

## **FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN – ROOTS OF DIVERSIFICATION**

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***Abstract:*** Since very inception, Pakistan inherited a population that was highly diverse ethnically, socially, geographically, economically, and also had language barriers. The inherent disparities among different segments deepened due to the policies pursued by the ruling elite. Administrative and political centralization further accentuated the situation, and created regional nationalism in the form of Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, and Balochs. Local and cross border religious interventions sharpened the sectarian split, which already existed in dormant stage within the country. These developments within the country hampered the process of nation building. Islam was the basis for the formation of this nation. Social and economic deprivations of certain segments of the society blurred this ideal of the nation. Now, though the nation maintains its overwhelmingly Muslim outlook, ethnically it stands highly fragmented and disintegrated. This paper examines the roots of diversity that eventually prevented the process of nation building in Pakistan.

**Key Words:** nationalism, nation building, ethnicity, diversity, sectarianism, Ernest Gellner, Two Nation Theory, Bangladesh, Bengali nationalism, religious nationalism, institutional imbalances

### **Introduction**

Ernest Gellner holds that men do not become nationalist from sentiment or sentimentality, atavistic or not, well-based or myth-founded; they become nationalist through genuine, objective

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and practical necessity, however obscurely recognized.<sup>1</sup> In his theory, Gellner assumes that there is always an unequal distribution of resources across the territory of the state. People originating from the deprived regions ask for their share, but the relatively prosperous group resists this demand, and retains the monopoly of its privileged position. Therefore, it exercises discrimination towards the other. The members of the under-privileged groups are bound to revolt and their discontent can find national expression. For Gellner, it is in these situations that culture, pigmentation, etc., become important, as they provide means of exclusion for the benefit of the privileged and means of identification for the under-privileged.<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan was created on the basis of a thesis of one nation, one culture. But this religious nationalism was short lived. The failure of nation-building and subsequently its disintegration is a classic illustration of Gellner's thesis. Since its inception, the country has been beset with grave ethnic conflicts. In 1995 alone, more than 1700 people were killed in its major city, Karachi.<sup>3</sup> Ethnic polarization in Sindh is almost complete, and in Balochistan, it has shattered the traditional fraternity between the ethnic groups. Now, one may ask: Does the state of Pakistan really have a nation?<sup>4</sup> This study examines the roots of diversity present within the Pakistani society, which eventually did not permit the transformation of a nation state to a unified nation; and why did religious nationalism failed to cater the long-term needs of the newborn state?

### **Roots of diversity in Pakistan**

Pakistan as a nation was carved out on religious basis. Unfortunately, religion as the basis of political ideology did not get

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<sup>1</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1964), p. 160

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167

<sup>3</sup> Feroz Ahmed, "Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National Integration?" in, *Pakistan Development Review*, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Vol. 35 (1996), p. 631

<sup>4</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Heart of the Pakistan Crisis", *Dawn*, Karachi, August 14, 1998

well with the practical functioning of politics within and outside the country. Lacking a viable political ideology, Pakistani political forces always depended on politicization of Islam and promotion of orthodoxy for evolving the integral personality as a nation and for legitimizing their position in the politics. In addition, the politicians of Pakistan continuously struggled between the options of dictatorship and democracy, and in the process, they could neither strengthen their nationhood nor serve Islam. Humayun Khan very rightly observes:

Pakistan's ruling elite in those days saw themselves as masters, or to put it more kindly, guardians of the masses in succession to the British... In comparison, Pakistan's political leaders, unlike those in India, were not a product of a sustained freedom struggle, they lacked ability and in strictest sense, their credentials as representatives of people were, if not suspect, at least out dated. Many of them had jumped on the Pakistani bandwagon rather late in the day, and few of them understood the intricacies of statecraft in an independent country.<sup>5</sup>

