

# **The Journal of Political Science**

- **Pakistan and U.N. Peace-Keeping.**  
*A Case Study of Suez Crisis*
- **India's Stand for Kashmir and her Practical Steps.**
- **Political Sagacity of**  
**Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal.**
- **The Treaty and Conflict :**  
*The Study of Soviet Asian Bilateral Treaties and Their Impact on Regional Stability*
- **Arms Control and Impediments in its Effectiveness.**
- **Book Reviews.**

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## **Editors :**

**Saeed Osman Malick**

**Hameed A. K. Rai**

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## PAKISTAN AND U.N. PEACE-KEEPING

[*A Case Study of Suez Crisis*]

*Hameed A.K. Rai*

“Peace-keeping” as applied to the United Nations is a term which has been given a variety of meaning, they range from the missions which have been undertaken by International Armies down, even more inclusively, to the activities of an individual who has been sent to the field on some political task.”<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, an accurate description of the activity by which the United Nations has established its presence in certain situations of actual or potential conflict.

In an organised society, the task of keeping the peace is of primary importance, because only on the basis of peace and security can a legal order be developed.

Centuries-old projects and plans for eliminating war and preserving peace were viewed with complacency by historians until recent times. They aroused nothing more than historical curiosity and at best were regarded interesting utopias, noble in spirit but quite unrealistic.

Occasional efforts at enforcing peace were made in the form of the “King’s peace” by the Anglo-Saxon rulers and the ‘Universal peace Organisation’ as propagated by King George of Bohemia. But

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1. Alan James, *The Politics of Peace-keeping* (London : Chatto and windus, 1966), p.1.

the actual fruition of the plan came only in the twentieth century.

The horrible experience of world War I emphasised the need and the importance of an International Institution which could keep peace in the world. The traditional peaceful settlement methods employed for centuries, usually by Third States, were supplemented by a variety of new adaptation exercised mainly by organs and agencies of the new International Organisation, *i.e.*, The League of Nations.

### **Peace-keeping by the League**

Article 10 of the Covenant of the League stressed that the Members were obliged "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of all League Members. Under Article 12 (1), the Members agreed that if there arose between them any dispute which might lead to a breach of the peace, "they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the League."

### **Peace-keeping by the United Nations**

After the failure of the League, the supreme objective before the framers of the Charter of the United Nations was the maintenance of peace. Article 1 (1) of the Charter declares that one of the basic purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security", and "to bring about the peaceful means, and in conformity with the principle of Justice and International Law, adjustments and

settlements of International disputes.” According to Article 2 (2) “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” Chapter VI of the Charter stresses the need for pacific settlement of disputes. Article 33 (1) lists the traditional techniques of peaceful settlement and commits States to select from them: The Article states “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of International peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Under Article 36 (1) the Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. By Article 37 (2). If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of International peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

The General Assembly has also been given the responsibility for the maintenance of peace under Article 11(2), which states :

“The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it

by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the State or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both."

Under Article 14, the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, that it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

The authority of the Assembly to make recommendations for the maintenance of peace, and for peaceful adjustments of disputes, seems to include peace-keeping measures. Thus, as a practical matter, two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly can initiate peace-keeping activities.

To avoid deadlock in the Security Council, for initiating peace-keeping measures, the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution adopted in 1950, gave additional authority to the General Assembly. According to this resolution :

"If not already in session, the General Assembly can meet in special emergency session within twenty-four hours if so requested by a majority of the United Nations Members or by the affirmative vote of any seven Members of the Security Council.



If the Security Council, due to a lack of unanimity of the permanent Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility in any case where there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, the Assembly is to consider the matter immediately.”<sup>2</sup>

‘In essence, the resolution granted to the Assembly, the right to act in place of the Council when that body failed to ‘exercise its primary responsibility, in a case ‘where there appears a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’<sup>3</sup>

Peaceful settlement of dispute, as used by the League and then by the United Nations, has developed into the concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’ which has emerged from the operating experience of the United Nations.

This concept is associated with the name of late Dag Hammarskjöld, as collective security is connected to that of Woodrow Wilson. It is an outcome of the experience of the Second Secretary-General in International Statemanship of his theoretical interpretation of the role which he conceived the Organisation should play, in the actual or potential Cold War era.

Hammarskjöld, defined the concept of Preventive Diplomacy :

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2. *United Nations Yearbook*, 1950, p. 194.
  3. Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Functions of International Organisation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), PP. 227- 228.

"as United Nations intervention in an area of conflict outside of, or marginal to the sphere dominated by Cold War struggles, designed to forestall the competitive intrusion of the rival Power blocs into that area. He began with the acknowledgement that "it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to exercise an influence on problems which are clearly and definitely within the orbit of present day conflicts between Power blocs." Having thus conceded that the Organisation could not effectively intervene in the central arena of the Cold War, he turned his attention to the periphery, asserting that "the areas which are not committed in the major conflicts are still considerable." These areas, he suggested, provided "the main field of useful activity of the United Nations, in its efforts to prevent conflicts or to solve conflicts."

He described this activity as the filling of vacuums by the United Nations or the localization of conflicts in the no-man's-land of the Cold War, with the relatively uncommitted members of the Organisation serving as its agents for this purpose. By undertaking such activity, he believed, the United Nations might prevent the extension and the exacerbation of the Cold War. Preventive Diplomacy, in short, was conceived by Hammerskjold as an International version of the policy of containment, designed not to restrict the expansion of one bloc or the other, but to restrict the expansion of the zone

permeated by bloc conflicts ; it was put forward as a means for containment of the Cold War.”<sup>4</sup>

The Middle Eastern and the Congo crises of 1956 and 1960 were the major elements which inspired Hammerskjold to expound the concept of Preventive Diplomacy. Before that, United Nations activities in other cases of peace-keeping, e.g., United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Palestine, United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan on Kashmir, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOMB) in Greece, were uses of more traditional forms of pacific settlement technique. Although this new approach to peace-keeping known as preventive diplomacy started from the United Nations Suez experience, most of the wording that has been used in describing the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force fits the familiar category of peaceful settlement. Pacific settlement lays emphasis upon the problem of discouraging resort to war as a means of solving disputes. Its main technique is to impose delay, to institute a “cooling off” period so that tempers may subside and temperate judgement may prevail. As Leonard Woolf put it, one of the reasons for the peace-keeping utility of an international conference is that :

“it prevents excitement by being so intolerably dull. When a score of diplomatic gentlemen have been sitting around a green baize table

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4. Inis L. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, (London ; University of London Press Ltd., 1964), p. 286.

discussing an international question for a fortnight, they have killed all interest in that question for at least a year.''<sup>5</sup>

### **Pakistan's role in Peace-Keeping**

Pakistan, from the date of its membership, had actively participated in peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. Pakistan was elected a Member of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans in 1947 and worked until it was dissolved in 1954 at the request of the Greek Government. This was the maiden United Nations experience in the field of keeping peace and the Special Committee discharged its function quite successfully.

Pakistan was also elected a Member of the peace Observation Commission, which was established in 1950 under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution. Pakistan contributed personnel to the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC) and was elected a Member of the Conciliation Commission.

In West Irian, in 1962, Pakistan supplied the entire bulk of United Nations Force, which completed its mission successfully.

### **Suez Crisis**

On 26th July 1956, President Nasser of Egypt Proclaimed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and placed in the hands of an Egyptian operating authority management of the Canal traffic, which 'in 1955, amounted to some 14,000 ships with net tonnage of some 107 million tons. The decree

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5. International Government, p. 134, quoted in Claude, *op.cit.*, p. 201.

provided for compensation on the basis of the market value of the shares on 25 July upon receipt of all the assets and property of the Canal Company. Nasser gave the assurance that nationalisation of the Canal would not affect the international commitments of Egypt with regard to the Canal and the freedom of navigation in it. President Nasser's announcement for nationalisation came after the United States and the United Kingdom, on 20 July 1956, had withdrawn offer of help in financing the construction of the Aswan High Dam. He declared then that the revenue from the Canal would be used for building the Aswan Dam.

After the nationalisation of the Canal, France, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed, in talks at London between 29 July and 2nd August 1956, that the Egyptian action threatened "the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888", and the United Kingdom issued invitations to a conference in London of parties to the 1888 Convention<sup>6</sup> and of other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal. The purpose of the Conference was to consider steps to establish operating arrangements, consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests, under an international system designed to assure operation of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention.

Meanwhile, Egypt had seized the Canal, its installations and all property of the Canal Company

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6. The Members of Constantinople Convention of 1888 were Egypt, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

in Egypt. France and the United Kingdom countered by refusing to pay tolls to the new Egyptian authority. Together with the United States, they blocked all Egyptian accounts, including those of the Canal Company.

Egypt refused to attend the London Conference, stating that it had been convened without consulting Egypt to discuss the future of an integral part of that nation's territory. Egypt proposed instead a conference of the 45 users of the Canal to reconsider the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and to confirm and guarantee freedom of navigation through the Canal.

Twenty-two powers attended the Conference.<sup>7</sup> While commenting on the possible success of the Conference, *The Economist* declared, "a blessing to count as the Conference began was that there was no diametrical opposition between Asia and the West on the Suez issue. The five "Bandoeng States"—Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Ethiopia—had decided to give the Big Three's projects the benefit of the doubt and to come to London. Further, although over twenty Asian and Soviet bloc states (plus Yugoslavia and Panama) had accepted President Nasser's plan for a different kind of Conference, one of them—India—was doing diplomatic overtime in Cairo to make sure that

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7. The 22 States were Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, The United Kingdom, the United States the U.S.S.R., Spain, Indonesia and India.

negotiations between East and West shall not become impossible.”<sup>8</sup>

As regards Pakistan's position with respect to the nationalization of the Canal by Egypt, its view from the beginning was that Egypt was within its rights in nationalising the Company.

At the London Suez Conference, which was held between 16 and 24 August, 1956, Pakistan's Foreign Minister introduced a number of amendments to the draft resolution submitted by Mr. John Foster Dulles, which were accepted. By these amendments—which emphasised the sovereign rights of Egypt, Pakistan sought to make the terms of the resolution acceptable to Egypt. Seventeen<sup>9</sup> of the 22 powers who attended agreed on proposals to be presented to Egypt. The proposals adopted at the Conference were known as “The Pakistan Plan.”

This proposed a definite system to guarantee at all times and for all powers free use of the Canal, with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt. The system was to assure : efficient operation and development of the Canal, and a free, open and secure international waterway : insulation of

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8. *The Economist* (London), 22 September 1956, p. 944.

