The Journal

of

Political Science

★ **India's Policy Towards Pakistan :** *A study in Historical perspective.*

★ **Arab-Israeli Negotiations (1973—1975):** *Parties and Actors.*

★ **Why a Separate U.N. Mission after the 1965 Indo-Pak War.**

★ **Nationalism :** *Towards a Theory.*

★ **Allama Inayat Ullah Mashriqi :** *A profile.*

★ **College Education in Pakistan :** *The Problem of Low Standard of Achievement.*

★ **Book Reviews.**

No. 2   Vols. I, II

Books and pamphlets for review, correspondence relating to advertisements, communication for subscriptions, bulk orders, and reprint of articles should be sent to the Manager of the Journal.

The opinion expressed in articles and reviews are those of the contributors and should not be construed in any way representing those of the Manager and Editorial Board.

The Journal can be obtained from Booksellers or from the Manager of the Journal, Department of Political Science, Government College, Lahore, Pakistan.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CONTENTS   *Page*

INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

(A Study in historical Perspective)

by

HAMEED A. K. RAI

I

The foreign policy of a country is the product of a multitude of factors. Many of these are matters of emotion and attitude rather than material interests. A Nation holds a view, based on popular traditions of its present position and its history that reveals longstanding enmities and friendships. The determinents of India's attitude towards Pakistan emerges largely from the years of the freedom movement.

After the partition of 1947, the Indian expansionist and hegemonistic attitude created a lot of hatred and suspicion in Pakistan. As President Ayub Khan wrote, "The Indian leaders have often stated that their true borders extends from the Hindu Kush Mountain to the Mekong River."[1] The idea of 'Vishal Bharat' or greater India is an expression of the Indian expansionist ambitions. Professor Keith B. Callard wrote as early as 1957 that 'many Indians feel that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which still might be corrected, at least,

---

1. Khan, Mohammad Ayub, "Pakistan-American Alliance : Stresses and strains," in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, January, 1964, p. 199.

as far as East Bengal is concerned.'[2]

An American expert on Pakistan stated, 'As late as 1963, Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be re-incorporated into an Indian dominated confederation'[3]. The Indian desire to dismember Pakistan had completely justified the distrust of the people of Pakistan. Although, the partition was legal, constitutional and above all mutually agreed upon, yet the Indians did not reconcile with the verdict of history.

There is a large group of Indians who believe that, "The fundamental problems of Indo-Pakistan relations arise out of a set of conflicts, a conflict over status, a conflict of images and finally a conflict generated by the problems of identity of the two new States as two new nations".[4] The Indian policy towards Pakistan has been based on hostility and distrust. It is hypothesized that India has always been hostile to Pakistan and every positive move from Pakistan is viewed with suspicion and distrust by India. Thus the politics of the Indo-Pak sub-continent is basically a continuation of the old animosities built up during the struggle for independence fought at cross-purposes by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress sought a united free and secular India ; the Muslim League wanted to divide it on communal lines. This had demanded the

---

2. Callard, Keith B., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Interpretation*, (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 11.

3. Trager, Frank N., "The United States and Pakistan : A failure of Diplomacy," in *Orbis*, vol. IX, No. 3, 1965, p. 626.

4. Gupta, Sisir, *International Studies*, July-October, 1963.

development of opposite habits of thought and action among the leaders of the two parties. These contrasts in style and attitude have been translated into the foreign policies of India and Pakistan after independence.

II

PRE-PARTITION HOSTILITY

Caste System :

The Hindu society was always a closed society in theory and for the most part in practice. It was based on birth and the genetic tie among its members. It did not practise conversion. Thus it developed a very strong self-consciousness, with a sense of irreconcilable contrast with other peoples, all of whom were described as *Mlechchhas*, or unclean foreigners.

Hindu experience of subjugation :

The feeling of Hindu exclusiveness was infinitely strengthened by the early Muslim invasions of India from the eighth to the twelveth centuries, before the final conquest in the last decade of the twelveth. Late in the tenth century a great Muslim scholar, Alberuni, noticed this hatred for foreigners and wrote, 'All their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them—against all foreigners', and he added, that 'above all, owing to the invasion of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, the Hindus 'cherished the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims'.[5]

5. Chaudhri, Nirad C., 'Nationalism in India : Past and Present' in *Soviet Survey*, vol. I, No. 2, 1968.

This xenophobia was accompanied by a hypertrophied magalomania. Alberuni also says. 'The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are haughty, foolishly vain, self conceited, and stolid.'[6]

After the Muslim conquest the hatred turned inwards, and generated a perpetual sense of national injury, self-pity, illusionism, and made all these an emotional enjoyment rather than an irritant. In practice, the Hindus did indeed serve their foreign rulers, learned their language, and even wore their dress. But these were concessions to political and economic life, beyond them a line was drawn which no Hindu could or would cross. As Abbe Dubois wrote that the 'Hindus hate and despise their rulers from the bottom of their hearts while they cherish and respect their government.'[7] It was during the epoch of Muslim rule that the Hindus developed this principle of their conduct towards foreigners and embodied it in a fixed pattern of behaviour.

This xenophobia give way to a hidden but persistent hatred against the Muslims, which led to the encounter of Hindu-Muslim Cultures. Social and religious differences between the Hindus and Muslims were so acute and fundamental that they raised a 'Chinese wall' between the two communities and even seven hundred years of close residence (including two hundred of common servitude) have failed to make the least crack in that solid

6. Ibid.
7. Quoted in Chaudhri, Nirad C., 'Nationalism in India : Past and Present', in *Soviet Survey*, vol, 1, No. 2, 1968.

and massive structure. Thus, inspite of living in close physical association for many centuries a Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis was not achieved.

III

CONGRESS–MUSLIM LEAGUE RIVALARY

As early as 1883, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, had speculated on a possible struggle for power in the event of a transfer of sovereignty to Indian hands. As he mentioned, "it is impossible that under these circumstances two nations—the Mohammadan and the Hindus—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power. Most certainly not ? It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconcievable."[8] The question was largely academic at that time, but it contained with in it the seeds of Pakistan because the later struggle for the achievement of Pakistan was based upon this "Two-Nation Theory".

The partition of Bengal in 1905 was undertaken by Lord Curzon as a step towards administrative efficiency, yet it was regarded by the Hindus as a British–Muslim conspiracy against their community. The reaction of the Hindus towards this partition in miniature was a signal of alarm for the Muslims in India. It made them conscious to protect their own rights. This resulted in the

8. Philips C. H. ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, Selected Documents* (London : Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 188-189.

formation of the "All India Muslim League" to serve as the chief Muslim political organ and a watchdog of Muslim interests.

The coming of political reforms – "The Minto-Morley Reforms"—increased the Hindu-Muslim differences as the Muslims sought to protect their interests through such constitutional devices as a separate Electorate. 'This concession to the Muslim of a separate electorate mark the begining of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in its twentieth century form of a struggle for political power.'[9] Some foreigners and even some Indians have taken it at its face value as a religious conflict, such as the world has hardly seen for over two centuries. But if religion and history were the only factors in the Hindu-Muslim conflict of the twentieth century, it would be hard to explain why, during the previous century, inspite of sporadic communal riots and a certain amount of bickering the two communities had on the whole lived fairly peacefully side by side. 'The reason is, of course, that the political element had not yet been injected into the conflict.[10] As soon as there was any prospect of even a limited amount of transfer of power, there arose the question, as to who would inherit the power, which the British would relinguish.

The final instalment of political reforms—which provided separate representation to the minorities—was passed by the British Parliament as the Government of India Act of 1935. After the election of early 1937—on

9. Lumby, E. W. R., *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47* (London : Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965). pp. 12-13.

10. Ibid. p. 14.

the basis of this Act—the Congress party came to power in seven out of the eleven provinces. The treatment meted out to the Muslim Community in the short rule of the Congress Ministeries—1937-Oct. 1939—worked as a lightening flash on the Muslim mind through out India. What had been a suspicion before, now became a certainty. The Congress as a Hindu-dominated body was bent upon the eventual absorption of Muslims. When the Congress Ministeries resigned in October, 1939, the Muslim League rejoiced and called on Muslims through out India to observe December 22 as a 'day of thanksgiving and deliverance' from the tyranny, oppression and injustice of the Congress Governments. "This bitterness," writes Sir Percival Griffiths, "had its inevitable reaction on Muslim constitutional thought. Up to now the Muslims had been prepared to depend for their protection on "weightage" or "safeguards". By 1939, they were convinced that, whatever safeguard might be designed, an Indian federation in which the centre retained substantial power, would infact mean Hindu domination."[11] This had a considerable impact on Muslims demand for a separate homeland.

M. A. Jinnah—now the undisputed leader of the Muslim League—set out to preserve the culture of the Muslim community against suffocation by militant Hinduism, which was using the ballot box as a tool and concealing itself behind congress party's secular cloak.[12] In 1939, Jinnah while expressing his feeling said, 'In my judge-

11. Griffiths, Sir Percival, *The British Impact on India* (London : Macdonald, 1952), p. 341.

12. Pandit Nehru himself admitted that many a Congressman was communalist under a national cloak. See Jawahar Lal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London : The Bodley Head, 1958), p. 136.

ment................democracy can only mean Hindu Raj all over India to this Muslim will never submit.'[13] A similar note was struck in his presidential address on 23 March, 1940, when he said, 'Islam and Hinduism are not religions, in the strict sense of the world, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality.[14] He declared that democracy was unsuited to India ; that the Muslims are a nation, according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state.

The Lahore Resolution demanded that in those parts of British India where the Muslims were in a majority, they should be allowed to set up their own state. This was opposed by the Indian National Congress. During 1940 to 1945 a series of negotiations and proposals were shipwrecked on the rock of Hindu-Muslim differences. In the elections which followed in 1946, the Muslim League emerged with resounding success. It won 460 out of the 533 Muslim seats in the Central and Provincial Assemblies. It proved the truth of its counter claim against the Congress, that there were, in fact, two political parties in India. The June 3rd Plan provided for the partition of India and inspite of bitter opposition by the Congress, Pakistan found its way to independence on 14 August, 1947.

13. Cited in K. B. Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 199.

14, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Some Recent Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore : Ashraf, 1952), p. 138.

IV

HINDU REACTION TO PARTITION

It should be noted that Congress leaders had always opposed the partition of 'Bharat Mata'—The Holy Motherland. They agreed to Pakistan only when it became clear to them that partition was inevitable, because the alternative was a civil war. They never really accepted the 'two nation theory'.

They accepted partition on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination. Moreover, some section in the Congress resented partition and accepted Pakistan with mental reservations ; in the hope and expectation that the new state would not be viable and would collapse under pressure from its large and more powerful neighbour, and that ultimately, Pakistan will come back to "Mother India". This view is confirmed by the statements of Indian leaders. Sardar V. Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India, referred, on the first Indian Independence Day, to 'the bitterness and sorrow which partition has brought to those who cherished unity', and expressed the full hope and confidence that sooner or later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country.'[15] The Congress President Acharya J. B. Kripalani was more explicit about the intentions of the Indian leaders : 'The freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the Unity of India.'[16] M. K. Gandhi, the father of Hindu

15. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 15 August, 1947.

16. Quoted from *Congress Bulletin* of 10 July, 1947 in "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, New York, January, 1965, p. 319.

IV

HINDU REACTION TO PARTITION

It should be noted that Congress leaders had always opposed the partition of 'Bharat Mata'—The Holy Motherland. They agreed to Pakistan only when it became clear to them that partition was inevitable, because the alternative was a civil war. They never really accepted the 'two nation theory'.

They accepted partition on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination. Moreover, some section in the Congress resented partition and accepted Pakistan with mental reservations ; in the hope and expectation that the new state would not be viable and would collapse under pressure from its large and more powerful neighbour, and that ultimately, Pakistan will come back to "Mother India". This view is confirmed by the statements of Indian leaders. Sardar V. Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India, referred, on the first Indian Independence Day, to 'the bitterness and sorrow which partition has brought to those who cherished unity', and expressed the full hope and confidence that sooner or later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country.'[15] The Congress President Acharya J. B. Kripalani was more explicit about the intentions of the Indian leaders : 'The freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the Unity of India.'[16] M. K. Gandhi, the father of Hindu

15. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 15 August, 1947.

16. Quoted from *Congress Bulletin* of 10 July, 1947 in "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, New York, January, 1965, p. 319.

Nationalism told in his prayer meeting : "We Moslems and Hindus are interdependent on one another ; we cannot get along without each other. The Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal *Nehru* to come back, and he will take them back'.[17] As late as 1950, Nehru told U. N. representative Josef Korbel that 'we want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration (of Pakistan with India) will invitably come. If it will be in four, five, ten years—I do not know.'[18]

Dr. Rajindra Prasad—who later became the first President of India—while commenting about the partition in 1946, said, 'one thing is certain ; partition is not likely to be attained with the good will of those most concerned, and this ill-will is bound to persist on both sides, even if the proposal succeeds even after the separation is effected. Distrust which is the basis of the proposal is bound to grow and any hope that after separation things will settle down and the independent States will become friendly will have been built on sand. The chances are that bitterness and distrust will make mutual accomodation more difficult and necessitate the maintenance of protection forces on both sides.'[19]

This belief that India did not reconcile to the creation

17. *New York Herald Tribune*, New York, 5th June, 1947.

18. Korbel, Josef, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 128.

19. Prasad, Dr. Rajindra, *India Divided* (Bombay ; Hind Kitabs, 1947), p. 337.

of Pakistan is further supported by the remarks made by foreign political commentators. Whatever might be the outward semblance, 'a cardinal underlying purpose of Indian policy', said Michael Brecher, 'was to keep her smaller neighbours weak and isolated, for eventual reabsorption.'[20] 'Pakistan does feel,' says Professor Quincy Wright, 'that India has its eye out for re-annexation of Pakistan.'[21] The Times remarked that Indian foreign policy 'amounts to little more than the containment of Pakistan.'[22]

V

POST-PARTITION HOSTILITY

The antagonism and distrust between the congress and the Muslim League which developed in the course of the freedom movement have been translated into the national foreign policies of the two countries after the partition of 1947.