### **(1) Religious Nationalism for Pakistan – Only a Short**

**Term Solution:** The struggle against the British Raj was initially driven on Indian Nationalism. It was rendered possible by the Indian identity, which was formed during the colonial discourse. This Indian identity accentuated the need to fight against the colonial powers. However, the Indian identity was not absolute, as it was influenced by ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and other aspects, existing within the society. Indeed, many more distinguished identities ran parallel to Indian Nationalism. In addition, the fear that India could turn into a Hindu-dominated state after independence existed among the Muslims in India. Yunas Samad thus describes

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<sup>5</sup> Humayun Khan, "Introduction", in, Roedad Khan, (ed.), *The British Papers: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. xiv

Pakistani Nationalism to be the counter-hegemonic discourse against Indian Nationalism.<sup>6</sup>

The Two-Nation Theory stated that India was composed of two nations. The creation of Pakistan, for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, became the ultimate manifestation and evidence of the Two-Nation theory.<sup>7</sup> Contrasting these two main forms of nationalism, it can be seen that the Pakistani Nationalism is mainly based on the assumption that religion is the central factor for nationhood. It was believed that Muslims need their own state in order to create their own nation, which cannot exist within a Hindu-dominated state. Pakistani Nationalism suggests that Islam unifies the people, and thus serves as a valid criterion for nationhood.

Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam but it had little else in the way of common national or cultural values around which to unite. Besieged with the threat posed by separatism and ethnic tensions, and the absence of a widely shared notion of nationhood, Islam became the only visible foundation on which to build unity.<sup>8</sup> But even Islam as a religion was not practiced uniformly, and there was a history of clashes between Sunnis and Shias and of divisions within the Sunnis.

This religious nationalism was effective in the short-term view to justify the creation of Pakistan, but at the same time could not solve the long-term needs of the newborn state.<sup>9</sup> In particular, there was a need to accommodate the interests of different groups, and it was questionable whether this uni-dimensional nationalism, based on religion alone, could serve this purpose. Pakistan's culture,

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<sup>6</sup> Yunas Samad,, “Reflections on Partition: Pakistan Perspective”, in, I. Talbot and G. Singh, (eds.), *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 379

<sup>7</sup> A. Mathur, *The Two-Nation Theory: A Study in the Context of Identity Crisis in Pakistan*, (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1994), p. 39

<sup>8</sup> Geoff Brown, “Pakistan: On the Edge of Instability”, in, *International Socialism*, Vol. 110 (2006), p. 374, web, March 25, 2009 <<http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=184&issue=110>>

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 375

albeit unified through the same religion, is strongly distinguished. Generally speaking, different sets of beliefs within Islam and many different ethnic, regional, and linguistic groups exist, which produce uncountable interests and demands within the Pakistani society. Can belief in Islam be so strong to antagonize all these needs? In fact, many interests existing in Pakistan seem to make the nation's unity weak.

It has also been argued that Islam was employed as a means of fostering group identity to mobilize the masses in the pre-independence period. The use of Islamic slogans by the bourgeois westernized leaders was largely a façade, and Islam as a belief system did not play an important role in the political strategy of pre-independence days, except in the revival movements in the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>10</sup>. This is evident from the fact that the programme of Muslim League did not appeal to the ulema, the religious leaders and scholars.

**(2) Born unstable:** Since its establishment, it was a state plagued with multi-faceted dilemmas and contradictions. An administrative bureaucracy had to be created to run the affairs of the state. For example, out of 1157 officers in the Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service, only 95 had opted for Pakistan<sup>11</sup>. As new and grave problems like refugee rehabilitation, Kashmir and canal waters continued to arise, the task of finding men to deal with them became harder and harder.

To compound these difficulties, there were quite a few problems on the external front, especially with India, particularly over the distribution of waters and the accession of princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir. India had taken the lion's share of the resources. These dangers, according to Ayesha Jalal, went on to encourage a political economy of defense, which by fostering a special relationship with the United States, helped the

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<sup>10</sup> Nasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh", in, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1981), p. 56

<sup>11</sup> Rafique Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947-71*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 15

civil and military bureaucracy register their dominance within the emerging state of Pakistan<sup>12</sup>.

