly, the economies of both actors suffered from instability due to both domestic political chaos and the failure of import substitution following WWII. Given the orientation toward internal concerns, it was decided that the first period would be used as a control. We would therefore expect to find fairly regular patterns of interaction both conflictive and cooperative between Argentina and Brazil as well as their interactions with the buffer states. We were therefore assuming that during this period there was minimal competition for leadership as indicated in most of the literature.

B. Period 2 : 1964-77

Against this central period, we would compare the trends of interaction of the second period 1964-77. The 1964 Brazilian coup is a watershed for it brought into decision making status men committed to rapid national development and modernization such as Roberto Campos and Gen. Golbery. Therefore, *Hypothesis 1*: A surge in the level of interaction by Brazil toward the other states in the region would stimulate a response by Argentina in order to counterbalance the Brazilian initiative. This would indicate a resumption in the competition for regional leadership.

Because of the fundamental shock of the 1973 petroleum price change access to readily available energy resources became a strategic problem.

Bolivia is a natural gas and oil exporter and Paraguay is a prime source of hydroelectric energy, therefore *Hypothesis 2*: The energy crisis of 1973 should qualitatively stimulate the competition for regional leadership and access to natural resources.

We also wanted to test Jaguaribe's description of the "conflictive-cooperative" nature of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship. Therefore, *Hypothesis 3*: Surges in levels of conflict should be accompanied by simultaneous surges in levels of cooperation.

Finally, given the role of perception in the rivalry, we decided to test for perceived status change whereby, *Hypothesis 4*: The center actor perceiving adverse changes in regional status will respond the most conflictively to the other center actor. We would therefore expect conflictive pattern of action to indicate either a perceived threat to status, or a basic insecurity in the center actor's perceived ability to maintain a status role.

In order to test the behavioral interactions between Argentina and Brazil and the buffer states, the methodology of research relied on the use of events data. The specific data system employed was the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) developed by Dr. Edward E. Azar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The COPDAB system is a collection of daily reported events (international and domestic) which can be utilized to measure dyadic levels of conflict and cooperation

1974 (based on SIPRE data). Migration patterns were traced when possible over time using primarily Brazilian government census sources and reports on Brazilian settlements in Paraguay by *Migration News*, an international Catholic journal (other sources on migration are listed in note 6).

IV. Behavioral Aspects of the Argentine-Brazilian Rivalry for Regional Leadership

Groups 1—4 describe the interactions of Argentina and Brazil toward one another (1), and to each of the buffer states : (2), Paraguay (3), and Uruguay (4). The data shows the yearly aggregate levels of conflict and cooperation of actor to target based on the Dimension of Interaction unit (DI). The DI unit is a derivative of the frequency of interaction (F) at specific scale point multiplied by the intensity or weight assigned to that scale point (I) such that $DI = F \cdot I$, (see note 9 for source of explanation). DI units are summed by either conflict or cooperation to produce the aggregate levels in the graphs. Initially there was no differentiation between types behaviour within the levels of measured cooperation and conflict.

The control period 1948-64, shows relatively low levels of interaction, most of that which is mildly cooperative. The fact that both center actors were concerned with domestic economic and political instability seems to have cooled their direct competition for leadership. Indeed, levels of behavioral interaction with the buffer states is also quite low.

When the second period of interaction is examined, 1964-77, although a highly nationalistic military group assumed control of Brazil in 1964, there seems to have been little alteration of regional interaction. The consistency of interaction is perhaps best explained by the emphasis on national consolidation and establishment of internal security by the governments of Castelo Branco (1964-66) and Costa-e-Silva 1968-69).¹¹ The Argentine response was not at the outset adverse to the military government of Brazil. The Onganía government of Argentina was itself military. Also with the attention of Brazil turned to internal consolidation, there was little disturbance to the Argentina perception of superiority in the status quo.¹² By 1969, with the implementation of a more active foreign policy by the Medici government, there is the beginning of change in interactions with an increased level of cooperative DIs by Brazil in the region is accompanied by even higher levels of Argentine cooperation (except toward Bolivia). For the remainder of the 1968-77 period we seem to find very symmetrical patterns of interaction by Argentina and Brazil in the region.

