

# The Journal of Political Science

- Fiscal Politics : The Case of Quetta Municipality.
- Canada as A Middle-Power : The Canadian Strategy of Non-Intervention.
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*Published by the Department of Political Science,  
Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.*

**Vol. X**

**No. 1, 2**

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**Books and Pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.**

**The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.**

**The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College Lahore, Pakistan.**

*Published by Rai Hameed Ali Khan, Manager of the  
Journal of Political Science.*

**Printed by : Shaukat Ali—Bukhari Printing Press,  
Paisha Akhbar, Lahore.**

# Journal of Political Science

Vol. X

Summer, Winter, 1987

No. 1, 2

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*The Journal of Political Science, Government College.  
Lahore, Pakistan.*



## **FISCAL POLITICS : THE CASE OF QUETTA MUNICIPALITY**

*Tossef Azid and Rana Ayaz Muhammad*

The provision of public goods is the main objective of the modern state and these are provided on a welfare basis. There is consensus of opinion between the economists and politicians that social welfare has positive effect on economic productivity of a society/country. So the modern states are selecting different methods by which facilities are distributed equally to all citizens rather than being restricted to the elite. At present, the government of Pakistan is also trying to provide these public facilities through different institutions ; the most important among them are local bodies.

The role of local bodies is gaining more importance in the present regime. It is a common opinion that local bodies are helpful in solving different problems at local level ; and for the enhancement of good relationship and reduced clash between public and administration. They have exact and correct informations about the difficulties of their areas and can easily diagnose suitable remedies for these difficulties. In developing countries, like Pakistan, local bodies are suitable institution for

the provision of public facilities and services and also for administrative affairs. An understanding, of the structure and functions of this institution has a positive effect on the social, economic, political and judicial system of the country. The present government of Pakistan claims that local bodies in the country are performing an important role in providing services to the public.

A survey have been carried out to find out how much and what kind of work is being done and to see if the government's claim is justified.

The survey is limited to test the claims of government and its objectives are :

- (a) To determine how far the local bodies fulfill the people's expectations in Quetta.
- (b) To determine the extent of power of local bodies as matched with the problem of people in Quetta.

In section one a review of literature on public choices have been presented.

Keeping in view the above mentioned objective exploratory research design was selected to complete the study. The research design was based on a survey through questionnaire. These are presented in section two. In sesction three suggestions and recommendations for equal and satisfactory distribution of services have been presented.

## SECTION I

Public choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or simply the application of economics to political science. The basic behavioural postulate of public choice, as far as economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer. This places public choice within the stream of political philosophy extending at last from Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, and within political science from James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville. It is separated from much of this earlier work on politics, however, by its use of the analytic tools of economics (see however Duncan Black [5, 158, pp. 156-213]., James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock [8, 1962, pp. 307-22]., Edwin T-Ha efefe [20, 1971]., and Vincent Ostrom [30, 1971].). Indeed, public choice's development as a separate field has been largely within the last four decades and in response to issues and needs arising elsewhere in economics. starting with Abram Bergson's 1938 article [3, 1938] and spurred by Kenneth J. Arrow's 1951 book [1, (1951) 1963] a large literature has grown exploring the properties of social welfare or social choice function. It focuses on the problems of aggregating individual preferences to maximize a social welfare function or to satisfy some set of normative criteria. This research on optimal methods of aggregating preferences has naturally spurred interest in the properties of actual procedures of aggregating via voting rules, *i.e.*, in public. The problem of finding

a social choice function satisfying certain normative criteria turns out to be quite analogous to establish an equilibrium under different voting rules. Thus both Arrow's study [3, 1963] of social welfare functions and D. Black's Seminal work on Committee voting procedures build on the works of J. C. de Borda [7, 1785] and C. L. Dodgson [12, 1876].

The second development in economics fostering interest in public choice has been the work on market failures, again stemming from papers appearing in the '40's and '50's. This work centres on establishing conditions for efficient allocation in the presence of market failures and leads directly to the study of non market procedures for revealing individual preferences in these situations. The public choice approach to non market decision making has been.

- (1) To make the same behavioural assumptions as general economics (rational, utilitarian man).
- (2) Often to depict the preference revelation process as analogous to the market (voters engage in exchange citizens exit and enter clubs).
- (3) To ask the same questions as traditional price theory (Do equilibria exist? Are they stable? pareto efficient?)

Public choice and public expenditure theory share an ancestry in the work of the "Continental" Writers on public finance (see Richard



Musgrave and Alan Peacock [27, 1958]). Of particular importance here are the papers by Erik Lindhal [24, 1919] and Knut Wicksell [35, 1896]. Lindhal's paper has had the greater influence on public goods theory., Wicksell's on public choice and public finance. Wicksell's view of government as a quid pro quo process of exchange among citizens underlies Buchanan and Tullock's calculus of consent [8, 1962] and much of the positive public choice literature. Musgrave's influential separation of government activity into allocation and redistribution decisions is directly traceable to Wicksell's [26, 1959].

An increasing amount of attention has been devoted in recent years to testing various hypotheses from the public choice literature. This work generally explores what might literally be called "political economy", *i.e.*, the two way causality between dollars and votes. One set of models focuses on the determinants of Campaign expenditures and their immediate effects [10, Crain and Tollison]. There is now empirical evidence that dollars do buy votes [31, Palda, 1973,]. A second set of models tries to explain the level of the vote on government popularity as a function of what it does in office. So far these studies have related government popularity chiefly to macro economic variables, *e.g.* Unemployment and inflation rates [19, Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970., 23 Kramar, 1971 15, Frey and Garbers, 1972 ; 25, Miller and Mackie, 1973 ; 11, Crain, Deaton and Tollison, 1975].

Turning the casualty around, one can try to explain the choice of government policy, level of expenditure and level of economic activity, by the desire to win votes. The median voter hypothesis was one of the first used to explain government expenditures [ 2, Barr and Davis, 1966 ; ], and a number of studies have either tested or employed this hypothesis [ 22, Kaspur, 1981, 6, Brocherding and Deccan, 1972 ; 4, Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973 ; 32, Pommerehne and Frey, 1975 ]. More generally, Gavin Wright [ 36, 1974 ] and W D. Nordhaus [ 29, 1975 ] have linked government macro policies and aggregate economic activity to party efforts to be re-elected. The logical extension of this work is full "Politico-econometric" model integrating the economic and political "Sectors" of Society [ 16. Frey and Lau, 1968 ; 14 Frey, 1974 ]. Initial attempts to estimate one such model give promising results. [ 17, Frey and Schneider, 1975].

## SECTION II

*Issues surveyed.* The survey was designed to collect public opinion on the following :—

- (a) Local bodies ; their effect on welfare.
- (b) Problem of the local areas. Power of the local bodies in relation to context problems.

### Survey Techniques

- (a) Designing the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was carefully designed in order to cover all aspects of the objectives of the survey. It consisted of two close-ended and two

open-ended questions which were asked in such a manner as to elicit accurate opinion of the respondents. A specimen of the questionnaire (translated in English) is given in Annexure-I.

#### **4. Demographic Profile of the Respondents**

The respondents, were randomly selected represented a good range of various strata of people. They included people belonging to different income groups, from Rs. 500/- p. m. to 3000/- p. m. different educational backgrounds, illiterate to highly educated ; different professional groups, from govt. servants to businessmen ; and different age groups ; from under 21 to 45 years. Table No. 1 shows all these strata in percentage of total respondents.

TABLE NO. 1

MOTHER TONGUE		EDUCATION		PROFESSIONS		INCOME		AGE	
UDRU	24	Illit	11	Govt. Servant	68	Up to Rs. 500	18	Less than 21	09
PUSHTO	14	1-5	5	Business man	12	Rs. 501-1,000	55	22-35	51
BALUCHI	15	6-10	35	Professions	9	Rs. 1,001-3,000	23	36-45	16
PUNJABI	38	11-13	21	Artisan	2	Over Rs. 3,000	4	Above 45	24
ERAVI	8	Higher	23	Misc.	9	-	-	-	-
OTHERS	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100		100		100		100		100

## **6. Sample Design**

A sample of the size of 100 was designed to present the population density in Quetta city. The sample design was primarily based on the population census 1980. All the data was taken from Statistical Division where which maintains a sampling frame for :

(a) Enumeration Blocks in Quetta.

(b) Households within each Enumeration Block.

We have used the systematic sampling. A two stage sampling technique was applied to this sampling frame.

In the first stage, enumeration blocks in Quetta city were selected and in the second stage, households were selected from these pre-selected Enumeration Blocks. The selection was based on systematic random sampling.

The sample provided us ten households per Enumeration Blocks. Thus from a total of 10 sample points (selected Enumeration Block) a sample of 100 households was finally selected for the survey. The head of household was selected as an Enumeration unit.

### **Interviewing**

A team of 10 interviewers was prepared to conduct the survey. It was ensured that the interviewers were familiar with the questionnaire designed for interview. They were also familiar with the sample points, language and culture. They had

under gone a training programme especially designed for them. During this Training Programme the questionnaire was pre-tested and necessary modifications were made. Each interviewer was assigned one sample point.

### **Analysis**

Now we analyse in statistical term the opinion of the survey.

### **General Questions**

- (a) What is the most important problem of your area/mohallah ? 32% of the respondent mentioned cleanliness, 21% supply of water and electricity, 11%, 2%, 13%, 5% and 5% sewerage, schools, roads, play ground and the supply of Gas respectively as their major problem, 20% gave no opinion.

Further breakdown shows that the problem of cleanliness and sewerage is faced by the most of highly educated and high income bracket people and it is interesting to note that bad roads are the only problem of artisans. Highly income group have the problem of sewerage beside the problem of cleanliness.

TABLE No-II

Q. What is the most important problem of your Area/Mohallah ?

	Cleanliness	Water and Electricity	Sewerage	School	Road	Play Ground	Gas	No.Opinion
	32.0	21.0	11.0	2.0	13.0	5.0	5.0	11.0
Illiterate	27.3	27.3	-	-	36.4	-	-	9.0
1----5	20.0	20.0	-	-	20.0	-	20.0	20.0
6---10	34.3	20.0	11.4	5.7	2.9	11.4	5.7	8.6
11---13	38.1	23.8	9.5	-	14.3	4.8	-	9.5
H. Education.	28.6	17.8	17.8	-	14.3	-	7.2	14.3
Govt. Servant	38.3	20.6	11.8	1.5	1.0	5.9	4.5	7.4
Businessman	16.7	41.7	8.3	8.3	-	-	8.3	16.7
Professionals	33.3	22.2	11.1	-	11.1	11.1	-	11.1
Artisans	-	-	-	-	50.0	-	-	50.0
Miscellaneous	11.1	-	11.1	-	44.4	-	11.1	22.3
Up to 500	27.8	27.8	11.1	-	27.8	-	5.5	-
501---1000	30.9	18.2	10.9	1.8	7.3	9.0	3.7	18.2
1001---3000	34.8	26.0	4.4	4.4	17.3	-	8.7	4.4
More than 3000	50.0	-	50.0	-	-	-	-	-
Less than 21	33.3	11.1	11.1	-	44.5	-	-	-
22---35	33.3	19.6	11.8	1.9	11.8	7.6	3.9	9.9
36---45	43.7	12.5	12.5	-	12.5	6.3	12.5	-
More than 45	20.8	33.3	8.3	4.2	4.2	-	4.2	28.0
URDU	4.2	12.5	20.8	-	4.2	-	6.4	20.9
Pushto	28.6	35.7	7.1	-	7.2	7.1	7.1	7.2
Saluchi	33.3	20.0	8.7	-	33.3	-	-	6.7
Punjabi	26.3	26.3	5.3	5.3	10.5	10.5	5.3	10.5
Brahvi	50.0	-	16.7	-	33.3	-	-	-
Others	66.8	-	33.4	-	-	-	-	-

Most businessmen have problem with the supply of electricity and water. Low income group have the same preference for cleanliness, roads and the supply of water and electricity. Illiterates have the high preference for roads and same for cleanliness and the supply of water and electricity. For further details please see table No. II.

### Power and Local Bodies

(a) Do you think that the councillors have enough powers for the solution of your problems ?

(i) Yes

(ii) No

In response to this question 27% people considered the powers are enough and 73% were of the opinion that these are not enough. A further analysis shows that 50% of Artisans considered the powers to be enough. Most of the respondents (88.9%) from professional group considered the powers are enough. However only the Balochi speaking group considered enough (100%). For further details see table No. III.

(b) What do you think such powers should be ?

The following options were given as possible answers :

(i) Less (ii) More (iii) adequate (iv) Don't know.

Most of the people (27%) were in favour of adequate powers in the hand of local bodies while



13% were in favour of reduction in the existing power of local bodies. 21% wanted more power and 30% said they did not know.

Further analysis reveals that people with higher level of income are in favour of more power (50%) and people in upperage group were also inclined towards more power. For further details see table No. IV.

T A B L E No-III

Q. Do you think that the Councillors have enough powers for the solution of your problems ?

	No	Yes
	27.0	73.0
Illiterate	45.5	54.5
1----5	20.0	80.0
6----10	22.8	77.1
11----13	23.9	76.1
H.Education	28.6	71.4
Govt.Servant	28.0	72.0
Businessman	33.3	66.7
Professionals	11.1	88.9
Artisans	50.0	50.0
Miscellaneous	22.2	77.8
Up to 500	27.8	72.2
501---1000	21.9	78.1
1001---3000	39.1	60.9
More than 3000	25.0	75.0
Less than 21	22.2	77.8
22---35	33.3	66.7
36---45	12.5	87.5
More than 45	25.0	75.0
URDU	29.2	70.8
Pushto	42.9	57.1
Baluchi	-	100.0
Punjabi	20.0	71.0
Brahvi	33.3	66.7
Others	33.3	66.7

T A B L E No-IV

Q. What do you think such powers should be ?

	Less	More	Adequate	Don't know
	13	21	27	39
Illiterate	27.3	45.5	16.1	9.1
1----5	20.0	20.0	-	60.0
6---10	8.6	14.3	31.4	45.7
11---13	9.5	33.3	19.0	38.2
H.Education.	14.3	10.7	35.7	39.3
Govt.Servant	14.7	20.6	26.5	38.2
Businessman	8.3	41.7	16.7	33.3
Professionals	11.1	-	33.3	55.6
Artisians	-	50.0	50.0	-
Miscellaneous	11.1	11.1	33.3	55.6
Up to 500	22.2	16.7	27.8	33.3
501---1000	12.7	21.6	23.6	42.9
1001---3000	4.3	17.4	39.1	39.2
More than 3000	25	50.0	-	25.0
Less than 21	11.1	11.1	22.2	55.6
22---35	15.7	17.6	31.4	35.3
36---45	12.5	18.8	31.2	37.5
More than 45	8.3	33.3	16.6	41.8
URDU	4.2	25.0	29.2	41.6
Pushto	14.2	21.4	28.6	35.8
Baluchi	26.7	26.6	26.7	20.0
Punjabi	10.5	18.4	28.9	42.2
Brabvi	33.3	-	16.7	50.0
Others	-	33.3	-	66.7

### **Welfare and Local Bodies**

Are the elected councillors of your area working for the welfare of the area or not ?

80% of the people gave a positive response, only 20% were not satisfied with the work of their councillors. Brahvi speaking groups have no complaint against their councillors and their response in favour of 'yes' is 100%. Among all the demographic group the Artisan and professionals have shown maximum dissatisfaction with the work of their councillors (50%) and 44% respectively. See table V.

On the basis of analysis given above, we can draw the following major conclusions :

#### **(a) Local Problems**

An overwhelming majority of people feel the need for cleanliness, supply of water and roads in their local areas.

#### **(b) Power and Local Bodies**

Most of our respondents were not satisfied with the existing powers of local bodies and they felt that there should be more funds and power for the local bodies.

#### **(c) Welfare and Local Bodies**

Our respondents thought, the institutions of local bodies have positive effect on welfare.