The country was split into two parts, West Pakistan (present day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The ‘two nations’ theory could not for long cover up the fact that it was made up of at least six distinct linguistic groups—Bengalis, Punjabis, Balochs, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Urdu speakers. Urdu, the official language of the state, was the first tongue of merely 8 percent of the population, mainly immigrants from North and Central India

Next, there was the problem of the North West frontier. A strong Pashtun nationalist force, the Red Shirts, had opposed Pakistan, wanting a Pashtun state to be part of India, and campaigned for independence when this was no longer possible. Then there was Balochistan, which made up nearly half the area of West Pakistan (one sixteenth of the population). Here the princely state of Kalat rejected joining Pakistan, until the Pakistan army invaded in April 1948 and took control, using military force to crush an uprising. Adjacent to Balochistan is Sindh, the province in which lie the city of Karachi, the country’s first capital. With migration, a million immigrants from the Muslim minority areas moved into the region, taking the plum jobs in the public services and private industry, creating massive resentment among Sindhis, who felt they were being discriminated against. Finally, the people of East Pakistan were soon beginning to feel they had lost out in the new state. It became apparent soon that what little wealth there was in East Pakistan was being used to develop industry in the West.

**(3) Power dynamics of migrant state:** Christophe Jaffrelot has discussed in length the power dynamics of the newly conceived state<sup>13</sup>. The author makes a case that according to the 1951 Census; the Mohajirs were 7 million in newly created Pakistan, including 7,

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<sup>12</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1995), pp. 37-38 and 65

<sup>13</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, “Introduction: Nationalism without a Nation”, in, *Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State*, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), pp. 15-16

00,000 in East Pakistan. In the West Pakistan, they were 6.3 million out of 33.7 million. A majority of them came from East Punjab, thus the cultural environment remained the same. But 1, 00,000 Urdu speaking Biharis went to East Bengal and about 1 million Urdu speaking Muslims from the UP, Bombay, Hyderabad, etc., migrated to West Pakistan. They gradually formed a single group and were known as Mohajirs. The Mohajirs formed intellectual and commercial elite and they settled in towns and cities where they replaced Hindu professionals, traders, and civil servants who had fled to India. According to Jeffrelet, the Mohajirs enjoyed certain prestige due to the fact that they had played a leading role in Pakistan movement and that the Muslim League was their creation.

It has also been contended that in the ensuing years, the Mohajirs dominated Pakistan, and exerted a strong influence on bureaucracy.<sup>14</sup> Out of 101 Muslims of the Indian Civil Service, 95 had migrated to Pakistan; among them only one-third came from East Punjab and one or two from West Bengal.<sup>15</sup> Another research demonstrated that while the Mohajirs represented 3.5% of population, they occupied 21% of the civil service of Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> Pakistan being, to a large extent, the creation of Mohajirs, their language, Urdu, was given the status of an official language.

In addition to Mohajirs, in the early years, the country was dominated by Punjabis. They represented only one-fourth of the Pakistani population, yet occupied 80% of posts in the army.<sup>17</sup> This stronghold eventually proved beneficial for their rise to power in the 1950s. After the demise of M. A. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, the Mohajirs eventually lost ground to the Punjabis. This shift was materialized by the transfer of the Capital from Karachi to

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16

<sup>15</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 132

<sup>16</sup> R. Braibanti, *Asian Bureaucratic Traditions Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 263

<sup>17</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan", in, A. Banazizi and M. Weiner, (eds.), *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), p. 318

Islamabad. The Punjabization of Pakistan, as discussed by Yunas Samad and Jeffrelot was bound to alienate other communities<sup>18</sup>.