Congress leaders had several reasons for seeking the merger of Pakistan with India. With the creation of Pakistan India had lost 19½% of the pre-partition population and 23% of the pre-partition area. Besides, the new frontier divided the Cotton and Jute Mills of India from their sources of supply in Pakistan, also the consumers of manufactured goods in Pakistan from factories of India. The result was that Indian economy was subjected to

---

20. Brecher, Michael, in Selig S. Harrison, ed. *India and the United States*, (New York : Macmillan, 1961), p. 53.

21. Wright, Quincy, in Selig S. Harrison. ed., op., cit., p. 55.

22. *The Times* (London), June 2, 1956.

stresses and strains. And as an Indian scholar put it, "The partition of India......................with two flanks of Pakistan forming a new type of *Cordon Sanitaire* weakend the defence potential of India to a large extent.'[23]

Indian leaders sought the absorption of Pakistan into India by first preventing the new state's establishment and than its consolidation. The consequence after partition was invoked in the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations. India managed to get the original membership of British India and Pakistan was asked to submit a fresh application for U. N. membership. Whatever the legal merits of the case, the political effect of the decision was to appear to place Pakistan in a position inferior to that of India.

Moreover, shortly before partition, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and a Hindu expert on Pathan affairs were sent to Kabul to support the move for an independent state of Pakhtoonistan. This led to Afghanistan's negative vote on the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations.

Immediately after partition there was a large scale massacre of Muslims in the East Punjab, the city of Delhi, Ajmeer and in U. P. which forced some five million Muslim refugees into West Pakistan. This placed a big strain on the administrative and financial resources of the Government of Pakistan, which was starting from scratch.

India first refused and then delayed the despatch of

23. Gupta, Karunahar, "Books", *Seminar.*

Millitary assets, defence equipment and installations. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the supreme commander, who was responsible for ensuring that Pakistan received her share of the defence stores, "was continually subjected by the political leaders of India to deceitful and underhand interference which amounted in the end, to complete sabotage.'[24] In his report to the British Prime-Minister, Auchinleck summed up the Government of India's attitude in these words, "I have no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present India cabinet are impalacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this I am supported by the unanimous opin'on of my senior officers and indeed by all responsible British officers cognizant of the situation.'[25]

With a view to destroy the monetary and currency system of Pakistan, India withheld for quite sometime Pakistan's share of cash balances amounting to Rs. 750 million. In April, 1948 India stopped the flow of water into the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur cannals which irrigated about 1·7 million acres in Pakistan but were fed from headworks in India. This had an adverse effect on Pakistan's crops. It should be noted that in the matter of cannal water India was legally 'under an obligation to preserve the *status quo*'. According to a Canadian scholar, 'the flow of the Ravi was diverted for no apparent reason except malice on the part of Indian authorities.'[26]

---

24. Connell, John, *Auchinleck*, London, 1959, p. 912.

25. Ibid., p. 920—1.

26. Callard, Keith B., *Pakistan : A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 312.

In September, 1949, India alongwith many other countries in the sterling area, devalued her rupee but Pakistan did not do so. Whatever the merits of Pakistan's case it was a matter for Pakistan alone to decide and no other country had any right to question that decision. However, India took the unprecedented step of not recognising the unaltered value of the Pakistan rupee. As a result there was a complete deadlock in the trade between the two countries. The implication of this step can be guaged from the fact that at that time India was by far the biggest partner in Pakistan's foreign trade, out of Pakistan's total exports amounting to 1710 million, India's share in 1948-49 was Rs. 1090 million or 62%. Similarly, of the total import of Rs. 1410 million in that year India supplied goods worth Rs. 770 million or 54%.

By the Indian occupation of Kashmir, Pakistan was convinced that India was bent upon its destruction. India for the sake of expediency—i.e. to gain time, accepted U. N. Resolutions of December, 1948 and January, 1949 on Kashmir but latter on refused to implement it by making her own interpretations. In 1950 and again in 1951 India massed her troops on West Pakistan's border posing a serious threat to its security. The Noon-Nehru Pact became a victim of Indian intransigence. An agreement on border demarcation was reached between President Ayub Khan and the Indian Government whereby Pakistan transferred some areas to India yet India refused to transfer Beru-Bari area to Pakistan. India announced her intention to control and utilize the waters

of the three Eastern Rivers, thus turning Pakistan into a desert. The Indus water dispute was solved, and the agreement signed between President Ayub and Pandit Nehru, amicably with the help of the World Bank. Under this Agreement India was to pay $ 17 crore 40 lac for the contruction of link cannals and to supply water until the canal system was to be completed but India stopped her share of contributions after the war of 1965. In the September, 1965 war, India tried with her full might to destroy Pakistan but failed.

The Tashkent Declaration :

By the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Mr. Alexi Kosigin the Tashkent Declaration was signed between the Pakistan's President and Indian Prime Minister Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri on 11 January, 1966. This provided for the withdrawal of forces to the pre-war international frontiers and asked for peaceful settlement of disputes by the parties.

In the field of foreign policy, Pandit Nehru did his level best to discredit Pakistan in the Afro-Asian Community, for Pakistan's participation in the Western Defence Pacts i.e. SEATO and CENTO. This shows that India has never missed any opportunity to create difficulties for Pakistan and made it difficult for Pakistan to exist.

India has continuosly interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs. Thus working on the basis of their old policy to destroy Pakistan and conforming to what Professor Callard stated in 1957, "that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected as for as

East Bengal is concerned,"[27] India supported the Bengali separatist movement with money, armaments and men and ultimately, forcibly separated the Eastern part of Pakistan by naked military aggression in December, 1971. By the establishment of Bangla Desh, India has achieved a major objective of her foreign policy vis a-vis Pakistan.

Simla Agreement :

After the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 between India and Pakistan. It emphasized that the two countries would resolve their disputes through peaceful means, bilateral negotiations or through other peaceful means, to respect each other's territorial integrity, to refrain from threatening each other and to prevent hostile propaganda. About Kashmir, it was decided to honour the ceasefire line in existence on December 17, 1971, the day the war ended.

Although, Indian Prime Minister did contribute for peace in this region through this agreement, yet inspite of all that, India felt that "the Simla" 'concession' was India's patternalistic gesture to a 'de-statured' partner willing to accept a dictated role.[28] Whatever were the Indian convictions, it was beyond any doubt that the Simla Agreement was a positive step towards peace in the Indo-Pak sub-continent and a departer from the politics of confrontation between India and Pakistan.

---

27. Callard, Keith B., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Interpretation*, (New York : Institute of Pacific relations, 1951), p. 11.

28. Niazi, Maulana Kausar, in *Pakistan after 1971*, ed. Zahid Malik, (Rawalpindi, 1974), p. 4.

President Z. A. Bhutto started the process of normalization of relations under the policy of "forget and forgive" and emphasized upon India the need for such an approach. Although, the Indian Leaders have appreciated, to some extent, the need for relationship between the two countries on the basis of bilateralism yet even than "when Indian Leaders have talked of bilateralism in respect of Pakistan, they have invariably meant a weaker Pakistan bowing before India's arbitrary will."[29]

The Delhi Agreement of 28th August, 1973 and the Delhi Tripartite Agreement of April 9, 1974 led to cooperation and understanding on less sensitive issues such as resumption of postal service, overflights and a Trade Agreement of November 30, 1974 between the two countries.

But after the initial success of the withdrawal of forces to their respective international frontiers, India again started a propaganda campaign again Pakistan. The prisoners of war issue was used by India as a political blackmail. Although, Post and Telegraph, Rail and Road link has been restored, overflights resumed, Ambassadors exchanged and Trade on Government level started yet the process of normalization of relations is so slow that the initial enthusiasm of the Simla Accord has disappeared. The Indian Atomic explosion has further frightened the Pakistani Policy-makers and have strengthened their suspicion and distrust of Indian designs. The Indian

---

29. Siddiqui, Marghub, in *Pakistan After 1971*, ed. Zahid Malik, (Rawalpindi, 1974), P. 42.

propaganda on Z. A. Bhutto's prosecution and hanging amounted to interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. On the issue of Pakistan's Nuclear Reprocessing Plant, India's attitude has proved that she does not want to create a congenial atmosphere for cooperation and understanding on equitable basis, she is rather trying to behave like a "Big Brother".

VI

CONCLUSION

In the light of the observations made, it is inferred that India would continue to maintain her hegemonistic attitude in its relation with Pakistan and would surely work towards the achievement of her final objective which very much conforms to Professor Trager's analysis that, "As late as 1963, Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be re-incorporated into an Indian dominated confederation".[30]

---

30. Trager, Frank N., "The United States and Pakistan : A Failure of Diplomacy' , in Orbis, vol. IX, No. 3, 1965, p. 626.

ARAB—ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (1973-1975) :
PARTIES AND ACTORS

DR. SARDAR MUHAMMAD

The Arab—Israeli conflict is rooted in the incompatible claims to statehood in Palestine by the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists, during the British Mandate of the territory. In the aftermath of the proclamation of the state of Israel, on May 15, 1948, the clash between the Arab and Jewish Communities in Palestine catapulted into a contest between the state of Israel and the Arab states.

In an international conflict states in a multi-member side are likely to be central or peripheral to the conflict and its defusion/resolution. The centrality or peripherality of a state in conflict is determined by : one, its potential to endanger adversary's core values and two, adversary's calculations that whether the solution of issues with it can or cannot he postponed or ignored. For conflict waging and for conflict defusing/resolving purposes central states take precedence over the peripheral states. It is, therefore, imperative for a analyst of a conflict and its defusion/resolution to identify the states central to the conflict and to know the attributes of the government leaders of the conflicting states.

The Arabs and the Israelis have fought four wars— the October, 1973 war being the last in the series. From the Arab side Egypt has played leading role both in war

19

and peace with Israel. Here we examine the reasons for the centrality of Egypt to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process that ensued in the the wake of October, 1973 war and analyse the characteristic qualities of the Egyptian and Israeli actors involved in the peace negotiations from October, 1973 to September, 1975.

Egypt, with 37.8 million population and about 800,000 men under arms, is the strongest and the most powerful state in the Arab world. Therefore, she occupies a pivotal position in matters concerning war and peace with Israel, among the Arab states.

Without Egypt the other Arab countries may not be in a position to initiate large-scale hostilities with Israel. Cairo's leading role in the four Arab-Israeli wars bears testimony to this fact. In the protracted dispute in the Middle East, Israel's conflict with Egypt has been, indeed, "the gravest from the point of view of the powers involved in it, the most dangerous in the short run, and pregnant with immediate dangers from the regional and international perspectives."[1]

Equally important is Egypt's role in peacemaking. Cairo, for its centrality, has been the focus of all U. N. and superpower efforts for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Sadat set rolling the concept of interim settlement in 1971. It is likely that peace in

---

1. Quoted by Naomi J. Williams, "Hawks and Doves in Israel's Foreign Policy. 1967-1973," in David S. Smith (ed.). *From War To Peace : Essays in Peacemaking aud War Termination,* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 226.

the Middle East cannot be attained without Egypt's participation, or sustained without her cooperation. "In the Arab-Israeli dispute," says Hurewitz, "when all is said and done, only Egypt can take the first step toward a settlement. Other Arab states may or may not follow. But if they do not follow, neither can they lead."[2]

The ceasefire, demanded by the Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22 in the October 1973 war in the Middle East, did not materialize. Israel continued to improve its military position on the ground.

On October 23, the Security Council adopted Resolution 339, demanding "immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action," and urging the belligerents to return to the positions of October 22. To ensure the proper observance of the ceasefire on October 25, the Security Council, by Resolution 340,[3] set up a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations, except the permanent members of the Security Council.

When the ceasefire finally went into effect, the armies of Israel and Egypt were inextricably intertwined. Israel had encircled the Egyptian Third Army Corps and cut off the main Suez-Cairo road. The situation was dangerous.

---

2. Hurewitz, J. B. "Superpower Rivalary and the Arab-Israeli Dispute : Involvement or Commitment ?" in M. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.). *The U. S. S. R. and the Middle East* (Jerusalem : Israel Universities Press, 1973), pp. 158-59.

3. See for texts of Security Council Resolutions 338. 339 and 340 concerning the October, 1973 war John Norton Moore (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict Vol. III : Documents* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1974). pp. 1138-39.

Egypt could not be indifferent to the fate of its Third Army and the residents of the city of Suez and permit Israel to starve and squeeze them to death. But Egyptian supplies could be brought to them only by breaking the Israeli cordon around the Third Army and the city of Suez.

Thus, though the second truce between Egypt and Israel was holding, dangerous uncertainty and insecurity prevailed. Due to the complications of the ceasefire line, and in the presence of so many enclaves and pockets, it could break down any moment in the absence of some permanent arrangement. The United States, which was now ready to commit its "top diplomatic resources" and unprecedented effort in search of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, focused its attention on the Egyptian-Israeli front to alleviate the precarious situation and to find some permanent solution of the issues of dispute between Egypt and Israel that, in turn, might lead to an overall resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

President Sadat and Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin headed the governments in Cairo and Jerusalam during this period and, as such, were directly involved in the process of conflict defusion/resolution.

Anwar-el-Sadat

Sadat, a member of the Free Officers movement, was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Command Council by President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the July, 1952 revolution and overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt. Because of his presumed incompetence in Nasser's opinion,

he was not given any important post. For "18 years......
beneath the shadow of his master, Sadat was a model of
mediocrity and subservience."[4] Nasser appointed him
Vice President in 1968. He succeeded as President after
Nasser's death on September 28, 1970, but he did not
seem to survive for long. Sami Sharaf, the Presi-
dential Affairs Minister, and Sharawi Gomma, the Interior
Minister, considered themselves the rightful heirs of
power after Nasser's death.

Instead of contesting their claim, Sadat engaged him-
self in building an alternate power base for himself to
deal with them from a position of strength at a later
stage. Feeling sure of his position, on May 2, 1972,. he
sent all his rivals to jail and, thus consolidating his power,
moved from impotence to supreme power.

After assuming power, Sadat set about to recover
territories lost in the 1967 war. He extended the cease-
fire on the canal front for three months, demonstrated
flexibility in the Egyptian position by accepting Jarring's
proposal, and floated the idea of partial settlements to
break the deadlock in the Middle East peace process. He
declared 1971 to be the "year of decision" and, finally
fed up with the "no-peace, no-war" situaion, plunged the
Middle East into its fourth and the fiercest war. The war
ended in a stalemate. Following the war, he readily
embraced the mediated, step-by-step diplomatic process
for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

———

4. Sheehan, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*:
A Secret Histoiy of American Diplomacy in the Middle East, (New
York : Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 44.