From the above analysis and after surveying the chart of taxes and functions of the Municipal Corporation (see Annexure-II), we conclude that most of our respondents do not have accurate knowledge of the power of Municipal Corporation of Quetta.

TABLE No. V

Q. Are the elected councillors of your area working for the welfare of the area or not ?

	Yes	No
	20.00	80.0
Illiterate	18.8	81.8
1 . . . 5	20.0	80.0
6 . . . 6	17.2	82.8
11 . . . 13	19.1	80.9
H. Education.	25.0	75.0
Govt. Servant	13.2	86.8
Businessman	16.7	83.3
Professionals	44.4	55.6
Artisians	50.0	50.0
Miscellenious	44.4	55.6
Up to 500	16.7	83.3
501 . . . 1000	20.0	80.0
1001 . . . 3000	21.7	78.3
More than 3000	25.0	75.0
Less than 21	22.2	77.8
22 . . 35	17.7	82.3
36 . . . 45	—	87.5
More than 45	—	70.8
URDU	—	91.2
Pushto	—	92.8
Baluchi	—	66.7
Punjabi	—	71.0
Brahvi	—	100.0
Others	33.4	66.6

### SECTION III

#### **Policy Recommendations and Suggestions Based on the Conclusions**

From our conclusion we have drawn the following policy suggestions and recommendations for enhancing the functioning of local bodies and welfare of the electorate.

(i) The public has a right to information about the affairs of their local bodies and local body meeting would well stimulate the public desire to be better informed and these functions will be performed by public relations units in local government and these are press relations, provisions of various information services, liason with various local organization. preparation of certain publications, and leaflets and publicity and organization of civic events.

(ii) Local councils should publish an annual report showing the post allocation of resources and identifying the major problems of the area and their plans for solving them.

(iii) Local bodies should regard the press as partner in the process of informing and educating the public.

(iv) There should be an effective partnership between the electorate, elected member and local authority officers for the benefit of the community and each should have full knowledge and understanding of the needs, aspirations and difficulties of others. A positive, energetic and sympathetic

approach is needed to foster and promote each partnership.

(v) There should be cooperation between local bodies and other institution in solving the the problem of public e.g. the problem of supply of electricity should be solved with the cooperation of water and Power Development authority.

(vi) With the expansion of Town scheme depopulation of inner city must also be considered.

The development of cities created a need for coordination and inter-authority decision understanding between decision-making authorities. Satisfying operation requires good communication between the participating authorities and full appreciation of common issues. However this would help to avoid wasteful duplication e.g. cooperation among local bodies and development authorities in Pakistan. Local authorities and their elected members need to be cognisant of gross root problems, needs and views.

(vii) Agencies and consultants working in the fields should correspond with each other about problems and action to be taken. Minutes of the other council's meetings should be included on the agenda of the each council's meetings. And there should be an inter-change of members at different bodies' meetings.

(viii) Effective Local Government thus requires an effective working partnership between officers and members.

(ix) Effective National Planning requires a detailed knowledge of Local Government needs, requirements and problems.

(x) Against severe funds restraints, local authorities may have to review their programmes and to give emphasis to maintenance as against improvement of services and make the preference list of programmes according to the needs and requirements of the society.

(xi) Central and Local Government, relationship should be good.

(xii) Experts and consultants should be available e.g. Economists, Engineers and Health supervisor.



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## ANEXURE I

## QUESTIONNAIRE

- (i) Wat is the most important problem of your Area/Mohallah ?

-----  
-----

- (ii) Do you think that the Councillors have enough powers to solve your problems ?

(a) Yes-----

(b) No-----

- (iii) What do you think such powers should be ?

(a) Less-----

(b) More-----

(c) Adequate-----

(d) Don't Know-----

- (iv) Are the elected Councillors of your area working for the welfare of the area or not ?

(a) Yes-----

(b) No-----

## ANNEXURE II

In Baluchistan, a Municipal corporation has an Urban population of 1,00,000 or above, and its membership is between 40 and 60. What additional separate seats are reserved for minorities and women over and above the number of membership fixed for the corporation. There is one corporation

at Quetta, with a membership of 50, excluding two seats for minorities and three for women. Now we will present a chart showing the taxes and functions of Municipal Corporation, Quetta.

**a. Chart of Municipal Corporation of Quetta**

1. Tax on the annual rental value of building and land.
2. Tax on cinemas and cinema tickets.
3. Entertainment tax on dramatical and theatrical shows.
4. Tax on the transfer of immoveble property.
5. Water Rate.
6. Drainage Rate.
7. Conservancy rate.
8. Tax on all kinds of vehicles.
9. Lighting rate.
10. Fees for the erection and re-erection of building.
11. Marriage tax on second marriage where first wife is alive.
12. Fees for the Licences, sanctions and permits granted by Municipal Corporation.
13. Fee on the slaughter of animals.
14. Tax on professions, trade calling and employment.
15. Market fees.

16. Tax on advertisements.
17. Tax on feast when more than twenty person not belonging to the household of the persons arranging the feasts are entertained with food stuffs.
18. Tax on animals and sale of animals.
19. Toll tax on roads and bridges maintained by a Municipal Corporation.
20. Fees at Fairs, agricultural shows, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and other public gatherings.
21. Tax on the construction or maintenance of any work of public utility.
22. Fees for specific services rendered by Municipal Corporation.
23. Parking Fees.
24. Tax on the birth of children.
25. Health tax.
26. Rate for remuneration for village police.
27. Community tax on adult males for the construction of a public works of general utility for the inhabitants of the Town.
28. Surcharge on any of the tax levied by Government.
29. Tax on the import of goods and animals for consumption use or sale.
30. Any other tax which the government directs to be levied.

**Chart Showing Functions of Municipal Corporation, Quetta.**

**Compulsory function**

***A. Public Health.***

1. Maintenance of sanitation.
2. Removal, collection or disposal of refuse.
3. Provision and maintenance of private and public latrines and Urinals.
4. Prevention and cure of infectious diseases.
5. Registration of births and deaths.
6. Reservation of composite and farm yard manure.

***B. Water Supply***

7. Regulate water supply.
8. Regulate inspection and control of private sources of water supply within Municipal Limits.

***C. Drains***

9. Provision of system of public drains.
10. Regulate private drainage and sewerage for commercial and industrial area (s) for adequate drainage and disposal of their waste.

***D. Articles of Food and Drinks***

11. Regulate private markets established for the sale of articles of food or drink or animals.
12. Provision and maintenance of slaughter house.

**E. Animals and Cattle**

13. Prohibition on picketing or tethering of animals in streets.
14. Regulate keeping and maintaing animals.
15. Control over dangerous animals.

**F. Eduction**

16. To establish, maintain and manage, for promotion of education, such educational institutions as may be required and approved by the government.
17. Enforcement of compulsory primary education.

**G. Public Safety**

18. Maintenance of fire fighting.
19. Civil defeuce.
20. Relief measures in the event of fire, flood, famine, hail storm or other natural clamities.
21. Control over dangerous and offensive trades.
22. Provision and maintenance of burial and burning places.

**H. Town Planning**

23. Master Planning for development expansion and improvement of any area.

**I. Building Control**

24. Regulate erection and re-erection of building.
25. Regulate, construction of buildings and development of sites.



**J. Streets**

26. Provision and maintenance of public streets and other means of public communication.
27. Measures for prevention of encroachments.
28. Regulation of private streets.
29. Proper lightening of streets and roads.
30. To adopt measures for the watering of public streets for the comfort and convenience of the public.
31. Regulation of traffic and public vehicles.

**K. Agriculture**

32. Plantation and protection of trees.

**L. Development**

33. Prepare and implement development plan including community development plan and commercial schemes.

**M. General**

34. To endeavour to reform the society in conformity with the injunctions of "Quran" and "Sunnah" discouraging un-Islamic practice and un-Islamic customs and practices. To encourage authority and simple way of life and to persuade the people to follow the religious injunctions.

# **CANADA AS A MIDDLE-POWER : THE CANADIAN STRATEGY OF NON-INTERVENTION**

*Khalid Javeed Makhdoom*

## **1. Some General Policy Dimensions**

It is usually believed that the foreign policy of a country is determined by the factors like its geopolitical position and economic aspirations. Such factors compose national interests and, on projection abroad, formulate a pattern of international relations. Therefore, the contemporary states, interaction in the world arena, though apparently for mutual security and progress, is also governed by the specific self-motivation of pursuing one's own strategic goals. Since policy formulation is prone to internal as well as external environmental pressures, and since the environments are never static and may have a penetrating influence on national priorities, the output of strategic policy formulation should be viewed in the context of changing environments.

The post-Second World War global strategy had a similar influence on Canada's capabilities to project its national interests in foreign policy. As consequence of the War, Canada's economy, like that of the United States, showed a remarkable

upward trend.<sup>2</sup> The reason primarily was Canada's geographic distance from the main battle field in Europe. In Canada's economic superiority after the War, as well as its adherence to the Western alliance (NATO), enabled it to play a many-fold role in world politics. The Canadian foreign policy dimensions in the period ensuing W. W. II had four prominent aspects : peace establishment ; support for the U. N. ; economic rehabilitation of the war-affected Western Europe and the emerging states elsewhere ; and, participation in the regional security arrangements<sup>3</sup>.

This was evident when, in the wake of bipolar antagonism during the 1950s, the world stood split into two ideological blocs and the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped states increased enormously. Consequently, Canada made strides and came to the lime-light as a "middle-power". Holmes defines "middle-power" as a nation denoting such countries which :

...by reason of their resources or military power or population, were not to be considered among the great powers but which had positions in the world clearly different from that of the small and powerless.<sup>4</sup>

Some of Holmes' contemporaries, too, ardently support the viewpoint of Canada's being a middle-power. For instance, John Halle employs the technique of comparison between the great

powers and the other states of Canada's stature. Illustrating the potentials of prominence acquired and maintained by the contemporary big states, Halle lists at least three criteria of a military power —adeqnat military force to meet any threat to the state's vital interests successfully ; the presence of will and competence to use that force effectively; and, the presence of an undoubtful reasonable control over that force. These criteria, Halle contends, though less visible in Canada's<sup>5</sup>, case suggest this country indeed to be a middle-power of great significance. Its trade and defence production capacity ranked it "nearest of the small powers to the Big Four and even in some ways to the Big Three".<sup>6</sup>

Thus Canada, especially since the 1950s, is an "intermediary" state which is "not too closely attached to any bloc, and capable of intercession".<sup>7</sup> From this standard, Canada is one of those states lesser in power but stronger in diplomatic maneuvering which can stand in between the super powers and act as a bulwark against any perceivable nuclear catastrophe.<sup>8</sup>

Assuming Canada as a middle-power of great diplomatic skill, one should comprehend that, unlike Israel in the Middle East and India in South Asia, the Canadian foreign policy demonstrates more "responsive" rather than "initiatory" characteristics.<sup>9</sup> Its diplomatic voice is the one of "concilliation, moderation, and willingness".<sup>10</sup> The responsive and concilliatory attitude in foreign

policy has made Canada conspicuous among the 'moderate and progressive nations'; and is acquired since the war-stricken Europe depended heavily on the U. S. sponsored air defence network and Canada made outstanding contributions therein.<sup>11</sup>

The factors which increased Canada's conciliatory-diplomatic skill and enabled it to acquire a middle-power status included : its enhanced capability in trade and economic assistance ; its relative security, particularly since the technological advancement of the United States made it subordinate and thus of lesser importance in security plans; its multilateral alliance which made it influential ; and, the largely unfixed loyalties in NATO and the Commonwealth which introduced Canada as an anti-colonial and piece loving country in the Third World.<sup>12</sup>

As such, by retaining its middle-power status, Canada sought an opportunity for such conciliatory diplomatic endeavours. It found one in the United Nations. We should remember that the United Nations was much handicapped since 1945 in its peace programmes especially because of contemporary inter-block antagonism. But the presence of conciliatory middle-powers like Canada enhanced the importance of lesser powerful states and minimized the impact of great powers' consensus in peacekeeping. This was evident when Canada got a seat in the Security Council in 1947 ; and the embodiment of the peacekeeping programme under

Article 44 of the Charter was attributed as the "Canadian article".<sup>13</sup> Likewise, despite the great powers still leading the world destiny, the middle and the smaller states came to the fore on the General Assembly's assertion of authority in 1950.<sup>14</sup> Thereafter, Canada could take an active role in the conflict control and created the Canadian Army Special Force.<sup>15</sup> For instance, when the Kashmir (1949) and the Suez (1956) crises effected a novel trend of applying the U. N. force outside the cold-war area, Canada could exercise a more peacekeeping and diplomatic influence.<sup>16</sup>

However, the notion of middle-power was blurred for Canada when its leading position among the smaller members of the United Nations was considerably jeopardized in the late 1960s with the admission of a host of new members, new trends in global strategy were evolved, and Europe had recovered after the War.<sup>17</sup> This state of affairs inevitably forced Canada to demonstrate a shift in its foreign policy from peacekeeping to localised problems.<sup>18</sup> Despite that, Canada was still identified as a "potential" force, whose capacity to promote world peace kept its ranked among the first ten.<sup>19</sup> Thus, even the reproachment' between the ideological blocs did not seem to have reversed the middle and smaller powers' status. It rather helped them counterweight any perceivable nuclear escalation. Probably on that account, as well as in view of Canada's rapid development, John Holmes also recommends an improvement in the peacekeeping programmes by bringing the U. N. Secretariat

and the middle-powers in the foreground at least till the time the super powers readily commit themselves beyond their strategic limitations'<sup>20</sup>

This proposition of enhanced reliance on the U. N. Secretariat and the middle-powers seems worthwhile especially in the wake of Canada's strides in nuclear technology and its persisting role in the world nuclear control programmes since the post-War period. Even as early as in the 1950s, Canada was invited to attend the first disarmament negotiation forum and the meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission. Though initially hesitant to involve itself in nuclear controversy, Canada retained its membership in the multilateral disarmament bodies since 1952. Acknowledging Canada's active participation in such arrangements and its interest in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as Dobell points out, Prime Minister Trudeau called the Canadian nuclear policy as :

".....one of the most important foreign relations tasks in which Canada is engaged [ with the object of ] arms limitation and disarmament."<sup>21</sup>

However, in a general perspective, the foreign policy of a country is not exclusively indebted to the external factors alone. It is prone to internal environment as well. As such, a foreign policy framework involves four key factors : environments (both external and internal) ; factors ; structures ; and, processes.<sup>22</sup> When combined, these factors make or unmake the regulatory capacity of a

political system, which in turn reflects upon the system's policy equilibrium.<sup>23</sup> Normally, in a democratic system, this capacity can be judged by evaluating the personality of various actors (or decision-makers) who specify policy objectives and their implementation.<sup>24</sup>

Although a comprehensive review of the structures and processes relevant to Canada's foreign policy is beyond the scope of this research, a reference to a few peculiar internal factors can be useful to understand the posture this country adopted abroad. The first note worthy factor is the class of decision-makers (or actors) who have been predominantly active in making the regulatory capacity of the system more responsive to the changing environments. They include the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Cabinet, and the House of Commons who are, in a broader sense, responsible to the electorates.<sup>25</sup> The image of the decision-makers is, however, decisive in decision making since they are supposed to react according to their perception of reality. As such, the success of a policy depends on a correct perception.<sup>26</sup> Here, the examples of Mackenzie King's "individualism", Pearson's "internationalism", and Trudeau's "nationalism"<sup>27</sup> can be cited in determining the premises of foreign policy, though without prejudicing the contributions of other prime ministers like Louis St. Laurent and Diefenbaker.