**(4) Regional Diversification in West Pakistan:** Jinnah had created Pakistan with a vision to have one nation, one culture, and one language. In context of the Two-Nation theory, Pakistan was supposed to be the homeland of the Muslims and Islam was supposed to act as unifying agent. But the available evidence suggests that it became apparent soon after the independence that aggregating all Pakistanis simply under the Muslim identity was impossible, because strong ethnic distinctiveness existed. Ethnic nationalism in Pakistan is so strong that it almost constitutes distinct nationalities and makes it a multicultural state.<sup>19</sup> Nasir Islam observes that multiple identities in a multiethnic state are often ignored, and that Pakistan always relied on the strength of its uniform nationalism.<sup>20</sup>

The failure to accommodate the existing identities and ethnicities, resulting from multiethnic nationalism, has remained a threat for Pakistan. Tariq Rahman offers an innovative approach to study identity and ethnicity. He asserts that identity creation in the modern context of decolonization is especially caused, *inter alia*, by language. At the same time, language is used to define group identity. Political leaders mobilize people in the name of ‘language-based ethnicity’. This, as he says, “is a modern phenomenon that is used to pursue political power”<sup>21</sup>. In other words, identity in the modern context is in particular determined by language, and language is an important cultural symbol for ethnic groups. Since this transformation of identity has occurred in the modern context and has dramatically changed the notion of ethnicity, which hitherto has only to a small extent been influenced by language, the idea that

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<sup>18</sup> Yunas samad, “Pakistan or Punjabization: Crisis of National Identity”, in, *International Journal of Punjab studies*, Association for Punjab Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1995), p. 30

<sup>19</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *op. cit.*, p. 7

<sup>20</sup> Nasir Islam, *op. cit.*, p. 58

<sup>21</sup> Tariq Rahman, “Language and Ethnicity in Pakistan”, in, *Asian Survey*, University of California Press, Vol. 37 (September, 1997), p. 835

identification of groups is enlarged to many distinct determinants is also referred to as “new ethnicity”<sup>22</sup>.

Urdu was declared as the only official language of Pakistan after independence. This project was doomed to failure. The proportion of Urdu speakers in Pakistan, according to the 1998 Census, is said to be 7.57% only. The decision to induct Urdu as official language especially benefited Mohajirs and the existing ruling elite. The non-recognition of regional languages and the fact that knowledge in Urdu (and English) is a precondition for receiving governmental jobs discriminated ethnic groups, who were strongly attached to their language identity. Apart from Urdu, the five other major languages spoken in Pakistan are Punjabi, Saraiki, Pashto, Sindhi, and Baluchi, all with their own rich history and influence on the ethnicity of the people (see Table 1).

*Table 1: Linguistic Background of Pakistan*

Languages	Percentages of Speakers
Punjabi	44.15
Sindhi	14.10
Pashto	15.42
Saraiki	10.53
Urdu	7.57
Balochi	3.57
Others	4.66

(Sources: Population Census 1998; p. 107)

Whereas Punjabis along with Mohajirs were well off in terms of representation in public institutions and the military, the groups belonging to the other four languages were rather underrepresented. Asaf Hussain observes that Pakistan failed to perform an “inter-ethnic recruitment” in its political system.<sup>23</sup> Ian Talbot says that the preference for Punjabis in terms of recruitment

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 834

<sup>23</sup> Asaf Hussain, “Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan,” in, *Asian Survey*, University of California Press, Vol. 16 (October, 1976), p. 925

has prevented the national integration of Pakistan, which therefore, is often called “Punjabistan”.<sup>24</sup>

The one-unit scheme also aimed to introduce *absolute* equality between the West and the East. This move towards centralization meant to be a rejection of the fact that West Pakistan had a multi-cultural design. Administering this heterogeneous region as one province is definitely a move attempted towards national integration, but caused just the opposite, since it fortifies the power struggle between different ethnic communities and the Center. Linguistic (and ethnic) groups felt discriminated, because they had to surrender a big amount of power to the Center.

