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- **Bureaucratic Accommodation to Change :**
A case study of Pakistan.
- **The Divisive Elections.**
- **U.S. Aid and Africa :** *An Attitudinal Analysis.*
- **Russian Intervention in Afghanistan :**
The Legal Perspective.
- **Book Reviews.**

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
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BUREAUCRATIC ACCOMMODATION TO CHANGE : A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

*Dr. Mustafa Chowdhury**

Resistance to change is not only a property of bureaucracies but can be found to some extent in all organizations.¹ All organizations strive to preserve their structures, and those who work in them try to cling to 'accustomed' values and institutions for as long as they can. As Robert Lapierre observes :

Bureaucracy, like other forms of organization, discourages the emergence of changes from within and resists the impact of changes from without (it) does much to discourage the emergence of innovative individuals, and even more to retard the adoption of whatever innovations do appear. ...The inherent tendency (is) for any mature bureaucratic organization to resist change from without, *i.e.* to be reluctant

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1. See Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (Alfred A. Knopf : New York, 1961) ; see also V. A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 10, 1965 ; V. A. Thompson, "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 10, 1955 ; and Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (N. Y. : The Free Press, 1962).

to adapt itself to changed external conditions or to adopt innovations that are available to it.²

The widely-held belief that bureaucracies necessarily resist change is based on the assumption that since such organizations are concerned with established procedures and continuity, any alteration in these routines tends to be considered a unwarranted disturbance. This identification with conventions leads those who so identify to sanctify procedure and therefore to resist change in them. Michael Crozier contends that a bureaucratic system resists change "as long as it can ; it moves only when crises develops."³ According to him, crises is a major basis of change in the bureaucratic organization.

The essential rhythm prevalent in bureaucracy is, therefore, an alteration of long periods of stability with very short periods of crises and change. Most analysis of the bureaucratic phenomenon refer only to periods of routine—but this is a partial image. Crisis is a distinctive and necessary element of the bureaucratic system. During crisis individual initiative prevails and people eventually come to depend on some strategic individuals arbitrary whim.

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2. R. T. Lapiere, *Social Change* (N. Y. : McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 329, 409-411 ; See also M. P. Smith, "Barriers to Organizational Democracy", *Administration and Society*, Vol. 8, pp. 275-375 ; Robert Presthus, *The Organisational Society* (N. Y. : St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 253 ; A. Etzioni, *The Active Society* (N. Y. : Free Press, 1918) ; M. Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (University of Chicago Press, 1964).
 3. Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

Forgotten, strained dependence relationships re-appear. Personal authority supersedes rules.⁴

M. H. Halperin, agrees, pointing out that "the bureaucratic system is basically inert ; it moves only when pushed hard and persistently."⁵ Robert Merton makes a similar claim :

Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means becomes transformed into an end-in-itself ; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby "an instrumental value becomes a terminal value." Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life organization of the bureaucrat. This emphasis, resulting from the displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily. Formalism, even ritualism ensues with an unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formalized procedures.... Thus, the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances.⁶

Implicit in all these arguments is the idea that bureaucratic identification with existing procedures prevents affective operations and leads to rigidity.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

5. M. H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D. C., 1974), p. 99.

6. R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 11, : Free Press, 1957), pp. 199-200 ; see also J. M. Piffner and Robert Presthus, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

F. W. Riggs argues that in political systems where representative institutions are weak, administrative reforms cannot be carried out and bureaucracy becomes ineffective and irresponsible.⁷ More specifically, administrative reforms, according to Riggs, cannot be achieved without political reform where the principles of 'capacity' and 'equality' can be realized. In other words, a roughly equal balance of the two is essential to the success of administrative reforms.

Riggs has a contextual approach to administrative reform in the sense that he takes "a comprehensive view of government as a system of interdependent elements."⁸ This approach is based on his conviction that the effectiveness of Government hinges on "its ability to command the continuing support and loyalty of its population."⁹ Riggs finds a positive correlation between non-bureaucratic participation in policy-making and administrative effectiveness. He puts it this way :

If groups outside a bureaucracy exercise major influence in controlling the actions of the bureaucrats, the decisions of the bureaucrats must be largely concerned with the implementation of terms set by the controlling groups, *i.e.*, with administrative functions. But if there are no such control groups...then the officials

7. F. W. Riggs. "Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness", in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (ed), *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 561-608.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 567.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 573.

cannot devote themselves primarily to implementing policies. ... If external groups control a bureaucracy...then (the bureaucracy) can produce services and impose regulations with relative efficiency and effectiveness.¹⁰

Regarding Pakistan Albert Gorvine has observed that administrative reform cannot be successful if it is not associated with major social, political, or economic reform which in effect "cracks the power structure" of the bureaucracy.¹¹ He argues that since administrators see administrative reforms either as a means of enhancing their power or as neutral with respect to their roles, reforms must be introduced from *outside* the administration in the form of 'ancillary' measures to major social, political, or economic reforms.

The purpose of this paper is to test the thesis of those who hold that bureaucratic organizations necessarily resist change,¹² and to determine the validity of Riggs' proposition that administrative reforms cannot be carried out in a bureaucratic polity and that bureaucracy cannot be effective in a polity dominated by bureaucracy. Our analysis will also test the validity of Gorvine's observation

10. F.W. Riggs, "Relearning an old Lesson : The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (March, 1965), p. 76.

11. Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reform : Function of Political and Economic Change," in Guthrie S. Birkhead (ed.), *Administrative Problems in Pakistan* (Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 185 211.

12 See, for example, F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickkson, *Management and the Worker* (Combrige, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1939).

cited above, namely, that administrative reforms, to be successful, must be preceded by social, political, or economic reform.

Since 1947 various attempts have been made to reorganize the structure of government and to improve administrative procedures in Pakistan. After assuming office in 1958, President Ayub "made a conscious and well publicized effort to modernize the social, economic and political life of the country".¹³ Thirty-three commissions were set up to study various issues like land redistribution, and constitutional reforms, educational reforms, legal provisions, and administrative reorganization. In what follows we confine our discussion to certain reforms which are of direct relevance to administration. In 1958, the government set up an Administrative Reorganization Committee consisting of the following career civil servants :

G. Ahmed, H.Q.A., Chairman Planning Commission

Members

A. R. Khan, CSP	Secretary, Establishment Division
H. A. Majid, CSP	Secretary, Ministry of Finance
N. A. Faruqi, CSP	Secretary, Ministry of Industries
M. Khurshid, CSP	Secretary, Ministry of Defence

13. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Pakistan, The consolidation of a Nation* (N. Y. : Columbia University Press), p. 208.

Hamid Ali, CSP	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
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M. Ayub, SPK, CSP	Director, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
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Secretary

S. S. Haider,	Joint Secretary, Efficiency and O. M. Wing, Establishment Division, President's Secretariat.
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Source : *Administrative Reorganization Committee Report, 1961*

The Committee had the following terms of reference :

To review the organizational structure, functions and procedures of the Ministries, Departments and Subordinate Offices of the Government of Pakistan, and to recommend improvement for efficiency and expeditious disposal of business in consonance with requirements of economy.

To carry out a survey of the staff position of the central government with a view to strengthening, retrenching or re-allocating the staff wherever necessary.

To recommend measures for the establishment of close liaison between the Central and Provincial Government administrators, particularly in the field of development work.

To examine and co-ordinate the recommendations of the Committee to be set up by the Provincial Governments with a view to ensuring uniform approach to the problem of organisation of the Government Offices.¹⁴

The Committee studied the administrative management of Pakistan for about three years and submitted its report in 1961. With a view to achieving efficiency, economy, and speedy disposal of business, the Committee recommended certain structural and procedural changes in the administrative system of Pakistan.

Perhaps the most important reform was the introduction of a Section Officer System in the Secretariat, which eliminated several layers of subordinate staff and put a single officer in their place. Fundamental changes were also introduced into the system of financial control, budgeting and accounting. Administrative Ministries were given substantial power, and 'the dilatory system of multiple clearances prescribed for incurring expenditure against appropriate funds was abolished.'¹⁵ Furthermore, a system of financial advice was erected which enabled other Ministries to have a larger voice in financial planning.

The scope of the Finance and Commerce Pool (developed in prepartition India) was substantially expanded through the creation of an Economic Pool intended to include officers selected from outside

14. *Pakistan 1958-59* (Karachi, 1959), p. 11.

15. Government of Pakistan, *The Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee* (Karachi, 1961), p. IV.

the CSP to serve the Ministry of Industries. In effect, this increased the participation of officials from other specialized services. The responsibility of officers of the Foreign Service of Pkaistan were increased as a result of a recommendation that they would assume the commercial and public relations functions performed by representative of the Ministries of commerce and information.¹⁶

The objectives of these reforms were many. The Section Officers Scheme was introduced to speed up the flow of files through the secretariat. Another objective was to separate the policy function from the executive function. Policy functions would be performed by the ministries and executive functions by the departments and subordinate offices. The Secretary in charge of a ministry was to have substantial administrative and financial power. The heads of departments would also enjoy administrative and financial powers within the sphere of their responsibility.

The economic pool mentioned earlier attempted to provide opportunities to officers from the finance and custom services to move out of their specialized positions. As a ministerial document stated: The specialized and increasingly complex character of the work of these Ministries and officers subordinate to them makes it necessary that an expert cadre should be built up to ensure a regular supply to these ministries, of officers, who, apart from having general administrative qualifications, should

16. *Ibid*, p. iv.

have special knowledge and experience of the working of the economic policies of the Government.”¹⁷

This Pool consisted of three categories of class I officers : Class ‘A’ posts, Class ‘B’ posts, and Class ‘C’ posts,. There were twenty posts in the class ‘A’ category, thirty-five posts in each of classes ‘B’ and ‘C’. The posts in the class ‘A’ category were reserved for secretaries, joint secretaries, and other officers of equivalent rank. Sixty per cent of the posts were reserved for the members of the CSP and forty per cent for members of the Central Superior Services.

The critical point to be emphasized here is that all recommendations of the Administrative Reorganization Committee were implemented without any resistance from CSP officers. My interviews with CSP officers revealed that they endorsed the recommendations of this committee because these recommendations did not affect their interests. Indeed, the power of CSP officers was increased since a certain percentage of posts in the Economic Pool were reserved for them.

Although they are only illustrative, the following quotes suggest the generally positive response of CSP officers. One civil servant, now serving in the Ministry of Finance in Bangladesh, maintained that:

The changes suggested by the Administrative Reorganization Committee further increased

17. Ministry of Interior (Establishment Division) Resolution, *Constitution of the Economic Pool* (Karachi, September 16, 1959).

the power of the CSP. For example, one of the objectives of the reform was to separate the policy function from the executive function, i.e., policy functions would be performed by the ministries in which most of the top posts were held by the members of the civil service of Pakistan, and executive functions by the departments and subordinate offices. The civil servant's role in policy making increased substantially as a result of such a clear demarcation of functions.¹⁸

Another, now officer working in the Ministry of Education in Bangladesh, claimed that "the Economic Pool created as a result of the recommendations of the committee did not stand in the way of the CSP's upward nobility since Class 'A' posts were reserved (sixty per cent) for members of the Civil service of Pakistan. It gave the CSP more access to finance posts."

That CSP's influence over financial matters increased substantially as a result of the committee's recommendations is evident from the fact that the creation of the Economic Pool was opposed by non-CSP officials like the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who exercised enormous financial powers before the creation of the Economic Pool.¹⁹

Other reforms were also carried out. In 1959, a Provincial Administration Commission, again, made up entirely of senior civil servants, was set

18. The statement is made by a civil servant whom I interviewed

19. See Albert Gorvine, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

up. The Commission was asked to suggest reforms relating to the reorganisation of the boundaries of districts and divisions in both provinces (East and West Pakistan), as well as on other matters which would ensure efficiency in the provincial administration. The following lines of reform were suggested

The present independent and disconnected activities of Government in the field (in the divisions and districts) have led to a situation where there is urgent need of coordinating governmental activities at district/divisional level. This coordination should be secured through District/Divisional Councils of which the Deputy Commissioner/Commissioner will be ex-officio chairman as is contemplated under the Basic Democracies Order. To discharge the essential role of coordinator, the District Officer/Commissioner should become the captain of a combined operations team of district, divisional officers of various departments operating within their respective jurisdiction.²⁰

The Commission therefore sought to increase the power of division and district heads, to whom more power was to be delegated by the provincial government :

They (divisional and District Heads) should be declared as the heads of administration within their jurisdiction and this position should be made known unambiguously to all departments.

20. *Report of the Provincial Administration Commission, 1960*, p. 99.

They should have the authority to call for a report direct from any regional divisional or district level officers (as the case may be) having jurisdiction in their areas. The Commissioner will in addition have the power to call for the relevant files and papers.

It should be the responsibility of divisional/district departmental officers to consult the commissioner/District officer in all important matters affecting the welfare of the people.

The Commissioner should have the power to enquire the divisional or regional officer of any department having jurisdiction in his Division to enquire into the conduct of any of his subordinates and to report the result of the enquires to him (Commissioner).

The Commissioner/District Magistrate should exercise adequate control and supervision over the working of the Police Department. ...²¹

These recommendations clearly indicate that the powers of the Divisional/District heads, who usually were the members of the civil service of Pakistan, were substantially increased. Such delegation of power to the Divisional/District heads was also made with a view to enabling the administration to undertake development activities under the Basic Democracies System. Once again, all these recommendations were accepted by the government. Bureaucracy offered no

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

resistance to the changes suggested by the Commission ; rather they hailed the recommendations of the Commission since they increased their power and enhanced their status.

Additional reforms were also carried out. During the Ayub regime, an attempt was made to transform the bureaucracy from an agency of law and order into an instrument of socio-economic development and modernisation.

The regime made economic development and modernization its primary objective and sought to bring about a fundamental change in the bureaucracy's training and ethos.