With regard to hypothesis 1, a surge in the level of interaction by Brazil toward the other states was accompanied by a very strong surge by Argen-

11. See Tyson, "Brazil," in Davis and Wilson.

12. Dr. Roberto Etcheparreborda. remarks in interview, Washington D. C. Dr. Etcheparreborda, currently director of the Office of Cultural Affairs, Organization of American States. held various ranking position in the Argentine Foreign Ministry throughout the sixties.

tina. In Bolivia and Paraguay, traditionally more linked to Argentina politically and economically, there are particularly higher levels of Argentine cooperation which will be further examined in conjunction with hypothesis. 4 The pattern in all cases is predominantly in the cooperative range. During 1973, the greatest peak of cooperative behaviour by both center actors is very symmetrical. This indicates that the pattern of competition for regional leadership is perhaps based on a "competition of cooperation." In order to better understand the pattern of interaction, cooperation and conflict were broken down by issue type (see COPDAB User's Manual) :

- (1) Political Symbolic—verbal support of denunciation ;
- (2) Economic—major trade agreements made or revoked ;
- (3) Military—aid, alliances, or clashes ;
- (4) Educational, Cultural, Scientific—technology transfer, educ. exchange ;
- (5) Physical environment—joint study of environmental problems, oil exploration, joint irrigation projects ;
- (6) Human environment—majority rights, demographic ;
- (7) International order and law—boundary agreements or disputes, settlement of disputes by arbitration, establishing a regional organization.

By applying this rudimentary typological analysis to the patterns of interaction, tables 1—2 were developed. Argentine interactions in the region were primarily (38%) followed by political symbolic (25%) and political order events (23%). Differentiation according to conflict or cooperation shows approximately 45% of all Argentine cooperative behaviour in the region is of an economic nature. Conflictive behaviour tends to be linked to either political order (38%) or symbolic activities (32%). For the case of Brazil, regional interactions on the whole were primarily economic (41%), political symbolic (23%), and political order events (20%). Cooperative interactions of the Brazilians were predominantly economic (46%) as in the Argentine case. Most important though is the difference between conflictive interactions wherein 62% of all Brazilian conflict is symbolic.

It would appear that there has been heightened economic activity in the buffer states by the center actors. Both Argentina and Brazil appear to be establishing economic linkages which will guarantee their own national strategies of development of adequate resources. Analysis of types of economic transactions which occur during the second period are predominantly related to energy.¹³ We can best understand the role of economic competition as part of the rivalry for leadership if the surge of regional interaction is examined in terms of hypothesis 2.

13. Emilio A. Radriguez, "Implications of the Energy Crisis on the Political and Economic Relations of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia," unpublished thesis, American University, Washington, D. C., 1975.

Because both center actors are net importers of energy, and because the buffer states are either sources of petroleum energy (Bolivia), or hydroelectric energy, (Paraguay) we expected in the second hypothesis that the energy crisis of 1973 would have a qualitative impact of regional competition. In fact, the peak of interactions which was measured for 1973, is so radical as to assume crisis dimensions. Crisis may be defined as a radical departure in interaction from a normal range of relations.¹⁴ The peak of cooperative interaction occurs during a period of shock to the national economies of both center actors by international price increases and oil shortages. Whereas in 1969 neither Brazil nor Argentina were interested in newly nationalized Bolivian petroleum, by 1973, both actors rushed to insure access to Bolivian supplies. This included the linkage of oil and gas agreements to railroad construction and opening of port facilities to Bolivia by Brazil. For their part, Argentina agreed to build a \$ 5 million pesticide plant in order to increase natural gas imports from 150 to 170 million cubic feet daily (1973). In Paraguay, where the Brazilians were negotiating the Itaipu hydroelectric project (world's largest), they agreed to share power production equally with Paraguay even though Brazil was providing nearly 90% of the capital investment. They agreed to buy back most of Paraguay's share of the electricity in dollars

14. The definition of crisis as a departure from a normal relations range is established in Edward Azar, "Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 1956," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Summer, 1972.