**(5) Bangladesh: The Cost of Over-centralization:** The political economy of alienation and exclusion resulted in failure of the state to integrate Bengalis, who were actually in majority in the country. The demographic balance was a good reason for Bengalis to ask for a democratic regime. In the Constituent Assembly, they had 44 members against 22 Punjabis and 5 Sindhi members, 3 representatives from NWFP and 1 from Balochistan.<sup>25</sup> However, the course of events that unfolded subsequently clearly meant hegemonic designs of the Center to deny the accession of power to Bengalis. Following are the important landmarks in this regard.

- ⇒ Adoption of Urdu as an official language: Bengalis were anxious to defend their language and literature. However, agitation was replied through repressive measures by the government.
- ⇒ One Unit Scheme: This was envisaged to create parity between the East and West Pakistan. West Pakistan was united into one administrative province to counterbalance East Pakistan, which constituted about 55 % of Pakistan’s total population<sup>26</sup>.
- ⇒ Under representation of Bengalis in the state administration: There were not more than a couple of Bengalis among the 95 ICS cadres who came to Pakistan in 1947. In 1949, the East

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<sup>24</sup> Ian Talbot, “The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality?” in, Christophe Jeffrelot (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 52

<sup>25</sup> Christophe Jeffrelot (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 17

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21

Pakistan got a quota of 40% of the posts in bureaucracy. In army, for example, in 1955, out of 58 generals, there was only one Bengali, and among the top 17 civil servants in 1964, there were only 2 Bengalis.<sup>27</sup>

- ⇒ Inner colonialism and economic exploitation by the West Pakistan: Bengali resentment was further aggravated by the fact that the per capita growth rate remained very low in East Pakistan, compared to the situation prevailing in West Pakistan (17% against 42% between 1959-60 and 1869-70).<sup>28</sup>
- ⇒ Emergence of militant Awami Party in response to repressive tools of the Center: Six Point Formula asked for democracy and loose federal system.
- ⇒ 1970 Elections and postponement of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly: General strike launched in Bengal. They demand a loose confederation of both the units, each unit having its own constitution. This was followed by military operation by the government.

Concluding from this course of events, Jeffrelot observes that the history of Bengali separatism showed that cultural features do not explain nationalism alone; obviously Islam did not provide the cementing force that was likely to hold Pakistan together. Inability of the elite of the West Pakistan to accommodate centrifugal forces finally created Bangladesh<sup>29</sup>.

**(6) Institutional Imbalances:** Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence in August 1947. The state apparatus, that is, the civil and military bureaucracy, was more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. This imbalance was reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain:

First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence, as the Muslim League lacked sufficient organization and capacity for state and nation building. As

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

a consequence, they failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a participatory national political framework.

Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by hierarchy, discipline, and esprit de corps. Given the situation that the country was confronted with multifarious problems since its birth, and in the words of Ian Talbot, the refugee problem alone could have suffocated Pakistan at birth, they were the civil servants who went on to ensure the survival of Pakistan<sup>30</sup>. This was the time when the political institutions and the Muslim League, the founder political party of the country had no viable solutions for these problems. But at the same times, as Ian Talbot also holds, this laid the seeds of future problems of Pakistan, that is, the intervention of civil and military bureaucracy in the politics of Pakistan<sup>31</sup>.

Military's position in the polity received additional boost with Pakistan's participation in the US sponsored military alliances in the mid-1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by the Americans in Pakistan, which increased military's efficiency and strike power. Thus, the degeneration of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and confidence of the military. These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the civilian leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves without the support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and the military to enhance their role in policy making and management, and they began to dominate politics.

The repeated assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape Pakistani polity in accordance with its political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic institutions and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire

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<sup>30</sup> Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1999), p. 123

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124

supreme legislative and administrative powers. They engaged in constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution or by making drastic changes in the existing constitutional framework to protect the interests of the military regime. Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite, willing to play politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers, and that is why supported their continued stay in power. The strategy of co-option pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political arrangements.