In the beginning, Sadat's foreign policy predispositions were not well-known. Apparently, he indulged in somewhat contradictory moves. He is an orthodox Muslim and seems to have an innate dislike for godless communism. Internally, he initiated a process of de-socialization. In July, 1971, he packed the pro-Soviets, including the Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union, Ali Sabri, off to jail. In a paradoxical move, perhaps to relieve the Soviet's uneasiness, he agreed to the draft treaty brought by Soviet President Podgorny on May 25, and on May 27, signed the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to last for fifteen years. Again he risked his relations with the Soviets by helping crush a communist coup in Sudan in July, 1971. Irritated by the Soviet reluctance to provide advanced weapons and the delays in deliveries, and suspecting a Soviet-American agreement to freeze the Middle East situation in the interest of detente, Sadat turned out Soviet advisors and technicians on July 18, 1972. In the absence of any positive American sign to his expelling of the Soviets, he made up with Moscow and, in the winter of 1972-73, started receiving arms from the Soviets to be used in the forcible eviction of Israel from Arab lands. However, in the aftermath of 1973 war, Sadat, believing that only American could help recover his Egyptian territory from the Israeli occupation, tilted toward the United States. In March, 1976, he terminated the 1971 treaty with Moscow.[5]

---

5. See for details Alvin Z. Rubinstein *Red Star On The Nile : The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since The June War* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 324-29.

Sadat is withdrawn, introverted and meditative. It is difficult to fathom his thinking, even for the people around him. His decisions, for this reason, seem dramatic and come forth as surprises. "Sad t does what Sadat does," say Zion and Dan, "with the help of Allah and a strong army."[6]

Sadat is a strategist and an imaginative thinker who has no patience with details. His decisions are quick and sharp. He is a visionary, and is optimistic about the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

The governmental system he inherited perfectly suits his temperament. Although Egypt has a well-defined governmental system with "well articulated structures and clear channels of authority,"[7] and the constitution divides power among the President, National Assembly and Judiciary, this is an oversimplification—as in many other constitutions of the world—in view of the realities of power in Egypt. The President has unlimited powers in practice and dominates the National Assembly, the cabinet and the Arab Socialist Union—the single, authorized political organization, which nominates the candidates for public offices. Sadat, no doubt, lacks the charisma and prestige of Nasser, but not his powers. On several occasions he has assumed the duties of the Prime Minister as well. His successful conduct of the 1973 war built his image among the masses in Egypt.

6. Zion, Sidney and Ori Dan, "Untold Story of the Middle East Talks," *New York Times, Magazine*, January 21, 1979. pp. 47-48.

7. Sands, William, "United Arab Republic," in Tareq V. Ismael (ed.). *Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* (Homewood, Illinois : The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 324.

Mrs. Golda Meir

The political system of Israel is characterized by a wide range of political and social viewpoints. This "diversity" has been most apparent ln the multiple parties contesting elections and in the coalition governments characteristic of Israel since inception."[8]   The election of members of the Knesset by a system of proportional representation tends to perpetuate political fragmentation.

Despite the ostensible factionalized nature of its politics, Israel clearly conforms to a dominant-party model—the Labour Party (formerly Mapai) being the pivot of every coalition government formed from the birth of the state in 1948 until 1977.   Officially, the cabinet is responsible to the 120-member Knesset, but a strict application of the principles—all decisions by majority and the collective responsibility of the cabinet for every decision reached—had allowed the Labour leadership to centralize political power and to take the lead in shaping policies.

Mrs. Meir, a Labour leader, held the office of Prime Minister for five years—1969 to 1974.   She was a Zionist revolutionary through-and-through, a driving organizer and a persuasive advocate.   One of the pioneers, she seemed to "carry the entire history of the Jewish ordeal, seeing herself as a paradigm of the Jew from the Diaspora

8.   Reich, Bernard, "Israel," in Tareq V. Ismael (ed.), *Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East,* (Homewood, Illinois : The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 324,

returned to the promised land."[9]   Her selection as Prime Minister by the Labor Party in 1969, after the death of Levi Eshkol, was a compromise choice to maintain the unity of the party.   Therefore, she maintained a firm control on the party.   In the aftermath of the October, 1973 disaster, the old political leadership had to face an unprecedented challenge to its authority from within the party and criticism of its policies from the people.   Mrs. Meir moved to silence the party critics.   In a brilliant political stroke she recovered her authority over the party and enforced discipline by announcing her resignation on March 3, 1974, before the Labor Coalition, and thus brought her critics to their knees by making them beg her to continue in office.   Through her skillful advocacy with the Jewish community in the United States after World War II, she was able to raise $ 50 million—double the target amount—to be used for the purchase of arms.

Mrs. Meir was a strict disciplinarian. Once a decision had been made, she could always "deliver the cabinet." Henry Kissinger admired her "as a woman of steel."[10] She was strong, decisive, bold and tough.   Shimon Peres hailed her as a "stalwart lioness."[11] She stoutly advocated and frequently resorted to a policy of harsh retaliation against Palestinian raids. For her toughness, Ben-Gurian said, "She is the only man in my cabinet."[12]

9.   *Time*. December 18, 1979.

10.   Sheehan, Edward R. F. *op. cit.*, p. 128.

11.   *Newsweek*. December, 18, 1978.

12.   Quoted by *Time*, December 18, 1973.

Yitzhak Rabin :

Rabin was the chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces in 1967, and, as such, a hero of the crushing victory of the Six-Day war. He served as Israeli Ambassador to Washington for five years (1968-1973). When Golda Meir announced her resignation on April 11, 1974, Rabin was selected by the Labor Party's Central Committee as the premier designate and entered the highest political office in June, 1974.

Untarnished by the political and military disasters of 1973-74, and a *sabra*—native Israeli—Rabin was somehow considered to possess an understanding of the Arab character and, as such, one who might expedite the peace process. He had a reputation for moderation and pragmatism.

As Prime Minister, Rabin proved to be hesitant and indecisive. He preferred delay to decision, inaction to action. He followed a course of stalling, rather than striving to reach a settlement with the Arabs. He gave proof of his diplomatic and political ineptness by openly saying that Israel's policy should be to gain time until the West could find an alternative to Arab oil. In a similar vein, he declared that Israel should wait and see the results of the 1976 elections in the United States and the induction of a more favourable Administration in Washington. He was inconsistent in his ideas and a timid leader. Before the negotiations of February-March, 1975, he had discarded non-billigerency, but when the opposition challenged him in the Knesset, he reverted to this theme.

Rabin's thin victory over Peres—298 to 254—in the Central Committee of the Labor Party constantly haunted him. His actions and decisions were prompted mostly by personal rivalries and political intrigues in the cabinet. His major concern was his rival, Peres, who had managed to create an image for himself for a "tough realist."[13]

Cabinet infighting made Rabin a weak Prime Minister who at times behaved clumsily. He could neither control the cabinet nor enforce discipline. During Rabin's premiership, Henry Kissinger went through the frustrating experience of his Middle East diplomacy and said, "Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics."[14]

Of the Arab confrontation states—Egypt, Syria and Jordan—The Americans whose strategic, political and economic interests had been adversely affected by the festering Middle East conflict, chose Egypt for peace negotiation with Israel for two reasons. First, withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab front would strategically weaken the Arabs. Militarily, no more they would be in a position to initiate a general war with Israel. Second, the military situation on the western-front was dangerous and held the possibility of a re-eruption of armed hostilities, which both America and Israel wanted to avoid. Another war could be avoided only by defusing the explosive situation on the canal front.

---

13. See for details Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger : Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East*, (New York : Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), p. 223.

14. Quoted by Sheehan, Edward R. F. *op. cit,,* p. 163.

Sadat and Mrs. Meir were in full control of their respective governments. Their decisiveness helped achieve positive results over a very short time period. Rabin's indecisiveness and his fear of Peres protracted the negotiations, giving Kissinger the most frustrating and exasperating experience of his mediatory role in the Middle East.[15]

---

15. See for details of the Middle East peace negotiations Sardar Muhammad, *Conflict Resolution ; The Simla Accord (1972) And Its Aftermath, And The Sinai Agreements (1974 and 1975)* (A Ph. D. Dissertation in International Relations Presented to the Graduate Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U. S. A. ; Unpublished, 1979), pp. 216—39 and 310—369.

WHY A SEPERATE U. N. MISSION AFTER THE 1965 INDO-PAK WAR ?

DR. SHAFQAT HUSSAIN CHAUDHRY

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan led to a number of controversies of legal, political and military nature at the national and international levels. One such controversy related to the setting up of a seperate U. N. mission in India-Pakistan while already there existed a group of U. N. observers in Kashmir. The United Nations Military Observers Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) had come into existence as a result of the Karachi Agreement of 1949 between India and Pakistan and its mandate was limited to supervising the cease-fire and cease-fire line in Kashmir. In 1965 a seperate group named United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was set up in order to supervise the cease-fire (CF) across the international border between West Pakistan and India for which the UNMOGIP had no authorization.

The Security Council in its Resolution 211 of 1965, besides demanding a cease-fire and deciding to consider steps towards a settlement of political problem under-lying India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, requested the Secretary-General, under para two of the resolution 'to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personel.'[1] In view of the expansion of the Kashmir war across the

---

1. *S. C. Resolution 211* (1965) 20 September, 1965,

31

international border between India and West Pakistan, the paragraph 2 resolution 211 entailed at least an extended and possibly additional peace keeping operation, which, while not large by any standards, would be much more than just a few additional observers. Presumably, the Secretary-General had a hand in the origin of paragraph 2 as he wanted to set up a sizeable mission to operate outside Kashmir, irrespective of whether it was formally an extension of UNMOGIP or not. With that in mind, and on the assumption that the Governments of India and Pakistan would eventually accede to the Security Council demand, the Secretary-General proceeded with preparatory arrangements in order to expand the UN presence in the subcontinent. U. Thant reported to the Council on 21st September, the day following the passing of Resolution 211.

> '(3) I have taken steps to determine the availability of a number of military observers to ensure the supervision of the cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal, and have alerted them to be prepared for early departure.
>
> (4) I have set in motion the logistical arrangements for the maintenance of a team of observers in the field.'[2]

The Secretary-General had advance plans to establish UNIPOM as a separate mission, but being sensitive to possible criticism from the Soviets, he kept his plans confidential till the resolution was accepted by the parties.

2, *U. N. Documents S/6699*, 21 September, 1965.

Implicitly, paragraph 2 and 5 of Resolution 211 were taken to have authorised the Secretary-General to adopt any step that he deemed vital to ensure supervision of cease-fire and withdrawal. On 23 September, a day after the coming into being of the cease-fire, the Secretary-General gave his account of establishing UNIPOM to the Security Council;

'.... In view of the difference in origin and function between UNMOGIP and the new group of observers, I have decided to organise the observers whose function it is to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawals as an organisation separate from UNMOGIP, entitled United Nations India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM). Obviously, the operations of UNIPOM and UNMOGIP will be closely co-ord·nated both administratively and operationally, but I have thought advisable in view of their separate function, to maintain them as two separate entities.'[3]

For all practical purposes, however, both the missions operated separately. They were co-ordinated neither administratively nor operationally. Both would mind their own business in their respective areas, except on occassions when they collaborated for purposes of bringing about the military agreement on withdrawal and to meet Indian and Pakistani military representatives. The provision for administrative and operational co-ordination was mentioned to mollify the Soviet Union and India because of a possible criticism from them over the two

---

3. *U. N. Document S/6699 Add. 3*, 23 September, 1965.

missions being separate entities.

It was in this way that UNIPOM was set-up. The Secretary-General himself was instrumental in setting up UNIPOM, therefore, he alone was responsible for not only running it but also for bearing the brunt of criticism against setting it up.

The Secretary-General's Reasous for Establishing UNIPOM.

There were some reasons propounded by the Secretary-General in connection with the formation of UNIPOM, as distinct from UNMOGIP. In a series of exchanges with India and Pakistan, he gave his arguments in support of his decision, which are summarised below.

First, the Secretary-General based his decision to constitute UNIPOM on the broad scope of Resolution 211 and insisted that 'it was necessary to set up a new operation in order to carry out fully the directive of the Security Council in paragraph 2 of its Resolution 211.'[4]

Second, legally and historically, the demarcation of the cease-fire line and functioning of UNMOGIP in Kashmir was based on the Karachi agreement of 1949. U. Thant could not be induced to extend the scope of UNMOGIP to a front which was beyond Kashmir because he assumed 'no authority on his part'[5] to that effect.

4. *U, N. Document S/6783*, 2 October 1965, aide-memoire of 25, Sempter, 1965 to India.

5. *Ibid.*

Third, in addition to the fact that UNMOGIP was 'limited in its terms of reference and functions to the cease-fire line in Kashmir',[6] there had evolved a series of agreed interpretations of various aspects of the observance of the cease-fire, agreed practices and procedures and agreed list of branches. The same procedures and practices could not be applied in respect of the international border without (a) a defined not demarcated cease-fire line, and, (b) fresh agreement between India and Pakistan. However, the Secretary-General agreed [that] 'if there were to be agreement . . . . between India and Pakistan directly, that the scope of UNMOGIP should extend beyond Kashmir, ... a single operation could suffice'.[7]

Fourth, 'in the absence of any Security Council resolution expanding the scope and authority of UNMOGIP, it was necessary to set-up a new operation......'.[8]

Despite the Secretary-General's reasons, India did not seem satisfied, and refuted his interpretations of the limits on UNMOGIP'S scope and authority. The Indian Government insisted that the operations and the cease-fire be treated as one whole and 'the supervision of the cease-fire has, therefore, necessarily to be a single operation to be carried out by a single group of observers under one command'.[9]

---

6. *Ibid.*
7. S/6738 *op. cit.*, aide-memoire of 30 September, 1965 to India.
8. S/6738 *op. cit.*, of 2 October 1965 to India.
9. *Ibid.*

India argued as follows. First, 'the supervision of the cease-fire by......two groups separately in different sectors is bound to cause confusion, and......it will not be possible to achieve the close co-ordination, administrative and operational , . . . essential to the proper implementation of the cease-fire...'[10]

Second, the Security Council contemplated one group to supervise the cease-fire. India reasoned ; 'The Security Council Resolution 210 (1965) of 6th September, speaks of the cessation of hostilities in the entire area of conflict. Neither that resolution of the Council nor any other provides warrant for treating the conflict and the operation otherwise than as a whole.'[11] In Resolution 210 the Secretary-General had been requested to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Group in India and Pakistan and Resolution 211 'could only be viewed in the context of the Council's earlier request for strengthening of UNMOGIP'.[12]

Third. 'the lack of agreement about the extension of the scope and functions of UNMOGIP could hardly be interpreted as sufficient reason to create another group of observers without consultation with, or agreement of, the Government of India.'[13]

Fourth, the functions of UNMOGIP could be expand-

---

10. *UN Document S/6742* 4 October, 1965 aide memoire from India to the Secretary-General.