which would represent an annual revenue for Paraguay of about \$ 200 million. Simultaneously, the Paraguayans began putting restrictions on two Argentine projects, Corpus and Yacireta-Apipe. Paraguay demanded payment in dollars for power sold to Argentina. However, unlike the accord with Brazil, there was no informal agreement to spend the dollars in Argentina. After the signing of the Itaipu accord, the president of Paraguay's National Electric Administration (ANDE) stated that Argentina would be limited to building only one of the two hydroelectric projects at Corpus at Yacireta.¹⁵

The surge in cooperative interaction in the region was, therefore, not an occurrence of regional integration. It was however a period of heightened rivalry for resources in the buffer states by Argentina and Brazil. The national developmental strategies of the buffer states during a period of international energy scarcity allowed these states to "sell to the highest bidder." The basic-alignment game being played by Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay permitted Brazil, operating from a stronger economic base than Argentina, to secure economic linkages to states which had traditionally been Argentine trading partners.¹⁶

15. *Latin America Political Report* (LAR), March 2, 1973, p. 3.

16. Though the economies of both Argentina and Brazil were damaged by the sudden price increase of oil, Brazil with its national reserves of over \$ 6 billion was more able to afford investments than Argentina in the buffer states. As of 1971, Argentina was suffering from the worst deficit in Brazilian

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Linking the surge of economic interaction during the energy crisis to the preliminary hypothesis about the stimulus to increased regional interaction, are the political perceptions of decision makers in each state. Peron, who returned to Argentina in 1973, attempted to use personal pressure on Stroessner of Paraguay to not to sign the Itaipu accord. The Argentines indicated that the project would not only threaten operation of the Corpus and Yaciréta-Apipe projects downstream, but would also allow the Brazilians to cause flooding at will, or reduce water levels, grounding ocean vessels that carry autos and steel out of the industrial center at Rosarios.¹⁷ Even more politically damning to Buenos Aires was Foreign Minister Pastor's (Paraguay) statement that "Paraguay will not involve itself in any hydroelectric project with any other country without the prior agreement of Brazil."¹⁸

The act of signing the Itaipu accord over Argentine protests, and the statements which followed, serve to reconfirm the fears of Argentine strategic thinkers such as Guglielmelli that a geopolitical competition exists between Argentina and Brazil, and, gains in buffer states are of a

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economic initiatives in the buffer states between 1970 and 1976; Bolivia (\$ 8M to \$ 114M), Paraguay (\$ 12M to \$ 158M), and Uruguay (\$ 43M to 252M) in total volume of trade. For Argentina in the same years; Bolivia (\$ 27.1M to \$ 165.2M), Paraguay (\$ 34.9M to \$ 78.7M), and Uruguay (\$ 34.9M to \$ 99.3M).

17. *Washington Post*, November 2, 1975.

18. *LAR*, *op. cit.*

zero-sum nature.¹⁹ Thus there was a marked increase in the level of Argentine conflict to Brazil while levels toward Paraguay actually decreased. Commercial relations and energy negotiations with Paraguay remained essentially un-changed, symptomatic that the tension was between Argentina and Brazil, not necessarily between Argentina and Paraguay. Argentina did respond to the Itaipu signing by breaking off negotiations with Brazil for the development of integrated hydroelectric projects on the Parana River. Joint study of the energy potential of the Uruguay River was also halted. Argentina denounced Brazil in the United Nations, proclaiming that previous accords on the use of rivers in the region required multilateral approval so that projects by one state would not be injurious to another.

The data for the second period, 1964-77, also seems to confirm the third hypothesis about the Argentine-Brazilian relationship being one of simultaneous conflict and cooperation (Jaguaribe). The peak of conflict during the energy crisis period is also marked by high cooperation. A paradox emerges during the period 1969-75. Both center actors participated in the establishment of integrative regional bodies : the River Plate Basin Group (1969), electric utilities integration between Argentina-Paraguay-Brazil (1971), and bilateral construction of three hydroelectric dams (Argentina-Brazil,

19. See the various articles by Juan Guglielmelli in *Estrategia*, or Rogelio García Lupo, *La Argentina en la Selva Mundial*, (Buenos Aires : Ediciones Corregidor, 1973), chpt. 12, "La victoria de los militares probrasilenos en Bolivia."