Another significant variable factor in the study of the internal environment of Canada is its



peculiar ethnic divergence which distinctly influences foreign policy. Since Canada is a product of the resistance movement of late eighteenth century when the North Americans resisted their merger with the United States, two distinct ethnic identities appeared in that period. A large portion of the English-speaking population wanted to stay in the British Empire and asked Britain to act as a counterweight against intrusions from the South ; while the French-speaking Quebecans desired to retain their ethnic identity.<sup>28</sup> This ethnic heterogeneity still persists and influences the Federal Government in determining the foreign policy directions. As such, in the perceptions of many regional ethnicists, this divergency prevents Canada from appearing as a true nation-state. They define nationhood as :

“—...a collection of people, usually though by no means always consanguineous and monoglot, accustomed to being governed from one center, who regard themselves as possessing virtues and qualities that must at all costs be preserved, and who are not disposed to allow their collective power to be shared with any other nation.”<sup>29</sup>

Likewise, when ethnic groups identify themselves with particular regions, the internal political structure may present a peculiar pattern of centrifugal and centripetal forces acting upon foreign policy. The twenty-two million population of Canada some time back included 43.8 per cent of the Canadians of the British origin,

30.4 per cent of the French, and 22.6 per cent of the other countries in Europe.<sup>30</sup> If Canada has some common interests with the United States for its geographical proximity, its cooperation relatively more with Britain and less with France might be assumed as a consequence of the impact of the internal ethnic environment. The triangle of relations with the United States, Britain and France, mainly in NATO; and Canada's efforts to develop its association with the French-speaking world<sup>31</sup> indicate the structural impact and internal demands of a country projecting its peculiar bilingual and bicultural nationalism. The diversification of outlook among the Canadians seems to be one of the concerns of Thomson as he asserts that many English-Canadians still identify themselves with Britain while many French-Canadians in Quabec have a desire to wipe out the impact of centuries old British conquests.<sup>32</sup>

Besides the major ethnic identities, the East European are also considerably potential in terms of foreign policy. These minorities formed a significant one-third of the electoral force of all the constituencies for their enjoying regional concentrations.<sup>33</sup> Their influence was more on the surface in Prime Minister Diefenbaker's period when Canada expressed its anti-Communist feelings in UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, this tendency was checked when in Trudeau's time a new impetus was given to the Canadian-Soviet relation; and the prospects of mutual bilateral cooperation in economic and scientific fields were earmarked

through periodic visits of the leaders from the two countries,<sup>34</sup>

We assumed that the output of a country's foreign policy should be responsive to the changed environments. Interestingly, Canada's external environment did change when the traditional Commonwealth association appeared to be ineffective in world politics, Britain was preoccupied in Europe and NATO. Lost much of its 'vitality' for Canada. Consequently, the foreign policy makers of the late 1960s and early 1970s got a better chance to focus their policy attention in favour of Canada's federalism and cultural heritage.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, one of the important objectives before the Trudeau government in the early 1970s seemed to be refining and refocusing the country's foreign policy to bring it in conformity with both "national needs and resources" of Canada and with the functional capabilities towards the discharge of its current "legitimate responsibilities" in the world affairs.<sup>36</sup> Elaborating this assessment, Thordarson further points out that in the readjustment of policy dimensions, the Trudeau government intended to establish relations with China, which it did much ahead of the Sino-U.S. ' rapprochement ' in 1971 ; to develop relations with Latin America and the Pacific rim ; and, to project Canada's bilingual national character abroad.<sup>37</sup> This new trend in Canada's foreign policy, however, cannot be assumed as unexpected since in the recent past, especially during the 1960s, it had been striving for and achieving most of its

objectives like trade with China and Japan ; enhanced interaction with several socialist countries ; relations with Cuba ; and, efforts to maintain cordiality with the French-speaking countries including France.<sup>38</sup>

Trudeau's foreign policy statement also had a special emphasis on increased relations with the countries of the Pacific. This shift in focus from Europe can be rightly attributed to the post-War development in Asia and the Far East, such as Canada's relations with Japan and China and the emergence of independent Asia. Holmes appreciates this trend by considering it a response to the Western provinces of Canada which were virtually neglected in the past because of the "ruttled Atlantic preoccupations".<sup>39</sup> The prospects of trade in this part of the world have further increased since Canada is at present the third largest trading country in terms of dollar value trade, and not only has developed its own nuclear power plant industry but can also supply products including food, nickle, and copper which can provide a better market opportunity in the Far East, including the Soviet Union.

Although Canada's attention is not mainly focussed on the Third World for the future policy determinations, the importance of the area is relatively increased with the readjustments in foreign policy. Retaining Europe as its extra foreign policy target, Canada appears to be moving, though slowly and not swiftly, towards this region. The prospects seem to be bright insofar as the general image

of Canada, like that of Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, is one of the anti-colonial peace-loving country. This viewpoint is also supported by Clarkson who suggests that Canada should develop "productive relations" with other countries especially so long as the bipolar nuclear proliferation has provided an opportunity to encourage the growth of neutral power areas which can act as buffer between the rival blocs.<sup>41</sup>

## **II. Canada-U.S. Bilateralism and Canadian Strategy of Non-Intervention**

With the background of general aspects of Canadian foreign policy, we now concentrate on the peculiar pattern of interaction and dependence presented by the Canada-U.S. relations.

Almost all political scientists agree that the geographical strategic position of international actor is always an important foreign policy determinant. Since the other factors like technology and political system are susceptible to change, as compared with the geographical factor, the external behaviour of the actor in a given period should be viewed in the light of "synthesis of the variable factors with those that are fixed."<sup>42</sup> Viewed in this perspective the geographical proximity between Canada and the United States is important in understanding the "dominant bilateral system."<sup>43</sup> of the region. As Michael Brecher says that "power is not the sole criterion of potential initiative",<sup>44</sup> we can assume that, beside the dominant status of the United States in the global system, the relative

proximity also enhances its initiatory and reactive capacity.

Found in such an external environment, Pearson insists that, like many other countries, Canada keep its foreign policy immune from the influence of the dominant American policies and decisions.<sup>45</sup> With the peculiar domestic structure and closeness to the United States, Canada is relatively more exposed and vulnerable. This geopolitical position of Canada enhances the possibility of the U.S. involvement in many respects. For instance, the United States is often instigated to intervene in the affairs of its northern neighbour to use that country as a defensive shield and to project the U.S. overseas interests. The arbitrary decision of the U.S. Administration for military installations in Canada and the controversy over their quality and quantity have minimised the functional values of the U.S. sponsored NORAD for the Canadian defence.<sup>46</sup> This pattern of "suspicion-cooperation" relationship poses a serious question for Canada : "how to work out a reasonable basis of association with a super power in an alliance of unequal partners ?"<sup>47</sup> The policy conflict between the two states makes Canada sometimes more exposed to the U.S. criticism. Whereas, on the contrary, Canada's policy vis-a-vis the United States seems to be indicative of a desire to achieve common objectives by means of non-intervention. A clash is usually inevitable when the United States insists on Canada's unconditioned cooperation both in the U.S. tactical and objective endeavours. This happened in the

Cuban crisis when Canada refused to follow suit considering the American actions of diplomatic rupture and trade embargo as "unwise tactics to achieve objectives."<sup>48</sup>

Even in the context of an overall global bipolar dominant system, Canada stood more exposed to the United States than to the Soviet Union. Although an observer could not visualise any territorial invasion by the United States, the possibilities of non-military intrusions could never be ruled out. As Michael Barkway points out, the anti-colonial tendency of Canada was supplemented by another desire to retain its ties with the overseas for self-protection against any perceivable threats from South.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, Canada's diminished interest in Europe in the later period of Prime Minister Trudeau, in spite of its predominantly European heritage, should also be examined as a consequence of the U.S. hegemonial pressures. Then, the same dominant-subordinate behaviour imposed by the United States made Canada a functional "inner actor" in NATO. To evade it, Canada allowed in its position a considerable shift in favour of semi-neutral role by inclining towards the Scandinavian group rather than involving itself in the super powers' polarization.<sup>50</sup> In other words, Canada participated more actively among the softliners in NATO.

This refined status acquired by Canada in NATO was also justified by the emergence of inter-dependence and solidarity in Western Europe.

Many European big states, which wanted the United States to dominate no more, raised the slogan of 'Europe for Europeans' President Charles de Gaulle of France was the chief exponent of this Europeanism and enjoyed considerable influence in Europe. But same de Ganlle was disliked by many Canadians for his expressed support in favour of the secessionist symptoms in the French-speaking Canadian province of Quebec. Logically, therefore, Canada opposed the concept of United States of Europe. It seemed that, in the first instance, European solidarity, though not strictly in confirmity with the U.S. policies, could eventually serve the U.S. anti-communist objects in Europe. And then, the same European solidarity, if realised, could isolate Canada as an "Outer One" or "a minor appendage in the American pillar."<sup>51</sup>

In the economic spheres, too, the U.S. penetration increased in the post-War period, effecting the cultural and economic life of Canada. The proportional inequilibrium in Canada's territory and population was apparently the obvious reason of its economic imbalance. Here Mathew holds the view that since Britain joined the EEC and the initial efforts of Canada to seek new markets did not prove very successful, its economic dependence on the United States was almost inevitable.<sup>52</sup> Once allowed to stretch, the U.S. dominant economic system influenced the Canadian policy-making process and hampered Canada's sovereign endeavours for projecting its national image abroad. A com-



parison of trade balance drawn out by Matthew and Thomson indicates alarmingly increased dependence of Canada on its great neighbour. According to the estimate, in the pre-War period, the United States took about 40 per cent of Canada's total exports, Britain 40 per cent, and the rest of the world 20 per cent. But, in 1970, the proportion altered to over 65 per cent to the United States, 9 per cent to Britain, and 26 per cent to the rest of the world including 4.1 per cent to Japan.<sup>53</sup>

Matthew's estimate, however, does not intend to suggest that Canada should totally alienate itself from the United States with which it has so many factors common. It rather leads some other writers of Dobell's stature to recommend that readjustment of Canada's foreign policy requires "conscious promotion of economic growth", since the increased rate of unemployment (8 per cent by 1971) and Canada's constant dependence of foreign trade already have acute strains on its economy. As per Dobell's assessment, 20 per cent of Canada's GNP depended on exports, as compared with 5 per cent of the United States.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, Canada's economic relations with the United States have since the 1970s been indicating reduced trade tariffs through GATT as one of the factors to enhance its trade as well as to abridge the gap between the standards of living in the two countries.<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Trudeau expressed his concern in one of his foreign policy statements. He lamented the close ties of Canada

with the United States as being a limitation on his country's freedom of action.<sup>56</sup> Trudeau's view, in fact, represented many Canadian intellectuals viewpoint that Canadian nationalism can be more identified with the "anti-Americanism" since the growing dependence of the country negates the age old desire of the people to build in North America a nation projecting characteristics distinct from those of the United States.<sup>58</sup> This inherent desire was lately evident in the foreign policy priorities. For instance, Holmes is of the opinion that two tendencies developed in Canada's foreign policy : an aspiration for the unattained in the present world ; and, to project an exaggerated view of Canada's real image.<sup>59</sup>

Whatever the policy shifts may be in Canada's relations with the United States, its interaction with the Latin Americans should also be reviewed in the context of proximity with the region as compared with the rest of the Third World ; and, the U.S. unavoidable dominance in the Hemisphere. It is believed that the OAS is the largest regional organization of both political and non-political significance. Canada developed diplomatic relations with Latin America as early as in the 1950s. Although the afore said shift in Canadian foreign policy dimensions has further enhanced its interests in the Hemisphere. It still seems to be reluctant to join the Organization. The advocates of Canada's joining the OAS argue that the two-third majority provision in the Constitution for such

purposes has become ineffective since Canada's recognition of Cuba and China did not bring any serious consequences in the region.<sup>60</sup> However, despite its political aloofness from the OAS, Canada has been playing a considerably significant role in the non-political activities of Latin America both through the U. N. Specialized agencies and the regional organizations. In spite of that, the progress in Canada's trade and economic endeavours is insignificant as its annual exports to Latin America did not exceed during the 1970s beyond 3.5 per cent of its total exports.<sup>61</sup> The paramount reason might be the growing suspicions in the Pentagon about Canada's bilateralism with the Latin Americans, especially since, denying to consider Canada as a member of the Hemisphere, the United States has been "shielding the Canadian view beyond the Kio Grande."<sup>62</sup> Probably on that account, Canada avoids entanglement and evades its formal membership of the OAS. Yet, in the Canadian perceptions, Canada's efforts to relieve itself of the regional pressures are conditioned to an unequivocal response from the other side as well. For that purpose, Canada depends more on its bilateralism, rather than on antagonism.

### **III. Europe and Canada's Strategy of Non-Intervention**

Canada has some known psychological, economic and defence aspirations in Europe. An understanding of Canada's pursuit of those aspirations demands of us focussing specifically on its relations

with NATO and Great Britain which were prone to environmental impact and so varied in different spans of time.

According to Ernst Hass, countries enter into pacts for joint ventures for peace and security and thereby "institutionalize" the process of decision-making by ignoring their traditional and individual "centres of national policy" in favour of those of the "treaty organization".<sup>63</sup> Although the concept of collective security means involvement of members in extensive defence preparedness and legal commitments, the intensity of their interdependence depends on certain variables. For instance, the geographical location of a treaty member has its impact on the efficiency of the treaty itself since all the members neither have similar outlooks nor do they share the same views on different issues. Therefore, as McLellan assumes, the dimensions of collective security system may fluctuate with the change in the global environment and so on the system itself can fall short of the expectations of its members.<sup>64</sup>

The collective security systems became inevitable for peace and security as a consequence of the technical advancement and bipolar antagonism of the post-War period. In a similar context, Wiseman opines, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a potential enemy made the defence strategy of Canada interdependent with that of the United States.<sup>65</sup> Since Canada already shared some common interests with Europe, it logically depended for its national defence on NATO as the "key

stone"<sup>66</sup> supported by both the United States and Canada's friends in Europe."<sup>67</sup>

We mentioned that the legitimacy of a security system does not depend primarily on the commitments or involvement of the actors but also on its utility vis-a-vis the real threat to the members. The East-West 'rapprochement' and the recovery of Europe after the War were some of the variable factors affecting the potential capability of NATO as a defence arrangement. Since Canada's role was that of a functional subordinate, the enhanced U. S. capability to air-lift armaments to Europe made the former more conscious of its presence in the Continent.<sup>68</sup> Windsor also assumes that, in spite of the presence of the U. S. token force in Europe is still considered as inevitable, the technological collaboration especially between Britain and Germany has also minimized the significance of the Treaty as a "coordinating centre for a detente policy towards Eastern Europe".<sup>69</sup> Another notable factor in this respect was the attitude of the European allies. If, on one hand, they expressed their indignation over Canada's proposed intention since it could establish a precedence for other members, on the other, they seldom considered Canada more than a "frontier province of America,"<sup>70</sup>

Canada's participation in the Atlantic community had two important aspects; "the political-strategic and the economic". The former was reflected more in NATO and less in NORAD; while the latter mainly through GATT.<sup>71</sup> There is

likelihood that a shift in policy may increase Canada's dependence on the U. S. oriented and more localized NORAD for defence while the importance of GATT may remain unchanged. In one of his policy statements at Calgary in 1968. Trudeau had emphasised even in that period the need of reversing the old presumption that the defence policy should be a base for determining the foreign policy dimensions.<sup>72</sup> After a thorough examination, and in view of stands taken by the Radicals and the Traditionalists, the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence recommended Canada's continued membership of NATO. The government, however, announced its paramount policy objectives on April 3, 1969 : protection of Canadian sovereignty via the surveillance of Canadian territory and coast-line ; the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States ; fulfilment of such NATO commitments as might be agreed upon ; and, performance of such international peacekeeping roles as Canada might assume.<sup>73</sup>

The rationale in Canada's moderate NATO policy lies in the fact that, despite economic strains, it kept adhered to the alliance and insisted on retaining the troops contributions not below 5,000.<sup>74</sup> This decision was in confirmity with Prime Minister Trudeau's guideline that NATO was not just strategic alone in the Canadian perceptions but also of a great diplomatic significance for furthering Canada's traditional role in world peace. Based on

Trudesu's guideline was a policy statement released in Ottawa suggesting avoidance of non-alignment and isolation as strategic in Canada's foreign policy framework.<sup>75</sup> This official view was endorsed by the Minister of National Defence, Donald McDonald, when he said in the House of Commons that Canada should now concentrate its attention not on Europe but on strengthening its position and interests in North America, though without abandoning the military arrangements.<sup>76</sup>

Such a revised policy stand in favour of localised defence emphasis was in the main, a part of Canada's known pursuance of the strategy of non-intervention. It got impetus from the minimized overall importance of NATO in the wake of the post-rapprochement inter-bloc relations ; which, in turn, brightened the prospects of diverting super powers' nuclear energies from massive deterrence to non-aggression and peaceful co-existence.<sup>77</sup>

To conclude, what can be inferred is that a middle-power of Canada's stature has multiple attributes in the present world politics. From its position of neither big nor small power, Canada can, on one hand, mediate in the bipolar rivalries ; and, on the others, it can serve as a link between the small and the great powers. The latter aspect of Canada's role, in particular, can eventually help the growth of a Third World order, especially since it projects the image of an aid-giving advanced country commanding the reputation of a non-committed semi-neutral state.