9. The 17 States were Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and The United States. Spain agreed that the United States proposal, as amended, should be put to Egypt, but requested that if agreement were not reached, recourse should be had to a Spanish proposal for international participation in an Egyptian body administering the Canal.

that operation from the politics of any nation ; an equitable financial return to Egypt, increasing as the Canal was enlarged and used by more shipping ; and Canal dues as low as was consistent with the above provisions. To achieve these results, a Suez Canal Board was to operate, maintain and develop the Canal, the Board to include Egypt and to make periodic reports to the United Nations. There would be an Arbitral Commission to settle disputes and effective sanctions which would treat any use or threat of force to interfere with the operating of the Canal as a threat to peace and violation of the Charter.

At the Conference, India offered a compromise solution between the position of the majority and that of exclusive control and management of the operation and the development of the Canal by Egypt. It proposed a consultative body which would advice Egypt in accordance with the interests of the users of the Canal and would maintain contacts with the United Nations. This proposal was not accepted by the Conference ; only Ceylon, Indonesia and the U.S.S.R. supported it.

The 18-power plan was presented to the Egyptian Government in Cairo on 3 September 1956, by a five-nation Committee headed by the Prime Minister of Australia. On 9 September the Committee reported rejection of the Plan by the Government of Egypt, which, it stated, resisted any control or management of the operation and development of the Canal by anybody other than itself. In a



memorandum of 10 September, Egypt stated that the essence of the proposal was the establishment of International, in place of Egyptian, control over the Canal and stipulations for sanctions. Egypt proposed instead the establishment of a negotiating body representative of the different user views to seek solution for questions relating to freedom of navigation of the Canal, its development and equitable tolls. This proposal of Egypt had been accepted by 21 States. After the rejection of the Western proposal by Egypt, there was some talk, in Western circles to use force to bring the Canal under International control. Pakistan's view on this was expressed in a statement by the Foreign Minister, who declared that Pakistan would "not associate itself in any way whatsoever with the use of force."<sup>10</sup>

As regards the proposed Users Association, the Pakistani Foreign Ministers, before his departure for London to attend the Second Conference, declared :

"If the Canal User's Association have any intention of enforcing their will, that in our view, would be against the United Nations Charter, and we as United Nations Member, are pledged to resolve our disputes peacefully."<sup>11</sup>

The Second London Conference, held between 19 and 21 September, considered the Egyptian proposal but rejected it as too imprecise to afford

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10. *Pakistan Times*, (Lahore) 17 September, 1956.

11. *Pakistan Times*, 19 September, 1957.

a useful basis for discussion. The Conference provided for an independent authority *i.e* the Suez Canal Users Association; fifteen of the eighteen conferring nations became members of this Association. Pakistan did not become a member. The Association was designed to assist its members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention with due regard for the right of Egypt. This was again rejected by president Nasser. As regards the Canal Users Association, Pakistan opposed its formation. Speaking in the Conference the Pakistan Foreign Minister declared that the formation (of the User's Association) might lead to an incident leading to the use of force, in spite of the desire of the sponsoring Powers to avoid it. "Even if that were not come to pass, the people of Pakistan, as indeed people throughout Asia and the Middle East, rightly or wrongly, believe that it might. They also believe that the present proposal means an imposed settlement, to which we have declared our opposition all along". He therefore suggested that the User's Association plan should be dropped, the User nations, acting as a body, should initiate direct negotiations with Egypt. Should the Egyptians refuse to negotiate the matter it should be taken to the Security Council.<sup>12</sup>

After these negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations had failed to produce a solution, the parties brought the problem before the

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12. *Commonwealth Survey*, Vol. 2., No. 20., 2 October, 1956, p. 802.

United Nations. The Security Council discussed the question in a series of meetings but could not reach any conclusion.

Israel, which was hard hit by Nasser's refusal to pass the Israeli bound ship through the Canal, made use of the tense situation-of course with the connivance of Britain and France - and invaded the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt on 29 October, 1956. The United States asked for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider "steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council met on 30 October to consider the situation. The United States introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would : call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal behind the established Armistice Lines ; call upon all Members to refrain from the use of force or threat of force in the area, to assist the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the Armistice Agreements and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel as long as it had not complied with the resolution ; and request the Secretary-General to keep Council informed on compliance with the resolution and to make recommendations for the maintenance of International peace and security in the area. A suggestion for the addition of another paragraph, whereby the Council would call upon "Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire" was accepted by the United States. The amended United States draft resolution received 7 votes in favour to 2 against. It was not adopted because of the British and French veto.

The representative of the United Kingdom informed the Council that the British and French Governments had that afternoon addressed urgent communications to Egypt and Israel, to stop all war-like action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Canal. They had also asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If on the expiration of twelve hours either or both Governments had not undertaken to comply with these requirements, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to secure compliance. This, in fact, was an ultimatum to Egypt. Because of this ultimatum Egypt asked for an evening meeting of the Security Council. The Security Council resumed discussion on 31 October 1956, the Anglo-French forces had already started their air attack on military targets in Egypt.

The reaction in Pakistan to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt was sharp. There were widespread demonstrations in support of Egypt. Hundreds of young men volunteered to fight arm-in-arm with the Egyptians against the aggressor. In a statement issued on 3 November, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, said "that his Government 'unreservedly condemn' the violation by the United Kingdom and France of the sovereignty and territory of Egypt, a Muslim country towards which Pakistan has always entertained feelings."<sup>13</sup>

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13. *Commonwealth Survey*, Vol. 2., No. 23, 13 November, 1956, p. 963.

In the Security Council, the representative of Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution whereby the Security Council, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of International peace and security, would call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" resolution 377 (V), in order to make appropriate recommendations. The Yugoslav draft resolution was adopted by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.

The first emergency special session of the Assembly, met on 1st November, 1956 and adopted the agenda by 62 votes to 2, with 7 abstentions. The United States introduced a draft resolution by which the Assembly would : urge, as a matter of priority, that all parties involved in hostilities in the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area ; urge the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the Armistice Line, to desist from raids across the Armistice Line into neighbouring territory ; and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements ; recommend that all Member States should refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and, in general, refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution ; (a) urge that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and

restore secure freedom of navigation ; (b) request the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on compliance with the resolution to Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they might deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter.

The United States draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions.<sup>14</sup>

In pursuance of paragraph 5 of this resolution, the Secretary-General reported, on 3 November, that the Egyptian Government had accepted the resolution stating that it could not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continued their aggression. He reported further, that the Government of France and the United Kingdom continued to maintain their view that police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities which were now threatening the Suez Canal, to prevent a resumption of those hostilities and to pave the way for a definitive settlement of the Arab-Israeli war which threatened the legitimate interests of so many countries. They would stop military action provided that, among other things, the Egypt and the Israeli Governments agreed to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace, the force to be established and maintained until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement was reached and

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14. *G.A.O.R.*, First Emergency Special Session, 662nd Plenary Meeting, 2 November, 1956, as Resolution 997 (ES-1). The opposing votes were of Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal and the Union of South Africa abstained.

satisfactory arrangements agreed upon in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the United Nations. The Secretary-General, reported further that the Gaza strip and the Red Sea Islands of Tiran and Sinafir had been occupied by Israeli military forces and that air operations over Egyptian territory had continued without interruption.

India, jointly with 18 other African and Asian countries, including Pakistan, submitted a draft resolution according to which the General Assembly, noting with regret that not all the parties concerned had yet agreed to comply with Resolution 997 (ES-1), would : (1) reaffirm that resolution and once again call upon the parties immediately to comply with its provisions ; (2) authorise the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of the military forces and arms into the areas and request him to report compliance, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the resolution ; (3) request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of UNTSO, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice Lines.

Canada also submitted a draft resolution, by which, as amended, the Assembly bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with resolution 997 (ES), would request the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours a plan for the

setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of that resolution.

The Canadian and the 19-power draft resolutions were put to vote in the early morning of 4 November. The Canadian draft resolution was adopted by 57 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 998 (ES-1). The 19-power draft resolution was adopted by 59 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions. Pakistan strongly supported the resolutions.

On 4 November, the Secretary-General reporting on implementations of the resolutions stated that only Egypt had accepted the cease-fire resolution of 4 November. He also reported about the information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had informed him on 4 November that the General Armistice Agreement no longer had validity and that he had been asked to order UNTSO personnel out of the Gaza area.

The Secretary-General also submitted the first report on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force. He reported his conclusion that without waiting for his final report, the Assembly should decide that a United Nations Command for "an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of its resolution



997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956 should be established ; that the Assembly should further appoint, on an emergency basis, Major-General Burns, at present Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to be Chief of Staff of the new command ; that General Burns in that capacity should be authorised immediately to organise the necessary staff of officers from the observer corps of UNTSO and in consultation with the Secretary-General, from various Member States, drawn from countries, which were not permanent members of the Security Council.

A draft resolution was submitted the same day by Canada, Columbia and Norway, whereby the General Assmby would note with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General and establish a United Nations Command for an emergency International Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of resolution 997 (ES-1), of 2 November, and authorise immediate recruitment of officers by General Burns, who was appointed Commander. The draft resolution was adopted on 5 November, by 57 votes to 0, with 19 ebstentions as resolution 1000 (ES-1). Pakistan voted for the resolution.

On 5 November 1956, the Security Council met at Soviet request to discuss Soviet draft resolution calling for armed action by United Nations Members, under Article 42 of the Charter, to curb the aggressors in Egypt. The Council rejected by 3 votes in favour to 4 against, with 4 abstentions, the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

In a communication to the Secretary-General on 5 November, Israel informed him that it agreed unconditionally to a cease-fire and that since morning all fighting had ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces.

The United Kingdom, in a note to the Secretary-General, also announced that Anglo-French forces would observe a cease-fire in Egypt from midnight 6th-7th November, 1956.

The Secretary-General submitted his plan for the emergency force on 7th November. The General Assembly discussed and adopted a 7-power resolution for immediate implementation of the Secretary General's report on the United Nations force and setting up a 7-power advisory committee consisting of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan to assist the Secretary-General.

Another draft resolution (A/3390) was introduced by Ceylon on behalf of 19 Afro-Asian States including Pakistan, by which the Assembly would re-affirm its resolutions of 2nd, 4th and 5th November; call upon Israel, the United Kingdom and France to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory and request the Secretary-General promptly to report on compliance with the resolution. It was adopted by 65 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

On 10 November, 1956, a United States draft resolution for placing on the agenda of the 11th Regular Session of the agenda of the Emergency Special Session was adopted by a vote of 66 to 0, with 2 abstentions.

In the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly, on 23 November 1956, 20 Asian-African States, including Pakistan, submitted a draft resolution, by which the Assembly would : (1) note with grave concern that its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawal had not been complied with ; and (2) reiterate its call for compliance forthwith. This was adopted by the Assembly, as revised, by 63 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions, as Resolution 1120 (XI).