1975). During the same period both sought to establish bilateral accords (noted above) which would at times contravene integrative agreements. Analysis of attribute trade data also seems to confirm Jaguaribe's hypothesis about the levels of trade between the two actors. From 1970 to 1976, absolute levels of trade between Argentina and Brazil rose 146%. It would appear therefore that in this dyad strong cooperative ties co-exist with conflictive political goals which are both symbolic and order related (Table 1).

Etcheparreborda, Lupo and others, indicate that through the fifties and mid-sixties, the Argentines did not perceive any serious threat to their regional status by Brazil. However, by 1969, and the shift to an active foreign policy tool of national development by the Medici government, the perception began to change. The Brazilian growth rate of 10% per annum surpassed the Argentin economy which was wrought by production decline, inflation and labor unrest. The fourth hypothesis therefore was to test for this perception of threat. The comprehensive means of measuring the shift will ultimately require content analysis of national newspapers, journals, and official government statements. However, given the assumption that behavior is the product of perception, events data can be used to measure behavioral shift which reflect change of perception. It was initially assumed that the center actor perceiving adverse changes in regional status would respond most conflictively to the other center actor. An asymmetric conflictive pattern of

interaction would therefore indicate either a perceived threat to status, or a basic insecurity in the center actor's perceived ability to maintain a leadership role. The 1973 pattern of interaction between Argentina and Brazil indicates the Argentine levels of conflict generated to Brazil are substantially higher ($DICONF=242$), than Brazilian conflict directed at Argentina, ($DICONF=84$, see graph 1).

In order to develop a more accurate understanding of the form of conflict, the DIs of conflict were separated by issue type. We found that 46% of all Brazilian conflictive behavior to Argentina was symbolic, while only 25% was of International political order. Examination of the Argentine data showed a closer balance of symbolic (40%) and political order (38%) interactions in the distribution of conflictive behavior toward Brazil. We therefore concluded that Argentina was in fact perceiving a higher threat to regional status than did the Brazilians. It was the Argentines in 1973 who took the initiative in breaking off negotiations on binational river projects, and nullified a 1967 fishing accord.

Because of the regional context of the competition for leadership, patterns of conflictive behavior by the center actors to the buffer states was adapted to the fourth hypothesis. Again there were noticeably higher levels of conflict to the buffer states by Argentina than from Brazil (graphs 2-4). As in the pattern of interaction with Brazil, Argentine conflict to the region was nearly even between symbolic (32%) and political order (38%)

in the distribution of conflict. There also tended to be a one year lag following the peak of conflict with Brazil, supporting the hypothesis that the conflict was actually between the two center actors. Conflict would then peak toward the buffer states as Argentina perceived a loss of influence or status in those states. The Argentines were registering displeasure in 1974, to the outcome of the various agreements between Brazil and the bufferer states in 1973.

By contrast, the absolute levels of Brazilian conflict are both lower and smoother over time (graphs 2-4), relative to Argentine interactions. Only 10% of all Brazilian interaction in the region was of a conflictive nature. Furthermore, an overwhelming (62)% of all conflictive interactions were political symbolic, while only 15% were order conflictive. This pattern of conflict type as well as absolute level, reflect a basic stability in Brazilian regional behavior. The Brazilians were seeking to expand bilateral economic relations in the region while displeasure was registered primarily through diplomatic channels.

Because the trend of behavior in all cases is skewed toward cooperation, hypothesis four was manipulated to test surges in cooperation as an aspect of perceived status change. However, only in the case of Paraguay do we measure a surge in cooperation by Argentina that is absolutely larger than that of Brazil. It is assumed that in the case of competition through cooperation, an actor perceiving a threat to status will intensify coopera-

tion in order to maintain parity of influence in the buffer state. This holds true for Paraguay in 1974 the year after Itaipu accord with Brazil. This perception of the loss of Argentine influence in Paraguay to Brazil stimulated unusually high levels of cooperation. Negotiations on the two Argentine dams were resumed as Buenos Aires attempted to recoup as best possible from the political blow of Itaipu. Commercial relations remained strong. The increase of conflictive interaction in 1976 was primarily due to a border clash between Paraguayan marines and Argentine border patrols. The increase in conflictive behavior occurs during a simultaneous downswing in absolute levels of cooperative interactions in the late seventies. It remains difficult to develop a coherent hypothesis on the linkage between the changes in cooperation and conflict without a better measure of intent and perception.