However, the main strains on Canada's foreign policy stem from its geographical proximity with the United States. Canada was forced to be allied with the West in NATO, and thus exposed to the neighbouring super power. But since the primary motivation in Canada's alliance was self-defence and not intervention, it soon found convenient to 'deactivate' itself in NATO and instead concentrate more on its own vital interests in North America. This approach was facilitated by the developments like the Soviet-U. S. and Sino-U. S. rapprochement. The British preoccupations in Europe, in the meanwhile, drove Canada closer to the Third World for trade.

Hence, in a broader perspective, Canada did not abandon NATO altogether, nor did it alienate itself from the United States and Great Britain. This new policy preference is of many advantages for Canada as well as for the prospects of a Third World bloc. For instance, it saved Canada of isolation ; helped its trade expansion in the Afro-Asian region, relieving Canada considerably of the U. S. economic dominance ; and, it suggested Canada as to be diplomatically in a position to cooperate with China in terms of balancing the Third World in between the bipolar blocs.



## FOOTNOTES

1. Henry Wiseman, *Theoretical Approaches and Policy Examination of Canada's Role in Peace-keeping*, (Ontario : thesis micro-film, in, University of Waterloo, Canada, 1970), p. 9.
2. Peter C. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Roles : Foreign policy in the Trudeau Era*, (New York : RIIA, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. I. He further says that after the War, in 1946, Canada offered Britain a loan of \$1,1260 million.
3. Henry Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
5. Peter C. Dobell, *op. cit.*
6. Robert B. Farrell, *The Making of the Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto : Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1969c), p. 4.
7. John W. Holmes, "Canada and the United States in World Politics", *Foreign Affairs*, No. 40, (October, 1961), p. 110.
8. Henry Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
9. John W. Holmes, *op. cit.*
10. John Halle, "Military Power", in, Davis S. McLellan, (ed.), *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, (New Jersey : Prentice-Hall Inc., Engelwood Cliffe, 1960), p. 142.
11. John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour : Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*, (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p. 14.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
13. Henry Wiseman, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.
14. Paul J. J. Martin, *Canada and the Quest for Peace*, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 25-26. Henry Wiseman also points out a shift in direction" in favour of the middle-powers, *ibid.*, p. 67.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
17. Peter C. Debell, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
18. Robin Ranger, "Canadian Foreign Policy in an Era of Super-Power Detente", *The World Today*, No. 12, vol. 28, (December. 1972), pp. 547-48. For a further explanation, see below.

19. Peter C. Dobell, *op. cit.*,
20. John W. Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
21. Peter C. Dobell, *op. lit.*, pp. 31-32.
22. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel ; Setting, Image, Process*, (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 1972), p. 2.
23. Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, (New York : J. Willey & Sons, Inc., 1967, p. 89.
24. Robert B. Farrel, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
25. *Ibid.* See also : Robert B. Farrell, "The Planning of Foreign Policy of Canada", *World Politics*, No. I, 1948. pp. 351-80 ; and, Robin Ranger, *op. cit.*, p. 549.
26. Michael Brecher. *op. cit.*, p. 12.
27. Robin Ranger, *op. cit.*, pp. 548, See in addition, Robert B. Farrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-20.
28. John, W. Holmes, 1970, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.
29. Lord Gladwyn, "World Order and the Nation-State—A Regional Approach", in, Stanley Hoffmann, (ed.), *Conditions of World Order*, (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968), p. 67.
30. Dale C. Thomson, *Canadian Foreign Policy : Options and Perspectives*, ( Toronto : McGraw.Hill Ryerson Limited, 1971), p. 11.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 43. This concept is further supported by Thomson by saying that, in spite of the strained relations caused by de Gaulle's visit, Trudeau considers French support "absolutely indispensable" for bilingual Canada.
32. *Ibid.*, p, 12.
33. Peter C. Dobell, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
34. *Ibid.* Further details, see, pp. 21-33.
35. Canada, *Federalism and International Relations*, (Ottawa : Department of External Affairs, 1968), p. 7.
36. Ivan L. Head, "The Foreign Policy of New Canada", *Foreign Affairs*, No. 50, (January. 1972), p. 239.
37. J, Thordarson, *Trudeau ond Foreign Policy : A Stndy in Decision-Making*, p. 105.

38. Robert B. Farrell, *op. cit.*, p. 5. See also, Roy A. Matthews, "A New Atlantic Role for Canada", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, (January 1968), p. 334.
39. John W. Holmes, "Canada and the Pacific", *Pacific Affairs*, (September, 1971), p. 6.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. Exports to Japan have risen from \$150 million to \$165 million, while imports from \$100 million to \$460 million. In 1962, sales to China were \$122 million, while imports \$27 million. An enhanced trade in the region can relieve Canada of excessive economic pressures.
41. Stephen Clarkson, "Canada's Role in Long-term Perspective", *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 28, (May, 1969), p. 4.
42. See for instance : Michael Brecher, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-5 ; and, Z. A. Bhutto, *Myth of Independence*, (London : Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 22.
43. Michael Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
45. Henry Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
46. Peter C. Dobell, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Since the Soviets have developed the ICBMs, the importance of the Continental bombers has become secondary.
47. For example, see the controversy over the manufacture of Arrow Aircrafts, in, John W. Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role", *Foreign Affairs*, No. 41, (July) 1963), pp. 661-62.
48. John W. Holmes, "Canada and the United States in World Politics", *op. cit.*, p. 107.
49. Michael Barkway, "Canada Rediscovered its History", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 35, (April, 1958), p. 414.
50. John W. Holmes, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
51. Roy A. Matthew, "A New Atlantic Role for Canada", *op. cit.*, pp. 337-38. He also assumes that one of the major objectives of the U. S. in Europe during the last thirty years had been solidarity and Unity of Western Europe. Here D. C. Thomson holds the opinion that the "two-pillar" concept was a part of Kennedy's "Great Design", *op. cit.*, p. 55. See also, J. Eayrs, "Canada and Enlarged Community", *Round Table*, No. 244, (October, 1971), p. 546.

52. Roy A. Matthew, "Canada, Britain and the Common Market: A Canadian View". *World Today*. No. 2, vol. 18, (February, 1962), pp. 52-53.
53. Roy A. Matthew, "A New Atlantic Role for Canada", *op. cit.*, p. 339. See in addition, D. C. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
54. Peter C. Dobell, *op. cit.* pp. 8-9.
55. Roy A. Matthew, "A New Atlantic Role", *op. cit.*, p. 336.
56. Dale C. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
57. See for instance, *Ibid.*, p. 18.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*, p. 101-102.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
61. John W. Holmes, "Canada and the Pan-America's", *Journal of Inter American Studies*, vol. 101 (April, 1968), pp. 174-76
62. Ernst Hass, "Alliances and National Objectives", in, Davis S. Mclellan, *op. cit.*, p. 472.
63. Davis S. Mclellan, "Collective Security", in, Davis S. Mclellan, *op. cit.*, p. 404.
64. Henry Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
66. Peter C. Dobell' *op. cit.* p. 23.
67. Roy A. Matthew, "A New Atlantic Role", *op. cit.*, p. 340.
68. Philip Windsor, "Current Tension in NATO", *World Today*, No. 7, vol. 26, (July, 1970), pp. 289, 294.
69. John W. Holmes, "Canada: The Reluctant Power", *Orbis*, (Spring, 1971), p. 292.
70. Roy A. Matthew, *op. cit.*, p. 335.
71. Dale C. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
72. Robin Ranger, *op. cit.*, p. 551. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 45-48.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 549.
74. Bruce Thordarson, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-39.
75. Dale C. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Regarding Canada's policy of non-committal pattern, Clarkson suggests that by "playing down" its NATO membership, Canada can "play up" its participation in activities like disarmament, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
76. Clarkson holds the view that after the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, Communism has lost its "expansionist momentum". Therefore, the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia should also be viewed as a "defensive operation" rather than offensive, *op. cit.*, p. 3. In addition, Canada's revised focus on the Third World was also mainly due to the diminished significance of the Commonwealth: "It is neither a power bloc, nor a diplomatic unit, nor a military unit ... The Commonwealth, therefore, proceeded to glorify its diversity", John W. Holmes. 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 116. See also - Peyton Lyon, "The Commonwealth in the 1970s", *World Today*, No. 4, vol. 27, (April 1971), p. 178 ; and, James G. Bayrs, "Canada and the Enlarged Community", *op. cit.*, p. 543.

## **THE 1958 COUP D'ETAT IN PAKISTAN : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

*Dr. Farhat Mahmud*

General Mohammad Ayub Khan took over power in Pakistan in a military *coup d'etat* in October 1958. He resigned as President of Pakistan in March 1969 in the wake of prolonged political agitation against him throughout the country. Before Ayub Khan took over power, Pakistan had already signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States in May 1954, had joined the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty [SEATO) in September 1954, and had become a member of the Baghdad Pact (later on the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO) in February 1955. An acute sense of insecurity vis-a-vis India, a decrepit economy, and the unsolved Kashmir issue had driven Pakistan into forming these various alliances. It was natural that Pakistan's distinctly feudal, bureaucratic and capitalist leadership should have aligned itself with the Western bloc.

Ever since January 1951, when he took over as the first Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, Ayub had been closely associated with the political situation of the country. In fact, Ayub's regime

was a continuation of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which had ruled Pakistan since the deaths of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, in 1948, and of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister' in 1951. Coming mostly from the provinces which were later to become West Pakistan, the oligarchs ruled as a front for the landlords, the businessmen, the industrialists and other elitist classes, again, mostly from West Pakistan. They manipulated these vested interests with great success to insure their continuous stay in power.

The bureaucratic-military oligarchy..has been in effective control of state power not, as is commonly believed, after the coup d'etat of October 1958 but, in fact, from the inception of the new state. In the first phase, politicians and political parties, who provided a facade of parliamentary government, were manipulated by them and were installed and expelled from office as it suited the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. When in 1958, the prospects of the impending general elections appeared to pose a challenge to the supremacy of the oligarchy, those who already held the reigns 'seized power' by abolishing the institution of parliamentary government through which the challenge was being mounted.<sup>1</sup>

The bureaucrats turned politicians and the professional politicians who sometimes joined them in ruling the country, having no roots among the

people, relied heavily on the army and Ayub Khan to keep them in power. Playing this role was nothing new to the Pakistan army, which was the British Indian Army merely renamed after independence in 1947. The British Indian Army, "an instrument of imperial conquest and repression," had been created after the abortive war of independence in 1857 to keep the handful of British and their local cohorts in power.

The social consciousness of the soldiers was "neutralized through emphasis on professionalization." When not fighting for the British in their wars outside India, "they were barracked in carefully guarded cantonments." Their domestic role "was to periodically suppress popular uprisings and localized riots." Due to the situation created by the two world wars, "some native Indians were handpicked for initiation into the officer ranks. These recruits, mostly descendants of the elite groups--were trained, groomed, and brainwashed in Sandhurst-type academies established in the subcontinent and in England."<sup>2</sup> Ayub Khan received his military training at Sandhurst, where he was promoted to the rank of Corporal and given two stripes.

Clearly, neither the structure nor the role of the Pakistan army changed after independence, and it was in the perspective of training and conditioning in the British Indian Army that one could easily trace the genesis of the thinking and the policies of Ayub Khan and his army colleagues.



The reliance of the politicians on Ayub, naturally, also resulted in great reliance on his opinions, which carried considerable weight because, as the Commander-in-Chief of the army, he headed the stronger and most organized branch of the ruling oligarchy. His influence on the internal as well as the external policies of Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. It would be too much to say that Ayub was the author of the policy of alignment, but he was certainly one of the strong voices which helped Pakistan to enter into close relations with the United States. "It is not known," wrote one of his colleagues, "when the Government of Pakistan decided to ask for military aid from the United States. Field Marshal [*sic*] Mohammad Ayub Khan was, however, definitely thinking along these lines in August 1951." The answer to the problems of Pakistan, he thought, "was to have a strong and reliable friend."<sup>3</sup>

That strong and reliable friend, in view of Ayub's training and frame of mind, had to be either Britain or the United States. According to one of his confidants, Ayub was also greatly instrumental in convincing the Americans about the wisdom of giving military aid to Pakistan. "Aid given to Pakistan came largely through his efforts and...the decisive factor in compelling the American authorities...was...the persuasive and untiring efforts of General Ayub." He dispelled the scepticism of the American politicians by convincing them of "the advantages of having the

Pakistan Army on their side." His arguments ultimately outweighed all other considerations.<sup>4</sup>

The tying up of Pakistan into military alliances with the US fitted into the US global strategy of 'containment through encirclement' of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, but it was quite evident that US policy-makers also envisaged the same domestic role of suppressing the popular uprisings for the Pakistan army as their British predecessors had done. Only a very naive student of international affairs would have thought that Pakistan, with the relatively meagre military aid provided to it by the United States, could ever have fought or even been able to resist the Soviet or the Chinese military advance into South Asia, had it ever come to pass. On the other hand, a Pakistani army equipped with American arms could be relied upon to crush popular movements in the name of stability; could help keep Pakistan's policies in line with those of the United States; and last but not least, it could be relied upon to take over the political power itself whenever the politicians showed signs of stepping out of line. The Pakistan army was envisioned as a 'stabilizing force', not only at home but also in the 'Middle East, and, even in Southeast Asia.

The usefulness of Pakistan in playing a role in the Middle East was one of the arguments used by Sir Olaf Caroe to convince American policy-makers to be friend Pakistan when he visited the United States in 1952 on a 'lecture tour' and most State

Department officials in Washington, an eminent British Civil Servant, the Foreign Secretary of India under Lord Wavell, the last British Governor of the North West Frontier Province, an authority on Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East, and an intermediary between the United States and Pakistan,<sup>5</sup> fore-saw a great role for Pakistan in the Middle East and advocated close accord among western power and the state surrounding the Persian Gulf in order to thwart the designs of the Soviet Union in the area.

The Mesopotamian campaigns of the First War and the strategic movements of the allies in Iraq and Persia in the Second World War were made possible from the Indian base ... In this quarter as on the North West Frontier, Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the Gulf opens directly in Karachi, in real sense its terminus.... The importance of the Gulf grows greater as the need for fuel expands, the world contracts, and the shadow lengthens from the North. Its stability can be assured only by the closest accord between the states which surround this Muslim Lake, an accord written by the great powers whose interests are engaged.<sup>6</sup>

However, Pakistan's joining the defence pacts did not secure the American and the British position in the Middle East in the face of the rising tide of Arab nationalism—nationalism which had its most vocal exponent in President Gamal Abdel

Naseer of Egypt. The 1956 British misadventure in Suez added to the prestige of President Naseer and put further pressure on the pro-American and pro-British regimes in the area. The United States Government tried desperately to come to the rescue of those regimes, first by declaring its support for the Baghdad Pact.