The representative of Pakistan, speaking in the Assembly, said :

“For the last few years a feeling of disillusionment had been growing amongst the smaller nations of the world regarding the United Nations. They had begun to feel that this organisation, that came into being with such high hopes and such faith, borne out of bitter suffering and great trial, was after all nothing better than holy alliances for the unholy purposes of the past and that it was almost futile to hope that justice regardless of power politics, could be had at the hands of the United Nations ; but, by taking at least bold and prompt action in this case of Israel and British-French aggression, the United Nations has redeemed itself. It has restored the faith of the small peoples of the world in its integrity.”<sup>15</sup>

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15 G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 592th Plenary Meeting, 23 November, 1956, p. 270.

As regards the Emergency Force, all important decisions were taken by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Advisory Committee.

In direct response to resolution 1001 (Es-1), Pakistan was one of those 24 States which offered to participate in the Force. But the Secretary-General finally asked for units from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

Pakistan also voted for a 6-power draft resolution (A/3386) sponsored by Canada and others by which the Assembly approved the aide memoire for the presence and functioning of the UNEF and clearing the Suez Canal.

Another draft resolution submitted by 16-powers asking the General Assembly to authorise the Secretary-General to establish a UNEF special account and other financial matters concerning the force was adopted by the Assembly by 52 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions.<sup>16</sup> The Soviet bloc opposed it. Pakistan supported it.

On January 15, 1957, Secretary-General reported Israel's failure to withdraw. Twenty-five powers, including Pakistan, submitted a draft resolution, 'noting with regret and concern' the failure of Israel to comply with the Assembly's resolutions 997, 998, 999, 1002 and 1120 (ES-1).

The resolution further requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing with-

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16. *G.A.O.R.*, 11th session, 596th Plenary Meeting, 25 November 1956, as resolution 1122(XI).

drawal and to report on such completion to the Assembly within five days. This was adopted by 74 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.<sup>17</sup>

Pakistan also voted in support of another resolution, sponsored by the United States and six other States, which deplored the non-compliance of Israel, asked to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Lines. This was adopted, by the General Assembly by 72 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, as Resolution 1124(XI).

Another 7-power resolution by which the Assembly sought the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement by Egypt and Israel and the placing of UNEF on the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice demarcation Line, was adopted by 56 votes to 0, with 22 abstentions, on 2 February, 1957, as Resolution 1125(XI).

The United Nations Emergency Force entered the Gaza Strip on midnight 6th-7th March, 1957, and into the Sharm-el-Sheikh area on 8 March after the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

The clearance operation of the Canal was completed by mid-April 1957. The United Nations was finally successful in bringing the situation back to the status quo as it was before 29 October 1956.

The cease-fire in the Suez Crisis, was one of the most important achievements of the United Nations in its entire history. The most astonishing feature of the episode was that the United States had come

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17. G.A.O.R. 11th Session, 642nd Plenary Meeting, 19 January, 1957, as Resolution (1123(XI)).

out against its principal allies Britain and France and its portege Israel, as an impartial champion of peace.

Of course, the fear of Soviet intervention was an important factor in the cessation of hostilities and for the later developments, as the Economist had pointed out, "The decisive new development to halt the Anglo-French adventure in the Middle East in reality, was Mr. Bulganin's threat to intervene with force, a threat which it was possible neither to accept with a good grace nor to ignore with safety."<sup>18</sup>

But the compelling force of public opinion, which was asserted through the United Nations and which brought about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the invading forces from Egyptian territory, could not be ignored. The close co-operation of the two world giants, the United States and the Soviet Union which is very rare in United Nations history, was also a major factor in its implementation of the United Nations decisions.

Pakistan had actively participated in United Nations activity in its handling of the Suez Chrisis, by supporting and co-sponsoring resolutions and through the Advisory Committee, to the Secretary-General, of which Pakistan was elected a Member.

Pakistan's policy on this question, had been affected by the Afro-Asian influence as Pakistan, with other Afro-Asian States co-sponsored resolu-

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18. *The Economist*, (London), 10 November, 1956, p. 484.

tions for the cession of hostilities and for the withdrawal of invading forces. It is important to mention that Pakistan's condemnation of the aggressors had not simply been influenced by its Afro-Asian solidarity. This, in fact, had been motivated by objective consideration of its policy on Kashmir. Since, Pakistan had declared India as an aggressor in Kashmir, it had always condemned aggression. This had been the underlying principle when in 1950, Pakistan condemned North Korean aggression. Commenting on the Korean situation, *Dawn* which generally represents Government's view—in an editorial, remarked :

“If, however, this war goes on, peace-loving nations such as Pakistan will have no alternative but to tread the painful path of duty which their conscience dictates and their abhorrence of aggression in any shape or form, in any part of the world, naturally prompts them to follow. Pakistan has been the victim of aggression herself and is still seeking a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute through the intervention of the United Nations.”

The Paper added that Pakistan :

“...can do no less than give at the United Nations call, her moral and material support, within her means, to any other country which may be the victim of similar aggression.”<sup>19</sup>

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19. *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 July, 1950.

This view has also been confirmed in the case of Suez, for Pakistan offered armed units for the United Nations Emergency Force.

Pakistan's support for Egypt on the Suez issue had also been influenced by its Muslim feelings, as expressed by Pakistan's Prime Minister, 'that his Government 'unreservedly condemn' the violation by the United Kingdom and France of the sovereignty and territory of Egypt, 'a Muslim country towards which Pakistan has always entertained fraternal feeling'.

Pakistan offered its total support to Egypt, including armed aid, although the offer, however, "was rejected by Cairo on the grounds that Pakistan's treaty relations with the Western powers made it an unwelcome friend."<sup>20</sup>

'Alliance Politics' had not affected Pakistan's position on the issue of Suez, as Pakistan openly condemned the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. The United States, the most important alliance partner from Pakistan's point of view, was itself leading the United Nations peace crusade against Britain and France. Pakistan, on the other hand, put pressure jointly with other Muslim Members of the Baghdad Pact, on Britain to accept the cease-fire, which was acknowledged by the British Government in the following statement :

"Her Majesty's Government are also most appreciative of the initiative of the Govern-

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20. Donald N. Wilber, *Pakistan*, (New York ; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 32.



ments of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The views offered both individually and collectively by these Governments have weighed heavily in the decision to bring an end to military action in Egypt."<sup>21</sup>

The fear of India had not affected Pakistan's policy on the question of Suez. Suez being a colonial issue for the Afro-Asians, India and Pakistan mostly followed a similar policy. But comparing in general whereas India adopted an attitude more favourable to Egypt, Pakistan had maintained its position of impartiality—that is to support the just cause—on the issue of Suez and had sought a just solution of the problem under the auspices of the United Nations.

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21. This statement was made by the United Kingdom Foreign Office on 8th November 1956. *Commonwealth Survey*, Vol. 2., No. 23.; 15 November 1956, p. 964.

## **INDIA'S STAND FOR KASHMIR AND HER PRACTICAL STEPS.**

*Ahmed-ud-Din Hussain<sup>1</sup>*

### **Roots of the Disputes**

The State of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence in 1846 resulting by the treaty of Amritsar. Sir Lord Lawrence sold the state for Rs. 7500,000 only. Sir Hary Singh succeeded Gulab Singh as the head of the state. He was the Raja at the time of Partition of the sub-continent.

The cruel attitude towards muslims, political suppression and denial of their rights, the muslims of the state started an organised agitation against Maharaja's rule in 1930. Hence the ALL JAMMU AND KASHMIR MUSLIM CONFERENCE came into existence. But no nation can be subjugated for ever. In 1933-34, the muslim conference moving ahead captured 16 seats out of 21 in the legislative assembly, and in 1938 the Conference won seats despite official interference. In 1939 cracks appeared in the Conference, and it became the supporter of ALL INDIA NATIONAL CONGRESS. Those who abandoned this organisation again established their MUSLIM CONFERENCE headed by

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1. Mr. Hussain is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Bahauddin Zakarya University, Multan.

late Ghulam Abbass Whereas, Shaikh Abdullah remained with the National Conference.

### **Partition Plan**

The Partition Plan was announced on June 3, 1947, according to which the Indian States were free to join India or Pakistan or remain independent.

Geographically Kashmir was a part of Pakistan. Kashmir has a 902 miles long border common with Pakistan, but has only 317 miles with India. River Indus, Jehlum and Chenab have their sources in Kashmir. By road Kashmir is linked with the world only by Pakistan. Politically it belongs to Pakistan, because it has 93% of the population consisting of Muslims.

Due to NEHRU and GANDHI'S secret talks, the Maharaja disarmed the Kashmir Muslims. Civil War broke out, and so the freedom fighters, after defeating Maharaja's troops, captured many cities of the state. Maharaja took refuge in Jammu, and conveyed his decision of accession with India to the Governor-General of India. On October 27th Indian airborne troops landed at Srinagar. It was a pre-planned INDIAN CONSPIRACY. India declared it as an Internal problem, however it stated that it would be solved according to the wishes of Kashmiris.

### **Protest :**

The Government of Pakistan protested against this fraud, and the Security Council was moved accordingly. During the year 1947, Indian Government

repeatedly stated that she favours the idea of Plebiscite, while Pakistan proposed that Plebiscite should be held under the auspices of U.N.O.

### **Liaquat Nehru Meeting**

Fighting broke out between the tribesmen and the Indian troops in 1947, resulted with impending defeats of the Indian Army, and Pandit Nehru agreed to meet Liaquat Ali Khan. They held two meetings in December but without any result. At last the case was referred to the Security Council on 31st December, 1947.

### **U.N.C.I.P**

United nations commission for India and Pakistan has successful negotiation, resulting the cease-fire, on 1st January 1949. Both the countries agreed to appoint a joint committee. Pakistan nominated its representatives on March 9th 1949 but did not honour its pledge.

### **India's First Refusal**

India rejected the proposal of 1948. First India asked for more time to submit her plans before the committee, later on she refused to honour its agreement.

### **India's Second Refusal**

India refused to accept the U.N. proposal of August 1949. U.N. tried to vacate Kashmir from Indian Army, but India continued to refuse to do so. As a result U.N.O. appointed Admiral NIMITZ as the Plebiscite Administrator to arbitrate the differences, arising from the interpretation of UNCIP Resolutions. Pakistan accepted the proposal but Bharat rejected it.

### **India's Third Refusal**

India rejected the December 1949 proposals. Admiral Nimitz reported his failure to the Security Council, and asked its president: General Mc Naughten to mediate. General Mc Naughten proposed for demilitarization. Pakistan accepted the U.N.O. President's proposal, while India 3rd time rejected it.

### **India's Fourth Refusal**

In July 1950, under U.N. resolution of March 1950, the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon as U.N. representative. He was entrusted the task of demilitarization but both the parties rejected these proposals.

### **India's Fifth Refusal**

In January 1951, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, met at London, considered removal of all troops of interested parties, as essential for holding a free Plebiscite in Kashmir. They suggested for the security of the state :—

- (i) a Common-wealth force from Australia and New Zealand at their own expense ;
- (ii) a joint force of India and Pakistan.
- (iii) a local force to be raised by Plebiscite Administrator.