V. Conclusions

Based on the pattern and type of Argentine-Brazilian interactions in the southern cone we may conclude that the competition for regional leadership made a resurgent appearance by 1969. This occurred after a relatively quiet period of equilibrium in the fifties and early sixties. During this period both actors were primarily concerned with domestic political-economic factors. The implementation of a dynamic foreign policy by the Medici government in 1969, marked the beginning of renewed awareness of regional competition for leadership. These interactions also indicate that the structural relationship of the region is such that behavioral changes by a center actor stimulate activity by all

members of the region, but especially the other center actor.

The basic form of competition since 1969, has been economic cooperation. The structure of the international economic system allowed the buffer states to play a non-alignment game which maximized their own strategies of national development. Because of the resource base of the buffer states (energy, and iron ore from the Mutun in Bolivia), Paraguay and Uruguay have become strategic to the industrial sectors of both Argentina and Brazil. The strategic nature of the resources, energy in particular, heightened the competition for regional leadership. To dominate the southern cone economic structure is to insure domestic growth to the "top dog."

In a rivalry for resources which is increasingly defined as a zerosum game, there is a noted increase by Argentine decision makers to foster cooperative ties with buffer states. If the Brazilian policy is indeed one of cooptation, then to respond conflictively would only further alienate Argentine interests. Thus Argentina competes with Brazilian economic expansion by implementing its own form of economic cooptation through increased commercial linkages and bi-national development of buffer resources. This is not to say that the rivalry occurs in an exclusive economic sphere. In 1973, president Peron renewed his efforts to establish a hispanic union in the southern cone to the exclusion of Brazil. His appeal was based in terms of cultural and economic unity founded on political cooperation.

The impact of economic structure on regional political relationships remains critical. The economic decline of Argentina has adversely affected it as a model for growth to be adopted by the smaller states. Some, such as Bolivia, have seemingly adopted the Brazilian model of growth which depends heavily on international finance and investments. The problem facing Argentina is how to maintain healthy economic links with the smaller states, given its already inferior economic position and ability to compete by matching bids over time. Argentina is increasingly concerned with containment by Brazil which transcends economics (a reverse of the situation in the nineteenth century). Concern over increasing migration by Brazilians into buffer states is increasing as well as general fear about predicted demographic differences between Argentina and Brazil by the year 2000.²⁰ Such concern led Peron to restrict the scale of contraceptives in 1974 on the grounds that by 2000, Brazil would have over 200 million people whereas Argentina is expected to have only 30 million inhabitants.

Whatever its causes, the problem of competition remains. In the period investigated here, it has been effected in the form of economic competitive bidding. It would appear that Argentina cannot indefinitely compete with Brazil on an economic basis. The energy crisis did slow the Brazilian

20. For information on Brazilian migration into buffer state border areas see Hans Hoyer, "Paraguay," in Davis and Wilson, or *Estrategia* 29, or Scenna, *Argentina-Brasil*. See also note 6.


economy, but this has stimulated a new commitment to the development of nuclear alternative. This strategy raises the issue of a potential arm race and weapons development in a region where neither of the two center actors has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Argentina had been active in atomic energy development since the fifties). Furthermore, the internal politics of Argentina have had a debilitating effect on its ability to pursue coherent policies internally or externally. The crisis between Chile and Argentina (1978) over the Beagle Island channel, has turned Argentine attention away from immediate concern with Brazil. This has induced a temporary change in the trend of interactions. The regional rivalry for leadership will nonetheless remain in the fore-front of Argentine and Brazilian foreign policy strategies.

0349
 Information for Cooperated Overland Traffic
 Argentina and Brazil (1943-44)


ARG to BRA
 BRA to ARG

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 405 410 415 420 425 430 435 440 445 450 455 460 465 470 475 480 485 490 495 500 505 510 515 520 525 530 535 540 545 550 555 560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600 605 610 615 620 625 630 635 640 645 650 655 660 665 670 675 680 685 690 695 700 705 710 715 720 725 730 735 740 745 750 755 760 765 770 775 780 785 790 795 800 805 810 815 820 825 830 835 840 845 850 855 860 865 870 875 880 885 890 895 900 905 910 915 920 925 930 935 940 945 950 955 960 965 970 975 980 985 990 995 1000

0349 NO. 649 - CROSS SECTION - 20 SQUARES TO INCH




Direction of movement indicated by
 Argentine and Bolivian
 forces and Bolivia
 1918-77



NO 12522/03

(340)
 Operation of Cooperate in/Conflicting Interaction
 Between Argentina and Paraguay, 1968-77
 67-673 and 73-674, 1968-77



ADG
 DNG

Percent distribution of directed events by
actor to region by event, 1948-77.