The United States has, from the inception of the Baghdad Pact, supported the Pact and the principles and objectives of collective security on which it is based—...The United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of those nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.<sup>7</sup>

And then, by initiating the so-called "Eisenhower Doctrine." In an address to a joint session of Congress on 5 January 1957, the President of the United States asked for the cooperation of the Congress. "to support free and independent governments.... against external menace, notably the menace of International Communism" in the Middle East. The action proposed would :

1. Authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

2. Authorize the Executive to undertake....programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desired such assistance.
3. Authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.
4. And authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.<sup>8</sup>

As a result, the Congress of the United States authorized the President "to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. The congressional resolution not only authorized the President to introduce military assistance programmes in the general area of the Middle East, but also gave him a Carte blanche to interfere militarily wherever "national independence" was threatened. The resolution stated that :

The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by International Communism.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, the American policy in the Middle East was in shambles. The friends of the United States were barely managing to survive. Ever since the American Government's *putsch* through its Central Intelligence Agency that overthrew Iran's Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and brought back the Shah,<sup>10</sup> the position of the latter had never been absolutely secure. The regimes in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon were also under great pressure from the Arab nationalists : Syria actually joined Egypt on 1st February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, Jordan escaped an alliance with Arab nationalists only because of a show of force by the US Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, a show of force which emboldened King Hussein to dismiss his pro-Naseer Prime Minister and thus to save himself and the interests of the United States.<sup>11</sup>

The Christian President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, was also living dangerously in the face of Arab nationalism, and by the middle of 1958,

the economically exploited Muslim Arab majority had found enough voice and support to threaten the pro-West, mostly urban, capitalist Christian minority and to bring the country to the brink of a civil war. To counter the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, the Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq formed an 'Arab Union.' On 14th July 1958, however, the whole edifice of Western policy in the Middle East was shaken by a revolution in Iraq, led by General Abdul Karim Kassem, in which the pro-West Premier, Nuri-es-Said, along with the royal family, was wiped out. S. M. Burke, a Pakistani Ambassador at the time and later a professor at the University of Minnesota, wrote, that :

For the moment it seemed as if the entire Western position in the Middle East would collapse. Many observers thought the revolution in Iraq would mean the end of the Baghdad Pact, the collapse of King Hussein's regime in Jordan and Chamoun's in Lebanon, and fresh perils for the King of Saudi Arabia, who had displayed affinity with his fellow Kings of Iraq and Jordan.<sup>12</sup>

As if in panic, next day on 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower ordered the US forces to land in Lebanon. Since the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' was meant to cover the cases of 'armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism,' the pretext invoked in order to interfere was the United Nations Charter, which recognized "as inherent the right of all nations to work

together and seek help when necessary to preserve their independence."<sup>13</sup> The following day, British paratroops were dropped in Jordan. It was thus that the Western position was 'saved' in the Middle East.

The Heads of state of the Muslim countries in the Baghdad Pact [Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey] had scheduled a meeting in Istanbul to review the situation in the Middle East the day the revolution occurred in Iraq. They hoped to protest to the United States for being too tolerant of President Naseer, for not becoming a full member of the Baghdad Pact, and for not helping Camille Chamoun in his worsening position in Lebanon.<sup>14</sup> The representatives of the Governments of Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, already in Istanbul to prepare the groundwork for the meeting, offered military aid to Chamoun against the "rebels" [Arab Nationalists] even before the Heads of State had reached Istanbul.<sup>15</sup> Iskander Mirza the President and Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, learnt of the "*coup*" in Iraq at Tehran Airport on their way to Istanbul. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, and the fear that the "*coup*" might be accompanied by "subversion" at other places, even Istanbul was not considered safe. The meeting, therefore, was shifted to Ankara. There, in an atmosphere which had a funeral ring to it,<sup>15</sup> the heads of state of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey learnt about and, in a telegram to President Eisenhower, expressed their gratitude for America's interference in Lebanon :



This bold and appropriate decision of the United States will not only ensure the...independence of Lebanon...but will at the same time strengthen the determined position of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey...We wish to convey to you...our appreciation and gratitude for this momentous decision in which we have great satisfaction and relief.<sup>17</sup>

In a joint declaration at the end of the meeting, they also expressed their "whole-hearted support by every possible means to any measure which might be taken to halt "international gangsterism in the Middle East.<sup>18</sup> From Ankara, the participants went to London for a Baghdad Pact meeting, which US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also attended. In the declaration issued at London on 28th July 1958 after the Baghdad Pact meeting, the United States extended the Eisenhower Doctrine to bring Pakistan, Iran and Turkey under its umbrella. The declaration stated, that :

The United States, in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to cooperate with the nations making this declaration for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation.<sup>19</sup>

John Foster Dulles assured the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact that the United States would not fail to act, even at great risk, to

preserve their independence. And, to compensate for the failure of the United States to become a member of the Baghdad Pact and to formalize the inclusion of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States later, on 5th March 1959, entered into identical Bilateral Defence Agreements with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.<sup>20</sup>

The imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in October, 1958 could only be understood in the context of the above-mentioned situation in the 'general area of the Middle East, and in terms of the response made by American elements to that situation and the direct or indirect involvement of the United States in response. The coup d'Etat under Ayub Khan by the pro-U.S. Pakistan army could further be explained by having a look at some internal factors which, if not checked, could have hurt U.S. interests in and around Pakistan.

While the Middle East was going through a revolutionary nationalist ferment, the course of Pakistan's alignment with the United States was not very smooth either. During 1957-58, general dissatisfaction in Pakistan became evident regarding the commitments the government had undertaken without any survey of defence against aggression from India, which was Pakistan's principal worry. The restrictions put on freedom of action in international affairs, the total absence of support on the Kashmir question from the United States, the unpopularity gained by Pakistan among the Afro-

Asian nations due to its policy of alignment, its involvement in the cold war and its alienation of China and the Soviet Union were other areas of concern.

The Pakistanis were also greatly distressed because of their alienation from Arab nationalism. They had always felt a strong bond between themselves and the Arab countries, with whom they shared a cultural heritage and a common religion. They also realised that the economic and military aid that they were getting for membership in the pacts with US was not a monopoly of the member countries. The neutral countries, which had not committed themselves to carry any burden of 'defensive', responsibilities were also recipients of US aid and, in many cases, received more than the committed ones did. India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, the three torch-bearers of neutralism during the 1950s, were among the highest recipients of American aid in their respective continents.

It was a sore point with the allied Pakistanis that neutral India should get more than twice as much economic assistance as they did. The explanation offered to the Pakistanis, that "India received more economic aid because next to China it was the most populous of the underdeveloped countries and was a testing ground for democracy's ability to compete with the totalitarian systems in industrializing large underdeveloped societies in a short time"<sup>21</sup>, did not convince the people of Pakistan, who of wearily felt that their country was being

prepared militarily against China and the Soviet Union, whereas India was being made a testing ground for economic development.

Other arguments given in order to explain US aid to India arguments such as it was only economic and not military aid, Pakistan should not feel threatened, and that Pakistan was receiving more aid per capita than India was—did not prove to be very satisfying either. The problem was emotional and not academic, as the United States thought, and ultimately, there was no difference anyway between economic and military aid, because the economic aid released money for military expenditure from India's own resources.

Enough anger and frustration had been caused in Pakistan by March 1958 to prompt Feroze Khan Noon, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a man rarely given to emotions and being life-long devotee of pro-Western policies, to declare in the National Assembly of Pakistan, that "Pakistan will revise its policy towards the West" unless the West aided in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. "The time was coming when Pakistan might have to revise her policy towards the West." Despite United States aid to Pakistan, he disclosed, India had four to five times the armed strength of Pakistan. "If Pakistan feels her independence in jeopardy," he told a cheering assembly.

We will break all pacts in the world and shake hands with those whom we have made

enemies for the sake of others.....It was wrong to think that a Muslim could not become a communist. If Muslims were given the choice of living under Hindu domination or communist they would prefer communist."<sup>22</sup>

In his address to a joint session of the US Congress on 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower had spelled out the conditions under which a country would fall an easy prey to communist aggression." "Experience shows," he said,

That indirect aggression rarely, if ever, succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression ; where the government possesses loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative.<sup>23</sup>

In Pakistan, positively one of the poorest countries of the world to start with, the economic conditions by 1958 had reached a stage where Communism will seem an attractive alternative. The miserable state of Pakistan's economy could best be visualized by the depressing picture the Finance Minister of Pakistan, Amjad Ali, presented to the National Assembly in September 1958. The Pakistan economy, except during the Korean War boom when there was a great demand for raw material in the industrialized countries, Amjad Ali said, had never been strong as far as foreign exchange was concerned. In the years 1956-58, the position had further deteriorated. The

foreign exchange reserves, including gold, stood at Rs. 126.29 crore (\$265.9 million) in December 1956; by June 1958 they had gone down to Rs. 89.03 crores (\$185.35 million), and during the next three months were reduced by approximately another Rs. 15 crores (31.57 million). The terms of trade had gone against Pakistan too. If the base in 1948 was supposed to be 100, by 1958 it had fallen to 61. Expenditure, at the same time, was rising gradually. It had risen from Rs. 145 crores (\$305.3 million) in 1954 to Rs. 228 crores (\$480 million) in 1957. Food imports caused the biggest drain on the economy, and Pakistan had been able to spend only \$186 million on constructive works out of total of \$838 million foreign aid received over the years.<sup>24</sup>

If the economic conditions in Pakistan were fast deteriorating to a stage where Communism could look like an attractive alternative, the growing trade between the People's Republic of China and Pakistan was of no less worry to the United States. In this regard, the exchange of Pakistani cotton and jute for Chinese coal was especially significant from the United States point of view. One of the corner-stone of US policy since World War II has been the acquisition of new materials for its industry from other countries at the cheapest price possible.<sup>25</sup> The United States Government, making no bones about it, had included a clause in its Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1954 with Pakistan to that effect. The agreement stipulated, that

The Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States.....Such quantities.....of raw and semi-processed material required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan.

Since the agreement was supposed to be 'mutual', "due regard" was to be given to the "reasonable requirements" of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export". In order to prevent any raw material falling into hands of the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union, commercial export to these countries was not considered to be one of Pakistan's 'reasonable requirement' of Pakistan, and lest anybody should have any doubt about it, Articles 6 of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement specifically stated :

In the interest of their mutual security, the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten maintenance of world peace,<sup>26</sup>

The China-Pakistan trade, based primarily on barter of Pakistani cotton for Chinese coal, and amounting to China buying 200,000 tons of cotton from Pakistan between 1950 and 1957,<sup>27</sup> was, therefore, an irritant to the United States. A series of trade agreements between Pakistan and China from June 1958 to October 1958, the time when the Middle East was at the peak of its revolutionary

ferment, heightened America's concern. A Sino-Pakistan barter agreement, under which China would sell 100,000 tonnes of rice to Pakistan and use the proceeds to buy Pakistani cotton and jute, was signed on 8th August 1958. This was the second agreement signed that year between the two governments. In June an agreement for the exchange of Chinese coal for Pakistani cotton was negotiated.<sup>28</sup> Later, on 4th October 1958, the two nations decided on a reciprocal grant of most-favoured-nation treatment.<sup>29</sup> This happened just these days before Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan on 7th October 1958.

United States policy-makers, conscious of their deteriorating position, visualized Sino-Pakistan trade not only as a challenge to American policy in the Middle East, but also as part of a general drive by the Communists to throw them out of the area. In a report presented at the time to the Council on Foreign Relations, a body closely associated with US Foreign policy formation and "the CIA's Principal 'constituency' in the American public,"<sup>30</sup> A. Doak Barnett wrote :

In the Middle East...Sino-Egyptian trade is particularly important. Between 1956 and 1957 this trade, based primarily upon an exchange of Chinese manufactured goods for Egyptian cotton, jumped from 35 million dollars to 65 million and served as an important symbol of growing friendliness at that time between



Asian communism and Middle Eastern neutralism. Peking has also fostered and developed considerable trade with all the major South Asian nation. In this region China-Pakistan trade...has been specially significant.

He was on to suggest that there was "the ominous possibility" that China had "deliberately embarked" on such trade to drive Western competition out of Asian markets, and "in order to tie the region as closely as possible to Communist China, making it increasingly susceptible to pressures from Peking."<sup>31</sup>

For a country as much interested in the affairs of Pakistan as the United States was, the greatest worry, however, was Pakistan's continued political 'instability' and the way the events were moving towards the first general elections in the country at the end of 1958. Since the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, effective political control had been grabbed by a trio consisting of the Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, a former civil servant, Major General Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary, who took over later as Governor General and then as President on Ghulam Mohammad's death and General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

This trio headed the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. It was under their direction that Pakistan's foreign policy was tied to, what Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had called, "the apron-strings of the Anglo-American block."<sup>32</sup> In order to keep themselves in power, having no support

among the masses, they had to indulge in a constant class game of internal politics, always playing one politician against the other. Due to the political manoeuvres of the trio, no less than six Prime Ministers had come and gone since the death of Lquat Ali Khan, thus making the politicians look more inept than they actually were. As long the trio held the reigns of power, all was well with the Pakistan-United States alliance.

But a new constitution had been promulgated in Pakistan in 1956, and the first ever general elections were scheduled for November 1959. The elections not only posed a threat to the ruling oligarchy, but also to the interests of the United States, since both had the same arms and worked in close collaboration under the circumstances, there was some talk of postponing the elections. The National Election Conference, for instance, recommended the postponement of the elections from November 1958 to February, 1959. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the President of the Muslim League and a strong opponent of the ruling clique, made the mistake of proclaiming that if the elections were postponed, "the Baghdad tragedy may be enacted in Pakistan also."<sup>33</sup> He forgot that everyone, everywhere, from Washington to Karachi, was allergic to that kind of rhetoric, and determined that what had happened in Iraq should never be allowed to happen again, anywhere.

The popularity of the Awami League, a political party which had components of communists and a power base in both wings of the country, was

also a cause of concern to the ruling classes. H. S. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during 1956-57 and the President of the Awami League, although extremely pro-West during his term of office, had also been instrumental in bringing Pakistan and the People's Republic of China closer. It was during his term of office that Premier Chou En-lai had visited Pakistan in December 1956 after Suhrawardy himself had paid a visit to China in October.

Suhrawardy was so impressed by his exchanges with Chou En-lai that he wrote to Eisenhower supporting the claim of the People's Republic to represent China in the United Nations, and also urging recognition of the People's Republic by the United States.<sup>84</sup>

President Eisenhower, needless to say, did not accept Suhrawardy's point of view. However, if the latter was elected the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the elections of November 1958, of which there was a strong chance, he could, especially under the growing influence of the leftist elements in the Awami League, draw Pakistan and China closer, as well as support the right of the People's Republic of China to sit in the United Nations. Naturally, something had to be done to stop that from happening.

The most formidable challenge to the existing collaboration between the Pakistani ruling clique and the United States came with the emergence of the pro-Chinese National Awami Party (NAP),

formed in East Pakistan in 1957 as a strong political force with growing influence among the masses.

Besides advocating many bourgeois-democratic reforms in both parts of the country, the NAP became the only party to demand Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO and the and its persuance of a no Baghdad Pact of naligned foreign policy. The growing influence the NAP treatened the interests of the United States and its West Pakistani collaborators. Before elections could be held in 1958, the military led by General Ayub Khan, staged a coup abrogated the constitution, and banned all political parties.<sup>39</sup>

The threat posed by the Awami League & NAP to the power of the West Pakistani ruling classes was the single most important reason for the imposition of army rule in Pakistan. The elitist West Pakistani ruling classes, the fedual lords, the army, the bureaucracy and big business, all working in harmony were understandably unwilling to hand over power to a popularly elected government from East Pakistan. Just a month before the elections were to be held. Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan in October 1958 in the name of bringing stability' to the country. It has rarely been recognized in Pakistan that the political manoeuvres of the Pakistani ruling oligrachy itself were mainly responsible for creating the 'political instability' which Pakistan had been subjected to, and which was used as a pretext to put an end to the political process in Pakistan.