The proposal were accepted by Pakistan one by one, but India rejected all.

### **India's Sixth Refusal**

In March 1951, Ambassador Muniz, of Brazil, proposed to both India and Pakistan that they

should agree to Arbitration on points risen from the two UNICP Resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January 1949. Pakistan accepted these proposals but Bharat did not agree to them.

### **India's Seventh Refusal**

On 22nd February 1951 the Anglo-American resolution presented in the Security Council proposed that U.N. Representative was to prepare plans for a free and impartial Plebiscite. Both parties were asked to submit points of difference to arbitration under the auspices of International Court. Pakistan was ready, but India refused as usual.

### **India's Eighth Refusal**

Under the Anglo-American resolution of 30th March 1951, Dr. Frank P. Graham was appointed as United Nations Representative in Kashmir. Indian indifference failed his mission, and he submitted his report to the Security Council on 16th October 1951. He mentioned Indian policy as the cause of failure.

### **India's Ninth Refusal**

Under another Anglo-US resolution adopted in October 1951, Dr. Graham was instructed to continue his efforts regarding demilitarization. But India did not agree to the quantum of troops embodied in the scheme which sought to fix the ratio between India and Pakistan troops on the two sides of the cease fire line.

### **India's Tenth Refusal**

On May 20th 1952 Dr. Graham resumed talks with India and Pakistan, but on September, 24,

1952, as usual, he reported to the Security Council his failure to effect an agreement between India and Pakistan to reach on demilitarization of Kashmir.

### **India's Eleventh Refusal**

On November 5th 1952 another Anglo-American resolution was introduced. It urged immediate negotiations at the U.N. But on 8th December 1952, India rejected flatly the Anglo-American proposal to help in demilitarization of the territory of Kashmir prior to plebiscite. On December 20th 1952, Pandit Nehru rejected Pakistan's proposal of demilitarization.

### **India's Twelfth Refusal :**

On 23rd December 1952 another resolution from Anglo-American wing, on demilitarization of Kashmir, the talks began between India and Pakistan on 4th February 1953. The talks centered round the matter of demilitarization, but India was not prepared to change its attitude, and later on, this twelfth attempt to solve the problem proved a failure, due to Indian refusal.

### **Ali—Nehru Talks :**

It was also fruitless. The talks between the then Prime-Minister Mr. Mohammad Ali and the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to settle the dispute were held in London in June 1953. They proposed to meet again in Karachi. In the last week of July 1953, Mr. Nehru came to Karachi. Talks were held in cordial atmosphere. Mr. Nehru was very happy with the talks, and acknowledged that the solution of the problem was no nearer.

"We all know that Kashmir is the toughest problem," he said, "All there is no good in my saying that it is nearer a solution."

### **Delhi Agreement**

Ali and Nehru during their four day's talk (17th to 20th April, 1953) both the Prime Ministers discussed the Kashmir dispute. They resolved to settle it in accordance with the wishes of the people.

- (i) It was decided that a Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir should be appointed by the end of April 1954.
- (ii) It was decided that committee of Military experts should be appointed to advise on Preliminary Issue".
- (iii) It was decided that Plebiscite Administrator will make his proposal for preparation of a fair and Impartial Plebiscite in the entire state.

These negotiations were within the frame-work of the U.N. But India wished that Kashmir case be withdrawn from U.N.O. because she failed before the bar of the world opinion. She wanted Kashmir—an international problems to be turned into a local and Internal affair. Pakistan was not at all prepared to withdraw the case from U.N O.

### **Pakistan's Pledge**

Pakistan considers it its duty to try and reach out of the people of Kashmir, to secure their right of self-determination at all costs.



### **Abdullah's Coup**

Through Ali-Nehru negotiations, India was posing to be on friendly terms with Pakistan, and on the other hand Abdullah's coup in Kashmir was being engineered feverishly.

At midnight of August the 8th, 1953, Shaikh Abdullah was dismissed from the premiership of India held Kashmir and arrested. Shaikh Abdullah was assured that there would be no communilism in Kashmir. So long as he danced to the tunes of Bharat he was hailed as "Sher-e-Kashmir", but when refused to obey the Hindu dictates he was sent back to jail.

### **Bakshi's Regime**

Indian subservient stooge stepped into his shoes. The upsurge of the Pro-Pakistan feelings in Kashmir had frightened Delhi and the Government of occupied Kashmir. India acted with dramatic suddenness and the blow fell. Shaikh Abdullah was dismissed and imprisoned. "This was the best news during the last six year", for hindus. Abdullah was charged with maladiministration, nepotism and corruption.

### **New Story**

On May 14, 1954, the Indian accepted the constituent Assembly's decision for the ratification of Kashmir's accession to India. Now Indian Government started shifting its stand. Mr. Nehru said in 1955 that the question of plebiscite in Kashmir was out of date because the situation had changed due to the following factors :

- (i) U.S. Military aid to Pakissan.
- (ii) Economic development of state.
- (iii) Creation of the constituent Assembly in Occupied Kashmir.
- (iv) Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO.

### **Gunner Jaaring**

In 1957, the Government of Pakistan moved the Security Council to implement its previous resolutions. Consequently Mr. Gunner Jarring of Sweden was deputed to study prospects of sending a U.N. military force to Kashmir. On Feb. 20, 1957 the Soviet Union Vetoed the resolution. Other resolution was passed, and on it Mr. Gunner Jarring submitted his report, mentioning that Pakistan accepted his proposal but India refused to agree.

### **New Conspiracy**

Meanwhile India hatched another conspiracy, its air bases and expanding air-fields in the valley. The military preparations were made to dominate the local muslims majority Hindus from all over the India were encouraged to settle in Kashmir. In Sept. 1957, Security Council was again moved. It appointed Dr. Graham to visit both the countries which he did in 1958. Dr. Graham's report was released in April 1958 bore the fact that Pakistan accepted all the proposals while India rejected them all.

### **1958 To 1963**

In January 1958, Shaikh Abdullah was released after a detention of 4½ years. He was

again arrested and put behind the bars. The news of his re-arrest gave a shock to Pakistanis. Consequently in June 1958 the *Central Kashmir Liberation Committee* decided to launch a peaceful Crossing in Kashmir, but Choudhry Ghulam Abbas was arrested. Ayub Khan being President of Pakistan tried many times to solve the problem but in vain. In 1962-63 ministerial conferences were held, meeting between President Ayub and Prime Minister of India were exchanged, but nothing came out.

### **Indian Aggressive Mood**

In 1965, the Indian Government started the conspiracy of merging Kashmir with India. Pakistan reported to the Security Council about the sinister move of Indian Government but U.N. was helpless as ever. Kashmiris demonstrated against this move, the Indian Government proclaimed Emergency. In January and March 1965 the integration bill was passed making Kashmir as Province of India. The integration bill created great indignation amongst the Kashmiris. Anger and frustration against the Indian Government turned into Revolt during the month of August. Indian Government named the war of Liberation as "Pakistani Infiltration into Kashmir.

### **Peace in Pieces**

On 15th August 1965 India crossed the border and occupied Kargil post on the same day. On August 24th 1965 Indian Army shelled a Pakistani Village Awan Sharif without giving any ultimatum. Indian forces crossed the International border and attacked Lahore from three sides. "September War" has now

fully started. The attack was repulsed with great vigor and strength. When Indian Government could not achieve its evil missions, she went to the U.N.O. on September 20th 1965. The Security Council passed a resolution asking for Cease-Fire.

Mr. Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan told the Security Council on September 22nd 1965, that although the resolution was unsatisfactory yet Pakistan would accept the cease-fire for the sake of peace. The cease fire was concluded on September 23, 1965 at 3.00 A.M. (W.P.S T.).

#### **The Resolution :**

Following is the text of the resolution passed by the Security Council.

(a) Having considered the reports of the Security Council for its un-remitting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the Security Council's resolution of 4th and 6th September.

(b) Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan. Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal (S/6683) but noting further with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being. Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters.

(i) Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday 22nd Sept. 1965 at 0700 hours G.M.T. and calls upon both

governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the position held by them before Aug. 5, 1965.

- (ii) Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of the armed personnel.
- (iii) Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area.
- (iv) Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the council resolution 210 of September has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem including those listed in articles 33 of the charter.
- (v) Request the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution to such a peaceful resolution and to report to the Security Council there-on.

Thus the war which India had imposed on Pakistan came to an end. Cease fire was concluded.

### **Tashkent Declaration**

After the cease-fire the U.S.S.R. Government offered to play host between India and Pakistan if they were prepared to solve the problem through mediation. Both the countries accepted the good

offices of U.S.S.R. Government. Pakistan considered Kosygin's offer as "friendly". Both the delegation headed by President Ayub Khan and Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri met at Tashkent in January 1966, thus was signed the Tashkent Declaration on January 10th 1966. The text of the "Tashkent Declaration" is as follows :—

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

They re-affirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in the region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.

It is against this background that Jammu and Kashmir issue was discussed, and each of the sides put fourth its respective position.

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed forces of the two countries shall be withdrawn, not later than February 25, 1966, to the position they held prior to August 5, 1965, and both sides shall observe cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that relation between the two countries shall be based on Non-Interference in the internal affairs of each other.

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country.

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that the High-commissioner may be posted again.

They further agreed to return the property and assets taken over by either side during the conflict.

#### **News Clippings :**

Irish Times August 12, 1953.

Under the heading "Struggle for Kashmir". 'It proves, if a proof was needed, that India is determined to keep Kashmir at all costs, that all talk about plebiscite and mutual negotiations is so much stuff for propaganda in the true style of imperialists'

## **India's Stand in the Eyes of Irish Times.**

**Dated August 17th 1953.**

“Mr. Nehru made all sorts of promises, including that of a free plebiscite to decide the wishes of the inhabitants in regard to their political future, but as usually happens in such matters, nothing was done until a few days ago, when Sheikh Abdullah was suddenly arrested..... It is almost certain that although there are vigorous denials from New Delhi, this new move in Kashmir has been instigated by the Indians at the moment when there are more than 10,000 Indian troops in Kashmir”.

**The Morgon Tindigen.** Swedish Government Paper.

“Whatever happens in Kashmir just as what has happened or will happen else where in Asia—in Tibet and in Indonesia—has replaced European Imperialism”.

**Het Vrye Volk.** Dutch Socialist Daily

“Pandit Nehru in his Kashmir policy (as for instance Hyderabad) seems lacking in conception which he pursues in regard of International policies and which he desires others to follow”.

**Cairo.** Egyptian Gazette.

“Nehru proclaimed as a champion of democracy, but it is impossible to avoid conclusion reserved for Kashmir and that it is labelled-incorporated in India’.

**Hurses.** Ankara Daily.

“Sheikh Abdullah was always a good means for propaganda for Nehru, although Abdullah disapproved Hindus treatment with Muslim”.