11. *UN Document S/6762* 8 October, 1965 aide memoire from India to the Secretary-General.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

ed in view of the fact that previously 'at one point the scope and functions of the UNMOGIP were expanded by agreement between the Chief Military Observer, on the one hand, and the local army Commanders of India and Pakistan on the other, without reference to the Security Council, to include investigation of border incidents eastward from the south end of the cease-fire line at Manawar in a sector of the border between India and Pakistan in Jammu. . . .'[14]

The Secretary-General concluded his arguments with India by emphasing three points as follows.

(a) He could not be induced to take any action that he 'lacked authority to take'.[15]

(b) He could not approach either of the two governments about extending the scope of UNMOGIP because it 'was not a propitious time to raise with the governments so sensitive a question as the extension of the scope by voluntary agreement between them which was already being widely disregarded'.[16]

(c) He assured India that 'the cease-fire will be supervised as one cease-fire throughout the area of conflict. . . .'[17]

---

14. UN Document S/6782, 13 October, 1965.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Higgins Rosalyn, *United Nations Peace-keeping 1946-1967 Documents and Commentary, Vol. 2 Asia* London 1970 p. 430.

This brought the controversy with India over the issue of UNIPOM as a separate mission to an end since there were no more exchanges between the Secretary-General and India on the subject.

Pakistan, by contrast, approved of the Secretary-General's arrangements for setting up a separate mission called UNIPOM. But she was anxious not to see the merging of the two operations, UNIPOM and UNMOGIP. She also opposed the extension of the functions and scope of UNMOGIP to the international border, even by operational and administrative co-operation. 'Indeed, Pakistan was anxious lest administrative co-operation succeeded in fusing UNMOGIP with UNIPOM.'[18] Pakistan raised the following three objections to the Secretary-General's arrangements and India's suggestions.

1. 'The separation of the two operations, UNMO-GIP and UNIPOM, is not a matter solely of administrative necessity. On the contrary it reflects the distinction between the two operations which differ in nature, in origin and in the legal authority behind each.'[19]

2. 'Any extension of the scope and function of the UNMOGIP requires the consent of both parties',[20] which Pakistan would decline.

3. The instance given by India of an agreement

18. *UN Document S/6751*, 5 October, 1965, Letter from Representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

between the local Army Commanders of India and Pakistan and the Chief Military Observer in Kashmir did not in any way extend the functions of UNMOGIP to the international frontier between India and Pakistan. 'When the Indian Representative talks of the 'border between India and Pakistan in Jammu' he talks of something which does not exist. The province of Jammu in the State of Jammu and Kashmir borders, for the greater part, on Pakistan and, for the smaller part, on India, there is and can be no border between India and Pakistan in Jammu.'[21]

The Secretary-General hastened to dispel Pakistan's misgiving about the extension of the scope of UNMOGIP beyond the cease-fire line in Kashmir and gave an assurance that the arrangement of administration and operational co-operation in question was 'informal and designed to take advantage of General Nimmo's[22] rich experience...which could clearly be helpful to General Macdonald[23] as a new comer to the area...'

With this, the controversy surrounding UNIPOM'S emergence came to an end so far as the two parties were concerned. Despite profound differences, UNIPOM happened to stay and no more fuss was created by either of the parties, though the questions of the Secretary-

21. *Chief Military Observer* of UNMOGIP.
22. *Chief Officer* of UNIPOM.
23. S/6782 *op. cit.*

General's authority to initiate action and the composition and financial aspects of UNIPOM became a subject of debate in the later Council meetings. But before getting on to that it is worth explaining the unstated reasons behind the anxieties and concerns of India and Pakistan about this matter. What was really troubling them ? The fact of the matter is that both the parties were trapped in a security-power dilema caused by mutual mistrust. Each side seemed sure of its own good intentions but fearful of the other. Each felt that the other would withold just that which would enable her to feel secure.

One un-expressed reason for India opposing UNI-POM was that it might over-shadow the political settlement of the underlying issue of the conflict viz : Kashmir. Indian fear stemmed from her considering that if, as a result of paragraph 2 of Resolution 211, the Secretary-General had set up UNIPOM, he might then, in pursuance of paragraph 5 which requested the Secretary-General to seek a peaceful solution, push for a negotiated resolution of the Kashmir issue. Settlement of Kashmir on the basis of the UN approach was obviously not what India desired.

There was a geo-political factor involved as well. India was anxious lest withdrawal arrangements be enter-

ed into separately in UNIPOM and UNMOGIP areas. The problem of withdrawal bristled with many difficulties and evoked suspicion and scepticism in both India and Pakistan. India thought that Pakistan might break faith in the middle of the operation after she had made tactical gains because of withdrawal in the UNIPOM area, thereby leaving India in a disadvantageous position in Kashmir. Withdrawal from across the international border, which precisely was UNIPOM area, was not controversial and was relatively less difficult to achieve. India was tactically better placed across the international border just as Pakistan was strategically better off in Kashmir. The existence of UNIPOM was, therefore, not what India considered to be in her interest.

India was also anxious to emphasize that the whole problem arose, as she saw it, out of Pakistan's bad behaviour in Kashmir. Thus it was a single issue and should be dealt with by a single mission.

Pakistan was, on the other hand, opposed even to the administrative and operational co-ordination of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM, which as she saw it, would result in telescoping the two missions into a single operation, in which event, Pakistan feared, India would gain a relatively better bargaining position. To withdraw

her forces from across the West Pakistan border India could make it conditional upon Pakistan to withdraw from incursion across the cease-fire line in Kashmir, without necessarily agreeing to a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan saw better prospects of inducing India to a political settlement in having two missions.

Also, UNIPOM was essentially a temporary mission and sooner or later it was bound to be disbanded which, of course, Pakistan would have liked to happen. If an expanded UNMOGIP had been responsible for the cease-fire lines in Kashmir as well as on the international border, it would have adversely affected Pakistan's position in two ways. First, the legal status of the Kashmir cease-fire line, governed by the Karachi agreement of 1949 which also envisaged a plebiscite in Kashmir, would have been altered to India's advantage. After the withdrawal of forces to the pre-August 5 position, India might have insisted on complete abandonment of UN presence from the entire area on the ground that the mandate given to an expanded UNMOGIP under Resolution 210 and 211 expired with the accomplishment of withdrawal. Secondly, India could refuse withdrawal from the West Pakistan border in order to press Pakistan to

come to a settlement in Kashmir on terms of her choosing. The existence of two separate missions would reduce the likelihood of such eventualities. Not surprisingly, therefore, Pakistan opposed fusing UNIPOM into UNMOGIP.

For the Secretary-General, the real difficulty stemmed from the fact that there were two parallel cease-fire lines after the acceptance of Resolution 211, one in Kashmir based on the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and the second an over-all cease-fire line covering the entire area of conflict based on Resolution 211. In order not to lose the legal character of the old cease-fire line in Kashmir, the Secretary-General presumably wanted to institute some such arrangements that would not complicate things later. By setting-up UNIPOM to deal exclusively with the cease-fire on the international border, the Secretary-General could keep UNMOGIP out of the legal confusion which could have occurred later. Treating the new cease-fire line in the area as a whole, but administering it through two missions, UNIPOM and UNMOGIP, the Secretary-General was guided more by common-sense and pragmatic considerations.

There was another important reason for UNIPOM'S coming into being. It was envisaged that sooner or later it would accomplish its task and then be disbanded. A

successful mission by UNIPOM would surely have enhanced the credibility of the United Nations. Yet another but less vital reason concerned the Secretary-General himself as the Chief Executive of the United Nations Secretariat. In order to assert his authority and the correctness of his decision successfully the Secretary-General found a pretext. Through the implied meanings of Resolution 211, the Secretary-General took upon himself the responsibility for setting up a new mission, UNIPOM.

The mission successfully completed its task and fulfilled its mandate viz. supervision of cease-fire and withdrawal of armed personnel by the end of March 1966 and whereupon it was disbanded, a rather rare occurance in UN experience.

NATIONALISM: TOWARDS A THEORY

KHALID JAVED MAKHDOOM

Certain Fundamentals :

If we try to find a definition of nationalism in an encyclopedia, we do not get more than a vague expression of the term. For instance, William Barton, in Encyclopedia Britanica, has more or less ignored the sentimental and historical aspects of nationalism when he says that it implies the identification of state or nation with people.[1]

Eli Kedourie, one of the most prominent contemporary writers on the topic, assumes nationalism as a doctrine which provides a given population with legitimate grounds to have its own government and state. Kedourie's interpretation, too, seems to lack the sentiment of attachment to the soil. It provides only a passing reference to the inherent characteristics which distinguish one nation from others :

> ...the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations, are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national government.[2]

---

1. Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol. 13, (Chicago, London, Toronto, 1960), pp. 999-1002.
2. Eli Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Hutchinson & Co., (London, 1961), p. 9.

The critics of Kedourie, however, point out his failure in emphasising the concept of "collective will" in the formation of a nation ; and likewise, they assert that the world is not naturally divided into nations which have rather grown out of a historical process and can be defined by their distinct characteristics.[3]

Even the definitions provided by the critics of Kedourie do not seem to be comprehensive. For example, Anthony Smith, though he steps a little further by calling nationalism as an ideological movement for independence and self-government, unfortunately omits the characteristics which differentiate between nations :

> Nationalism [is] an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential "nation" like others.[4]

The most comprehensive concept of nationalism, in our opinion, is provided by Hans Kohn. He recognises it as a collective movement, enshrined with the spirit of "corporate will"[5] of a self-asserting and self-identifying compact human group expressing its loyalty towards nation-state. He says :

---

3. See for further explanation, Anthony Smith, *The Theories of Nationalism*, The Comelot Press Ltd,, (London, 1971), pp, 17-20

4. Ibid., p. 171.

5. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism : Its Meaning and History*, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, rev., ed., (New York. 1965), p. 10.

> Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state. A deep attachment to one's native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout history.[6]

In the light of the definition provided by Hans Kohn, we can assume nationalism as a manifestation of dual loyalty of man—loyalty towards nation and loyalty towards state. The social instinct of man and his fear from real or unknown alien dominance drives him closer to his identical group. As such, nationalism becomes a dynamic movement which sometimes disintegerates larger groups into smaller segments and sometimes integerates smaller groups into a corporate whole. In both the cases, nationalism is neither a movement of the "right" nor of the "left". It is a mass movement, the ultimate goal of which is to knit together the scattered segments of mankind and establish a history of their own on a given territory.

Viewed as such, in its evolutionary process each national group discovers its distinct identity. The stimulating force for the attainment of its justful place in the world may be a strong middle-class or a numerically insignificant political elite which determines the course of action and inspires the masses by its mottos and slogans. The former development, the emergence of a middle-class, is more relevant in the case of the developed

---

6. Ibid., p. 9,

societies. Whereas, the later development, the appearance of an influential elite, can be witnessed more often in the underdeveloped societies. Here, nationalism can be suggested as a "children's crusade"[7], denoting to the emergence of a relatively small but vocal group which reacts against alien domination and effects national awakening. The immediate goal before this selected elite is to launch a mass movement for the attainment of a political realm, though with the ultimate objective of achieving both economic and political self-rule. Stressing the sublime responsibilities of a potential elite in a national movement, Anthony Smith explains a nationalist as "one who harbours these particular aspirations so ardently, because they are necessary stepping-stones to 'nationhood', the supreme postulate of his political ethics".[8]

Nevertheless, like all other human phenomena, nationalism has several dimensions. It can be interpreted according to the changed conditions. Nationalism of the primitive man reflected his deep sense of loyalty, and in this respect could be compared with contemporary nationalism. But since primitive nationalism presented a rather shallow eoncept of loyalty, it could be attributed to tribalism which binds tribesmen not by a "decree of General Will" or an "edict of Legislative Reason", but by tribal customs.[9] The modern concept of nationalism, though not very much in conflict with the primitive

7. Eli Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
8. Anthony Smith, *cp. cit.*, p, 192.
9. Eli Kedourie, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

concept in terms of loyalty, is more comprehensive. It represents Hans Kohn's concept that "each nationality should form a state, its own state, and that the state should include the whole nationality".[10]

We should also note that modern nationalism was properly advocated for the first time toward the end of the eighteenth century, when loyalty and devotion for nation state were given new dimensions. A novel concept of "diversity" was recognised as the most important feature of the universe. Eli Kedourie interprets this concept of diversity as a significant feature which "lies at the back of and justifies the quest of every national doctrine for those singular and unique characteristics which distinguish a particular nation from the rest of mankind".[11] Therefore, contemporary nationalism can be recognised as an embodiment of a coherent and self-identifying community, the members of which are joined together in traditional bond, creating a distinction between this "We" and the alien "They".[12] It also means to say that distinct national identity is the essence of nationalism. It comes to the surface when each self-identifying group evolves a particular cultural or ethnic heritage, developed in the "succession of generations"[13] and expressed in the form of various symbols and slogans.

---

10. Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

11. Eli Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, The World Publishing Company, (New York, 1970), p. 34.

12. Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development", *Journal of Politics*, V. 22, February, 1960, p. 22.

13. Kenneth R. Minogue, *Nationalism*, (London, 1967), p. 58.

So long as a nation carries forward its history, its past glories and traditions may also culminate in the revival of religion or language or a common culture.[14] Common territory, as such, remains no longer a sure test of single nationalism. In many cases, more than one nationalism emerge juxtaposed to each other, forestalling conflicting territorial and cultural claims of their supporters.

While asserting our viewpoint that cultural identity supercedes territorial identity, we should also consider the fact that not all the cultural features such as religion and language are absolutely important to be present collectively for identifying the distinct features of a nation. In fact, it is a "living and alive corporate will" among the individuals which emerges either out of a common religion or a common language or both.[15] Ernest Barker has evolved a well-worked expression of a nation which can be presented hero to provide the reader with a better understanding of both the cultural characteristics of a nation and the concept of corporate will :

> A nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history ; who on the whole

---

14. Rupert Emerson, quoted in, Immanuel Wallerstein, *Social Change : The Colonial Situation,* John Wiley and Sons, Inc., (New York, 1966), p. 523.

15. See above.

and in the main, though more in the past than in the present, include in the common stock a common religious belief ; who generally and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of their thoughts and feelings, also cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form, a separate state for the expression of that will.[16]

Conceptual Analysis of Contemporary Nationalism :

After examining certain fundamentals of nationalism, we now concentrate on some of its contemporary concepts which developed as a consequence of the present century ethnic consciousness.