**(7) Rise of Sectarianism:** Sectarian conflicts between Shias and Sunnis have further challenged the notion that Islam provided Pakistan with a common platform, observes Jeffrelot<sup>32</sup>. Although sectarian violence in Pakistan existed since the early 1950s, it only became a severe problem after the Iranian revolution<sup>33</sup>. Additionally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought Pakistan closer to the United States, one of the main enemies of Iran after the Islamic revolution. Hence Pakistan has moved further away from Iran. The enmity among various sectarian groups is also one of the main reasons why Islam will probably never be a unifying force in Pakistan.

**(8) Indian Factor:** Since independence, relations between Pakistan and India have been characterized by rivalry and suspicion. The Indian leadership in the early years after the independence held the belief that the partition would shortly be undone. In ideological terms, they in fact remained un-reconciled to the partition and treated it as a temporary aberration<sup>34</sup>. Plagued with inborn weaknesses like the communal riots, refugees issue, Kashmir issue and the awkward division of Pakistan into two wings, allowed India to fish in troubled waters. In the following years, India assumed the

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<sup>32</sup> Christophe Jeffrelot (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 8

<sup>33</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan 1979-1998", in, *Comparative Politics*, The City University of New York, Vol. 32 (2000), p. 174

<sup>34</sup> S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 8

role of fanning and supporting the separatist elements in Pakistan. Full-scale hostilities erupted in September 1965 War. During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India intervened into Pakistan. The East Pakistan-India border was opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India and the governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. Finally, the declaration of war by India on Pakistan, when the latter was busy in crushing the popular uprising in the eastern part, eventually helped to liberate East Pakistan and Bangladesh was created.

## **Discussion**

Critics argue that once Pakistan was created, the Two-Nation theory was outdated, and the inability of the leadership to define a new concept of nationhood finally disintegrated Pakistan. Regional identities in the Western wing were acting against their own national identity and building movements against the Punjabi dominance of the Center. Post-Bangladesh Pakistan still remains a classic example of multi-ethnic, segmented, political system. Individuals and groups operating within this political system tend to possess a layered set of identities. These different identities become the basis of political mobilization at different levels of politics, depending on the issues at hand. Ethnic and tribal identities are still dominant and the Pakistani identity remains weak.

The Center has not been able to accommodate the demands of all these groups and rather favored a select class of people. The use of extreme methods to integrate the country, like the one-unit plan, has failed. It only boosted regional identities, which consequently did not act supplementary but against Pakistani Nationalism. Finally, the recent experiences with sectarian conflicts further question the claim that Islam has a universal binding. Sectarian violence and ethnic conflicts are devastating for the integrity of Pakistan and the political elite and religious clergy are unable to combat them.

The tactics used rather repressed the ethnic identities and caused them to explode. Pakistan could have been more successful if they had – at least partly – decentralized their political system to

accommodate more interests. The redefinition of the state's ideology and the reorganization of provinces in a more federalized structure could have enhanced regional identities and finally "grassroots nationalism" to evolve and support a new Pakistani nationalism<sup>35</sup>.

John Acton published an essay on nationality in 1862. Acton hold that a multinational state or union would help to protect liberty: "The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty... provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combine opinion"<sup>36</sup>. John S. Mill holds that a representative government should be based on feelings of national unity and would be difficult to operate if those feelings are not developed.

Unfortunately, the entire scenario of the political economy of the country during last 62 years of its existence has supplemented the Gellner's theory. There is sufficient evidence to support the idea that the ethnic nationalism was more influential than religious nationalism.

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<sup>35</sup> S. M. M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered", in, *Pacific Affairs*, University of British Columbia, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 556

<sup>36</sup> Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 185

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