In 1960, an Administrative Training Council was established to introduce an elaborate training programme for officers of the central services. The scheme submitted by the council envisaged systematic training programmes for officers of the various services.²² Various training institutions such as the Administrative Staff College, the National Institutes of Public Administration, Academies for Rural Development, the Civil Service Academy at Lahore, and the Secretariat Training Institute imparted training to officers of the various services.²³

One significant result of this training scheme was that it brought together for the first

22. *Report of the Administrative Training Council, 1960.*

23. For an analysis of the functions of the Administrative Staff College, the National Institutes of Public Administration, the Civil Services Academy, and the Academies for Rural Development, see Inayatullah (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan* (Peshawar, 1962).

time men from various services like the CSP, the Police, audit, and accounts, PCS (Provincial Civil Services), education, and agriculture. This produced a collegial sense among members of the services, something which permitted them to work together more closely in subsequent year. The programme was also successful because it imparted considerable information to officers of the various services. They could now acquire knowledge in fields like administration, economic development, and constitutional development.

For example, the courses offered by the NIPA (National Institute of Public Administration) included public administration, management process, management analysis, human relations, personnel administration, financial administration, social and economic development and its administrative requirements, structure and functions of government in Pakistan, and the administrator and the public interest. The courses offered by the Civil Service Academy included public administration, development economics, and Islamic Studies.²⁴

Once again, this training scheme, prepared by the Administrative Training Council, met no resistance from CSP officers because it increased the power of the Establishment Division and its secretary. Moreover, senior CSP officers were made heads of the National Institute of Public Administration, the Civil Service Academy, and the Administrative Staff College, Since no change was made

24. See M. A. Chaudhari, *The Civil Service in Pakistan* (Dacca ; NIPA, 1963),

in the organizational pattern for personnel administration, the Civil Service Academy and the Public Service Commission continued to be dominant by CSP officers.

Besides these reforms, bureaucracy also accommodated other salient changes. With the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit in 1955 (integrating four provinces into one), a vast administrative reorganization also took place. The task of eight secretaries serving respectively Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, and the North West Frontier Province were integrated into one. A number of services, provincial and state, were thereafter consolidated, and recruitment procedures were also changed.

Though the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit was essentially a political reform, it had a tremendous impact on the administrative management of the country.²⁵ Democracy accommodated the necessary changes brought about by the consolidation. It offered no resistance to these changes ; rather, it supported such reorganization since its power and status were enhanced by it. When asked to express their opinion about the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit instead of the four provinces which had existed up to 1955, all civil servants expressed their support for the proposed integrations. They further maintained that though this was a political reform, it had no adverse effect on their status and power ; rather such consolida-

25. Willcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-197.

tions extended the authority of the civil servants over the provinces.

The foregoing analysis has indicated clearly that the recommendations of Administrative Re-organisation Committee, Provincial Administration Commission, and Administrative Training Council were implemented without any resistance from the CSP officers. It strongly suggests how capable Pakistani bureaucracy in fact was when it came to accommodating change.

One of the reasons why the bureaucratic elite offered no resistance is that these recommendations were consistent with the values of civil servants. Those who recommended those change were mostly senior members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. Consequently, they recommended changes which would be acceptable to the members of civil service. Since President Ayub depended on the burerucracy to achieve his objectives of socio-economic development and modernization, he did not want to antagonize it.

All these reforms enhanced the power and status of the bureaucracy. Even political reforms like the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit and the introduction of Basic Democracy System (to be discussed later), which brought about fundamental changes in the administrative system, did not challenge the status and power of the bureaucracy. Even economic reforms like the development of an effective national planning system, and the use of public corporations for development

purposes, increased the power of the bureaucracy. Whatever reforms were undertaken in Pakistan, none dare to attack bureaucracy's privileged position.

Therefore, Albert Gorvine's conclusion to the effect that administrative reform, to be successful, must be preceded by social, political or economic reform, does not seem to be true, at least in the case under review here. The reforms we have looked at were implemented by the bureaucracy, who perceived no threat to its status and power. It must be emphasized once again that none of the reforms, whether social, political, or economic, affected the privileged position of the bureaucracy.

We now turn to an analysis of the role played by bureaucracy in the functioning of the Basic Democracies System. This should show the extent to which Ayub was dependent on the bureaucracy to achieve his political and socio-economic objective. It should also demonstrate the extent to which the Pakistani bureaucracy was effective in carrying out the regime's policies.

Basic Democracies System

On October 27, 1959, President Ayub promulgated the Basic Democracies Order providing for the creation of a five tiered structure,²⁶ which consisted

26. *Basic Democracies, District Administration and Development* (Peshawar : PARD, 1963) : Government of West Pakistan, *A Handbook on the Law of Basic Democracies* (Lahore, 1962) ; see also Elliott L. Tepper, "Changing Patterns of Administration in rural East Pakistan," South Asia Service, Occasional Paper no. 5, Asian Studies Centre, Michigan State University ; Elliot L. Tepper "The Administration of


of a union council, thana council (Tehsil in West Pakistan), district council, divisional council, and a development advisory council (abolished in 1962). Reason for the introduction of the Basic Democracies System included "the need to accelerate rural development, import social welfare facilities, and create a new politically conscious class of leaders with administrative skills capable of the rural population."²⁷

Initially, each province was divided into 40,000 electoral units. The number of electoral units was subsequently increased to 120,000, 60 000 for each province. Each electoral unit would elect from among themselves an elector who must be at least 25 years of age. The electors of all electoral units would collectively constitute the Electoral College of Pakistan. The latter would elect the president and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. After performing this political function, the members of the Electoral College would be converted into members of the union councils in the rural areas.

Continued

Rural Reform: Structural Constraints and Political Dilemmas," in Robert D. Stevens, Hamza Alavi, and Peter J. Bertocci (ed.), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan* (The University Press of Hawaii, 1976); A. T. R. Rehman, *Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots* (Comila: PARD, 1962).

27. Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69* (Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 15.

Table 1. *Basic Democracy Structure, 1965*

Source : Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies," in Birkhead (ed.), *Administrative Problem in Pakistan*, p. 32.

The Basic Democracies System created a historical administrative structure for legal government. Essentially, a four-tiered system, the lowest tier was composed of the union councils in rural areas and the union and town committees in urban areas. The chairman of the union council was elected by the members of the union councils from amongst themselves. The second tier was the thana council in East Pakistan and Tehsil in West Pakistan. A Thana council consisted of the chairman of the union councils and town committees, if any, and a number of official members, as determined by the commissioner. The sub-divisional officer appointed the official members while remaining as chairman of the thana council.

The district council above the thana/tehsil was the most important tier in the Basic Democracies System. It consisted of officials and elected members as determined by the government. But the total of elected members could not be less than the total number of official members. Elected members of the district council were designated by the chairman of the union councils and town committees within the district. Official members were appointed by the commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner (usually a CSP officer) was chairman of the district council and chief executive of the council. Elected members, however, failed to act independently because of the presence of the deputy commissioner and other official members.

The divisional council was the topmost tier of the system. Elected members of the district coun-

cil in turn elected the members of the divisional council. Before promulgation of the 1962 constitution, half the members were appointed officials, and half were not. The Commissioner was the presiding officer. The council was really a coordinating body, meshing the activities of all local councils and municipal bodies within the division. It also recommended certain development schemes to the government.

This discussion suggests that different tiers of the system were interdependent, and that higher civil servants like the subdivisinal officer, the deputy commissioner, and the commissioner were the key individuals empowered to superwise the activities of its different tiers. Civil servants continued to dominate these institutions as chairman of the thana/tehsil, district and divisional council.

We will now consider the role played by the Basic Democracies System. One of its functions was to undertake development activities, but a shortage of funds made this key task virtually impossible. Though the Basic Democracies System had taxing powers, the villagers had no way of paying the taxes.²⁸ Moreover, government grants to the union councils were not sufficient to underwrite development activities.

In 1961-62, compared with a province-wide current budget of approximately 36 million dollars, the resources commanded by the Basic Democracies

28. Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies," in Birkhead, (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 45.

was only ... approximately 16 million dollars. Of this about one-third was required for current operations, leaving less than ... twenty-one cents U.S. per capita for development. While the Basic Democracies made a brave effort and supplemented their limited resources with voluntary assistance, it is not surprising that the villager should have found it difficult to see any improvement.²⁹

The Second Five Year Plan, scheduled to begin in 1960, provided the government with an opportunity to formulate strategies of economic development. Since available resources were not sufficient to insure development activities, the government had to adopt a strategy which called for an expanded programme of United States Public Law 480 assistance.³⁰

With this assistance, the government introduced Rural Works programmes,³¹ first as an experiment in 1961 by the Comila Academy then as a province-wide scheme in 1962-63. The economic objectives of the programme included the following :

1. to provide larger employment, by creating work opportunities in the rural areas on local projects not requiring large capital

29. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

30. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *Use of Resources Provided by Expanded P. L. 480 Aid* (Karachi, 1961).

31. For detailed analysis of the Rural Works Programme in East Pakistan, see John Woodward Thomas, "The Rural Public Works Programme and East Pakistan's Development," (Ph. D. Thesis, Harvard University Press, 1968).

investment, the benefits of which can be easily recognized by the workers. ...

2. to create an infra-structure such as roads, bridges, irrigation channels, and the like in the rural areas, and
3. to raise additional financial and manpower resources for the implementation of local projects, through taxation or voluntary labour.³²

The rural Works Programme undertaken by the Basic Democracies System achieved considerable success. A large number of roads, bridges, canals, embankments, community and training centres were constructed or repaired in East Pakistan.³³ Table 2 shows the physical achievements of the works programme also realized success.³⁴ About 1600 projects were undertaken in 1963-64. Table 3 shows the allocation of resources in works programme. Responding to these successes President Ayub observed in 1963, "You would be surprised how much happiness it (the Rural Works Programme in East Pakistan) has given to the people of East Pakistan...and how much they really feel thankful to the government. ... Wherever you go you get the spontaneous word

32. Pakistan Planning Commission, *Final Evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan*, p. 129.

33. See A. H. Khan, "The Public Works Programme and A Developmental Proposal for East Pakistan," in PARD, *An Evaluation of the Rural Works Programme in East Pakistan*: also see Walter P. Falcon and G. F. Papanek (ed.), *Development Policy II—The Pakistan Experience* Harvard University Press, 1971).

34. S. J. Burki "West Pakistan's Rural Works Programme: A Study in Political and Administrative Response," *Middle East Journal* vol. 123, 1969.

Table 2. *Physical achievements of works programme in East Pakistan*

Items of Work	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965 66	1966-67
Kutchra roads (miles)	20,929	27,553	28,410	17,848	16,678
Pucca roads (miles)	48	4,928	1,080	742	446
Bridges and culverts (nos)	7,428	103,788	300,415	8,585	20,565
Drainage and canals (miles)	920	1,248	5,357	953	1,562
Embankments (miles)	258	1,842	3,654	1,560	1,560
Union community centres		2,307	1,742	586	
Coastal community centres		79		22	
Thana training and development centres	244	230	225		

Source : Jahan, op. cit. p. 213.

Table 3. *Allocation of resources in works programme (million rupees)*

Year	East Pakistan	West PaPistan
1962-1963	100.00	100.00
1963-64	200.00	100.00
1964-65	150.00	17.70
1965-66	100.55	87.70
1966-67	121.08	19.60

Source : Jahan, op. cit. p. 212.

thanks from even the ordinary villager. ... We are going to continue the system."³⁵

In support of Ayub's enthusiasm the government released the following figures.

Comparative study of the physical achievements of the Works programme during 1962-63 and 1963-64 reveals that larger percentages of allocations was devoted in 1963-64 to complex ... works. ... The Municipal Committees and Town Committees built 363 culverts and bridges, 28,250 miles of pucca (hard top) roads and 163 drains and canals in 1963-64 ; the corresponding figure for 1962-63 were 112 bridges and culverts, 336 miles of roads and 84 miles of drains and canals. Of 27,818 miles of roads built during 1963-64 in rural areas 487 miles were pucca construction as against 20,926 miles of roads during 1962-63. ... 856 miles of embankments were raised or repaired and 1,315 miles of canals were excavated or reexcavated during 1963-64 as against 248 miles of embankments and 902 miles of canals during 1962-63.³⁶

Though there is considerable skepticism about the reliability of official statistics on the performance of the Rural Works Programme,³⁷ it is beyond

35. Government of East Pakistan, *A Retrospect on Basic Democracies in East Pakistan* (Dacca, East Pakistan Government Press, 1965), p. 7.

36. Quoted in Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era* (Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 154.

37. See Rahman, Sobhan *Basic Democracies Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan* (Dacca : Bureau of Economic Research, University of Dacca, 1968).

dispute that the Works Programme achieved considerable success in developing a rural infrastructure.³⁸ Our main question is this : What role was played by civil servants in carrying out the Rural Works Programme ? The evidence suggests that they were an essential part of its success, again providing empirical evidence of bureaucracy's capacity to implement change when change is consistent with its own interests.

The three major activities of the Works Programme, planning, approval and execution, will now be discussed.

Planning

The development schemes of Thana and union councils were prepared in a meeting of unit members, who decided what problem were to be solved first. They were responsible for tackling the various problems of the union council. The next step was a meeting by the union council where the proposals for the year under the Works Programme were finalised. These proposals were nothing less than the schemes for development themselves, which were thereafter transmitted to the Thana Approving Authority, a committee of the Thana Council. The function of the Thana Council was to discuss all the schemes recommended by union councils and to assign priorities for their execution. Such priorities were determined according to instructions given by the government. First, priority was given to mainte-

38. See *Performance Report on Rural Works Programme, 1965-66* (Government of East Pakistan, Basic Democracies and Local Government, 1967).

tenance schemes, second, to the incomplete schemes from previous years. Local councils were required to set apart 25 per cent of their budget for maintenance of schemes under the Works Programme.³⁹

Approval

The next stage was to get approval of the schemes selected by the sponsoring councils, Thana or Union. The chairman of the Thana Council approved the schemes in a meeting of members of the Thana Council. The Circle Officer, subordinate to the sub-divisional officer, acted as the secretary.⁴⁰ The Thana Council's chairman was the sub-divisional officer who was usually a member of the civil service of Pakistan. The approving authority for the Thana Council at the district level consisted of the Deputy Commissioner as chairman, the assistant director, Basic Democracies, the secretary and engineers of Construction and Building, and Water and Power Development Authority, plus a few other members. The approving authority for District Council and Municipal Committee consisted of the Secretary, the Basic Democracies Department, the Deputy Secretary, the Works Programme, the Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering, and the Deputy Secretary of the Basic Democracies Department.