**New York Times :**

Said that Kashmir's accession to India was the work of the deposed Maharaja. Shaikh Abdullah, now has been deposed with the obvious blessing and consent of India. Kashmiris themselves were not consulted on either acting. It is the time that their views should be heard.

**The Economist :** (15th August 1953)

"It is significant that the change has produced riots in Sirinagar for the first time since the Kashmir dispute begins, and it looks as if India might have won a plebiscite under the old regime but would not now."

**Expression :** (Swedish Journal)

"One is astonished by the stiff, hard attitude by India....., the moment there is any talk about an endeavour to reach an amicable agreement, Indian's stipulations do not permit one to conclude that she is willing to make a friendly compromise. In fact the opposite seems true. India intends to hang on her part of Kashmir."

**Chicago Daily Tribune :** (October 29th 1953)

" There is growing feeling that India is not using the American Aid running into hundreds of millions of dollars a year to support its continuation as the endless and unjustified military occupation of Kashmir."

**CONCLUSION**

Kashmir has always been a subject dear to the hearts of the Muslims of this Sub-continent. It is then the more surprising that most of them are

ignorant about the facts pertaining to the Kashmir dispute. Generally it is believed that there is an International agreement, embodied in the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions of August 13th 1948 and January 5th 1949 that a plebiscite will be held so that Kashmiris can determine their own future ; and to this comes the acrimonious accusation that India is preventing the happy event from taking place.

India has meanwhile consistently propagated the line that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to her and thus becomes an integral part of the Indian Union. To which she adds that, by entering the territory of the state. Pakistan has committed aggression which she must vacate. In foreign countries Indian's Stands is generally appreciated more than Pakistan. This is quite logical, for once India makes out a legal title to the state and Pakistan leave it unchallenged, other countries are allowed to get away with the impression that India has certain rights under International Law which Pakistan does not mind to violate in order to grab some territory ; the wishes of the Kashmiris themselves are then forgotten.

**References :** (The following books and journals were consulted in preparation of this assignment).

1. Twenty Years of Pakistan by (Altaf Gohar) Chapter 30 'the foreign relations' page, 663.
2. Cyclopedia of General Knowledge by : A.S. Mahmood. Current Problems "Kashmir Dispute" page 172.
3. Pak-India 17 days War of 1965 Part I : By Nek Alam.

4. Crisis in Kashmir : By Alastair Lamb.  
1947-to-1966.
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6. Standard General Knowledge : By Dogar.  
Page 888. Seventeenth Edition.
7. Weekly Outlook : Vol. 8 No. 15, July  
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## POLITICAL SAGACITY OF DR. SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL

*Ahmed Husain*

To-day Pakistan is independent like many other developing countries with a common heritage of colonial rule. However, there is a big difference between Pakistan and other developing countries. The other developing countries attained independence after organising themselves into separate entities with emphasis on nationalism. In this way the process of independence became simple. The nation had a singular objective to get rid of the British imperial power.

The creation of Pakistan was based on the demand of Muslims of India that they are a separate nation with emphasis on partition of India. For this the contribution of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal is of very great significance. According to him: "Nations are born in the heart of poets : they prosper and die in the hands of politicians."<sup>1</sup> He was an exception to this generalisation. Iqbal was knighted in 1922 due to his poetic and scholarly wisdom.<sup>2</sup> The main purpose of his poetic and philosophical approach was to inspire the Muslims of British India so that they should regain their old glory. At the same time his political contribution

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1. *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1984.

2. M. U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*, Book Traders, P. O. Box, 1854, Lahore, P. 52.

was also very vital for the Muslims of South Asia. Hence contribution of Iqbal was not only philosophical but also political.

He took part in active politics for a very short period but his contribution was very beneficial for the creation of Pakistan. Till 1927 he played no role as a politician. The last eleven years of his life were important from the view point of Muslim politics in which he not only played decisive role but also was able to forestall the Hindu sinister designs to make Muslims of India fall in the trap of the Congress dominated by caste Hindus. He died in 1938. The Quaid-i-Azam in his condolence message to his son said : "To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go he stood like rock, and never flinched one single moment."<sup>3</sup>

Iqbal was Muslim first and Muslim last. He had great love for Islam and wished prosperity and glory for the Muslims of Sub-continent in particular and Islamic world in general, in the old Islamic traditions : "According to Sir Abdul Qadir, Shikwa (complaint in which Iqbal has complained to God about the moral and political degeneration of the Muslims) and Jawab-i-Shikwa (Reply to the Complaint) in which a way has been shown for their regeneration seem to have been written through revelation."<sup>4</sup> He expressed his views about impor-

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3. Riaz Hussain, *The Politics of Iqbal*, Islamic Book Service, Lahore, p. 59.

4. Dr. Parveen Shaukat Ali, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal* Publisher United, Lahore, 1978, p. 118.

tance of Islamic state in a letter addressed to the Quaid in 1937. "After a long and careful study of the Islamic law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is reduced to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India."<sup>5</sup>

Not only he believed that a Muslim state was a penaecca for the problems being faced by the Muslims of South India but also had a feeling that Muslims alone without the help or co operation of the other communities of India could determine their destiny. For example, he was elected member of the Punjab Khilafat Committee in 1920, but he resigned from it within a short time. He did not like the idea of Muslim politics being dominated by Mathama Gandhi and Congress.

He also opposed Maulana Muhammad Ali when he came to Lahore to campaign for Gandhi's non co-operation movement. "Gandhi joined both the Khilafat question and the Punjab wrong to his non-cooperation Movement. The Khilafat question arose out of the Muslim anger at the harsh treatment of Turkey by the Allied Powers after the war. Turkey was disposed of her imperial territories some of

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5. *Syed Ahmed Wahid Allama Iqbal, A History of the Freedom Movement Vol. III, Pakistan Historical Society Karachi, 1963, p. 533.*

which were regarded as reared by Muslim India. The Punjab wrong related to the killing of about 500 of the 20,000 unarmed Indians who had unlawfully assembled for a protest meeting on a piece of wasteland in Amritsar (Punjab) called the Jallian-wala Bagh.”<sup>6</sup>

In his opinion the Khilafat Movement lost its importance due to political motivation of the Indian National Congress. “It is unbearable to sell Islam at the hands of the Hindus. It is sad that the protagonists of Khilafat have gone far away from their true path. They are pointing towards a kind of nationalism which no Muslim can accept even for a moment.”<sup>7</sup> Drawing his inspiration direct from the Holy Quran and early history of Islam he declared with authenticity that it comes only from the sureness of experience that Islam was a whole, a philosophy of life which was truer and fuller than any other philosophy, that it was the only true philosophy of life and everything that was not Islam was fully falsehood.<sup>8</sup>

While the above mentioned outlook Iqbal decided in 1926 to contest election to the Punjab Legislative Council. During the election campaign he addressed about two dozen meetings. The main theme of the electioneering campaign was to make his co-religionists realise the importance of Islamic way of life. In one of his election speeches he said :

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6. B. N. Bandey—*The Indian Nationalist Movement*, The Macmillan Press, Ltd. London, 1879, p. 52.
  7. Iqbal Nama, Vol. I p. 158.
  8. Durrani, *The meaning of Pakistan*, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1944. p.156.

The secret of the success of the Muslims lies in their unity. I have carried research for years and I have spent days and nights in unravelling how under the impact of the message of the Holy Prophet of Islam. Arabia became the leader of the world within a short space of thirty years. That was primarily because of the unity among the Muslims. I wish the Muslims should realise the truth about unity.

Difference of opinions is natural because temperaments differ, but such differences should be expressed in the way early Muslims did. When the people are actuated by nobler sentiments, differences of opinions are a blessing. When the people become narrow minded such differences of opinions which come to be perpetuated become a curse.— At the present moment most of the nations of the world are arrayed against the Muslims, but I am confident that ultimately Islam will triumph.<sup>9</sup>

From 1927 to 1930 he remained member of the provincial council. During the membership of the council he not only tried to adhere to his election manifesto but also worked for communal harmony and uplift of the masses of Punjab in general. About the general economic condition he advocated relief in land revenue for the small farmers. About unemployment he believed that industrial development was its only solution. He strongly recommended universal primary education. In 1927 he was elected a member of the Standing Committee

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9. Prof. Masud-ul-Hasan, *Life of Iqbal*, Ferozsons, Lahore, p. 183.



on Science and Education. In March 1928, Iqbal was re-elected a member of the Standing Committee on Education. In 1929 he was elected member of Education and Local Self Government Standing Committees. The year 1930 saw him as a member of the Medical Board Punjab.

In 1927 he completely rejected the concept of Hindu Nationalism. A resolution was moved by a non-muslim member that all posts under Government in all departments should be filled by open competition. He opposed the resolution being unrealistic. The proposer of the resolution believed it to be advantageous for the development of nationalism. Iqbal was critical of the concept of nationalism as envisaged by the non-muslim councillor. He believed it to be detrimental to the cause of muslims who were in minority with a ratio of one to four. The two major communities of India did not trust each other. Thus there could not be "oneness which was the basis of western concept of nationalism. It was due to this drawback that despite a lot of talk about Nationalism in India there was no coherence in the society. Hence he advocated the principle of competition tempered by selection and nomination. Lastly he mentioned that the Hindus believed in double policy about Nationalism. According to a discreet Hindu. "Let Nationalism be on your lips, but fix your gaze on your own community."<sup>10</sup> From this it can be concluded that Iqbal believed in self reliance among the Muslims of the sub-continent. Like Sir Syed

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10. *Ibid.* p. 186.

Ahmed Khan he wanted the Muslims to shun the Hindu dominated congress and also such political parties whose membership was open to all communities on the basis of Indian Nationalism.<sup>11</sup>

Iqbal wished equality among the Muslims in politics irrespective of the urban and rural background. Due to this he had a clash of opinion with his old class fellow at Government College, Lahore, Mian Fazle-i-Husain, who founded the National Unionist Party in 1923. He organized the party which was originally called the Rural Party and was latter called the National Unionist Party. The membership was open both to Muslims and New-Muslims. The majority of members had the rural background. It could be called a political party of the landed aristocracy. The impact which Mian Fazl-i-Hussain made on the political life of the Punjab was not only due to new imaginative schemes which gave him virtual control of the provincial legislature, but also to the bold effective manner in which he carried out his policies and programmes.<sup>12</sup>

He remained provincial Minister for Education under Act of 1919 from 1921 to 1926. His tenure of office as Education Minister marks an epoch in the annuals not only of the educational, but also of the political life of the Punjab. "The entire province benefited by the vigorous drive launched under Fazl-i-Hussain, but Muslims received special atten-

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11. Syed Shameem Hussain Kadri, *Creation of Pakistan*, Wajidalis Ltd. Lahore, 1982, p. 80.