The elections and the policies of the Awami League and the National Awami Party threatened the West Pakistani ruling classes, on the one hand, and the interests of the United States, which were closely associated with them, on the other. The United States and the West Pakistani ruling classes, with the bureaucratic-military oligarchy led by Major General Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan, had worked in close cooperation over the years. They also worked in close cooperation, it could safely be assumed, in putting an end to the process which was posing a threat to their alliance and their interests.

Democracy [ in Pakistan ] was given a bad name and hanged, because the democratic process would lead to a reversal of the policy of alignment with the West. In the wake of the realization that the general elections could no longer be postponed, the ruling hierarchy affected a *coup en famille (sic)* and General Ayub Khan stepped in, much, to the relief of the Americans and the British.<sup>36</sup>

Considering the situation in the Middle East and the internal situation in Pakistan itself, it could safely be inferred that the *coup* by General Ayub in Pakistan was a link in the chain involving the so-called 'stabilization' process in the general area of the Middle East under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The United States Government, if it was not actually involved, at least had definite prior know-

ledge of the *coup* and encouraged it. Ayub Khan and the American officials worked in close liaison all through 1958. Feroze Ahmad has observed that Ayub Khan "later revealed that he had consulted officials in Washington, including CIA Chief Allen Dulles, before declaring Martial Law in Pakistan."<sup>37</sup>

Ayub Khan revealed in his autobiography that during his tour of the United States in May 1958, he had extensive discussions with General Nathan Twining, General Omar Bradley and the Chiefs-of-Staff of all the services. He also met the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, who, according to Ayub Khan, "put his brother, who was the US Foreign Secretary (*sic*), in picture regarding our problems."<sup>38</sup> Again, Ayub Khan had extensive discussions with American officials during the Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara, just after the revolution in Iraq, and also at the London meeting of Pact countries where Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was present.

The presence of the United States Defence Secretary Niel H. McElroy in Karachi just one day before the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan is evidence of the fact that the involvement of the United States in the *coup* went beyond mere knowledge of what was coming. During the hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1959 in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Niel McElroy defended the military government of Ayub Khan in no uncertain terms.<sup>39</sup>

It was thus, following in the footsteps of Lebanon and Jordan, that the process of change in

Pakistan was also curbed, with the United States and the Pakistani ruling class working hand in hand. It was no coincidence that a report by the U.S. Departments of Defense and State for the year 1958 described the armed forces of Pakistan as "the greatest stabilizing force in the country."<sup>40</sup>

Sardar Bahadur Khan, brother of Aynb Khan and the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly of Pakistan, a man who should have been in the know of things, stated quite categorically in the National Assembly of Pakistan in July 1962 that the United States was responsible for bringing Ayub Khan to power in October 1958. He stated that most of the "ills and difficulties" of Pakistan were due to "American conspiracies." He said that "America had a hand in all changes and revolutions [in Pakistan] since 1953."<sup>41</sup> Sardar Bahadur Khan stated that the United States was only interested in "gaining its own objectives and furthering its own cause" and was not "seriously interested in or sympathetic to" the problems of Pakistan. Commenting on Ayub's Government, he said that it was "an unworthy attempt" on the part of the Americans "to instal in this country a Government [like Ayub Khan's]." He said :

Our country has witnessed many revolutions. The first revolution took place when Khawaja Nazimuddin was in power and the Americans had a hand in [his overthrow]. Then we had another revolution in 1958 and the

Americans, again, had something to do with it.

Sardar Bahadur Khan went on to reveal that Iskander Mirza himself, while in England after he was thrown out and sent into exile by General Ayub Khan, admitted to one of his (Bahadur Khan's) friends, that the Americans had a hand in the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan and bringing Ayub Khan to power in 1958.<sup>43</sup>

The unwillingness of the West Pakistani ruling classes to hand over power to an elected Prime Minister from East Pakistan, and the unwillingness of the bureaucracy and the army to accept the supremacy of an elected government were the principal reasons for the imposition of martial law in Pakistan in 1958. However, the United States also cannot be absolved of the responsibility of being a party to the whole operation. It was, after all, the American-equipped army which had staged the coup d'état and had done away with the parliamentary system. Considering the involvement of the U.S. Government in policy-making in Pakistan at the time, it seems impossible, that the United States did not encourage or, at least, know about the *coup d'état* which was being planned.

A senior official of the Government of Pakistan talking about the extent of the American involvement in the policy-making in Pakistan's affairs told the writer that copies of all the important Government files at the time were sent to the US Ambassador for information and consultation. The



presence of US Secretary of Defense McElroy in Pakistan on the eve of the imposition of martial law points towards the fact that the involvement of the United States in the *coup d'etat* went beyond mere knowledge of it. Ayub wrote in his autobiography that he had met Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in May 1958, and Allen Dulles had later put his brother in the picture regarding Pakistan's problem. While US involvement in the 1958 Coup d'etat cannot be proved in absolute terms, the circumstantial evidence definitely points the finger towards the United States.

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4. Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, *My Chief* (Lahore : Longman, 1960), 67 and 76.
5. For details of Sir Olaf's role as a go-between, see Selig S. Harrison's "India, Pakistan and the U.S. 1, Case History of a Mistake," *The New Republic*, 10 August 1959.
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7. *United States Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XXXV, No. 911, 10 December 1956.

8. White House Press Release, 5 January 1957. Text also in *United States Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 917, 21 January 1957.
9. *Ibid.*,
10. Victor Marchetti and John D. Mark, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York : Dell, 1975), p. 51.
11. *The Washington Post* of 18 February 1977 revealed that King Hussein of Jordan has been on the payroll of the CIA since 1957. The CIA paid millions of dollars to Hussein up to 1977 for "allowing US intelligence agencies to operate freely in his strategically placed Middle Eastern country...Hussein himself provided intelligence to the CIA and forwarded payments to other government officials who provided intelligence or co-operated with the CIA". Also see *The Montreal Star*, 18 February 1977. President Carter also confirmed the news and described King Hussein as "our most reliable source" of information in the Middle East. *The New York Times*, 26 February 1977. For a detailed account see, *ARR: Arab Report and Record*, London 18 March 1977, pp 116-117.
12. S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 193.
13. *White House Press Release*, 17 July 1958.
14. *The New York Times*, 17 July 1958.
15. *Pakistan Horizon*, September 1958, p. 210.
16. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London : Oxford University Press. 1967), p. 66. Aynb Khan wrote that the meeting "was like a mourning." He also revealed his aloofness from Arab nationalism and his admiration for the pro-West elements in the Middle East writing about Nuri-es-Said's death : "News came there [in Ankara] that Nuri-es-Said was murdered....This is the way they have treated a man who had done so much for them." *Ibid.*
17. *Telegram of the Heads of State*, Ankara, 16 July 1958. Text in *United States Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 997, 4 August 1958.
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Rarely any voice was raised in the US, against its intervention in Lebanon. I. F. Stone was one of the exceptions. His expose of the US policy in Lebanon not only revealed the type of policy the three Heads of State had so outrightly committed themselves to follow, but it also

made clear as to who was committing the so-called international gangsterism. He commented: 'Those who believed that no major power would risk a world war in the H-bomb age now have their answer. It is also the answer to those who thought that the only danger might be from a half-mad dictator ruling a terrorized society. Eisenhower....ordered the Marines into action in Lebanon without consulting Congress, our allies in NATO or the UN. All three were confronted with a *fait accompli*, as if this were the world of 1900, Lebanon a banana republic on our doorstep, and the most lethal weapon still the machine gun.....

Only eighteen months ago when President Eisenhower asked Congress to approve the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine he promised that if armed intervention became necessary, he would first consult Congress. But only one member, representative Reuss....had the nerve to stand up and recall that promise. His criticism was cut short by Speaker Rayburn with a rebuke: 'In times like these we had better allow matters to develop rather than make remarks about them.' These 'matters' may be thermonuclear. (The Speaker edited his rebuke out of the *Congressional Record* but it was reported by the *Associated Press* and *The New York Times* on 16 July 1958....Next day, when [Representative Celler of New York rose to ask unanimous consent for a one-minute speech, Rayburn wanted first to know if it were on foreign policy and refused consent when told it was—until Celler explained that he wanted to support the sending of troops to Lebanon, then he was allowed to proceed....This, in a representative assembly).

In the atmosphere of demonology created by the State Department, it has become dangerous to suggest that maybe there may be social revolution in the Middle East, as in Iraq (all parties had been outlawed and a free press long banned in that oil company utopia), or a great big Saturday night family brawl as in the Lebanon, without its necessarily being the handiwork of Big Devil in Moscow or Little Devil in Cairo. We are being blinded by our own propaganda. The right of the Arabs to a place of respect in the world is something we must recognize....See, "Gunboat Diplomacy in the H-Bomb Age," *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, 21 July 1958.

19. *United States Department of State Bulletin*, 19 August 1958, p. 273.
20. Following the Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation of 5 March 1958, the Government of India

asked for a clarification of certain provisions of the agreement from the United States. Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, revealed in the Indian Parliament : "We have been assured by the US authorities that their latest bilateral agreement with Pakistan has no effect other than the extension of the Eisenhower Doctrine to cover Pakistan and that the Eisenhower Doctrine restricts the use of United States armed forces to cases of armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches : 1957-1963*. (New Delhi : Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964), p. 289.

21. William G. 'Carleton, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy : Its Global Range* (New York : Random House 1963), p. 305.
22. *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, 4 September p. 367. Also see *The New York Times*, 9 March 1958.
23. *United States Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1917, 21 January 1957, pp. 86-87. (Emphasis added).
24. *National Assembly of Pakistan ; Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 9 September 1958 (Karachi ; Manager of Publications, 1958), pp. 664-674. Also see S. M. Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 259. All figures given were in Pakistani Rupees. They have been converted into U. S. dollars by the author at the then existing rate of Pak Rs. 4.75=\$1US approximately.
25. One of the best books on the subject is by the Editor of *Le Monde Le Monde Diplomatique*, Claude Jullien, *American's Empire* (New York : Vintage, 1973).
26. Text of the Pakistan-United States Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (signed at Karachi on 19 September 1954) in, *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. No. 2736 (New York) United Nations, 1954-1955(, p. 301.

Talking to the writer, an official of the Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, said, "I do not know why the agreement was called 'Mutual.' There was nothing 'Mutual about it.'"

27. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, 1563, 5 July 1957.
28. *Peking Review*, 19 August 1958.
29. Douglas M. Johnson and Hungdah Chiu, *Agreements of the People's Republic of China : A Calendar* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 86.

30. Marchetti and Marks, *op. cit.*, p. 267. The Council on Foreign Relations claims itself to be a private body, but has always been closely associated with the State Department, the CIA, and with the foreign policy formation of the United States Government. Marchetti and Marks write. "The influential but private council, composed of the country's top political, military, business, and academic leaders, has long been the CIA's principal 'constituency' in the American public. When the Agency has needed prominent citizens to front for its proprietary companies or for other special assistance, it has always turned to Council members." *Ibid.* John J. McCloy officers an interesting case in point. He was the former Assistant Secretary of War, the former High Commissioner to Germany, and a great personal friend of John Foster Dulles) At the time of the Suez crisis, he was the Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank as well as of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations: incidentally, Allan Dulles, the Director of the CIA was a member of the same board. During the Suez crisis, John J. McCloy helped the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, determine Israel's intentions about attacking Egypt. In October 1956, he telephoned the foreign department heads of major New York banks to find out if any extraordinary flow of funds from New York to Israel had taken place. See Herbert S. Permet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 472.

The close association of the Council and the State Department is also confirmed by David Wise, *The Politics of Living, Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power* (New York: Vintage, 1973), p) 141. "In 1971," Wise wrote, "former Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy spent considerable time at the State Department reading classified material for the preparation of a book. As the new editor of *Foreign Affairs*, the quarterly published by Council on Foreign Relations. Bundy was, by definition, a charter member of the foreign policy establishment"

William J. Barnds, a former (or present) CIA) official joined the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in mid-1960's and was its secretary in 1968. See Marchetti and Marks, *op. cit.*, pp. 332 and 333.

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32. *Dawn*, 9 March 1951.
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39. See U. S. Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on The Mutual Security, Act of 1959*, 6 May 1959, pp. 105-206.
40. Department of State and Department of Defence. *The Mutual Security Program Fiscal Year 1958, Vol. 1* (Washington, D. C), 1962), p. 359.
41. *The New York Times*, 11 July 1962.
42. *National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Official Report* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), 11 July 1962, p. 1241.

## **CHINA : NATURE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE**

*Arshad Syed Karim*

China is one of the few nations of the world which carried a constant historical development from ancient to medieval and then to the modern times. In her long thousands and thousands years of recorded history, China was always involved in search of development and therefore, constantly remained under the process of change. Modern Chinese history has a unique experience in her socio-political and economic development, she is a particular nation which went through continued revolutionary periods in this century from liberal to violent to silent revolutions. In all three cases she passed through one change to another for the ultimate goal of modernization and development. This led her to experiment different ideological and institutional elements in her system environment. A liberal revolution (1911) of western philosophy gave China nothing but disorder, discontent, frustration and civil war. It was more of a burgeoies revolution than people's rule which could neither bring mass participation nor development leaving her in a stage of multiple crises. The violent revolution (1949) sought many newer orders

making modern China a state of proletariat dictatorship under the sole leaderships and personality cult of Mao Zedong. Mao gave China many things : ideology, unity, economic order, political philosophy, human value, and above all self-reliance — all to be put under a strong sense of democratic-centralism where democracy was people's support to Mao and centralism of his Chinese Communist party supremacy and hold on the entire life style of the Chinese. That pressurised Mao to keep the Chinese under the iron-curtain and regularly teach them a philosophy which had only one meaning, the "sayings of Mao". In other words, China of violent revolution was Mao and Mao was China. Undoubtedly Mao changed China, but he in a true sense, could not make China lived under flux because his "fear", "disliking" or "distrust" for outer world never allowed the Chinese to lead a life with broader sense and live in the world with the value of exchange of thoughts and knowledge. Mao's revolutionary schemes in socio-political and economic shperes sought development till his image was present with all strength and glory. The moment his personal charisma saw the decline, his revolutionary enthusiasm started vanishing. He himself became victim of his own schemes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution so much that his own concept of self-criticism was used for him by his followers at the later part of his life. Consequently, Mao's China changed. A change appeared again after quarter of a century when Mao departed from the world. A Nationa-



list China (1911-49) changed to Maoist China (1949-76) and has now entered into another changed China, a Modernist China (1976—present). The change to change is therefore, a typical of modern Chinese history.

The new leadership in China under Deng Xiaoping has taken a developmental approach with much difference to Mao Zedong. Deng has established a new strategy and new institutions to modernize China. In politics, he looks for greater stability and reliability to protect China from such movement like the Cultural Revolution which led to chaos and uncertainty. He invited younger, better educated and more professionally trained officials to replace the older generation in the CCP, government and armed forces with the removal of Maoist from power.

On ideological side, the new leadership replaced the Maoist equalitarianism with an emphasis on material incentives like hard work and pragmatism for efficiency and productivity. This has led to the new educational development in science, technology, humanities and law.

In economic system, Deng has introduced a decentralized, quasi-market socialist system" better suited to Chinese conditions. He has legalized some private ownership by permitting holding of small groceries, tailoring and other such shops. There has emerged light industries and a "consumer revolution" has also begun. A greater emphasis

has been put on technological advancement for rapid development and modernization which has led a great number of Chinese youth to go abroad for such scientific higher education.