What emerge from the foregoing is that civil servants were the key individuals who alone had enough power to approve or disapprove the schemes submitted

39. See *ibid.*

40. For an elaborate analysis of the role of circle officer, see Md. Anisuzzaman, *The Circle Officer* (Dacca: NIPA, 1963).

by local councils. Without the cooperation of these civil servants, the schemes of the Thana and Union Councils could not have been carried out.

Execution

The final step is to execute the approved projects. The unit committee which acted as the project committee was responsible for the implementation of schemes. The chairman of the project committee received necessary funds from the Circle Officer (a non-CSP officer). He was responsible to the S.D.O. (sub-divisional Officer, usually a CSP officer) for his activities. The work of the project committee was supervised by the circle officer and his staff, and by the sub-divisional officer and other officers of the Basic Democracies Department under the general guidance of the Deputy Commissioner, who was ultimately responsible for the successful implementation of the Works Programme within his jurisdiction.

His role was summarized in the following way by a former member of the civil service of Pakistan :

The D.C. (head of a district) is involved in the development process at various stages. He stimulates project preparation before his help is sought in the actual preparation of a scheme. He is an agent for articulating the views of the common man, that he functions as a catalyst. Whether an irrigation project or a road programme, a programme for agricultural extension service or one for use of pumps and fertilizers, a dairy scheme or one for establishment of a

telephone network, a post office programme or dredging and river port project, a scheme for expansion of educational facilities or a public health scheme or for that matter even a scheme for a processing plant ; in most cases the requirement of an area is generally impressed upon by the D.C., at times he stimulates public awareness of the necessity for the programme. In this way he contributes to the planning process at the stage of preparation of the planframe. In the preparation of the actual schemes, his role is no less significant. Being in the picture of the overall situation of the area under his jurisdiction and being the kingpin of administration, in the district, he has to ensure that schemes envisaged in the planframe are, indeed, prepared in time.

In project administration, the responsibilities of the D.C. (Deputy Commissioner, head of a district) are multifarious. Securing cooperation from the members of the public and stimulating interest in a project among them is the primary and the most difficult job in this area. The example of the planning programme is enough to bring out the pathos of the problem. ...There is the watch-dog responsibility. A scheme has to keep to the schedule of work, its qualitative as well as quantitative achievement has to be up to the standard. ... Last but not the least is the responsibility to provide basic facilities

to projects and remove bottleneck as they develop during the process of implementation.⁴¹

Civil servants who were interviewed were asked the following question: What was your attitude toward the rural works programme undertaken by President Ayub? All 50 higher civil servants whom I interviewed indicated a positive attitude, one CSP officer, now serving in the Ministry of Education, maintained:

We have always been conscious of the fact that the civil servants should play an important role in stimulating economic growth and initiating social change. Such a need was felt because of the absence of private elites able and willing to undertake developmental activities. When President Ayub introduced his rural works programme under the Basic Democracies System, we supported the programme since it would contribute to national economic development.

Another civil servant observed that:

It is the responsibility of the civil servant to implement the policies formulated by top political leaders. Since the civil servants were entrusted with the task of undertaking rural works programme, they naturally carried out this programme.

41. A. M. A. Muhith, C S P., *The Deputy Commissioner in East Pakistan* (NIPA: Dacca, 1963), pp. 59-60; also see A. M. A. Muhith, C.S.P., "Political and Administrative Rules in East Pakistan's Districts," *Pacific Affairs*, 40, 1967, pp. 279-293; Abunasar Shamsul Haque, "District Administration in East Pakistan: Its Classical Form and the Emerging Pattern," *Administrative Science Review*, no. 4, 1970, pp. 21-48.

He further maintained that "the introduction of the rural works programme under the Basic Democracies System gave the civil servants an opportunity to act as an agent of socio-economic change."

One of the reasons for the positive attitude of the CSP officers is that the system of Basic Democracies increased their power. We have seen how members of the civil service of Pakistan worked as heads of divisions and districts, and how they supervised and coordinated the activities of the different tiers of the Basic Democracies System. In sum, they controlled the functioning of local bodies. The deputy commissioners were authorised to receive funds from the government and to distribute these funds to the various councils in the districts. By controlling funds and by acting as head of the civil administration, and as the 'controlling authority' of all the local councils in his area, the deputy commissioner easily influenced the decisions of the Basic Democracies institutions.

The forgoing analysis suggests that members of the civil service of Pakistan supported the rural Works Programme undertaken by the Basic Democracies institutions because they had 'controlling power' over the local bodies. Unlike the organizational and personnel changes reviewed earlier, the system of Basic Democracies increased the power of the CSP. As Burki observes :

By being the undisputed leaders of the local communities, the civil servants commanded

authority not as the agents of a law and order administration, but as the representatives of an avowed welfare state. And with the launching of the massive Rural Works Programme in 1962, aimed at developing the rural areas by further activating the local councils, the CSP divisional and district administrators obtained a new lever of power : control over development funds.

The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented here is that bureaucracy is indeed capable of accommodating change within its own sphere, and that it can even act as an agent of social change. Our analysis of the reports of Administrative Reorganization Committee, Provincial Administration Commission, Administrative Training Council, has shown that bureaucracy accommodated necessary changes suggested by these commissions. Furthermore, without the support and co-operation of the civil servants, the functioning of local bodies would not have been possible.

Therefore, our findings challenge the common thesis who hold that bureaucratic organizations necessarily resist change. Our analysis has also shown that bureaucracy accommodates the necessary changes if these do not effect the privileged position of the bureaucracy. Our findings also challenge Riggs' argument that in an unbalanced polity bureaucracy cannot be effective in undertaking development programmes. Therefore, it may be concluded on the basis of the Pakistani experience that bureaucracy is clearly capable of accommodating change.

THE DIVISIVE ELECTIONS

*Ahmed Husain**

Present is a century of representative government based on adult franchise and periodical elections. Here, the pertinent example is of the British political system. The representative system was also applied in British India by piecemeal process, because in the beginning it was considered an allian system. Secondly the literacy percentage was very low in India. Therefore proper consideration was given to the maxim. "Universal education should precede universal suffrage". Hence the introduction of the Indian Council Acts 1861 and 1892 followed by Acts of 1909/1919 and 1935. Nonetheless, the suffrage was restricted only to propertied and educated classes till the end of British suzerainty over Indo-Pak sub-continent, *i.e.* 1947.

The basic concept that the will of the people is determined by Elections was adhered to in India despite restricted suffrage. "The question of elections is at the centre of politics everywhere"¹. This is most appropriate to the elections held in 1945-46 in India. There was political impasse due to antagonism of the Hindu dominated Congress to recognise

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1. W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Free Elections: An elementary Text-book*, New York, Rinehart & Company, 1958, p. 175.

the Muslim League as the representative body of the Muslims. Consequently, the Quaid-i-Azam announced on behalf of the Muslim League that it would fight the forthcoming elections on two clear-cut issues "Pakistan is the national demand of the Muslims of India and the Muslim League is their representative organization"². The Quaid launched the election campaign with determination and trust in the eligible muslim voters and declared : "Give us the silver bullet and we will finish the job"³. The Muslim League won all the thirty Muslim seats reserved for them in the Central legislative Assembly. Referring to the League the Quaid said : "It was the only authoritative body of the 100 million Muslims of India"⁴. By and large, the election results paved the way for the creation of Pakistan. It is correct to say that the immediate factor responsible for making of Pakistan was the success of the All India Muslim League in the general elections of 1945-46.

After independence keeping in view the importance of the periodical elections all restrictions on right to vote were withdrawn and universal suffrage was introduced in Pakistan. Even though the literacy was only 18.9 percent⁵. It did not have its constructive results. The majority of the electorate were uneducated and did not fully appreciate the

2. Jamil ud din Ahmed, *The final phase of the struggle for Pakistan*, Publishers United Ltd., Lahore 1968 p. 21.

3. Ibid P-22

4. Ibid P-23

5. G. A. Almond & J. S. Colema Eds., *The Politics of Developing Area*, Princeton University, Princeton 1971, P-177.

importance of the ballot paper. "Elections are of great value in the developing countries because they have to achieve their goal of modernism in the shortest possible time to compete with the developed world. Elections enable the nation to take stock of the existing problems and find a solution to them. But sometimes the election results do not have positive ends and de-stabilise the political system"⁶. The same phenomenon happened in Pakistan due to mutual mistrust. The election results of 1954, 1965, 1970 and 1977 created disharmony in the society which lead to unbridgeable political gap.

Pakistan had the unique handicap of having division of the two parts of the country by a foreign territory of one thousand miles. Lack of geographical contiguity was the main reason for the conflict between East Pakistan and the Central Government which came in open after the provincial elections of East Pakistan in 1954. Since independence the Muslim League had been in power at the centre and East Pakistan, but did not look after the interests of the inhabitants of the province. A civil polity is one in which the public interest is preserved by men accountable to their community"⁷. This was not applied during the Muslim League rule in East Pakistan and the community which was ignored by the League Government avenged this indifference during the 1954 election.

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6. Sameul P. Huntington *Political Order in changing Societies* (New Haven : Yale, University Press, 1968 P-7.
 7. John Badgley, *Asian Development : Problems & Progress* (New York ; The Free Press, 1971) P-139.

There was formed an election alliance known as the United Front, led by H. S. Suharwardy and A. K. Fazalul Haq, with a twenty one points manifesto was to have greater autonomy for East Pakistan *vis-a-vis* the Central Government". The object of the United Front clearly was to destroy the Muslim League and to strengthen its *position*"⁸. At the same time, Muslim League was oblivious about the prospective strength of the United Front. The Muslim League ministry at the centre was complacent about the performance of the provincial Muslim League. For example, Dawn a leading pro-league Karachi newspaper, predicted that the League would win from 75 to 80 percent of the seats when the returns were in, the League had won only 10 of the 237 Muslim Seats⁹, and the Centre, which was beginning of the end of confidence in Centre ; it culminated in creation of Bangla Desh in 1971.

The triumph of the United Front, was however, short lived. The Chief Minister A. K. Fazlul Haq was dismissed and Governor's rule was imposed on the province. It was alleged that some of his utterances threatened the unity of Pakistan¹⁰. This action further gave fillip to the suspicion of East Pakistan voters that the Centre wanted to rule the province arbitrarily without any regard to the political demands of East Pakistan. Fazlul Haq was a veteran Muslim political leader.

8. G. A. Almond & Coleman (Eds), *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton University Press, 1971, P-197.

9. *Ibid* P-209.

10. Ahmed Hussain, *Politics & People's Representation in Pakistan*. Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore 1972, P-39.

He moved the Pakistan Resolution of the Muslim League on March 23, 1940. He was the member of the cabinet which drafted the 1956 Constitution and proposed that it should be enforced on Pakistan day *i.e.*, March 23. Later on he acted as Governor of East Pakistan. Hence it may be concluded that the charges on the basis of which his ministry was dismissed in 1954 were logically untenable. As a matter of fact, the Muslim League was reluctant to accept the representative change which had taken place due to the results of 1954 provincial election. The denial of this political change unleashed centrifugal activities in East Pakistan.¹¹

It was a vital political change as far as relations between East Pakistan and the centre were concerned. The politicians of East Pakistan became suspicious of Politicians at the national level. They started demand for political autonomy but for a few years they were kept under control by President Ayub Khan. He introduced a constitution in 1962 which gave all decision making powers to the Centre. There was National Assembly but it had limited powers. He introduced a device of Basic Democracies which replaced erstwhile local bodies. The basic democrats also formed an Electoral College for the election of President and National Assembly. The most important work done by the Electoral College was to get President Ayub Khan elected for a second term in 1965. His opponent was Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of Quaid-e-Azam the founder of Pakistan. Being sister of the Quaid and also a

11. *Ibid* P-46.

freedom fighter she enjoyed great respect among the citizens of Pakistan. Her defeat in the Presidential election due to restricted franchise created suspicion in the mind of the common man about political pressure put on, the members of the Electoral College to vote for President Ayub. "Ayub's victory was hardly a landslide affair. The military president received a slim vote of confidence but hardly the mandate he was seeking"¹².

President Ayub Khan, considered his re-election as an advancement towards political institutions. However, a number of milestones still had to be covered. But he remained complacent about them. Instead, being over confident about his success as a national leader, the tenth anniversary of the revolution which brought him to power was celebrated in October 1968, and was called a "decade of reforms"¹³. This had a sharp reaction and the country exploded in protest. Rioting spread from West to East Pakistan where different issues fuelled the violence¹⁴. Early in 1969 Ayub announced that he would not seek reelection but would permit a return to parliamentary government based on direct elections. This announcement failed to quell the disorders and acknowledging that his government had lost control, he resigned on March 25¹⁵.

12. Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The enigma of Political Development*, Wm Dawsons Ltd., England, 1980 P-184.

13. Ahmed Husain, *Op. Cit.* P-101.

14. Lawrence Ziring—*Op. Cit.* P-197.

15. Banks and W. Overstreet (Eds)—*Political Hand book of the World*. 1980 P-351.

In the end it is correct to say that unpopularity of President Ayub started with his re-election in 1965.

The ensuing General Election of 1970 was fair and honest as far as its conduct was concerned. President Yahya Khan deserved full credit for making the election process fair and impartial. However, there were two inherent parts of the election process which were complicated and they were not taken care before the elections. Hence, after the declaration of the election results there were created difficulties to enforce the mandate of the electorate. The first was suspicion about six points for provincial autonomy and re-organised political system announced in March 1966 by the Awami League¹⁶. Second was the regional outlook of the political parties which looked amineous due to lack of geographical contiguity between two parts of the country.