12. S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, Sh. Ashraf, Lahore, 1965 p. 213.

tion. Hitherto, very few — not more than 5 to 10%. Muslims were able to gain admission to the prestigious Institutions like Medical College and Government College of Lahore. Fazl-i-Husain ordered reservation of seats for them in these institutions in proportions,<sup>13</sup> to their representation under the Lucknow Pact. (viz. 40%). However, he wanted to dominate Punjab politics without sharing power with the Muslim masses. In short, his party's regard for muslim mass participation in politics was the ultimate cause of the disintegration of the Unionist Party.

The Act of 1935 provided for provincial autonomy for which election had to take place in the provinces in 1937. He reorganised his party in 1936 with eyes on the forthcoming provincial elections. He believed that to have provincial autonomy the party should be only organised at the provincial level. Hence he was against the Muslim League, which under Jinnah's Leadership wanted to control provincial politics from the central party machinery. Therefore, he started anti-League activities and became active in getting membership for the Unionist Party from Muslim, Hindu and Sikh landlords and urban capitalists.<sup>14</sup>

Iqbal on the other hand was endeavouring to convert the Muslim League into a mass political party. For reviving the League in the Punjab, Iqbal rendered useful service to the Muslims at a

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13. *ibid.* p. 212.

14. Riaz Hussain, *The Politics of Iqbal*, Islamic Books Service, Lahore, 1877, p. 93.

time when the Quaid was fighting single handed against heavy odds. His greatest political contribution was to expose the political tactics of the leaders of the Unionist party. The main fault with Sir Fazl-i-Husain was that he tried to suppress the muslim movement and tried to fight for the Muslim cause according to his own way. On the other hand Iqbal showed great depth of understanding of the political process and outrightly rejected the approach of his old friend about muslim politics. Furthermore in the following words he described the harm done by Sir Fazl-i-Husain to muslim cause in 1935.

“It is really unfortunate that this rural-urban question should have received the support of Sir Fazl-i-Husain who obtained power in the first instance not as a rural leader but as a Muslim leader of the province, but unfortunately clung to his power by accentuating rural—urban differences. In this way he secured as his colleagues some third-class men with no title to Government power, and the prestige and authority which the possession of such offices as ministerships secure, but who on that very account namely, their mediocrity, look up to him as superman. Some of the authorities also encouraged this policy as in this way they were able to break the force of the Reforms of 1919. The result of these tendencies has been that, so far as the Muslims are concerned, real leadership has stood at a distance while the thoroughly incompe-

tent political adventurer has come into the lime-light".<sup>15</sup>

Mian Fazl-i-Husain died in 1936. A year later Sir Sikander Hayat Khan his successor formed Unionist government in Punjab. In provincial elections of 1946. All India Muslim League smashed the Unionist party. For this the nation is indebted to Sir Muhammad Iqbal. He took a bold and firm stand against the Unionist party at a time when apparently the entire government machinery supported it. Hence, it is correct to say: "Except Iqbal, no Punjab politician has a broad all India outlook."<sup>16</sup>

Allama Iqbal remained President of Punjab Muslim League in last two years of his life. In these two years his inspiration increased membership of the League by manifolds. To properly appreciate the contribution made by him as a leader of the Muslim League, the start has to be made from the year 1906. In that year three important events took place which are very important in the creation of Pakistan. To begin with the demand for separate electorate was accepted by the viccroy, Lord Minto, at Simla on October 1, 1906. "First, in all elections, local and provincial, Muslims must be separately represented and their representatives elected by purely Muslim electors. Secondly, the extent of Muslim representation must be commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value

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15. Syed Abdul Wahid *op. cit.* p. 274.

16. Riaz Hussain. *op. cit.* p. 59.

of the contribution they make to the defence of the Empire".<sup>17</sup> The conclusion from this demand for separate electorate is that Muslims demanded separate representation because they considered themselves to be separate from the Hinds. The second was the formation of a Muslim political party known". The All-India Muslim League. The third was the debut of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Indian politics, when he attended the Calcutta-session of the All-India Congress, as the private secretary of the President Dadabai Naoroji. It is worth noting that his very first speech in the Congress arena was about a matter concerning the Muslims, "Waqf-al-Aulad".<sup>18</sup> This means that like Iqbal he was from the very beginning interested in safeguarding the Muslim rights.

The Muslim League gained its full status as representative body of the muslims in 1916 by the famous Lucknow pact with the Congress. In the pact the deman of muslims for separate electorate was accepted by the Congress. The architect of this success was Jinnah known as "the Ambassador of Hindu—Muslim Unity".<sup>19</sup> However, it was unfortunate that Hindu leadership never thought of applying the contents of the pact in practice.

The Muslim League leadership was sceptical about the Hindu majority and tried to find safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu dominance. By 1930 it was generally believed that federation with

17. K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim india*, Heinemann, London 1963. p. 65.

18. S. M. Ikram, *op. cit.* p. 240.

19. *ibid.* p. 241.

some safeguards was the answer to the Muslim search for security. Actually everything was amorphous at that time. It was in this uncertainty that Iqbal showed a way which eventually led to the social and economic emancipation of the Muslims of South Asia from majority exploitation. It was the climax of Iqbal's political career. He gave the direction from the Muslim League platform. At the annual session of All India Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad in his presidential address he said : "I would like to see the Punjab North-west Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan, amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-west India."<sup>20</sup>

The above address gave a new turn to India's Muslim politics. For many it had remote possibility of success. He again repeated the fears of Muslim minority at the hands of Hindu majority during the Presidential address at the meeting of Muslim Conference in 1932. The minorities, feeling themselves as distinct cultural units and fearing that their very existence is at stake, demand safeguards which the majority community, for obvious reasons, refuses to concede. The majority community pretends to believe in a nationalism, theoretically correct, if we start from Western premises, belied by facts, if we look to India. Thus the real parties to the present struggle in India are not England and

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20. *ibid.* p. 181.

India, but the majority community and the minorities of India which can ill afford to accept the principle of Western democracy until it is properly modified to suit the actual conditions of life in India.<sup>21</sup>

The All India Muslim Conference lasted from 1928 to 1935. During this period the Muslim leadership was divided due to controversial Nehru Report. It was in this critical period that the conference provided a common political platform for muslim groups of varying opinions. Iqbal also use the platform to reiterate the theme of Allahabad. There was a continuity of thought in the mind of Iqbal about the creation of a Muslim<sup>24</sup> State. About this he again refferred in June 1937 in a letter to the Quaid : "A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are." There is such continuity of thought in Iqbal's outlook that the allegation made by Edward Thompson in 1940 that Iqbal had supported the Pakistan plan only because he was President of the Muslim League is baseless. Iqbal was never President of the League after 1930. He died two years earlier before the Lahore Resolution was passed and before Thompson made this

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21. K. K. Aziz, *The All India Muslim Conference*, National Publishing House, Karachi, 1972, p. 95.

22. Syed Abdul Wahid, *op. cit.* pp. 534-535.



charge.<sup>21</sup> The political philosophy of Iqbal about muslim state in south Asia was correctly mentioned in these words. "The national self or the collective ego is born in the hearts of individuals. From individuals it grows and expends until it grips a whole people, and then it becomes national consciousness. Among us it took its birth in the soul of Iqbal. That is why I have called him the Father of Pakistan."<sup>22</sup>

Iqbal firmly believed that Muslim state was the only solution to overcome the domineering attitude of the Hindu majority against the Muslim minority. He was really alarmed by the orthodox movements started by Swami Shirdhanand for connecting Muslims to Hinduism and Hindu Sangathan (Hindu Consolidation) by Pandit M. M. Malaviya.

To counter such movements he wished Muslims to be united with only one political organisation all over the country. In no way he wanted to be associated with the Hindu dominated congress. About this he showed his political owner at the time of publication of the Nehru Report in 1928. The report rejected separate electorate as detrimental to the development of national spirit among the Indians.

There arose political difference between Jinnah and Iqbal at that juncture. Though Jinnah initially wanted to accept it with minor adjustments advantageous to Muslims. But later on, he was disappointed

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23. K. K. Aziz— *Britain and Muslim India*, *op. cit.* p. 143.

24. Durrani, *op. cit.* p. 157.

with the callous attitude of the Hindu leaders and in reaction to the acceptance of the Nehru Report by the congress he formulated his famous fourteen points which also included "separate electorate".

Iqbal on the other hand did not went to compromise on the issue of separate electorates because he did not trust the Hindu leadership. Hence he rejected the Nehru Report outright. He also decided to co-operate with the Simon Commission. Here again Jinnah had a different approach and boycott the commission. Iqbal believed that the boycotted would lead to disastrous consequences for the Muslims, for one of the avowed objects of the commission was to safeguard the rights of the minorities and in the event of non-cooperation such rights could not be safeguarded.<sup>25</sup> Thus there arose temporary difference between the two great muslim leaders. However, the difference, was only of approach, the goal was the same the welfare of the muslim nation.

Politically, Iqbal was open minded which is shown by letters written by him to Jinnah during May 1936 to Nov. 1937. Iqbal rightly realised that among the Muslim leaders at that time Jinnah was the only suitable political leader : "I know you are a husy man, but I do hope you won't mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India to-day to whom the community has a right to look for safe guidance through the storm which

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25. Masud-ul-Hasan, *op. cit.* p. 214.

is coming to North-West India and perhaps to the whole of India.”<sup>26</sup>

On April 21, 1938 Iqbal died. Two years later Pakistan Resolution was passed. In the course of his historic speech supporting the Pakistan resolution the Quaid forcefully advocated the two nation theory of Iqbal. The wording of the Resolution itself echoed the language of Iqbal's speech at Allahabad in 1930. The Muslim League now wholly embraced Iqbal's programme of mass contact and and became genuinely a party of the people about which he had already hinted : “I suggested that the Indian Muslims should have only one political organisation with provincial and district branches all over the country.”<sup>26</sup> The Muslim League increased its popularity day by day under the dynamic leader of the Quaid-i-Azam and finally in 1947 Iqbal's political sagacity paid dividends in the form of a Muslim State in South Asia.

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26. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, Lahore, 1960, p. 25.

27. Aziz, The All India Muslim Conference, *op. cit.* p. 98.

**THE TREATY AND CONFLICT :**  
**The Study of Soviet Asian Bilateral Treaties**  
**and Their Impact on Regional Stability**

*Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary*

In the period following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Leadership felt the need to counteract the adverse attention that it had brought on itself and at the same time sensed an opportunity to gain influence in Asia. The British governments' announcement in 1968 to withdraw from east of Suez, the evidence drawn from President Johnsons' speech of March 31, 1968 that the United States would withdraw from Indo-China sooner or later, provided the background against which Brezhnev addressed an important meeting of Communist parties on June 7, 1969. In his address he proposed the need for system of collective security in Asia.

Although the system of collective security was designed to put an end to "closed" military alignments based on opposition of some countries to the others, but since its inception it has contributed to inter-state conflicts in the region.