Argentina to	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-	7+	7-
BRA.	17	12	31	06	02	0	02	0	04	0	12	12
BOL.	15	05	37	03	0	05	06	0	05	0	16	05
PAR.	15	06	36	0	0	11	10	0	04	0	11	07
URU.	19	07	39	0	0	0	04	0	03	0	18	10
Mean												
Frequency	17	08	36	02	0-5	04	06	0	04	0	14	09
Brazil to	1+	1-	2+	2-	3+	3-	4+	4-	5+	5-	7+	7-
ARG.	17	11	37	03	04	03	02	0	04	0	14	06
BOL.	13	03	56	0	02	0	04	0	05	0	15	02
PAR.	24	03	31	0	0	04	04	0	14	0	20	0
URU.	17	04	43	0	04	0	01	0	10	0	21	0
Mean												
Frequency	18	05	41	0.7	3	02	05	0	08	0	18	02

Note: Issue area six, human environment issues, was empty in all but one case (Arg. to Bol.) which was statistically insignificant (.003). Therefore issue area six, cooperative and conflictive was not included in this table.

TABLE 2
Distribution of events by actor to region by percent
cooperative—conflictive, 1948-77.

Actor : ARGENTINA		COOPERATION							coop. of all interaction
Target		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BRA.	24	45	04	03	05	0	0	17	69
BOL.	19	47	0.5	07	06	0	0	20	79
PAR.	20	47	0	13	06	0	0	15	76
URU.	23	40	0.5	05	04	0	0	21	83
Mean COOP. by issue	22	45	01	07	04	0	0	18	76
		CONFLICT							conf. of all interaction
Target		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BRA.	40	21	0	0	0	0	0	38	31
BOL.	24	14	22	0	0	0	14	26	21
PAR.	23	01	45	0	0	0	01	29	24
UrU.	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	17
Mean CONF. by issue	32	09	16	0	0	0	04	38	24

Contd.

Actor *BRAZIL*

Target <i>t</i>	COOPERATION							coop of all interaction
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
ARG.	27	48	05	02	05	0	19	96
BOL.	13	59	02	04	06	0	16	95
PAR.	26	33	0.4	42	15	0	22	93
URU.	17	45	04	0.7	11	0	22	77
Mean COOP. by issue	20	46	03	12	09	0	20	90

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Target	CONFLICT							conf. of all interaction
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
ARG.	46	14	14	0	0	0	25	23
BOL.	57	0	07	0	0	0	35	05
PAR.	48	0	52	0	0	0	0	07
URU.	00	0	0	0	0	0	0	04
Mean CONF. by issue	62	04	18	0	0	0	15	10

PATTERNS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICS OF PAKISTAN

Dr. Muhammad Sarwar

A general observation of the political conditions of Third World reveals that military's intervention in politics is possible either because of domestic political turmoils or due to the attitude of military towards its place in society. The military involvement in politics is most likely if the government is not legitimate and stable. The decay of political institutions and parties leave the military as the only organised force capable of governing. And in such a political vacuum, it is almost inevitable that the military will play a domineering role. For these reasons military coups and its involvement in civil affairs is frequent in developing states that lacked stable political institutions and legitimized political frameworks.¹ Military's disposition to intervene is also influenced by the political legacy of a society. If a country has a history of military's coups, it is likely that there will be more in the future.