The National Elections were contested on the basis of legal Framework order 1970. The first point of it was about the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of Pakistan which had not to be impaired¹⁷. The Government arranged for the broadcast of the policies of all the major political parties of Pakistan over Radio Pakistan and Television on the eve of the Election for National Assembly held on December 7, 1970. Sh. Mujibur Rehman, President of Awami League spelled out in detail the demand of provincial autonomy which was almost demand for a separate state. The part of his speech was :

16. Ahmed Husain, *Op. Cit.* P-98.

17. Ahmad Husain *Ibid* P-122.

"The only feasible solution is the re-ordering of the constitutional structure by giving full regional autonomy to the federating units on the basis of our six-point formula. Such autonomy in order to be effective must include the power of managing the economy. This is why we insist upon federating units having control over monetary and fiscal policy and foreign exchange earnings, and other powers to negotiate foreign trade and aid"¹⁸.

In his speech, there was a clear indication of provincial autonomy being interpreted as independence. Unfortunately, the popularity of Awami League in East Pakistan was underestimated. There were fifteen political parties in the contest and the analysts believed the six point formula as the hoax and failed to foresee the changed trend in East Pakistan. The election results completely baffled the political pundits. Sheikh Mujib's Awami League set aside all opposition in East Pakistan.

Referring to the resounding victory of the Awami League Sheikh Mujib said that this verdict of the people was in fact a referendum on his party's six points and a victory of the suffering millions of the "Bangla Desh"¹⁹.

Now we come to the second difficulty about the elections *i.e.* regional outlook of the political parties. In Dec., 1970 election of the 300 seats was up for direct election. Sheikh Mujib's East Pakistan

18. *Ibid*, P-130

19. *Ibid* P-203.

Awami League won 167 and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won 82 in West Pakistan. This means that the two major political parties were not national in character and the legal framework order was silent on this important deficiency in the political parties of Pakistan. National integration is only possible if the political parties are open to the People in different parts of the country and there is a central Office of a party with input from nook and cover of the country. This is the only method by which centrifugal forces can be checked in a developing country and benefits can be attained of the representative system. Take the example of Nigeria. On the eve of elections in 1979 there were about 35 political parties and groups which were reduced to five by Federal Election Commission (FEDECO). The political parties had to be national in character with offices in at least 13 of the 19 states. It was also required that the rules and constitution of a party provided for the periodic election on a democratic basis²⁰. The presumption in Pakistan was different. "The generals and other civilian advisors believed that so many parties would contest the election that no one of them would emerge with a majority. The probable outcome, there would be a coalition government comprising a number of parties, no one of which would be dominant"²¹. To avoid similar situation in Nigeria the FEDECO could cancel the certificate of registration of a party

20 Billy Dudley, *Nigeria Government and Politics*, Macmillan (Nigeria) 1982, P-183.

21. Lawrence Ziring Op. Cit. P-100

if in the judgement of it the programmes and object of the party were not in conformity with the Fundamental objectives of the constitution.

Due to the two above mentioned difficulties, the transfer of power to the elected representative of the people became a thorny issue, which ultimately, resulted in converting East Pakistan into Bangla Desh. Elections mean looking for alternates. In case of East Pakistan the electorate looked for complete autonomy and the election process helped them to achieve their objective. "Full-scale civil war erupted in East Pakistan on March 26, 1971, when a clandestine radio broadcast announced the proclamation by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the Awami League of the sovereign independent people's republic of Bangla Desh"²². The element of suspicion was the main cause of dismemberment of the country after the 1970 National Elections.

A new and truncated Pakistan had emerged from the civil war and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. With the introduction of Constitution in August 1973, a new Pakistan emerged, from legal point of view²³. Regular elections are an important indicator of working of democratic political institutions, for this, the constitution had comprehensive provisions, designed to ensure the independence of the Election Commission and the fairness of its operation. The members of the Commission are taken

22. Keessing's Research Report, *Pakistan*, Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1973, P-111.

23. Norman D. Palmer, *Elections and Political Development*, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1975, P-190.

from the highest strata of the judiciary appointed by the President and governed by the Constitution and the election laws enacted by the parliament. It was mandatory for all executive authorities at the federal and provincial levels to give the Election Commission all the assistance it needed in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission conducted the General Election according to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution in March 1977. There were two main political parties contesting the election. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the ruling party and combined opposition, called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) formed by the nine political parties with divergent views. The only common ground among them was political discontent with Butto regime²⁴. In developing societies to belong to a ruling party is a privilege of very big magnitude. In this respect Pakistan was not an exception during Butto regime. The members of the ruling party were given preferential treatment in social and economic spheres. The party workers had complete monopoly in mass contact devices. The opposition was not permitted to hold political meetings and were denied access to radio and television. It was strange coincidence that a political leader who started mass movement against dictatorial approach of Ayub Khan, was denying right to ventilate their grievance to the opposition. It has one singular reason which ena-

24. Akhtar Rashid—*Elections 77 and aftermath*, P. S. Publishers Islamabad, 1981, P-8.

bled the PNA leaders to attract large crowds in the public meetings.

The PNA's main plan was the introduction of Nizam-e-Mustafa. So massive were the turnouts at PNA meetings that some of its leaders started saying that the people had already given a verdict in their favour and that the elections on March 7 would only formalise this verdict. In other words, the PNA leadership had taken the results of the Elections as a forgone conclusion. Hence when they saw the ruling party winning landslide victory by capturing 155 against thirty six by the PNA. Their spontaneous reaction was that the elections were rigged. The allegation was partly correct because later on the Chief Election Commission declared the election of six PPP members to the National Assembly null and void due to grave irregularities. The record of 20 other constituencies was also seized by the Commission for detailed investigation²⁵. However, it was incorrect that there was total rigging. The PPP was a mass party and had sound base among the eligible voters. This point was supported by election statistics. About 17 million person or about 55 per cent of the registered voters cast ballots. Out of this, the PPP polled about 10 million voters and the PNA about six million. The PPP in other word secured 59 per cent and the PNA 36 per cent of the votes cast²⁶.

The urban demonstrations which followed the elections clearly showed that election rigging was

25. *Ibid* P-22.

26. *Ibid* P-9.

a minor factor. The main forces behind them were economic and religious resentments of middle class represented by the PNA. It was apparent that business had suffered because of nationalization. Private investment had declined. The refugee middle class had suffered because of shrinking job opportunities caused by decline in private investment and by the quota system of the new government.

The lower middle class felt that Bhutto would cause incalculable harm to the Islamic ideology²⁷. Between March 14, and May 17, 4653 processions had been taken out, including 248 by women, 92 by members of the legal profession-18 by Ulema and 248 by Students. Two hundred and forty one civilian belonging to both political parties had been killed and 1,195 injured²⁸.

In the last days of the Ayub Khan regime Z. A. Bhutto had refused to attend the Round Table Conference and demanded Ayub to quit office because the people wanted a change both in the regime and system of government²⁹. Ironically almost identical stand was taken by PNA leadership *vis-a-vis* Bhutto regime and finally he had sad exit in July 1977.

The National elections after regular interval have their usefulness. This is perhaps the only device by which there can be harmony in the society

27. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan*, Praeger Publishers New York, 1980, P-157.

28. Akhtar Rashid, Op. Cit P-49.

29. Ahmed Husain, Op. Cit. P-110.

and viable political system leading to national integration can be secured. The Quaid was mindful about problems to be faced by the new state and the importance of National coherence. "Pakistan is the embodiment of the unity of the Muslim nation and so it must remain. That unity, we as true Muslims, must jealously guard and preserve. If we begin to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, etc., first and Muslims and Pakistanis only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate"³⁰. Unfortunately, his advice was not followed due to which we had a political set back in 1971. Quaid-e-Azam firmly believed in elections and it was partly due to them that Pakistan came into existence. He believed "that in fighting elections League's object was not to capture ministeries, but to establish Pakistan"³¹.

The reason for the failure of elections to provide cohesive results was the suspicion about approach and conduct of the elections in Pakistan. Again we forgot the teaching of the Quaid about approach to election. "Although the elections are crucial, yet you should see to it that we do not resort to dishonest methods to win the elections. I do not want you to brimble the voters. That I will never forgive. I do not want you to give a single rupee to any voter and to buy votes. That is being dishonest I prefer defeat to dishonesty"³².

30. Riaz Ahmed, *Quaid-e-Azam*, Quaid-e-Azam Academy, Pakistan, 1981, P-143.

31. *Ibid* P-115.

32. G Allana—*The story of Nation*, Ferozsons Limited, Lahore 1981, P-381.

The main reason for the success of the Quaid was his honesty of purpose. Hence honesty is the best policy which also encourages tolerance. This is the basis of usefulness of elections and we have to emulate it to make the future elections salutary in Pakistan.

U.S. AID AND AFRICA

AN ATTITUDINAL ANALYSIS

Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary

Introduction

Ideally, the objective of foreign aid is to help produce accelerated and sustained economic growth in the recipient nations. Theoretically, bilateral aid is a good thing, but the practice of aid has led to frustrations and disillusionment in both the donor and recipient nations. The ideal objective of aid has been concealed in actual global aid relationships, yet both the donors and the recipients have failed to appreciate the performance of aid within the global context. This failure, of course, has put foreign aid in crisis. The advanced nations have started questioning the role of external assistance in accelerating economic development in the developing countries ; the less developed countries on the other hand, feel a sense of frustration as they have not been able to attain the stage of self-attaining growth as early as they expected.

This article is designed to determine the attitude of Ghana and Nigeria towards U.S. aid, and to outline the relationship between aid and dependency in these two situations. We begin from the premise that the success of bilateral aid depends, in part, on

the psychology of the recipient. In 1971, Kenneth and Mary Gregon suggested that international assistance programs involved inter-personal relations between the donor and the recipient and therefore the attitudes, aspirations and perceptions of the recipient were indispensable to a better understanding of foreign aid.¹ In a survey of aid officials in five nations they concluded that there was a strong relationship between the psychology of the aid partners and the efficacy of international assistance programs, and that the physical properties of aid such as its quality and its type were ranked of secondary importance.

We recognize that to have a successful aid relationship it is essential for all interested parties to know how the recipient feels about the donor and the aid it receives. The importance of attitude is seen in the fact that it conditions the behaviour of one actor toward the other. Once aid is received attitude becomes one of the most important factors affecting the implementation of aid programmes, as well as the success of bilateral aid in general. Attitude is also important in determining, first of all, if a poor nation will ask for aid ; it also affects the type of aid normally requested by a Third World nation.

The concluding part of the study explores the need for aid in terms of dependency theory. Some authors have argued that the underdevelopment of

1. Kenneth and Mary Gregon, "International Assistance in Psychological Perspectives," *The yearbook of World Affairs*, 1971, p. 87-103.

African countries is produced by the developed nations.² Ironically, most African nations believe that foreign aid is necessary to bring about rapid economic development. If both of these assertions are true, then foreign aid will lead to further dependency on the advanced nations, and worsen the very condition they are trying to change. The research tries to examine this issue. Furthermore, we try to determine if there has been any perception of danger by the receiving nations in relations to the need to rely on aid for development.

The concept of foreign aid accepts in principle the division of the world into rich and poor nations, for aid implies (in recent years) the transfer of resources, at less than market prices, from the rich to the poor. Historically, contemporary aid relationship has roots in the process of the development of the world political economy which has been dominated by the capitalist mode of production. According to Emmanuel Wallerstein, the end result of this process has been the division of the world into rich (producers of manufactured goods) and the poor (mainly primary producers).³ Dependency theorists further argue that the world economy is a single system in which there are unequal exchange between the core and the periphery that work to benefit the core.

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2. Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue: From conflict to compromise", *Foreign Affairs* 54, April 1976, p. 546.
 3. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Three Stages of African Involvement in World Economy", in *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, eds., Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.)

Dependency has also come to mean lack of autonomy for the periphery. Here the critics of aid argue that reliance on external sources of finance and technology for development ultimately leads to domination by the donor. That means that the foreign policy as well as domestic programmes of the recipient will become subservient to the interest and policies of the donor. In Africa, this represents a kind of paradox. As a result of past and, sometimes, continuing experience with foreign domination, African nations are very apprehensive about any new form of external domination, yet they want to use external resources for development.

A person's attitude toward an object may be defined as the object's evaluative meaning for the person.⁴ That is to say, a person's attitude toward U.S. aid is basically how he evaluates it. To collect data for this study, we studied newspaper reports from Ghana and Nigeria. From 1960-77 newspaper articles expressing some opinion about U. S. aid were examined to determine how the authors felt about U. S. aid. With these data we try to show the variations in attitude toward U. S. aid by looking at the relationship between attitude and political regime.

Perspectives on U.S. Aid

Before Ghana achieved its independence in 1957 the United States had played very limited

4. Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Policy", in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward Shils and Henry Finch, (New York: The Free Press, 1949) pp. 49-112.

role in Africa. Economically, politically, and militarily (strategically) there is enough evidence to indicate that American interests in Africa have been limited. Initially, this worked to the advantage of the United States because its image in Africa was not tainted like the French or British who used to possess colonies in Africa. Though Africans did not exactly support nor even trust the foreign policy goals of the U. S. (as a result of U.S. reluctance to back self-determination in Africa), they knew very well that in order to achieve rapid economic development they would have to turn to the U.S. After all, the U.S. was the nation with the most resources to give, and it never held a single colony in Africa. It was in the light of this earlier optimism and enthusiasm that aid relationship between the U. S. and several African nations was established. How this earlier enthusiasm for and commitment to U. S. aid has changed over the years will be the focus of our discussion below.

Like many foreign policy issues bilateral aid is affected by several intervening variable in the world political economy. In the case of Ghanaian and Nigerian attitudes toward American aid we expect that attitudes toward other categories of U.S. foreign policy may sometimes affect attitudes toward aid. Anytime such intervening variables do occur an effort will be made to show how they distort the evaluation of U.S. aid.

GHANA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. AID

First Civilian Government (1960-62)

When Ghana achieved its independence in 1957

the aim of its leadership was to build a "political kingdom" where every citizen would enjoy a meaningful measure of economic prosperity. It was not long before they realized that Ghana could not build a viable economy with her own resources. Therefore, the nation was full of praise for the U.S. when the U.S. government announced that it was ready to aid Ghana. American aid was sought in several areas : Development Aid ; and the Peace Corps.