Ethnicity, in its modern sense, has become more acute since the Wilsonian "self-determination" and the "League's minority protection system"[17] worked as a catalytic agent. The present century doctrine of self-determination asserts that "any self-differentiating people, simple because it is a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself".[18] Therefore, in confirmity with the prevalent conditions, certain scholars like Walker Connor have assumed that these "self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations (and) loyalty to the ethnic

16. Louis Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism,* Greenwood Press, (New York, 1968). p. 32.

17. Rupert Emerson. *From Empire to Nation,* Beacon Press, (Boston, 1962), p. 108.

18. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying ?", *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 24, April, 1972, p. 331.

group, therefore, should logically be called national-ism".[19]

Most of the present century large and multiethnic states, which emerged as a result of previous wars or modern advancement, do not necessarily manifest a coincidence in ethnic and political borders. As such, we can rightly infer that in most of the modern states, numerous ethnic groups are merely flocked together. A considerably rigid political system in such states apparent-ly serves the vested interests of the dominant group on the arbitrary principle of "might-makes-right".[20] In reaction to this forced "Integration", each ethnic group, which by definition can be interpreted as a nation, strives "to take over the state as the political instrument through which it can protect and assert itself".[21] In such cases, antagonism becomes an instrument of coercion and denial of nationalism by a predominant group to others, and the concept of loyalty to a coherent political state is by and large jeapordised since it does not coincide with the territorial limits of the political state :

> The national principle and the state principle, despite close ties which have grown up between them in modern times, are far from being identi-cal and not infrequently come into dramatic

---

19. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

20. Louis Snyder also quotes George Bernard Shaw as saying : "The world is to the big and powerful states by necessity ; and the little ones must come within their borders or be crushed out of existence." *The New Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, (New York, 1968), f. n. 10, p. 20.

21. Rupert Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

conflict with each other.[22]

Political integration by means of coercion might be possible to a large degree under an autocratic rule in which the arbitrary and exclusive will of the autocrat prevails. Since the concept of autocratic state is outmoded and contemporary nationalism symbolises democratic aspirations of a society, there is more likelihood of a multiethnic democratic state to disintegrate allowing its components to project their individual nationalism on the same principle of "corporate will" to which we noted as the essence of nationalism.[23]

Walker Connor has provided statistics about the contemporary multiethnic states, emphasising a remarkable lack of ethnical and political homogenity. This flaw in the structures of the modern states leads to antagonistic divergence between the contesting ethnic groups, rendering the secondary groups aspiring for political recognition. Walker Connor's assessment, based on a sample of 132 states, indicates not more than 12 states as essentially homogenous while another 50 states as comprising of a dominant group accounting for 75 per cent of the total population of the given state. In most of the remaining cases, the distinct group is comprised of even much less than 50 per cent of the total state population :

> ...in 39 cases (29.5% of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's

---

22. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

23. Rupert Emerson quotes Ernest Barker as distinguishing between the arbitary will of a dictator binding the ethnic identities and the democratic will of the individual groups causing disintegration of the state, *Ibid*, p. 342.

population . . . . In some instances, the number of groups within the state runs into hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2% of the total) the population is divided into more than *five* significant groups.[24]

The statistics provided by Walker Connor present three models of contemporary states. In the first model, the ethnic borders seem to be quite coinciding with the political, and the concept of loyalty towards the state is thus fully manifested. The numerical ethnic identities in these states may not pose any serious threat since they have no territorial claims and their grievances can be treated as demands for minority rights.

In the second model, though the minority groups enjoy a relatively distinct identity, the integrated and overwhelming position of the major group cannot be underestimated which makes the presence of the other groups more or less insignificant in terms of state functioning.[25]

The third model, as derived from Walker Connor's assessment, seems to depict a pattern most commonly found in the newly independent states. In such cases, the acute hetrogenity gives the indication that each group stands juxtaposed to one another and is still in an

24. Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

25. Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation*, Hutchinson & Co., (London, 1964), p. 43.

embryonic stage of nationhood. Therefore, we can agree with Akzin when he expresses his concern about the seriousness of ethnicity in conflict model states by saying that any attempt to resolve their differences may "affect the structure and social climate of the state involved in extreme cases even its territorial integrity or its very existence".[26]

It seems rather difficult to find a universally workable formula for the ethnic problems in so far as the legitimate rights of each group cannot be denied arbitrarily. However, certain scholars hold the assumption that segmentation can be overcome by the assimilation of the divergent groups by way of acquiring a relatively high level of economic development and improved means of communications, which is indeed a lengthy process. For instance, Karl Deutsch maintains: "It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen. How are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians or Malavians in one generation?"[27] To our understanding, the assumption of Karl Deutsch does not seems to justify the bare facts prevalent in the world. The complex process of assimilation cannot be kept immune from the present century international conflicts. Even if a relatively considerable level of assimilation is attained, it would rather enhance ethnic affiliations especially where a given society is segmented in various deep-rooted distinct territorial identities. Therefore, we can conveniently rely upon the assumption of Walker Connor when he says

26. *Ibid.*
27. Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

that assimilation can promote ethnic consciousness in two ways : first, by making the individual aware of his own identical group, and, second, by making him conscious of the distinct alien characteristics of the others.[28]   Assimilation of insignificant groups appears to be possible only if they do not have fixed historical attachment with the soil they inhabit and rather represent mixed cultural identities, otherwise any alliance between divergent groups is of a short duration either in war or under a colonial rule and cannot be attributed to all-embracing nationalism.[29]

Therefore, it should be contended that in contemporary hetrogeneous societies, each ethnic group, having a fixed territorial identity, expresses its own nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, at the same time, should not be confused with provincialism which does not necessarily involve ethnic considerations and imposes problems which can rather be solved by attaining a sufficient social and economic parity. The cleavages between the divergent ethnic groups may tend to deepen so long as they lack in a considerable degree of compromise relationship or the "corporate will" to assimilate.

Some Comparison :

As already given a passing reference, colonial nationalism may be interpreted as a collective resistence

---

28. *Ibid,,* p. 329.
29. *Ibid.,* p. 349.

of the natives against the imperialist intruders.[30] The main attacks on European imperialism came from the socialist camp which denounced it as finance capitalism ; and, as such, nationalism got its slogans from socialism. The contrast found by the socialists between nationalism and imperialism is better explained by Kedourie when he says :

> ... just as imperialism is the expression of finance capitalism, so nationalism is on the one hand the expression of industrial capitalism in Europe and on the other a reaction to European "imperialism" in the "colonies" and "semi-colonies" which finance capitalism has incited European states to establish [31]

Imperialism can be interpreted as an expansion of nationalism of the stronger over the weaker, with the prime objective of economic exploitation through a highly centralised political system. The underlying principle of imperialism is exploitation by the White minority of the native labour which is subjugated by means of authoritarian political instrumentality.[32]

If nationalism in the West was s middle-class movement aspiring to creat a state of its own, then in Asia and Africa it was a peasentry revolt or "mass national-

---

30. Anthony Smith also contends that nationalism in Asia and Africa was a reaction to colonialism which spread due to Europe's "early superiorjty in wealth and technology", *The Theories of Nationalism, op. cit.*, p. 65.

31. Eli Kedourie *op. cit.*, p. 8.

32. Anthony Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

ism"[33] motivated by the sentiment of throwing away the "White capitalist domination".[34] The early advancement of the West in technological and institutional know-how provided new incentives to colonial nationalism when the Western oriented elite, by way of exploiting the Western knowledge and experience, served as a lever in general awakening in the colonial scene.[35] Therefore, in colonies, nationalism developed in two phases : elite consciousness, followed by mass national movement. It can also be perceived that the primary task of the colonial elite, which comprised of a numerical minority of intelectuals and professional individuals, was to inculcate a spirit of loyalty and devotion among the varying segments of the masses which were otherwise identified by their parochial attachments. The trends of authoritarian one-party leadership in the colonial nationalism were, as such, evident for the conservativeness of the peasentry and its dependence on the elite to realize the sublime objectives of the nationalist movement. Therefore, an elite in anti-colonial movement, as already refered to, is a dynamic force which lifts a society from unawareness to consciousness. Thus, the role of a nationalist is not of creating a nation which is otherwise historically in existence but rousing it to consciousness.[36]

A reference may also be made here to the irony of

---

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

35. Rupert Emerson, *op. cit* , p. 44.

36. Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development", *op. cit..* p. 16.

contemporary nationalism that it is sometimes associated with the totalitarian concepts of Fascism and Nazism which have in their turn the germs of Russian "massianic nationalism".[37] The concepts of individual's liberty and equality were given due recognition in the later half of the eighteenth century when Rousseau gave impetus to the modern views about nation-state and popular sovereignty.[38] He rejected the prevalent concepts of "aristocracy of birth and brain" as factor determining the destiny of a nation. He rather supported the modern notion of liberty, equality and devotion as "the only moral and rational foundation of the State".[39] But the later period, the post-Napoleonic era, was one of the consolidation of the nation-state by the elite at the helm. In this phase of state-building, emphasis on individual's rights was sufficiently minimised which paved the way for the emergence of totalitarian leadership.[40] Totalitarian nationalism, thus, sought shelter in a rigid political structure based on one-party system. The Darwinian "struggle for survival"[41] and Arthur de Gobineau's philosophy of "blood"[42] had a deep impact on both Fascism and Nazism, as the former created the myth of the "nation" and the Nazi National Socialism of the "race".[43]

---

37. Stalin revived the great Russian concept of nationalism according to which it was believed that "world society could be saved only by conforming to supreme Soviet ways", Louis Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-319.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
39. Hans Rohn, *op. cit.*, pp, 21-22.
40. Louis Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.
41. Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
43. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism A Report by a Study Group.* Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., (London, 1963), p. 212.

Fascism, to which Talcott Parson calls the "radicalism of the right",[44] was primarily a reaction to the post-World War I humiliation to Italy and could not be equated with any recognised political philosophy. Yet, in his Doctrine of Fascism, Mussolini asserted individual's dedication to state and racial superiority of the proposed Italian Empire.[45]

The irrational concept of nationalism presented by Fascism was more or less similar to the hostile and expansionist philosophy of National Socialism which may be assumed as the German version of Italian Fascism. Hitler's anti-liberal philosophy denounced democracy as contrary to the laws of nature ; and, likewise, his elitist theory of "absolute responsibility unconditionally combined with absolute authority"[46] presented germs of anti-parliamentarianism for both the doctrines. His fanaticism made the Germans the "Chosen People" and to Hitler himself, the "Chosen Leader".[47] In his Mien Kampf, he not only counted upon the distinct characteristics of the Nordic race, but also expressed his inherent motives of expansionism when he asserted that the main tasks of the German Reich were to embrace in itself "the most valuable stocks" of the German race and to elevate it to a position of dominance.[48]

44. Talcott Parson, *Politics and Social Structure*, The Free Press, (New York, 1969), p. 83.

45. See, Carl Cohen, *Communism, Fascism and Democracy*. Random House, (New York, 1969), p. 349-64.

46. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manheim, Houghton Co., (Boston, 1943), p. 450.

47. Richard Musman, *Hitler and Mussolini*, Chatto & Windus, (London, 1968), p. 35.

48. Adolf Hitler, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

ALLAMA INAYAT ULLAH MASHRIQI :
A PROFILE

SHER MUHAMMAD GAREWAL

Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963) was undoubtedly one of the most striking figures of Modern Muslim India, He was really possessed of excellent qualities of both pen and mind. A versatile genius, he was a brilliant mathematician, a modern trained scholar, a creative thinker, a prolific writer, a scientific philosopher, a skilful organiser, a keen social reformer, an inspiring politician and a born leader of men, though coupled with some personal demerits. Ambitious and inspiring he played a very dynamic role in the regeneration of his co-religionists particularly during the twenties and thirties. But regretfully, no scholarly, comprehensive and scientific study on this great son of Islam has so far been made.[1]

Nevertheless, Allama's contribution cannot be well-estimated without keeping in view the psyche of the people, the tempo of the events and the nature of the politics of those hectic decades. Briefly speaking, the rapidly increasing anti-British feelings was the main feature of the period under review. The Indians wanted

---

1. See for the introductory remarks about the life and achievements of Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi : (a) *Dawn*. August 28, 1963. p. 9, cols : 7-8 ; August 29, (editorial remarks).

(B) *The Pakistan Times* : August 28, 1963, p, 9, August 29, p. 6 (editorial remarks) (*The Daily Nawa-e-Waqat*, August 28, 1963 pp. 1, 8.

immediate withdrawal of the British, while on the contrary, the strategy of the British was to prolong their rule in India as long as possible. The Majority Report of the Muddiman Committee (1925) and the Report of the Simon Commission (1930), the proceedings of the Round-Table Conference (1930-32) and the very text of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided an ample proof in this regard. The disunity among the Indians particularly between the Hindus and the Muslims was favouring the British cause.