As regards the personal inclinations of some military leaders to intervene in politics, it may be inspired by a psychological attitude based on the

Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Heaven ; Yale University Press, 1968, p. 196.

notion that the military is the guardian of the national interest, hence a symbol of national solidarity.² Moreover, military officers often view themselves as more efficient organisers of men and material as compared to their civilian counterparts. Believing itself the best modernizing force in the country, the military may stage in coup to promote economic and social reforms during a period of political crisis. Under the circumstances military plays the role of constitutional arbiter between the contending political forces, as it is regarded as the most disciplined and trained institution. These countries had to spend a large amount on the maintenance of armed forces in the face of internal and external threats. By virtue of its unique position the military, directly or indirectly, has been the repository of political power in most of the developing countries.³

Different types of military involvement in civil affairs has been observed in the developing countries. It is either through influence, persuasion, sharing power or direct assumption of political authority. When the military attempts to influence policy makers it assumes the role of an institutional interest group. However, excessive military lobbying may lead to military's infringe-

2. *Ibid.* pp. 225-26.

3. For a detailed account, See: F. LaMond Tullis, *Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), Also See: Fred R. Von Der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1964. Ch.6 pp. 115-16; Regarding the causes leading to the military's involvement in Civil Affairs, See: Howard Elook, *Political Behavior*, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1976).

ment on the prorogation of the civilian leadership. In some countries military's involvement becomes somewhat direct. One way this might happen is through military's political alliance with a ruling group. Where political parties are weak, the military may, as the most powerful political group, fill the vacuum. At a higher level of military's political involvement is the military coup to replace civilian leadership. In Pakistan, all such patterns of military's involvement can be traced in the records of its political past.

During British rule in India, the military maintained the tradition of aloofness from practical politics. But after independence this tradition was broken when Mr. Ayub Khan became Commander in Chief.⁴ He started taking interest in politics, and was active participant in negotiation of treaties with America and for this purpose he visited that country. Later, he was included in the Cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra.⁵ After the imposition of martial law in 1958, the army directly took political control.

Ayub and Yahya period has been characterised by the predominance of civil-military bureaucracy

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4. Ayub exerted his pressure on decision-making. Commenting on Indo-Pakistan Crisis of 1951, to cite an example, he wrote that Liaquat Ali and other politicians and even Pakistani troops were prepared to fight but he stooped them. See: M. Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A political Auto-Biography*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 40; After Liaquat's death the advice of Ayub Khan was sought especially on foreign affairs. See: Mohammad Khan, *My Chief* (LHR: Longmans, 1960) p. 50.
 5. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The military and politics in Pakistan*, (LHR: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 83)

in national decision-making. Even after assuming the office as President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan retained close contact with the Army. The Army remained so much involved in politics that with inevitable weakness of Ayub's political hold during last year of his rule, the race for attaining political control started between Noor Khan, A. R. Khan and Yahya Khan, the leaders of all the three armed forces.⁶

Mr. Bhutto wanted to curtail the influence of bureaucracy and military in politics. But he lowered the prestige and influence of civil service more than that of military. In his dealings with the military he was very cautious as he was fully aware of its power and influence. "Bhutto's exemption of military officer's holdings from his land reforms programme is another indication of his caution in threatening their interests."⁷ Under Mr. Bhutto, the process of enlargement of defence establishment

6. G.W. Chowdhry, *The last days of United Pakistan*, (London: G. Hurst And Co., 1974), p. 28; "It is an impression regarding Bhutto's rise to power, that he was helped by a faction in the army that was not satisfied in the area of constitution-making and foreign affairs." Shahid Javed Burki, *State and Society in Pakistan, 1971-77*. London: The Macmillan Press, (1980) p. 108.

Bhutto's link with military Generals during Yahya's period was also revealed by General Gul Hasan in a Press Conference at Karachi. See: Sajad Mir's article in *Islamic Jamburia* (A weekly from Lahore) 5-6 Sept., 1977. p. 9. See also: Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy*, LHR, Afrasia Publications (1980) p. 81.