Capital for industrialization has been one of Ghana's main development problems. The country's economy is foreign oriented depending on cacao and other primary products to earn foreign exchange. For any long-term development plan, the lack of finance becomes a major constraint that place serious limits on what can be done. Ghana's need for external aid has never been in doubt, and it was even much more so in the early 1960's. This explains why most of the development projects and long-term plans relied on external aid. Except in a few isolated cases nobody had any qualms about appealing to the U.S. for more aid. When plans were announced to build Volta River Dam (the largest single project in Ghana) the country turned to the United States and her allies. Ghana provided about half of the cost for the project and the remaining amount was financed by the U.S., Britain and the World Bank. The U.S. provided about 75% of the total in loans and grants for the Volta Aluminium Smelter which is the principal user of electricity from the Dam. Despite the initial

negative reaction over U. S. foot-dragging and lengthy negotiations, American's role in the project was highly acclaimed. The Ghanaian people had been educated about the positive impact of the Dam on their lives. In helping with its financing many people came to see the U.S. as generous, helpful and a dependable friend in time of need.

The mainstream of the Ghanaian economy is agriculture, and this is another area where many people felt the need for U. S. Aid. U. S. aid for agriculture came in several forms including farming aids (fertilizers, better crop yields, machetes) ; and technical aid (U. S. agriculture advisors for establishment of farm institutions, for soil conservation and irrigation, for rice cultivation, rubber plantation, and grazing camps).

Another sector in which U. S. aid was vigorously sought was technical aid for education. Apart from aid funds and equipment for scientific and technical education, many Americans went to teach in Ghana with the sponsorship of several academic programs. Ghana was the first African nation to ask for and receive Peace Corps volunteers.

The Ghanaian President, Nkrumah, hailed the Peace Corps as a "splendid bold idea." In asking for the Peace Corps the country indicated that it needed educators, especially in the areas of science, mathematics and agriculture to improve secondary school education. By 1962 about 128 Peace Corps volunteers were working in Ghana as teachers, nurses, engineers, geologists, social workers, etc.

As the activities of the Peace Corps permeated the Ghanaian society, the members were hailed for their sacrifice and dedication. A memorandum issued by the Ministry of Education described the Peace Corps scheme as "godsent."

During the nationalist struggles for independence, Ghana was described as a 'model colony.' In 1957, it became the first black African nation to achieve independence. Ghanaians were even more anxious after independence to project the image of a 'model independent African state' to the world. To make achieve this it was crucial to achieve economic progress to make more meaningful the political independence they had just won. At this time, the press emphasis was on the positive contributions U. S. aid could make to the Ghanaian economy. In short U.S. aid was thought to be crucial for economic development. There are a few critics of aid centered mainly in the academic community. The criticisms of U. S. aid were basically warnings to Ghanaians to exercise some restraint in their quest for more U. S. aid. They reminded the country of certain inherent dangers in reliance on external aid : terms of aid ; motives of the donor ; and economic dependence on the donor.

Attitude Change

The turning point in Ghanaian-U.S. relations occurred in 1962 when Nkrumah began to implement his Marxist-Leninist principles in Ghana. By early 1963 Ghana had become a socialist state. The differences and disagreements between Ghana and the U.S. began to show at this time. The Ghanaian

government started a massive campaign to damage the image of the U.S. in the country. The U.S. was portrayed as the leader of the neo-colonialists who desired nothing less than the complete domination and exploitation of Ghana and Africa. The government was openly hostile to the overall U.S. policy in Africa and the Third World. The success of the negative campaign against the U.S. is evidenced in the fact that the communist ideology served as the lens through which the writers evaluated all U.S. actions. Ghanaians therefore came to associate the U.S. with only negative behavior patterns: neo-colonialism, imperialism exploitation, etc; and the negative attitude toward the donor led to unfavourable attitude toward U.S. aid and the Peace Corps.

A careful analysis of the Ghanaian economy would reveal that Ghana's need for aid was never in doubt, yet after financing the Volta River project, together with a host of other programmes the attitude toward U.S. development aid was unfavourable. Interestingly, at the same time Ghanaians were turning down American aid, they were appealing for Soviet assistance. Obviously, the need for aid was not a predominant factor in explaining Ghana's behaviour toward the U.S. The main concern in the country was not economic domination through aid or trade, but the perception of injustice of U.S. foreign policy. As a result of Ghana's negative attitude toward the U.S. the Ghanaian government was reluctant to ask for aid from Washington, and the U.S. was also unwilling to give aid to Ghana.

The attitude toward the Peace Corps also changed drastically by the end of 1965. The earlier enthusiasm toward the Corps gave way to suspicion and hostility. Initially, the Peace Corps was hailed for bringing in technical expertise. But when the relations between the two nations became sour, the Peace Corps was branded as an instrument of the CIA. As a matter of fact, Ghanaians came to believe that the U.S. was working through the CIA and the Peace Corps to overthrow the socialist regime of Nkrumah. People working in the field with the Peace Corps began to complain about their condescending attitude, and lack of respect for Ghanaian customs and traditions. By 1965 the qualification of some Peace Corps volunteers were being openly challenged.

First Military Government (1966-68)

After Nkrumah's overthrow in early 1966 he bitterly accused the "imperialist" powers for exerting an economic squeeze on Ghana. The military government inherited a poor economy and a debt of \$800 million, 80% of which was owned to Western creditor nations. During this period Ghana's worsening economic situation dictated its attitude toward U.S. aid. Scott Thompson has observed that the range of options available to the National Liberation Council (NLC) was limited.⁵ According to Thompson for the government to redress the country's economic woes the U.S. was the best available alternative. There was an urgent need to revive the

5. W. Scott Thompson, "Ghana's Foreign Policy under Military Rule", *Africa Report*, May-June, 1969, p. 8.

economy to cater for the needs of the ordinary citizen. The last years of Nkrumah's government were climaxed by unprecedented inflation, rising unemployment, and shortages of "essential commodities."

The NLC Government made a swift appeal to the U.S. for aid and the response was good. By mid-1968 the U.S. had made available about \$55 million in varying forms of credits, grants, and assistance programmes.⁶ The overwhelming attitude in the country was that due to the extent of damage done to the economy through mismanagement of the previous government, the country could not survive without external assistance. American aid was earnestly sought in several areas :

1. U.S. commodities under (PL 481) Food Aid Programme to ease the acute shortage of food in the country ;
2. Agricultural raw materials for the country's industrial needs-cotton, powdered milk, tobacco-also requested under PL 481 ; and
3. Loans to import commercial products from the U.S. mainly industrial equipment and spare parts.

U.S. aid generally fit into the growing sentiment within the country to rebuild the economy. Among other things, for main economic policies had to be pursued simultaneously :

6. Kenneth Grundy and Robert Farlow, "Internal Source of External Behavior : Ghana's New Foreign Policy", *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 43, 1969, p. 163.

1. Revival of the nation's agricultural production to increase exports and domestic food supply ;
2. Improvement in transportation to the rural areas of the economy to enable farm products to be transported to the urban centers ;
3. Increased industrialization, first by reviving idle industries and second, to attract foreign investors ; and
4. Correction of the Balance of Payments deficit.

To achieve these policies most writers favoured reliance on U.S. aid, for it was believed that the nation's economy could not be revived without help from major aid donors.

Consequently, few people seemed to be worried about the previous negative image of the U.S. in Ghana. Along with the new image of the U. S. in Ghana also came a new perception of Ghanaian U.S. relations. The relation was described as co-operative rather than dependence. Thus, the Ghanaian people who, just a few years back, called the U.S. a neo-colonialist power was now calling for more U.S. involvement in the country. However, in the academic community, a note of caution was being sounded : 'Look before you leap.' This concern was centered around two issues. First, it was indicated that the influx of foreign capital would make Ghana a pawn to foreign capitalists. Second, it was argued that what the country needed was not

aid, but sound economic policies to attract capital to boost the economy.

Perhaps, the most vocal dissent was against American involvement in economic planning. While there was practically no argument over using U.S. money for long-term economic projects, several writers questioned the wisdom of relying on U.S. personnel for long-term economic planning. Additionally, occasional references were made to the "traditional Ghanaian pride and dignity":—that in Ghanaian society it was alright to ask for assistance when in need, and return the favour when conditions improved. But to depend increasingly on gifts and the generosity of others was not a behaviour to be proud of. This meant that U.S. aid should be a temporary measure, and that any idea of long-term economic dependence on the U.S. was a distant to Ghanaians.

Peace Corps

During the first military government only a minimum reference was made to the Peace Corps. Apart from issues discussed briefly the Peace Corps was taken out of the headlines. First, there was an intensive campaign to convince the people about the positive aspects of the Peace Corps program. Similarly, the need for outside volunteers to teach in Ghana was also becoming an issue in itself. This issue arose because certain elements in the society felt Ghanaian universities could produce enough teachers for the country's needs, especially in the arts, it was still felt that the Peace corps was essential to the country's educational needs, especially in the scientific and technical areas.

The Second Civilian Government (1968-71)

By 1968 the Ghanaian economy was in a very big slump. Agricultural productivity was very low and this affected the export sector of the economy. Incidentally, there was also a serious decline in the world market price for cocoa, and the resultant decline revenue worsened the balance of payments situation. Industrial production was declining for two main reasons, among others. Existing industries were idle because of the lack of foreign exchange to import raw materials to feed the industries. Additionally, the lack of foreign exchange made it difficult to replace worn-out parts.

The period 1968-71 denotes the height of Ghana's dependence on foreign aid. Ironically, as will be shown later, this period also attests to the nation's desperate attempts to break away from a serious crisis generated by a sense of helplessness in the face of mounting economic problems. With declining productivity and no available foreign exchange reserves to depend on, the only alternative was foreign aid. U. S. aid was used for three main purposes :

1. to finance day-to-day economic activities ;
2. to undertake long-term economic planning ; and
3. to ease the balance of payments problems.

On the whole the attitude toward the U. S. was favorable because of the need for more external aid, and the necessity to reschedule external debts, the bulk of which was owed to Western nations.

The largest single (organized) group affected by the worsening economic conditions were the trade unions, and they came out strongly against foreign aid and the government's economic policies. On several occasions trade union leaders argued that too much dependence on foreign financial aid would never help resurrect Ghana's shattered economy. Consequently, they advocated reliance on the nation's own resources for development.⁷

Apart from the trade unions groups and individuals were growing skeptical about U. S. aid. It was clear that despite the seemingly enormous amount of U. S. aid received the economy kept worsening. Perhaps, the biggest concern was the sudden realization that the most serious economic problem facing the country was the national debt that had accumulated over the years. In the period 1968-71 concerns over the economy and the national debt clearly overshadowed the Peace Corps. Moreover, the country had three full-fledge universities to produce enough graduates to fill the gap that was normally filled by the Peace Corps.

Debt Burden

By 1968 Ghana's external debt was more than \$ 1003 million, and its repayment had become the single most important issue in the headlines. With the country, there was a major consensus that some of the debts were not sacrosanct, for they were contracted in an atmosphere of corruption and insanity

7. Olajide Aluko, Ghana's Foreign Policy" in Aluko's ed., *The Foreign Policies of African States*, (London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).

in complete disregard to their commercial feasibility. Nevertheless, there was a sharp disagreement as to whether these dubious debts should be repudiated or be paid.

The opponents of further debt payment referred constantly to the effects of the debts and also the burden on future development. Estimates indicated that the "debt of \$ 1003 million to about \$ 125 per head as opposed to the per head annual income of \$ 211 or a gross of \$ 211 million." Most economic forecasts painted a glossy picture as a result of debt repayment and higher interest rates.

It was now being felt that debt repayment would adversely affect economic growth, increase unemployment and worsen the balance of repayments position of the country. Worst of all it would be necessary to resort to further borrowing in order to finance new projects.

The ultimate culmination in everybody's mind was finally made known : if the donor nations are serious about aiding Ghana, why not give a break to the poor country by repudiating some of the debts or, at least, agreeing to reschedule them. As a matter of fact, the government had made several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate for better terms with the creditors (U.S. included). Despite its failures at the negotiating table, the Ghanaian government argued vigorously against repudiation of the debt. Obviously, it feared the consequences because the creditor-nations were also the major aid-givers and the government could not afford to

antagonize them by repudiating debts it had labeled dubious.

This is where the vulnerability of the country becomes apparent. As a consequence of the economy's dependence on external finance the nation was unable to pursue policies that were considered necessary to revive the economy. Though the repayment of the debts under present conditions were impossible, and the creditors were unwilling to agree to any new terms, the alternative was even unthinkable. Apart from the memories of colonialism, never before had Ghanaians been so exposed to a fundamental fact of international relations—that nations act in their own self-interest. The creditors had been very uncooperative; they were not even concerned about the plight of the Ghanaian economy. Above all, what bothered Ghanaians most was the apparent refusal of the creditors even to negotiate with Ghana as individual nations. Consequently, in all its debt talks Ghana had to confront the numerous creditors all at the same time under pre-arranged conditions.

In fact, the debt burden was a bitter pill for Ghanaians to swallow. Even the U.S., the closest friend the country has had since 1966 would not yield when it came to the repayment of debts. In the midst of all the disappointment and frustration with the creditors and despite the fact that the debts were described as dubious, most Ghanaians blamed the corruption and mismanagement of the first civilian government for the debt problem. In other words, there was nothing wrong with the aid,

money was only misused. Perhaps, this was a good tactic to convince the creditors that the country had a new image and a new leadership. Lastly, it was better to discredit a government that had already fallen out of favour than to confront the creditors and the donors with accusations. Needless to say that by the end of 1971 one could recognize a deep sense of frustration over the debt burden and the apparent inability to find relief domestically or internationally.