The main reason behind the Hindu-Muslim cleavage was the lack of confidence in each other. The Hindu majority wanted, indeed, to establish Hindu Raj in India. The publication of the Nehru Report (1928) and the rule of the Congress Ministeries in Hindu majority provinces (between 1937-1939) had definitely exposed the Hindu mentality. Now the Muslim minority was naturally anxious about its future in India. But unfortunately, it was religiously, socially, economically and politically disorganised and backward, while the Hindu Community was at least economically and educationally advanced and was strenthening itself day by day by starting movements such as *Sangathan* (binding together) and *Shudhi* (purification). No doubt, the Muslims had also launched organ-isation such as *Tanzim* and *Tablish*. But, in fact, they were internally weak. They were divided into warring political groups, factions and parties. The Khilafat Movement, which shock the foundations of the alien rule, had failed. The All-India Muslim League was still an organization of Nawabs and landslords. And it was

split in 1927 into Jinnah League and Shafi League. The dramatic emergence of so called All-Parties Muslim Conference (1928-29) had further shattered the Muslim unity. Besides, religious organizations such as Jamitul Ulema-e-Hind (1919) and Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam (1929) were also not doing so good and had their own leeways in the troubled waters of the Muslim politics[2]

Such were the circumstances under which Allama Mashriqi appeared on the stage of Indian history. Synchronously, Allama had a very brilliant academi. career and a distinguished service record. Born on August 24, 1888 at Amritsar, in a well to-do religious family, he did his F. A. with distinction at the age of 15 ; B.A. from Forman Christian College in 1906. He obtained his M.A. Degree in Mathematics from the Punjab University at the age of 18 securing first position an 1 toppling all the previous records. In 1909, he went to England for further studies. He entered the Cambridge University, where his achievements were bewildering for everybody. During his five years stay in Cambridge, he did four Triposes, all in first-class, and created new records at the University. His main subjects were Mathematics, physics, mechanical engineering and Oriental languages (Arabic and Persian). At Cambridge, he was awarded the title of Wrangler and declared Bachelor Scholar and Foundation Scholar. The British News Papers described him "as the first student from anywhere in the world to have attained highest

---

2. See (a) Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore. 1969;
(b) M. Raflque Afzal ; *Political Parties in Pakistan*; Islamabad, 1976,
(c) Mohammad Noman, *Muslim India*, Allahabad, 1942.

distinction in four different branches of knowledge".[3] One wonder if, Allama Mashriqi, on his return to India, "was repeatedly offered many luxurative appointments by princely states of India".[4]

Allama ultimately joined Education service. He was Principal of Islamia College Peshawar between 1913-1917. Then he served as Under-Secretary to the Government of India. And in 1920, he joined the Indian Education Service and worked as Principal Training College. Peshawar, Inspector of Schools and Registrar of the University of Peshawar. During the same period, he was offered a knighthood with the post of a political Secretary to the Government of India but he "declined to accept the appointment due to his high-sense of patriotism and feelings of the Muslims of the sub-continent."[5]

Allama had actually no serious aptitude for any sort of Government or non-Government service. And "as a British India Government Servant Allama behaved extremely independently, sometimes haughtily towards his superior British officers. His personal file contains entries which reveal his fearless personality 'furious steed ; he does not allow even a fly to sit on his hump ; 'incorrigible Mashriqi' etc.[6]

3. "Introduction" to *Man's Destiny* (a collection of some important writings) by Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi edited by Shabbir Hussain, Rawalpindi. 1972, p. 10.

4. *Dawn*, August 28, 1963, p. 9 Cols : 7-8.

5. "Introduction" to *Man's Destiny*, p. 11.

6. Ibid.

The Nature was indeed preparing Inayatullah Mash-riqi for another major task—the task of reforming the Muslim society on its traditional footings. Like other social reformers of the world, Allama, too, started his work by spreading his ideas, researches, teachings and programmes through his writings. The publication of first volume of his famous *Tazkira* in 1924 was the most thrilling poineer attempt in this respect. It was originally designed to appear in ten volumes. But soon after, Allama, due to his organizational engagements, suspended the publication of the remaining volumes. However, the second volume of *Tazkira* appeared from Lahore in 1964, a year after his death.

Taking as a whole, *Tazkira* is a very inspiring and thought-provoking commentry on the *Quran*, the last Message of God to Man. It is a mine of knowledge and an exhaustive exposition of Divine law. With a bombastic and masterly style, he speaks in the context of modern lore and learning. He bitterly criticises the religious notions and concepts of the traditional Orthodoxy. He projects religion as science. To him religion is the only way to provide peace, prosperity and salvation for modern man. He also throws enough light on the meaning, spirit and importance of knowledge. He lists knowledge into two broad categories ; The physical Science (Ilam-ul-Abdan) and the Science of Religion (Ilam-ul-Adyan). To

him, Physical Sciences are assisting man to be aware of the nature, structure and importance of matter, whereas, the Science of Religions is necessary for him to comprehend the law which particularly governs the rise and fall of the nations. Besides, Allama considers man the best creation of God. However, he upholds the main features of the Darwinian theory of evolution and survival of the Fittest but in a different way,[7] Shortly, the *Tazkira* shook the entire Muslim World. It was really a message of life and death for the Muslims of the world In the words of Muhammad Saeed "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Allama Mashriqi both wrote *Tazkiras*, Azad's Tazkira was full of interesting instructive stories of the past, whereas Mashriqi's *Tazkira* was the voice of the Death-Angle Israfeel",[8] meaning warning to the Indian Muslims for resurrection.

Allama's *Tazkira* was generally appreciated by modern scholars of Islam both at home and abroad. Anyhow, in words of Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, "It also invited a good deal of criticism both from the Ulema and from those educated in modern discipline. The former were annoyed because the Allama had gone against some of

---

7. See for details : Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi, *Tazkira* (Urdu) Vol. I. Amritsar, 1924 ; Vol. II, Lahore, 1964.

8. Muhammad Saeed, *Ahang-e-Baaz Gashat* (Urdu), Lahore, 1979, p. 113.

their widely held interpretations and the latter because they felt that the Allama had taken rather a narrow view of religion in general and of Islam in particular".[9] Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind had openly condemned the *Tazkira* "as a work full of anti-Islamic and atheistic views",[10] Whatever the case may be, *Tazkira* was really a master-piece of all his writings mainly including *Ishaarat, Maqalaat, Hareem-e-Ghalib, Dah Albbab (ten truths) Hadis-ul-Quran, Armaghan-e-Hakim,* (poetic work), *Qauil-e-Faisal, Khitab-e Misr* which were written, mostly emphasising his teachings and concepts, on several occasions before and after the Independence (1947).

Taken as a whole, his fascinating and thought-provoking writings won his name and fame both at home and abroad. As a distinguished educationist, he was attached to a number of academic societies and international forums. He was the President of the Mathematical Society and Member, Delhi University Board. In 1923, he became Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. After two years, he went to Cairo as India's Chief delegate to the Motamar-e-Khilafat, where he delivered an historical address known as the *Khitab-e-Misr.* On his way back home, he went to Europe where he met Prof. Einstein

---

9. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, Karachi, 1972, p. 324.

10. M. Rafique Afzal, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

(1879-1955) with whom he held long discussions on man's future as visualised in *Tazkira*. In 1930, the Allama became Member of the International Congress of Orientalists (Lieden). He also attended the Palestine World Conference. The next year, he was awarded Gold Medal by the World Society of Islam. Besides, he was Fellow, Geographical Society Paris, and Fellow, Society of Arts, Paris.[11]

Allama was not only a thinker and Idealist but he was also a practical man. To practically implement his socio-economic and politico-religious ideals and theories, he, after resigning from Indian Educational service in 1930, launched an historic Movement in 1931, which came to be known in history as *The Khaksar Movement*[12]

The launching of the Khaksar Movement was really one of the greatest events of the history of the sub-continent. It is said that Allama had been thinking in this respect since long. As he was very much worried about the poor plight of the Muslims, he certainly wanted

11. See for details : *The Pakistan Times*, August 29, p. 6 August 30, p. 8, August 28, 1963, p. 9 : *Dawn*, August 28, 1963 p. 9 cols. 7-8 ; Introducation to *Man's Destiny*, pp. 10-11.

12. See (a) Safdar Saleemi, *Khaksar-e-Azam, Aur Khaksar Movement* (Urdu) Lahore. 1967 ; (b) Abdullah Malik, "Khaksar Tehrik" *Punjab Ki Siyasi Tehriken*, (Urdu) Lahore, 1971, pp. 277-347. Waheed-uz-Zaman, "The Khaksar Movement" : *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1968, pp. 233-36 M. Rafique Afzal, "The Khaksar Movement", op. cit. pp. 28-30 ; *Dawn*, August 28, 1963, p. cols : 7-8 ; *The Pakistan Times*, August 28, 1963, p. 9.

to do something for their welfare. His meeting with Hitler (1889-1945) in 1929 during his journey to Europe might have certainly excellerated his idea to start a movement on Nazi pattern whatever the case may be, it was generally a para military organization. Absolutism and strict discipline from top to bottom was its main characteristic. Allama, as Khaksar-e-Azam, enjoyed a pivotal and absolute position in the whole structure of the organization. Though the Khaksar-e-Azam had an advisory Council but he could overrule its advice. Similarly, *salars* in Muhallas, cities and provinces had also absolute powers[13]

It is not correct to say that the Movement had no definite aims before it. *Qauil-e-Faisal*, Allama's famous treatise first published in 1935, was fundamentally aimed at em hasing the Movement's aims and objects.[14] Generally, the Khaksar Movement was launched to ameliorate the condition of the Muslim society. And its basic aim was the revival of Islam with full spirit and vigour. "In brief the one aim of the Khaksar Movement" writes Allama, "is to raise, once again after a lapse of thirteen centuries, soldiers for God and for Islam. Our aim is to become once again kings, rulers, world conquerors and supreme masters on earth. This is our religion ; our Islam, our creed and our faith".[15]

---

13. M. Rafique Afzal, op. cit. pp. 28-29.

14. See Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi, *Qaul-i-Faisal* (Urdu) Lahore, 1942.

15. Ibid pp. 17-18.

..... That is why Islamic spirit was hovering on the general behaviour of the Khaksar contingents, generally divided into four categories : *Mujahids*, *Pakbaz*, *Janbaz* and *Muawins*. Simplicity, equaility, fraternity, devotion, sacrifice and discipline were the main characteristics of every Khaksar. Shining spade and Khaki uniform with a badge of *Akhuwat* were his great symbols.[16].

. . The Khaksar Movement had primarily started with a social reform programme. But gradually, it gained momentum throughout the sub-continent including Burma and became a formidable political party with its military characteristics. And at the end of the thrities it reached its climax, when it directly came to defy the orders of U.P. and Punjab Governments.[17] But unfortunately its direct confrontation resulted in many casualities in Lucknow and Later in Punjab. The British Government ultimately suppressed the Movement very ruthlessly and finally banned it in February, 1940. Allama was jailed for years[18]. Hence the historic Movement soon eclipsed and could not revive itself again with the same force and vigour as showed during thirties.

Whatever the causes of the downfall of Khaksar Movement may be, one thing is quite clear that Allama wanted to settle religious and political problems with his own ways and methods. He had indeed very conspicuous political ideas. He did not believe in western type of

16. M. Rafique Afzal, op. cit : pp. 28-30.

17. See Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi, Maqalat (Urdu) Vol. 6, Lahore. n-d.

18. Dr. Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit. pp. 233-36.

democracy. And he equally condemned democracy and communism.[19] He was of the opinion that it were not the Hindus, but the Muslims alone were entitled to rule over India.[20] He had no good opinion about the Congress during thirties. He despised it and condemned it as a "Debating Club" run by "impotent Babus".[21]

Allama and his Movement had no differences with All-India Muslim League till 1940. But after the Khaksar trag-dy of Lahore and the passage of the Lahore Resolution, Khaksar-League Confrontation started, quite contrary to the national interests. Had their been no difference between these two organizations, history of the Partition would have been quite different. Particularly the Khaksars could play a very significant role in saving the lives of the Muslim masses in the Hindu-Muslim roits of 1946-47.

Strangely enough, Allama disbanded the Khaksar Movement after the creation of Pakistan and himself spent almost inactive life till his death on August 27, 1963 "except for such little forays into politics as the threatened march to cross the Wagha border into India or earlier the creation of an Islam League."[22]

19. Booklet-No. 19 ; "*Nazariyat-e-Al-Mashriqi*" Published by Idara-e-Muasife Afkar-e-Al-Mashriqi, Gujrat, 1977.
20. See Allama's Pamphlet, *A Ksaryyat aur Khun*, 1939 (Urdu).
21. *Qaul-i-Faisal*, pp. 1C6-7.
22. *Dawn* August 29, 1963, (editorial remarks).

Anyhow, like every true patriot, Allama always remained very much worried about the critical situation in Pakistan. During the course of a speech, at Iqbal Park in 1956, he had visualised the disintegration of the country in 1970-1971.[23] Shortly speaking, Allama Mashriqi was certainly a dynamic personality. He was really one of epoch-makers. He made and wrote history. He was a revolutionary harbinger of Islam. His whole mission was to revive Islam and establish the world Khilafat for the Muslims. His revolutionary teachings and deeds had really revolutionised the minds of our young generation. His merits and demerits, his achievements and failures are certainly the part of our history.

23. See his pamphlet : *Unis so Sattar (1970) Ke Baad Kiya Hoga* (*Urdu*). n-d.

COLLEGE EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

The Problem of Low Standard of Achievements

MIRZA MOHAMMAD AHMED

The present education system in Pakistan bears a history of more than hundred years. The system was introduced during the colonial rule to replace the native Maktab or Madrisa system prevelant at that time. With all its merits and demerits, the system has managed to servive and produced scholars, politicians, administrators, doctors and engineers. The quality of the product has been good at times but generally of lower order to meet the national requirements. One serious criticism against the system has been that it was largely moulded, in the beginning, by the desire of the rulers of the time to suit their own ends. One of these ends being to create a section of literate and educated persons to fill the sub-ordinate posts in administration. Hence the system served more in creating a service class than initiators, inventors, innovators, adventurous scholars and researchers. impera-tively needed in every field of national and social life. As a result we have developed heavy dependence on foreign training, reading materials, technology and books etc. This dependency has put us in such an inferior position that we can think about "higher studies" or "advanced studies" in terms of "studies abroad" only. Even the equivalent degrees from the foreign universities are regarded as superior to those of our universities. Our

73

degree awarding institutions regard their own degrees and diplomas as sub-standard, that is why there is always a preference for the foreign qualified people. The fact cannot be denied that despite all the efforts to improve the situation we have failed to bring it upto the modern and national requirements. Our universities at present continue to be examining and teaching institutions and not the centres of excellence and research.

The Educational Waste :

Apart from this there is a big educational waste at all levels of education. This waste was termed as "mass failure" by Muhammad Afzal Hussain, in his study Higher Education Examined".[1] He concluded that almost 50 per cent of the total candidates appearing in various examinations of the Panjab University fail to get pass marks which means tremendous educational waste and a big ecomic loss. This problem of mass failure further generates the issues of substantial number of repeators in the class-rooms, over-crowding, indiscipline on the campuses and frustration among the youth.

The situation to-day is not much better. The following data suggest that the proportion of failures has been on the increase. Average pass percentage for the

---

1. Mohammad Afzal Husain ; *Higher Education Examined,* University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1956.

Table No. 1

Number and Pass Percentage of Matriculation
Examinations 1970—75

Year	Number and Pass Percentage		
	No. Appeared	No. Passed	Pass Percent
1970	45,243	26,872	59.4
1971	47,456	28,590	60.2
1972	46,034	28,088	61.0
1973	50,451	32,167	63.7
1974	44,517	26,373	59.3
1975	46,669	23,432	50.2

Aveɪage Pass Percentage during the period 1970-75
= 58.96.