7. William J. Barnds, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting opportunities and Constraints" in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti etc. (eds) *Pakistan: The Long view*, Durham W. C. Duke Univ. Press (1977) p. 386.

continued along with an increase in the military budget.⁸

During PPP period, the military, however, did not remain completely aloof from civilian affairs as the government used military troops for political objects. In July 1972, military was used for curbing violence caused by linguistic riots in Sind. Similarly in November 1972, it was employed for restoring Industrial peace in Karachi. In 1972 and 1973, the military was active in restoring law and order situation in Muree-Bughti regions of Baluchiston. During the last days of PPP rule, military was frequently used for curbing mass movement organized by PNA.⁹

The Military remained well organized and powerful as usual during this period. Nevertheless, Mr. Bhutto tried to limit the freedom of action of high command through constituting a committee consisting of Mr. Bhutto. General Tikka Khan and General Imtiaz Ahmad to approve all promotions and transfers of higher military officials. "Bhutto's tactics was to distribute the top military positions among officers who did not have known group loyalties."¹⁰ In addition, the command of the armed forces was divided functionally between three persons. The armed forces had to accept this deci-

8. General Zia in an interview admitted that Bhutto gave due attention to the defence affairs and that with China's aid the situation was quite well. See: Altaf Hasan Qureshi, "General Zia-ul-Haq", Urdu Digest, LHR, Sept, 1977, p. 27.

9. 'Sir, The troops have come: Army Coup. *Time* July 18, 1977, 110: 29-30.

10. Shahid Javed Burki, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

sion due to events of 1969-71 ; otherwise it was doubtful for them to accept.¹¹

In fact, military no longer held field of policy-making during PPP rule. Mr. Bhutto had invariably criticised the role of military Generals. In order to have a firm grip over military he had changed the titles of the Chiefs of the three forces and all were put under the control of Chief of Army Staff, who was under direct control of the President. Certain constitutional measures were also adopted for restricting the role of army.¹² He also took great care in giving the command of army to safe hands.

After the removal of the PPP government, the military once again took directly the control of the civil administration. But this time the administration generally preserved its civilian cast. President Zia-ul-Haq tried to carry on the administration through the participation of different types of people-foremost of them have been the civilian bureaucrats. He also tried to consult politicians and the

11. *Ibid.*

12. In order to block the way of military involvement in Civil affairs, he established a parallel security force, FSF. As he was fully aware of the role and power of students and that of workers in toppling the government in the past, he established this force for the specific purpose to maintain law and order in case of any future political upheaval. He knew that once the armed forces are invited in civilian affairs they play the game according to their own rules. But the formation of FSF made the army more hostile to his regime. See : Khalid Bin Saeed, *Politics in Pakistan. The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York, Praeger Publishers. (1980), p. 107.

The author concludes : "In the kind of political polarization that Bhutto's politics and actions had brought about, the army threw its weight with PNA, and thus Bhutto was overthrown." *Ibid.*, p. 110.

'Ulema' from time to time on sensitive issues. Generally speaking he shows no pretence of knowing everything, rather tries to listen to others and runs the administration on the principle of consultation.

The military regime has taken concrete steps especially in the direction of Islamisation of society. In developing countries, the socio-economic development is normally conditioned by political stability which military government provides, of course, for the time being.¹³ But there is inherent tendency in military governments to minimize participation which ultimately results in the autocracy of civil-military bureaucracy. The entire political process is depoliticized, as Ayub Khan had done through the introduction of B. D. system. His preference for an administrative style of decision-making led to an expansion of technical roles to the neglect of political ones.

Increasingly, corrective objectives attempting to reform the deep rooted thorny problems which provoked military involvement in the first place, receded into the background paving the way for new forms of corruption. Pakistan's experience shows that with the passage of time military government also fall short of these promises, hence process of

13. The performance of military governments of Egypt, Peru, Ghana, Libya, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria, is clear example in this context. Military has played a positive role during the process of modernisation in these countries. See: Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, *The Role of the Military in underdeveloped countries*. (Princeton Press, 1962), p. 76.

cyclic change continues producing more political instability. Persistent use of the military to control domestic political disorders frequently politicises the military even it has a past record of political neutrality. "In Chile, for example, Allende's growing reliance on the military to quell civil political disturbances ultimately ended the Chilean military's traditional noninvolvement in politics."¹⁴

An important problem facing a military government as experienced in Pakistan as well, is withdrawal from power. This involves sensitive issues and political risks which affect the fate of a military government. Hence it prefers to legitimize its political role within the new constitutional arrangement and allow political participation.

14. David F. Roth, Frank L. Wilson, *The Comparative Study of Politics*, (2nd Ed. 1980) Prentice Hall, Inc, New Jersey, p. 313.

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