Second Military Government (1972-77)

When Busia's Government was overthrown in a coup d'etat in February 1972 most experts believed that the governments's downfall was the result of gross inefficiency and economic mismanagement. According to Aluko the government's liberal economic policies were ill-advised, and that the unwise massive devaluation of the cedi by 48.58 in December, 1971, was the immediate cause for the coup. Ronald Libby holds a similar opinion :

The economic difficulties that precipitated the downfall of the previous regime also dictated behaviour in the new era. The government responded swiftly to public opinion by attacking the debt question head-on.

Most important of all, the government announced the repudiation of some of the country's debts. About \$94.4 million was repudiated, representing one-third of the principal debts arising from supplier's credits contracted during the Nkrumah's regime. However, genuine debts were to be

honoured, but with a 50-year moratorium. Similarly Ghana was to honour long-term debts which arose principally out of long-term loans and credits granted by the World Bank, International Development Association (IDA), the Government of the U.S. and Governments of other donor nations.

The general feeling in the nation was exemplified, perhaps typified by the demonstrations of the country's university students in support of the debt repudiation. The attitude toward U.S. aid was dictated by the bitter lessons learned through the year.

1. That extreme dependence on external resources was harmful to both the nation's long-term economic planning and short-term policies and programmes.
2. The foreign aid is normally given in the economic interests of the donor.
3. That despite the assistance from the U.S. and to others, the country's currency had to be devalued twice in five years ; the so-called friends could have salvaged the Ghanain economy.
4. That mounting foreign debts consequently leads to foreign control of the national government.
5. The projects built with external funds are generally structured in such a way that they would remain perpetually dependent on imports from foreign supplies.

A completely new orientation had taken place in the country. The first major realization was that foreign aid does not pay. Moreover, if aid money becomes unproductive its side-effects are obviously disastrous, external debts. Though not denying past economic mismanagement, a new pattern of thought was that Ghana's economic disaster should be explained in structural terms. Throughout the years no radical measures had been initiated to diversify the economy in order to lessen its dependence on a few primary commodities for the foreign exchange it needed. Consequently, the majority of external assistance in the past had been unproductive simply because it had been used for the wrong causes. This only encouraged the continuing foreign orientation of the Ghanaian economy. True aid, defined as the type that would stimulate structural changes in the economy was never received, or was very limited, thus making it ineffective.

This background served as the impetus for a new attitude toward U.S. aid. In a way the new policy of self-reliance was partly due to the inability to get any further aid from abroad since the repudiation of external debts.

By this policy the country chose to rely on its own resources and ask for aid only if it would fall within the guidelines of the nation's development plans. The acceptance of this policy significantly affected the evaluation of development aid. To the government the policy was a means to rationalize its inability to receive external funds for

development ; to most of the people it provided an opportunity to return to the old familiar theme that aid does not promote development but rather it contributes to underdevelopment and dependency by making the recipient poorer and poorer.

Another dimension of the Ghanaian attitude was the conception that trade was preferable to aid. Giving the extent of Ghana's economic problems, the opinion indicated, only trade expansion within the country coupled with reform of the unjust economic relations between the rich and the poor nations could be the right prescription. Thus, in terms of priorities for development, foreign aid from the U.S. became a secondary issue.

The case of Ghana from 1960-77 offers three different cases. First, the attitude toward U.S. aid was unfavourable between 1960-65 when it was believed that the U.S. was the leading imperialist, neo-colonialist power whose aid was an instrument for external control. On the other hand, the period from 1966-71 denotes classical case of extreme reliance on U.S. aid. The U.S. was believed to be a good friend, and its aid was in Ghana's best interest. Lastly, Ghanaian became indifferent to U.S. aid after 1971. After all, U.S. aid did not bring the type of economic benefits people had anticipated.

NIGERIA : ATTITUDES TOWARD AID

The development of Nigerian attitude toward U.S. aid has been affected by several domestic vari-

ables. The character of the federal government, the domestic economy, the large and diverse population, and the perceived role of Nigeria in Africa together have dictated the attitude toward the U.S. These variables also account for the apparent differences between the two regimes examined in Nigeria.

Civilian Regime (1960-65)

Nigerian foreign policy during the civilian govt, has been described by most writers as conservative, cautious, and extremely pro-West. Not surprisingly the Nigerian attitude toward the U.S. was generally favourable, and this continued until the coup in early 1966.

On January 15, 1960, a Federal Government Economist called on the U.S. to aid the economic development of Nigeria. Generally speaking, he was merely echoing the sentiment of the nation. Officially, Nigeria had stated clearly that it was committed to a far reaching programme of development in education, agriculture, trade and industry with the hope to raise the standard of living of the people. A universal call was issued to all friendly nations to assist in the development effort. According to the Nigerian perception the U.S. response was excellent. Through a series of negotiations U.S. aid came in several forms :

1. Technical aid, in the form of American technical advisors for Nigeria ;
2. Technical aid, including the Peace Corps, Scholarships for Nigerians to study in the

U.S., and funds and equipment for Nigerian schools ;

3. Aid for basic human needs, in the form of aid for transportation, communications, health care, and electric power for both domestic and industrial use ; and
4. Aid for agriculture.

In the early 1960's public opinion in Nigeria heavily favoured some kind of reliance on U.S. aid. American aid was considered indispensable to Nigeria's development. Most writers frequently referred to the lack of development before independence which made it absolutely necessary to rely on external aid. Like many African nations at that time. Nigeria admitted that it could not engage in any major development projects without help from outside. Colonialism was partly blamed for the country's economic status as a poor nation in a world sharply divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots". The gulf between the rich and poor made it imperative for the latter to import technological know-how from the rich because of inability to accumulate it at home. There was every indication that Nigerians would have preferred trade to aid, for trade was much more dignifying to the new nation than aid. However, the "laws of supply and demand were likely to operate against the poor nation." As a consequence of Nigeria's subordinate status in the world political economy, it was concluded that capital accumulation through trade would be a tedious process, whereas the country needed a more radical approach to development.

Nigeria's need for foreign aid was a predominant factor in the first two development plans-the Seven-Year Plan (1955-62) and the Six Year Plan (1962-68). For the Six-Year Plan (which falls within the limits of this article) the estimates showed that about 50% of the total investment in the public sector was to come from foreign aid. Though several Nigerian critics contended that the U.S. effort toward the plan left much more to be desired, it was generally agreed that it was a generous gesture. Moreover, U.S. aid not only demonstrated its confidence in the Nigerian economy, but also America's long term commitment to Nigeria's future. U.S. confidence in Nigeria, it was hoped, would also stimulate private American investment to supplement U.S. aid. To most of the writers the two were basically the same in that they were given by the American people to help Nigeria in the short-run, and the latter was bound to repay in the long-run.

The Nigerian approach to U.S. aid was more "business-like." A recurrent theme among many people was that the country was rich in resources, and that its need for aid was absolutely short-term. This behavioural trait could possibly explain the extent of enthusiasm for American aid. Aid was considered to be mutually beneficial for the U.S. as well as Nigeria. In that case, Nigeria was entitled to more U.S. aid without having to beg for it :

Consequently, all Nigeria had to do was to show sincerity to the U.S. the benefits it would derive from aiding the economic development of Nigeria. Lastly every attempt was made to project

the image of Nigeria as a big, potentially rich and stable country, offering a good environment for aid and investment.

Despite Nigerian's positive attitude toward U.S. aid and their optimism about the future potential of the country's economy there was a few isolated cases of warnings against reliance on U.S. aid for fear of adverse consequences. It was feared that as a result of aid the Nigerian government might sacrifice non-alignment for a pro-West policy. Given the fact that aid was mutually beneficial to the donor and the recipient, these writers unequivocally called on the Nigerian government to reject all aid with strings attached (whether political or economic). Aid with strings attached they argued, reduce the effectiveness of that particular aid, both economically and politically.

Most people also feared that the country would become susceptible to American influence. In fact, they accused the government for tilting too much to the West.

Once again, as a result of its "business-like" approach to aid, most people were curious to find out what Nigeria had to offer in return for U.S. aid. This question was put to the government several times. Another persistently expressed opinion was the need to avoid long-term dependence on foreign experts. As a corollary, technical aid was considered a noble concept, but it was often offered to retain some of the positions of privilege in the economic and administrative organizations of the new nations. In short, the best approach to

Nigeria's manpower needs, it was to utilize aid money to train local personnel for a sustained economic growth in the country.

Peace Corps

The Peace Corps was terminated in Nigeria during the Civil War (1960-1969) and it was not resumed afterwards. When the programme was active during the early 1960's it was favourable evaluated by the people. The call for the Peace Corps was first made by the Federal Government in order to ease the shortage of personnel in the country. According to the Government, the Peace Corps was needed to help develop the country in technical, scientific and professional fields. Both the government and the people praised the role of the Peace Corps. The services provided by the volunteers were regarded as invaluable to the cultural and educational development of the country.

By 1965, about 566 Peace Corps volunteers were stationed in Nigeria, and many people shared the view of the government that they were ambassadors of goodwill and benefaction, promoting cordial relations between the U.S. and Nigeria. Here the emphasis was placed on the hope or realization that the Peace Corps will bring understanding between the people of the U.S. and Nigeria. With a few exceptions the programme was described as a success.

Nonetheless, the minority opinion cannot be safely ignored, for it represented, among others, the views of students of all Nigerian Universities

at the time. On the whole, the student community was silent on the Peace Corps at the initial stages. Basically, the Peace Corps volunteers were assigned to secondary and technical schools and they had very little to do with the universities. The students silence was however broken by one incident in which a Peace Corps volunteer allegedly wrote an insulting letter about Nigeria intended for her parents. For some reason the contents of that personal letter became publicly known. A public outcry ensued that ultimately forced the volunteer to resign. The incident brought strong reactions from university students. Student leaders organized several demonstrations on university campuses against the entire Peace Corps scheme. The National Union of Nigerian students passed a resolution calling the government to probe the activities of the Peace Corps, and "to deport immediately these agents of imperialism."

The actions taken by the students stimulated a hot debate about the merits and demerits of the Peace Corps schemes. It is difficult to tell if the actions of the students were supported by a majority of the people. It is interesting to note, however, that while several editorials agreed with the students for condemning that individual member, they all seemed to indicate that the entire Peace Corps scheme should not be attacked for the action of one person. In fact, on the question of abolishing the entire Peace Corps the students did not receive much support from the general population. If anything, this attitude could be taken to indicate

the support the Peace Corps had among the citizens of Nigeria.

Military Regime (1970-1977)

Between 1966-1969 a bitter civil war almost tore Nigeria apart. Curiously, the nation emerged from the war more unified socially, and politically, there emerged a Federal Government stronger and more able to act without undue domestic encroachment. Perhaps, the most dramatic and visible change in Nigeria after the war has been the growth of crude oil production and sales in the world market. The oil boom has provided Nigerians with a greater sense of economic independence.

In view of all these changes one would expect some major differences between the two periods (civilian and military) with regard to the attitude toward the U.S. The major variable that accounts for the difference in attitude, is Nigeria's oil revenues and its ability to pay for the much needed external resources. In fact, this crucial variable was missing during the first regime.

Immediately after the war an appeal was issued to all friendly nations to aid in Nigeria's economic reconstruction. Initially, U.S. contributed what was termed a reasonable amount toward the reconstruction of the Nigerian economy. Largely in response to aid from donor nations U.S. not specifically mentioned) the Nigerian Government, through pressure from several groups made it clearly known that "Nigeria was not a beggar-nation." Many people in Nigeria resented the indiscriminated acceptance

of aid from all nations. Ironically, most Nigerians thought some of the potential aidgivers could use some aid from Nigeria. As a further reaction to indiscriminate aid acceptance, most people called for a policy of self-reliance in order to make Nigeria dependent on its own people and resources. Obviously the pride of many Nigerians was hurt by the generosity of many friendly nations.

Even before the oil boom began in 1974 the general resentment of foreign aid had significantly affected the attitude toward U.S. aid. Therefore, the oil boom merely provided the machinery to reinforce a trend that had already begun. Between 1970-77 the countries need for external aid declined considerably. By 1975 total U.S. economic aid to Nigeria had declined to \$2.5 million, from \$44.4 million in 1970. In 1975 the U.S. terminated all concessional assistance to Nigeria. The new development in Nigeria's attitude toward U.S. aid was that Nigeria was able and willing to pay for the capital and technical assistance it needed for development. Needless to ask how this affected the evaluation of U.S. foreign aid.

Another noticable change was that Nigeria had the right to dictate the type of aid it wanted, and the conditions under which it would receive U.S. aid. At this point, we could see a vigorous rebirth of the old "business-like" attitude toward aid. Since Nigeria was going to repay U.S. aid faster than other developing nations, the country also deserved the privilege to dictate aid conditions.

This approach was also meant to give the country the freedom to channel aid money to the appropriate sectors to achieve rapid industrialization. In other words, it was designed to induce flexibility in planning, and to avoid distortion of priorities in the national development programmes.

Were Nigerians really interested in aid at that time? In essence, they were asking for technical aid and equipment for which they were prepared to pay the real cost. It seems that they showed more interest in trade than aid per se. For example, several writers began to question the logic of food aid in a manner that implied a shift from aid to trade.

The statement, which was typical, goes to show that many people were not interested in any kind of aid, especially the type that would perpetuate the country's dependence on external sources for survival, for a long time. What was needed was short-term assistance that would give Nigeria the technology to survive on her own.

Another trend in the Nigerian attitude at that time was the growing skepticism about the rationale of U.S. aid, not only in Nigeria but in the Third World in general. Most writers identified what they commonly referred to as the "facade of U.S. assistance." Assuming that U.S. aid was mainly designed to help the poor nations economically many wondered about the wide disparity between military and development aid.

As if to crown it all, one incident involving U.S. aid to Nigeria gave most Nigerians the pretext they needed to express their innermost feelings about U.S. aid. The scholarship of a Nigerian student in the U.S. was revoked by AID because of a personal letter he wrote to his parents in which he criticized certain U.S. policies was intercepted. The editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor all had a similar tone : "go to hell". This is how one editorial put it :

You may recall that when a similar incident occurred with a Peace Corps member in the early 1960's Nigerian students reacted angrily and asked the government to expell all Peace Corps members. Well, this was in 1974 when Nigeria's need for aid had changed considerably. Nevertheless, amidst all the strong talk about U.S. aid there were a few realists who sincerely thought that Nigeria, despite her oil, would still have to rely to some extent on U.S. technical aid for quite some time in order to achieve its goal of rapid economic development.