Source : Result Gazettes ; Board of Intɜrmediate and
Secondary Examinations, Lahore.

period 1970 75 remained 58.96 and the highest
figure stood at 63.7 per cent. This very clearly
shows more than 40% educational waste in the form of
failures at matriculation level. This waste increɩses
further in the Intermediate Examinations. For example
the camputations from the Examination results of the

Table No. 2
Pass Percentage of Intermediate Examinations
1970—75

Year	General	Pre-medical	Pre-Engineering	Arts
1970	40.5	56.0	46.3	37.6
1971	35.6	46.1	36.0	34.2
1972	35.3	46.7	31.8	34.3
1973	33.4	56.9	37.2	33.4
1974	32.9	53.9	31.0	28.6
1975	29.1	49.4	28.2	24.6
Mean	34.5	51.5	35.1	32.1

Source : Examination Gazettes, Board of Inter-
mediate and Secondary Education, Lahore.

Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore
(Table No. 2) show that the category of failures at this
level constitutes more than 60% of the total candidates
appeared. Average general pass percentage for the period
1970-75 stood at 34.5. On the whole the science students
have been showing better results than the Arts students.
The highest average pass percentage for the period is
secured by the pre-medical group, but that figure i.e.
51.5% is not very satisfactory. The reason for relatively
better pass percentage of science group despite the

common view to regard these subjects as relatively labourious and tough, may be attributed to the general policy of allowing science subjects to good students only and hence Arts subjects left automatically to the poor stuff. Economic incentives may also form another set of factors affecting the morale and performance of the students. The science subjects, more particularly pre-medical and pre-engineering promise more immediate and ascertained economic gains as compared to non-science subjects. Under the impact of these incentives the students become desirous of joing science subjects which tendency is responsible for over-crowding and heavy competition for admissions, since the seats for these subjects are always limited. Such an atmosphere of competition combined with economic incentives prepares the students for better performance in these subjects.

The Degree results show still more deterioration. The proportion of failures becomes 3/4th of the total number of candidates appeared (Table No. 3).

Table No. 3

Pass Percentage of Degree Examinations 1972—74

Pass Percentage

Year	General	Arts	Science
1972	21.0	20.1	24.6
1973	26.7	22.13	32.2
1974	26.9	—	—

Source : Result Gazettes, University of the Panjab, Lahore.

The pass percentage has not gone beyond 27.0 per cent, science studeuts showing better results than their counterparts at this level also. The academic waste in the form of failures has gone further up which amounts to more than 70 per cent. It may be mentioned here that this is the situation despite the concessions like hundred per cent choice in question papers, all the questions being set very stricktly from the prescribed Syllabii, liberal marking and 33 per cent score as pass marks. These standards of evaluation are obviously too liberal. With better evaluation standards the silting of educational channels is to increase further, hence we are compelled to maintain smooth flow even at the cost of educational standards.

Low Standard of Achievements :

There is another aspect of this problem which concerns the mode or level of performance. Traditionally the successful candidates are placed in three hierarchical Divisions i.e. First Division comprising of candidates securing 60 per cent marks or above, Second Division comprising those who get 45% to 59% marks and the Third Division which covers the range of 33% to 44% marks. This means that a student only needs to know 1/3rd of a course to pass it, but keeping in view the choice of questions and other concessions it will only need 25 per cent of a course to prepare for the examination. But if one manages to prepare even 45 per cent of the course, he gets Second Division, a quite respectable position in the hierarchy of performance. An examina-

tion of successful candidates shows that maximum number of students swarm in the lower categories whereas the First Division students comprise only less than 20 percent of the total successful candidates. For example in the Matriculation Examination of the Lahore Board

TABLE No. 4

Distribution of Successful Candidates According to Division. Matriculation Examination 1974

Division	No	Per cent
First Division	4949	18.8
Second Division	10840	41.1
Third Division	10584	40.1

Source : Result Gazettes : Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore.

(Table No. 4) held in 1974, only 18.8% of the total successful candidates were placed in First Division. The Third Divisioners who for all practical purposes constitute academic waste comprised 40.1 per cent.

Similar situation prevails at the Degree level. The results of the Degree Examination, 1972 of the Punjab University are computed according to subjects and Divisions in Table No. 5 which also support the above conclusion. Out of the total successful candidates only 7.8 per cent were placed in First Division whereas Third Division category comprised almost 30.0 per cent. The category of Second Divisioners was the largest one

Table No. 5

Subjects and Level of Achievements
B.A./B.Sc. Examination Results, 1972
Subjects.

Divisions		Arts	Science	Total
I		49.8%	50.2%	100
		116	117	233
		4.7%	22.1%	7.8%
		84.6%	15.4%	100
		1591	289	1880
		64.5%	54.7%	62.8%
III		86.1%	13.9%	100
		761	122	883
		30.8%	23.1%	29.4%
Total		82.4%	17.6%	100
		2468	528	2996
		100	100	100

Source : Result Gazettes : University of the Panjab, Lahore.

consisting of about 63.0 per cent. Out of the total success-ful Arts students only 4.7 per cent were placed in First Division while the corresponding figure of their counter-parts in Science subjects stood at 22.1 per cent suggesting that not only the pass percentage of Science students is

better than the Arts students but their level of achieve-
ment is also better. It is also evident from the above
that the proportions of Science students in the lower
categories are smaller as compared to their counterparts
in Arts subjects. Among the Second Divisioners 84.6
per cent were Arts Students and similarly 86.1 per cent
constituted Third Divisioners in the same subjects where-
as in Science subjects the corresponding figures were
15.4% and 13.9% respectively.

The data also show a successive and gradual decline
in the standard of achievements. As we move from Matri-
culation to the higher examinations the category of First

Table No. 6

Percentage Distribution According to Division
and Examinations

Examination	Percentage		
	I Division	II Division	III Division
Matriculation 1974	18.8	41.10	40.10
B.A./B.Sc. 1972	7.8	62.8	29.4

Source : The Lahore Board and Panjab University
Result Gazettes.

Divisioners gets rarified and the lower categories
getting larger and larger. This means a deterioration in
the performance of those students also who have qualified
their previous examination in higher Divisions. This was

also observed by Mohammad Afzal Husain[2] in his study on the problem of mass failure. In his own words,

> "Of the candidates who appear in the three examinations under study, and are declared successful, a very large portion is placed in the lowest category, and this proportion increases successively from the lower to the higher stages".

Educational Reforms :

Since independence, various reforms have been attempted to improve the situation. The first venture of this type was attempted by the Commission on National Education established on 30th December, 1958. The major task before the commission was to suggest reorientation and reorganization of the educational system. The commission examined all the levels of education i.e. from the University to the school levels including professional education and educational facilities. Among various recommendations of the commission more significant were the introduction of three year degree course, adoption of inter-disciplinary approach, better incentives for teaching and more laboratory and library facilities for the students. Most of the recommendations of the commission were either ignored or were not properly implemented. Three years degree course for instance was to be abandoned after the Second year of its introduction and the similar happened with the sessional work programme. The later governments also took measures to improve the system.

2. Ibid p. 15.

These measures include better scales for the teachers, free education initially upto primary and then upto the middle classes, mass literarcy programmes, nationalization of schools and colleges and the experiment of semester system. Despite all these reforms the problem of educational standards remaines un-affected and alarmingly acute. In fact there is general impression that the standard has further gone down due to the liberal concessions which have been granted to the students from time to time. This is the situatlon in Lahore Board and the Panjab University which are known for very high academic standards. It can be safely concluded that the matter may not be very different in other institutions. In the modern world no government can afford such a big academic waste. Many countries do not allow it to go beyond fifteen per cent whereas in our case it always goes beyond 50 per cent. Thus our precious resources and efforts are being chiefly employed to cultivate a marginal and even sub-marginal talent. The problem requires thorough research and investigation. At this stage we can only enlist few factors which may be significant in this connection.

Compartmenialization of Subjects :

A prominant feature of our educational system is a tight compartmentalization of subjects which starts from the high school level; The scheems of study divide the subjects into Science and Arts. In this scheme of studies a science student gets no opportunity to taste arts subject and similarly an art students seldom experiences science, though in c s of those stutents who fail to pull on w th science subjects their is a possibility of a change over to

arts subjects but no such possibility for an arts student. This compartmentalization of subjects narrows down the vision, perspective and academic experience of the student. He learns to swim in the same channel he has selected in the beginning, never bothering for and seldom allowed to make further explorations. It has been realised that compartmentalization at early stages is harmful for the student and obstructs the growth of various capabilities imperatively needed in the future life. The advanced countries have adopted inter-disciplinary approach as opposed to the compartmentalization of subjects. Specialization is only allowed at the post graduate levels. They have organised their Syllabi in such a way that each science student gets the opportunity to study some non-science subjects and similarly every arts student studies some science subjects during his academic career. Our planners and educationalists should also realize this need of the present time and earlier they do it, the better it would be.

Lecture Method :

The lecture method continue to be the way of imparting instructions at the college level. The usual duration of a lecture is forty-five minutes, but for the post graduate classes the limit is extended to an hour. The new entrants to the colleges who are not familiar with the lecture method, find it difficult to adjust with the situation. They experience difficulties in following lectures and taking notes. But there is another serious objection against lecture system, that is, even under the best circumstances, the most stimulating teacher and the most

eager students, the lecture method places the learner in a passive role. The students hardly remain attentive throughout the lecture and after sometime they develop the tendency to withdraw from the lecture psychologically as well as physically.

It also leaves very little scope of class discussions. The discussions in fact, are considered merely a waste of time. Most of the teachers find no time for discussions because they have to cover a length syllabus, the completion of which being the most important duty of a teacher. The student who misses a point during the lecture or faces difficulty in following a particular topic either takes the help of "Guide Books" which are usually sub-standard, or carries the difficulty along, never realizing that this may create a serious gap in his educational attainments.

Medium of Instructions :

The instructions are imparted through different media at different levels of education. Upto the primary level the usual medium is the mother tounge of the student which is the local language or dialect. After the primary upto the high school level Urdu is used as medium of i ᵐstructions, but at the Intermediate and Degree stages whereas Urdu continues to be the medium of instructions for Arts students, the science students shift to English. But there is very heavy dependence upon English at the post-graduate level. Though, in case of some subjects, there is option for Urdu, the experience shows that the Urdu medium students are relatively in

disadvantageous position. They get insufficient reading materials and whatever megre material they get is generally either a bad translation or sub-standard. This disadvantage is further carried in the practical life where preference is given to English. In the competitive examinations for superior services, during the interviews for various jobs and for the working of various bureaucratic structures, English is the basic requirement. This provides a better edge to those who are trained in or through English. The problem of medium of instructions thus, needs more serious thought and planning in order to provide uniform chances and basis in all the fields of educational attainments.

The Commission on National Education very rightly observed that :

> "Education in a foreign language places an enormous strain on students, forcing them to memorize and to spend an undue proportion of their time in learning the language. On the other hand, education in a national language enables the students to devote more time to the acquisition of knowledge and the development of their intellectual capabilities. It leads to original thinking and promotes facility of writing. It developes imagination, initiative and creative thinking".[3]

The mind of a Pakistani student works three times more than his counterpart outside the country. In his

3. The Report of Commission on National Education, 1958 p. 290.

academic and intellectual persuits, he conceives ideas in mother tounge which are first translated in national language i.e. Urdu, and then further transformed into English for overt expression. This hampers creativity and initiative to a great extent because a larger part of mental energies is consumed in the process of mere translations.

But the great importance of English cannot be ignored. English is undoubtedly one of the most important and widely spoken languages in the world to-day. It is a must for our scientists, technologists and experts to keep them in touch with current developments. In view of this the problem of medium of instructions may not be seen in categorical yes or no, instead, we shall have to adopt the policy of gradual change over from English to Urdu with adequate functional knowledge and skill of English. We must first of all remove the deficiencies in our national languages in the fields of science and techno- logy which were caused due to stagnation and lack of development during the period of foreign rule. Although some spade work has been done in this respect, yet we are to go a long way before making a total shift towards national language.

Text Books :

Text books continue to be the most important read- ing material for the students. The education system also makes the students dependent of the text books. The main concern of the class lectures is to cover the text books seldom going beyond the scope of the text content. To provide standard text material to the student has become a very important issue of our educational system.

The Commission on National Education recommended the establishment of text book boards to tackle this problem. These boards have published text boks upto Intermediate level. It is expected that the institutions should allow the use of these textbooks only and the paper setters should also set the question papers from these books. Whereas this state of affaires promotes standardization and unformity of reading materials, it also encourages the tendency of cramming and delimits the choice of selection of a basic teaching tool. The teacher and the taught are left with no alternative except for the books published by the textbook boards.

For the higher classes the dependence upon foreign books increases. In view of the problem of import complexities, foreign exchange and heavy cost etc. there always exists scarcity of textbooks and reading materials. Apart from this, the contents of these books in some cases may be written from a particular point of view sometimes prejudicial to our national, political or cultural matters. This heavy dependence upon foreign books shall have to be gradually curtailed. We are not to cut off ourselves from the rest of the world particularly in the field of knowledge and learning, it is infact very much desired that the process of cross fertilization of ideas and knowledge should continue at its optimum level but we should not be always at the receiving end, rather we should attempt to establish a feed back arrangement with the out side world. For the purpose we shall have to explore and encourage our talent to produce standard works. It may

be suggested that our Textbook Boards should promote free competition in writing the books wh·le continuing with their responsibility of standardization-cum-publication of reading materials. It must be realized that writing a textbook is not only a skill but also an art. It is a combined exercise of knowledge, experience, skill and the ablity of the author to identify himself with the student and hence not the privilage of every one. It is thus not a manufacturing commodity that by joing different parts which are manufactured in different shops one can make a good machine. A text-book is wholesome, a unity and finished work of a scholar or scholars who have common identities and a real taste, devotion and competence for such an enterprise. Our Texbook Boards have succeeded in manufacturing the textbooks, but they are yet to produce standard reading materials and learning aids of good quality for our students. This can be better achieved through free competition and proper incentives. The more free and voluntary this activity is the better would be the finished product.

In connection with the reading materials, the problem of cheap notes, Get Through Guides and Guess Papers is also worth mentioning. The students have acquired the habit of dependence on these easy methods of through the examinations. This dependence is due to their more interest in getting a certificate or degree than learning and knowledge. As a result they remain unconceined throughout the academic session with the hope that they will be able to prepare for the examinations through the short cut methods. There is a need to make

our students realize that there is no short cut to knowledge and knowledge is a value in itself. The degrees and certificates are of the secondary nature in the sense that it is only knowledge and learning which pay in actual life. The students need to be encouraged to adopt regular and systematic approach in studies. They should be required to utilize library facilities for co-lateral and extra readings. There is no doubt that our libraries and reading rooms are ill equipped, but it is equally true that our students lack reading habits and do not utilize even that little bit which is available to them. Necessary steps must be taken to inculcate the habit of library work and the library facilities should be further strengthened. The experiment of book banks has proved useful and the National Book Foundation has taken a good initiative with the publication of re-prints of foreign standard books on medicine and other subjects. These reprints are relatively cheap and more readily available to the students. Despite all this we shall have to explore our own talent to minimise and ultimately eliminate our dependence on foreign books.