The cultural values have also been given a new dimension. Greater cultural diversity based on national and international value system has been adopted. Alien movies, arts, literature, plays, books, clothes, foods and drinks, which were either completely banned or unknown to the modern Chinese under Mao's reign are open for the whole society, which are being taken by them excitingly and eagerly. Professionals have gained a great respect in society and the intellectuals have sought higher prestige and new power in socio-political and economic orders.

Foreign economic and cultural influences have taken place in China at a large scale with an "open door" policy which has diminished Maoist concept of "self-sufficiency." Consequently, China has entered into a more open society with the virtual displacement of Maoist institutions and practices.

The changing China in post-Mao era, politically speaking, has put a greater emphasis on stability development of legal institutions so that security to the people could be provided. The economic-stability exercise is one of the reasons to the end. To avoid the holocaust of the Cultural Revolution in future, which is still alive in China mind, the political authorities believed in a regular constitutional process with stable government institutions

and creation of constitutional provisions. For this purpose, an amended constitution was adopted in 1980 altering the major governmental institutions where the role of intellectuals was increased. For example, in the government new leader were selected with a background of education and training. It is also significant to note that in the CCP the changes occurred with the inclusion of younger and energetic leadership. In the bureaucratic set up, under the new Constitution (1982) military responsibilities are separated from those of the chief of state. The president no longer directs the armed forces. This is now the responsibility of the State Military Commission. The impetus for the reforms though comes largely from the very top leadership, the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy are responsible for carrying them out. Powers are decentralized by sharing with professionals and expertise. The PLA representation in the National People's Congress has been reduced and that of professionals and intellectuals is increased. At the regional and local levels also the organizational structures are changed. These structures are the provinces, prefectures, cities and Xiangs, and until recently the communes. The communes are not any more empowered with governmental responsibilities, Yiangs (villages) have been made the lowest level of government. Communes are now assigned with only economic functions to performs. Legal system is taking place and laws are seeking significant values in the socio-political system. Importance of law has enhanced the number of young

students for the studies of law. In the State Council, pattern of personnel is also changing. The younger, better trained and educated officials are replacing the old age group with the expectation of providing future dynamic and pragmatic leadership for modernization. Technocrats (trained engineers) are appointed on the positions of vice-premierships indicating the importance of technological advancement. In the PLA also, the older officers are replaced by younger, professionally trained and better educated personnel. The political background personnel is replaced by professionals and the political work of the PLA is shifted to new commanders equipped with trained people.

From ideological angle, the post-Mao period shows a different ideological mood denouncing Mao's egalitarianism. The present leaders believe that egalitarianism was a "disaster to their socialist cause." The Maoist concept of class-struggle has diminished by the removal of class labels like landlord, rightist or reactionary. The founding Chinese Communist ideology i.e. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, pursuit of socialism, and leadership of the CCP—are interpreted with pragmatism by Deng's emphasis on seek truth from facts." Deng's believes are in using practice as the "sole criterion for truth, and to emancipate the mind from dogma." Mao's approach of "hurried way the better way" is changed to slower and sober realism.

Economically, there has been far-reaching changes. There follows a policy of the "de facto decollectivization of agriculture." The land ownership is not allowed to private sector, but there has appeared a system of "house-hold responsibility in countryside, in which families are assigned collective fields with local officials". The agriculture surplus may be sold by these families according to their own method in the free market. The government has allowed private plots also for the individual to work on agriculture production. These policies have expanded peasant marketing which has improved the agricultural efficiency. In economic policy the other significant change is the replacement of priorities on heavy industry and defense by light industry consumer goods, agriculture and rise of standard of living. There is emphasis on greater labour productivity and efficiency. The labours are judged through skills and competence instead of political purity and they are awarded and promoted on the basis of their work. There has emerged the decentralization of economic decision-making with local authorities. The locality like provinces, special municipalities and special economic zones are allowed (within a limit) to sign contracts with foreign companies without the approval of the central government. Further, private enterprise has been introduced in economic reforms. For example, purchase of private trucks by farmers, opening of shops, restaurants, and other private enterprises by individuals in towns and cities are openly allowed. Moreover, the post-Mao leader-

ship has opened economic liaison with the West like the permission of foreign investment in China, use of foreign technology and learning of foreign techniques. Consequently, China has opened its trade with the United States, Japan and Western Europe, which is expanding with the passage of time. For the same purpose the government is sending Chinese student to these countries in a large number for advanced professional training. The ambition of technological advancement for economic development has led the pro-Mao leadership towards the open-door policy unbelieving the Maoist slogan of self-sufficiency.

In cultural and social aspects, the pro-Mao regime has taken a wide open step by opening up new universities all over the country. It has established many economic and political research centres to recognise the prestige of intellectuals and scholar. The government has allowed the availability of variety of national and foreign books, films, plays and operas. Music, dance, art, dresses, and food are permitted for local entertainments reflecting the image of socio-cultural revolution.

Chinese deviation in political economic and socio-cultural value-system is significant with reference to change. Post-Mao China has again entered a new road with definite direction as did at the advent of Mao. Revolutionary China under Mao led the nation towards development and change in a reactionary method by withering away with the existing traditional value-system and gave China a

promising hope of modernization. The faster-change policy and Mao's ambition of continuing his dogma with personality cult even after his death diverted to growing nation towards depression and dissatisfaction, and thus to another revolution for newer hope with new direction and change. Deng's influence on changed Chinese society is not an outcome of his ideological or dogmatic causes. He is neither a philosopher nor a spiritual charisma. He speaks with a pragmatic tone and pragmatism generally leads to success, particularly if used with facing the fact with truth, on what Deng implies upon. It is difficult to assume that the present change in Chinese value-system may be permanent as change-itself does not plead continuity. However, one cannot deny the fact that China today has emerged as a changed society after diminishing the clouds of Mao's charisma,

## THE MAY 4TH 1919 MOVEMENT AN ANALYSIS

*Mrs. Aqila Khawaja*

The May Movement was one of the most important movements in the recent Chinese political and cultural history. It was a milestone in the growth of nationalism and had gone along with a cultural movement and programme of social reform. It was probably the culture which was crucial in 1919. The totalistic rejection of the tradition was indeed a novel as well as the most characteristic feature of the movement.

The essential problems afflicting Chinese society were seen to be fundamental in the realm of thought, values, and psychology. Only a complete reformation and revolutionization of the thinking and morality of the people—a wholesale transformation of human “consciousness”—could lead to a meaningful action in the political and economic sphere. It began with a fiercely iconoclastic onslaught against traditions of Chinese past, traditions which seemed to weigh all too heavy on the Chinese present.

In this paper I shall deal with two developments which demonstrate theme of May Fourth Movement. Firstly, what was the dominant force in May Fourth Movement? It was intellectual



force which primarily attacked traditional Chinese society, which consequently led to a revolution. Secondly, it was the political force, primarily directed against foreign imperialism. My major emphasis is upon the intellectual movement.

The May Fourth Movement—In part it was an intellectual reawakening, sometimes called the Chinese Renaissance, but in fact, if a comparison with European intellectual history must be made closer in spirit to the eighteenth century. The May Fourth was a kind of Chinese enlightenment.<sup>1</sup>

On May Fourth 1919 students in Peking demonstrated to protest the decision of the Paris Peace Conference, that transferred Germany's rights in Shantung Province to Japan. The demonstration led to strikes by students, merchants, and Labourers and to the refusal of the Chinese delegates to sign the Treaty of Versailles. But the student protest, though making the pivot of the movement was not the whole story.

The May Fourth Movement, in the broad sense was a combined intellectual and socio-political movement covering the years of 1917-1921. Its purpose was to achieve national independence, overthrow stagnant traditions and modernize China. The significance of the May Fourth Movement lies in its contribution to the surge of nationalism and the birth of Chinese Communism. Imperialism, rather than Bolshevism instigation, was the cause of the patriotic outburst.

The May Fourth Movement called into question on the very basis of Chinese society. The young students who wished to be rid once and for all of the evils, they denounced were not wrong to hurl themselves against the confucian citadel—crying, 'overthrow Confucius and Sons,' (Ta-Tao Kung-Chia-Tien).

May Fourth was a Movement of intellectuals, and primarily of academics at that; its strength came from students and Professors. In the narrowest sense, May Fourth refers to a student demonstration. (The May Fourth incident.) In its broader accepted meaning, May Fourth was a movement of cultural renewal and revolution, a movement that in fact started several years before the demonstration of 1919 and lasted years after it.

Chen Tu-hain, Hu Shih, Ysai Yuan-Pei, and Mao Tse-Tung were among the intellectuals, who had great contribution in the movement. The combination of certain intellectual forces made this movement broadly iconoclastic.

The humiliation of a century of unequal treaties and fresh arrogance of Japan's twenty-one demands in 1915, resulted in demands by young intellectuals for reforms which were iconoclastic in their criticism of traditional Chinese society and frantic and disorganised in their scrutiny of western theories. The traditionalist and conservative elements within the Nationalist Government while accepting its nationalistic goals have condemned the iconoclastic elements of the movement, which

to liberal was a renaissance and to the Communist a popular movement against imperialism and feudalism. Dr. Chow persuasively suggests that in fact it was,

Actually a combined intellectual, socio-political movement to achieve national independence, the emancipation of the individuals and a just society by the modernization of China... ..intellectual...because it precipitated a mainly intellectual awakening and transformation and because it was led by intellectuals...The most important purpose of the movement was to maintain the existence and independence of a nation, a goal which had actually generated all the the major reforms and revolutions in China, since the later half of the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

The historical precedents for May Fourth, both as a campaign against imperialism and as one for cultural revolution were particularly rich for the years between 1898 and 1912.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 completely humiliated China and foreign threats to China became trivial, and enormous. The Japanese blow encouraged Western Powers to partition China. The presence of imperial powers in China (Japan, Russia, France, Germany, U K., U.S.A ) and their imperialism and colonialism led to Chinese nationalism. Around 1900 Chinese of all sorts accepted the challenge that Chinese Civilization was at the verge of extinction.

Among students the experiments with anti-imperialist popular protest movement began not long after 1900. China's first modern student protest probably occurred in 1903, when the Russians delayed a promised evacuation of their troops from Manchuria. Several hundred students in Tokyo, Shanghai, and Peking held meetings, petitioned the government and finally attempted to form a volunteer brigade to fight in the northwest.

The nation's first anti-imperialist protest involving mass action and cooperation of several strata of society was probably the anti-American boycott of 1905. The boycott was initiated by Chinese merchants, vigorously promoted by students supported by a popular press campaign, and participated in by a variety of treaty port residents, from dock to labourers to petty shopkeepers and many individuals with personal ties to overseas Chinese.

Other smaller eruptions followed a similar pattern. One was a student drive against the then Governor of Kwangs who was thought to be giving away valuable railroad concessions to the French and in turn using French troops to suppress a local rebellion. Another was the student merchant protest and boycott in Canton in 1908 mounted to uphold against the Japanese and the Chinese government's right to seize a Japanese ship dealing in contraband. One can link these incidents with May Fourth Movement, because they were stimulated by explicit hostility to imperialism, both political

and economic, and by the new populist consciousness.

The belief that people had the right and duty to break officialdom's historic monopoly of political action, they were perceived dynamically, as opinion molding, rather than statically, as expressions of sentiments.

Furthermore the leaders of these protests imagined a double enemy—both the predatory foreign power and the native authorities who acted to protect foreign interests before those of their own people. So the imperialist threats and the treachery became a motivation for May Fourth Movement.

All these facts suggest that the basis for a radical student movement and a certain amount of mass social mobilization against western impositions and native acquiescence in these existed well before the events of 1919.

The intellectual manifestation against Chinese traditions were also strong prior to 1919. Before 1900 few students went abroad mostly to Japan for higher education but the number increased in 1905 and 800 Chinese students were studying abroad in Japan, U. S. A., and England. These students, when coming back to China, brought new ideas, and were influenced by western philosophy.

Liang Chi-Cho started publishing a newspaper in Japan with appealing style and emphasized upon western history, and science. Darwin, Spencer and

J. S. Mill's philosophical ideas influenced radical young Chinese. The principle of "survival of the fittest" seemed to be very attractive to young students especially in response to humiliation.

The two developments in short period further stimulated Chinese youth. The first was that in 1905 examination system was abolished, which was a key measure in destruction of the old order, for the examination system which had kept all government posts in the hands of traditionally educated literate was one of the confucianism's main institutional hold. The second was the collapse of the imperial system in 1911 which was a decisive factor to the breakdown of traditional political and cultural order.

May Fourth Movement was an iconoclastic movement and the iconoclasm was a result of the interplay of the intellectual change of thought and traditional confucian mode of thinking. A typological treatment of two leading figures of the intelligentsia, Chen-Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih serve to illustrate the concrete, content of the May Fourth iconoclasm. The contribution of Tsai Yuan-Pie as President of Peking University, was also of great importance. The ideas and endeavours of these intellectuals reflect the theme of the May Fourth Movement.

Hu Shih completed his Ph. D. thesis in 1917 at Columbia University in U. S. He was a staunch follower of John Dewey, adopted the early concepts and values of Dewey's experimentatism undre-

servedly and brought the Deweyan concept of scientific method to China. He regarded Dewey's philosophy as the most advanced stage in the progress of western culture. He wanted to make Chinese culture a scientific culture in which everything including ethics was to be orbitrated by science and the Deweyan method of science. He was committed to the ideas and values of John Dewey because they represented to Hu's mind not only a set of particular ideas and values of the west but the most advanced ideas and values of world civilization which every civilization sooner or later had to follow. He believed that new circumstances in Chinese society would induce China to become westernized. Hu felt that cruelty, laziness, and suppression of the individual were the fundamental and distinctive features of the nature of Chinese tradition. Hu's totalistic rejection of Chinese society was based on the belief that China's 'unique treasures' were

eight legged essays, bound feet enunch, concubinage five generation house hold, memorial orders for honouring chastity, hellish prisons, and law courts filled with instrument of torture."<sup>4</sup>

Hu said that China's "unique treasures" were the evils created by our ancestors. So an attack on Chinese traditions had to be totalistic. Since the traditional Chinese mind was so diseased, that it could not cure itself on its own resources. Its salvation was possible only after the advent of

western civilization on the Chinese scene. He also purposed that all Chinese who made their living as writers henceforth used the spoken language instead of the literary language. It is difficult to over-emphasize the language revolution but it did reflect a break from the Chinese traditions. So May Fourth Movement was closely associated with an iconoclastic revolt against tradition, and according to Hu's conviction the iconoclasm was to be a totalistic one.

The other important figure in Chinese iconoclasm in terms of the May Fourth Movement was Chen Tu-hsiu. He studied in Japan and France. In 1915 he established a magazine known as "New Youth." The character of the magazine was iconoclastic and Chen called upon youth to destroy or turn over obsolete Chinese culture. Chen waxed lyrical.

Youth is like the dawning of spring, the sunrise, new grass, and fruit trees in blossom, a newly sharpened blade. It is the most precious time of life. The function of youth in society is the same as that of new cells in human body; in the metabolic process, the old and rotten is constantly replaced by the new and vital.<sup>5</sup>

Chen also suggested six principles to be observed by youth, which was a clear rejection of the model that young Chinese traditionally had been urged to follow :

Be independent; not sumbisive, progressive; not conservative, outspoken, not reserved, cos-



mopolitan ; not proclial, practical ; not formalist, and scientific not imaginative.<sup>6</sup>

This was to turn upside down confucian morality, which preached respect for the aged and for the tradition, submission to codes and rituals, restraint and obedience. Chen vehemently criticised Chinese history, culture, art, tradition and institutions. He introduced through his magazine broad range of western thought. In 1917-18 "*New Youth*" magazine passionately argued equality of sexes abolition of family system, freedom of choice in marriage and opposed the old standard of double morality. It was emphasized that old superstitions and religion were to be abolished. Young Chinese were diverting from old culture. It was believed that it should be replaced by new culture. It was thought that new Chinese man was to replace the old man. The new men were to be young men for it was assumed that the younger were the more virtuous and the more revolutionary and were capable of destroying old culture and builders of the new society. Chen believed that the emancipation from filial basis could be achieved through western knowledge. The new spirit of patriotism was to be found in new Chinese man who could be an active participant in public affairs. The rationality of thought and the need to appreciate the spirit of science was greatly emphasized as a basic need for the Chinese society.