CONCLUSION : THE REALITY OF DEPENDENCE AND PERCEPTION DANGER

When Ghana and Nigeria attained political independence in 1957 and 1960, respectively, the leaders of these two nations knew that economic development was necessary to make political independence a reality. Control over political structures were handed over to Ghanaians and Nigerians during independence, but the economy still main-

tained its foreign orientation and external dependence. In 1960 there was a paradoxical situation of political independence and economic dependence in Ghana and Nigeria. According to dependency theorists economic progress becomes difficult in such a situation because the laws of supply and demand normally work against the primary producer (the dependent nation). Moreover, the rich nations deliberately resist change to maintain their dominant status.

The situation in Ghana and Nigeria was such that they had to face the twin problems of dependency and underdevelopment at the same time. To solve the latter problem aid was considered crucial.

On the other hand, dependency theorists argue that aid reinforces dependency which, in turn, hampers development. Therefore, how does a poor nation get out of this dilemma? This is where the psychology of dependency becomes important. Do Third World nations actually feel their economies are dependent, or dependency is just an academic fantasy? If these nations feel they are dependent, what strategies are available to them in dealing with the developed world: collaboration or confrontation? Lastly, what are the perceived options available to the peripheral state?

It is argued that economic dependence is manifested in five ways in the Third World, including dependence through development aid and technical

expertise. If aid reinforces dependence, why did Ghana and Nigeria decide to rely on U.S. development and technical aid? In 1960 nations believed that as a result of colonialism the only way to achieve rapid economic development was to accept external aid, including U.S. aid. These nations indicated that they would have preferred trade to aid, but because they could not generate enough money from trade they had to rely on aid in the short run, until trade had been developed. In the early 1960's they foresaw limited range of options available for two main reasons. The post-colonial economy could not produce enough goods for export to get the needed foreign exchange. Further, lack of skills and technical expertise was a constraint on development.

Another reason for the earlier enthusiasm for aid was the "misperception" of the motivations of foreign aid. For instance, Ghanaians perceived U.S. aid on moral grounds; a friendly nation was generously sacrificing its money to help Ghana. In Nigeria, U.S. aid was evaluated in terms of the mutual benefits it would bring to the economy's of the U.S. as well as Nigeria. Further, they thought of their relationship with the U.S. as interdependence rather than dependence. Since both nations never perceived their economies to be in a peripheral status, they also did not bother about dangers of further dependence through aid. Consequently, U.S. aid was welcome for the anticipated benefits and the positive impact it would have on their economies. That was the

case in Ghana from 1960-63 and Nigeria from 1960-65.

The Ghanaian perspective on U.S. aid changed from 1963 onwards. The negative attitude that emerged was not related to the economic performance of U.S. aid. Rather Ghanaians began to look at the political effects of economic dependence. There was persistent talk of a new form of colonialism that threatened the independence of the nation. It was argued that the advanced capitalist nations, led by the U.S., were using other means, principally economic to destroy the independence of the new nations. That was the first perception of danger in accepting U.S. aid. To most Ghanaians U.S. aid was good, but the donor was imperialist and neo-colonialist. External aid was still needed for economic development, except that the political ramifications of U.S. aid was unacceptable.

Between 1966-71 Ghanaian attitude toward U.S. aid changed again. For this five year period the economy experienced little or no growth. As expected this period also denotes the country's extreme dependence on U.S. aid. It was believed that foreign aid was the fastest available solution to the economic crisis at that time. The economic slump was caused mainly by the decline in the world market price for cocoa, the country's main export commodity. The reality of economic dependence was obvious in that case. The cause of the country's economic problems was the nature of the post-colonial economy. Once again, external aid was the answer. Interestingly, the blame for the country's economic woes

was put on economic mismanagement of Nkrumah's Government (1960-65). No attempt was made to link the poor performance of the Ghanaian economy to the world economy. Meantime, the economy continued to depend on a few primary commodities ; and foreign aid was believed to be the only hope in the short-run.

By the end of 1971 the adverse effects of aid had further worsened the Ghanaian economy. Despite extensive aid from all sources, the economy continued its foreign orientation. Whatever progress was made did not affect the basic structure of the economy. While agricultural production was still for export, the few industries set up depended on raw materials and technology from abroad. If the positive effect of aid was invisible, its negative impact was real. External debts arising out of aid was over \$1003 million by the end of 1971. We may add however that despite the detrimental effects of the debts repayment on the economy, U.S. aid was favourably received by many Ghanaians. Perhaps, this was due to the need for more aid to revitalize the ailing economy. After all, bad money was better than no money. Further, the country could not afford a policy of confrontation with the creditor nations. This explains why the country felt the debts were bad for the country. Thus, there was a perception of danger from aid, but this was better than a confrontation with the donors.

Between 1972-77 most of the Ghanaian authors favoured a policy of self-reliance in place of dependence on foreign aid. Through the experience over

the years it had become clear that foreign aid could not solve their economic problems. In addition, the unanticipated consequences of aid—external debts—had become unbearable. During this period it was felt that a policy of confrontation was appropriate. In line with public opinion, the government moved to repudiate a part of the external debts. Afterwards, when the country could not get any foreign aid from the major donors (U.S. included) self-reliance became the official policy. The economy was still in a subordinate status, but the only alternative was to depend on local resources for development.

The pattern of development of Nigerian attitude toward the U.S. aid has been slightly different from Ghana. As already indicated Nigerians (1960-65) argued that the status of the post-colonial economy was the main reason for their acceptance of U.S. aid. At that time, the emphasis was put on short-run aid because it would take a longer time to develop viable trade to earn the required foreign exchange for economic development. In addition, it was believed that if the U.S. would step up its aid to Nigeria, she could quit the poor man's club through the judicious use of external aid. Nevertheless, many Nigerians felt that the U.S. was just not ready to commit large sums of aid money to Nigeria because East-West rivalry was the major determinant of U.S. aid allocation and Nigeria was non-aligned. Therefore, the long-term solution to Nigeria's development problem was trade, not aid.

Surely, when Nigerian trade improved tremen-

dously after 1974 its attitude toward U.S. aid also changed. As a result of its oil revenues Nigerians felt they could pay for the external resources they needed for development. In other words, it was time to put more emphasis on trade than aid. Oil had increased the bargaining power of Nigeria in the world market, and this was correctly perceived by Nigerians. This time trade was to be used to stimulate development and to achieve economic independence, not aid. Therefore, Nigeria (1970-77) was able to avoid the circular process that it went through between 1960-65, and which also affected Ghana throughout the years. By the end of 1977 Nigerians had accepted the call for self-reliance.

Thus by 1977 both Ghana and Nigeria had rejected aid as the principal engine of growth in favour of self-reliance. In statistical terms self-reliance means indifferent attitude toward aid. Third World nations that claim to be non-aligned are more inclined to fashion their economic policies in terms of their own needs, problems and experience. It helps the poor nation to deploy aid money to avoid the distortion of priorities in national development plans ; it also allows flexibility in the selection of products in order to ensure maximum benefits.

We may ask the question, what is the probability of success of self-reliance in Ghana and Nigeria ? Self-reliance does not mean disengagement from the world economy, neither does it imply confrontation. It is simply intended as a means to achieve fair cooperation that will ultimately bring about genuine interdependence among nations. In Ghana, self-

reliance was a last resort. The inability to get aid as well as the bad experience with aid left no other alternative. In Nigeria, it came as a result of the sudden realization that the country had enough resources for its own development. The success of these efforts in Ghana and Nigeria will require a fundamental change in their attitude toward U.S. aid. U.S. aid has never been intended as a substitute for domestic resources ; it is merely a supplement to domestic efforts. If self-reliance brings about this fundamental orientation it may be a step in the right direction. As Nigeria's experience has shown, aid will still be needed, but only genuine aid that will bring in the needed technology to make structural changes in the domestic economy, will be acceptable.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN : THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

Hameed A. K. Rai

The Russian intervention in Afghanistan, which was a surprise to the world in December, 1979 is still continuing with all its barbarity. In spite of its condemnations at international forums, the Soviet Union has not taken any serious notice of these protests. This leads one to examine the crucial question *i.e.* is the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan justified under Article 51 of the U.N. charter, or the Afghan-USSR Treaty of friendship of 1978 and if not, does it constitute aggression ?

For a clear understanding of the problem, it is imperative to know a brief background of the chequered history of Representative Government in Afghanistan. The first constitution in Afghanistan was introduced in 1931, which invested the supreme legislative power in the Afghan King, the Senate and the Lower House. In October, 1964 the King of Afghanistan promulgated a new constitution. This defined Afghanistan as a constitutional Monarchy, the King to be an Afghan national, a Muslim and follower of the Hanafi School of Islam. It provided for a bicameral Shura (Parliament), the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) consisting of 87 members, one third appointed by the King and

others elected from provinces for five years. The Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House) consisted of 215 members elected for a four years term by Universal Adult suffrage. A third body the Loya Jirga comprised of all members of the Shura and all chairman of the 29 provincial councils. The Loya Jirga was to aid and advise the King in emergency and was a permanent body.

The new constitution enabled Noor Mohammad Taraki to found the People's Democratic Party (PDP) on January 1, 1965.¹ It started its own paper Nida-i-Khalq. Among other political groups which made their appearance were Sholaye-Jawed, which was Maoist and the Progressive Democratic Party led by Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, a former Prime Minister. The PDP contested the election of 1965, in which Babrak Karmal, Dr. Mrs. Anahita Ratebzad and Nur Muhammad Nur were elected to the Lower House whereas Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin lost from amongst the member of the Central Committee of the PDP. The newspaper Nida-i-Khalq was closed after a violent students riots in Kabul in 1955. In 1967 the PDP spilt into two hostile factions the Khalqis and Parchames because of more ambitious role by Babrak Karmal. The Former were rural based and the latter urban based. Karmal brought out his own paper Parcham in March, 1968. In the 1969 elections, although, all these communist leaders were elected yet the overall vote ratio

1. Tahir Amin. *Afghanistan crisis*, (Institute of Policy studies, Islamabad, 1982), p. 37.

dropped in 1969. However, the constitution was shortlived and on 17th July, 1973 Sardar Mohammad Daud, cousin and brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah, staged a coup, proclaimed Afghanistan a Republic and became its first President. A new constitution was adopted in 14th January, 1977. In the meantime, Sardar Daud tried to become more independent from the Soviet Union which was a serious challenge for the Russian leadership in Moscow. The PDP has infiltrated the Army and both its factions Khalq and Parcham reconciled in the summer of 1977. There were a series of political assassinations in Kabul. The last assassination, before Sardar Daud met his tragic end took place on the night of April 17, 1978. Mr. Akbar Khyber, one time editor of Parcham, was murdered. The PDP staged a big demonstration when ten to fifteen thousand persons took part in the funeral procession of Khyber.¹

Daud arrested leading members of PDP. The Afghan military, which was already infiltrated by elements of PDP staged an armed uprising. On April 27, 1978, Col. Abdul Qadar of the Afghan Air Force, one time colleague of Daud of the 1973 Coup attacked the presidential place in which Daud was killed. Col. Qadar announced on Kabul Radio the death of Daud and declared Afghanistan as a Democratic Republic: "all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan. The.....of the state fully rests with the Revolutionary Command Council of the armed Forces."

2. N. P. Newell and R. S. Newell, *the struggle for Afghanistan* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1981), p. 68

Two days later, the Revolutionary council was reconstituted and had 30 civilians and 5 military men as members. The R.C. was a body *Sui generis* (self created). It did not owe its existence to any fundamental or basic law. It made no attempt to gain public approval. By decree No. I of April 30, 1978 Nur Mohammad Taraki was proclaimed President of the R.C. and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Decree also named the R.C. as the principle governing body and declared that the cabinet will be responsible to it. Russia extended recognition to the DRA on the very same day.

The unity of Khalq and Parcham was short-lived. A plot hatched by Parcham under Karmal to overthrow Taraki was uncovered in August, 1978. Abdul Qadar, who had proudly proclaimed over Kabul Radio the death of Sardar Daud and the birth of DRA and who was mainly responsible for the air strikes on the Presidential palace was arrested for plotting against the regime. Others picked up soon after included, the Chief of Staff Lt. General Shahpur, President of Jamhouriya Hospital, Dr. Mir Ali Akbar, Minister of planning, Sultan Ali Kheshtmand, Minister of Public Works, Lt. Col. Mohammad Rafi and Minister of Frontier Affairs, Nizam-ud-Din Tehzib. These arrests were made on August 17, 1978. All of them confessed plotting against the Saur Revolution. Other important members of Parcham *i.e.* Babrak Karmal, Dr. Mrs. Bnahita Ratebzad and Nur Mohammad Nur were already sent by Taraki to East European

Countries as Ambassadors. Taraki, after discovery of the plot, ordered them to return to Kabul but they ignored the orders and went to Moscow. Keshtmand, Qader and Shahpur were sentenced to death by Taraki but before they could be executed, Taraki himself was toppled by Amin, who commuted their death sentence to 15 years imprisonment.

Differences between Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin (both of them Khalqis) had sprung up immediately after the so-called Saur Revolution of April, 1978. Amin, obviously desired to elbow out Taraki, his President. The "palace intrigues" came ahead by March, 1979, when Amin, who then was the Foreign Minister, was named Prime Minister replacing Taraki, who, however, remained as President of DRA. Kabul Radio reported the change in the Government on March 27, 1979. It also reported that the R.C. has empowered Hafiz Ullah Amin to revamp the Government.

Even the hardy Afghans could not bear the unmitigated terror and persecution of Taraki's Government. This enabled Amin to stage a coup on September 14-15, 1979 when Taraki was first taken prisoner (after an exchange of fire, right outside his office) by military units loyal to Amin and later strangled to death on October 8, 1979. For the media, Tarak's sudden death was ascribed to a grave illness. The ouster of Taraki in mid-September, 1979 was, therefore, no sudden development but the culmination of the on going power struggle within the ruling party of Afghanistan.