The "treaty" is treated as an independent variable in this study. The researcher is conscious of the fact that empirically there is no observable phenomenon that one can accumulate and label as a

"cause" of conflict. Causation is a logical or analytical concept, to be inferred cautiously at best. Furthermore, in assessing various antecedents of international conflict one must be aware that there are likely to be multiple determining conditions for explaining dependent variable.

The "conflict" is treated here as dependent variable. Conflict is defined as a deviant behaviour of an international actor where active and overt means are employed to neutralize, injure or eliminate its rival.

The 'treaty', independent variable of the study, is not exclusively the product of either one nation-state's domestic consideration, or its projected action (foreign policy), or international environments (international system), but is brought into existence with the conjunction of all. It can get its explanatory value only when all those factors are considered which brought it into existence.<sup>1</sup>

The studies of Singer and Small<sup>2</sup> (1966), Choucri and North (1969)<sup>3</sup>, and Russett (1963)<sup>4</sup> are supportive to the proposition. Singer and Small find that formal alliance commitments increase a

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1. Rosenau, James N., "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R. Barry Farrel, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, North-Western University, Press, 1966, pp. 27-92.
  2. J. D. Singer, and M. Small, "Formal Alliance 1815-1939, : a quantitative description", *op. cit. Journal of Peace Research* 3 : 132 (1966).
  3. North R. C. and N. Choucri, "Background Condition to the Outbreak of the First World War," *Peace Research Society Papers* 9 : 125-137 (1968).
  4. Russett, B. M. 'The Calculus of Deterrence'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7 : 97-109 (1963).

nation's propensity to support an ally militarily ; also, nations in defense pacts are more likely to come to the defense of their allies than are nations with commitments to remain neutral or merely consult. Choucri and North conclude that the most pronounced paths to violence are from alliance commitments.

Russett studies a special situation of coming to the aid of an allied nation. The focus of his analysis is seventeen cases from 1935 to 1961 in which a defending power had expressed some kind of commitment to protect a threatened "pawn" from impending attack. He finds that ties in the form of military cooperation, political interdependence, and economic interdependence led to successful deterrence of the threatening nation.

These findings provide a foundation to proceed to give further support to the independent variable (treaty) to explain the dependent variable conflict) resulting in a particular region.

## II

The year 1971 brought some development that encouraged the Soviet Union to bring back the collective security proposal. It re-emerged as a countervailing action to the prospective Sino-American relationship which the Soviet Union thought were directed against itself. Another stimulus in the same direction was provided by the events of 1971 in South Asia. In the Soviet eyes the possibly emerging Sino-American combination could be balanced, at least in South Asia, by a Soviet-Indian

combination. On the other hand India was found wanting a reliable and supportive ally to counter-balance the U.S. China-Pakistan combination as well as to assure its own security in case she intervenes militarily to support separatist movement in Pakistan. This collusion of interest of both powers culminated in signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation on August 9, 1971. There is little doubt that this commitment, which was reportedly reinforced by the specific Soviet threats against China, played a major role in keeping Peking out of the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

So far as the West Asia was concerned the foundations had already been laid in the form of treaties of friendship and cooperation with Iraq and Egypt which various Soviet commentators suggested could be constructed as the first stage of emerging security design. Essentially these treaties were also dictated by the need to consolidate the Soviet position in the crucial regions in the face of challenges by Moscovs' rival—American Middle Eastern initiatives.

In as much as the collective security initiative was originally meant to bring about normalization of relations between Asian states themselves, it could be interpreted as a means of facilitating the Soviet policy of broad-basing its Asian contacts and seeking to develop a diverse range of relationship within that continent. But as events unfolded during the early 1970s' it became increasingly apparent that attainment of these two objectives suffers from internal inconsistency. On the one

hand, in the context of great power rivalry, the Soviet Union found itself drawn into the policy of bilateralism. Whereas the Soviet media had indicated that the collective security in Asia might be constructed by both bilateral efforts, the former created serious difficulties for the later course. How was the Soviet Union to get any cooperative Asian enterprise of the ground when the first fruit of its policy of bilateralism was the alienation of a significant section of regional states, most notably Iran as a product of Iraqi treaty and Pakistan as a consequence of the Indian one ?

As the United States started pursuing vigorously the conciliation with China after the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet Union started mending its fences again for obvious reasons. First, the America-China combination was clearly taken as a threat to the Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, and second, which can be considered as a psychological factor, the Western commentators had endeavoured to create an impression that Soviets' collective security design in Asia, after an initial start, has totally failed. To overcome these adverse developments, and to give a signal to the United States not to involve itself heavily in placating the P.R.C., a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded with Vietnam on November 4, 1978 to formalize already existing strong relationship between the two countries. It is cautiously presumed that the treaty proved to be catalyst in precipitating a conflict between the Vietnam and Cam-



bodia and resulted in complete occupation of the later and the installation of pro-Vietnam-USSR regime.

The latest entry into the Soviet Unions' Asian bilateral treaty network is that of Afghanistan. It is the second treaty-partner, first being Mongolia, who has common borders with the Soviet Union. Its strategic importance can be judged from the fact that the Soviet Union, by precipitating a regional conflict by encouraging territorial and ethnic rivalries, can fulfil her long-desired goal of having an access to the warm waters of the Indian ocean and thereby controlling the oil nerve of the Persian Gulf.

The possibility of recurring conflict in this region becomes more obvious when one looks at the clause of the treaty. The treaty gives the Soviet Union far greater leeway for intervention than similar friendship treaties with other Asian countries. For instance, India pledges to consult Moscow in the event of an attack on either party, but this treaty commits Afghanistan to much more. Art. 10 requires 'consultation' on all "all major international issues", a language that could provide a basis for future Soviet support for Afghanistan on any issue against its neighbours, thereby precipitating another conflict.

Since the year 1971 to the end of the year 1978 the Soviet Union has concluded bilateral friendship treaties with Egypt, Iraq, India, Somolia, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Each of these

states have a long history of either ethnic, ideological or territorial disputes with their neighbour states. In some of these cases the disputes have resulted in open conflicts between the parties even prior to the establishment of bilateral treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. The purpose with which the Soviet Union initiated these bilateral treaties with the respective nations was to normalize the regional inter-state relationship in order to create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation in the respective regions. On the contrary, the post-treaty period, in each case, is marked by increased tension, and, in most cases, by an open conflict between the Soviet treaty partners and their neighbors.

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## ARMS CONTROL AND IMPEDIMENTS IN ITS EFFECTIVENESS

*Uzma Burki*<sup>1</sup>

Arms control is used by some writers as a generic term to include any kind of co-operation with respect to armaments which would curtail the arms race, reduce the possibility of war, or limit its scope and violence. It includes unilateral decisions of states informed understanding among them and formally negotiated and institutionalized agreements. The stress is on reducing the incentives rather than the capacity for war. This does not mean that it might not require substantial arms reduction, on the other hand it might mean their increase, at least in certain categories.

Arms control is based on the assumption that in an atmosphere of hostility prevalent amongst nations, where military force poses as a factor for the foreseeable future there have been innumerable instances where a nation's own armaments are often the cause of threat to its security than some foreign Nation. This is because weapons can become so destructive and costly that the risk of using or possessing them can exceed their utility. It is at this stage that the need for arms control is felt

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1. MS. Uzma Burki is a student of M. A. Final in the Department and doing research on "Role of strategic perspectives on American Foreign Policy towards Pakistan 1979-83; Afghanistan Crises", for her thesis.

**strongly by the nations to strengthen their economy and increase their security.**

Modern arms are fearsome because of their number and power. They pose three kinds of dangers to the international community, Firstly there is the enormous economic burden—financial and more important in terms of resources squandered. Secondly the accumulation of sophisticated weapons either by a single nation or many may endanger the world security. Finally if a nuclear war ever erupts it would prove to be the most destructive that mankind has ever known.

Arms control is more comprehensive and less ambitious than disarmament since it does not aim at total abolition of weapons but hopes to control their use and production. Therefore, the goals of arms control are more modest. It also initiates a policy of internal and external control on the levels of arms and their nature and deployment. The advocates of arms control have a pragmatic approach in the manner in which they deal with areas of partial agreement and agreement leading to both national and international security.

**They recognize three things ;**

- 1. No nation will restrain itself unless guaranteed that its basic interests will be preserved.**
- 2. In order to see the general welfare of the international community arms control must transcend self interest, or it will be counter productive.**

3. The reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments is a major objective of arms control policy but "General and complete disarmament" is not practical because every state seeks to preserve its own national interest.

### **Disarmament and Arms Control.**

Disarmament and arms control are thought to be synonymous. Since the time immemorial or when the nations emerged, physical violence has always been present and nations have been fully armed to counter the threats from other nations. Disarmament may imply that the nation should not have any types of weapons which hurt their potentialities. Thus, disarmament imposes a ban on both conventional and non-conventional weapons but arms control focuses primarily on fixing certain limits on nuclear arms by one particular agreement between two states. Disarmament is also taken to be a single nation action in order to save a nation from annihilation by another. All the nations can be participant of disarmament talks. But arms control is a product of international agreements. It is essential in case of arms control for the two Super powers to arrive at a mutual agreement if the control of arms is to be achieved.

The quest for arms control began with the advancement of nuclear technology with the acceptance of nuclear weapons as hazardous to peace and security of the world with this view came the theory of deterrence. Deterrence theory considered lite-

rally, is an explanation of the phenomena in which conflict is maintained within limitations and it does not go out or spread as an international conflict. Deterrence is an instrument of keeping the nations out of conflict in which one nation's security is bracketed with its adversary's security. In this situation both the countries are deterred from each other or by each other and therefore, do not initiate the conflict.

Deterrence in terms of nuclear weapons had led to second stage *i.e.* the non-proliferation stage. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is an essential arms control development. The future of this treaty is not certain due to the following threats.

India's 1974 nuclear explosion, which was not strongly condemned by either Moscow or Washington.

The demand for nuclear energy will tremendously increase the prospect for illicit plutonium diversion.

The persistent although usually wrong view that nuclear weapons augment security.

Due to the possible use of such weapons by terrorists some nations are doubtful about its success.

But the main problem as presented by many delegates to the Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 1975, is that the NPT freeze is an unjust imbalance between nuclear "haves and have nots".

## SALT TALKS

The third stage starts with the strategic arms limitation talks or the SALT stage. In these talks United States of America and Soviet Union are involved and they talk about tactical or strategic weapons, which have the capacity of carrying war heads.

SALT I ABM treaty limits development of anti-ballistic Missile Systems to two sites in each country. SALT I interim offensive Arms Agreement provides for 5 years freeze on aggregate number of fixed land based ICBM'S and SLBM'S on each. SALT II ABM treaty limits development of anti-ballistic missile system to one site in each country. SALT II Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Prohibits under ground tests of nuclear weapons with explosive yields greater than 150 kilo tons. SALT II interim offensive-arms agreement commits both parties to negotiate extension of SALT I interim offensive—arms agreement through 1985.