Daily Hours of Teaching :

The daily teaching work can also be used as a reliable indicator of our educational performance. The number of teaching hours we give to our students for imparting education determine the quantum of knowledge received by the student daily. The number of teaching hours should be so determined that it is neither too taxing nor inadequate. It should be kept at the optimum level and sufficiently uniformly distributed for all the students. The

data computed in Table No. 7 show that the number of

Table No. 7

Teaching Hours Per day in a College

Level of Education	Average No. of Hours Per day	
Intermediate	4.82	Average
F.Sc. Pre medical	4.17	4.06
F.Sc. Pre engineering	3.2	
F.A. Arts		
Degree		
B.Sc.	3.4	Average
B.A.	2.1	2.75

Source : Computed from the time table of Government College, Lahore, Session 1975—76.

teaching hours decreases from the Intermediate to the Degree Classes. Whereas the Intermediate students get four hours daily teaching on the average, the degree students get half of it. The four hours daily teaching of the Intermediate students may be sufficient but 2.7 average is highly insufficient for Degree students. Being in the higher classes, the Degree students should be involved more than their counterparts at the Intermediate level.

It is also evident from the above data that the teach-hours are not uniformly distributed among science and arts students. The science students remain busy for the double of the time of arts students. This un even distri bution of time creates the problem of tackling a huge mass of vacant students at the campus. One usual argument that favours the continuation of this situation is that the arts students are provided more spare time for their participation in games, sports and various other extra-curricular activities. But the point is that if extra-curricular activities are an integral part of education, then why the science students are deprived of these important items. We can conclude that despite the participation of arts students in games and sports, there is ample scope for keeping them more busy through the introduction of aditional subjects in the scheme of studies.

Teacher-Student Relationship :

There has appeared a marked change in the teacher student relationship. The old and conventional authoritarian pattern has undergone a rapid democratization. The element of personal touch in the relationship is replaced by formalism. Due to the mass education policies and plans, teaching has become more a profession than a mission. Educational administration is a very important part of every government machinary.

The class-room is a situation where one can observe the maximum yet quite inadequate interaction between

the teacher and the taught. The teacher addresses the class instead of individual students. By doing so he may develope personal relations with some of the students but this is just a by-product of class work and not an intended objective. In his present role of a teacher, he remains impersonal and more concerned with covering the syllabus within the prescribed time. The individual problems of the students in following and understanding lessons may thus go unattended. In order to improve this situation we can benefit ourselves from the experience of foreign countries. They compensate this deficiency through tutorials, seminars and extension lectures. We do have tutorial work in our colleges but it needs to be made more effective and useful for the students. These tutorials and seminars should be mentioned in the regular time table to be counted as a part of teacher's work load.

The students also need counselling and guidance in connection with their adjustment problems and selection of their subjects. The new entrants in the college face some adjustment problems because they enter into a new environment, a new teaching process and a new phase of life i.e. adolescence. This all necessitates intelligent handling, proper guidance and expert vigillance. The guidance service becomes all the most imperative in selection of subject combinations. The college education offers a great variety of alternative combinations, of many of them the students might not have been introduced at the school level. The students usually offer the subjects under the guidance or compulsion of their parents. The

parents on their own part recommend those subjects which promise more definite and immediate career i.e. pre-medical or pre-engineering, irrespective of the apptitude, capabilities or personal preferences of the student. This gives rise to heavy pressure for admission in these subjects.

Our students also remain unaware of the new disciplines which are introduced in the scheme of studies. They never bother to go through the curricular guides. It is a common observation that even if a student fails to pull on with one subject or a combination, he continues to stick to it despite many failures which amounts to wastage of money, time and energies. This loss can be checked through proper guidance at proper time.

In order to achieve better understanding and communication between the teacher and the student an experiment is being tried for the last few years. It was felt that the time has come that the students be involved in educational administration. They should be given chance to convey their problems and plans to the administration and properly involved in decision making. So that they may appriciate themselves the difficulties, merits and demerits of academic issues as a party to the administration. For this purpose they are being given representation in various academic bodies at all levels of higher education. This has resulted into better communication and understanding between the teacher and the taught. But this relationship has a very delicate balance. Unless both the parties do not function strictly within their

specified roles, there will be always a danger of mis understanding and conflict.

About five year ago the semester system of teaching was introduced at the post-graduate level to deal with the educational problems more particularly the problems of standards and teacher-student relationship. This system offers more frequent and intense academic association between the teacher and the student through tutorials, seminar discussions and assignments to compensate the deficiencies of lecture system. It also sttengthens the internal system of examination and evaluation. The teacher who has been associated throughout the semester is regarded as the best judge of the performance of the student. The conventional pattern of examinations has also been dispensed with the regular gradation and evaluation which takes into account the entire performance throughout the semester. The long standing criticism against the public examinations that these are not the real judge of the student's ability is thus met through this system. There may be some difficulties faced by the teachers as well as the students in running the system, but as such it appeares to be more promising than the previous one. It will be too early to pass any judgment regarding the successes or failures of this system, however, various inquiries have been instituted to study in detail various aspects of this system and suggest ways and means to overcome these difficulties. Nevertheless one can gather an impression from the public debate and initial studies that the semester system is being criticised by those who are shy of work or shirk responsibility. That is why it is quite successfully and satisfactorily functioning in the Engineering University and the Government College

Lahore where relatively more responsible and hard-work-ing students are admitted.

External Pushes and Pulls :

Our students are subject to various kinds of out-side pushes and pulls of which the "political" are most impor-tant. A controversy goes on the subject of their involve-ment in politics. There has been a view that the students should be kept aloof from the politics. The main and the only concern of the students according to this view, should be acquisition of knowledge. But opposite to this, there have been those who have been supporting and recognizing the political role of students. The students being the most sensitive group among elites, cannot be kept amune against politics. The best method is to face the facts and to accept their democratic right to form their unions and organizations according to their inclina-tions. Our constitution has also recognised this fact and lowered the voting age from twenty-one years to eighteen years for the second general elections. The student at eighteen in our country is definitely a college student, usually a second or third year student. This constitutional provision paves the way for the students to play active role in national politics. The past experience shows that the participation of students into politics reduces educational institutions into political arena. Every party exploiting the students for their political ends in violation of all democratic principles and demolishing the sanctity of educational institutions. This not only adversely affects the performance of the students but also hampers

the functioning of the institutions. Presently, whereas both the opposing views continue to exist, there is emerg. ing a more rational approach to this issue. The students may be allowed to participate under proper protections and safe-guards. They may be discouraged to become party tools, instead they may be involved in heal hy youth programmes and union activities. But the things can only remain within controlable limits if the teachers and students are left alone to decide matters and in case of out-side intervention the authority of the teacher is never by passed.

Teacher's Role :

The teacher continues to play the most important and pivotal role in the system of education. The experiments of teaching without teacher are though in progress yet the replacement of conventional teacher is far from immediate visulization. At present the role of teacher is a subject of criticism. Many rush to conclude that the present teacher is responsible for the degeneration of educational standards. To them the present teacher fails to fulfil the expectations attached to his status and has become less enthusiastic and missionary. They compare the past model of the teacher with the present one in order to show that the new changes are the source of trouble. But we must also realize that it is not only the teacher who has undergone a change but the student also. The student of today is no more prepared to accept the supreme authority of the teacher. He has become much more aware, demanding and democratic. In fact the entire institutional and social set up has so much changed that the comparison of conventional teacher and the present

teacher is to render no fruitful results. This should not imply that the performance of present teacher is above evaluation. This only suggests that while evaluating the performance of present teacher we should keep in view the social and economic conditions in which he is performing his job.

As a functionary of education service the freedom of teacher is considerably curtailed. He is to follow a set routine of time table, he is to finish the syllabus within the prescribed period called session and he has to follow a particular course of reading for a particular class. He cannot afford to many digressions, he cannot extend the session and he cannot postpone the examinations. Everything must follow according to the specified schedule. The work load is usually so heavy that the teachers seldom find spare time for general talk, academic chat or any other colateral work. It is not difficult to conclude that the present teacher is less independent and is also over-worked as compared to the old teacher.

The present education system, while concentrating upon imparting knowledge, depends much upon the related institutions particularly the family, religion and polity to do the compensatory work. The failure on the part of these related institutions also results into educational degeneration. There is ample evidence to show that mal-functioning has appeared in these institutions. The family today fails to inculcate high ideals, supreme values, self discipline and sound behaviour patterns. The weakening of religious control has belittled the respect of moral and ethical codes. The political institutions fail bitterly in giving us sincere, dynamic, devoted and clean

leadership. So the teacher may not be entirely responsible for all this, the further, the holy father and the leader all are equally responsible in this matter. The traits of self discipline, cooperation, healthy competition, sportsmanship and group-work that a student learns from the educational institutions as a by-product of learning, are to be properly protected, nuhrished and functionally adjusted in the society. Our social system should offer practical instances and situations for these patterns so that these are not rejected being merely dogmatic or something which is no where found in actual practice.

One very significant factor which is related to the performance is the factor of job satisfaction. The studies have shown that workers who are satisfied with their jobs give better performance and show higher efficiency of work than those who are dissatisfied ones. Although the research material on job satisfaction is meagre, yet from the general unrest and dissatisfaction that our teaching community have shown during the past few years, one can easily conclude that they have not been happy with the service-conditions. Raza H. Gardezi[4] found in his study that job satisfaction is directly related to income (earnings from the job), chances of promotion and fringe benefits, thereby implying that more the earnings from the job, better the chances of promotion and more the extra benefits, the higher will be the degree of satisfaction. In

---

4. Raza H. Gardezi : "A Study of Job Satisfaction Among The Teachers, Teaching in Different Department of Punjab University. 1965 (An Unpublished Thesis).

case of inverse relatishionships he found that more the advanced the age of the worker, higher the educational qualifications and more the experienced the worker is, the more he will be dissatisfied. Allah Ditta Malik[5] concluded from his study on job satisfaction that the relative deprivation in income, prestige, authority, promotion and other opportunities is inversely related to job satisfaction. The relative deprivations that a worker feels in his job as compared to other parallel services create dissatisfaction towards his own job. He found in his study that the University teachers felt relatively deprived of income, prestige, authority, promotion and other facilities as compared to the doctors, engineers and administrators. This sense of deprivation is responsible for lack of interest mal-adjustment with the job. The worker in such a state of affairs developes outside interests, he grows the tendency of leaving the job and if forced by the circumstances to continue, remains mal-adjusted. In another study Mohammad Ali[6] concluded that the adjustment of teacher to the profession has a positive relationship with the actual performance. He found that better adjusted teachers show their actual performance closer to the ideal roles specified for the situations within class room teaching process.

—————

5. Allah Ditta Malik, Job Satisfaction in Relation to Relative Deprivation among the Lecturers of Punjab University, 1967 (An Unpublished Thesis).

6. Muhammad Ali, Teachers Adjustment to their roles with Special Reference to those Related to Actual Class Room Teaching Situation. 1962 (An Unpublished Thesis).

It follows from the above that the performance of the teacher is intricately related to many out-side factors particularly economic, authority, recognition, service conditions and differential rewards. The net result of these factors appears in the form of mal-adjustment and a sense of relative deprivation. The teacher thus remains unsettled and dissatisfied throughout his career. There is utmost need to attend to this state of affairs. It must be realized that the job of the teacher is of most fundamental nature and in the modern age of science and technology his services become all the most imperative. No country can afford to ignore education and hence the teacher. He must be given status according to his services and should be saved from the complex of relative deprivation so that his performance comes up to the best desired standards. Before growing high expectations from his role performance we should also recognize his expectations from the society. Education however, is a continuous and dynamic process where new problems and needs always grow necessitating re-assessments and re-adjustments. The punitive approaeh towards the teachers performance also needs reconsideration. Accountability and punishment have their own value, but it is equally true that reward has also its incentive value. In our system we have punitive measures for those who fail to show the required

results but no reward for showing good results not even a single word of appreciation. We must realize this also. Whereas one is to be penalized for inefficiency, one equally deserves to be rewarded for efficiency and honesty.

BOOK REVIEW

A Study in Comparative Politics

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (1947 to 1958)

By

HAMEED A. K. RAI

Nzarsons, Circular Road, Lahore, pp. 60, Price Rs. 20.00.

Political Development in the Third World countries is a virgin soil for research and investigation in contemporary political science and Scholars all over the world, particularly in the West have shown great interest in this area during the past quarter of a century. Numerous, approaches, models and typologies have been constructed to analyse and understand the bewildering political realities of the New States, but the whole discussion is still plagued with baffling controversies, and it is difficult to find out a pattern of thought which is universally operational.

The small treatise under review is an effort to examine briefly the political developments in India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1958. The period represents, on the one hand, the common start of India and Pakistan as parliamentary democracies and, on the other, the departure of Pakistan from the efforts to evolve a democratic system of government. The theoretical framework for analysis

has been based on the concept of consensus and Nation-Building. The author has extracted his conclusions from the statistics available for the two countries, and since political systems are culture-bound, the statistical facts are corraborated with the historical legacy of the two countries. His thesis is that the two countries inherited from the British the trends of "modernistic authoritarian government" but after independence the two nations had different history of constitutional development. The primary objective of the writer is to answer some critical questions as to why the two countries with roughly the same brand of political and institutional legacy from their foreign rulers have adopted different courses of action for their political development. Mr. Hameed A. K. Rai has handled his material with great objectivity, and I am confident that it can provide students of Comparative Politics with considerable insight in to the dynamic of political development in India and Pakistan.

Dr. Shaukat Ali

Southeastern Massachusetts University,
Massachusetts, U. S. A.

CONTRIBUTORS

1. Hameed A. K. Rai, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Government College, Lahore.

2. Dr. Sardar Mohammad, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Government College, Lahore.

3. Dr. Shafqat Hussain Chaudhry, Lecturer in Political Science, Government College, Wahdat Road, Lahore.

4. Khalid Javed Makhdoom, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Government College, Lahore.

5. Sher Muhammed Garewal, Lecturer in History, Government College, Lahore.

6. Mirza Muhammed Ahmed, Assistant Professor, Sociology, Government College, Lahore.