Under attack were all the customs that inter-

ferred with self-fulfilment, arranged marriages, bound feet, and the subservience of younger sons.

The three sacred social bonds that confucianism had made the basis of social organization, the subordination of subject to sovereign of sons to father, of wife to husband—The May Fourth Movement rejected as responsible for the prevailing despotism of both the family and the state.<sup>7</sup>

In 1916 another important development took place, which aggravated the symptoms of cultural revolution. Tsai Yuan-Pie was appointed the Chancellor of Peking University. Before Tsai's appointment Peking University had a bad reputation of students. The new Chancellor acquired his western education from France and Germany, having already become an accomplished scholar in Chinese. For his accomplishments as Chancellor of Peking University, he was known as the father of the Chinese Renaissance.

The students of the university, prior to Thai's appointment, were sons of high ranking government officials. They regarded the university less as an educational institution than as the surest stepping stone to an administrative career. The professors were civil servants. They were judged not by the quality of their teaching or learning but by their bureaucratic rank and they were addressed as your excellency.

The moral level both of the students or of their excellencies was notoriously low, as was clear from the nicknames for the university 'the gambling den,' 'the fountain head of ribaldry' the brothel brigade.<sup>8</sup>

Tsai's great accomplishment was to bring genuine liberalism to an institution, previously untouched by it. He defended academic freedom against government pressure. He allowed all schools of thought a voice and he recruited a heterogeneous but first rate faculty. He appointed the men like Chen, Hu and Li Ta-Chao. The university soon became a forum for debates between traditional and modern intellectuals.

The most spectacular and most often noted aspect of this intellectual transformation, the 'Literary Revolution' was at first just work of writers and publicist. As for the two steps that contributed most to the movements success, they affected only the intelligentsia. The creation of a magazine intended for an intellectual audience and the recognition of Peking University.<sup>9</sup>

The result was to bring the modern intellectuals on the natural scene and make possible the formation of a group of innovators. It was they who won the student's support.

The rejection of Chinese ideals and the adoption of European ones were linked in China pro-westernism followed naturally from the criticism of Chinese values.

Signs of pro-western frenzy were everywhere to be seen among modern intellectuals. Popular slogans such as 'total westernization' were common.<sup>10</sup>

The very violence of its revolt against Chinese culture gave the May Fourth Movement its normal rightful place in the intellectual evolution of Modern China from culturalism to nationalism.

The period was intellectually exciting and the currents of change set in motion by the May Fourth Movement continued to be strong in the universities and the intellectuals in the large cities. Numerous foreign intellectuals such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell made prolonged visits.

Dr. Hu Shih pressed on with the drive to give spoken Chinese respectability and to break the grip of classical Chinese as the only language of literature.<sup>11</sup>

The transformation of consciousness, impact of western thought, cultural iconoclism, worship of youth, and radical student political activism were the needs and practise of the time.

The May Fourth Movement was a dynamic expression of an intellectual transformation. Within weeks the Peking students demonstration was transformed into a national movement. Above all, the movement drew the country's different social classes together in a joint effort.

May Fourth Movement was an intellectual

movement. It was started by the young intellectuals. So intellectual and youth movements go together as Lucian Bianco aptly remarks.

The May Fourth Movement was a youth movement, in which professors in their thirties and their student followers sought with young men's passion to impose young men's value on their society.<sup>12</sup>

The May Fourth Movement was no tragedy, even though there are some who say it was a national catastrophe and other find it little more than one episode to document a supposedly universally tragic pattern of generational conflict. It was by any reasonable standard of historical judgement one of the truly glorious chapters in Chinese history, a remarkable human accomplishment that was launched by the intellectuals.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Bianco, Lucian. *Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915-49*, Stanford University Press. 1971, p. 27.
2. *Ibid.* p. 28.
3. Chow Tse-Tung. *The May Fourth Movement : Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 358-359.
4. Schwartz B. I. (Edited). *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement : East Asian Research Centre*, Harvard University, 1972, p. 52.
5. Bianco, L. *op. cit.*, p. 37.
6. *Ibid.* pp. 37-38
7. *Ibid.* p. 39.
8. Chow Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
9. Bianco, L. *op. cit.*, p. 32.
10. *Ibid.* p. 41.
11. Pye Lucian. *China, An Introduction*, Little Brown and Company, 1972, p. 127.
12. Bianco, L. *op. cit.*, p. 36

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## **BRITISH HEGEMONY IN BALUCHISTAN: STUDY OF ITS HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATION**

*Mahmood Ali Shah*

By the cultivation of forward policy, the policy makers of British empire decided to extend British Raj in Baluchistan. Baluchistan is a land about which Nasir Khan, the most popular and Nationalist ruler of Kalat had stated.

“Pleasant as the home land of others may be populous and affluent and great name. Streams of honey may run there. But for Nasir the Dry wood of home land is better than all the world.”<sup>1</sup>

On the contrary the British who ruled Baluchistan for a period of more than a century had the different view. They had started at Baluchistan as Charles Napier described “Baluchistan is the place where God threw rubbish when he made the world.”<sup>2</sup> By this statement a question struck to the mind that when British decision makers had such a poor opinion about Baluchistan and they were sure that this land was not useful for the commercial exploitation then why they decided to advance into the barren land and difficult mountainous terrain of Baluchistan.

Inclusion of Baluchistan as the part of British Empire, where sun was not already setting, was the out-come of many complex reasons of the time. The note worthy were :

- (i) To establish a zone of influence between India, Afghanistan and Iran in order to strengthen and safeguard the frontiers of India.
- (ii) To maintain Afghanistan as buffer state between India and Russia and keep Czarist Russia away from the Indian frontiers.
- (iii) To check French activities in Iran and keep them away from western frontiers of India.
- (iv) To safeguard Indus valley which was highly useful for commercial exploitation.<sup>3</sup>

British occupation in Baluchistan was not the result of a decisive war between Baluch and British Empire, though while retreating from Afghanistan (After first Afghan War) General Will shear attacked Kalat in November 1839 on the pretext that Khan of Kalat failed to provide supplies to British army in Kachhi area according to the agreement.<sup>4</sup> Mir Mherab Khan then Khan of Kalat State was killed in this war. No doubt this war was the result of the frustration of a General, but not of the British policy.

On the contrary British occupation of Baluchistan was a speciman of excellence which it obtained during the rule in India. It used political



tacts and played with the prevailing conditions of the area. In other way it was a continuation of the policy by which the British occupied and established their rule in India.

Baluchistan being a tribal area and having a tribal society had been filled with tribal rivalries. This situation provided ideal conditions for the British Imperialism to act according to its notorious policy of divide and rule. The Treaty of 1876 between Khan and his tribal chiefs provided a best example of this policy. The story of the Treaty reveals that a young British Officer Robert Sandeman who was later on appointed as the Agent to Governor General in Baluchistan, first had created rift and widen the gulf of differences between Khan and his Sardars and later on compromised between them at Mastung. Though apparently this treaty was a compromise between the Sardars and Khan of Kalat, but infact it was compromise of British Raj in Baluchistan.

Extension of British rule in Baluchissan region came in peace meals, there were many agreements which were responsible for this extension of the British authority in Baluchistan. The most important treaties in this connection which were imposed on the rulers of Kalat and Kabul were of 1841, 1854 and 1879.<sup>5</sup>

On February 21, 1877 by the resolution of the Government of Baluchistan an agency was constituted with its head quarters at Quetta: In 1879

Sibi, Pishin with some other areas were annexed to Baluchistan. The annexation of these areas was the outcome of the Gandamic Treaty, British signed this treaty with Yakoob Khan, the son of Sher Ali then ruler of Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup> In the same year Quetta, which was called (Shall Kot), and its surrounding according to the treaties of 1876 and 1879 with Khan of Kalat, was handed over to the British occupation. In 1891 authority was extended to ZHOBE Valley in 1899 Nushky and in 1903 Nasirabad and portion of Naibat Lehri, Bhag and Gandawah were ceded to British on loan by Khan of Kalat.

During the British rule the geographical boundaries of the traditional Baluchistan were resettled. This step was taken by British with malicious intentions to make Baluch weak by dividing their land into different neighbouring countries.

Acting on this policy one fourth area of west Baluchistan was handed over to persia. This division of Banaluchistan took place by the decision of the Boundry Commission of 1871 and 1895 which revised the boundary between Kalat and Iran.<sup>8</sup> In the north Durand Line Agreement awarded a small strip of Baluchistan to Afghanistan in 1894.<sup>9</sup> In the similiar way Jacobabad (Khangarh) and Dera Ghazi Khan were handed over to the then Indian provinces of Sindh and Punjab.<sup>10</sup>

The total area which British occupied through

different means in Baluchistan comprised of 134,000 square miles.<sup>11</sup> The details of which were :

1. Area occupied through Gandamic treaty	--	11403
2. By settlement through Durand line	...	36401
3. Leased area	--	1685
4. Native States	...	69382
5. Tribal areas	...	7129
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		134,00
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Khan of Kalat received a total amount of one lakh seventy four thousand as rent of the leased areas from the British Government.<sup>12</sup> The break up of the amount was :

1. For Quetta Naibat and surrounding area	:	Rs. 25000
2. For Nushky Naibat	:	Rs. 9000
3. For Nasirabad	:	Rs. 115000
4. Portion of Lehri Bhag and Gandawah	:	Rs. 25000
		<hr/>
		Rs. 174000
		<hr/>

As already indicated, the British occupied whole of the Baluchistan with the passage of time by using different tacts and applying various means.

But as the political status of the area was concerned, it varied considerably from each other, following was the official classification of different areas according to the British Government notification.

British Baluchistan<sup>13</sup>—under this classification of area those districts were included, which were formerly part of Afghanistan and were ceded by the treaty of Gandamic, which was signed with Afghanistan in 1879. The Districts included in this way were Shahrug, Sibi, Duki, Pishin Chaman and Shororad.

(ii) The remaining area came under the classification of the territories administered by the Agent to the Governor General. This area was again divided into three categories

(i) Directly administered areas

(ii) Native States and

(iii) Tribal areas.

Category of directly administered areas included the districts, which were either leased from Khan of Kalat, or tribal areas and territories obtained by the ratification of boundaries with Afghanistan. These areas contained agencies of Zhobe, Chagi, eastern part of Quetta, Sanjavi, Kohlo, Barkhan as well as the strip of land along the railway line. These directly administered areas were managed in the similar manner that of British Baluchistan. The second category of area constituted on the Native states, which were Kalat and its feudatry states like Lasbela and Kharan, while

third category included the tribal areas of Marri and Bugti.

Administrative set up and organization adopted during the British rule to run government was hotch potch. The story of the administrative set up starts with the appointment of an Agent to Governor General in 1877 headquarter at Quetta and with a staff of three political agents and medical Officer. Initially the political agents were appointed at Quetta. Jacobabad and Kalat.<sup>14</sup>

But later on, this small administration spread for the effective control of the law and order situation in the area. The Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan became the administrative head of the whole of Baluchistan including Kalat and its other Fuedatry states. Khan-e-Baluch became a Ruber stamp. Orders concerning all the matters were issued by the political agent of Kalat, who was also performing the duties of Prime Minister of Khan-e-Kalat.<sup>15</sup> In this way practical position indicated that it was Khan's reign and British rule.

Similar was the administrative arrangement in all other fuedatry states of Kalat, like Lasbela, Kharan, and Makran, which were also administered by the respective political agents, through chiefs of these states who were also de jure heads of administration in their own states.<sup>16</sup>

The system of administration introduced in Native Baluchistan on which the British Raj con-

tinued to hold power was called in the name of its introducer Sandeman system. The main pillars on which this system stood were two.

1. To respect tribal individuals, elders and Sardars.<sup>17</sup>
2. Decide their fueds through Jirga (council of elders). It looks as if these principles were laid down after the psycho analysis of the Baluch community.

The Sandeman administrative system is explained in a better way by another writer Olaf Caro.<sup>18</sup> According to him Sandeman system rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and other tribal territory in considerable force linking them together by fair weather roads and leaving the tribes to manage their own customs and working through their chiefs and Maliks. These Chief and Maliks were required to establish levies (Name of tribal police) paid by government but regarded as tribal servants, except in cantonments where troops were stationed and there was influx of shop keepers and others from India. There were no regular courts and no police. It was indirect rule, custom was administered by political agents through Jirgas, using the instruments of frontier crime regulation.

Though basic administrative institutions of traditional Baluchistan, like Jirga and Sardari system were not intervened at the initial stage. But after establishing firm roots of power the

British introduced drastic changes in Customary Jerga system of Baluch tribes to make it conducive for their imperialistic policies. These changes to many extent affected the law, procedure and administrative set up of Jirga. The new procedural changes allowed the political agents to nominate the members for the Jirga in their respective districts, previously these members were chosen by their tribes. Appeals against the decision of Jirga instead of Khan-e-Kalat now were lodged with the Agent to Governor General in India. He issued final orders in the name of Khan-e-Baluch.<sup>19</sup> In the same way Sharia law and Baluch customs by which disputes were decided had been substituted by new laws known as frontier crimes regulations.

The other basic institution of tribal political set up that of Sardary system was also influenced gradually and used maliceously by the British to establish and continue their rule successfully. Sardar in the traditional and genuine tribalism was a chosen head of his tribe. He was responsible to the tribe and bounded by the decision of the Jirga.<sup>20</sup> But according to administration of the Sandeman system Sardars had been set up as Omnipotent chief of their tribes. They got freedom, mediating family disputes, handling trade for whole tribe and exercising powers of life and death over every one in the tribe.<sup>21</sup>

In this way it looks that the British rule in Baluchistan was imposed on them by the circumstances, especially external, which they continued

half heartedly. It is why they did nothing for the betterment of the area. Leaving aside the economic sector, and building of industries, they cared less even for education, which provides a broader base for the development of a community. This presents a sorry state of affairs that the sphere of education was completely ignored. The budget allocation for this primary need was Rs. 83,000 only.<sup>22</sup> As the Fruit of this policy at the time of the creation of Pakistan there was only one degree college centred at Quetta, with few high schools. The educated persons were to be counted on fingers.

### **Conclusions**

The British hegemony in Baluchistan reveals the following facts :

- (i) British extended their Raj to Baluchistan with different Motives than the remaining India.
- (ii) Their rule was forced by circumstances they did not like deep involvement in the area.
- (iii) Basically the British relied on the traditional institutions of administration, which were working effectively in tribal political set up, but with certain changes to make them helpful for effective control. But ultimately these institutions were perverted in the result these institutions lost the influence once for all, whatever they had in the past.



- (iv) British did nothing for the development of Baluchistan. The impact of the policy is that Baluchistan looks centuries behind from the other provinces of Pakistan. This situation has created many problems including difficulty of national integration and bringing this economically backward provinces for successive Pakistani Governments.
- (v) British rulers shifted and reshifted the area in a way to break the force of communities and make them weak. They did so to carry on their rule with out any difficulty. As a consequence of the policy, Baluchistan became multiracial province. This multiracialism has created serious political problems in contemporary Baluchistan.

Effects created by the British Raj demanded early and careful attention in Baluchistan, but unfortunately required attention could not de paid by successive governments. Present geo-political conditions have aided in the importance of Baluchistan War torn Iran and disturbed Afghrnistan, which are two bordering countries with Baluchistan have increased the need of urgent attention to Baluchistan. To remove the adverse effects of the British Raj A crash programme for development and drastic changes in administration and its line agencies are required.

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