Hafizullah Amin was the second President of DRA. Like Taraki, he also owed his office to intrigue, force and violence. Congratulatory telegrams on his accession to power poured from the Russian bloc and they extended recognition to Amin's Government.

Amin had inherited from Taraki, a party riddled with factions and divided on personalities. Elimination of Taraki did not eliminate other ambitious groups and the Parcham leadership was in the sanctuary of East European Countries. There was mounting unrest in the country and the ranks of the standing Army were fast dwindling by desertions.

In mid-October, 1979, Amin survived a coup when army units loyal to Major Watan Yar rose up in revolt near Kabul.

In the meantime the number of Russian military delegations to Afghanistan all headed by senior ranking officers of Russia, increased. General Epishev, had led a Military Delegation in late May, 1979, followed by the Russian Deputy Minister of Interior, Lt. General Viktor S. Paputin on November 28, 1979. It is said that he remained in Afghanistan up to December 13, 1979.³ General Paputin's death was announced in an obituary reference dated December 28, 1979 published in Pravda on January 3, 1980. The circumstances in which he met his end are still obscure.

3. Inquiry Committee Report on Afghanistan *Radiance Weekly India* (April 4, 1982), p. 9.

Real Story

Amin's nephew, Assadullah Amin, who was the Chief of Intelligence service of Afghanistan, was stated to be seriously wounded in an assassination attempt on December 17, 1979. He was evacuated to Tashkent for treatment and after Amin's fall, the Russian handed him over to Babrak Karmal, who got him executed. But according to observers, the real story is different ; that Assadullah Amin was wounded in an exchange of fire between him and Geaeral Paputin, who was wrongly reported as having left Afghanistan on December 13, 1979. Both injured persons were removed from Kabul. Assadullah Amin to Tashkent and General Paputin to Moscow. General Paputin died and Assadullah Amin, as already stated, was executed. It is likely that General Paputin's death became the immediate cause of Russian Military intervention in Afghanistan.

Hafizullah Amin was killed on December 27, 1979 and Babrak Karmal made his first broadcast on December 27 as the third President of DRA. Some say, Amin was killed on December 29, 1979 and Karmal did not make his broadcast on December 27, 1979, over Kabul Radio. This fact is important.

The Press Agency Tass, on December 28, 1979 said the new Government has called on Russian Government to provide "urgent political moral and economic aid, including military aid". In a separate report Tass said that President Leonid Brezhnev congratulated Babrak Karmal on his "election

to be post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA and to the highest state post."

The Russian troops had entered ; Afghanistan in strength in around December 23, 1279. The Indian institute of stretegic studies has given the date entry of Russian troops as December 27, 1979 and their number as 5,0000. It is obviously impossible to move such a large force in one day. If Tass is to be believed the Afghan Government which called on Russia for aid could not be Hafizullah Amin's Government. And on December 23 or 27, 1979 there was no other government in Afghanistan.

There appears to be convincing evidence that Babrak Karmal was not in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. His broadcast to the people of Afghanistan was made from Radio Tashkent. This is borne out by evidence of witness who stated, that Kabul Radio was broadcasting music at the time Babrak Karmal is said to have delivered his broadcast message on the Radio. Even the Russian Government official publication on Afghanistan does not contain the text of Karmal's broadcast said to be made on December 27, 1979. The broadcast is dated December 29, 1979 in that document.

Leonid Brezhnev's congratulatory message is also significant Amin was the President of Revolutionary council and only he had the power under Article XVI of the Decree of March 31, 1979 to call the extraordinary session of the R.C. Amin did not call any such meeting for electing General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDP or the President of DRA.

We have noticed above some articles of the decree of March, 1979. For the "invitation" to Russian Government for military aid to be "valid" under international law, it must be sustainable by some express provisions of that decree. We fail to find any support from the relevant articles of the decree that any valid invitation by a competent body or authority or Government of Afghanistan was made to the Russian Government.

The Italian Communist Party on January 5, 1980, condemned the Russian Intervention in Afghanistan as "a violation of the principal of independence and national sovereignty". On February 6, 1960, a two day meeting of twelve communist states was held in Bulgaria, where Romania and North Korea refused to sign the statement endorsing Russian intervention in Afghanistan.

ARTICLE ELEVEN

On April 21, 1960 "in the name of God, the compassionate and merciful, the Government of Babrak Karmal promulgated "the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." This replaced the Decree of March 31, 1979. Article 11 of the Fundamental Principle says "the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will expand and strengthen its friendship and traditional all out cooperation and friendly relations with other countries of Socialist alliance on the basis of international solidarity" This article enjoines higher standing than a mere policy statement it say DRA will expand relations with Russia on the basis of sovereign equality but international solidarity."

Article 11 contains this unique provision which is unheard of in any other constitutional document of the world, not even in the constitutions of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or other East European states and even the Soviet Union. This is a serious pointer to the status of DPRA before the law of nations. More so when the Russian constitution makes no similar provision for Afghanistan. Even the March 31, 1979 decree of Taraki's Government did not contain any such provision. It was introduced only after the entry in strength of thousands of Russian soldiers into Afghanistan. This is the classical case of vassalage. This is a clear cut evidence of Russian interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Russian Position :

The Novosti Press Agency has published "the Truth about Afghanistan" subtitled "Documents, facts and eye witness Reports"⁴ and circulated by Soviet Embassies all over the world. Its foreward states "In order to repulse the outside imperialist aggression, the new leadership of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union to render it prompt moral, political, economic and military assistance. Such requests had in fact been made to Afghanistan's northern neighbour a number of times both under President Taraki and later.

The Soviet Union granted that request and sent limited troop contingents to Afghanistan with the sole task of helping the Afghans to fight the aggres-

4. *The Truth about Afghanistan*. (Moscow ; Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1980), P. 10.

sors. It was anticipated that the Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan territory when their mission was fulfilled.

“In no-way is this assistance limited in time, purpose and scale directed against or does it infringe upon the interests of third countries. It is valid and legitimate, since it has been provided fully in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation, which the two countries signed in December 1978, and it is in keeping with International Law specifically Article 51 of the U.N. charter which provide for the inalienable right of states to collective and individual self-defence against aggression.

The action taken jointly by Afghanistan and the USSR is of an exclusively defensive nature and was motivated by the pressing need resolutely and once for all to put an end to armed and any other interference by external forces hostile to Afghanistan.”⁵

On January 13, 1980 Leonid Brezhnev, in an interview to the Pravda correspondent, said, if the “limited contingent” of the Russian armed forces had not been sent to Afghanistan it “would have meant passively watching the creation on our southern border of a source of serious danger to the security of the Soviet State.”⁶

5. *Ibid.*

6. Leonid Brezhnev's interview to Pravada (Moscow) published on 13 January, 1980 see also K. P. Misra, *Afghanistan in Crisis* (Vikas publishing House PVT Ltd., New Delhi, 1981), p. 12-13.

Referring to the Treaty of Friendship, he said, "the request proceeded from the clear cut provisions of that Treaty and also from the right of each state, in accordance with the U.N. charter, to individual or collective self-defence."

Mr. Brezhnev added, "it was not easy decision for us to send military contingents to Afgaanistan. But the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet Government acted in full awareness of their responsibility and took into account all the relevant circumstances. The only task of the Soviet contingents is to assist the Afghans in repulsing the aggression from outside. They will be withdrawn from Afghanistan once the reasons from the Afghan leadership's request for them disappears."

On December 29, 1979, Babrak Karmal an assuming power in Kabul delivered an address, the text of which was circulated by Russian Embassy. In this Babrak Karmal does not say that he invited the "limited armed contingents of Russia to Afghanistan. He, however, in his press conference on January 10, 1980, said, "it was the old Government that has invited contingent of Soviet troops. This was not done by Amin, who has been proved to be an agent of the CIA, but by the majority of the Revolutionary Conucil." The following conclusion emerge from these two statements (1) Neither Babrak Karmal nor Hafizulla Amin invited the Russian troops into Afghanistan. (2) It was the old Government that did it (3) The decision was taken by majority of the body called the Revolutionary council.

On January 17, 1980, the "Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" made a statement, which unequivocally states, "The fraternal assistance.....the Soviet Union has lent to Afghanistan at the request of our Government....."

Conclusions

After making a careful analysis of the above statements we can say that the claim by Novosti Press Agency that the new Government invited the Russians to send their armed contingents to Afghanistan is not supported by Babrak Karmal, who says, the old Government had invited the Russians. Moreover, Babrak Karmal's statement that the majority of the Revolutionary Council invited the Russians is belied by the statement of the Revolutionary Council itself which says the Council did not invite the Russian troops but Government of Afghanistan did.

Brezhnev very specifically identified the organs of Russian Government who decided to send troops into Afghanistan but he is purposely vague in identifying the organs of the Afghan Government who asked for military aid from the Russians. It leads to the one and only conclusion that there was no "invitation" and the story is a clear after thought. The Russian "Limited troop contingents" entered uninvited into Afghanistan in the last week of December, 1979. In fact, the admission by late President Brezhnev that Russian troops were sent to Afghanistan to secure the southern borders of Russia, proves the dominant purpose for which

Russia deployed her troops in Afghanistan. And the fact that Karmal took over as the President of Afghanistan after the Russian troops had entered that country suggest that Karmal was installed as President to provide legitimacy to the military intervention by Russia in Afghanistan. It appears that the Italian communist party refused to recognise legitimate or valid Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Similar was the reaction of both North Korea and Rumania.

Brezhnev had Made a reference to the Afghan-USSR Treaty of 1978. Article 4, of the Treaty is similar to Article 3 of the Warsaw Pact is the basis for stationing Soviet forces in Afghanistan, But it is a matter of common knowledge that after signing the Warsaw Pact Treaty, four East European States i.e. Poland, East Germany, Rumania and Hungary signed separate Treaties with Russia for the stationing of Russian troops. Russian troops in these countries are not stationed because of the stipulation of Article 3 of the Warsaw Pact (which is equivalent to Article 4 of Afghan-USSR Treaty) but under the separate treaties. Russian troops were withdrawn from Rumania in April, 1958, in spite of the separate treaty because Rumania was against their continued presence on its soil.⁷ Afghanistan has not signed any such treaty with Russia on stationing of Russian troops. Thus Brezhnev's invocation of the 1978 treaty, in justification of the Russian troops is misconceived.

7. Inquiry Committee Report on Afghanistan, Radiance, weekly, India (April 18, 1982), p. 5.

Brezhnev's justification of the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan, under Article 51 of the U. N. charter is also not correct. For, Russia has violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, and has illegally interfered in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by sending its armed forces, which in size and numbers far exceeds the total strength of the Afghan forces. It hardly gives any comfort to call it limited troop contingents."

Article 51 of the U.N. charter stipulates that states have the right of collective self defence. This does not mean that by virtue of the Treaty of 1978. Russia is constituted as the sole arbiter of whether forces should be used in Afghanistan or not. Article 2 (4) of the U. N. charter denies to the Soviet Union the right to send its armed forces into Afghanistan even as a pre-emptive measure. Before Article 51 can be invoked there must be an armed attack. Any preventive, anticipatory or preemptive use of force prior to an armed attack can not be regarded as action in self-defence.

The question of Afghanistan came before the security council in January, 1980 where the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Consequently, the General Assembly discussed this question on 14-1-1980, 20-11-1980 and again on 18-11-1981. At every occasion the General Assembly expressed its deep concern at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the pur-

poses and principles of the U.N. charter and repeatedly called, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghonistan.

In conclusion it can be said that Russia has comitted armed aggression in Afghanistan as defined by Resolution 3314(XXIX) of the U.N. General Assembly and has no *locus standi* for its intervention in Afghanistan.

BOOK REVIEW

**BILLY J. DUDLEY : An introduction to Nigerian
Government and Politics. Macmillan
Nigeria, 1982.**

It is a comprehensive book on the Nigerian political system. There are seven topics spread over 356 pages. Under the conceptual framework, discussion is about various concepts and the decision is to have emphasis on indigenous values. 'A return has to be made to traditional values the rediscovery of 'Africanism' and institutions must be created which are consonant with such values". (p. 39) Under topic political institutions of the First Republic, the period from 1960 to 1966 comes under consideration. After discussing different aspects of the Republic the conclusion is that it was power struggle between president Dr. Azikiwe and prime Minister Abubakar which paved the way for military intervention in 1966. "The fact that both he and the president, individually and separately bargained for the loyalty of the armed forces only succeeded in making the armed forces ultra-conscious of the blurred boundary lines separating the military from the civil and the legal from the political". (p. 71) Under the topic the Military and politics the thirteen years of Military rule has been discussed in detail. Under discussion came the tenure of Major General Ironsi and his blunder to replace the federal fromeork with a more unified and centralised political system. Followed by Lt. Col. Yakub Gowon and the bloody and castly

civil war which lasted for some 30 months, from July 1967 to January 15, 1970. Lastly the political rule of General Mohammad Murtala and Lt. General Clusegun obasanjo about the steps taken by them to introduce civilian rule by october 1979 came undr discussion. "The real achievement of the administration lies in its attempts to creat new institutions, a consequence of the decision to demilitarise, to hand over power to a popularly elected civilian government not later than october 1, 1979". (p. 105) Under the topic political Indstitutions of the second republic, the 1979 constitution has been discussed. "The Central institution the key figure within the configural framework of the second republic is the president, who is the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the federation" (p. 139) In other words the 1979 Constitution introduced the presidential form of government with emphasis on strong leadership. The discussion under parties and the 1979 Elections are detailed. The role and performance of Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) has been analyed. There are twelve tables about the results of five elections in 1979. Under the topic, the economy, the agricultural and mineral resources have been discussed. Lastly under the topic, the external relations, the Nigerian foreign policy has been disussed in five phases starting from 1960 to the present. Fully documented by economic, social and political statistics, this is a good reference book for the students of Afarican Politics.

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