The difficulty encountered in obtaining the arms control agreement is illustrated by the problems that the SALT II agreement faced. At the time of U.S. presidential elections of November 1980 the Senate had not considered the treaty. And when Republicans formed the government the hindrances to formal ratification of this treaty remained formidable. This was because as a nominee for presidential elections Ronald Reagan projected strong opposition towards the terms of SALT II although the absence of ratification of this treaty did not imply that both U.S. and U.S.S.R. would be reluctant to subscribe to its basic terms.



The SALT agreements which were widely believed to be the avenues towards the control of expensive Soviet-Americans arms race were also presented to the people of these two states as major steps for the implementation of arms control. Yet some critics have questioned whether they accomplished either task. It is interesting to note that during the first five years of SALT-I agreement (1972-1977) the total expenditure on arms spent by the two super powers exceed \$ 1 trillion this is a rate of spending greater than that of the quarter century between the end of world war II and the signing of Salt-I when total military spending was \$ 2.3 trillion. This amounts to 9 per cent of GNP of U.S.A. produced since the end of the war, and about a quarter of that of U.S.S.R. and if this pace continues the aggregate defense costs of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. would exceed \$ 5 trillion.

The list of achievements derived so far from arms control is impressive, indicating the possibility of limitations on the number and the destructive capability of weapons. But these achievements not only camouflage the failures but also the lack of meaningful controls of armaments in other areas. These achievements may even lead to rather than eradicate the dangers that threaten the world by use of contemporary weapons. Critics are of the view that arms control agreements may just provide us with a false sense of security by leading us to a false notion that arms race is being successfully controlled where as the reality is just the opposite.

## IMPEDIMENTS TO ARMS CONTROL

Why have arms control been so ineffective, and why have agreements to control the size and dispersion of weapons been so modest? Since most nations are reluctant to engage in arms limitations in an atmosphere where trust of their adversaries is lacking and trust is unlikely to be cultivated as long as those adversaries remained armed with threatening weapons. Hence nations find themselves caught in a vicious circle of fear and insecurity, others arms provoke fear, fear stimulates the desire to arm for defense, armament in turn encourages the enemy to increase its arms, and so it goes in a never-ending spiral. The chain is difficult to break, and efforts to do so have failed whenever the underlying fear has persisted.

Secondly when a fearful nation abides by the axiom that they should never negotiate out of fear, and that they should never negotiate from a position of weakness, then they are left with no option but to refuse to negotiate. Arms bargaining is a game of give and take, but all participants typically want to take much and give little because security is dear and fear is strong.

Thirdly, there is the problem of ratio among the parties to a disarmament treaty, is that of agreeing to changes that leave no party relatively worse off than before the agreement and ideally better off hence the terms balanced or proportionate reductions. As long as states rely on military force to obtain their objectives, since power is a relation-

ship than a thing each party to disarmament negotiations must of necessity give major attention to, the effect of any change on its relative power position. There is always the suspicion, usually quite justified that a state is trying to strengthen itself and weaken its opponents.


Fourthly, equally troublesome is the difficulty of separating the control of weapons from other issues. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Soviet—American dialogue, where the evolution of arms talks have been inextricably tied to the vicissitudes of the Soviet American competition in other areas.

And lastly the belief that armament reduction would enhance the prospects of peace is a theory for the control of violence that has not as yet been meaningfully implemented. Thus, because we have no actual contemporary experience of politics among nations in a disarmed world, we have no way of knowing whether a dis-armed world would indeed be a peaceful world. A disarmed world might actually have more political troubles, even if it would have fewer military expressions of them.

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**BOOK REVIEW :**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**Theory and Practice**

*By*

*Hameed A.K. Rai, Published by Aziz Publishers,  
Lahore, price Rs. 120.00 pages 848.*

Professor Hameed Ali Khan Rai is an expert on international affairs. His major interests are Pakistan's Foreign policy, Politics of Developing Nations and Comparative Politics and International Relations. He is author of a number of books most famous of which are : Pakistan ; a Study in Political System ; Political Development in India and Pakistan ; Pakistan in the United Nations ; Select Modern Governments and International Relations etc.

The book under review covers both the theory of International Relations as well as the Current issues. It is primarily meant for the students of Political Science and International relations but one hopes that it will also be useful for a general reader as well.

The author is of the view that the concept of struggle for power among nations and the idea that international relations is really a manifestation of a global struggle between social causes both relate to human conflict. The theory of conflict should

encompass these as well as other conflict interpretations. Indeed, the anticipated integrating effect on theory and research in international relations was main motive in advancing general conflict in the 1960's. It is, however, important to add that conflict theory came to coexist with integration theory and game theory, both of which approach some conflict phenomena from different conceptual angles.

By the 1970's only the realist theory of power politics survived as a relatively simple, and persuasive, and comprehensive of international politics in a conceptual environment that otherwise had become pluralistic and complex to the extent that "theory" could no longer be outlined quickly or conveniently in a class room or before a large audience.

The author opines that power and influence in the diffuse system are distributed widely among the interacting units. There is an ill-defined hierarchy of status among states, established according to various criteria of stratification, but a comparatively large number of political units are of roughly equal size and military capability. None permanently dominates the others, although there may be some leaders of regional alliances. Diplomatic and military coalitions disintegrate rapidly once mutual objectives have been achieved. They do not form into stable blocs. These coalitions are unstable because the interest underlying them tends to shift quickly, members are not economically or ideologically dependent upon each other, and there are no

ideological issues dividing the alliances. Communication and interaction among the units is wide spread, although geographic proximity and logistic factors undoubtedly make some units more involved than others in the major issue areas.

Elaborating the concept of political power, Professor Rai holds that the concept of political power is one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science. The value of any concept used in political science is determined by its ability to explain a maximum of the phenomena that are conventionally considered to belong to a certain sphere of political activity.

Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exerts over the latter's mind. That influence derives from three sources ; the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men or institutions. It may be exerted through orders, threats, persuasion, the authority or charisma of a man or of an office or a combination of any of these.

The author then discusses the functions and processes of diplomacy at two separate levels. The higher level concerns the activities of national leaders and statesmen and involves foreign policy making. The lower level concerns the activities of professional diplomats and involves foreign policy

implementation through negotiations. Policy making and negotiations are in most instances interdependent processes.

The major functions of diplomacy are to establish and maintain communications and to negotiate and bargain for tolerable agreements and other arrangements between sovereign centres of decision-making in the international system.

Foreign policy goals and actions are largely a response to domestic and external conditions, but no two people perceive the environment in exactly the same way. Sometime knowledge is faulty or sparse because of lack of information or experience; more important, characterizations of the environment and responses to changing events are heavily influenced by established attitudes, values, beliefs, doctrines, and analogies. It is these that give shape and meaning to our perception of reality, resulting in images upon which our actions are based. But these actions can only lead to successful achievement of objectives if the images from which they derive are more or less accurate reflections of reality. Foreign policy decisions or goals or actions thus result from combining values and attitudes with perceptions provide by various sources of information.

In order to understand the role of ideology in international affairs, it is important to distinguish between ideologies and "theories" of international relations. Ideology is more or less coherent and consistent sum total of ideas and views on life and



the world that guides the attitudes of actual or would be power holders ; leaders of political units, such as nation-states or city states, or a major organization or movements such as churches or political parties. Theory, on the other hand, refers to the more or less systematic entirety of concepts and ideas about international relations held and developed by individuals (such as political philosophers).

The impact of ideology on world affairs is paramount. Especially in recent times, there are few issues not carried on in an ideological framework.

Study of ideology enables one to understand other people's "blinkers" and eventually, perhaps, one's own. This way the West might come to understand Communist policy as based, in part at least, on fears rather than inherent aggressiveness ; and Communist countries might better understand the preoccupation of the West, particularly in the light of the gradual "erosion" of ideology that some observers see in the Communist world. A resulting "diedologization" of foreign policies might dampen their emotional, crusading character, reducing tensions to conflicts over interest, where compromise is easier to achieve than in ideological struggle. The realization of the danger in which nuclear weapons have placed all mankind might contribute to "diedeologization" (as apparently it has done in recent Soviet policy thereby furnishing one perspective of reality common to all. With

dusk of ideology we might eventually witness the dawn of a true theory and practice of peace).

As regards regionalism, the author is of the view that it has grown enormously and has increased in importance. It has not so far reached the point where a universal organisation becomes superfluous. There is no possibility of the opposed groups coming to an understanding in such an organization. Moreover, regional organizations can not satisfactorily cope with all the problems which may arise in the future. The members of the United Nations can guarantee them security and consequently they have to rely more and more on the regional organizations for their safety. However, they do not deny the fact that the United Nations has also a role to play in the world.

In the end, the author highlights Pakistan's future objectives. Here are his views on the subject.

After the fall of East Pakistan in December 1971 and the emergence of "Bangladesh" as a new state on the world map, Pakistan has to recast and reformulate her foreign policy objectives in view of the changed circumstances. The war of 1971 with India has given a great lesson to the policy-maker in Pakistan. It is now an admitted fact that the Great Powers do not help a small ally, unless their own interest is at stake. Therefore Pakistan, in future, should not depend upon any Great Power, but instead make her own arrangements for the defence of the country. In this connection the following facts should guide the policy-makers.

- (1) Pakistan is now a Middle Eastern Power. Its future lies with the countries of the Middle East. Pakistan, therefore, should concentrate in developing trade relations with the Middle Eastern countries.
- (2) Pakistan being an Ideological state should make efforts for the unity of the Muslim countries, especially the Arabs. This, of course, would meet a lot of opposition from the Soviet Union and the United States. The threat to the Soviet Union from such a move is that a large number of Muslims in Central Asia would also aspire to become independent and join the Muslim bloc.

The United States of America and other Christian States of Europe do not want that the Islamic world should unite because they have bitter memories of Crusade and the Turkish rule.

Thus to cope with the prevailing situation and to promote her interest in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf States, Pakistan should build a most modern and powerful Navy, which should control the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan should continue to make efforts for Islamic unity and develop good relations with the Arabs and African Muslims, because, in their first test have proved as an asset on the question of Bangladesh, in the United Nations.

The last chapter deals with certain current topics. Here the author discusses Civil war in

Spain (1936-39) ; The Hungarian Revolt (1956), and Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1968). From amongst recent topics he discusses : Egypt and Israel vis-a-vis Camp David Accord (1978) ; The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding Horn of Africa ; Uganda ; Diego Garcia : Asean ; The Iran-Iraq War ; Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan etc.

In sum, the book under review serves as a useful guide to those who are interested in knowing about the fundamental issues of international relations as well as their application to our immediate environments.

COL. GHULAM SARWAR,  
*National Defence College,  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan.*